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Published by atoy.dequit, 2019-07-15 20:51:02

civil code0101

persons and family relations

Persons and
Family Relation

Compliled Case Digest

Bautista, Bryan, Bautista, Paulo, Bilas, Gelliane Christine, Bogbog, Aleli, Bolide, Rouelli Gift,
Corres, Kaiser John, De Guzman, Mageryl Shay, Diaz, Charina, Donggayao, Bryan Christopher

Gironella, Jsa Noble, Mabitazan, Tedd, Macarimpas, Raihanah Sarah, Narag, Janro, Reyes,
Jareed, Rosario, Keouh, Savellano, Michael Niño Jesus, Solda, Ace Aries

S.y 2013 -2014

Case Title G.R./SCRA No.
EFFECTIVITY
Lara v. Del Rosario 94 Phil 778
Tanada v. Tuvera DATE OF EFFECTIVITY

136 SCRA 27

Philippines International Trading Corp. v. Angeles G.R. 108461
No.
G.R.
National Electrification Administration v. Gonzaga No. 158761

Basa v. Mercado G.R. L-42226
No.
Association of Southern Tagalog Electric Cooperatives Inc. v. Energy G.R.
Regulatory Commission No. 192717

COMPUTATION OF TIME G.R. 162155
No.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Primetown

People v. Del Rosario G.R. L-7234
PRESUMPTION OF KNOWLEDGE OF THE LAW No.

D.M. Consunji Inc v. Court of Appeals G.R. 137873
No.

People v. Gasacao G.R. 168445
PROCESSUAL PRESUMPTION No.

Yao Kee v. Sy Gonzales G.R. L-55960
No.
G.R.
Laureno v. Court of Appeals No. 114776

Philippine Export and Foreign Loan Guarantee v. V.P. Eusebio Construction G.R. 140047
Inc. No.

PROSPECTIVE AND RETROACTIVE EFFECT OF LAWS G.R. 112193
No.
Aruego Jr. v. Court of Appeals

Bernabe v. Alejo G.R. 140500
No.
Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation v. Stockholders of Intercity G.R.
Savings and Loan Bank, Inc. No. 181556

Montanez v. Cipriano G.R. 181089
No.
G.R.
Dacudao v. Secretary of Justice No. 188056
WAIVER OF RIGHTS
G.R. 163707
Guy v. Court of Appeals No.

1

Persons and Family Relation

F.F. Cruz & Co.., Inc. v. HR Construction Corp. G.R. 187521
No.
G.R.
People v. Morial No. 129295
EXPRESS AND IMPLIED REPEAL
G.R. 1622155
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Primetown No.

Magkalas v. National Housing Authority G.R. 138823
EFFECT OF REPEAL OF REPEALING LAW No.

Garcia v. Sandiganbayan G.R. 165835
STARE DECISIS No.

Ting v. Velez-Ting G.R. 166562
No.

Negros Navigation Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals G.R. 110398
LAW OF THE CASE No.

Fulgencio v. National Labor Relations G.R. 141600
OBITER DICTUM No.

Villanueva v. Court of Appeals G.R. 142947
No.
G.R.
Office of the Ombudsman v. Court of Appeals No. 146486

Ayala Corporation v. Rosa-Diana Realty and Development Corporation G.R. 134284
No.

People v. Veneracion DURA LEX SED LEX 249 SCRA 251
CONCEPT OF CUSTOMS

Yao Kee v. Sy Gonzales G.R. L-55960
No.

EQUITY IN THE APPLICATION OF LAW

Floresca v. Philex Mining Corp. G.R. L-30642
No.
G.R.
Ursua v. Court of Appeals No. 112170
APPLICATION OF PENAL LAWS, EXCEPTIONS
G.R. L-24170
Asaali v. Commissioner of Customs No.
NATIONALITY/ CITIZENSHIP THEORY
G.R. 124371
Llorente v. Court of Appeals No.
INCIDENTS OF SUCCESSION
G.R. L-22595
Miciano v. Brimo No.

2

Persons and Family Relation

RENVOI

Aznar v. Garcia G.R. L-16749
No.
G.R.
Bellis v. Bellis No. L-23768

Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank v. Escolin G.R. L-27860
FORMS, SOLEMNITIES OF CONTRACTS, WILLS No.

Van Dorn v. Romillo G.R. L-68470
No.

Bank of America NT and SA v. American Realty Co. G.R. 133876
PRINCIPLE OF ABUSE OF RIGHTS No.

University of the East v. Jader G.R. 13234417
No.

G.F. Equity Inc. v. Valenzona G.R. 156841
No.

Go. V. Cordero G.R. 164703
No.

Villanueva v. Rosqueta G.R. 180764
No.

Yuchengco v. The Manila Chronicle Publishing Corp. G.R. 184315
DAMNUM ABSQUE INJURIA No.

Custodio v. Court of Appeals G.R. 116100
No.
G.R.
Equitable Banking Corporation v. Calderon No. 156168
VOLENTI NON FIT INJURIA
G.R. 154259
Hotel Nikko v. Reyes No.
LIABILITY OF EX-MALEFICIO OR EX-DELICTO
G.R. 165842
Manuel v. People of the Philippines No.

Romero v. People of the Philippines G.R. 167546
ACTS CONTRA BONOS MORES No.

Pe v. Pe G.R. L-17396
BREACH OF PROMISE TO MARRY No.

Hermosisima v. Court of Appeals G.R. L-14628
No.
G.R.
Galang v. Court of Appeals No. L-17248

Gasheem Shookagt Baksh v. Court of Appeals G.R. 97336
No.

3

Persons and Family Relation

Wassmer v. Velez G.R. L-20089
No.
Natividad v. Tunac G.R.
UNJUST ENRICHMENT No. 143130

Shinryo Company Inc. v. RRN Inc. G.R. 172525
No.
Car Cool Philippines v. USHIO Realty and Development Corporation G.R.
No. 138088
Elegir v. Philippine Airlines
PARENS PATRIAE DOCTRINE G.R. 181995
No.
Valenzuala v. Court of Appeals
RIGHT TO PRIVACY G.R. L-56168
No.
Concepcion v. Court of Appeals
G.R. 120706
Padalhin v. Lavina No.
NON-FEASANCE, MISFEASANCE, MALFEASANCE
G.R. 183026
Philex Mining Corp. v. Commisioner of Internal Revenue No.
ACTION FOR DAMAGES BASED ON CRIME
G.R. 125704
Manantan v. Court of Appeals No.

Nuguid v. Nicdao G.R. 107152
No.
People v. Agacer G.R.
INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION (OTHER SOURCES OF No. 150758
OBLIGATIONS)
G.R. 177751
People v. Bayotas No.

Cancio, Jr. v. Isip G.R. 102007
No.
Heirs of Guaring v. Court of Appeals G.R.
INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION (DEFAMATION, FRAUD, No. 133978
PHYSICAL INJURIES)
G.R. 108395
Arafiles v. Philippine Journalists, Inc. No.

International Flavors and Fragrance (Phils.) Inc. v. Argos G.R. 150256
No.
Ruiz v. Ucol G.R.
INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION (VIOLATION OF No. 130362
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS)
G.R. L-45404
Persons and Family Relation No.

4

Vinzons-Chato v. Fortune Tobacco Corp. G.R. 141309
No.
Cojuanco v. Court of Appeals G.R.
No. 119398
Manila Electric Company v. Castillocase
INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION (QUASI-DELICTS/TORTS) G.R. 182976
No.
Barredo v. Garcia
G.R. 48006
Safeguard Security Agency v. Tangco No.
PREJUDICIAL QUESTION G.R.
No. 165732
City of Pasig v. COMELEC
G.R. 165732
Beltran v. People No.

Merced v. Diez G.R. 125646
No.
Donato v. Luna
G.R. L-15315
Tenebro v. Court of Appeals No.
PRESUMPTIVE CIVIL PERSONALITY
G.R. L-53642
Geluz v. Court of Appeals No.
RESTRICTIONS OR MODIFICATION ON CAPACITY TO ACT
G.R. 150758
Catalan v. Basa No.

Domingo v. Court of Appeals 2 SCRA 801

Mendezona v. Ozamis G.R. 159657
No.
Oposa v. Factoran Jr. G.R.
KINDS OF DOMICILE No. 127540

Marcos v. COMELEC G.R. 143370
RETROACTIVE APPLICATION No.
G.R.
Aruego Jr. v. Court of Appeals No. 101083

Bernabe v. Alejo G.R. 119976
DEFINITION AND NATURE OF MARRIAGE No.

Ancheta v. Ancheta G.R. 112193
No.
Abadilla v. Tabiliran
G.R. 140500
Persons and Family Relation No.

G.R. 145370
No. MTJ-92-
Adm. 716
No.
5

PRESUMPTION IN FAVOR OF EXISTENCE AND VALIDITY OF G.R. 155733
MARRIAGE No.

Dela Rosa v. Heirs of Rustia vda. De Damian'

Eugenio v. Velez G.R. 85140
No.
G.R.
Balogbog v. Court of Appeals No. 83598
LEGAL CAPACITY
G.R. 174689
Silverio v. Republic No.

Republic v. Cagandahan G.R. 166676
AUTHORITY OF SOLEMNIZING OFFICER No.

Beso v. Judge Daguman A.M. MTJ-99-
No. 1211
Aranes v. Occiano A.M. MTJ-02-
MARRIAGE LICENSE No. 1390

Alcantara v. Alcantara G.R. 167746
Republic v. Court of Appeals No.
Carino v. Carino
Sy v. Court of Appeals 477 SCRA 277
Sevilla v. Cardenas
G.R. 132529
No.

