civil code0101

An appellate court acquires no jurisdiction to review a judgment which, by express provision
of law, is immediately final and executory. The Republic of the Philippines, as oppositor in the
petition for declaration of presumptive death, should not be treated differently. It had no right to
appeal the RTC decision of November 7, 2001. But, if only to set the records straight and for the
future guidance of the bench and the bar, let it be stated that the RTC‘s decision dated November 7,
2001, was immediately final and executory upon notice to the parties. It was erroneous for the OSG
to file a notice of appeal, and for the RTC to give due course thereto. The Court of Appeals
acquired no jurisdiction over the case, and should have dismissed the appeal outright on that
ground.

The Court, therefore, finds in this case grave error on the part of both the RTC and the
Court of Appeals. To stress, the Court of Appeals should have dismissed the appeal on ground of
lack of jurisdiction, and reiterated the fact that the RTC decision of November 7, 2001 was
immediately final and executory.

As it were, the Court of Appeals committed grave reversible error when it failed to dismiss
the erroneous appeal of the Republic on ground of lack of jurisdiction because, by express provision
of law, the judgment was not appealable.

200

Persons and Family Relation

VALID BIGAMOUS MARRIAGES

ANTONIA ARMAS Y CALISTERIO vs. MARIETTA CALISTERIO

G.R. No. 136467 April 6, 2000

Facts:
On 24 April 1992, Teodorico Calisterio died intestate, leaving several parcels of land with an

estimated value of P604,750.00. Teodorico was survived by his wife, herein respondent Marietta
Calisterio.Teodorico was the second husband of Marietta who had previously been married to James
William Bounds on 13 January 1946 at Caloocan City. James Bounds disappeared without a trace on
11 February 1947. Teodorico and Marietta were married eleven years later, or on 08 May 1958,
without Marietta having priorly secured a court declaration that James was presumptively dead.

On 09 October 1992, herein petitioner Antonia Armas y Calisterio, a surviving sister of
Teodorico, filed a petition entitled, "In the Matter of Intestate Estate of the Deceased Teodorico
Calisterio y Cacabelos, Antonia Armas, Petitioner," claiming to be inter alia, the sole surviving heir of
Teodorico Calisterio, the marriage between the latter and respondent Marietta Espinosa Calisterio
being allegedly bigamous and thereby null and void.

Respondent Marietta opposed the petition. Marietta stated that her first marriage with James
Bounds had been dissolved due to the latter's absence, his whereabouts being unknown, for more
than eleven years before she contracted her second marriage with Teodorico. Contending to be the
surviving spouse of Teodorico, she sought priority in the administration of the estate of the
decedent.

On 05 February 1993, the trial court issued an order appointing jointly Sinfroniano C.
Armas, Jr., and respondent Marietta administrator and administratrix, respectively, of the intestate
estate of Teodorico. On 17 January 1996, the lower court handed down its decision in favor of
petitioner Antonia. On 31 August 1998, the appellate court reversed the lower court‘s decision.

Issue:
Whether or not the marriage between the deceased Teodorico and respondent Marietta is

valid, that, in turn, would be determinative of her right as a surviving spouse.

201

Persons and Family Relation

Ruling:
Verily, the applicable specific provision in the instant controversy is Article 83 of the New

Civil Code which provides:
Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first
spouse of such person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void
from its performance, unless:
(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or
(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second

marriage without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or if the absentee,
though he has been absent for less than seven years, is generally considered as dead and believed to
be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is
presumed dead according to articles 390 and 391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of
the three cases until declared null and void by a competent court.

Under the foregoing provisions, a subsequent marriage contracted during the lifetime of the
first spouse is illegal and void ab initio unless the prior marriage is first annulled or dissolved. A
judicial declaration of absence of the absentee spouse is not necessary as long as the prescribed
period of absence is met.

In the case at bar, it remained undisputed that respondent Marietta's first husband, James
William Bounds, had been absent or had disappeared for more than eleven years before she entered
into a second marriage in 1958 with the deceased Teodorico Calisterio. This second marriage, having
been contracted during the regime of the Civil Code, should thus be deemed valid notwithstanding
the absence of a judicial declaration of presumptive death of James Bounds.

The conjugal property of Teodorico and Marietta, no evidence having been adduced to
indicate another property regime between the spouses, pertains to them in common. Upon its
dissolution with the death of Teodorico, the property should rightly be divided in two equal portions
— one portion going to the surviving spouse and the other portion to the estate of the deceased
spouse. The successional right in intestacy of a surviving spouse over the net estate of the deceased,
concurring with legitimate brothers and sisters or nephews and nieces (the latter by right of
representation), is one-half of the inheritance, the brothers and sisters or nephews and nieces, being
entitled to the other half. Nephews and nieces, however, can only succeed by right of representation
in the presence of uncles and aunts; alone, upon the other hand, nephews and nieces can succeed in
their own right which is to say that brothers or sisters exclude nephews and nieces except only in
representation by the latter of their parents who predecease or are incapacitated to succeed. The
appellate court has thus erred in granting, in paragraph (c) of the dispositive portion of its judgment,
successional rights, to petitioner's children, along with their own mother Antonia who herself is
invoking successional rights over the estate of her deceased brother.

It is hereby DECLARED that said one-half share of the decedent's estate pertains solely to
petitioner to the exclusion of her own children.

202

Persons and Family Relation

VALID BIGAMOUS MARRIAGES

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. YOLANDA CADACIO GRANADA

G.R. No. 187512 June 13, 2012

Facts:
In May 1991, respondent Yolanda Cadacio Granada (Yolanda) met Cyrus Granada (Cyrus)

at Sumida Electric Philippines, an electronics company in Paranaque where both were then working.
The two eventually got married at the Manila City Hall on 3 March 1993. Their marriage resulted in
the birth of their son, Cyborg Dean Cadacio Granada.Sometime in May 1994, when Sumida Electric
Philippines closed down, Cyrus went to Taiwan to seek employment. Yolanda claimed that from
that time, she had not received any communication from her husband, notwithstanding efforts to
locate him. Her brother testified that he had asked the relatives of Cyrus regarding the latter‘s
whereabouts, to no avail. After nine (9) years of waiting, Yolanda filed a Petition to have Cyrus
declared presumptively dead. On 7 February 2005, the RTC rendered a Decision declaring Cyrus as
presumptively dead.

In its 23 January 2009 Resolution, the appellate court granted Yolanda‘s Motion to Dismiss
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Citing Republic v. Bermudez-Lorino,the CA ruled that a
petition for declaration of presumptive death under Rule 41 of the Family Code is a summary
proceeding.

Issues:
a) Whether the CA seriously erred in dismissing the Petition on the ground that the Decision
of the RTC in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death is
immediately final and executory upon notice to the parties and, hence, is not subject to
ordinary appeal.
b) Whether the CA seriously erred in affirming the RTC‘s grant of the Petition for Declaration
of Presumptive Death under Article 41 of the Family Code based on the evidence that

respondent presented.

203

Persons and Family Relation

Ruling:
The Supreme Court affirms the CA ruling with regard to the first issue.Clearly, a petition for

declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse for the purpose of contracting a subsequent
marriage under Article 41 of the Family Code is a summary proceeding "as provided for" under the
Family Code. Taken together, Articles 41, 238, 247 and 253 of the Family Code provide that since a
petition for declaration of presumptive death is a summary proceeding, the judgment of the court
therein shall be immediately final and executory.

Article 238 of the Family Code, under Title XI: SUMMARY JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS
IN THE FAMILY LAW, establishes the rules that govern summary court proceedings in the Family
Code/By express provision of law, the judgment of the court in a summary proceeding shall be
immediately final and executory. As a matter of course, it follows that no appeal can be had of the
trial court's judgment in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of an
absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code. It goes without saying, however, that an
aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari to question abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. Such petition should be filed in the Court of Appeals in accordance with the Doctrine
of Hierarchy of Courts. To be sure, even if the Court's original jurisdiction to issue a writ of
certiorari is concurrent with the RTCs and the Court of Appeals in certain cases, such concurrence
does not sanction an unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. From the decision of the Court
of Appeals, the losing party may then file a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court with the Supreme Court. This is because the errors which the court may commit in
the exercise of jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment which are the proper subject of an appeal.

In sum, under Article 41 of the Family Code, the losing party in a summary proceeding for the
declaration of presumptive death may file a petition for certiorari with the CA on the ground that, in
rendering judgment thereon, the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
of jurisdiction. From the decision of the CA, the aggrieved party may elevate the matter to this
Court via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

On whether the CA seriously erred in affirming the RTC‘s grant of the Petition for
Declaration of Presumptive Death under Article 41 of the Family Code based on the evidence that
respondent had presented. The belief of the present spouse must be the result of proper and honest
to goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain the whereabouts of the absent spouse and whether the
absent spouse is still alive or is already dead. Whether or not the spouse present acted on a well-
founded belief of death of the absent spouse depends upon the inquiries to be drawn from a great
many circumstances occurring before and after the disappearance of the absent spouse and the
nature and extent of the inquiries made by present spouse.

Applying the foregoing standards to the present case, petitioner points out that respondent
Yolanda did not initiate a diligent search to locate her absent husband. Nevertheless, we are
constrained to deny the Petition. The RTC ruling on the issue of whether respondent was able to
prove her "well-founded belief" that her absent spouse was already dead prior to her filing of the
Petition to declare him presumptively dead is already final and can no longer be modified or
reversed. Indeed, "[n]othing is more settled in law than that when a judgment becomes final and
executory, it becomes immutable and unalterable. The same may no longer be modified in any

respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion
of fact or law."

204

Persons and Family Relation

MARRIAGE IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 40

ROBERTO DOMINGO vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 104818 September 17, 1993

Facts:
On May 29, 1991, private respondent Delia Soledad A. Domingo filed a petition for

"Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and Separation of Property" against petitioner Roberto
Domingo. The petition which was docketed as Special Proceedings No. 1989-J alleged among others
that: they were married on November 29, 1976 at the YMCA Youth Center Bldg., as evidenced by a
Marriage Contract Registry No. 1277K-76 with Marriage License No. 4999036 issued at Carmona,
Cavite; unknown to her, he had a previous marriage with one Emerlina dela Paz on April 25, 1969
which marriage is valid and still existing; she came to know of the prior marriage only sometime in
1983 when Emerlina dela Paz sued them for bigamy; from January 23 1979 up to the present, she
has been working in Saudi Arabia and she used to come to the Philippines only when she would
avail of the one-month annual vacation leave granted by her foreign employer since 1983 up to the
present, he has been unemployed and completely dependent upon her for support and subsistence;
out of her personal earnings, she purchased real and personal properties with a total amount of
approximately P350,000.00, which are under the possession and administration of Roberto;
sometime in June 1989, while on her one-month vacation, she discovered that he was cohabiting
with another woman; she further discovered that he had been disposing of some of her properties
without her knowledge or consent; she confronted him about this and thereafter appointed her
brother Moises R. Avera as her attorney-in-fact to take care of her properties; he failed and refused
to turn over the possession and administration of said properties to her brother/attorney-in-fact;
and he is not authorized to administer and possess the same on account of the nullity of their
marriage.

