civil code0101

FAMILY HOME

G.R. No. 165060 ALBINO JOSEF vs. OTELIO SANTOS November 27, 2008

Facts:
In Civil Case No. 95-110-MK, Petitioner Albino Josef was the defendant, which is a case for

collection of sum of money filed by herein respondent Otelio Santos, who claimed that petitioner
failed to pay the shoe materials which he bought on credit from respondent on various dates in
1994. After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Marikina City found petitioner liable to respondent.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial court‘s decision in Toto.
Petitioner filed before this Court a petition for review on certiorari, but it was dismissed in a
Resolution dated February 18, 2002. The Judgment became final and executory on May 21, 2002.

A writ of execution was issued on August 20, 2003and enforced on August 21, 2003. On
August 29, 2003, certain personal properties subjects of the writ of execution were auctioned off.
Thereafter, a real property located at Marikina City was sold by way of public auction to fully satisfy
the judgment credit.

On November 5, 2003, petitioner filed an original petition for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals, questioning the sheriff‘s levy and sale of the abovementioned personal and real properties.
Petitioner claimed that the personal properties did not belong to him but to his children; and that
the real property was his family home thus exempt from execution.

Issue:
Whether or not the levy and sale of the personal belongings of the petitioner‘s children as

well as the attachment and sale on public auction of his family home to satisfy the judgment award
in favor of respondent is legal.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that the family home is the dwelling place of a person and his

family, a sacred symbol of family love and repository of cherished memories that last during one‘s
lifetime. It is the sanctuary of that union which the law declares and protects as a sacred institution;
and likewise a shelter for the fruits of that union. It is where both can seek refuge and strengthen the
tie that binds them together and which ultimately forms the moral fabric of our nation. The
protection of the family home is just as necessary in the preservation of the family as a basic social
institution, and since no custom, practice or agreement destructive of the family shall be recognized
or given effect, the trial court‘s failure to observe the proper procedures to determine the veracity of
petitioner‘s allegations, is unjustified.

The same is true with respect to personal properties levied upon and sold at auction. Despite
petitioner‘s allegations in his Opposition, the trial court did not make an effort to determine the
nature of the same, whether the items were exempt from execution or not, or whether they
belonged to petitioner or to someone else.

400

Persons and Family Relation

401

Persons and Family Relation

FAMILY HOME

SPOUSES AUTHER G. KELLEY, JR. and DORIS A. KELLEY vs. PLANTERS
PRODUCTS, INC. and JORGE A. RAGUTANA

G.R. No. 172263 July 9, 2008

Facts:
Petitioner Auther G. Kelley, Jr. (Auther) acquired agricultural chemical products on

consignment from respondent Planters Products, Inc. (PPI) in 1989. Due to Auther‘s failure to pay
despite demand, PPI filed an action for sum of money against him in the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City. After trial on the merits, the RTC Makati City decided in favor of PPI and issued a writ
of execution. After being belatedly informed of the said sale, petitioners Auther and his wife Doris
A. Kelley filed a motion to dissolve or set aside the notice of levy in the RTC Makati City on the
ground that the subject property was their family home which was exempt from execution.

Issue:
Whether or not the subject property is the family home of the petitioners.

Ruling:
Under the Family Code, there is no need to constitute the family home judicially or

extrajudicially. All family homes constructed after the effectivity of the Family Code (August 3,
1988) are constituted as such by operation of law. All existing family residences as of August 3, 1988
are considered family homes and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home
under the Family Code.

The exemption is effective from the time of the constitution of the family home as such and
lasts as long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein.Moreover, the debts for which the
family home is made answerable must have been incurred after August 3, 1988. Otherwise (that is, if
it was incurred prior to August 3, 1988), the alleged family home must be shown to have been
constituted either judicially or extrajudicially pursuant to the Civil Code.

The rule, however, is not absolute. The Family Code, in fact, expressly provides for the
following exceptions: Article 155. The family home shall be exempt from execution, forced sale or
attachment except: (1) For non-payment of taxes; (2) For debts incurred prior to the constitution of
the family home; (3) For debts secured by a mortgage on the premises before or after such
constitution; and (4) For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders, material men and
others who have rendered service or furnished material for the construction of the building.

402

Persons and Family Relation

FAMILY HOME

MARY JOSEPHINE GOMEZ and EUGENIA SOCORRO C. GOMEZ-SALCEDO
vs. ROEL, NOEL and JANNETTE BEVERLY STA. INES and HINAHON STA. INES

G.R. No. 132537 October 14, 2005

Facts:
Purificacion dela Cruz Gomez (deceased), mother of Mary Josephine C. Gomez and

Eugenia Socorro C. Gomez-Salcedo, entrusted rice land in Nueva Vizcaya to Marietta dela Cruz Sta.
Ines. Josephine and Socorro demanded for an accounting of the produce of said rice lands while
under the management of Marietta and for the return of the Transfer Certificate Title (TCT) of the
property.

Trial court rendered judgment against Marietta and ordered her to deliver the owner‘s copy
of the TCT and pay damages. In order to satisfy damages, a writ of execution was issued, by virtue
of which, a parcel of land in Nueva Vizcaya registered in Marietta‘s name was sold at a public
auction wherein Josephine was the highest bidder. Marietta‘s husband, Hinahon together with their
children, filed a complaint for the annulment of the sale before the RTC of Nueva Vizcaya on the
ground that said house and lot sold during the public auction is their family residence and is thus
exempt from execution under Article 155 of the Family Code. Respondents assert that the house
and lot was constituted jointly by Hinahon and Marietta as their family home from the time they
occupied it in 1972

Issue:
Whether or not the property can be sold.

Ruling:
Yes. The Supreme Court held that under article 155 of the Family Code, the family home

shall be exempt from execution, forced sale, or attachment, except for, among other things, debts
incurred prior to the constitution of the family home. While the respondent contends that the house
and lot was constituted jointly by Hinahon and Marietta as their family home in 1972, it is not
deemed constituted as such at the time Marietta incurred her debts.

Under prevailing jurisprudence, it is deemed constituted as the family home only upon the
effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988. The complaint against Marietta was instituted in
1986 to for acts committed as early as 1977, thus, her liability arose years before the levied property
was constituted as the family home in 1988. The liability incurred by Marietta falls within the
exception provided for in Article 155 of the Family Code: debts incurred prior to the constitution of
the family home.

403

Persons and Family Relation

FAMILY HOME

FLORANTE F. MANACOP vs. COURT OF APPEALS and E & L MERCANTILE, INC.
G.R. No. 97898 August 11, 1997

Facts:
Petitioner Florante F. Manacopand his wife Eulaceli purchased on March 10, 1972 a

residential lot with a bungalow, in consideration of P75,000.00.On March 17, 1986, Private
Respondent E & L Merchantile, Inc. filed a complaint against petitioner and F.F. Manacop
Construction Co., Inc. before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila to collect an
indebtedness of P3,359,218.45. Instead of filing an answer, petitioner and his company entered into
a compromise agreement with private respondent, the salient portion of which provides: That
defendants will undertake to pay the amount of P2,000,000.00 as and when their means permit, but
expeditiously as possible as their collectibles will be collected. On April 20, 1986, the trial court
rendered judgment approving the aforementioned compromise agreement. It enjoined the parties to
comply with the agreement in good faith. On July 15, 1986, private respondent filed a motion for
execution which the lower court granted. However, execution of the judgment was delayed.
Eventually, the sheriff levied on several vehicles and other personal properties of petitioner. In
partial satisfaction of the judgment debt, these chattels were sold at public auction for which
certificates of sale were correspondingly issued by the sheriff.

On August 1, 1989, petitioner and his company filed a motion to quash the alias writs of
execution and to stop the sheriff from continuing to enforce them on the ground that the judgment
was not yet executory. They alleged that the compromise agreement had not yet matured, as there
was no showing that they had the means to pay the indebtedness or that their receivables had in fact
been collected.

Issue:
Whether or not the final and executory decision promulgated and a writ of execution issued

before the effectivity of the Family Code can be executed on a family home constituted under the
provisions of the said Code.

Ruling:
Yes. The Supreme Court held that Under the Family Code, a family home is deemed

constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence. There is no need to
constitute the same judicially or extrajudicially as required in the Civil Code. If the family actually
resides in the premises, it is, therefore, a family home as contemplated by law. Thus, the creditors
should take the necessary precautions to protect their interest before extending credit to the spouses
or head of the family who owns the home.

Article 155 of the Family Code also provides as follows: Art. 155. The family home shall be
exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except: (1) For nonpayment of taxes; (2) For
debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family home; (3) For debts secured by mortgages on
the premises before or after such constitution; and (4) For debts due to laborer, mechanics,
architects, builders, material men and others who have rendered service or furnished material for the
construction of the building. The exemption provided, as aforestated is effective from the time of

404

Persons and Family Relation

the constitution of the family home as such, and lasts so long as any of its beneficiaries actually
resides therein. In the present case, the residential house and lot of petitioner was not constituted as
a family home whether judicially or extrajudicially under the Civil Code. It became a family home by
operation of law only under Article 153 of the Family Code. It is deemed constituted as a family
home upon the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 not August 4, one year after its
publication in the Manila Chronicle on August 4, 1987 (1988 being a leap year).

405

Persons and Family Relation

FAMILY HOME

PABLITO TANEO, JR., JOSE TANEO, NENA T. CATUBIG and HUSBAND, CILIA T.
MORING and HUSBAND vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ABDON GILIG

G.R. No. 108532 March 9, 1999

Facts:
As a result of a judgment in Civil Case No. 590 (for recovery of property) in favor of private

respondent, two (2) of petitioners' properties were levied to satisfy the judgment amount of about
P5,000.00: one was a parcel of land located in Barrio Igpit, Municipality of Opol, Misamis Oriental
with an area of about five (5) hectares, and the other was the family home also located at Igpit,
Opol, Misamis Oriental. The subject properties were sold at public auction on February 12, 1966 to
the private respondent as the highest bidder. Consequently, after petitioners' failure to redeem the
same, a final deed of conveyance was executed on February 9, 1968, definitely selling, transferring,
and conveying said properties to the private respondent.

To forestall such conveyance, petitioners filed an action on November 5, 1985 (docketed as
Civil Case No. 10407) to declare the deed of conveyance void and to quiet title over the land with a
prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. In their complaint, it was alleged that petitioners are the
children and heirs of Pablo Taneo and Narcisa Valaceras who died on February 12, 1977 and
September 12, 1984, respectively. Upon their death, they left the subject property covered by OCT
No. P-12820 and Free Patent No. 548906. Considering that said property has been acquired through

free patent, such property is therefore inalienable and not subject to any encumbrance for the
payment of debt, pursuant to Commonwealth Act No. 141. Petitioners further alleged that they were
in continuous, open and peaceful possession of the land and that on February 9, 1968. Deputy
Provincial Sheriff Jose V. Yasay issued a Sheriffs Deed of Conveyance in favor of the private
respondent over the subject property including their family home that was extra judicially
constituted in accordance with law. As a result of the alleged illegal deed of conveyance, private
respondent was able to obtain in his name Tax Declaration No. 851920 over the land, thus casting a
cloud of doubt over the title and ownership of petitioners over said property.

Issue:
Whether or not the family home is exempt from execution.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that the applicable law, therefore, in the case at bar is still the Civil

Code where registration of the declaration of a family home is a prerequisite. Nonetheless, the law
provides certain instances where the family home is not exempted from execution, forced sale or
attachment. The trial court found that on March 7, 1964, Pablo Taneo constituted the house in
question, erected on the land of Plutarco Vacalares, as the family home. The instrument constituting
the family home was registered only on January 24, 1966. The money judgment against Pablo Taneo
was rendered on January 24, 1964. Thus, at that time when the "debt" was incurred, the family home
was not yet constituted or even registered. Clearly, petitioners' alleged family home, as constituted by
their father is not exempt as it falls under the exception of Article 243 (2).