330 SCRA 550

G.R. 167684
No.
G.R.
Abbas v. Abbas No. 183896

MARRIAGES EXEMPT FROM MARRIAGE LICENSE A.M. MTJ-00-
REQUIREMENT No. 1329
G.R. 133778
Manzano v. Sanchez No. MTJ-92-
A.M. 721
Ninal v. Badayog No.
145226
Cosca v.Palaypayon MARRIAGE CEREMONY G.R.
Morigo v. People THREE-FOLD LIABILITY No. MTJ-94-
Moreno v. Bernabe 963
A.M. MTJ-96-
Navarro v. Domagtoy No. 963
MARRIAGE CERTIFICATE A.M.
No.

6

Persons and Family Relation

Vda. De Jacob v. Court of Appeals G.R. 135216
FOREIGN DIVORCE No.

Republic v. Iyoy G.R. 152577
Republic v. Obrecido III No.
Van Dorn v. Romillo G.R.
San Luis v. San Luis No. 154380
Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas
Garcia-Recio v. Recio G.R. L-68470
No.
NO MARRIAGE LICENSE G.R.
Atienza v. Brillantes No. 133743

BIGAMOUS/ POLYGAMOUS MARRIAGES G.R. 186571
Enriquez Vda. De Catalan v. Catalan Lee No.
Quita v. Court of Appeals G.R.
Tenebro v. Court of Appeals No. 138322
Jarillo v. People of the Philipppines
Macarrubo v. Macarrubo A.M. MTJ-
Weigel v. Sempio Dy No. 92706
Montanez v. Cipriano
G.R. 183622
VALID BIGAMOUS MARRIAGES No.
Republic v. Nolasco
Republic v. Court of Appeals G.R. 124862
Bienvenido v. Court of Appeals No.
Manuel v. People of the Philippines
Republic v. Bermudes G.R. 150758
Calisterio v. Calisterio No.
Republic v. Granada
G.R. 164435
Persons and Family Relation No.

A.C. 6148
No.

G.R. L-53703
No.

G.R. 181089
No.

G.R. 94053
No.

477 SCRA 277

G.R. 111717
No.
G.R.
No. 165842

G.R. 160258
No.
G.R.
No. 136467

G.R. 187512
No.

7

MARRIAGE IN VIOLATION OF ART. 40 FC G.R. 1084818
Domingo v. Court of Appeals No. MTJ-
Atienza v. Brillantes A.M. 92706
No.
CHARACTERISTICS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY 119190
Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals and Lao G.R. 112019
Santos v. Court of Appeals No. 126010
Hernandez v. Court of Appeals G.R. 184063
Yambao v. Republic of the Philippines No.
GUIDELINES IN DETERMINING PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY G.R. 108763
Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina No. 130087
Barcelona v. Court of Appeals G.R. 157610
Tongol v. Tongol No. 136490
Marcos v. Marcos 161793
Te v. Te G.R. 170729
Agraviador v. Agraviador No. 178741
Marable v. Marable G.R. 175367
Aurelio v. Aurelio No. 159594
Republic v. Court of Appeals G.R.
No. 170022
OTHER JURISPRUDENCE ON PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY G.R. 157649
Republic v. Encelan No. 168796
Mendoza v. Republic G.R. 167459
Republic v. Galang No. 185286
Ochosa v. Alano G.R. 165321
Camacho-Reyes v. Reyes No. 168796
Toring v. Toring G.R.
Ligeralde v. Patilunghug No. 8
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.

G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.

Persons and Family Relation

No.

Suazo v. Suazo G.R. 164493
Aspillaga v. Aspillaga No.
Alcazar v. Alcazar G.R.
Najera v. Najera No. 170925
Halili v. Santos-Halili
Paras v. Paras G.R. 174451
Zamora v. Court of Appeals No.
Perez-Ferraris v. Ferraris G.R.
Antonio v. Reyes No. 164817
Carating v.-Siayngco v. Siayngco
Villalon v. Villalon G.R. 165424
Buenaventura v. Court of Appeals No.
Republic v. Quintero-Hamano G.R.
Dedel v. Court of Appeals No. 147824
Republic v. Dagdag
Pesca v. Pesca G.R. 141917
No.
ACTION FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE, G.R.
GROUNDS No. 162368

Mallion v. Alcantara G.R. 155800
PROPER ACTION AND PROCEDURE No.
G.R.
Leonor v. Court of Appeals No. 158896
PARTIES
G.R. 167206
Juliajvo-Llave v. Republic No.
Enrico v. Heirs of Medinaceli G.R.
Catalan v. Court of Appeals No. 127358

Persons and Family Relation G.R. 149498
No.
G.R.
No. 151867

G.R. 109975
No.
G.R.
No. 136921

G.R. 141528
No.

G.R. 112597
No.

G.R. 169766
No.

G.R. 173614
No.

G.R. 167109
No.

9

Ninal v. Badayog G.R. 133778
No. 179922
Carlos v. Sandoval G.R. 158298
No.
Ablaza v. Republic G.R. 155409
APPEARANCE OF THE STATE No. 139676
137590
Maquilan v. Maquilan G.R. 116607
No. RTJ-04-
Republic v. Cuison-Melgar G.R. 1861
No.
Malcampo-Sin v. Sin G.R. L-53880
No.
Tuason v. Court of Appeals G.R. 138509
No. 127406
Corpus v. Ochotorena A.M.
DEFAULT JUDGMENT AND JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS No. 122749
178044
Pacete v. Carriaga G.R.
FINAL JUDGMENT AND SUBSEQUENT PROCEEDINGS No. 132955
L-27930
Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis G.R. 47101
No.
Ty v. Court of Appeals EFFECTS G.R. 132955
Valdes v. RTC and Valdes No. 6148
L-3561
Dino v. Dino G.R.
VOIDABLE MARRIAGES, CONCEALMENT No. 174451
G.R. 10
Villaneva v. Court of Appeals No.

Anaya v. Palaroan G.R.
No.
Buccat v. Buccat-Mangonon G.R.
FORCE, INTIMIDATION, UNDUE INFLUENCE No.
G.R.
Villaneva v. Court of Appeals No.

Macarrubo v. Macarrubo G.R.
No.
Reyes v. Zaballero A.C.
No.
DOCTRINE OF TRIENNIAL COHABITATION G.R.
Alcazar v. Alcazar No.

G.R.

Persons and Family Relation

No.

Villanueva v. Court of Appeals G.R. 132955
No.
Jimenez v. Canizares G.R.
LEGAL SEPARATION, GROUNDS No. L-12790
Ong Eng Kiam v. Ong
G.R. 15320
Gaudioncio v. Penaranda No.

Prima Partosa-Jo v. Court of Appeals G.R. 79284
DEFENSES, CONDONATION/ PARDON No.
Arroyo v. Court of Appeals
G.R. 82606
Ginez v. Bugayong No.

People v. Zapata G.R. 96602
No.
De Ocampo v. Florenciano
DEFENSES, CONSENT G.R. L-10033
No.
Matubis v. Praxedes
G.R. L-3047
People v. Schneckenburger No.

People v. Sensano G.R. L-13553
DEFENSES, MUTUAL GUILT No.

Benedicto v. De La Rama G.R. L-11766
DEFENSES, COLLUSION No.
G.R.
De Ocampo v. Florenciano No. 48183
DEFENSES, PRESCRIPTION
G.R. 37720
Brown v. Yambao No.

De Ocampo v. Florenciano G.R. 1056
No.
Contreras v. Macaraig
ACTION FOR LEGAL SEPARATION, PROCEDURE G.R. L-13553
No.
Banez v. Banez
G.R. L-10699
Lapuz Sy v. Eufemio No.

Persons and Family Relation G.R. L-13553
No.

G.R. L-29138
No.

G.R. 132592
No.
G.R.
No. L-30977

11

MANDATORY COOLING-OFF PERIOD G.R. L-9667
Araneta c. Concepcion No.
G.R.
Somosa-Ramos v. Vamenta Jr. No. L-34132

Pacete v. Carriaga G.R. L-53880
NECESSITY OF TRIAL AND INTERVENTION OF STATE No.

Pacete v. Carriaga G.R. L-53880
LEGAL SEPARATION PENDENTE LITE No.

Sabalones v. Court of Appeals G.R. 106169
No.
Espiritu and Layug v. Court of Appeals
G.R. 115640
Lapuz Sy v. Eufemio No.
DECREE OF LEGAL SEPARATION
G.R. L-30977
Laperal v. Republic No.

Siochi v. Gozon G.R. L-18008
RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF SPOUSES No.
G.R.
Pelayo v. Lauron No. 169900

Go v. Court of Appeals G.R. 129295
No.
Arroyo v. Vasquez-Arroyo G.R.
No. 114791
Illusorio v. Bildner-Illusorio
G.R. 17014
Goitia v. Campos Rueda No.
G.R.
Cuenca v. Cuenca No. 139789
PROHIBITION AGAINST DONATION TO EACH OTHER
G.R. 11263
Arcaba v. Vda De Batocael No.
G.R.
Matabuena v. Cervantes No. L-7231

Harding v. Commercial Union Assurance Company G.R. 146683
ABSOLUTE COMMUNITY PROPERTY, COMPONENTS No.

Navarro v. Escobido G.R. L-28771
Villanueva v. Court of Appeals No.

Persons and Family Relation G.R. 12707
No.

G.R. 153788
No.

G.R. 143286

12

Imani v. Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co. No. 187023
ABSOLUTE COMMUNITY PROPERTY, EXCLUDED PROPERTY G.R.
No. 124642
Ching v. Court of Appeals 120594
G.R.
Tan v. Court of Appeals No. 149615
ABSOLUTE COMMUNITY PROPERTY, DISSOLUTION G.R.
No. 187490
In Re Muller v. Muller 169584
CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF GAINS, COMPONENTS G.R.
No. 188305
Dela Pena v. Avila
G.R. 157537
Titan Construction Co. v. David No. 170166
CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF GAINS, LIABILITIES G.R. 169900
No. 165803
Ayala Investment & Development Co. v. Court of Appeals 178902
CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF GAINS, DISPOSITION G.R.
No. 163744
Heirs of Go, Sr. v. Servavio
G.R. 176556
Ros v. Philippine National Bank No.
G.R. 178044
Siochi v. Gozon No. L-45870
G.R. 132529
Aggabao v. Parulan No. 122749
G.R. 127358
Fuentes v. Roca No.
CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF GAINS, DISSOLUTION G.R. 13
No.
Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co. v Pascual
CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF GAINS, LIQUIDATION G.R.
No.
Quiao v. Quiao
VOID MARRIAGES OR LIVE-IN RELATIONSHIPS G.R.
No.
Dino v. Dino
G.R.
Maxey v. Court of Appeals No.
G.R.
Carino v. Carino No.
G.R.
Valdes v. RTC and Valdes No.
Buenaventura v. Court of Appeals G.R.
No.
G.R.