On February 7, 1992, the Court of Appealsdismissed the petition. The motion for
reconsideration was subsequently denied for lack of merit.

205

Persons and Family Relation

Issues:
a) Whether or not a petition for judicial declaration of a void marriage is necessary. If in the
affirmative, whether the same should be filed only for purposes of remarriage.
b) Whether or not SP No. 1989-J is the proper remedy of private respondent to recover certain
real and personal properties allegedly belonging to her exclusively.

Ruling:
There is no question that the marriage of petitioner and private respondent celebrated while

the former's previous marriage with one Emerlina de la Paz was still subsisting, is bigamous. As
such, it is from the beginning.Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be
invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for said
projected marriage be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage
void. The invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only on the basis of a final judgment declaring the
marriage invalid, except as provided in Article 41. The Court of Appeals disregarded this argument
and concluded that "the prayer for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may be raised together
with the other incident of their marriage such as the separation of their properties."

The Family Code has clearly provided the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage,
one of which is the separation of property according to the regime of property relations governing
them. It stands to reason that the lower court before whom the issue of nullity of a first marriage is
brought is likewise clothed with jurisdiction to decide the incidental questions regarding the couple's
properties. Accordingly, the respondent court committed no reversible error in finding that the
lower court committed no grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner's motion to dismiss SP
No. 1989-J.

206

Persons and Family Relation

MARRIAGE IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 40

LUPO ALMODIEL ATIENZA vs. JUDGE FRANCISCO F. BRILLANTES, JR.

Adm. Matter No. MTJ-92706 March 29, 1995

Facts:
Complainant alleges that he has two children with Yolanda De Castro, who are living

together at No. 34 Galaxy Street, Bel-Air Subdivision, Makati, Metro Manila. He stays in said house,
which he purchased in 1987, whenever he is in Manila. In December 1991, upon opening the door
to his bedroom, he saw respondent sleeping on his (complainant's) bed. Thereafter, respondent
prevented him from visiting his children and even alienated the affection of his children for him.

Complainant claims that respondent is married to one Zenaida Ongkiko with whom he has
five children, as appearing in his 1986 and 1991 sworn statements of assets and liabilities. For his
part, respondent alleges that complainant was not married to De Castro and that the filing of the
administrative action was related to complainant's claim on the Bel-Air residence, which was
disputed by De Castro. Respondent also denies having been married to Ongkiko, although he
admits having five children with her. He alleges that while he and Ongkiko went through a marriage
ceremony before a Nueva Ecija town mayor on April 25, 1965, the same was not a valid marriage
for lack of a marriage license.

Upon the request of the parents of Ongkiko, respondent went through another marriage
ceremony with her in Manila on June 5, 1965. Again, neither party applied for a marriage license.
Ongkiko abandoned respondent 19 years ago, leaving their children to his care and custody as a
single parent. Respondent claims that when he married De Castro in civil rites in Los Angeles,
California on December 4, 1991, he believed, in all good faith and for all legal intents and purposes,

207

Persons and Family Relation

that he was single because his first marriage was solemnized without a license.

Issue:
Whether or not respondent is guilty of an immoral and illegal act by cohabiting with De

Castro.

Ruling:
Under the Family Code, there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous

marriage before a party thereto can enter into a second marriage. Article 40 is applicable to
remarriages entered into after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 regardless of the
date of the first marriage. Besides, under Article 256 of the Family Code, said Article is given
"retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance
with the Civil Code or other laws."

This is particularly true with Article 40, which is a rule of procedure. Respondent has not
shown any vested right that was impaired by the application of Article 40 to his case. Respondent is
the last person allowed to invoke good faith. He made a mockery of the institution of marriage and
employed deceit to be able to cohabit with a woman, who begot him five children. His failure to
secure a marriage license on these two occasions betrays his sinister motives and bad faith. It is
evident that respondent failed to meet the standard of moral fitness for membership in the legal
profession.

While the deceit employed by respondent existed prior to his appointment as a Metropolitan
Trial Judge, his immoral and illegal act of cohabiting with De Castro began and continued when he
was already in the judiciary. The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must
be free of a whiff of impropriety, not only with respect to his performance of his judicial duties but
also as to his behavior as a private individual. There is no duality of morality. A public figure is also
judged by his private life. A judge, in order to promote public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary, must behave with propriety at all times, in the performance of his
judicial duties and in his everyday life. These are judicial guideposts too self-evident to be
overlooked. No position exacts a greater demand on moral righteousness and uprightness of an
individual than a seat in the judiciary.

208

Persons and Family Relation

CHARACTERISTICS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY

CHI MING TSOI vs. COURT OF APPEALS and GINA LAO-TSOI
G.R. No. 119190 January 16, 1997

Facts:
Sometime on May 22, 1988, the plaintiff married the defendant at the Manila Cathedral,

Intramuros Manila, as evidenced by their Marriage Contract. After the celebration of their marriage
and wedding reception at the South Villa, Makati, they went and proceeded to the house of
defendant's mother. In an effort to have their honeymoon in a private place where they can enjoy
together during their first week as husband and wife, they went to Baguio City. But, they did so
together with her mother, an uncle, his mother and his nephew. They were all invited by the
defendant to join them. They stayed in Baguio City for four (4) days. But, during this period, there
was no sexual intercourse between them, since the defendant avoided her by taking a long walk
during siesta time or by just sleeping on a rocking chair located at the living room. They slept
together in the same room and on the same bed since May 22, 1988 until March 15, 1989. But
during this period, there was no attempt of sexual intercourse between them.

She claims, that she did not: even see her husband's private parts nor did he see hers.
Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical examinations to Dr. Eufemio Macalalag, a
urologist at the Chinese General Hospital, on January 20, 1989. The results of their physical
examinations were that she is healthy, normal and still a virgin, while that of her husband's
examination was kept confidential up to this time. While no medicine was prescribed for her, the

209

Persons and Family Relation

doctor prescribed medications for her husband which was also kept confidential. No treatment was
given to her. For her husband, he was asked by the doctor to return but he never did.

The plaintiff claims, that the defendant is impotent, a closet homosexual as he did not show
his penis. She said, that she had observed the defendant using an eyebrow pencil and sometimes the
cleansing cream of his mother. And that, according to her, the defendant married her, a Filipino
citizen, to acquire or maintain his residency status here in the country and to publicly maintain the
appearance of a normal man.

In open Court, the Trial Prosecutor manifested that there is no collusion between the parties
and that the evidence is not fabricated."After trial, the court rendered judgment, the dispositive
portion of which reads: ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered declaring as void. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision. Hence, the instant petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in holding that the refusal of private respondent to have sexual

communion with petitioner is a psychological incapacity inasmuch as proof thereof is totally absent.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court finds the petition to be bereft of merit.The case has reached this Court

because petitioner does not want their marriage to be annulled. This only shows that there is no
collusion between the parties. When petitioner admitted that he and his wife (private respondent)
have never had sexual contact with each other, he must have been only telling the truth. Appellant
admitted that he did not have sexual relations with his wife after almost ten months of cohabitation,
and it appears that he is not suffering from any physical disability. Such abnormal reluctance or
unwillingness to consummate his marriage is strongly indicative of a serious personality disorder
which to the mind of this Court clearly demonstrates an 'utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage' within the meaning of Article 36 of the Family Code.

First, it must be stated that neither the trial court nor the respondent court made a finding
on who between petitioner and private respondent refuses to have sexual contact with the other.
The fact remains, however, that there has never been coitus between them. At any rate, since the
action to declare the marriage void may be filed by either party, i.e., even the psychologically
incapacitated, the question of who refuses to have sex with the other becomes immaterial.If a
spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential marriage
obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes
to psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to
psychological incapacity. Thus, the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual intercourse with his
or her spouse is considered a sign of psychological incapacity.

Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is "To procreate
children based on the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is
the basic end of marriage." Constant non- fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the
integrity or wholeness of the marriage. In the case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of one
of the parties to fulfill the above marital obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity.

210

Persons and Family Relation

While the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe
mutual love, respect and fidelity (Art. 68, Family Code), the sanction therefor is actually the
"spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and wife and not any legal mandate or court
order" (Cuaderno vs. Cuaderno 120 Phil. 1298). Love is useless unless it is shared with another.
Indeed, no man is an island, the cruelest act of a partner in marriage is to say "I could not have cared
less." This is so because an ungiven self is an unfulfilled self. The egoist has nothing but himself. In
the natural order, it is sexual intimacy which brings spouses wholeness and oneness. Sexual intimacy
is a gift and a participation in the mystery of creation. It is a function which enlivens the hope of
procreation and ensures the continuation of family relations.

It appears that there is absence of empathy between petitioner and private respondent. That
is — a shared feeling which between husband and wife must be experienced not only by having
spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep sense of spiritual communion. Marital union is a two-way
process. An expressive interest in each other's feelings at a time it is needed by the other can go a
long way in deepening the marital relationship. Marriage is definitely not for children but for two
consenting adults who view the relationship with love amor gignit amorem, respect, sacrifice and a
continuing commitment to compromise, conscious of its value as a sublime social institution.
This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties found themselves
trapped in its mire of unfulfilled vows and unconsummated marital obligations, can do no less but
sustain the studied judgment of respondent appellate court.

CHARACTERISTICS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY

LEOUEL SANTOS vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND JULIA

G.R. No. 112019 ROSARIO BEDIA-SANTOS January 4, 1995

Facts:
Leouel, who then held the rank of First Lieutenant in the Philippine Army, first met Julia.

The meeting later proved to be an eventful day for Leouel and Julia. On 20 September 1986, the two
exchanged vows before Municipal Trial Court Judge Cornelio G. Lazaro of Iloilo City, followed,
shortly thereafter, by a church wedding. Leouel and Julia lived with the latter's parents at the J. Bedia
Compound, La Paz, Iloilo City. On 18 July 1987, Julia gave birth to a baby boy, and he was
christened Leouel Santos, Jr. The ecstasy, however, did not last long. It was bound to happen,
Leouel averred, because of the frequent interference by Julia's parents into the young spouses family
affairs. Occasionally, the couple would also start a "quarrel" over a number of other things, like
when and where the couple should start living independently from Julia's parents or whenever Julia
would express resentment on Leouel's spending a few days with his own parents.

On 18 May 1988, Julia finally left for the United Sates of America to work as a nurse despite
Leouel's pleas to so dissuade her. Seven months after her departure, or on 01 January 1989, Julia
called up Leouel for the first time by long distance telephone. She promised to return home upon

211

Persons and Family Relation

the expiration of her contract in July 1989. She never did. When Leouel got a chance to visit the
United States, where he underwent a training program under the auspices of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines from 01 April up to 25 August 1990, he desperately tried to locate, or to somehow
get in touch with, Julia but all his efforts were of no avail.