406

Persons and Family Relation

407

Persons and Family Relation

FAMILY HOME

SPOUSES CHARLIE FORTALEZA and OFELIA FORTALEZA vs. SPOUSES RAUL
LAPITAN and RONA LAPITAN

G.R. No. 178288 August 15, 2012

Facts:
Spouses Charlie and Ofelia Fortaleza obtained a loan from spouses Rolando and Amparo

Lapitan (creditors). As security, spouses Fortaleza executed on January 28, 1998 a Deed of Real
Estate Mortgage over their residential house and lot situated in Barrio Anos, Municipality of Los
Baños, Laguna (subject property). When spouses Fortaleza failed to pay the indebtedness including
the interests and penalties, the creditors applied for extrajudicial foreclosure of the Real Estate
Mortgage before the Office of the Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff of Calamba City. The
public auction sale was set on May 9, 2001.

At the sale, the creditors‘ son Dr. Raul Lapitan and his wife Rona emerged as the highest
bidders. Then, they were issued a Certificate of Salethat was registered with the Registry of Deeds of
Calamba City. The one-year redemption period expired without the spouses Fortaleza redeeming the
mortgage. Thus, spouses Lapitan executed an affidavit of consolidation of ownership on November
20, 2003 and the registration of the subject property in their names on February 4, 2004. Despite the
foregoing, the spouses Fortaleza refused spouses Lapitan‘s formal demandto vacate and surrender
possession of the subject property.

Issue:
Whether or not the Honorable court of appeals gravely erred in not holding that the

petitioners were prevented by the respondent from exercising their right of redemption over the
foreclosed property by demanding a redemption over the foreclosed property by demanding a
redemption price of a highly equitable and more than double the amount of the foreclosed property,
especially that the foreclosed mortgaged property is the family home of petitioners and their
children.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that Article 155(3) of the Family Code explicitly allows the forced

sale of a family home "for debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such
constitution." In this case, there is no doubt that spouses Fortaleza voluntarily executed on January
28, 1998 a deed of Real Estate Mortgage over the subject property, which was even notarized by
their original counsel of record. And assuming that the property is exempt from forced sale, spouses
Fortaleza did not set up and prove to the Sheriff such exemption from forced sale before it was sold
at the public auction.

408

Persons and Family Relation

KIND/STATUS OF CHILDREN

MANUEL DE ASIS vs. COURT OF APPEALS, et al.

G.R. No. 127578 February 15, 1999

Facts:
Vircel D. Andres, as the legal guardian of the minor, Glen Camil Andres de Asis, filed an

action for maintenance and support against Manuel de Asis. She alleged that Manuel is the father of
Glen but as a father, he failed to provide support to his child. Manuel countered that he is not the
father of the child and so he has no obligation to support mentioned child. Thereafter, Vircel moved
for the dismissal of the case because of the father's judicial declaration denying that he is the father
of subject minor child. Six years later, Vircel filed a similar complaint against the putative father.
Manuel moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground of res judicata.

Issue:
a.) Whether or not the civil status of a son or his filiation and paternity could be left to the will
or agreement of his parents.
b.) Whether or not the child is barred from filing an action to ask for support from his alleged
father due to the dismissal of the first case filed.

Ruling:
No, a child‘s civil status or his filiation and paternity cannot be left to the will of his parents.

Such issue must be judicially established and it is for the court to declare its existence or absence. In
the case at bar, the civil status of a son having been denied, and this civil status, from which the right
to support is derived being in issue, no conclusion could be given to such a denial until an
authoritative declaration has been given.

No, the child is not barred from filing an action to ask for support. The right to receive
support can neither be renounced nor transmitted to a third person. Furthermore, future support
cannot be the subject of a compromise.

The right to support being founded upon the need of the recipient to maintain his existence,
he is not entitled to renounce or transfer the right for this would mean sanctioning the voluntary
giving up of life itself. The right to life cannot be renounce; hence, support which is the means to
attain the former, cannot be renounced.

409

Persons and Family Relation

KIND/STATUS OF CHILDREN

RODOLFO FERNANDEZ, et al. vs. ROMEO FERNANDEZ, et al.

G.R. No. 143256 August 28, 2001

Facts:
The late Spouses Dr. Jose K. Fernandez, and Generosa A. de Venecia being childless by the

death of their son, purchased from a certain Miliang for P20.00 a one month baby boy. The boy

being referred to was later on identified as Rodolfo Fernandez, the herein appellant. Appellant was
taken care of by the couple and was sent to school and became a dental technician. He lived with the
couple until they became old and disabled. On August 31, 1989, after the death of Dr. Jose,
appellant and Generosa de Venecia executed a Deed of Extra-judicial Partition dividing and
allocating to themselves the estate left by the deceased. Same day, Generosa sold her share to
Rodolfo‘s son, Eddie Fernandez. After learning the transaction, Romeo, Potenciano, Francisco,
Julita, William, Mary, Alejandro, Gerardo, Rodolfo and Gregorio, all surnamed Fernandez, being
nephews and nieces of the deceased Jose K. Fernandez, their father Genaro being a brother of Jose,
filed on September 21, 1994, an action to declare the Extra-Judicial Partition of Estate and Deed of
Sale void ab initio. They claimed that Rodolfo is not a legitimate nor a legally adopted child of
spouses Dr. Jose Fernandez and Generosa de Venecia Fernandez, hence Rodolfo could not inherit
from the spouses.

Issue:
Whether or not Rodolfo is a legitimate or a legally adopted child of Jose Fernandez and

Generosa de Venecia Fernandez.

Ruling:
No, Rodolfo is neither a legitimate nor a legally adopted child of Jose Fernandez and

Generosa de Venecia Fernandez. Rodolfo failed to come up with evidences to prove his filiation.
The only public document he could show was the Application for Recognition of Back Pay Rights
under Act No. 897. 897. Such is a public document but nevertheless, it was not executed to admit

the filiation of Jose K. Fernandez with him. Rodolfo also claims that he enjoyed and possessed the
status of being a legitimate child of the spouses openly and continuously until they died. Open and
continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child is meant the enjoyment by the child of the
position and privileges usually attached to the status of a legitimate child such as bearing the paternal
surname, treatment by the parents and family of the child as legitimate, constant attendance to the
child's support and education, and giving the child the reputation of being a child of his parents.
However, it must be noted that possession of status of a child does not in itself constitute an
acknowledgment; it is only a ground for a child to compel recognition by his assumed parent. His
baptismal certificate, although public documents, is evidence only to prove the administration of the
sacraments on the dates therein specified, but not the veracity of the statements or declarations
made therein with respect to his kinsfolk. It may be argued that a baptismal certificate is one of the
other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws of proving filiation but in this case, the
authenticity of the baptismal certificate was doubtful when Fr. Raymundo Q. de Guzman of St. John
the Evangelist Parish of Lingayen-Dagupan, Dagupan City issued a certification on October 16,

410

Persons and Family Relation

1995 attesting that the records of baptism on June 7, 1930 to August 8, 1936 were all damaged. The
pictures he presented do not also constitute proof of filiation.

ACTION TO IMPUGN LEGITIMACY

GERARDO B. CONCEPCION vs. COURT OF APPEALS, et al.
G.R. No. 123450 August 31, 2005

Facts:
Gerardo B. Concepcion and Ma. Theresa Almontewere married on December 29, 1989. A

year later, they begot Jose Gerardo. On December 19, 1991, Gerardo filed a petition to annul his
marriage to Ma. Theresa on the ground of bigamy. This was because it was found out that Ma.
Theresa had already married a Mario Gopiao nine years before their marriage. Such marriage of Ma.
Theresa to Mario was never annulled. The trial court ruled that Gerardo and Ma. Theresa‘s marriage
was bigamous and that her marriage to Mario is valid and subsisting. It declared the child as being
illegitimate. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court‘s decision but on appeal, reversed its
ruling and held that Jose Gerardo was not the son of Ma. Theresa by Gerardo but by Mario during
her first marriage.

Issues:
a) Whether or not the child born out of a bigamous marriage is considered legitimate.
b) Whether or not Gerardo could assail Jose Gerardo‘s legitimacy.

Ruling:
Yes, a child born out of a bigamous marriage is considered legitimate. The legitimacy would

come from the validity of the first marriage and not on the bigamous marriage for that bigamous
marriage is void from the very beginning(ab initio). Ma. Theresa was married to Mario Gopiao, and
that she had never entered into a lawful marriage with the Gerardo since the so-called ―marriage‖
with the latter was void ab initio. Ma. Theresa was legitimately married to Mario Gopiao when the
child Jose Gerardo was born on December 8, 1990. Therefore, the child Jose Gerardo – under the

law – is the legitimate child of the legal and subsisting marriage between Ma. Theresa and Mario
Gopiao; he cannot be deemed to be the illegitimate child of the void and non-existent ‗marriage‘
between Ma. Theresa and Gerardo.The status and filiation of a child cannot be
compromised. Article 164 of the Family Code is clear. A child who is conceived or born during the
marriage of his parents is legitimate.

As a guaranty in favor of the child and to protect his status of legitimacy, Article 167 of the
Family Code provides that the child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have
declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.

No, Gerardo is not in a position to assail Jose Gerardo‘s legitimacy. He has no standing in
law to dispute the status of Jose Gerardo. Only Ma. Theresa‘s husband Mario or, in a proper
case, his heirs, who can contest the legitimacy of the child Jose Gerardo born to his wife.Impugning
the legitimacy of a child is a strictly personal right of the husband or, in exceptional cases, his

411

Persons and Family Relation

heirs. Since the marriage of Gerardo and Ma. Theresa was void from the very beginning; he never
became her husband and thus never acquired any right to impugn the legitimacy of her child.

ACTION TO IMPUGN LEGITIMACY

BELEN SAGAD ANGELES vs. ALELI “CORAZON” ANGELES MAGLAYA
G.R. No. 153798 September 2, 2005

Facts:
Francisco M. Angeles died intestate on January 21, 1998 in the City of Manila, leaving

behind four parcels of land and a building, among other valuable properties. Respondent Aleli
claims that she is the sole legitimate child of the deceased and Genoveva Mercado, and, together
with petitioner, Belen S. Angeles, decedent‘s wife by his second marriage, are the surviving heirs of
the decedent. For this matter, respondent prays that she be made administratrix of Francisco‘s
estate. Petitioner Belen opposed respondent‘s claim, alleging that the respondent could not be the
daughter of Francisco for, although she was recorded as Francisco‘s legitimate daughter, the
corresponding birth certificate was not signed by him. Belen petitioner further alleged that
respondent, despite her claim of being the legitimate child of Francisco and Genoveva Mercado, has
not presented the marriage contract between her supposed parents or produced any acceptable

document to prove such union.

Issue:
Whether or not respondent Aleli could validly claim that she is the legitimate daughter of

Francisco Angeles.

Ruling:
No, respondent‘s legitimacy was impugned, and for failing to establish the presumption of

her legitimacy, she could not validly claim that she is the legitimate child of the deceased. The
presumption of legitimacy under Article 164 of the Family Code may be availed only upon
convincing proof of the factual basis- that the child‘s parents were legally married and that his/her
conception or birth occurred during the subsistence of that marriage. In the case at bar, respondent
failed to prove such legal marriage of her parents, for she failed to show any marriage certificate or
marriage contract. She failed to present any priest, judge, mayor, or other solemnizing authority to
the witness box to declare that he solemnized the marriage between her parents. Clearly,
therefore, respondent could not be vested with the legal presumption of legitimacy which, as above
explained, should flow from a lawful marriage between Francisco and Genevova.