Persons and Family Relation

No.

Maquilan vs. Maquilan G.R. 155409
No.
Gonzales vs. Gonzales
G.R. 159521
Mercado-Fehr vs. Fehr No.
BIGAMOUS, ADULTEROUS RELATIONSHIPS G.R.
No. 152716
Carino v. Carino
G.R. 132529
Tumlos v. Fernandez No.
G.R.
Francisco v. Master Iron Works No. 137650

Joaquino v. Reyes G.R. 151967
No.
Saguid vs. Court of Appeals G.R.
No. 154645
Juaniza v. Jose
G.R. 150611
Adriano v. Court of Appeals No.
COVERAGE OF FAMILY RELATIONS G.R. L-50127-

Guerrero v. Regional Trial Court No. 28
SUITS AMONG MEMBERS OF THE SAME FAMILY G.R.
No. 124118
Hiyas v. Acuna
Hontiveros v. Regional Trial Court 229 SCRA 274
Vda. De Manalo v. Court of Appeals
Santos v. Court of Appeals 500 SCRA 514

PROHIBITED COMPROMISE 309 SCRA 340
Mendoza v. Court of Appeals
G.R. 129242
FAMILY HOME No.
Trinidad-Ramos v. Pangilinan
475 SCRA 1
Modequillo v. Breva
19 SCRA 756
Josef v. Santos
G.R. 185920
Kelley, Jr. v. Planters Product, Inc. No.
G.R.
Gomez v. Sta. Ines No. 86355

Manacop v. Court of Appeals G.R. 165060
Taneo v. Court of Appeals No.
G.R.
Persons and Family Relation No. 172263

G.R. 132537
No.
G.R.
No. 97898

G.R. 108532

14

No.

Fortaleza v. Lapitan G.R. 178288
KINDS/ STATUS OF CHILDREN No.

De Asis v. Court of Appeals G.R. 108532
No.
Fernandez v. Fernandez
ACTION TO IMPUGN LEGITIMACY, GROUNDS G.R. 143256
No.
Concepcion v. Court of Appeals
G.R. 123450
Angeles v. Maglaya No.

Jao v. Court of Appeals G.R. 153798
No.
Babiera v. Catotal
ACTION TO IMPUGN LEGITIMACY G.R. L-49162
No.
Liyao, Jr.v. Tanhoti-Liyao
G.R. 138493
De Jesus v. Estate of Dizon No.
ACTION TO CLAIM LEGITIMACY
G.R. 138961
Tijing v. Court of Appeals No.
VOLUNTARY RECOGNITION G.R.
No. 142877
Cabatania v. Court of Appeals
G.R. 125901
Eceta v. Eceta No.

Alberto v. Court of Appeals G.R. 124814
COMPULSORY RECOGNITION No.

Rivero v. Court of Appeals G.R. 157037
No.
People v. Bayani
G.R. 86639
People vs. Manahan No.
PROOF OF ILLEGITIMACY
G.R. 141273
Nepomuceno v. Lopez No.
Rivera vs. Heirs of Villanueva
Cruz v. Cristobal G.R. 120894
Perla v. Baring No.

Persons and Family Relation G.R. 128157
No.

G.R. 181258
No.

496 SCRA 135

G.R. 140422
No.

G.R. 172471

15

No.

PROBATIVE VALUE OF DNA TESTS IN PATERNITY CASES G.R. 125901
No.
Tijing v. Court of Appeals
460 SCRA 315
Agustin v. Court of Appeals
Herrera v. Alba 460 SCRA 197

People v. Vallejo G.R. 144656
No.
G.R.
Estate of Ong v. Diaz No. 171713
COMPULSORY RECOGNITION
G.R. 163707
Guy v. Court of Appeals No.

Marquino v. Itermediate Appelaye Court G.R. 72078
No.
G.R.
Tayag v. Tayag-Gallor No. 174680
RIGHTS OF ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN
G.R. 156343
Briones v. Miguel No.

Republic v. Abadilla G.R. 133054
No.

Verceles v. Posada G.R. 159785
No.

People v. Glabo G.R. 129248
No.

Tonog v. Court of Appeals G.R. 122906
No.

Mossesgeld v. Court of Appeals G.R. 111455
No.

Silva v. Court of Appeals G.R. 114742
No.

David v. Court of Appeals G.R. 111180
No.

RIGHTS OF LEGITIMATE CHILDREN

De Santos v. Angeles G.R. 105619
No.

Abadilla v. Tabiliran 249 SCRA 448

WHO MAY ADOPT

Republic v. Court of Appeals G.R. 100835
No.
G.R.
Republic v. Toledano No. 94147

Republic v. Alarcon-Vergara G.R. 95551
REQUIREMENTS FOR ADOPTION No.

16

Persons and Family Relation

In re: adoption of Michelle and Michael Lim G.R. 168992
No. 164948
Landingin v. Republic G.R. 105308
No. RTJ-96-
Cang v. Court of Appeals G.R. 1362
No.
Department of Social Welfare and Development v. Belen A.M. 117209
NATURE AND EFFECTS OF ADOPTION No. 103695
148311
Republic v. Hernandez G.R. L-18753
No.
Republic v. Court of Appeals G.R. 143989
No.
In re: adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia G.R. 131286
No.
Teotico v. Del Val G.R. 156343
RESCISSION OF ADOPTION No. L-26795
43794
Lahom v. Sibulo G.R. L-61700
SUPPORT No. 165166
Lam v. Chua
G.R. 150644
WHO IS ENTITLED TO SUPPORT No.
Briones v. Miguel 163209
G.R. 159785
Quimiging v. Icao No. 125041
G.R. 156013
Francisco v. Zandueta No.
G.R.
Santero v. Court of Appeals No.
G.R.
Gotardo v. Buling WHEN DEMANDABLE No.
Lacson v Lacson WHO MUST PAY SUPPORT G.R.
Lim v. Lim No.

Verceles v. Posada G.R.
No.
Mangonon v. Court of Appeals
G.R.
De Guzman v. Perez No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.

17

Persons and Family Relation

RIGHTS OF THIRD PERSONS WHO PAY

Lacson v. Lacson G.R. 150644
No.

SUPPORT PENDENT LITE

Estate of Ruiz v. Court of Appeals G.R.
No. 118671

SUPPORT DURING PROCEEDINGS

Reyes v. Ines-Luciano G.R.
No. L-48219

CHARACTERISTICS OF PARENTAL AUTHORITY

Silva v. Court of Appeals G.R.
No. 114742

WHO EXERCISES PARENTAL AUTHORITY AND CUSTODY

Tonog v. Court of Appeals G.R.
No. 122906
G.R.
Vancil v. Belmes No. 133323

Bondagjy v. Fouzi Ali Bondagjy G.R.
No. 140817
G.R.
Sagala-Eslao v. Court of Appeals No. 116773

Sombong v. Court of Appeals G.R.
No. 111876

TENDER AGE PRESUMPTION RULE

Gamboa-Hirsch v. Court of Appeals G.R.
No. 174485

Pablo-Gualberto v. Gualberto G.R.
No. 154994

Santos v. Court of Appeals G.R. 113054
No.

Golangco v. Court of Appeals G.R. 124724
No.

David v. Court of Appeals G.R.
No. 111180

Espiritu v. Court of Appeals G.R.
No. 115640

Perez v. Court of Appeals G.R.
No. 118870

RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF PERSONS EXERCISING PARENTAL
AUTHORITY

Libi v. Intermediate Appellate Court G.R.
No. 70890

Tamargo v. Court of Appeals G.R.
No. 85044

SPECIAL PARENTAL AUTHORITY

Aquinas School v. Inton G.R. 184202

18

Persons and Family Relation

St. Joseph's College v. Miranda No.
St. Mary's Academy v. Carpitanos G.R.
Amadora v. Court of Appeals No. 182353
Salvosa v. Intermediate Appellate Court G.R.
Philippine School of Business Administration v. Court of Appeals No. 143363
G.R.
USE OF SURNAME BY WOMEN No. L-47745
Remo v. Scretary of Foreign Affairs G.R.
Yasin v. Judge Shari's District Court No. L-70458
G.R.
USE OF SURNAME BY CHILDREN No. 84698
In re: adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia
In re Julian Lim Wang G.R.
In re Change of name of Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte No. 169202
G.R.
USE OF DIFFERENT NAME No. 94986
People v. Estrada
Ursua v. Court of Appeals G.R.
No. 148311
AMMENDMENTS/ CORRECTIONS OF ENTRIES G.R.
Republic v. Coseteng-Magpayo No. 159966
Lee v. Court of Appeals G.R.
In re change of name of Julian Wang No. L-51201
Silverio v. Republic
Republic v. Cagandahan G.R.
Braza v. City Civil Registrar of Himalayan City No. 164368
G.R.
No. 112170

G.R.
No. 189476
G.R.
No. 118387
G.R.
No. 159966
G.R.
No. 174689
G.R.
No. 166676
G.R.
No. 181174

19

Persons and Family Relation

EFFECTIVITY

LARA vs. DEL ROSARIO

G.R. No. L-6339 April 20, 1954

Facts:
In 1950 defendant Petronilo Del Rosario, Jr., owner of twenty-five taxi cabs or cars,

operated a taxi business under the name of ―Waval Taxi.‖ He employed among others three
mechanics and 49 chauffeurs or drivers, the latter having worked for periods ranging from 2 to 37
months. On September 4, 1950, without giving said mechanics and chauffeurs 30 days advance
notice, Del Rosario sold his 25 units or cabs to La Mallorca, a transportation company, as a result of

which, according to the mechanics and chauffeurs above-mentioned they lost their jobs because the
La Mallorca failed to continue them in their employment. They brought this action against Del
Rosario to recover compensation for overtime work rendered beyond eight hours and on Sundays
and legal holidays, and one month salary (mesada) provided for in article 302 of the Code of
Commerce because the failure of their former employer to give them one month notices.
Subsequently, the three mechanics unconditionally withdrew their claims. So only the 49 drivers
remained as plaintiffs.