A possible collusion between the parties to obtain a decree of nullity of their marriage was
ruled out by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor (in its report to the court).

Issue:
Whether or not Leouel‘s marriage with Julia can be declared invalid.

Ruling:
It could well be that, in sum, the Family Code Revision Committee in ultimately deciding to

adopt the provision with less specificity than expected, has in fact, so designed the law as to allow
some resiliency in its application. Mme. Justice Alicia V. Sempio-Diy, a member of the Code
Committee, has been quoted by Mr. Justice Josue N. Bellosillo in Salita vs. Hon. Magtolis (G.R. No.
106429, 13 June 1994); thus:The Committee did not give any examples of psychological incapacity
for fear that the giving of examples would limit the applicability of the provision under the principle
of ejusdem generis. Rather, the Committee would like the judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-
case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines,
and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given
persuasive effect since the provision was taken from Canon Law.

A part of the provision is similar to Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which
reads:

Canon 1095. They are incapable of contracting marriage:
1. who lack sufficient use of reason;
2. who suffer from a grave defect of discretion of judgment concerning essentila matrimonial rights and duties,
to be given and accepted mutually;
3. who for causes of psychological nature are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage.

Accordingly, although neither decisive nor even perhaps all that persuasive for having no
juridical or secular effect, the jurisprudence under Canon Law prevailing at the time of the code's
enactment, nevertheless, cannot be dismissed as impertinent for its value as an aid, at least, to the
interpretation or construction of the codal provision. So the progress was from psycho-sexual to
psychological anomaly, then the term anomaly was altogether eliminated. it would be, however,
incorrect to draw the conclusion that the cause of the incapacity need not be some kind of
psychological disorder; after all, normal and healthy person should be able to assume the ordinary
obligations of marriage.

This incapacity consists of the following: (a) a true inability to commit oneself to the essentials
of marriage. Some psychosexual disorders and other disorders of personality can be the psychic
cause of this defect, which is here described in legal terms. This particular type of incapacity consists
of a real inability to render what is due by the contract. This could be compared to the incapacity of a
farmer to enter a binding contract to deliver the crops which he cannot possibly reap; (b) this
inability to commit oneself must refer to the essential obligations of marriage: the conjugal act, the

212

Persons and Family Relation

community of life and love, the rendering of mutual help, the procreation and education of
offspring; (c) the inability must be tantamount to a psychological abnormality. The mere difficulty of
assuming these obligations, which could be overcome by normal effort, obviously does not constitute incapacity. The
canon contemplates a true psychological disorder which incapacitates a person from giving what is due (cf. John Paul
II, Address to R. Rota, Feb. 5, 1987). However, if the marriage is to be declared invalid under this
incapacity, it must be proved not only that the person is afflicted by a psychological defect, but that
the defect did in fact deprive the person, at the moment of giving consent, of the ability to assume the
essential duties of marriage and consequently of the possibility of being bound by these duties.

Marriage is not an adventure but a lifetime commitment. We should continue to be
reminded that innate in our society, then enshrined in our Civil Code, and even now still indelible in
Article 1 of the Family Code. The above provisions express so well and so distinctly the basic
nucleus of our laws on marriage and the family, and they are doubt the tenets we still hold on to.

The factual settings in the case at bench, in no measure at all, can come close to the
standards required to decree a nullity of marriage. Undeniably and understandably, Leouel stands
aggrieved, even desperate, in his present situation. Regrettably, neither law nor society itself can
always provide all the specific answers to every individual problem.

The petition is denied.

CHARACTERISTICS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY

LUCITA ESTRELLA HERNANDEZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 126010 December 8, 1999

Facts:
Petitioner Lucita Estrella Hernandez and private respondent Mario C. Hernandez were

married and three children were born to them. On July 10, 1992, petitioner filed before the Regional
Trial Court, a petition seeking the annulment of her marriage to private respondent on the ground
of psychological incapacity of the latter. She claimed that private respondent, after they were
married, cohabited with another woman with whom he had an illegitimate child, while having affairs
with different women, and that, because of his promiscuity, private respondent endangered her
health by infecting her with a sexually transmissible disease (STD). Petitioner prayed that for having
abandoned the family, private respondent be ordered to give support to their three children in the
total amount of P9,000.00 every month; that she be awarded the custody of their children; and that
she be adjudged as the sole owner of a parcel of land located in Cavite.

213

Persons and Family Relation

On April 10, 1993, the trial court rendered a decision dismissing the petition for annulment
of marriage filed by petitioner. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which, on January 30,
1996, rendered its decision affirming the decision of the trial court. Hence, this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the marriage of petitioner and private respondent should be annulled on the

ground of private respondent's psychological incapacity.

Ruling:
In Santos v. Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court held:"Psychological incapacity" should

refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of
the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the
marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations
to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any
doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity"
to the most serious cases of personality, disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychological condition must exist at
the time the marriage is celebrated. The law does not evidently envision, upon the other hand, an
inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This conclusion is implicit under
Article 54 of the Family Code which considers children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of
nullity of the void marriage to be "legitimate."

The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the state of a
party being of unsound mind or concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality
or lesbianism, merely renders the marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If
drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality should occur only during the
marriage, they become mere grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code.
These provisions of the Code, however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility of these various
circumstances being themselves, depending on the degree and severity of the disorder, indicia of
psychological incapacity.

Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are established, every circumstance
that may have some bearing on the degree, extent, and other conditions of that incapacity must, in
every case, be carefully examined and evaluated so that no precipitate and indiscriminate nullity is
peremptorily decreed. The well-considered opinions of psychiatrists, psychologists, and persons with
expertise in psychological disciplines might be helpful or even desirable.

The Court, therefore, find no reason to reverse the ruling of respondent Court of Appeals
whose conclusions, affirming the trial court's finding with regard to the non-existence of private
respondent's psychological incapacity at the time of the marriage, are entitled to great weight and
even finality.

The conclusion we have reached makes it unnecessary for us to pass upon petitioner's
contentions on the issue of permanent custody of children, the amount for their respective support,
and the declaration of exclusive ownership of petitioner over the real property. These matters may

214

Persons and Family Relation

more appropriately be litigated in a separate proceeding for legal separation, dissolution of property
regime, and/or custody of children which petitioner may bring.

CHARACTERISTICS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY

YAMBAO vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 184063 January 24. 2011

Facts:
Petitioner Cynthia E. Yambao and respondent Patricio E. Yambao married on December

21, 1968. On July 11, 2003, after 35 years of marriage and three children raised into adulthood,
petitioner filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court, Makati City, praying the marriage be
declared null and void due to her husband‘s psychological incapacity pursuant to Article 36 of the
Family Code. Petitioner claims that her marriage is marred by bickering, quarrels and recrimination
because of the respondent‘s difficulty to find a stable job, failure in the family business, refusal to

change children‘s diapers while petitioner was still recovering from her Caesarean operation,
insecurity and jealousy towards acquaintances and relatives, eating and sleeping all day, gambling,

215

Persons and Family Relation

and threats to kill her. She then consulted with a psychiatrist who concluded that the respondent
suffered from Dependent Personality Disorder. On February 9, 2007, the Regional Trial Court
dismissed the petition for lack of merit. On April 16, 2008, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
Regional Trial Court‘s Decision; hence, this petition for review before the Supreme Court.

Issue:
Whether or not the totality of petitioner‘s evidence establishes the respondent‘s

psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage.

Ruling:
No. Though there are existing antecedents, assumptions, predilections, or generalizations,

this case must be treated uniquely, given its facts and idiosyncrasies. For marriage to be annulled
under Article 36 of the Family Code, it must be proven that the incapacitated spouse manifested
mental, not physical, incapacity causing him or her to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants. The spouse must suffer from a mental incapacity so severe that he is and becomes
unaware of his marital and familial obligations. Psychological incapacity must be judged according
to:

(a) gravity,

(b) juridical antecedence, and

(c) incurability.

Article 36 considers incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital
obligations as totally different from mere difficulty, refusal, neglect or ill will in the performance of
marital obligations. Incapacity is defined as:

(a) true inability to commit oneself to the essentials of marriage;

(b) this inability to commit oneself must refer to the essential obligations of marriage: the conjugal act, the
community of life and love, the rendering of mutual help, the procreation and education of offspring; and

(c) the inability must be tantamount to a psychological abnormality.
All marriages go through ―bickerings, quarrels and recrimination‖ and rough patches. In this
case, the respondent may not be the ideal husband for petitioner‘s exacting standards but they have
gone through 35 years of marriage and have raised 3 children into adulthood ―without any major
parenting problems‖. Moreover, respondent never committed infidelity or physically abused the
petitioner or their children. These facts do not prove psychological incapacity.

216

Persons and Family Relation

GUIDELINES IN DETERMINING PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MOLINA
G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997

Facts:
On April 14, 1985, Roridel Olaviano Molina, respondent was married to Reynaldo Molina at

the Church of Saint Augustine, Manila. From their marriage was borne a child named Albert Andre
Olaviano Molina. After a year of marriage, Reynaldo started exhibiting signs of ―immaturity and
irresponsibility‖. He preferred to spend more time with the company of his friends and peers on

whom he squandered money, he depended on his parents for aid and assistance, ;and he was never
honest with the family finances. These circumstances led to frequent quarrels between the petitioner

217

Persons and Family Relation

and respondent. In February 1986, Reynaldo was relieved of his job in Manila, making Roridel the
sole breadwinner.

On October 1986, they were both estranged from each other. In February 1986, Roridel
moved back to Baguio with her parents and a few weeks later Reynaldo abandoned Roridel and left
Albert in her custody. Reynaldo admitted that he and Roridel could no longer live together as
husband and wife because of Roridel‘s strange behavior and insistence to leave his group of friends
eve after their marriage, Roridel‘s refusal to perform some of her marital duties like cooking meals,
and Roridel‘s failure to run the household and handle their finances. On May, 1991, the Regional
Trial Court of Baguio rendered judgment and declared the marriage void. The Court of Appeals
affirmed in toto the Regional Trial Court‘s decision.

Issue:
Whether or not ―opposing and conflicting personalities‖ is equivalent to psychological

incapacity.

Ruling:

No. Psychological incapacity must be judged according to: (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability. In this case, there was no clear showing of the psychological
incapacity but the mere showing of difficulty, refusal, neglect and irreconcilable differences and
conflicting personalities which do not constitute psychological incapacity. In this case, it is not
enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons.
Essentially, it must be shown that they are incapable of doing so due to some psychological, not
physical, illness. Although there was evidence that the couple could not get along or are
incompatible with each other, there was no evidence of the gravity of the psychological incapacity;
neither its juridical antecedence nor incurability. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the
incapacity must be psychological, not physical.

The following guidelines must be proved in invoking psychological incapacity:
(1) The burden of proof to show nullity of the marriage lies in the plaintiff;
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be
a. Medically or clinically identified,
b. Alleged in the complaint,
c. Sufficiently proven by experts, and
d. Clearly explained in the decision.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at ―the time of the celebration‖ of the marriage.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family
Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code
in regard to parents and their children.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church
in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.