Article 172 of the Family Code provides that the legitimate filiation of a child can be
established by any of the modes therein defined even without direct evidence of the marriage of
his/her supposed parents. But respondent failed to prove her legitimacy even in this aspect.
Respondent presented, in support of her claim of legitimacy, a copy of her Birth Certificate dated
November 23, 1939 issued by the Civil Registrar of the City of Manila. But such birth certificate was
not signed by her putative father. Jurisprudence teaches that a birth certificate, to be considered as

412

Persons and Family Relation

validating proof of paternity and as an instrument of recognition, must be signed by the father and
mother jointly, or by the mother alone if the father refuses.

ACTION TO IMPUGN LEGITIMACY

JANICE MARIE JAO vs. COURT OF APPEALS, et al.

G.R. No. L-49162 July 28, 1987

Facts:
In 1967, Arlene Salgado was introduced to PericoJao. After such introduction, Jao courted

Arlene. Not long thereafter, they had sexual intercourse and subsequently, they lived together. 1968,
Arlene became pregnant. Jao paid for all the expenses related to Arlene‘s pregnancy but when the
child, Janice was born, Jao insisted that she could not be the father of such child. When the case was
filed with the RTC, the RTC ordered the NBI for a group blood testing. The group blood testing
result showed that Janice could not have been the possible offspring of Jao and Arlene.

Issue:
Whether or not group blood testing could be conclusive evidence to impugn the legitimacy

of Janice.

Ruling:
Yes, group blood testing could be admitted as conclusive evidence to impugn the legitimacy

of Janice. For the past three decades, the use of blood typing in cases of disputed parentage has
already become an important legal procedure. There is now almost universal scientific agreement
that blood grouping tests are conclusive as to non-paternity, although inconclusive as to paternity —
that is, the fact that the blood type of the child is a possible product of the mother and alleged father
does not conclusively prove that the child is born by such parents; but, if the blood type of the child
is not the possible blood type when the blood of the mother and that of the alleged father are cross

matched, then the child cannot possibly be that of the alleged father.

Medical science has shown that there are four types of blood in man which can be
transmitted through heredity. Although the presence of the same type of blood in two persons does
not indicate that one was begotten by the other, yet the fact that they are of different types will
indicate the impossibility of one being the child of the other. Thus, when the supposed father and
the alleged child are not in the same blood group, they cannot be father and child by consanguinity.

413

Persons and Family Relation

ACTION TO IMPUGN LEGITIMACY

TEOFISTA BABIERA vs. PRESENTACION B. CATOTAL June 15, 2000
G.R. No. 138493

Facts:
TeofistaBabiera claims that she was born to the spouses Eugenio and HermogenaBabiera

then 65 and 54 years old respectively, at the time of her birth. PresentacionBabiera-Catotal, daughter
of the late spouses Eugenio and Hermogena counters this claim, saying that she saw with her own
eyes that Teofista was actually born to their housemaid named Flora Guinto. Presentacion testified
that Teofista was born through the help of a ―hilot‖ and that her mother Flora forged the Teofista‘s
birth certificate, making it appear that HermogenaBabiera was the mother by forging Hermogena‘s
signature. Presentacion further claims that Teofista‘s real surname is Guinto, her mother being
single; the father, a carpenter, refused to sign the birth certificate. Teofista on her defense, claims
that Presentacion has no legal capacity to file the instant petition pursuant to Article 171 of the
Family Code which states that only the father could impugn the child's legitimacy, and that the same
was not subject to a collateral attack.

Issue:
Whether or not such petition may prosper considering Teofista‘s claim that Presentacion has

no legal capacity to file the instant petition and can the presumption of regularity in the issuance of
her birth certificate be upheld.

Ruling:

Yes, the petition may prosper. The case at bar is not covered by Article 171 for the prayer
therein is not to declare that Teofista is an illegitimate child of Hermogena, but to establish that the
former is not the latter's child at all. The present action does not impugn Teofista‘s filiation to
Spouses Eugenio and HermogenaBabiera, because there is no blood relation to impugn in the first
place. Presentacion only aims to assail and cancel Teofista‘s birth certificate for the void and
simulated birth certificate of the latter would affect the former‘s hereditary rights.

Also, Teofista‘s birth certificate cannot be taken into consideration for there were already
irregularities regarding the birth certificate itself. It was not signed by the local civil registrar.More
importantly, the Court of Appeals observed that the mother‘s signature therein was different from
her signatures in other documents presented during the trial. The most significant piece of evidence,
however, is the deposition of HermogenaBabiera which states that she did not give birth to Teofista,
and that the latter was not hers nor her husband Eugenio‘s.

414

Persons and Family Relation

ACTION TO IMPUGN LEGITIMACY

WILLIAM LIYAO, JR. vs. JUANITA TANHOTI-LIYAO, et al.
G.R. No. 138961 March 7, 2002

Facts:
Corazon Garcia alleges that she was cohabiting with William Liyao from 1965 up to

William‘s death in December, 1975 even though Corazon is still legally married but living separately
to a Ramon Yulo. William Liyao himself was legally married to Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao at the time of
his cohabitation with Corazon. Corazon and deceased lived together with the company of Corazon‘s
two children from her subsisting marriage- Enrique and Bernadette, both surnamed Yulo. In 1974,
they begot a child, William Liyao, Jr. It was alleged that William Liyao paid for all the expenses for
the subsistence of William Jr. and also that of Corazon and her two children from her subsisting

marriage during their cohabitation. William Jr. was said to be in continuous possession and
enjoyment of the status of the child of said William Liyao, having been recognized and
acknowledged as such child by the decedent during his lifetime. Upon the death of his alleged father,
William Jr. prays that he be recognized as an illegitimate child and an heir by the family of the
deceased from his subsisting marriage. The deceased‘s legitimate children on their part, alleges that
the deceased could not have fathered petitioner for their father and mother have never been
separated.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner may impugn his legitimacy with that of his mother‘s subsisting

marriage and establish his claim of filiation with the late William Liyao.

Ruling:
Holding that Corazon‘s marriage with Ramon Yulo is still subsisting, it is presumed that

petitioner is the legitimate child of Ramon Yulo and not the illegitimate child of William Liyao.
Under the New Civil Code, a child born and conceived during a valid marriage is presumed to be
legitimate. This presumption is grounded in a policy to protect innocent offspring from the odium
of illegitimacy. The presumption of legitimacy of the child, however, is not conclusive and
consequently, may be overthrown by evidence to the contrary. Article 255 of the New Civil Code
provides: ―Children born after one hundred and eighty days following the celebration of the
marriage, and before three hundred days following its dissolution or the separation of the spouses
shall be presumed to be legitimate.‖ No evidence other than that of physical impossibility of the

husband having access to his wife within the first one hundred and twenty days of the three hundred
which preceded the birth of the child can be admitted. Such physical impossibility may be caused by:

415

Persons and Family Relation

(a) By the impotence of the husband; (b) by the fact that husband and wife were living separately in
such a way that access was not possible; (c) by the serious illness of the husband.

Petitioner cannot impugn his own legitimacy. Article 255 of the Civil Code provides that
only the husband, or in proper cases, his heirs under the conditions set forth under Article 262 of
the Civil Code can impugn such legitimacy. And, in the case at bar, the petition was initiated by
petitioner himself through his mother, Corazon Garcia, and not through Enrique and Bernadette
Yulo who are the undisputed children of Corazon and Ramon Yulo. The child himself cannot
choose his own filiation.

ACTION TO IMPUGN LEGITIMACY

JINKIE CHRISTIE A. DE JESUS vs. ESTATE OF DECEDENT JUAN GAMBOA
DIZON

G.R. No. 142877 October 2, 2001

Facts:
Danilo and Carolina de Jesus were married on 23 August 1964. It was within this marriage

that the petitioners, Jinkie and Jacqueline were born. In 1991 though, Juan Dizon acknowledged
petitioners as his own illegitimate children through a notarized document. Thereafter, Juan died
intestate and petitioners filed a prayer that they be given their legitime and be recognized as
illegitimate children by the surviving spouse and legitimate children of Juan Dizon.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioners‘ legitimacy as children of Danilo may be impugned and they be

recognized as illegitimate children of Juan Dizon.

Ruling:
No. The petitioners were born under the subsisting marriage of Danilo and Carolina. It is

presumed that children born in wedlock are legitimate. This presumption becomes conclusive in the
absence of proof that there is physical impossibility of access between the spouses during the first
120 days of the 300 days which immediately precedes the birth of the child due to (a) the physical
incapacity of the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife; (b) the fact the husband and wife
are living separately in such a way that sexual intercourse is not possible; or (c) serious illness of the
husband, which absolutely prevents sexual intercourse. And only the father, or in exceptional
instances the latter's heirs, can contest in an appropriate action the legitimacy of a child born to his
wife. Since the petitioners failed to show records of the impossibility of their parents‘ access to each
other during the first 120 days of the 300 days which preceded their birth, they cannot assail their
presumed legitimacy. Failing therefore to impugn their legitimacy, petitioners cannot claim that they
are the acknowledged illegitimate children of the deceased, Juan Dizon.

416

Persons and Family Relation

ACTION TO CLAIM LEGITIMACY

EDGARDO A. TIJING vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 125901 March 8, 2001

Facts:
Edgardo and BienvenidaTijing are husband and wife, they have six children, youngest of

whom is Edgardo Tijing Jr. In August 1989, Angelita Diamante fetched Bienvenida for an urgent
laundry job. Bienvenida left to Angelita her 4-month old child, Edgardo Jr. as she usually let Angelita
take care of her child while she was doing laundry. When Bienvenida returned from work to get her
son, Angelita was nowhere to be found, and despite her and her husband‘s efforts, they could not
locate Angelita and their child‘s whereabouts.

Four years later, Bienvenida read about the death of Tomas Lopez, the common-law
husband of Angelita, whose interment is in Bulacan. She went there and allegedly saw her son
Edgardo Jr., now named John Thomas Lopez. John is now being claimed by Angelita as her own
son, sired by her common-law husband Tomas Lopez during their cohabitation. Bienvenida now
alleges that the child cannot possibly be born to Angelita and Tomas for it was the latter‘s own
brother who admitted that Tomas was rendered sterile, caused by an accident. Tomas begot no
children from his legal marriage nor with the cohabitation with Angelita. Tomas‘ brother even
testified that Tomas himself admitted to him that the subject child was adopted.

Issue:
Who among the claimants is the true parent of the subject child.

Ruling:
Bienvenida. It was Bienvenida who was able to produce the competent evidences to

establish the child‘s filiation with her and her husband. She substantiated her claim with sufficient
clinical records, presenting the proper and credible witnesses who assisted her in her child‘s birth.
Not to mention the fact that it could be readily observed that Bienvenida and the child have strong
similarities in their faces, eyes, eyebrows and head shapes. Resemblance between a minor and his
alleged parent is competent and material evidence to establish parentage. Whereas, Angelita had
been known to have undergone ligation years before the alleged birth of the child and the admission
of Tomas‘ own brother that Tomas was sterile makes it impossible that he and Angelita could have
produced subject child. More importantly, the birth certificate of the child stated Tomas Lopez and
private respondent were legally married which is false because even private respondent had admitted
she is a common-law wife. This false entry puts to doubt the other data in said birth certificate.

417

Persons and Family Relation

KINDS OF RECOGNITION

G.R. No. 124814 CAMELO CABATANIAvs. COURT OF APPEALS October 21, 2004

Facts:
Florencia is the mother of the respondent. Her husband left her in 1981 and she was hired as

petitioner‘s household help. It was then that petitioner and Florencia had sexual intercourse. After a
month, petitioner‘s wife noticed that Florencia is pregnant. For this reason, petitioner‘s wife
dismissed Florencia and told her to go home. Petitioner was surprised when Florencia demanded
from him support for their alleged child. Petitioner refused, denying paternity and claimed that
Florencia was already pregnant when they had sexual intercourse. During trial, Florencia claimed

that petitioner voluntarily recognized respondent when he rented a house for her after the dismissal
and misrepresented herself as a widow when in fact her husband is still alive. Trial court brushed this
misrepresentation and used as one of its bases of its decision the similarities on personal
appearances of the petitioner and respondent and favored the respondent‘s claim.