Issue:
Whether or not the claim of the plaintiffs-appellants for overtime compensation under the

Eight-Hour Labor Law is valid.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that the month pay (mesada) under article 302 of the Code of

Commerce, article 2270 of the new Civil Code (Republic Act 386) appears to have repealed said
Article 302 when it repealed the provisions of the Code of Commerce governing Agency. This
repeal took place on August 30, 1950, when the new Civil Code went into effect, that is, one year
after its publication in the Official Gazette. The alleged termination of services of the plaintiffs by
the defendant took place according to the complaint on September 4, 1950, that is to say, after the
repeal of Article 302 which they invoke. Moreover, said Article 302 of the Code of Commerce,
assuming that it were still in force speaks of ―salary corresponding to said month.‖ commonly
known as ―mesada.‖ If the plaintiffs herein had no fixed salary either by the day, week, or month,

then computation of the month‘s salary payable would be impossible. Article 302 refers to
employees receiving a fixed salary.

20

Persons and Family Relation

DATE OF EFFECTIVITY

LORENZO M. TAÑADA vs. HON. JUAN C. TUVERA

G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985

Facts:
Petitioners herein are seeking a writ of mandamus to compel public officials to publish

and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of
instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letters of implementation and
administrative orders. Respondents, on the other hand, claimed that this case has no legal
personality or standing. Further, they argued that the publication in the Official Gazette in necessary

for the effectivity of the law where the law themselves provides for their own effectivity dates.

Issue:
Whether or not the presidential decrees in question which contain special provisions as to

the date they are to take effect still need to be published in the Official Gazette.

Ruling:
Publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where the legislation itself does

not provide for its effectivity date, for then the date of publication is material for determining the
date of the effectivity which must be 15 days following the completion of its publication, but not
when the law itself provides for the date when it goes to effect. Article 2 does not prevent the
requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its
effectivity. The publication of all presidential issuances of a public nature or of general applicability
is mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures, or penalties
for their violation or otherwise impose burdens on the people, such as tax revenue measures, fall
within this category. Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of
persons such as administrative and executive orders need not be published on the assumption that
they have been circularized to all concern. The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of
general application, which have not been published, shall have no force and effect.

21

Persons and Family Relation

DATE OF EFFECTIVITY

PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL TRADING CORPORATION vs.HON. PRESIDING

G.R. No. 108641 JUDGE ZOSIMO Z. ANGELES October 21, 1996

Facts:
PITC issued Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01 under which applications to the

PITC for importation from the People‘s Republic of China must be accompanied by a viable and
confirmed export program of Philippine products. PITC barred Remington and Firestone from
importing products from China on the ground that they were not able to comply with the

requirement of the said administrative order. Thereafter they filed a petition for prohibition and
mandamus against the said order of PITC in which the trial court upheld and declared to be null and
void for being unconstitutional. The court contends further authority to process and approve
applications for imports SOCPEC and to issue rules and regulations pursuant to LOI 144 has
already been repealed by EO 133 issued on February 27, 1987. Hence, the PITC filed a certiorari
seeking the reversal of the said decision.

Issue:
Whether or not PITC‘s Administrative Order 89-08-01 is valid.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that PITC is empowered to issue such order; nevertheless, the said

AO is invalid within the context of Article 2 of the New Civil Code. The Court cited Tanada vs
Tuvera which states that all statues including those of local application and private laws shall be
published as condition for their effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication in the Official
Gazette or a newspaper of general circulation unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the
legislature. The AO under consideration is one of those issuances which should be published for its
effectivity since it is punitive in character.

22

Persons and Family Relation

DATE OF EFFECTIVITY

NATIONAL ELECTRIFICATION ADMINISTRATION vs. VICTORIANO B.

G.R. No. 158761 GONZAGA December 4, 2007

Facts:

On November 13, 2000, respondent Victoriano B. Gonzaga filed his Certificate of
Candidacy for membership in the Board of Directors of Zamboanga Del Sur II Electric
Cooperative, Inc., District II (ZAMSURECO). Later that day, the screening committee resolved to

disqualify respondent because his spouse was an incumbent member of the Sangguniang Bayan of
Diplahan, Zamboanga del Sur. Based on the Electric Cooperative Election Code (ECEC),
promulgated by petitioner National Electrification Administration (NEA), a candidate whose spouse
occupies an elective government position higher than Barangay Captain is prohibited to run as
director of an electric cooperative. ZAMSURECO‘s by-laws, however, do not provide for such
ground for disqualification. Respondent averred that the ECEC was null and void because it had not
been published. NEA, on the other hand, failed to prove whether the ECEC was indeed published
in a newspaper of general circulation as required by the New Civil Code and the Administrative
Code of 1987.

Issue:

Whether or not Electric Cooperative Election Code was null and void for not complying
with the publication requirement.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court held that Electric Cooperative Election Code was null and void for not
complying with the publication requirement. It observed that while ZAMSURECO complied with
the requirements of filing the code with the University of the Philippines Law Center, it offered no
proof of publication neither in the Official Gazette nor in a newspaper of general circulation.
Without compliance with the requirement of publication, the rules and regulations contained in the

ECEC cannot be enforced and implemented. Article 2 of the New Civil Code provides that laws
shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following the completion of their publication in the Official
Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, unless it is otherwise provided.
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in
the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at
present, directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must also be
published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.
The ECEC applies to all electric cooperatives in the country. It is not a mere internal memorandum,
interpretative regulation, or instruction to subordinates. Thus, the ECEC should comply with the
requirements of the Civil Code and the Administrative Code of 1987.

23

Persons and Family Relation

DATE OF EFFECTIVITY

JOAQUINA BASA, ET AL., vs. ATILANO G. MERCADO

G.R. No. L-42226 July 26, 1935

Facts:
Hon. Hermogenes Reyes, Judge of Pampanga CFI, allowed and probated the last will and

testament of Ines Basa, decedent. The same judge also approved the account of the administrator of
the estate, declared him the only heir, and closed the administration proceedings. Joaquin Basa, et al.,
filed a motion to reopen the proceedings, alleging that the court lacked jurisdiction because there
was failure to comply with the requirements as to the publication of the notice of hearing.

They contended that the hearing took place only twenty-one days after the date of first
publication instead of three full weeks. Moreover, the Ing Katipunan where the notice was published
was not a newspaper of general circulation as contemplated by law.

Issues:
a) Whether or not there was compliance with the publication requirement
b) Whether or not Ing Katipunan is a newspaper of general circulation

Ruling:
The language used in section 630 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not mean that the

notice, referred to therein, should be published for three full weeks before the date set for the
hearing of the will. In other words, the first publication of the notice need not be made 21 days
before the day appointed for the hearing.

The records show that Ing Katipunan is a newspaper of general circulation in view of the
fact that it is published for the dissemination of local news and general information; that it has a
bona fide subscription list of paying subscribers; that it is published at regular intervals and that the
trial court ordered the publication to be made in Ing Katipunan precisely because it was a newspaper
of general circulation in the Province of Pampanga.

24

Persons and Family Relation

DATE OF EFFECTIVITY

ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHERN TAGALOG ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. vs.

G.R. No. 192117 ENERGY REGULATROY COMMISSION September 18, 2012

Facts:

Petitioners Batangas I Electric Cooperative, Inc., Quezon I Electric Cooperative, Inc.,
Quezon II Electric Cooperative, Inc. and Pampanga Rural Electric Service Cooperative, Inc. are
rural electric cooperatives established under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 269 or the National

Electrification Administration Decree. BATELEC I, QUEZELCO I and QUEZELCO II are
members of the Association of Southern Tagalog Electric Cooperatives, Inc. PRESCO is a member
of the Central Luzon Electric Cooperatives Association, Inc. Petitioners are engaged in the
distribution of . On 8 December 1994, R.A. No. 7832 was enacted. The law imposed a limit on the
recoverable rate of system lossthat may be charged by rural electric cooperatives to their consumers.
The Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 7832 required every rural electric cooperative
to file with the Energy Regulatory Board on or before 30 September 1995, an application for
approval of an amended PPA Clause incorporating the cap on the recoverable rate of system loss to
be included in its schedule of rates. On 8 June 2001, R.A. No. 9136 or the Electric Power Industry
Reform Act of 2001 was enacted. Section 38 of the EPIRA abolished the ERB, and created the
Energy Regulatory Commission. The powers and functions of the ERB not inconsistent with the
provisions of the EPIRA were transferred to the ERC, together with the applicable funds and
appropriations, records, equipment, property and personnel of the ERB. All electric cooperatives
were directed to implement the PPA in the manner the then Energy Regulatory Board had
prescribed. Subsequently, the ERC issued policy guidelines on the treatment of discounts extended
by power suppliers. Petitioners attack the validity of the 22 March 2006 Order, 16 February 2007
Order, 7 December 2005 Order, and 27 March 2006 Order of the ERC directing the refund of over-
recoveries for having been issued pursuant to ineffective and invalid policy guidelines. Petitioners
assert that the policy guidelines on the treatment of discounts extended by power suppliers are
ineffective and invalid for lack of publication, non-submission to the U.P. Law Center, and their
retroactive application.