218

Persons and Family Relation

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear
as counsel for the state.

GUIDELINES IN DETERMINING PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY

G.R. No. 130087 BARCELONA vs. COURT OF APPEALS
September 24, 2003

Facts:
Diana M. Barcelona, petitioner, and Tadeo R. Bengzon, respondent were legally married at

Holy Cross Parish after a whirlwind courtship. They established their residence at Quezon City and
begot five children. The couple had frequent quarrels because Diana was from a rich family, was a

219

Persons and Family Relation

disorganized housekeeper and was frequently out of the house playing tennis all day. During a family
crisis where Diana suffered from several miscarriages and during sickness of a child, the petitioner
would withdraw herself and would not talk to the husband. During her pregnancy, she would insist
the husband to offer her more freedom and leave their conjugal dwelling. The husband would
eventually leave and the both of them would eventually become estranged from each other.

On March 29, 1995, respondent Tadeo R. Bengzon filed a Petition for Annulment of
Marriage on the grounds of psychological incapacity against petitioner Diana M. Barcelona. On July
21, 1995, respondent filed a second Petition for Annulment of Marriage against the petitioner.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that the second petition fails to state a cause of
action and that it violated Supreme Court Circular No. 04-49 in failing to state the filing of a
previous petition for annulment of marriage, its termination and status.

On September 18, 1996, in an Order (first Order) Judge Julieto P. Tabiolo deferred
resolution of the Motion until the parties have ventilated their arguments in a hearing. Petitioner
filed a motion for reconsideration. However, on January 21, 1997, the trial court through Pairing
Judge Rosalina L. Luna Pison issued an Order (second Order) denying the motion for
reconsideration on the ground that when the ground for dismissal is the complaint‘s failure to state a
cause of action, the trial court determines such fact solely from the petition itself. According to
Judge Pison, a perusal of the allegations in the second petition shows that petitioner has violated
respondent‘s right, thus resulting to a cause of action. Judge Pison also rejected petitioner‘s claim
that respondent was guilty of forum shopping explaining that when respondent filed the second
petition, the first petition was no longer pending and was dismissed without prejudice.

The Court of Appeals affirmed with the Regional Trial Court‘s decision that the allegations
in the second petition state a cause of action sufficient to sustain a valid judgment if proven true as
well as the decision that the respondent has not committed forum shopping.

Issues:
a) Whether or not the second petition for annulment sufficiently states the cause of action.
b) Whether or not the respondent violated Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 04-49
in failing to state the filing of a previous petition for annulment of marriage, its termination
and status.

Ruling:
Yes. The second petition states a legal cause of action since it states the legal right of

respondent, the correlative obligation of the petitioner, and the act or omission of the petitioner in
violation of the legal right. After Santos and Molina, the new Rules on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages provided that expert opinions need
not be alleged, to wit:

SEC. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages –
x x x.
(d) What to allege. – A petition under Article 36 of the Family Code shall specifically allege the
complete facts showing that either or both parties were psychologically incapacitated from complying

220

Persons and Family Relation

with the essential marital obligations of marriage at the time of the celebration of marriage even if
such incapacity becomes manifest only after its celebration.

No. The first petition was already dismissed without prejudice. Therefore, there is no litis
pendentia since respondent has already withdrawn and caused the dismissal of the first petition
when he subsequently filed the second petition. Neither is there res judicata because the dismissal
order was not a decision on the merits but a dismissal ―without prejudice‖.

GUIDELINES IN DETERMINING PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY

G.R. No. 157610 TONGOL vs. TONGOL October 19, 2007

Facts:

221

Persons and Family Relation

On August 27, 1967, petitioner Orlando G. Tongol and respondent Filipinas M. Tongol
were married. From their marriage they begot four children.

On August 19, 1996, Orlando filed before the Regional Trial Court, Makati a verified
petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Filipinas on the ground that she is
psychologically incapacitated to comply with her essential marital obligations.

In his petition, Orlando stated that he and Filipinas‘ marriage was objected by the latter‘s
family. The continuous interference of Filipinas‘ parents, their attempts to break up their union and
their influence on Filipinas made their marriage an unhappy one. Because of the influence of
Filipinas‘ parents, she regarded Orlando with contempt. When Orlando started a junk shop
business, he was met with ridicule, instead of encouragement, from his wife. Eventually, his junk
shop business flourished and became profitable enough for Orlando to embark on a new business
venture by putting up a pharmaceutical company. Filipinas became interested and began to interfere
with the operation of the business; however, the employees of the company were aloof. She also
resented that her husband was getting along with the employees and, as a result, was the subject of
their frequent and continued quarrels. She even suspected Orlando of diverting the income of his
business to his relatives. The continued fighting persisted and affected their children.

Filipinas, in her counter-petition claimed that the marriage was, indeed, fruitless; however,
this was the fault of Orlando‘s psychological incapacity. In 1990, Orlando decided to live separately
from Filipinas and on May 13, 1994, Orlando and Filipinas filed a petition for dissolution of their
conjugal partnership gains, granted by the Makati Regional Trial Court.

Evidence for Orlando consisted of his testimony, his sister‘s, his employee‘s, and Dr. Cecilia
Villegas‘ psychological examination of both parties. Meanwhile, evidence for the respondent only
consisted of her testimony.

The Regional Trial Court dismissed the petition. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
Regional Trial Court‘s decision in toto.

Issue:
Whether or not respondent is psychologically incapacitated.

Ruling:
No. First, psychological incapacity must be more than just ―difficulty‖, ―refusal‖ or

―neglect‖. Second, the personality disorder or psychological incapacity of the respondent must be
grave enough to bring about her disability to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Third,
there was no evidence that the psychological incapacity is incurable. Fourth, the psychological
incapacity considered in Article 36 must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not
necessarily to those not related to marriage like, in this case, the family business. Marriage
obligations must correspond to the management of the household and the provision of support for
the family. Fifth, marital obligations must not only include the spouse‘s obligation to the spouse but
also that to her children. No evidence was shown that the respondent was negligent in the rearing
and care of her children as enumerated in Article 220 of the Family Code. Although, the respondent

222

Persons and Family Relation

exhibited Inadequate Personality Disorder, there was no evidence to prove that, indeed, the
respondent was incapacitated or incapable of complying with the essential obligations of marriage.

GUIDELINES IN DETERMINING PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY

MARCOS vs. MARCOS

223

Persons and Family Relation

G.R. No. 136490 October 19, 2000

Facts:
Petitioner Brenda B. Marcos and respondent Wilson G. Marcos married twice. First was on

September 6, 1982, with Judge Eriberto H. Espiritu as solemnizing officer of the marriage held at
the Municipal Court of Pasig and second was on May 8, 1983 by Rev. Eduardo L. Eleazar,
Command Chaplain at the Presidential Security Command Chapel in Malacañang Park, Manila. They
were both military personnel. They begot 5 (five) children. Wilson left military service in 1987 and
started a business that did not prosper. Brenda put up a business until she was able to put up a
trading and construction company.Their frequent quarrels stemmed from the petitioner‘s urges on
respondent to be gainfully employed to convince their children that their father, as the breadwinner,
is the head of the family and a good provider. Because of Wilson‘s failure to provide for his family,
he began beating the children for slight mistakes and forcibly having sex with his already weary wife.
The tipping point was when they had a quarrel on October 16, 1994 when she did not want him to
stay in their house anymore. Wilson became violent and inflicted physical harm on her and her
mother. The following day, Brenda and her children sought refuge at her sister‘s house. On October
19, 1994, she was diagnosed with contusions from the bitter quarrel. The Regional Trial Court found
respondent to be psychologically incapacitated. The Court of Appeals negated the Regional Trial
Court‘s ruling.

Issues:
a) Whether or not personal medical or psychological evaluation is a requirement for the
declaration of psychological incapacity.
b) Whether or not the demeanor or behaviors of the respondents determine psychological
incapacity.

Ruling:
No. The guidelines in Santos and Molina do not require that a physician examine the person

to be declared psychologically incapacitated even if the root cause be ―medically or clinically
identified‖. What is most important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the
party‘s psychological condition. If the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination is not necessary.

No. Although the respondent failed to provide material support to the family and may have
resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, these do not necessitate psychological incapacity. The
evidence presented do not zero in on the Santos and Molina guidelines on psychological incapacity.
The behaviors can be attributed to the respondent‘s loss of employment for a period of more than
six years. It was from this that he became intermittently drunk, failed to give material and moral
support and leave the family home. Therefore, his psychological incapacity can be traced to this
certain period and not before the marriage nor during the inception of the marriage. Equally
important, the condition was not proven to be incurable, especially now that he is again gainfully
employed as a taxi driver.

GUIDELINES IN DETERMINING PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY

224

Persons and Family Relation

G.R. No. 161793 TE vs. TE February 13, 2009

Facts:
In January 1996, Petitioner Edward Kenneth Ngo Te decided to court Rowena Ong

Gutierrez Yu-Te after seeing her in a Filipino-Chinese association in their college. He decided to
court Rowena after learning that her close friend had a boyfriend. They shared the same angst
towards their families and developed a closeness with each other. In March 1996, Rowena asked
Edward that they elope despite being bickering about being young and jobless. Edward eventually
gave in to Rowena‘s plans, left Manila, and sailed for Cebu that month with P80,000 pension. He
provided the traveling money and she purchased their boat ticket. Because of their house
accommodation, daily sustenance and joblessness, their pension lasted for only a month. After
Edward proceeded to his parents‘ home, Rowena kept on telephoning him and threatening him that
she would commit suicide. Edward agreed to stay with Rowena at her uncle‘s place.

On April 23, 1996, Rowena‘s uncle brought the two to court to get married. He was 25 years
old and she was 20. They continued to stay at her uncle‘s place but he Edward was being treated like
a prisoner. In one instance, Rowena insisted Edward to claim his inheritance so they could live
independently but this request was angrily denied by his father who insisted that Edward go home
else, he would be disinherited. After a month, Edward escaped from the house of Rowena‘s uncle
and stayed with his parents. His family hid him from Rowena when she called. In June 1996,
Edward was able to talk to Rowena but, unmoved by Edward‘s persistence that they live together,

she decided that they should separate ways. On January 18, 2000, Edward filed a petition before the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for the annulment of his marriage with Rowena on the ground
of psychological incapacity.

On August 23, 2000, the Office of the City Prosecutor submitted an investigation report
stating that it could not determine if there was collusion between the parties and therefore,
recommended trial on the merits. Upon the findings of the clinical psychologist of psychological
incapacity of Edward (dependent personality disorder) and Rowena (narcissistic and antisocial
personality disorder), the Regional Trial Court declared the marriage null and void. However, the
Appellate Court reversed and set aside the Trial Court‘s decision on the ground that the clinical

psychologist did not examine the respondent and merely banked on the testimony of the petitioner.

Issue:
Whether or not the marriage is null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity given

the petitioner‘s totality of evidence.