Issue:
Whether or not respondent may compulsorily be recognized by petitioner.

Ruling:
No. Respondent failed to show conclusive evidence as to establish his filiation with

petitioner. Aside from Florencia‘s self-serving testimony that petitioner rented a house for her,
private respondent failed to present sufficient proof of voluntary recognition. A certificate of live
birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent evidence of paternity when there is
no showing that the putative father had a hand in the preparation of said certificate. The local civil
registrar has no authority to record the paternity of an illegitimate child on the information of a third
person.

More importantly, the fact that Florencia‘s husband is living and there is a valid subsisting
marriage between them gives rise to the presumption that a child born within that marriage is
legitimate even though Florencia may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been
sentenced as an adulteress. Only the husband or in exceptional cases, his heirs may impugned the
presumed legitimacy of the child.

418

Persons and Family Relation

With regards the personal appearance of the child, the Supreme Court provided that in this
age of genetic profiling and deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) analysis, the extremely subjective test of
physical resemblance or similarity of features will not suffice as evidence to prove paternity and
filiation before the courts of law.

KINDS OF RECOGNITION

ROSALINA P. ECETA vs.MA. THERESA VELL LAGURA ECETA
G.R. NO. 157037 May 20, 2004

Facts:
Isaac and Rosalina married in 1926. The begot a child named Vicente. When Isaac died, he

left behind properties to which Rosalina and Vicente were the compulsory heirs. Thereafter, Vicente
also died but he had an illegitimate daughter, Ma. Theresa. Thus, the latter is a compulsory heir
together with Rosalina. Theresa then filed for a petition that she be made co-owner of a property

which was originally owned by Isaac, passed to Rosalina and Vicente upon his death. Ma. Theresa‘s
contention was that she should be made as co-owner by virtue of her father‘s death. During pre-
trial, Rosalina already admitted that she is the grandmother of Ma. Theresa. On appeal though, she
questions the alleged filiation and whether if such could be established by mere birth certificate and
by her admission during the trial.

Issue:
Whether or not respondent‘s filiation to her alleged father could be established by the birth

certificate and by the admission made.

Ruling:
Yes. Ma. Theresa successfully established her filiation with Vicente through the duly

authenticated birth certificate. Vicente himself signed respondent‘s birth certificate thereby
acknowledging that she is his daughter. By this act alone, Vicente is deemed to have acknowledged
his paternity over Ma. Theresa, thus, the filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is
established by (1) the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2) an
admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and
signed by the parent concerned. In the absence thereof, filiation shall be proved by (1) the open and
continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) any other means allowed by the
Rules of Court and special laws.

The due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a
court of record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgement of

419

Persons and Family Relation

the child. In fact, any authentic writing is treated not just a ground for compulsory recognition; it is
in itself a voluntary recognition that does not require a separate action for judicial approval.

KINDS OF RECOGNITION

MA. THERESA R. ALBERTO vs. COURT OF APPEALS June 2, 1994
G.R. No. 86639

Facts:
Aurora Reniva and Juan M. Alberto had a child born out of wedlock in the person of the

petitioner. Accordingly, petitioner used "Alberto" as her surname in all her school records and

correspondences. On September 18, 1967, Juan M. Alberto, felled by a bullet from an assassin‘s gun,
died intestate. His widow, Yolanda R. Alberto, filed a petition for the administration of his estate.
The petition was granted but was reopened as petitioner filed a motion that she be declared to have
acquired the status of a natural child and be entitled to share in the estate of the deceased. The court
favored the petitioner but CA reversed such ruling.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner be declared to have acquired the status of a natural child.

Ruling:
Yes. During his lifetime, deceased acted in such a manner as to evince his intent to recognize

petitioner as his flesh and blood, first, by allowing her from birth to use his family name; second, by
giving her and her mother sums of money by way of support and lastly, by openly introducing her to
members of his family, relatives and friends as his daughter. Supplementing such unmistakable acts
of recognition were those of his kin and gang mates, and openly visiting his daughter in school, had
meetings with her at the MOPC, manifesting open acceptance of such relationship. Taken
altogether, the claimed filiation would be hard to disprove.

Deceased died during the minority of the petitioner, thus, Art 285 of the Civil Code allows
her to file an action for recognition 4 years from the time she reaches majority age. Such motion was
filed seasonably before the expiration of the 4-yr period.

420

Persons and Family Relation

KINDS OF RECOGNITION

JOSE RIVERO, JESSIE RIVERO and AMALIA RIVEROvs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 141273 May 17, 2005

Facts:
Benito DyChiao, Sr., a married man, had an amorous relationship with Shirley Arevalo. They

begot a son, BenedickArevaloDyChiao. When Benito Sr. died, Benedick, through her natural mother
and guardian ad litem, being a minor, filed a complaint on his behalf, against the legitimate children
of the deceased for compulsory recognition as an illegitimate child and that he be given his share in
the estate left by the deceased. This was opposed by Mary Jane, daughter of the deceased, but later
on signed a compromise agreement with Benedick, recognizing the latter as illegitimate son of her
father and giving him his share in the estate. Attached to the agreement was a SPA appointing Mary
Jane to represent her brothers who are confined in a mental hospital. Such compromise agreement
was approved by the court, thus requiring the compulsory recognition of Benedick. Thereafter, the
Dy-Chiao brothers, through their uncle, assailed such compromise agreement.

Issue:
Whether or not the recognition of Benedick‘s illegitimacy by Mary Jane is valid based on the

compromise agreement made.

Ruling:
No. Article 2035(1) of the New Civil Code provides that no compromise upon the civil

status of persons shall be valid. As such, paternity and filiation, or the lack of the same, is a
relationship that must be judicially established, and it is for the court to determine its existence or
absence. It cannot be left to the will or agreement of the parties. Further, such recognition is
ineffectual because under the law, the recognition must be made personally by the putative parent
and not by any brother, sister or relative.

421

Persons and Family Relation

KINDS OF RECOGNITION

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SGT. MORENO BAYANI
G.R. No. 120894 October 3, 1996

Facts:

Victim Ma. Elena Nieto, then 15 yrs old, was living with her paternal grandmother together
with her siblings as their parents were abroad. Appellant frequented their house as he was a neighbor
and a ―kumpadre‖ of her paternal uncles. One day, appellant asked victim‘s grandmother for her
consent to let victim accompany him to visit a friend. Victim‘s grandmother consented. After
visiting his friend who was allegedly his mistress, appellant invited her to have lunch in a hotel
restaurant but victim declined and suggested they go home. Appellant however said they would still
visit another friend. Turns out, the building they went to was a motel, where appellant deceived the
friend they were going to visit was in the 2nd floor. When appellant opened a room, he forcibly let
victim in and succeeded in having carnal knowledge with her, intimidating and threatening her with a
gun pointed at her. After his lust was sated, he threatened to kill her and her family if ever she‘ll
divulge the incident. Victim did not divulge the incident because of fear, until it became apparent
that she was pregnant. She was then sent to another place for her safety and as the trial ensued,
appellant‘s contention was that victim consented to the act, she being the appellant‘s mistress. The
trial court found him guilty of rape.

Issue:
Whether or not appellant may be made to compulsorily recognize the child borne of his

crime.

Ruling:
No. Article 345 of the Revised Penal Code provides that persons guilty of rape, seduction, or

abduction, shall be sentenced to: (a) indemnify the offended woman; (b) acknowledge the offspring,
unless the law should prevent him from so doing; and (c) in every case, to support the
offspring. While under Article 283 of the Civil Code, the father is obliged to recognize the child as

422

Persons and Family Relation

his natural child in cases of rape, abduction, and seduction when the period of the offense coincides,
more or less, with the period of the conception. It has been held, however, that acknowledgment is
disallowed if the offender is a married man, with only support for the offspring as part of the
sentence. Therefore, under article 345 of the Revised Penal Code, the offender in a rape case who is
married, as in the case at bar, can only be sentenced to indemnify the victim and support the
offspring, if there be any.

KINDS OF RECOGNITION

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.MANUEL MANAHAN

G.R. No. 128157 September 29, 1999

Facts:
Victim TeresitaTibigar, then 16 yrs old was working at a canteen as stay-in waitress, and

sleeps at the 2nd floor of the canteen. Manahan is the brother-in-law of the owner of the canteen. He
and his wife lives temporarily with the owner as his wife was then pregnant. One night, as victim
was sleeping, she was suddenly awakened when she felt someone beside her. When she opened her
eyes, she saw that it was Manahan who immediately placed himself on top of her. Victim tried to
shout but accused covered her mouth. She tried to free herself but to no avail. In her weakened
state, accused succeeded in raping her. Thereafter, he left her. Within the month, victim left the
canteen and returned to her parents. The incident resulted to her pregnancy, thus, she was forced to
divulge the rape incident to her parents. They then filed a criminal complaint against accused. The
accused on his part, alleged that they were lovers and that the sexual congress between them were
consensual. The court favored the testimony of the victim and convicted accused of rape.

Issue:
Whether or not accused may be made to compulsorily recognize the child borne of his

crime.

Ruling:
No. Article 345 of the Revised Penal Code provides that persons guilty of rape shall also be

sentenced to "acknowledge the offspring, unless the law should prevent him from doing so," and "in
every case to support the offspring." In the case at bar, compulsory acknowledgment of the child
Melanie Tibigar is not proper there being a legal impediment in doing so as it appears that the

accused is a married man

423

Persons and Family Relation

PROOF OF ILLEGITIMACY

BEN-HUR NEPOMUCENO vs. ARHBENCEL ANN LOPEZ, represented by her mother
ARACELI LOPEZ

G.R. No. 181258 March 18, 2010

Facts:
Respondent Arhbencel claims to be the illegitimate child of petitioner, Ben-hur. She

therefore filed a complaint for recognition. What she presents to the court as evidence is her birth
certificate which had not been signed by her alleged father as the latter allegedly refused to do so.
Another evidence that she adduced was a handwritten note by the petitioner obligating himself to
give her financial support in the amount of P1,500 on the 15th and 30th days of each month.

Issue:
Whether or not evidences adduced by respondent is sufficient proof of illegitimacy.

Ruling:
No. Art 175 of the Family Code provides that illegitimate children may establish their

illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children. Thus such is to
be based on Art 172 which provides that filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the
following: (1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2) An
admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and
signed by the parent concerned. In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation
shall be proved by: (1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2)
Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. In the case at bar, the adduced
evidence which is the note written by the alleged father, does not contain any statement whatsoever

about Arhbencel‘s filiation to petitioner. It is, therefore, not a competent evidence of illegitimate

424

Persons and Family Relation

filiation as an admission of filiation in a private handwritten instrument signed by the parent
concerned.

Under Art 278 of the New Civil Code, voluntary recognition by a parent shall be made in the
record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing. To be
effective, the claim of filiation must be made by the putative father himself and the writing must be
the writing of the putative father. A notarial agreement to support a child whose filiation is admitted
by the putative father is considered acceptable evidence. In the present case, the note cannot be
accorded the same weight as the notarial agreement to support the child for it is not even notarized.
Further, the notarial agreement must be accompanied by the putative father‘s admission of filiation
to be an acceptable evidence of filiation. Here, however, not only has petitioner not admitted
filiation through contemporaneous actions. He has consistently denied it.

Lastly, the copy of her Certificate of Birth, has no probative value to establish filiation to
petitioner, the latter not having signed the same.

PROOF OF ILLEGITIMACY

ELINO RIVERA, et al. vs. HEIRS OF ROMUALDO VILLANUEVA represented by
MELCHOR VILLANUEVA, et al.