Issue:

Whether the policy guidelines issued by the ERC on the treatment of discounts extended by
power suppliers are ineffective and invalid for lack of publication, non-submission to the University
of the Philippines (U.P.) Law Center, and their retroactive application.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court held that publication is a basic postulate of procedural due process.
Article 2 of the Civil Code, as amended by Section 1 of Executive Order No. 200, states that "laws
shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication either in the Official
Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, unless it is otherwise provided."
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in
the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at

25

Persons and Family Relation

present, directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must also be
published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.
However, there are several exceptions to the requirement of publication such as an interpretative
regulation. It seeks to regulate only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the general
public. The policy guidelines of the ERC on the treatment of discounts extended by power suppliers
are interpretative regulations. The policy guidelines merely interpret R.A. No. 7832 and it‘s IRR,
particularly on the computation of the cost of purchased power. The policy guidelines did not
modify, amend, or supplant the IRR. Hence, it is exempt from the publication requirement.

26

Persons and Family Relation

COMPUTATION OF TIME

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE vs. PRIMETOWN PROPERTY GROUP,

G.R. No. 162155 INC. August 28, 2007

Facts:
On April 14, 1998 Primetown Property Group. Inc. filed its final adjusted return. On March

11, 1999 Gilbert Yap, vice chair of Primetown Property Group. Inc., filed for the refund or tax
credit of income tax paid in 1997. However, it was not acted upon. Thus Primetown filed a petition
for review but the Court of Tax Appeals dismissed it claiming that it was filed beyond the two-year

reglementary period provided by section 229 of the National Internal Revenue Code. The Court of
Tax Appeals further argued that in National Marketing Corp. vs. Tecson the Supreme Court ruled
that a year is equal to 365 days regardless of whether it is a regular year or a leap year.

Issue:
Whether or not the respondent‘s petition was filed within the two-year reglementary period.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that the petition was filed within the two-year reglementary period

because Article 13 of the New Civil Code that provides that a year is composed of 365 years is
repealed by Executive Order 292 or the Administrative Code of the Philippines. Under Executive
Order 292, a year is composed of 12 calendar months.

27

Persons and Family Relation

COMPUTATION OF TIME

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PAZ M. DEL ROSARIO

G.R. No. L-7234 May 21, 1955

Facts:
On May 28, 1953, Paz M. Del Rosario committed slight physical injuries. The information

was filed on July 27, 1953. Thereupon, the accused filed a motion to quash the information to
ground that the offense charged had already prescribed in accordance with Article 90 and 91 of the
Revised Penal Code. The municipal court sustained this motion and dismissed the case. Thus, this
appeal of dismissal is made directly to the court.

Issue:
Whether or not the offense charged to the plaintiff-appellant had already prescribed.

Ruling:
The offense have not yet prescribed because the provision in the Revised Penal Code does

not provide the computation of month therefore it must be supplied by Article 13 of the Civil Code
which provides for the computation of years, months, days and nights. According to Article 13 of
the Civil Code a month is a 30-day month not the solar or civil month. Further, the Supreme Court
held that the case took effect on May 28, 1953 after the New Civil Code take effect so the new
provisions should apply.

28

Persons and Family Relation

PRESUMPTION OF KNOWLEDGE OF THE LAW, EXCEPTIONS

D.M. CONSUNJI, INC. vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MARIA J. JUEGO

G.R. No. 137873 April 20, 2010

Facts:
Jose Juego, a construction worker of D.M. Consunji, Inc., fell 14 floors from the

Renaissance Tower, to his death. Jose Juego‘s widow then filed a petition for damages in the
Regional Trial Court against the deceased employer. The employer raised the defense that Maria
Juego already availed of the benefits provided by the State Insurance Fund. Considering the ruling in
Pacarra vs. Cebu Autobus Company, an injured worker has a choice of either to recover from the

employer the fixed amounts set by the Workmen‘s Compensation Act or to prosecute an ordinary
civil action against the tort fees for higher damages but he cannot pursue both actions
simultaneously. The Regional Trial Court rendered a decision in favor of the widow Maria Juego.
On appeal by D.M. Consunji, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial
Court.

Issue:
Whether or not respondent is prohibited from recovering damages under the Civil Code.

Ruling:
No. Respondent is not barred from recovering damages under the Civil Code although she

has already availed the benefits of the State Insurance Fund. The respondent‘s case is an exception
because private respondent was not aware of petitioner‘s negligence when she filed her claim for
benefits from the State Insurance Fund. She was not only ignorant of the facts, but of her rights as
well. The decision of the court is affirmed.

29

Persons and Family Relation

PRESUMPTION OF KNOWLEDGE OF THE LAW, EXCEPTIONS

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FLORENCIO GASACAO

G.R. No. 168445 November 11, 2005

Facts:
Capt. Florencio O. Gasacao was the crewing manager of Great Eastern Shipping Agency,

Inc., which company was headed by his nephew. On August 4, 2000 appellant and Jose Gasacao
were charged with Large Scale Illegal Recruitment. The appellant was arrested while his nephew
remained at large. The lower court found Capt. Gasacao guilty beyond reasonable doubt of large
scale illegal recruitment. The Court of Appeals also affirmed the decision. Hence, Capt. Gasacao

appealed to the Supreme Court claiming that he can‘t be held liable for illegal recruitment because
he was just a mere employee of the manning agency. He also claimed that he was not aware of the
law against prohibition on bonds and deposits under section 60 of the Omnibus Rules and
Regulations implementing R.A. 8042.

Issue:
Whether or not the appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of large scale illegal

recruitment.

Ruling:
There is no merit in appellant‘s contention that he was just a mere employee of the manning

agency because he was the company‘s crewing manager. As testified by the witnesses, the accused
appellant actively participated in the recruitment process from receiving job applications,
interviewing the applicants, and informing them of the agency‘s requirement of payment of
performance or cash bond prior to the deployment. The Supreme Court held further that appellants
defense of ignorance is not commendable as provided for by Article 3 of the Civil Code which states
that ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith. The defense of goodwill is
neither unavailable because the appellant failed to deploy the complainants without valid reasons.

30

Persons and Family Relation

PROCESSUAL PRESUMPTION

YAO KEE vs. AIDA SY-GONZALES

G.R. No. L-55960 November 24, 1988

Facts:
Sy Kiat, a Chinese National died on January 17, 1977, leaving behind real and personal

properties here in the Philippines worth more or less Php 300,000. Thereafter, Aida Sy-Gonzales,
Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy-Bernabe, and Rodolfo Sy filed a petition alleging that they are the children of
the deceased with Asuncion Gillego. However, Yao Kee testified that she was married to Sy Kiat on
Jan. 19, 1981 through a Chinese marriage with Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho, and Chun Yen as their

children. Petitioners provided that fact of marriage through evidences like Yao Kee‘s and Gan
Ching‘s testimony, Sy Kiat‘s Master Card of Registration stating his marriage with Yao Kee, and the
certificate by the Embassy of the People‘s Republic of China affirming the fact of the marriage.

Issue:
Whether or not the marriage of Sy Kiat and Yao Kee was valid.

Ruling:
Under Article 71 of the Civil Code to establish the validity of foreign marriages the existence

of the foreign law as a question of fact must be proven and the alleged foreign marriage must be
proven by convincing evidence. The petitioners have provided the fact of marriage however the
same do not suffice to establish the validity of said marriage with Chinese Law or custom. In such
absence of foreign law, the doctrine of processual presumption must be applied. The Supreme Court
then held that in the absence of a foreign law it must be presumed as the same as ours. In the
Philippine Laws, a marriage cannot be valid without the presence of a solemnizing officer; therefore
the marriage of Sy Kiat to Yao Kee was null and void.

31

Persons and Family Relation

PROCESSUAL PRESUMPTION

LAUREANO vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 114776 February 2, 2000

Facts:
Menandro Laureano was employed with the Singapore Airlines Limited on 1979. However

because of the recession that hit the Airline Industry sometime in 1982, Defendant Company
initiated cost-cutting measures such as terminating its A-300 pilots including the plaintiff.
Subsequently, plaintiff filed a case of illegal dismissal against defendant. Laureano then cited
Singapore Laws to his case since he was employed in the Singapore Airlines Ltd.

Issue:
a) Whether or not Singaporean Laws shall be applied in this case.
b) Whether or not there was illegal dismissal on the part of Singapore Airlines Ltd.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that foreign laws must be proved as fact in order to employ them.

The plaintiff was not able to prove the applicability of the laws of Singapore that he cited to his case.
Under the principle of processual presumption, if foreign laws are not proved as facts it will be
presumed as the same as ours. Hence, Philippine Laws should apply. Further, under Article 291 of
the Labor Code of the Philippines, the petitioner‘s action for damages due to illegal dismissal has
already prescribed having been filed on January 8, 1987, or more than four (4) years after the
effective date has prescribed.

32

Persons and Family Relation

PROCESSUAL PRESUMPTION

PHILIPPINE EXPORT AND FOREIGN LOAN GUARANTEE CORPORATION vs.

G.R. No. 140047 V.P. EUSEBIO CONSTRUCTION, INC. July 13, 2004

Facts:
On November 8, 1980, State Organization of Buildings, Ministry of Housing, and

Construction, Baghdad, Iraq, awarded the construction of the Institute of Physical Therapy–Medical
Rehabilitation Center, Phase II, in Baghdad, Iraq, to Ajyal Trading and Contracting Company, a firm
duly licensed with the Kuwait Chamber of Commerce.