Ruling:
Yes. The courts must not discount but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence the

expert opinion on the psychological and mental temperaments of the parties. The psychological
assessment adequately, sufficiently and decisively points to Edward‘s dependent personality disorder
and Rowena‘s narcissistic and anti-social personality disorder. Also, the Regional Trial Court viewed,

at first-hand, the witnesses‘ deportment. With Edward‘s affliction of dependent personality disorder,
he cannot assume the essential marital obligations of living together, observing love and respect and
rendering help and support because he is unable to make everyday decisions without advice from

225

Persons and Family Relation

others, allows others to make most of his important decisions, tends to agree with people even when
he believes they are wrong, has difficulty doing things on his own, volunteers to do things that are
demeaning in order to get approval from other people, feels uncomfortable or helpless when alone
and is often preoccupied with fears of being abandoned. The petitioner followed everything dictated
to him by the persons around him. He is insecure, weak and gullible, has no sense of his identity as a
person, has no cohesive self to speak of, and has no goals and clear direction in life.Rowena‘s
affliction with antisocial personality disorder makes her unable to assume the essential marital
obligations.

This finding takes into account her disregard for the rights of others, her abuse,
mistreatment and control of others without remorse, her tendency to blame others, and her
intolerance of the conventional behavioral limitations imposed by society.Moreover, as shown in
this case, respondent is impulsive and domineering; she had no qualms in manipulating petitioner
with her threats of blackmail and of committing suicide.Both parties being afflicted with grave,
severe and incurable psychological incapacity, the precipitous marriage they contracted on April 23,
1996 is thus, declared null and void, reversing and setting aside the decision of the appellate court.

226

Persons and Family Relation

GUIDELINES IN DETERMINING PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY

G.R. No. 170729 AGRAVIADOR vs. AGRAVIADOR
December 8, 2010

Facts:
In 1971, Petitioner Enrique A. Agraviador met respondent Erlinda Amparo-Agraviador at a

beerhouse where Erlinda worked. The petitioner was a 24-year old security guard of the Bureau of
Customs while the respondent was a 17-year old waitress. They soon entered a common-law
relationship. On May 23, 1973, the petitioner and the respondent married in a ceremony officiated
by Reverend Juanito Reyes at a church in Tondo Manila. The petitioner‘s family was apprehensive
because of the nature of the respondent‘s work and that she came from a broken family. They begot
four (4) children. On March 1, 2001, Enrique filed with the Regional Trial Court a petition of the
nullity of his marriage with Erlinda. Petitioner alleged that Erlinda was carefree, irresponsible
immature and whimsical, and refused to do household chores like cleaning and cooking; stayed away
from their conjugal dwelling for long periods of time; had an affair with a lesbian; did not take care
of their sick child; consulted a witch doctor in order to bring him bad fate; and refused to use the
family name Agraviador in her activities. Enrique also claimed that Erlinda refused to have sex with
him since 1993 because she became ―very close‖ to a male tenant in their house, discovered their
love notes, and even caught them inside his room several times. Respondent denied that she
engaged in extra-marital affairs and maintained that it was Enrique who refused to have sex with her.

She claimed that the petitioner wanted to have their marriage annulled because he wanted to marry

their former household helper, Gilda Camarin. She added that she was the one who took care of
their son at the hospital before he died. The Regional Trial Court ordered to investigate if collusion
existed between parties. On November 20, 2001, the Regional Trial Court then allowed the
petitioner to present his evidence ex parte. The petitioner presented testimonial and documentary
evidence as well as a certified true copy of their marriage contract and the psychiatric evaluation
report of Dr. Juan Cirilo L. Patac which found that respondent was afflicted with mixed personality
disorder. The Appellate Court, however, reversed and set aside the Regional Trial Court‘s decision
on the grounds that the psychiatric evaluation report failed to establish that the mental incapacity
was serious, grave and permanent.

Issue:
Whether or not the totality of evidence established the respondent‘s psychological

incapacity.

Ruling:
No. The petitioner‘s testimony established ―difficulty‖, ―refusal‖, and ―neglect‖. However, it

did not reveal utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.
Moreover, Dr. Patac‘s psychological report only enumerated the respondent‘s behavioral defects but
failed to prove the gravity or seriousness of the psychological incapacity. Psychological incapacity
must be judged according to: (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. Additionally,
the Molina case set stricter guidelines in establishing psychological incapacity:

(1) The burden of proof to show nullity of the marriage lies in the plaintiff;
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be

a. Medically or clinically identified,

227

Persons and Family Relation

b. Alleged in the complaint,
c. Sufficiently proven by experts, and
d. Clearly explained in the decision.
Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological, not physical.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at ―the time of the celebration‖ of the marriage.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as
regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to
parents and their children.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as
counsel for the state.

These guidelines were incorporated with the basic requirements established in Santos. In
Marcos v. Marcos, it was no longer necessary for the defendant or respondent spouse to be
personally examined by a physician or psychologist. Accordingly, it is no longer necessary to
introduce expert opinion under Article 36 of the Family Code so long as gravity, juridical
antecedence, and incurability can be duly established. In Ngo Te v. Yu-Te, Ting vs. Velez-Ting, and
Suazo vs. Suazo. the Molina precedent was flexibly applied (yet never abandoned) instead of used as
a strict criteria or ―straightjacket‖.

228

Persons and Family Relation

GUIDELINES IN DETERMINING PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY

G.R. No. 178741 MARABLE vs. MARABLE January 17, 2011

Facts:
In 1967, petitioner Rosalino L. Marable and respondent Myrna F. Marable met while still

classmates studying at Arellano University. He only became attracted to her only after they
happened to sit beside each other in a passenger bus. Despite having a girlfriend, petitioner courted
the respondent and eventually became sweethearts with Myrna demanding more love, time and
attention from Rosalino who appreciated this gesture. On December 19, 1970, the two eloped and
were married in civil rites at Tanay, Rizal before Mayor Antonio C. Esguerra. This was followed by a
church wedding on December 30, 1970 at the Chapel of the Muntinlupa Bilibid Prison. They begot
five children. The relationship turned sour. Verbal and physical quarrels increased when their eldest
daughter transferred from several schools because of juvenile misconduct and had an unwanted
teenage pregnancy. Rosalino then sought for peace, love and affection from a relationship with
another woman. Myrna eventually found out about the affair. These aggravated their quarrels. Their
business ventures failed. Rosalino felt unloved, unwanted, and unappreciated; felt indifferent toward
the respondent; left the conjugal home; gave up all properties; and converted to Islam after dating
several women. On October 8, 2001, petitioner filed a petition for declaration of nullity of his

marriage with respondent on grounds of psychological incapacity. Petitioner also alleged that his
family background from a poor family and his father being a compulsive gambler and womanizer,
made him obsess for attention and strive for success only to find himself in misery and loneliness
because of the void in his relationship with his family. To support these, petitioner presented the
Psychological Report of Dr. Nedy L. Tayag and stated that he suffered from Antisocial Personality
Disorder. The Regional Trial Court rendered a Decision annulling the marriage while the Court of
Appeals reversed the said decision.

Issues:
Whether or not the totality of evidence established psychological incapacity therefore

rendering the marriage null and void.

Ruling:
No. The findings of Dr. Tayag‘s psychological report merely made a general conclusion that

the petitioner suffered from Anti-Social Personality Disorder; however, it failed to prove the root
cause of the psychological incapacity. It also failed to fit into the framework of the Molina Doctrine.
Moreover, there was no factual basis that the petitioner was a socially deviant, rebellious, impulsive,
self-centered and deceitful person. In fact, he was proven to act responsibly during the marriage by
working hard to provide for his family especially his children. Petitioner also tried to make it appear
that his family background was one of the reasons why he engaged in extra-marital affairs when,
actually, he was simply dissatisfied with his marriage. He was also shown to have learned from his
extra-marital affairs and has immediately terminated them.

In short, petitioner‘s marital infidelity, their squabbles, and conflicts in child-rearingdoes not
appear to be symptomatic of a grave psychological disorder which rendered him incapable of

229

Persons and Family Relation

performing his spousal obligations. It has been held in various cases that sexual infidelity, by itself, is
not sufficient proof that petitioner is suffering from psychological incapacity.It must be shown that
the acts of unfaithfulness are manifestations of a disordered personality which make petitioner
completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of marriage.That not being the case with
petitioner, his claim of psychological incapacity must fail. It bears stressing that psychological
incapacity must be more than just a "difficulty," "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some
marital obligations. Rather, it is essential that the concerned party was incapable of doing so, due to
some psychological illness existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage. In Santos v. Court
of Appeals,the intention of the law is to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the
most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability
to give meaning and significance to the marriage.

230

Persons and Family Relation

GUIDELINES IN DETERMINING PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY

AURELIO vs. AURELIO

G.R. No. 175367 June 6, 2011

Facts:
On March 23, 1988, petitioner Danilo A. Aurelio and respondent Vida Ma. Corazon Aurelio

were married. They begot two sons. On May 9, 2002, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the basis of psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. The psychological assessment revealed that
respondent suffers from Histrionic Personality Disorder with Narcissistic features as seen from her
quick changes in temperament, self-indulgence, intolerance, and inability to delay her needs. On the
part of the petitioner, it has been revealed in the same assessment that he suffers from Passive
Aggressive (Negativistic) Personality Disorder as seen from his lack of drive to discern the plight of
his working wife, consistent jealousy and distrust toward his wife, arrogance and insensitivity toward
his wife. These findings were found to be grave, incorrigible, and incurable. On November 8, 2002,
petitioner filed a motion to dismiss. On January 14, 2003, the Regional Trial Court rendered a
Decision denying the motion. On February 21, 2003, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration
and found that respondent‘s petition for declaration for nullity of marriage complied with the

Molina Doctrine and that the merits of the case depend upon the proofs presented in trial. On
February 16, 2004, petitioner appealed the Regional Trial Court decision to the Court of Appeals via
petition for certiorari. On October 6, 2005, Court of Appeals dismissed the petition.

Issues:
Whether or not the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is valid.

Ruling:
Yes. For a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage to be valid, it must comply with the

standards or criteria set by the Molina Doctrine. Petitioner asserts that the petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage is invalid because it did not comply with the following cited in the Molina
Doctrine: (a) root cause of the psychological incapacity, (b) gravity of such illness, and (c) non-
compliance of marital obligations. First, the root cause of the psychological incapacity was stated
and alleged in the complaint. The root cause being their family backgrounds, as determined by a
competent and expert psychologist. Second, the petition establishes that the respondent suffers from
Histrionic Personality Disorder with Narcissistic Features as well as the petitioner suffers from
Passive Aggressive (Negativistic) Personality Disorder which are conditions that are allegedly grave,
incorrigible and incurable. Lastly, the Court also finds that the essential marital obligations were not
complied with. Petition for dismissal is denied.