G.R. No. 141501 July 21, 2006

Facts:
Gonzales cohabited with Villanueva without the benefit of marriage because the latter was

married to one Amanda Musngi. They allegedly had an illegitimate daughter, respondent Angelina.
Thereafter, Gonzales died intestate. Villanueva and respondent Angelina then executed an
extrajudicial settlement of Gonzales' estate, some were allegedly acquired during the cohabitation. In
this document, Villanueva, for the amount of P30,000, conveyed his interests in the estate to
Angelina.

Petitioners who are Gonzales‘ half-brothers contested such extra-judicial settlement and
questioned Angelina‘s illegitimacy.Angelina adduced her birth certificate to prove her filiation.

Issue:
Whether or not the adduced birth certificate is able to prove Angelina‘s filiation.

Ruling:
No. A close examination of the birth certificate reveals that respondent Angelina was listed

as "adopted" by both Villanueva and Gonzales. It was previously held that the mere registration of a
child in his or her birth certificate as the child of the supposed parents is not a valid adoption, and
does not confer upon the child the status of an adopted child and the legal rights of such child.

425

Persons and Family Relation

Furthermore, it is well-settled that a record of birth is merely a prima facie evidence of the
facts contained therein. It is not conclusive evidence of the truthfulness of the statements made
there by the interested parties. Angelina should have adduced evidence of her adoption, in view of
the contents of her birth certificate. The records, however, are bereft of any such evidence.

Lastly, Gonzales was already 44 years old and on the verge of menopausal and that she had
been living childless with Villanueva for 20 years at the time of the alleged birth. Thus, it was not
sufficiently established that respondent Angelina was Gonzales' biological daughter, nor even her
adopted daughter.

PROOF OF ILLEGITIMACY

MERCEDES CRISTOBAL CRUZ, et al. vs. EUFROSINA CRISTOBAL, et al.

G.R. No. 140422 August 7, 2006

Facts:
Petitioners are the alleged children of Buenaventura during his first marriage. Private

respondents on the other hand, claim to be Buenaventura‘s children from his second marriage. Long
after their alleged father died, petitioners learned that respondents had executed an extrajudicial
partition of a certain property belonging to their alleged father and transferred such to their names.
Such was contested by the petitioners and filed a complaint to recover their alleged shares in the
property.

To prove their filiation, petitioners presented their baptismal certificates. Such contention
was also confirmed by witnesses presented during the trial.

Issue:
Whether or not the alleged filiation of the petitioners to Buenaventura was sufficiently

proven.

Ruling:
Yes. Article 172 of the Family Code provides that the filiation of legitimate children is

established by any of the following: (1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final
judgment; or (2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the

426

Persons and Family Relation

legitimate filiation shall be proved by: (1) the open and continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate child; or (2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.

"Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and Special Laws," may consist of the
child‘s baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family bible in which the child‘s name has been
entered, common reputation respecting the child‘s pedigree, admission by silence, the testimony of
witnesses, and other kinds of proof of admission.

In the case at bar, the baptismal certificates of respondents were adduced. In the case of
Mercedes, she produced a certification issued by the Local Civil Registrar attesting to the fact that
records of birth for the year she was born were all destroyed. A witness was also presented who
testified that petitioners enjoyed that common reputation in the community where they reside as
being the children of Buevaventura. Testimonies of witnesses were also presented to prove filiation
by continuous possession of the status as a legitimate child. The foregoing evidences thus suffice to
prove that petitioners are children of the late Buenaventura.

PROOF OF ILLEGITIMACY

G.R. No. 172471 ANTONIO PERLA vs. MIRASOL BARING, et al. November 12, 2012

Facts:
Mirasol alleges that she and Antonio cohabited for about 2 years. As a result, Randy was

born to her. However, when Antonio landed a job as seaman, he left them and refused to give
support to their son. Antonio for his part, denied that they ever cohabited although admitted that he
had a one night stand with Mirasol. During the trial, Mirasol presented Randy‘s birth and baptismal
certificates. She avers that she and Antonio supplied the information indicated in the certificates, as
the ‗hilot‘ who assisted her went to Antonio‘s house to solicit the said information. Randy also
testified, saying that he even had a vacation at her aunt, Antonio‘s sister for a week with which he 1st
met Antonio, calling him Papa and while the latter hugged him, he promised to support Randy.

Issue:
Whether or not Randy‘s filiation to Antonio was sufficiently proven.

Ruling:
No. Respondents failed to establish Randy‘s illegitimate filiation to Antonio. The rules for

establishing filiation are found in Arts.175 and 172 of the Family Code. Whereas, in the case at bar,
the birth and baptismal certificates presented have no probative value to establish the alleged
filiation since the Antonio had not signed them. It is settled that such evidences adduced identifying
the putative father is not competent evidence of paternity when there is no showing that the

427

Persons and Family Relation

putative father had a hand in their preparation. Mirasol failed to present the mentioned hilot to
prove her claim that it was Antonio who supplied the information in the certificates. Besides, they
do not contain Antonio‘s signature and that there were also inconsistencies such as Antonio‘s
middle name, signifying that he had no hand in their preparation.

Neither does the testimony of Randy establish his filiation. The single instance of Antonio‘s
hug and promise to support Randy cannot be considered as proof of continuous possession of the
status of a child. To emphasize, the father‘s conduct towards his son must be spontaneous and
uninterrupted for this ground to exist. Whereas, except for this mentioned single instance, there
were no other acts of Antonio treating Randy as his son.

Lastly, assuming that Antonio indeed had sexual contact with Mirasol, still, none of these
sexual congresses could have led to the conception of Randy who was born two years later.

PROBATIVE VALUE OF DNA TESTS IN PATERNITY CASES

EDGARDO A. TIJING, et al. vs. COURT OF APPEALS, et al.

G.R. No. 125901 March 8, 2001

Facts:
Edgardo and Bienvenida Tijing are husband and wife, they have six children, youngest of

whom is Edgardo Tijing Jr. In August 1989, Angelita Diamante fetched Bienvenida for an urgent
laundry job. Bienvenida left to Angelita her 4-month old child, Edgardo Jr. as she usually let Angelita
take care of her child while she was doing laundry. When Bienvenida returned from work to get her
son, Angelita was nowhere to be found, and despite her and her husband‘s efforts, they could not
locate Angelita and their child‘s whereabouts.

Four years later, Bienvenida read about the death of Tomas Lopez, the common-law
husband of Angelita, whose interment is in Bulacan. She went there and allegedly saw her son
Edgardo Jr., now named John Thomas Lopez. John is now being claimed by Angelita as her own
son, sired by her common-law husband Tomas Lopez during their cohabitation. Bienvenida now
alleges that the child cannot possibly be born to Angelita and Tomas for it was the latter‘s own
brother who admitted that Tomas was rendered sterile, caused by an accident. Tomas begot no
children from his legal marriage nor with the cohabitation with Angelita. Tomas‘ brother even
testified that Tomas himself admitted to him that the subject child was adopted.

Issue:

428

Persons and Family Relation

Who among the claimants is the true parent of the subject child.

Ruling:
Bienvenida. She presented sufficient clinical records, presenting the proper and credible

witnesses who assisted her in her child‘s birth. Not to mention that it could be readily observed that
Bienvenida and the child have strong similarities in their faces, eyes, eyebrows and head shapes.
Resemblance between a minor and his alleged parent is competent and material evidence to establish
parentage. Whereas, Angelita had been known to have undergone ligation years before the alleged
birth of the child and the admission of Tomas‘ own brother that Tomas was sterile makes it
impossible that he and Angelita sired subject child. More importantly, the birth certificate of the
child stated Tomas Lopez and private respondent were legally married which is false because even
Angelita had admitted she is a common-law wife. This false entry puts to doubt the other data in
said birth certificate.

In this case, the Supreme Court made mention of the DNA test for identification and
parentage testing. The DNA from the mother, the alleged father and child are analyzed to establish
parentage. The use of DNA test as evidence is still open to challenge, but as the appropriate case
comes, courts should not hesitate to rule on its admissibility. Though it is not necessary in this case
to resort to DNA testing, in future it would be useful to all concerned in the prompt resolution of
parentage and identity issues.

RULES ON DNA EVIDENCE

G.R. No. 162571 AGUSTIN V. COURT OF APPEALS June 15, 2005

Facts:
Respondents Fe Angela and her son, Martin sued Martin‘s alleged biological father,

petitioner Agustin, for support and support pendente lite before the RTC. The respondents alleged
that the petitioner impregnated her and bore a son Martin out of wedlock. The baby‘s birth
certificate was purportedly signed by the petitioner as the father. Arnel even shouldered the prenatal
and hospital expenses but later refused Fe‘s repeated requests for Martin‘s support despite his
adequate financial capacity and even suggested to have the child committed for adoption.

The petitioner denied having sired Martin because his affair and intimacy with Fe had
allegedly ended in 1998, long before Martin‘s conception. He admitted that their affair started in
1993 but theirs was an on-and-off relationship. He terminated the affair when he was unable to bear
the prospect of losing his wife and family. Finally, the petitioner claims that the signature and the
community tax certificate attributed to him in the acknowledgement of Martin‘s birth certificate
were falsified.

429

Persons and Family Relation

The private respondents moved for the issuance of an order directing the parties to submit
themselves to DNA paternity testing pursuant to Rule 28 of the Rules of Court. The petitioner
opposed said motion invoking his constitutional right against self-incrimination and stating that
there was no cause of action, considering that his signature on the birth certificate was a forgery and
that under the law, an illegitimate child is not entitled to support if not recognized by the putative
father.

The trial court denied the motion to dismiss the complaint and ordered the parties to submit
themselves to DNA paternity testing at the expense of the applicants. CA affirmed the trial court.

Issues:
a) Whether or not the respondent court erred in denying the petitioner‘s MTD.
b) Whether or not the court erred in directing parties to subject to DNA paternity testing and
was a form of unreasonable search.

Ruling:
No. The trial court properly denied the petitioner‘s motion to dismiss because the private

respondents‘ complaint on its face showed that they had a cause of action against the petitioner. The
elements of a cause of action are: (1) the plaintiff‘s primary right and the defendant‘s corresponding
primary duty, and (2) the delict or wrongful act or omission of the defendant, by which the primary
right and duty have been violated. The cause of action is determined not by the prayer of the
complaint but by the facts alleged.

No. In Ople v. Torres, the Supreme Court struck down the proposed national computerized
identification system embodied in Administrative Order No. 308, we said:In no uncertain terms, we
also underscore that the right to privacy does not bar all incursions into individual privacy. The right
is not intended to stifle scientific and technological advancements that enhance public service and
the common good... Intrusions into the right must be accompanied by proper safeguards that
enhance public service and the common good.

Historically, it has mostly been in the areas of legality of searches and seizures, and the
infringement of privacy of communication where the constitutional right to privacy has been
critically at issue. Petitioner‘s case involves neither and, as already stated, his argument that his right
against self-incrimination is in jeopardy holds no water.

430

Persons and Family Relation

RULES ON DNA EVIDENCE

G.R. No. 148220 HERRERA V. ALBA June 15, 2005

Facts:
On 14 May 1998, then thirteen-year-old Rosendo Alba (―respondent‖), represented by his

mother Armi Alba, filed before the trial court a petition for compulsory recognition, support and
damages against petitioner. On 7 August 1998, petitioner filed his answer with counterclaim where
he denied that he is the biological father of respondent. Petitioner also denied physical contact with
respondent‘s mother.

Respondent filed a motion to direct the taking of DNA paternity testing to abbreviate the
proceedings. In her testimony, Dr. Halos described the process for DNA paternity testing and
asserted that the test had an accuracy rate of 99.9999% in establishing paternity.Petitioner opposed
DNA paternity testing and contended that it has not gained acceptability. Petitioner further argued
that DNA paternity testing violates his right against self-incrimination.