On March 7, 1981, in behalf of Spouses Eduardo and Iluminada Santos, 3-Plex
International, Inc a local contractor engaged in construction business, entered into a joint venture
agreement with Ajyal. However since it was not accredited under the Philippine Overseas
Construction Board, it had to assign and transfer all its right to VPECI and entered into an
agreement that the execution of the project will be under their joint management. To comply with
the requirements of performance bond, 3-Plex and VPECI applied for the issuance of a guarantee
with Philguarantee, a government financial institution empowered to issue guarantees for qualified
Filipino contractors to secure the performance of approved service contracts abroad. Subsequently,
letters of guarantee were issued by Philguarantee to the Rafidain Bank of Baghdad. Al Ahli Bank of
Kuwait was engaged to provide a counter-guarantee to Rafidain Bank, but it required a similar
counter-guarantee in its favor from the Philguarantee. The Surety Bond was later amended to
increase the amount of coverage and to change the bank in whose favor the petitioner's guarantee
was issued, from Rafidain Bank to Al Ahli Bank of Kuwait. SOB and the joint venture VPECI and
Ajyal executed the service contract for the construction of the project. However, they were not able
to start the project on schedule because of that surety bond was also extended and the Advance
Payment Guarantee was extended three times more until it was cancelled for reimbursement.

On 26 October 1986, Al Ahli Bank of Kuwait sent a telex call to the petitioner demanding
full payment of its performance bond counter-guarantee. VPECI advised the Philguarantee not to
pay Al Ahli Bank because efforts were being exerted for the amicable settlement of the Project.
VPECI received another telex message from Al Ahli Bank stating that it had already paid to Rafidain

Bank but VPEIC insisted on not paying however Central Bank authorized the remittance to Al Ahli
Bank. Philguarantee informed VPECI that it would remit payment to Al Ahli Bank, and reiterated
the joint and solidary obligation of the respondents to reimburse the Philguarantee for the advances
made on its counter-guarantee but they failed to pay so a case was filed.

Issue:
Whether or not the Philippine laws or Iraq‘s laws should be applied in determining VPECI's

failure to pay in the performance of its obligations under the service contract.

Ruling:
Yes. In this case, the laws of Iraq bear important link to the contract, since one of the parties

is the Iraqi Government and the place of performance is in Iraq. Consequently, the problem of
whether respondent VPECI evaded its obligations may be determined by the laws of Iraq. However,
those foreign laws of Iraq were not properly alleged and prove. Under the doctrine of processual
presumption, where a foreign law is not pleaded or, even if pleaded, is not proved, the presumption

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Persons and Family Relation

is that foreign law is the same as ours. Further, the Supreme Court held that the petitioner guarantor
should have waited for the natural course of guaranty. Petitioner as a guarantor cannot be compelled
to pay the creditor SOB unless the property of the debtor VPECI has been exhausted and all
legal remedies against the said debtor have been resorted to by the creditor. It could also set up
compensation as regards what the creditor SOB may owe the principal debtor VPECI. In this case,
however, the petitioner has clearly waived these rights and remedies by making the payment of an
obligation that was yet to be shown to be rightfully due the creditor and demandable of the principal
debtor.

34

Persons and Family Relation

PROSPECTIVE AND RETROACTIVE EFFECT OF LAWS

JOSE E. ARUEGO, JR. vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 112193 March 31, 1996

Facts:
In 1959, Jose M. Aruego Sr., a married man, had an amorous relationship with Luz M.

Fabian until his death on March 30, 1982. Out of this relationship were born Antonio Aruego and
Evelyn F. Aruego. On March 7, 1983, a complaint for compulsory recognition and enforcement of
successional rights was filed by the minors, Antonia and Evelyn. However, Jose Aruego Jr., and the
petitioners also filed a complaint to declare the private respondents as illegitimate children of their

defunct father. The lower court decided that Antonia Aruego is an illegitimate daughter or Jose
Aruego Sr., and Luz M. Fabian and that she is entitled to a share of equal to one-half portion of
share of the legitimate. So the petitioners filed a motion for partial reconsideration alleging loss of
jurisdiction on the part of the trial court over the complaint by virtue of the passage of E.O. 209 or
the Family Code of the Philippines. It was denied, hence this petition for review.

Issue:
Whether or not the provisions of the Family Code be applied retroactively.

Ruling:
Private respondent‘s action for compulsory recognition as an illegitimate child was brought

under Book I, Title VIII of the Civil Code on Persons under Art. 285 thereby stating that the
recognition of natural children is brought only the lifetime of the presumed parents except when the
parents die during the minority of the child. Petitioners, on the other hand submit that with the New
Family Code on August 31, 1988, the trial court lost jurisdiction on the ground of prescription.
Further, the Family Code provides that it shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not impair
the vested right of others. The Supreme Court held that the present law which is the Family Code
cannot be applied retroactively because its application will impair the vested right of the respondent
to have her case decided under Article 285 of the Civil Code which has vested to her by the fact that
she filed her action under the regime of the Civil Code.

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Persons and Family Relation

PROSPECTIVE AND RETROACTIVE EFFECT OF LAWS

BERNABE vs. ALEJO

G.R. No. 140500 January 21, 2002

Facts:
Fiscal Ernesto Bernabe allegedly fathered a son with his secretary, Carolina Alejo. The son

was born on September 18, 1981and was named Adrian Bernabe. Fiscal Ernesto Bernabe died as
well as his legitimate wife, leaving Ernestina Bernabe the sole surviving heir.

Carolina, in behalf of her son, filed a complaint praying that Adrian be declared an

acknowledged child of the deceased and also be given the share of Bernabe‘s estate. Regional Trial
Court dismissed the complaint and said that the death of the putative father had barred the action.
Further, under the law, an action for the recognition of an illegitimate child must be brought within
the lifetime of the alleged parent to give the latter an opportunity to either affirm or deny the child‘s
filiation.

The Court of Appeals ruled that the rights of Adrian are governed under Article 285 of the
Civil Code which allows an action for recognition to be filed within 4 years after the child has
attained the age of majority and that subsequent enactment of the Family Code did not take away his
right.

Issue:
Whether or not Adrian Bernabe may be declared an acknowledged illegitimate son.

Ruling:
The Family Code makes no distinction on whether the former was still a minor when the

latter died. Thus, the putative parent is given by the new code a chance to dispute the claim,
considering that ―illegitimate children‖ are usually begotten and raised in secrecy and without the
legitimate family being aware of their existence. Furthermore, the grounds or instances for the
acknowledgment of natural children are utilized to establish the filiation of spurious children. Hence,
the petition was denied and assailed decision was affirmed.

36

Persons and Family Relation

PROSPECTIVE AND RETROACTIVE EFFECT OF LAWS

PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION vs. STOCKHOLDERS OF

INTERCITY SAVINGS AND LOAN BANK, INC.
G.R. No. 181556 December 14, 2009

Facts:
The Central Bank of the Philippines, now known as BangkoSentralngPilipinas, filed on June

17, 1987 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati a Petition for Assistance in the Liquidation
of Intercity Savings and Loan Bank, Inc. (Intercity Bank) alleging that said bank was already
insolvent and its continuance in business would involve probable loss to depositors, creditors and

the general public. The trial court gave it due course.Petitioner Philippine Deposit Insurance
Corporation was eventually substituted as the therein petitioner, liquidator of Intercity Bank. In the
meantime, Republic Act No. 9302 which provides that ―After the payment of all liabilities and
claims against the closed bank, the Corporation shall pay any surplus dividends at the legal rate of
interest, from date of takeover to date of distribution, to creditors and claimants of the closed bank
in accordance with legal priority before distribution to the shareholders of the closed bank‖. Relying
on Republic Act No. 9302 PDIC filed on August 8, 2005 a Motion for Approval of the Final
Distribution of Assets and Termination of the Liquidation Proceedings

Issue:
Whether or not Section 12 of RA 9302 should be applied retroactively in order to entitle

Intercity Bank creditors to surplus dividends.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that Statutes are prospective and not retroactive in their operation,

they being the formulation of rules for the future, not the past. Hence, the legal
maxim lex de futuro, judex de praeterito — the law provides for the future, the judge for the past,
which is articulated in Article 4 of the Civil Code: ―Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the
contrary is provided.‖ The reason for the rule is the tendency of retroactive legislation to be unjust
and oppressive on account of its liability to unsettle vested rights or disturb the legal effect of prior
transactions. Further, a perusal of RA 9302 shows that nothing indeed therein authorizes its
retroactive application. In fact, its effectivity clause indicates a clear legislative intent to the contrary,

Section 28. Effectivity Clause. ―This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days following the completion
of its publication in the Official Gazette or in two (2) newspapers of general circulation‖.

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Persons and Family Relation

PROSPECTIVE AND RETROACTIVE EFFECT OF LAWS

MERLINDA CIPRIANO MONTANEZ vs. LOURDES TAJOLOSA CIPRIANO

G.R. No. 181089 October 22, 2012

Facts:
On April 8, 1976, Lourdes Tajolosa married Socrates Flores. On January 4, 1983 Lourdes re-

married Silverio V. Cipriano. In 2001, respondent filed a Petition for the Annulment in the Regional
Trial Court in the ground of psychological incapacity as defined in Article 36 of the Family Code.
On July 8, 2003, the marriage was declared null and void. On May 14, 2004, Silverio‘s daughter filed
a complaint of bigamy against Lourdes under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. Lourdes then

contended that sine her two marriages were contracted prior to the Family Code, Article 40 cannot
be retroactive effect because it will impair her right to remarry without need of securing a judicial
declaration of nullity of marriage. The RTC dismissed the complaint ruling that the existing law at
the time of the second marriage do not require a judicial declaration of absolute nullity as a
condition precedent to contracting a subsequent marriage. The complainant then filed a motion for
reconsideration but the decision rendered was again in favor of the respondent. Hence, this petition
was filed.

Issue:
Whether the judicial nullity of a first marriage prior to the enactment of the Family Code is a

valid defense for the crime of bigamy.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that the subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first

marriage was immaterial because prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime of bigamy had already
been consummated. The Supreme Court ruled further that what is required for a crime of bigamy to
prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted. Even
the accused eventually secured a declaration that his first marriage is a void ab initio, the first and
second marriage was subsisting before the first marriage was annulled. Also, Art. 40 should be
applied retroactively because it does not prejudice or impair the right of anyone. The petition is
thereby granted.