231

Persons and Family Relation

GUIDELINES IN DETERMINING PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY

REPUBLIC vs. COURT OF APPEALS and DE QUINTOS, JR.
G.R. No. 159594 November 12, 2012

Facts:
Eduardo De Quintos, Jr. and Catalina Delos Santos-De Quintos were married on March 16,

1967 in civil rites solemnized by the Municipal Mayor of Lingayen Pangasinan. They were not
blessed with children due to Catalina‘s hysterectomy after her second miscarriage. On April 6, 1998,
Eduardo filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of their marriage, citing Catalina‘s
psychological incapacity to comply with her essential marital obligations. Eduardo testified that
Catalina‘s psychological incapacity manifested when she always left their house without his consent;
engaged in petty arguments with him; constantly refused to do household chores or take care of
their adopted daughter; gossiping with the neighbors; gambling; and abandoning their conjugal
home to live with Bobbie Castro. A neuro-psychiatric evaluation by Dr. Annabelle L. Reyes revealed
that Catalina exhibited traits of Borderline Psychiatric Disorder and was not curable. These
manifested through her immaturity that rendered her psychologically incapacitated to meet her
marital obligations. Catalina did not interpose any objection to the petition, but prayed to be given

her share in the conjugal house and lot located in Bacabac, Bugallon, Pangasinan.The Regional Trial
Court ruled in favor of Eduardo; however, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision
of the Regional Trial Court.

Issues:
Whether or not the totality of evidence established psychological incapacity therefore

rendering the marriage null and void.

Ruling:
No. First, Catalina‘s supposed behavior was not corroborated by others and, therefore, was

not established. Eduardo‘s testimony was self-serving. Second, Dr. Reyes‘ neuro-psychiatric
evaluation was ostensibly vague on the root cause, gravity, and incurability of the disorder. Dr. Reyes
merely established that Catalina was immature and childish and that her immaturity and childishness
could no longer be treated due to Catalina‘s reaching of an age of maturity. Thirdly, Dr. Reyes had
only one interview with Catalina and, therefore, lacked depth and objectivity which would have been
achieved if her report corroborated not only with Eduardo‘s statements but also with interviews by
other persons. Fourth, no proof was made to establish the natal or supervening disabling factor
which effectively incapacitated Catalina from complying with her basic marital functions. In this
case, the Court cited Santos and Molina in setting the criteria or standards to dispute psychological
incapacity.

232

Persons and Family Relation

OTHER JURISPRUDENCE ON PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY

REPUBLIC vs. ENCELAN

G.R. No. 170022 January 9, 2009

Facts:
On August 25, 1979, Cesar married Lolita and the union bore two children, Maricar and

Manny. To support his family, Cesar went to work in Saudi Arabia on May 15, 1984. On June 12,
1986, Cesar, while still in Saudi Arabia, learned that Lolita had been having an illicit affair with Alvin
Perez. Sometime in 1991, Lolita allegedly left the conjugal home with her children and lived with
Alvin. Since then, Cesar and Lolita had been separated. On June 16, 1995, Cesar filed with the RTC
a petition against Lolita for the declaration of the nullity of his marriage based on Lolita‘s
psychological incapacity.

Lolita denied that she had an affair with Alvin; she contended that Alvin used to be an
associate in her promotions business. She insisted that she is not psychologically incapacitated and
that she left their home because of irreconcilable differences with her mother-in-law. At the trial,
Cesar affirmed his allegations of Lolita‘s infidelity and subsequent abandonment of the family home.
He testified that he continued to provide financial support for Lolita and their children even after he
learned of her illicit affair with Alvin.

Cesar presented the psychological evaluation report on Lolita prepared by Dr. Fareda Fatima
Flores of the National Center for Mental Health. Dr. Flores found that Lolita was "not suffering
from any form of major psychiatric illness," but had been "unable to provide the expectations
expected of her for a good and lasting marital relationship"; her "transferring from one job to the
other depicts some interpersonal problems with co-workers as well as her impatience in attaining her
ambitions"; and "her refusal to go with her husband abroad signifies her reluctance to work out a
good marital and family relationship."

In its June 5, 2002 decision, the RTC declared Cesar‘s marriage to Lolita void, finding
sufficient basis to declare Lolita psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations. The CA originally set aside the RTC‘s verdict, finding that Lolita‘s abandonment of the
conjugal dwelling and infidelity were not serious cases of personality disorder/psychological illness.
In its amended decision,the CA found two circumstances indicative of Lolita‘s serious psychological
incapacity that resulted in her gross infidelity: (1) Lolita‘s unwarranted refusal to perform her marital
obligations to Cesar; and (2) Lolita‘s willful and deliberate act of abandoning the conjugal dwelling.
OSG filed the present petition.

Issue:
Whether or not there exists sufficient basis to nullify Cesar‘s marriage to Lolita on the

ground of psychological incapacity.

233

Persons and Family Relation

Ruling:
No. In interpreting Article 36 of the Family Code, the Supreme Court has repeatedly

stressed that psychological incapacity contemplates "downright incapacity or inability to take
cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations", not merely the refusal, neglect or
difficulty, much less ill will, on the part of the errant spouse. The plaintiff bears the burden of
proving the juridical antecedence (i.e., the existence at the time of the celebration of marriage),
gravity and incurability of the condition of the errant spouse.Cesar testified on the dates when he
learned of Lolita‘s alleged affair and her subsequent abandonment of their home, as well as his
continued financial support to her and their children even after he learned of the affair, but he
merely mentioned in passing Lolita‘s alleged affair with Alvin and her abandonment of the conjugal
dwelling.Sexual infidelity and abandonment of the conjugal dwelling, even if true, do not necessarily
constitute psychological incapacity; simply grounds for legal separation. To constitute psychological
incapacity, it must be shown that the unfaithfulness and abandonment are manifestations of a
disordered personality that completely prevented the erring spouse from discharging the essential
marital obligations.No evidence on record exists to support Cesar‘s allegation that Lolita‘s infidelity
and abandonment were manifestations of any psychological illness.

Dr. Flores‘ observation on Lolita‘s interpersonal problems with co-workers does not suffice
as a consideration for the conclusion that she was – at the time of her marriage – psychologically
incapacitated to enter into a marital union with Cesar. Aside from the time element involved, a
wife‘s psychological fitness as a spouse cannot simply be equated with her professional/work
relationship; workplace obligations and responsibilities are poles apart from their marital
counterparts. Dr. Flores‘ further belief that Lolita‘s refusal to go with Cesar abroad signified a
reluctance to work out a good marital relationship is a mere generalization unsupported by facts.

234

Persons and Family Relation

OTHER JURISPRUDENCE ON PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY

MENDOZA vs. REPUBLIC

G.R. No. 157649 November 12, 2012

Facts:
Petitioner Arabelle J. Mendoza and private respondent Dominic C. Mendoza met in 1989

upon his return to the country from his employment in Papua New Guinea. They had been next-
door neighbors in the apartelle they were renting while in college – she, at Assumption College while
he, at San Beda taking a business management course. After a month of courtship, they became
intimate which led to the pregnancy with their Daughter Alyssa Blanca. They got married when she
was eight months into her pregnancy in civil rites solemnized in Pasay City, June 24, 1991, after
which they moved to her place, remaining dependent on their parents for support.

Dominic remained jobless and dependent upon his father for support until he finished
college in October 1993. She took on various jobs, being the one with the fixed income, she
shouldered all of the family‘s expenses (i.e., rental, food, other bills and their child‘s educational
needs). In September 1994, she discovered his illicit relationship with Zaida, Dominic‘s co-
employee at Toyota Motors. Eventually, communication between them became rare until they
started to sleep in separate rooms, thereby affecting their sexual relationship.

In November 1995, Dominic gave her a Daihatsu Charade car as a birthday present and later
asked her to issue two blank checks for the car‘s insurance coverage, only to find out that the checks
were not paid for the car‘s insurance coverage but for his personal needs. Worse, she also found out
that he did not pay for the car itself, forcing her to rely on her father-in-law to pay part of the cost
of the car, leaving her to bear the balance.

To make matters worse, Dominic was fired from his employment after he ran away with
P164,000.00 belonging to his employer. He was criminally charged with violation of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 22 and estafa, for which he was arrested and incarcerated. She and her mother bailed him out of
jail, but discovered that he had also swindled many clients some of whom were even threatening her,
her mother and her sister.

On October 15, 1997, Dominic abandoned the conjugal home because Arabelle asked him
for "time and space to think things over." A month later, she refused his attempt at reconciliation,
causing him to threaten to commit suicide. At that, she and her family immediately left the house to
live in another place concealed from him.

235

Persons and Family Relation

On August 5, 1998, petitioner filed in the RTC her petition for the declaration of the nullity
of her marriage with Dominic based on his psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family
Code. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) opposed the petition. In the RTC, petitioner
presented herself as a witness, together with a psychiatrist, Dr. Rocheflume Samson, and Professor
Marites Jimenez. On his part, Dominic did not appear during trial and presented no evidence. On
August 18, 2000, the RTC found all characteristics of psychological incapacity – gravity,
antecedence, and incurability as set forth in Molina and declared the marriage between petitioner and
Dominic an absolute nullity. On March 19, 2003 the CA promulgated its assailed decision reversing
the judgment of the RTC.
Issue:

Whether or not the totality of evidence established the respondent‘s psychological
incapacity.

Ruling:
No. The findings of Dr. Samson were one-sided, self-serving and uncorroborated because

only Arabelle was evaluated. Dr. Samson even conceded that there was a need to verify her findings
concerning Dominic‘s psychological profile which were colored by Arabelle‘s ill-feelings toward him
during her evaluation. Emotional immaturity and irresponsibility cannot be equated with
psychological incapacity. Santos v. Court of Appeals sets the guidelines for psychological incapacity
as characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability." These guidelines do not
necessarily require the root cause to be ―medically or clinically identified‖ by a physician or a
psychologist. What is important is that totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding
of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be
resorted to. Finally, petitioner contends that the Court‘s Resolution in A.M. No. 02-11-10 rendered
appeals by the OSG no longer required. On the contrary, the Resolution explicitly requires the OSG
to actively participate in all stages of the proceedings as seen in its provisions.

236

Persons and Family Relation

OTHER JURISPRUDENCE ON PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY

G.R. No. 168335 REPUBLIC vs. GALANG June 6, 2011

Facts:
On March 9, 1994, respondent Nestor Galang and Juvy married in Pampanga. They lived in

Nestor‘s father‘s house in San Francisco, Mabalacat, Pampanga. Nestor worked as an artist-
illustrator at the Clark Development Corporation, earning P8,500.00 monthly. Juvy, stayed at home
as a housewife. Christopher is their only child.