431

Persons and Family Relation

In an Order dated 3 February 2000, the trial court granted respondent‘s motion to conduct
DNA paternity testing on petitioner, respondent and Armi Alba.Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration of the 3 February 2000 Order. He asserted that ―under the present circumstances,
the DNA test is compelled to take would be inconclusive, irrelevant and the coercive process to
obtain the requisite specimen, unconstitutional.‖In an Order dated 8 June 2000, the trial court
denied petitioner‘s motion for reconsideration.

On 29 November 2000, the appellate court issued a decision denying the petition and
affirming the questioned Orders of the trial court. The appellate court stated that petitioner merely
desires to correct the trial court‘s evaluation of evidence. Thus, appeal is an available remedy for an
error of judgment that the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction. The appellate court
also stated that the proposed DNA paternity testing does not violate his right against self-
incrimination because the right applies only to testimonial compulsion. Finally, the appellate court
pointed out that petitioner can still refute a possible adverse result of the DNA paternity testing.

Issue:
Whether or not DNA test is a valid probative tool in this jurisdiction to determine filiation.

Ruling:
Before discussing the issues on DNA paternity testing, we deem it appropriate to give an

overview of a paternity suit and apply it to the facts of this case. We shall consider the requirements
of the Family Code and of the Rules of Evidence to establish paternity and filiation.Filiation

proceedings are usually filed not just to adjudicate paternity but also to secure a legal right associated
with paternity, such as citizenship, support, or inheritance. The burden of proving paternity is on the
person who alleges that the putative father is the biological father of the child. There are four
significant procedural aspects of a traditional paternity action which parties have to face: a prima
facie case, affirmative defenses, presumption of legitimacy, and physical resemblance between the
putative father and child.

A prima facie case exists if a woman declares that she had sexual relations with the putative
father. In our jurisdiction, corroborative proof is required to carry the burden forward and shift it to
the putative father.There are two affirmative defenses available to the putative father. The putative
father may show incapability of sexual relations with the mother, because of either physical absence
or impotency. The putative father may also show that the mother had sexual relations with other
men at the time of conception.

A child born to a husband and wife during a valid marriage is presumed legitimate. The
child‘s legitimacy may be impugned only under the strict standards provided by law.Finally, physical
resemblance between the putative father and child may be offered as part of evidence of paternity.
Resemblance is a trial technique unique to a paternity proceeding. However, although likeness is a
function of heredity, there is no mathematical formula that could quantify how much a child must or
must not look like his biological father. This kind of evidence appeals to the emotions of the trier of
fact.

In the present case, the trial court encountered three of the four aspects. Armi Alba,
respondent‘s mother, put forward a prima facie case when she asserted that petitioner is

432

Persons and Family Relation

respondent‘s biological father. Aware that her assertion is not enough to convince the trial court, she
offered corroborative proof in the form of letters and pictures. Petitioner, on the other hand, denied
Armi Alba‘s assertion. He denied ever having sexual relations with Armi Alba and stated that
respondent is Armi Alba‘s child with another man. Armi Alba countered petitioner‘s denial by
submitting pictures of respondent and petitioner side by side, to show how much they resemble
each other.

Paternity and filiation disputes can easily become credibility contests. We now look to the
law, rules, and governing jurisprudence to help us determine what evidence of incriminating acts on
paternity and filiation are allowed in this jurisdiction.

RULES ON DNA EVIDENCE

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS GERRICO VALLEJO
G.R. No. 144656 May 9, 2002

Facts:
On July 10, 1999 9-year old Daisy Diolola went to her neighbor‘s house to seek help in an

assignment. It was a Saturday. Gerrico Vallejo, the neighbor, helped Daisy in her assignment. At
5pm of the same day, Daisy‘s mom noticed that her child wasn‘t home yet. She went to Vallejo‘s
house and Daisy wasn‘t there. 7pm, still no word of Daisy‘s whereabouts. The next morning, Daisy‘s
body was found tied to a tree near a river bank. Apparently, she was raped and thereafter strangled
to death.

In the afternoon of July 11, the police went to Vallejo‘s house to question the latter as he
was one of the last persons with the victim. But prior to that, some neighbors have already told the
police that Vallejo was acting strangely during the afternoon of July 10. The police requested for the

433

Persons and Family Relation

clothes that Vallejo wore the day Daisy disappeared. Vallejo complied and the clothes were
submitted for processing.

The person who processed the clothing was Pet Byron Buan, a Forensic Biologist of the
NBI. At the instance of the local fiscal, he also took mouth/cheek swabs from Vallejo and a vaginal
swab from Daisy‘s body for DNA testing. Dr. Buan found that there were bloodstains in Vallejo‘s
clothing – Blood Type A, similar to that of the victim, while Vallejo‘s Blood Type is O. Buan also
found that the vaginal swab from Daisy contained Vallejo‘s DNA profile.

Meanwhile, Vallejo already executed a sworn statement admitting the crime. But when trial
came, Vallejo insisted that the sworn statement was coerced; that he was threatened by the cops; that
the DNA samples should be inadmissible because the body and the clothing of Daisy were already
soaked in smirchy waters, hence contaminated. Vallejo was convicted and was sentenced to death by
the trial court.

Issue:
Whether or not the DNA samples gathered are admissible as evidence.

Ruling:
Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that the findings of Dr. Buan are conclusive. The court

reiterated that even though DNA evidence is merely circumstantial, it can still convict the accused
considering that it corroborates all other circumstantial evidence gathered in this rape-slay case.The

Supreme Court also elucidated on the admissibility of DNA evidence in this case and for the first
time recognized its evidentiary value in the Philippines, thus: DNA is an organic substance found in
a person‘s cells which contains his or her genetic code. Except for identical twins, each person‘s
DNA profile is distinct and unique.When a crime is committed, material is collected from the scene
of the crime or from the victim‘s body for the suspect‘s DNA. This is the evidence sample. The
evidence sample is then matched with the reference sample taken from the suspect and the victim.
The purpose of DNA testing is to ascertain whether an association exists between the evidence
sample and the reference sample. The samples collected are subjected to various chemical processes
to establish their profile.

RULES ON DNA EVIDENCE

ESTATE OF ROGELIO G. ONG V. JOANNE RODJIN DIAZ

G.R. No. 171713 December 17, 2007

Facts:
A Complaint for compulsory recognition with prayer for support pending litigation was filed

by minor Joanne Rodjin Diaz (Joanne), represented by her mother and guardian, Jinky C. Diaz
(Jinky), against Rogelio G. Ong (Rogelio) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tarlac City.
As alleged by Jinky in her Complaint in November 1993 in Tarlac City, she and Rogelio got
acquainted. This developed into friendship and later blossomed into love. At this time, Jinky was
already married to a Japanese national, Hasegawa Katsuo, in a civil wedding solemnized on 19
February 1993 by Municipal Trial Court Judge Panfilo V. Valdez. From January 1994 to

September 1998, Jinky and Rogelio cohabited and lived together. From this live-in relationship,

434

Persons and Family Relation

minor Joanne Rodjin Diaz was conceived and on 25 February 1998 was born at the Central Luzon
Doctors‘ Hospital, Tarlac City.

Rogelio brought Jinky to the hospital and took minor Joanne and Jinky home after delivery.
Rogelio paid all the hospital bills and the baptismal expenses and provided for all of minor Joanne‘s
needs that is recognizing the child as his.

In September 1998, Rogelio abandoned minor Joanne and Jinky, and stopped supporting
minor Joanne, falsely alleging that he is not the father of the child.Rogelio, despite Jinky‘s
remonstrance, failed and refused and continued failing and refusing to give support for the child and
to acknowledge her as his daughter, thus leading to the filing of the heretofore adverted
complaint.On 28 April 1999, Rogelio filed a motion to lift the order of default and a motion for
reconsideration seeking the court‘s understanding, as he was then in a quandary on what to do to
find a solution to a very difficult problem of his life.

Issue:
Whether or not the court of appeals erred when it remanded the case to the court a quo for

DNA analysis despite the fact that it is no longer feasible due to the death of Rogelio G. Ong.

Ruling:
As a whole, the present petition calls for the determination of filiation of minor Joanne for

purposes of support in favor of the said minor. Filiation proceedings are usually filed not just to

adjudicate paternity but also to secure a legal right associated with paternity, such as citizenship,
support, or inheritance. The burden of proving paternity is on the person who alleges that the
putative father is the biological father of the child. There are four significant procedural aspects of a
traditional paternity action which parties have to face: a prima facie case, affirmative defenses,
presumption of legitimacy, and physical resemblance between the putative father and child.

A child born to a husband and wife during a valid marriage is presumed legitimate. As a
guaranty in favor of the child and to protect his status of legitimacy, Article 167 of the Family Code
provides:Article 167. The children shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have
declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.

COMPULSARY RECOGNITION

MICHAEL GUY V. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 163707 September 15, 2006

Facts:
The special proceeding case concerns the settlement of the estate of Sima Wei (a.k.a. Rufina

Guy Susim). Private-respondents Karen and Kamille alleged that they are the acknowledged
illegitimate children of Sima Wei who died intestate. On June 13,1997 the minors were represented
by their mother Remedios Oanes who filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration
before the RTC of Makati City.

435

Persons and Family Relation

Petitioner who is one of the children of the deceased with his surviving spouse, filed for the
dismissal of the petition alleging that his father left no debts hence, his estate may be settled without
the issuance of letters administration. The other heirs filed a joint motion to dismiss alleging that the
certification of non-forum shopping should have been signed by Remedios and not by counsel.

Petitioners further alleged that the claim has been paid and waived by reason of a Release of
Claim or waiver stating that in exchange for financial and educational assistance from the petitioner,
Remedios and her minor children discharged the estate of the decedent from any and all
liabilities.The lower court denied the joint motion to dismiss as well as the supplemental motion
ruling that the mother is not the duly constituted guardian of the minors hence, she could not have
validly signed the waiver. It also rejected the petitioner's objections to the certificate of non-forum
shopping. The Court of Appeals affirmed the orders of the lower court.

Hence, this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not a guardian can validly repudiate the inheritance.

Ruling:
No, repudiation amounts to alienation of property and parents and guardians must

necessarily obtain judicial approval. Repudiation of inheritance must pass the court's scrutiny in
order to protect the best interest of the ward. Not having been authorized by the court, the release
or waiver is therefore void. Moreover, the private-respondents could not have waived their
supposed right as they have yet to prove their status as illegitimate children of the decedent. It would
be inconsistent to rule that they have waived a right which, according to the petitioner, the latter do
not have.

The court is not precluded to receive evidence to determine the filiation of the claimants
even if the original petition is for the issuance of letters administration. Its jurisdiction extends to
matters collateral and incidental to the settlement of the estate, with the determination of heirship
included. As held in previous decision, two causes of action may be brought together in one
complaint, one a claim for recognition, and the other to claim inheritance.

COMPULSARY RECOGNITION

MARQUINO vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

GR. No. 72078 June 27, 1994

Facts:
Respondent Bibiana filed action for Judicial Declaration of Filiation, Annulment of Partition,

Support and Damages against Eutiquio. Bibiana was born on December 1926 allegedly of Eutiquio
and in that time was single. It was alleged that the Marquino family personally knew her since she
was hired as domestic helper in their household at Dumaguete. She likewise received financial
assistance from them hence, she enjoyed continuous possession of the status of an acknowledged

436

Persons and Family Relation

natural child by direct and unequivocal acts of the father and his family. The Marquinos denied all
these. Respondent was not able to finish presenting her evidence since she died on March 1979 but
the sue for compulsory recognition was done while Eustiquio was still alive. Her heirs were ordered
to substitute her as parties-plaintiffs.