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Persons and Family Relation

PROSPECTIVE AND RETROACTIVE EFFECT OF LAWS

DACUDAO vs. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE

G.R. No. 188056 January 8, 2013

Facts:
Petitioners were among the investors whom Celso G. Delos Angeles, Jr. and his associates in

the Legacy Group of Companies allegedly defrauded through the Legacy Group's "buy back
agreement" that earned them check payments that were dishonored. After their written demands for
the return of their investments went unheeded, they initiated a number of charges for syndicated
estafa against Delos Angeles, Jr., et al. in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Davao City on

February 6, 2009.

On March 18, 2009, the Secretary of Justice issued Department of Justice (DOJ) Order No.
182 (DO No. 182), directing all Regional State Prosecutors, Provincial Prosecutors, and City
Prosecutors to forward all cases already filed against Delos Angeles, Jr., et al. to the Secretariat of the
DOJ Special Panel in Manila for appropriate action. Thereafter, the petitioners directly went to the
Supreme Court via petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, ascribing to respondent
Secretary of Justice grave abuse of discretion in issuing DOES No 182. They further argued that
DO No. 182 was an obstruction of justice and a violation of the rule against enactment of laws with
retroactive effect.

Issue:
Whether or not the issuance of DOJ Order No. 182 should cover only future cases against

Delos Angeles, Jr., et al., not those already being investigated.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that as a general rule, laws shall have no retroactive effect.

However, exceptions exist, and one such exception concerns a law that is procedural in nature. The
reason is that a remedial statute or a statute relating to remedies or modes of procedure does not
create new rights or take away vested rights but only operates in furtherance of the remedy or the
confirmation of already existing rights.A statute or rule regulating the procedure of the courts will be
construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of its passage. All

procedural laws are retroactive in that sense and to that extent. The retroactive application is not
violative of any right of a person who may feel adversely affected, for, verily, no vested right
generally attaches to or arises from procedural laws. Therefore DOJ Order No. 182 can be applied
retroactively in the cases the petitioners filed against Delos Angeles.

39

Persons and Family Relation

WAIVER OF RIGHTS

G.R. No. 163707 MICHAEL C. GUY vs. COURT OF APPEALS
September 15, 2006

Facts:
On October 29, 1992, Sima Wei died in Makati City leaving an estate valued 10 million more

or less. His known heirs are his spouse Shirley Guy with their children five children. On June 13,
1997, private respondents Karen Oanes Wei and Kamille Oanes Wei represented by their mother
Remedios filed a petition for letters of administration before the Regional Trial Court alleging that
they are duly acknowledged illegitimate children of Sima Wei. However, petitioner and co-heirs

alleged that private respondent‘s claim had been paid, waived, abandoned, or otherwise extinguished
by Remedios‘ June 7, 1993 Release and Waiver of Claim stating that in exchange for the financial
and educational support received from petitioner, Remedios and her minor children discharge the
estate of Sima Wei and any and all liabilities.

The petition was denied in the lower court and the motion for reconsidered dismissed in the
Court of Appeals. Hence, this petition was made.

Issue:
Whether or not the Release and Waiver of Claim bar respondents from claiming successional

rights.

Ruling:
The Release and Waiver of Claim does not bar respondents from claiming successional

rights because it does not state with clarity the purpose of its execution. It merely states that
Remedios received Php 300,000 and an educational plan for her daughters. The document does not
specifically mention private respondents‘ hereditary rights, hence it can‘t be construed as a waiver of
successional rights. The Supreme Court held that under Art. 1044 of the Civil Code any inheritance
left to minors or incapacitated persons may be accepted by their parent or guardian. Parents may
repudiate the inheritance only by judicial authorization. Not having been judicially approved, the
release and waiver claim is null and void. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of
Appeals.

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Persons and Family Relation

WAIVER OF RIGHTS

F.F. CRUZ & CO., INC. vs. HR CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION

G.R. No. 187521 March 14, 2012

Facts:

Sometime in 2004, FFCCI entered into a contract with the Department of Public Works and
Highways (DPWH) for the construction of the Magsaysay Viaduct, known as the Lower Agusan
Development Project. On August 9, 2004, FFCCI, in turn, entered into a Subcontract Agreement
with HR Construction Corporation (HRCC) for the supply of materials, labor, equipment, tools and

supervision for the construction of a portion of the said project called the East Bank Levee and Cut-
Off Channel in accordance with the specifications of the main contract. Pursuant to the Subcontract
Agreement, HRCC would submit to FFCCI a monthly progress billing which the latter would then
pay, subject to stipulated deductions, within 30 days from receipt thereof.

The parties agreed that the requests of HRCC for payment should include progress
accomplishment of its completed works as approved by FFCCI. Additionally, they agreed to
conduct a joint measurement of the completed works of HRCC together with the representative of
DPWH and consultants to arrive at a common quantity. Thereafter, HRCC commenced the
construction of the works pursuant to the Subcontract Agreement. However, before the project was
completed, HRCC pursuant to the arbitration clause in the subcontract agreement filed with the
Construction Industry Arbitration Commission a complaint praying that FFCI pay the overdue
application plus legal interests they have not paid. FFCCI maintained that HRCC failed to comply
with the condition stated under the Subcontract Agreement for the payment of the latter‘s progress
billings, i.e. joint measurement of the completed works, and, hence, it was justified in not paying the
amount stated in HRCC‘s progress billings.

Issue:
Whether or not FFCCI is already barred from contesting HRCC‘s valuation of the

completed works having waived its right to demand the joint measurement requirement.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court held that FFCCI had waived its right to demand for a joint
measurement of HRCC‘s completed works under the Subcontract Agreement. Further, on account
of its failure to demand the joint measurement of HRCC‘s completed works, had effectively waived
its right to ask for the conduct of the same as a condition sine qua non to HRCC‘s submission of its
monthly progress billings. Basically, the instant issue calls for a determination as to which of the
parties‘ respective valuation of accomplished works should be given credence. FFCCI claims that its
valuation should be upheld since the same was the result of a measurement of the completed works
conducted by it and the DPWH.

On the other hand, HRCC maintains that its valuation should be upheld on account of
FFCCI‘s failure to observe the joint measurement requirement in ascertaining the extent of its
completed works. FFCCI admits that in all three instances where it paid HRCC for its progress
billings, it never required compliance with the aforequoted contractual provision of a prior joint
quantification. Such repeated omission may reasonably be construed as a waiver by FFCCI of its
contractual right to require compliance of said condition and it is now too late in the day to so

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impose it. Article 6 of the Civil Code expressly provides that ―rights may be waived unless the
waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals or good customs‖. The tribunal cannot
see any such violation in this case.

42

Persons and Family Relation

WAIVER OF RIGHTS

PEOPLE vs. MORIAL

G.R. No. 129295 August 15, 2001

Facts:
Edwin Morial, Leonardo Morial and Nonelito Abinon were convicted of Robbery with

Homicide. During the custodial investigation, Leonardo Morial made an extrajudicial confession
admitting to the crime. However, later on, he recanted his confession saying that the police tortured
him into admitting the crime. On appeal, Morial moved to quash the extrajudicial confession
claiming that such confession was made without the assistance of counsel given him by the police

was not present during the whole interrogation. He left to attend some personal matters while the
interrogation of Morial was still going on. However, said attorney claimed that he was present when
Morial signed the admission.

Issue:
Whether or not the extrajudicial confession can be used as evidence against the accused.

Ruling:
The extrajudicial confession cannot be used against the accused. An excused under custodial

interrogation must continuously have a counsel assisting him from the very start until the
termination of such investigation. An effective and vigilant counsel ―necessarily and logically
requires that the lawyer be present and able to advise and assist his client from the time the
confessant answers the first question asked by the investigating officer until the signing of the
confessant answers the first question asked by the investigating officer until the signing of the
extrajudicial confession.‖ Section 2A of RA No 7438 requires that ―any person arrested, detained or
under custodial investigation shall at all times be assisted by counsel. In the absence of any lawyer,
no custodial investigation shall be conducted‖. Additionally, there was an invalid waiver of the right
to counsel since this right cannot be waived unless the same is made in writing and in the presence
of counsel. No such written and counseled waiver of these rights was offered in evidence.

43

Persons and Family Relation

EXPRESS AND IMPLIED REPEAL

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE vs. PRIMETOWN

G. R. No. 162155 August 28, 2007

Facts:
On April 14, 2000, the Taxpayer filed its petition for review claiming refund based on its

final adjusted return filed on April 14, 1998, Counting 365 days a year pursuant to Article 13 of the
Civil Code, the CTA found that the petition was filed beyond the two year respective period
equivalent to 730 days for filing the claim under Section 229 of the NIRC, ruling that the petition
was filed 731 days after the filing of the return.On Appeal, the CA reversed the CTA and ruled that

Article 13 of the Civil Code did not distinguish between a regular year and a leap year.

Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the CTA.

Ruling:
The SC affirmed the CA's reversal but ruled that the basis for the reversal is EO 292 of the

Administrative Code of 1987, a more recent law, which provides that a year is composed of 12
calendar months.

Section 31 provides that a ―year‖ shall be understood to be 12 calendar months. Both article
13 of the Civil Code and Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987 deal with the same subject
matter — the computation of legal periods. Under the Civil Code, a year is equivalent to 365 days
whether it be a regular year or a leap year. Under the Administrative Code of 1987, however, a year
is composed of 12 calendar months and the number of days is irrelevant. There obviously exists a
manifest incompatibility in the manner of computing legal periods under the Civil Code and the
Administrative Code of 1987. For this reason, the Supreme Court held that Section 31, Chapter
VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987, being the more recent law, governs the
computation of legal periods.

Using this, the petition was filed on the last day of the 24th month from the day the
taxpayer filed its final adjusted return.

44

Persons and Family Relation

EXPRESS AND IMPLIED REPEAL

MAGKALAS vs. NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY

G.R. No. 138823 September 17, 2008

Facts:
Plaintiff and her predecessors-in-interest have been occupying a lot designated as TAG-77-

0063, Block 1, Barangay 132, located at the corner of 109 Gen. Concepcion and Adelfa Streets,
Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City, for the past 39 years.