On August 4, 1999, Nestor filed with the RTC a petition for the declaration of nullity of his

marriage with Juvy, under Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended. He alleged that Juvy was
psychologically incapacitated to exercise the essential obligations of marriage because she was a
kleptomaniac and a swindler. The respondent‘s testimony showed that Juvy: (a) refused to wake up
early to prepare breakfast; (b) left their child to the care of their neighbors when she went out of the
house; (c) squandered a huge amount of the P15,000.00 that the respondent entrusted to her; (d)
stole the respondent‘s ATM card and attempted to withdraw the money deposited in his account; (e)
falsified the respondent‘s signature in order to encash a check; (f) made up false stories in order to
borrow money from their relatives; and (g) indulged in gambling.According to the respondent, Juvy
suffers from ―mental deficiency, innate immaturity, distorted discernment and total lack of care, love
and affection towards him and their child.‖ He posited that Juvy‘s incapacity was ―extremely
serious‖ and ―appears to be incurable.Prosecutor Angelito I. Balderama formally manifested,
on October 18, 1999, that he found no evidence of collusion between the parties. The RTC set the
case for trial in its Order of October 20, 1999. The respondent presented testimonial and
documentary evidence to substantiate his allegations.

Aside from his testimony, the respondent also presented Anna Liza S. Guiang, a psychologist,
who testified that she conducted a psychological test on the respondent. According to her, she wrote
Juvy a letter requesting for an interview, but the latter did not respond.

On January 22, 2001, the RTC nullified the parties‘ marriage. On November 25, 2004, the
CA affirmed the RTC decision in toto explaining that Juvy‘s indolence and lack of responsibility
coupled with her gambling and swindling undermined her capacity to comply with her marital
obligations. The testimony of psychologist Anna Liza S. Guiang characterized Juvy‘s condition as
permanent, incurable and existing at the time of celebration of her marriage with respondent.

237

Persons and Family Relation

Issue:
Whether or not the totality of evidence established the respondent‘s psychological

incapacity.

Ruling:
No. The testimony of the petitioner only showed isolated incidents, not recurring acts.

Psychological incapacity must be more than difficulty, refusal or neglect. It is essential that he or she
must be shown to be incapable of complying with the responsibility and duty as a married person
because of some psychological, not physical, illness. In other words, proof of a natal or supervening
disabling factor in the person – an adverse integral element in the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations
essential to marriage – had to be shown. The psychological test was uncorroborated and one-sided;
therefore, biased towards Juvy‘s negative traits. First, the psychologist did not identify the types of
psychological tests to determine the root cause of Juvy‘s psychological condition. Second, the report
failed to prove the gravity or severity of Juvy‘s condition. Lastly, the report failed to prove
incurability. The psychologist‘s testimony was totally devoid of any information or insight into Juvy‘s
early life and associations, how she acted before and at the time of the marriage, and how the
symptoms of a disordered personality developed. Simply put, the psychologist failed to trace the
history of Juvy‘s psychological condition and to relate it to an existing incapacity at the time of the
celebration of the marriage.

238

Persons and Family Relation

OTHER JURISPRUDENCE ON PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY

G.R. No. 167459 OCHOSA vs. ALANO January 26, 2011

Facts:
Jose Reynaldo B. Ochosa met Bona J. Alano in August 1973 – he, a young lieutenant

in the AFP; she, a 17-year-old 1st year college drop-out. They had a whirlwind romance that
culminated into sexual intimacy and eventual marriage on October 27, 1973 before the Honorable
Judge Cesar S. Principe in Basilan. The couple did not acquire any property. Neither did they incur

any debts. Their union produced no offspring. In 1976, however, they found an abandoned and
neglected one-year-old baby girl whom they later registered as their daughter, naming her Ramona
Celeste Alano Ochosa.

During their marriage, Jose was often assigned to various parts of the Philippine archipelago
as an officer in the AFP. Bona did not cohabit with him in his posts, preferring to stay in her
hometown of Basilan. Neither did Bona visit him in his areas of assignment, except in one (1)
occasion when Bona stayed with him for four (4) days.

Sometime in 1985, Jose was appointed as the Battalion Commander of the Security Escort
Group. He and Bona, along with Ramona, were given living quarters at Fort Bonifacio, Makati City
where they resided with their military aides.In 1987, Jose was charged with rebellion for his alleged
participation in the failed coup d‘etat. He was incarcerated in Camp Crame.

Even at the onset of their marriage when Jose was assigned in various parts of the country,
Bona had illicit relations with other men. Bona entertained male visitors in her bedroom whenever
Jose was out of their living quarters at Fort Bonifacio. On one occasion, Bona was caught by
Demetrio Bajet y Lita, a security aide, having sex with Jose‘s driver, Corporal Gagarin. Rumors of
Bona‘s sexual infidelity circulated in the military community. When Jose could no longer bear these
rumors, he got a military pass from his jail warden and confronted Bona.During their confrontation,
Bona admitted her relationship with Corporal Gagarin who also made a similar admission to Jose.
Jose drove Bona away from their living quarters. Bona left with Ramona and went to Basilan.In

1994, Ramona left Bona and came to live with Jose. It is Jose who is currently supporting the needs
of Ramona.

239

Persons and Family Relation

Jose filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, seeking to nullify his marriage to
Bona on the ground of the latter‘s psychological incapacity to fulfill the essential obligations of
marriage.In a Decision dated 11 January 1999, the trial court granted the petition and nullified the
parties‘ marriage. The OSG appealed with the CA which granted the appeal, reversed and set aside
the decision of the RTC.

Issue:
Whether or not Bona should be deemed psychologically incapacitated to comply with the

essential marital obligations.

Ruling:
No. There is inadequate credible evidence that her ―defects‖ (sexual disloyalty with Jose,

sexual promiscuity with other men) were already present at the inception of, or prior to, the
marriage. In other words, her alleged psychological incapacity did not satisfy the jurisprudential
requisite of ―juridical antecedence.‖ Verily, Dr. Elizabeth E. Rondain evaluated Bona‘s
psychological condition (Histrionic Personality Disorder) indirectly from the information gathered
solely from Jose and his witnesses. This factual circumstance evokes the possibility that the
information fed to the psychiatrist is tainted with bias for Jose‘s cause, in the absence of sufficient
corroboration. It is apparent from the above-cited testimonies that Bona, contrary to Jose‘s
assertion, had no manifest desire to abandon Jose at the beginning of their marriage and was, in fact,
living with him for the most part of their relationship from 1973 up to the time when Jose drove her
away from their conjugal home in 1988. On the contrary, the record shows that it was Jose who was
constantly away from Bona by reason of his military duties and his later incarceration. A reasonable
explanation for Bona‘s refusal to accompany Jose in his military assignments in other parts of
Mindanao may be simply that those locations were known conflict areas in the seventies. Any doubt
as to Bona‘s desire to live with Jose would later be erased by the fact that Bona lived with Jose in
their conjugal home in Fort Bonifacio during the following decade. In view of the foregoing, the
badges of Bona‘s alleged psychological incapacity, i.e., her sexual infidelity and abandonment, can
only be convincingly traced to the period of time after her marriage to Jose and not to the inception
of the said marriage.

240

Persons and Family Relation

OTHER JURISPRUDENCE ON PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY

G.R. No. 185286 CAMACHO-REYES vs. REYES August 18, 2010

Facts:
Petitioner Maria Socorro Camacho-Reyes met respondent Ramon Reyes at the University of

the Philippines (UP), Diliman, in 1972 when they were both nineteen (19) years old. Petitioner and
respondent got marriedon December 5, 1976. At that time, petitioner was already five (5) months
pregnant and employed at the Population Center Foundation.Thereafter, they lived with the
Ramon‘s family in Mandaluyong City. All living expenses were shouldered by Ramon‘s parents, and
the couple‘s respective salaries were spent solely for their personal needs.

Financial difficulties started. A year into their marriage, the monthly allowance ofP1,500.00
from respondent stopped because Ramon resigned from his family‘s business. Because of this,
Ramon engaged into (1) a fishpond business in Mindoro and eventually, (2) a scrap paper and carton
trading business which both failed..To prod respondent into assuming more responsibility,
petitioner suggested that they live separately from her in-laws. After two (2) years of struggling, the
spouses transferred residence and, this time, moved in with Maria Socorro‘s mother where petitioner
continued to carry the financial burdens

Sometime in 1996, petitioner confirmed that respondent was having an extra-marital affair.
One of the last episodes that sealed the fate of the parties‘ marriage was a surgical operation on
petitioner for the removal of a cyst where respondent remained unconcerned and unattentive; and
simply read the newspaper, and played dumb when petitioner requested that he accompany her as
she was wheeled into the operating room.

As a last resort, petitioner approached respondent‘s siblings and asked them to intervene,
Adolfo Reyes, respondent‘s elder brother, and his spouse, Peregrina, members of a marriage
encounter group, invited, sponsored and scheduled counseling sessions with petitioner and
respondent, but these did not improve the parties‘ relationship as respondent remained
uncooperative. In 1997, Adolfo brought respondent to Dr. Natividad A. Dayan for a psychological

241

Persons and Family Relation

assessment; however, respondent resisted and did not continue with the clinical psychologist‘s
recommendation to undergo psychotherapy.At about this time, petitioner, with the knowledge of
respondent‘s siblings, told respondent to move out of their house. With the de facto separation, the
relationship still did not improve. Neither did respondent‘s relationship with his children.

Finally, in 2001, petitioner filed before the RTC a petition for the declaration of nullity of
her marriage with the respondent, alleging the latter‘s psychological incapacity to fulfill the essential
marital obligations under Article 36 of the Family Code. RTC affirmed petitioner. CA reversed and
set aside RTC‘s decision.

Issue:
Whether or not the totality of evidence established psychological incapacity therefore

rendering the marriage null and void.

Ruling:
Yes. The lack of personal examination and interview of the respondent, or any other person

diagnosed with personality disorder, does not per se invalidate the testimonies of Dr. Estrella T.
Tiongson-Magno and Dr. Cecilia C. Villegas. Neither do their findings automatically constitute
hearsay that would result in their exclusion as evidence. The clinical psychologists‘ and psychiatrist‘s
assessment were not based solely on the narration or personal interview of the petitioner. Other
informants such as respondent‘s own son, siblings and in-laws, and sister-in-law (sister of petitioner),
testified on their own observations of respondent‘s behavior and interactions with them, spanning
the period of time they knew him. Dr. Natividad A. Dayan‘s recommendation that respondent
should undergo therapy does not necessarily negate the finding that respondent‘s psychological
incapacity is incurable.

In sum, we find points of convergence & consistency in all three reports and the respective
testimonies of Doctors Magno, Dayan and Villegas, i.e.: (1) respondent does have problems; and (2)
these problems include chronic irresponsibility; inability to recognize and work towards providing
the needs of his family; several failed business attempts; substance abuse; and a trail of unpaid
money obligations.

It is true that a clinical psychologist‘s or psychiatrist‘s diagnoses that a person has personality
disorder is not automatically believed by the courts in cases of declaration of nullity of marriages.
Indeed, a clinical psychologist‘s or psychiatrist‘s finding of a personality disorder does not exclude a
finding that a marriage is valid and subsisting, and not beset by one of the parties‘ or both parties‘
psychological incapacity. In the case at bar, however, even without the experts‘ conclusions, the
factual antecedents (narrative of events) alleged in the petition and established during trial, all
point to the inevitable conclusion that respondent is psychologically incapacitated to perform the
essential marital obligations. In the instant case, respondent‘s pattern of behavior manifests an
inability, nay, a psychological incapacity to perform the essential marital obligations as shown by his:
(1) sporadic financial support; (2) extra-marital affairs; (3) substance abuse; (4) failed business
attempts; (5) unpaid money obligations; (6) inability to keep a job that is not connected with the
family businesses; and (7) criminal charges of estafa.