Petitioners, legitimate children of Eutiquio, assailed decision of respondent court in holding
that the heirs of Bibiana, allegedly a natural child of Eutiquio, can continue the action already filed
by her to compel recognition and the death of the putative parent will not extinguish such action
and can be continued by the heirs substituting the said deceased parent.

Issues:
a) Whether or not right of action for acknowledgment as a natural child be transmitted to the
heirs and
b) Whether or not Article 173 can be given retroactive effect.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that right of action for the acknowledgment as a natural child can

never be transmitted because the law does not make any mention of it in any case, not even as an
exception. The right is purely a personal one to the natural child. The death of putative father in an
action for recognition of a natural child cannot be continued by the heirs of the former since the
party in the best position to oppose the same is the putative parent himself.

Such provision of the Family Code cannot be given retroactive effect so as to apply in the
case at bar since it will prejudice the vested rights of petitioners transmitted to them at the time of
death of their father.IAC decision was reversed and set aside. Complaint against Marquino is
dismissed.

COMPULSARY RECOGNITION

GR. No. 174680 TAYAG vs. TAYAG-GALLOR March 24, 2008

Facts:
On January 15, 2001, respondent, Felicidad A. Tayag-Gallor, filed a petition for the issuance

of letters of administration over the estate of Ismael Tayag. The respondent alleged that she is one
of the illegitimate children of the late Ismael Tayag and Ester Angeles.

437

Persons and Family Relation

On September 7, 2000, Ismael Tayag died intestate, leaving behind two real properties both
of which are in the possession of petitioner, and a motor vehicle which the latter sold on 10 October
2000 preparatory to the settlement of the decedent‘s estate. Petitioner allegedly promised to give
respondent and her brothers P100, 000.00 each as their share in the proceeds of the sale. However,
petitioner only gave each of them half the amount she promised.

In a Motion dated August 31, 2001, petitioner reiterated her sole ownership of the properties
and presented the transfer certificates of title thereof in her name. She also averred that it is
necessary to allege that respondent was acknowledged and recognized by Ismael Tayag as his
illegitimate child. There being no such allegation, the action becomes one to compel recognition
which cannot be brought after the death of the putative father. To prevent further encroachment
upon the court‘s time, petitioner moved for a hearing on her affirmative defenses.

The motion was denied.

Issue:
Whether or not respondent‘s petition for the issuance of letters of administration sufficiently

states a cause of action considering that respondent merely alleged therein that she is an illegitimate
child of the decedent, without stating that she had been acknowledged or recognized as such by the
latter.

Ruling:

The appellate court held that the mere allegation that respondent is an illegitimate child
suffices. Rule 79 of the Rules of Court provides that a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration must be filed by an interested person. The Court, applying the provisions of the
Family Code which had then already taken effect, ruled that since Graciano was claiming illegitimate
filiation under the second paragraph of Article 172 of the Family Code, i.e., open and continuous
possession of the status of an illegitimate child, the action was already barred by the death of the
alleged father.

In contrast, respondent in this case had not been given the opportunity to present evidence
to show whether she had been voluntarily recognized and acknowledged by her deceased father
because of petitioner‘s opposition to her petition and motion for hearing on affirmative defenses.
There is, as yet, no way to determine if her petition is actually one to compel recognition which had
already been foreclosed by the death of her father, or whether indeed she has a material and direct
interest to maintain the suit by reason of the decedent‘s voluntary acknowledgment or recognition of
her illegitimate filiation.

RIGHTS OF ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN

BRIONES vs. MIGUEL

GR. No. 156343 October 18, 2004

Facts:
On March 5, 2002, petitioner Joey D. Briones filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus to obtain

custody of his minor child Michael Kevin Pineda.The petitioner alleges that the minor Michael
Kevin Pineda is his illegitimate son with respondent Loreta P. Miguel. He was born in Japan on

438

Persons and Family Relation

September 17, 1996 as evidenced by his Birth Certificate. The respondent Loreta P. Miguel is now
married to a Japanese national and is presently residing in Japan. The petitioner prays that the
custody of his son Michael Kevin Pineda be given to him as his biological father and has
demonstrated his capability to support and educate him.

Issue:
Whether or not the natural father may be denied the custody and parental care of his own

child in the absence of the mother who is away.

Ruling:
Having been born outside a valid marriage, the minor is deemed an illegitimate child of

petitioner and Respondent Loreta. Article 176 of the Family Code of the Philippines explicitly
provides that "illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of
their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code." This is the rule
regardless of whether the father admits paternity.

Parental authority over recognized natural children who were under the age of majority was
vested in the father or the mother recognizing them. If both acknowledge the child, authority was to
be exercised by the one to whom it was awarded by the courts; if it was awarded to both, the rule as
to legitimate children applied. In other words, in the latter case, parental authority resided jointly in
the father and the mother.

RIGHTS OF ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN

GR. No. 133054 REPUBLIC vs. ABADILLA January 28, 1999

Facts:
Gerson Abadilla and Luzviminda Celestino have been living together as husband and wife

without the benefit of marriage. During their cohabitation, Luzviminda begot two children,

439

Persons and Family Relation

Emerson and Rafael. In the Certificates of Birth of these two children, they were registered with the
surname ―Abadilla‖ and the name of their father was entered as ―Herson‖ Abadilla. Moreover, the
entry in the date and place of marriage of the children‘s parents appeared as June 19, 1987 at
Dingras, Ilocos Norte.

On February 5, 1997, Gerson Abadilla, Luzviminda Celestino and their two minor children,
Emerson and Rafael,filed a petition for correction of the birth certificates.The petition was granted.
The instant petition for review on certiorari is now being interposed by the Office of the Solicitor
General on the ground that the trial court committed a reversible error when it allowed the deletion
of the ―date and place of marriage of parents‖ from the birth certificates of minors Emerson C.
Abadilla and Rafael C. Abadilla but failed to order the change of the minors‘ surname from
―Abadilla‖ to ―Celestino.‖

Issue:
Whether or not the court committed an error in their ruling of the case.

Ruling:
Yes. According to Article 176 "Illegitimate children shall use zthe surname and shall be

under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this
Code. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one half of the legitime of a legitimate
child.‖Thus, as illegitimate children, Emerson and Rafael should bear the surname of their mother,
Luzviminda Celestino.

RIGHTS OF ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN

VERCELES vs. POSADA

GR. No. 159785 April 27, 2007
Facts:

440

Persons and Family Relation

On November 11, 1986, at around 11:00 a.m., Verceles fetched Clarissa Posada from "My
Brother‘s Place" where the seminar was being held.Clarissa avers that he told her that they would
have lunch at Mayon Hotel with their companions who had gone ahead. When they reached the
place her companions were nowhere. After Verceles ordered food, he started making amorous
advances on her. She panicked, ran and closeted herself inside a comfort room where she stayed
until someone knocked. She said she hurriedly exited and left the hotel. Afraid of the mayor, she
kept the incident to herself. She went on as casual employee. One of her tasks was following-up
barangay road and maintenance projects.

On December 22, 1986, on orders of Verceles, she went to Virac, Catanduanes, to follow up
funds for barangay projects. At around 11:00 a.m. the same day, she went to Catanduanes Hotel on
instructions of petitioner who asked to be briefed on the progress of her mission. They met at the
lobby and he led her upstairs because he said he wanted the briefing done at the restaurant at the
upper floor.

Instead, Verceles opened a hotel room door, led her in, and suddenly embraced her, as he
told her that he was unhappy with his wife and would "divorce" her anytime. He also claimed he
could appoint her as a municipal development coordinator. She succumbed to his advances. But
again she kept the incident to herself.Sometime in January 1987, when she missed her menstruation,
she said she wrote petitioner that she feared she was pregnant.

Issue:
Whether or not the filiation of Verna Aiza Posada as the illegitimate child of petitioner was

proven.

Ruling:
The letters are private handwritten instruments of petitioner which establish Verna Aiza‘s

filiation under Article 172 (2) of the Family Code. In addition, the arrays of evidence presented by
respondents, the dates, letters, pictures and testimonies, to us, are convincing, and irrefutable
evidence that Verna Aiza is, indeed, petitioner‘s illegitimate child.

Petitioner not only failed to rebut the evidence presented, he himself presented no evidence
of his own. His bare denials are telling. Well-settled is the rule that denials, if unsubstantiated by
clear and convincing evidence, are negative and self-serving which merit no weight in law and
cannot be given greater evidentiary value over the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on
affirmative matters.

RIGHTS OF ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN
PEOPLE vs. GLABO

441

Persons and Family Relation

GR. No. 129248 December 7, 2001

Facts:
One afternoon in October, 1991, 21-year old victim Mila Lobrico, a mental retardate, and

her 11-year old sister, Judith, were summoned by Justiniano Glabo, their maternal uncle, to his
house. He told them to wash the clothes of his wife. After the two sisters finished their chore,
accused-appellant ordered Judith to wash the dishes in the nearby creek, about 200 meters away
from his house. When Judith was gone, accused-appellant dragged Mila from the yard, where she
was hanging the washed clothes, into the house. He pushed her to the floor and made her lie down.
He undressed the victim, and then he inserted his penis into her private organ and made push and
pull motions. Mila was overpowered by accused-appellant‘s brute strength. She shouted for help,
but there were no neighbors nearby.

Suddenly, it started to rain hard, so Judith had to run back to the house for shelter. She
went directly under the house, which was elevated 3 feet above the ground. While underneath the
house, she heard someone crying on the floor above. She looked up through the bamboo floor and
saw accused-appellant on top of her elder sister. Both were naked. Judith went to the kitchen, and
she saw accused-appellant‘s penis as he stood up and raised his briefs.

The two girls went home silently. They did not say a word about the incident. However, the
victim became pregnant as a result of the rape, and after six months her condition could no longer
be concealed. Severino Lobrico, Mila‘s father, confronted her, but she said nothing. It was her
sister, Judith, who told their father that accused-appellant raped Mila. Severino brought Mila to the
police and filed a complaint for rape before the Municipal Trial Court.

Issue:
Whether or not the offspring is illegitimate.

Ruling:
Article 345 of the Revised Penal Code provides for three kinds of civil liability that may be

imposed on the offender: a) indemnification, b) acknowledgement of the offspring, unless the law
should prevent him from so doing, and c) in every case to support the offspring. With the passage
of the Family Code, the classification of acknowledged natural children and natural children by legal
fiction was eliminated and they now fall under the specie of illegitimate children. Since parental
authority is vested by Article 176 of the Family Code upon the mother and considering that an
offender sentenced to reclusion perpetua automatically loses the power to exercise parental authority
over his children, no ―further positive act is required of the parent as the law itself provides for the
child‘s status.‖ Hence, accused-appellant should only be ordered to indemnify and support the
victim‘s child. However, the amount and terms of support shall be determined by the trial court
after due notice and hearing in accordance with Article 201 of the Family Code.

RIGHTS OF ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN

DINAH B. TONOG v. COURT OF APPEALS

442

Persons and Family Relation

G.R. No. 122906 February 7, 2002

Facts:
Dinah gave birth to Gardin Faith Belarde Tonog, her illegitimate child with Edgar V.

Daguimol. The two cohabited for a time and lived with Edgar's parents and sister. A year after
Dinah left for US where she found work as a registered nurse. Gardin was left in the care of her
father and grandparents. Edgar later filed a petition for guardianship over Gardin and the trial court
granted the petition and appointed Edgar as the legal guardian. Dinah filed a petition for relief from
judgment and the court set aside the original judgment and allowed Dinah to file her opposition to
Edgar's petition. Edgar filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied and the court issued a
resolution granting Dinah's motion for custody over Gardin.

Edgar filed a petition for certiorari before the CA who modified their previous decision and
granted Edgar custody over Gardin. Dinah contends that she is entitled to the custody of the minor,
Gardin Faith, as a matter of law. As the mother of Gardin Faith, the law confers parental authority
upon her as the mother of the illegitimate minor.