On March 26, 1978, P.D. No. 1315 was issued expropriating certain lots at Bagong Barrio,

Caloocan City. In the same Decree, the National Housing Authority (NHA) was named
Administrator of the Bagong Barrio Urban Bliss Project with the former to take possession, control
(sic) and disposition of the expropriated properties with the power of demolition. During the
Census survey of the area, the structure built by the plaintiff was assigned TAG No. 0063. After
conducting studies of the area, the NHA determined that the area where plaintiff‘s structure is
located should be classified as an area center (open space). The Area Center was determined in
compliance with the requirement to reserve 30% open space in all types of residential development.
Plaintiff, together with Mr.& Mrs. Josefino Valenton and Mr.& Mrs. Rey Pangilinan, through
counsel, filed an appeal from the decision to designate the area where the plaintiff and the two other
spouses have erected structures, as an Area Center. The said appeal was denied by the NHA. In a
letter, dated August 6, 1985, the NHA sent a Notice of Lot Assignment to plaintiff recognizing the
latter as a Censused Owner of a structure with TAG No. 0063-04 which was identified for
relocation.

On August 23, 1985, plaintiff filed a Complaint for Damages with prayer for the issuance of
a restraining order and writ of Preliminary Injunction against the NHA with the Regional Trial
Court of Caloocan City.

The Order denying plaintiff‘s prayer for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction was
appealed, by way of Petition for Certiorari, to the Court of Appeals (docketed therein as CA-G.R.
No. 33833). On March 10, 1999, the trial court promulgated its assailed decision dismissing
petitioner‘s complaint. Petitioner‘s subsequent motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by

the trial court in its Order dated May 14, 1999. Hence, this petition for review of the said decision
and order of the RTC.

Issue:
Whether or not the demolition or relocation of the petitioner‘s structure will violate the

vested rights of the petitioner over the acquired property under the social justice clause of the
constitution.

Ruling:
Petitioner maintains that she had acquired a vested right over the property subject of this

case on the ground that she had been in possession of it for forty (40) years already. Thus, to order
her relocation and the demolition of her house will infringe the social justice clause guaranteed
under the Constitution.

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Persons and Family Relation

Petitioner‘s contentions must necessarily fail. The NHA‘s authority to order the relocation of
petitioner and the demolition of her property is mandated by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1315.
Under this Decree, the entire Bagong Barrio in Caloocan City was identified as a blighted area and
was thereby declared expropriated. The properties covered under P.D. No. 1315 included
petitioner‘s property. The NHA, as the decree‘s designated administrator for the national
government, was empowered to take possession, control and disposition of the expropriated
properties with the power of demolition of their improvements.

P.D. No. 1315 explicitly vests the NHA the power to immediately take possession, control
and disposition of the expropriated properties with the power of demolition. Clearly, the NHA, by
force of law, has the authority to order the relocation of petitioner, and the demolition of her
structure in case of her refusal as this is the only way through which the NHA can effectively carry
out the implementation of P.D. No. 1315.

Inasmuch as petitioner‘s property was located in the area identified as an open space by the
NHA, her continued refusal to vacate has rendered illegal her occupancy thereat. Thus, in
accordance with P.D. No. 1472, petitioner could lawfully be ejected even without a judicial order.
Neither can it be successfully argued that petitioner had already acquired a vested right over the
subject property when the NHA recognized her as the census owner by assigning to her a tag
number (TAG No. 77-0063).

46

Persons and Family Relation

EFFECT OF REPEALING LAW ON LAW FIRST REPEALED

G.R. No. 165835 GARCIA vs. SANDIGANBAYAN June 22, 2005

Facts:
This is a petition filed by Clarita Garcia, wife or retired Major General Carlos F. Garcia, with

application for injunctive relief in order issued by the Fourth Division of Sandiganbayan denying the
motion to quash or dismiss Civil Case No. 0193. This is a suit for the forfeiture commenced by the
Republic against petitioner and her immediate family.

The forfeiture suit was to recover unlawfully acquired funds and properties that the Garcias
allegedly acquires and amassed. Then Republic then filed the Sandiganbayan through the OMB a
petition for forfeiture of those alleged unlawfully acquires properties of the Garcias. The case was
docketed as civil case 0193(forfeiture I) and subsequently another case of forfeiture involving the
same parties was filed docketed as Civil Case 0196(forfeiture II). Thus the two cases were
consolidated for convenience and clarity. Before the filing of Forfeiture II but subsequent to the
filing of Forfeiture I, the OMB charged the Garcias with violation of RA 7080(plunder) and the case
raffled to the second division of SB. The plunder charge covered substantially the same properties
identified in both Forfeiture I and II.

Petitioner now contends, after denying there motion to dismiss the Forfeiture I case, that the
plunder case and the Forfeiture I case should be consolidated in the second division of SB pursuan
to R 8249. On May 20, 2005, the SB 4th Division denied the motion for the reason that the
forfeiture case is not the corresponding civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the
criminal case of plunder.

Issue:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over petitions for forfeiture under RA

1379.

Ruling:
The Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over forfeiture proceedings pursuant to RA 1379.

Forfeiture proceedings are actions in rem and civil in nature. It is a divestiture of property without
compensation in consequence of an offense.

47

Persons and Family Relation

STARE DECISIS

TING vs. VELEZ-TING

G.R. No. 166562 March 31, 2009

Facts:
On October 21, 1993, after being married for more than 18 years to petitioner and while

their youngest child was only two years old, Carmen filed a verified petition before the RTC of Cebu
City for the declaration of nullity of their marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code. She
claimed that Benjamin suffered from psychological incapacity even at the time of the celebration of
their marriage, which, however, only became manifest thereafter.

On January 9, 1998, the lower court rendered its decision declaring the marriage between
petitioner and respondent null and void. The RTC gave credence to Dr. Onate‘s findings and the
admissions made by Benjamin in the course of his deposition, and found him to be psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage.

On October 19, 2000, the petitioner appealed to the CA, reversing the trial court‘s decision.

Issue:
Whether or not the CA correctly ruled that the requirement of proof of psychological

incapacity for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code
has been realized

Ruling:
No. By the very nature of case involving the application of Article 36, it is logical and

understood to give weight to the expert opinions furnished by psychologists regarding the
psychological temperament of parties in order to determine the root cause, juridical antecedent,
gravity and incurability of the psychological incapacity. However, such opinions, while highly
advisable, are not conditions in granting petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage. At best,
courts must treat such opinions as decisive but not indispensable evidence in determining the merits
of a given case. In fact, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity, then actual medical or psychological examination of the person concerned

need not be resorted to. The trial court, as in any other given case presented before it, must always
base its decision not solely on the expert opinions furnished by the parties but also on the totality of
evidence adduced in the course of the proceedings.

But where, as in this case, the parties had the full opportunity to present professional and
expert opinion of psychiatrists tracing the root cause, gravity and incurability of a party‘s alleged
psychological incapacity, then such expert opinion should be presented and according, be weighed
by the court in deciding whether to grant a petition for nullity of marriage.

The petition for review on certiorari is granted.

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Persons and Family Relation

STARE DECISIS

NEGROS NAVIGATION CO. vs COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 110398 November 7, 1997

Facts:
In April of 1980, private respondent Ramon Miranda purchased from the Negros

Navigation Co., Inc. four special cabin tickets (#74411, 74412, 74413 and 74414) for his wife,
daughter, son and niece who were going to Bacolod City to attend a family reunion. The tickets were
for Voyage No. 457-A of the M/V Don Juan, leaving Manila at 1:00 p.m. on April 22, 1980. The
ship sailed from the port of Manila on schedule.

At about 10:30 in the evening of April 22, 1980, the Don Juan collided off the Tablas Strait
in Mindoro, with the M/T Tacloban City, an oil tanker owned by the Philippine National Oil
Company (PNOC) and the PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation (PNOC/STC). As a result,
the M/V Don Juan sank. Several of her passengers perished in the sea tragedy. The bodies of some
of the victims were found and brought to shore, but the four members of private respondents‘
families were never found.

Private respondents filed a complaint on July 16, 1980 in the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 34, against the Negros Navigation, the Philippine National Oil Company (PNOC), and the
PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation (PNOC/STC), seeking damages for the death of Ardita
de la Victoria Miranda, 48, Rosario V. Miranda, 19, Ramon V. Miranda, Jr., 16, and Elfreda de la
Victoria, 26. In its answer, petitioner admitted that private respondents purchased ticket numbers
74411, 74412, 74413 and 74414; that the ticket numbers were listed in the passenger manifest; and
that the Don Juan left Pier 2, North Harbor, Manila on April 22, 1980 and sank that night after
being rammed by the oil tanker M/T Tacloban City, and that, as a result of the collision, some of the
passengers of the M/V Don Juan died. Petitioner, however, denied that the four relatives of private
respondents actually boarded the vessel as shown by the fact that their bodies were never
recovered. Petitioner further averred that the Don Juan was seaworthy and manned by a full and
competent crew, and that the collision was entirely due to the fault of the crew of the M/T Tacloban
City.

On January 20, 1986, the PNOC and petitioner Negros Navigation Co., Inc. entered into a
compromise agreement whereby petitioner assumed full responsibility for the payment and
satisfaction of all claims arising out of or in connection with the collision and releasing the PNOC
and the PNOC/STC from any liability to it. The agreement was subsequently held by the trial court
to be binding upon petitioner, PNOC and PNOC/STC. Private respondents did not join in the
agreement.

Issues:
a) Whether the members of private respondents‘ families were actually passengers of the Don
Juan;
b) Whether the ruling in Mecenas v. Court of Appeals, finding the crew members of petitioner
to be grossly negligent in the performance of their duties, is binding in this case;
c) Whether the total loss of the M/V Don Juan extinguished petitioner‘s liability; and
d) Whether the damages awarded by the appellate court are excessive, unreasonable and
unwarranted.

49

Persons and Family Relation


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