242

Persons and Family Relation

OTHER JURISPRUDENCE ON PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY

G.R. No. 165321 TORING vs. TORING August 3, 2010

Facts:
Petitioner Ricardo P. Toring was introduced to Teresita M. Toring in 1978 at his aunt‘s

house in Cebu. Teresita was then his cousin‘s teacher in Hawaiian dance and was conducting lessons
at his aunt‘s house. They became sweethearts after three months of courtship and eloped soon
after, hastened by the bid of another girlfriend, already pregnant, to get Ricardo to marry her.

Ricardo and Teresita were married on September 4, 1978 before Hon. Remigio Zari of the
City Court of Quezon City. They begot three children: Richardson, Rachel Anne, and Ric Jayson.

On February 1, 1999, more than twenty years after their wedding, Ricardo filed a petition for
annulment before the RTC. He claimed that Teresita was psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential obligations of marriage prior to, at the time of, and subsequent to the celebration
of their marriage. Before the RTC, Ricardo offered in evidence their marriage contract; the
psychological evaluation and signature of his expert witness, psychiatrist Dr. Cecilia R. Albaran, and
his and Dr. Albaran‘s respective testimonies.

Ricardo alleged that Teresita was an adulteress and a squanderer – that she was very
extravagant, materialistic, controlling and demanding. He was an overseas seaman, and he regularly
sent money to his wife to cover the family‘s living expenses and their children‘s tuition. However,
not only did she fail at paying the rent, utilities and other living expenses, she also she incurred debts
from other people and failed to remit amounts collected as sales agent of a plasticware and
cosmetics company. Also, during one of his visits to the country, he noticed that Teresita‘s stomach
was slightly bigger. He tried to convince her to have a medical examination but she refused. Her

243

Persons and Family Relation

miscarriage five months into her pregnancy confirmed his worst suspicions. Ricardo alleged that the
child could not have been his, as his three instances of sexual contact with Teresita were
characterized by ―withdrawals‖; other than these, no other sexual contacts with his wife transpired,
as he transferred and lived with his relatives after a month of living with Teresita in Cebu. Ricardo
reported, too, of rumors that his wife represented herself to others as single, and went out on dates
with other men when he was not around.

Dr. Cecilia R. Albaran diagnosed Teresita with Narcissistic Personality Disorder.

Issue:
Whether or not Teresita should be deemed psychologically incapacitated to comply with

essential marital obligations.

Ruling:
No. Dr. Albaran‘s psychological evaluation merely relied on Ricardo and Richardson‘s

testimonies. The mere narration of the statements of Ricardo and Richardson, coupled with the
results of the psychological tests administered only on Ricardo, without more, does not constitute
sufficient basis for the conclusion that Teresita suffered from Narcissistic Personality
Disorder. Other than from the spouses, such evidence can come from persons intimately related to
them, such as relatives, close friends or even family doctors or lawyers who could testify on the
allegedly incapacitated spouse‘s condition at or about the time of marriage, or to subsequent
occurring events that trace their roots to the incapacity already present at the time of marriage.
Richardson, the spouses‘ eldest son, would not have been a reliable witness as he could not have
been expected to know what happened between his parents until long after his birth. He merely
recounted isolated incidents. The root cause must be alleged and not just the manifestations during
the marriage described as ―refusal‖, ―difficulty‖ or ―neglect‖.

244

Persons and Family Relation

OTHER JURISPRUDENCE ON PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY

G.R. No. 168796 LIGERALDE vs. PATALINGHUG April 15, 2012

Facts:
Silvino and May got married on October 3, 1984. They were blessed with four

children. Sometime in September 1995, May arrived home at 4:00 o‘clock in the morning. Her
excuse was that she had watched a video program in a neighboring town, but admitted later to have
slept with her Palestinian boyfriend in a hotel. In the midst of these, Silvino‘s deep love for her, the
thought of saving their marriage for the sake of their children, and the commitment of May to
reform dissuaded him from separating from her. He still wanted to reconcile with her. May was
back again to her old ways. This was demonstrated when Silvino arrived home one day and learned
that she was nowhere to be found. He searched for her and found her in a nearby apartment
drinking beer with a male lover. Later, May confessed that she had no more love for him. They then
lived separately. Silvino referred the matter to Dr. Tina Nicdao-Basilio for psychological evaluation.
The psychologist certified that May was psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential
marital obligations; that the incapacity started when she was still young and became manifest after
marriage; and that the same was serious and incurable. On October 22, 1999, the RTC declared the
marriage of Silvino and May null and void. The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC decision.

Issues:
(a) Whether or not the CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess
jurisdiction.
(b) Whether or not May is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations.

Ruling:

245

Persons and Family Relation

No. On procedural grounds, the Court agrees with the public respondent that
the petitioner should have filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 instead of this
petition for certiorari under Rule 65. For having availed of the wrong remedy, this petition deserves
outright dismissal.In order to avail of the special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Court, the petitioner must clearly show that the public respondent acted without
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess in jurisdiction. By grave
abuse of discretion is meant such capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to
lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of
a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation
of law as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and
hostility. In sum, for the extraordinary writ of certiorari to lie, there must be capricious, arbitrary or
whimsical exercise of power. These were not proven in the close scrutiny of the records.

No. (1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff; (2)
the root cause of the psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically identified, alleged in the
complaint, sufficiently proven by experts and clearly explained in the decision; (3) the incapacity
must be proven to be existing at the "time of the celebration" of the marriage; (4) such incapacity
must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable; and (5) such illness must be
grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage (Republic v. Court of Appeals). The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be
identified as a psychological illness, its incapacitating nature fully explained and established by the
totality of the evidence presented during trial. An adulterous life is not tantamount to psychological
incapacity as contemplated in Article 36. Petitioner must be able to establish that respondent's
unfaithfulness is a manifestation of a disordered personality, which makes her completely unable to
discharge the essential obligations of the marital state.

246

Persons and Family Relation

OTHER JURISPRUDENCE ON PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY

G.R. No. 164493 SUAZO vs. SUAZO March 10, 2010

Facts:
Jocelyn and Angelito were 16 years old when they first met in June 1985; they were residents

of Laguna at that time. After months of courtship, Jocelyn went to Manila with Angelito and some
friends. Having been gone for three days, their parents sought Jocelyn and Angelito and after
finding them, brought them back to Biñan, Laguna. Soon thereafter, Jocelyn and Angelito‘s marriage
was arranged and they were married on March 3, 1986 in a ceremony officiated by the Mayor of
Biñan.

Without any means to support themselves, Jocelyn and Angelito lived with Angelito‘s parents
after their marriage. They had by this time stopped schooling. Jocelyn took odd jobs and worked
for Angelito‘s relatives as household help. Angelito, on the other hand, refused to work and was
most of the time drunk. Jocelyn urged Angelito to find work and violent quarrels often resulted
because of Jocelyn‘s efforts.

Jocelyn left Angelito sometime in July 1987. Angelito thereafter found another woman with
whom he has since lived. They now have children.

Ten years after their separation, or on October 8, 1997, Jocelyn filed with the RTC a petition
for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended. She claimed
that Angelito was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of
marriage. In addition to the above historical narrative of their relationship, she alleged in her

247

Persons and Family Relation

complaint that from the start of their marriage until their separation in July 1987, their relationship
has been marred with bitter quarrels that caused unbearable physical and emotional pain inflicted
upon by Angelito; that one of the main reasons for their quarrels was Angelito‘s refusal to work, his
indolence and excessive drinking; and that Angelito‘s psychological incapacity started at the time of
their marriage and proves to be continuous, permanent and incurable.

In the RTC, Jocelyn reiterated the incidents of her physical beating by Angelito but told the
Court that she was not treated violently before the marriage. Maryjane Serrano, Jocelyn‘s aunt,
corroborated Jocelyn‘s testimony. The psychologist testified that Angelito haed Chronic Antisocial
Disorder which was permanent and incurable. The RTC annulled the marriage on the grounds
provided by Santos v. Court of Appeals. The CA reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC.

Issue:
Whether or not Angelito is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital

obligations.

Ruling:
No. Both the psychologist‘s testimony and the psychological report did not conclusively

show the root cause, gravity and incurability of Angelito‘s alleged psychological condition.
Thepsychologist derived all her conclusions from information coming from Jocelyn whose bias for
her cause cannot of course be doubted. Jocelyn merely testified on Angelito‘s habitual drunkenness,
gambling, refusal to seek employment and the physical beatings she received from him – all of
which occurred after the marriage.

Significantly, she declared in her testimony that Angelito showed no signs of violent
behavior, assuming this to be indicative of a personality disorder, during the courtship stage or at the
earliest stages of her relationship with him. She testified on the alleged physical beatings after the
marriage, not before or at the time of the celebration of the marriage. She did not clarify when these
beatings exactly took place – whether it was near or at the time of celebration of the marriage or
months or years after. This is a clear evidentiary gap that materially affects her cause, as the law and
its related jurisprudence require that the psychological incapacity must exist at the time of the
celebration of the marriage. Habitual drunkenness, gambling and refusal to find a job, while
indicative of psychological incapacity, do not, by themselves, show psychological incapacity.
Standing alone, physical violence does not constitute psychological incapacity.

248

Persons and Family Relation

OTHER JURISPRUDENCE ON PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY

G.R. No. 170925 ASPILLAGA vs. ASPILLAGA October 26, 2009

Facts:
Rodolfo Aspillaga met Aurora Apon sometime in 1977 while they were students at

the Philippine Merchant Marine Academy and Lyceum of the Philippines, respectively. Rodolfo
courted her and five months later, they became sweethearts. Thereafter, Aurora left for Japan to
study Japanese culture, literature and language. Despite the distance, Rodolfo and Aurora
maintained communication.

In 1980, after Aurora returned to the Philippines, she and Rodolfo got married. They begot
two children, but Rodolfo claimed their marriage was ―tumultuous.‖ He described Aurora as
domineering and frequently humiliated him even in front of his friends. He complained
that Aurora was a spendthrift as she overspent the family budget and made crucial family decisions
without consulting him. Rodolfo added that Aurora was tactless, suspicious, given to nagging and
jealousy as evidenced by the latter‘s filing against him a criminal case (concubinage) and an
administrative case. He left the conjugal home, and filed on March 7, 1995, a petition for annulment
of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of Aurora. He averred
that Aurora failed to comply with the essential obligations of marriage.

Aurora, for her part, alleged that sometime in 1991, Rodolfo gave her a plane ticket
to Japan to enable her to assume her teaching position in a university for a period of three

249

Persons and Family Relation