Issue:
Whether or not Dinah is entitled to the custody of Gardin.

Ruling:
No. The general rule is recommended in order to avoid many a tragedy where a mother has

seen her baby torn away from her. The exception allowed by the rule has to be for ―compelling
reasons‖ for the good of the child. A mother may be deprived of the custody of her child who is
below seven years of age for ―compelling reasons.‖ Instances of unsuitability are neglect,
abandonment, unemployment and immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment
of the child, insanity, and affliction with a communicable illness. If older than seven years of age, a
child is allowed to state his preference, but the court is not bound by that choice. The court may
exercise its discretion by disregarding the child‘s preference should the parent chosen be found to be
unfit, in which instance, custody may be given to the other parent, or even to a third person.

Bearing in mind that the welfare of the said minor as the controlling factor, SC find that the
appellate court did not err in allowing her father to retain in the meantime parental custody over her.
Meanwhile, the child should not be wrenched from her familiar surroundings, and thrust into a
strange environment away from the people and places to which she had apparently formed an
attachment. Moreover, whether a mother is a fit parent for her child is a question of fact to be
properly entertained in the special proceedings before the trial court.

RIGHTS OF ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN

443

Persons and Family Relation

GR. No. 111455 MOSSESGELD vs. COURT OF APPEALS
December 23, 1998

Facts:
Marissa Alfaro Mossesgeld , single, gave birth to a baby boy on December 2, 1989. The

presumed father is Eleazar Siriban Calasan, a married lawyer. The father signed the birth certificate
of the child as the informant, indicating hat the child‘s name is Jonathan Mossesgeld Calasan. He
also executed an affidavit admitting the paternity of the child. The person in charge at the
hospital refused to place the presumed father‘s surname as the child‘s surname in the
certificated of live birth. Thus, petitioner himself submitted the certificate to the office of the Local
Civil Registrar of Mandaluyong for registration.

Again, the municipal treasurer, as officer in charge of the local civil registrar‘s office,
rejected the registration on the basis of the Civil Registrar General‘s Circular No. 4,
which provides that under Article 176 of the Family Code, illegitimate children born on or
after August 3, 1988 shall use the surname of their mother. Upon inquiring about the status of
the status of the registration of his child, Calasan was furnished with a copy of the letter of
the Civil Registrar General denying the registration of the certificate of live birth on the grounds that
it is contrary to law. Calasan, thereafter, filed a petition for mandamus with the Pasig RTC to compel
the local civil registrar to register the certificate of live birth of his illegitimate son using his surname.
His petition was denied. He filed a motion for reconsideration and a motion to for leave to amend
the petition to substitute the child‘s mother as the petitioner. His motion to amen was granted, but

motion for reconsideration was denied. He elevated the petition to the Court of Appeals,
which affirmed the RTC‘s decision

Issue:
Whether or not mandamus lies to compel the Local Civil Registrar to register

thecertificate of live birth of an illegitimate child using the alleged father‘s surname
where the latter admitted paternity.

Ruling:
No. Local Civil Registrar correctly refused. Illegitimate children must use the surname of

their mother, regardless of whether or not they had been acknowledged by their fathers in
their record of birth. Article 176 of the Family Code effectively repealed Article 366 of the Civil
Code, which gives a natural child the right to use the surname of his/her father where he/she has
been acknowledged by both parents. Article 176 explicitly states that illegitimate children shall use
the surname of their mother, be under her parental authority, and be entitled to support
inconformity with the provisions of the Family Code.

RIGHTS OF ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN

444

Persons and Family Relation

GR. No. 114742 SILVA vs. COURT OF APPEALS July17, 1997

Facts:
Carlitos E. Silva, a married businessman, and Suzanne T. Gonzales, an unmarried local

actress, cohabited without the benefit of marriage. The union saw the birth of two children: Ramon
Carlos and Rica Natalia. Not very long after, a rift in their relationship surfaced. It began, according
to Silva, when Gonzales decided to resume her acting career over his vigorous objections. The
assertion was quickly refuted by Gonzales who claimed that she, in fact, had never stopped working
throughout their relationship. At any rate, the two eventually parted ways.

The instant controversy was spawned, in February 1986, by the refusal of Gonzales to allow
Silva, in apparent contravention of a previous understanding, to have the children in his company on
weekends. Silva filed a petition for custodial rights over the children before the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 78, of Quezon City. The petition was opposed by Gonzales who averred that Silva
often engaged in "gambling and womanizing" which she feared could affect the moral and social
values of the children.

Issue:
Whether or not the Father can visit his children.

Ruling:
The biological father has visitorial right over his illegitimate children in view of the

constitutionally protected inherent and natural right of parents over their children. This right is
personal to the father; no other person, like grandparents, can exercise this right for him.
Silva (the father) may have won with the Supreme Court‘s upholding of his visitation rights, but this
favorable decision did not prevent Suzanne (the mother) in the exercise of her parental authority
from immigrating to Holland with her two children.

RIGHTS OF ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN

445

Persons and Family Relation

GR. No. 111180 DAVID vs. COURT OF APPEALS
November 16, 1995

Facts:
Daisie David had an intimate relationship with her boss Ramon Villar, who is married, and a

father of 4 children, all grown-up. They first had a son, Christopher, who was eventually followed by
2 more girls, Christine and Cathy Mae. The relationship became known to Villar‘s wife when Daisie
took Christopher J, to his house and introduced him to Villar's wife. After this, Daisie‘s were freely
brought by Villar to his house as they were even accepted by his legal family.

Then Villar asked Daisie to allow Christopher J., then 6 years old, to go with his family to
Boracay. Daisie agreed, but after the trip, Villar refused to give Christopher back and had enrolled
him at the HolyFamilyAcademy for the next school year. Daisie filed a petition for habeas corpus on
behalf of Christopher J. which the RTC granted, giving custody to Daisie and ordering Villar to give
temporary support of P3K a month to the 3 kids and to pay the costs of suit.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed, hence this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not custody should be given to Daisie

Ruling:
Yes. CA ruling reversed, custody granted to Daisie and Villar ordered to givetemporary

support in the amount of P3K, pending the fixing of the amount of support in an appropriate
action. Christopher J. is an illegitimate child since at the time of his conception, his father Villar,
was married to another woman other than his mother.

As such, pursuant to Art. 176, FC, he is under the parental authority of his mother, who, as a
consequence of such authority, is entitled to have custody of him. And because she has been
deprived of her rightful custody of her child by Villar, Daisie is entitled to issuance of the writ of
habeas corpus.

Rule 102, Sec. 1 makes no distinction between the case of a mother who is separated from
her husband and is entitled to the custody of her child and that of a mother of an illegitimate child
who, by law, is vested with sole parental authority, but is deprived of her rightful custody of her
child. The fact that Villar has recognized the Christopher may be a ground for ordering him to give
support to the latter, but not for giving him custody of the child. Under Article 213, FC, "no child
under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother unless the court finds compelling
reasons to order otherwise."

LEGITIMATED CHILDREN

446

Persons and Family Relation

GR. No. 105619 DE SANTOS vs. ANGELES December 12, 1995

Facts:
On February 7, 1941, Dr. Antonio de Santos married Sofia Bona, which union was blessed

with a daughter, herein petitioner Maria Rosario de Santos. After some time, their relationship
became strained to the breaking point. Thereafter, Antonio fell in love with a fellow doctor,
Conchita Talag, private respondent herein. Antonio sought a formal dissolution of his first marriage
by obtaining a divorce decree from a Nevada court in 1949. Antonio proceeded to Tokyo, Japan in
1951 to marry private respondent, with whom he had been cohabiting since his de factoseparation
from Sofia. This union produced eleven children. On March 30, 1967, Sofia died in Guatemala. Less
than a month later, on April 23, 1967, Antonio and private respondent contracted a marriage in
TagaytayCity celebrated under Philippine laws. On March 8, 1981, Antonio died intestate leaving
properties with an estimated value of P15, 000,000.00.

On May 15, 1981, private respondent went to court for the issuance of letters of
administration in her favor in connection with the settlement of her late husband's estate. She
alleged, among other things, that the decedent was survived by twelve legitimate heirs, namely,
herself, their ten surviving children, and petitioner. After six years of protracted intestate
proceedings, however, petitioner decided to intervene. Thus, in a motion she filed sometime in
November 1987, she argued inter aliathat private respondent's children were illegitimate. This was
challenged by private respondent although the latter admitted during the hearing that all her children

were born prior to Sofia's death in 1967.

The court, declared private respondent's ten children legitimated and thereupon instituted
and declared them, along with petitioner and private respondent, as the heirs of Antonio de Santos.
Hence, she filed the instant petition for certiorari on June 16, 1992, contending that since only natural
children can be legitimized, the trial court mistakenly declared as legitimated her half brothers and
sisters.

Issue:
Whether or not natural children by legal fiction be legitimized.

Ruling:
Art. 269. Only natural children can be legitimated. Children born outside wedlock of parents,

who, at the time of the conception of the former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry
each other, are natural. In other words, a child's parents should not have been disqualified to marry
each other at the time of conception for him to qualify as a "natural child."

In the case at bench, there is no question that all the children born to private respondent and
deceased Antonio de Santos were conceived and born when the latter's valid marriage to petitioner's
mother was still subsisting. That private respondent and the decedent were married abroad after the
latter obtained in Nevada,U.S.A. a decree of divorce from his legitimate wife does not change this
fact, for a divorce granted abroad was not recognized in this jurisdiction at the time. Evidently, the

decedent was aware of this fact, which is why he had to have the marriage solemnized in Tokyo,
outside of the Philippines. It may be added here that he was likewise aware of the nullity of the

447

Persons and Family Relation

Tokyo marriage for after his legitimate, though estranged wife died, he hastily contracted another
marriage with private respondent, this time here in Tagaytay, attention must be drawn to the fact
that this case has been decided under the provisions of the Civil Code, not the Family Code which
now recognizes only two classes of children: legitimate and illegitimate. "Natural children by legal
fiction" are nothing if not pure fiction.

448

Persons and Family Relation

LEGITIMATED CHILDREN

ABADILLA vs. TABILIRAN

AM No. MTJ-92-716 October 25, 1995

Facts:
Ma. Blyth Abadilla, a Clerk of Court, filed a complaint against Judge Tabiliran on the

grounds of gross immorality, deceitful conduct, and corruption unbecoming of a judge. With
respect to the charge on gross immorality, she contended that the judge scandalously and publicly
cohabited with Priscilla Baybayan during subsistence of his marriage with Teresita Banzuela.
Tabiliran and Priscilla got married in May 1986. On the other hand, with respect to the charge on
deceitful conduct, petitioner claims that the judge caused his 3 illegitimate children with Priscilla be
registered as legitimate by falsely executing separate affidavits stating the delayed registration was
due to inadvertence, excusable negligence or oversight when in fact, he knew these children cannot
be legally registered as legitimate. The judge averred that 25 years had already elapsed since the
disappearance of her wife in 1966 when he married Priscilla hence the cohabitation was neither
bigamous nor immoral. However, as early as 1970, based on the record, Priscilla had begotten her 3
children.

Issue:
Whether or not the 3 children can be considered legitimate.

Ruling:
The 3 children cannot be legitimated nor in any way be considered legitimate since the time

they were born, there was an existing valid marriage between Tabiliran and Teresita. Only natural
children can be legitimated. Children born outside of wedlock of parents who, at the time of the
conception of the former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other, are natural.

Under Article 177 of the Family Code, only children conceived and born outside of wedlock
of parents who, at the time of the conception of the former, were not disqualified by any
impediment to marry each other may be legitimated. Reasons for this limitation:
1) The rationale of legitimation would be destroyed;
2) It would be unfair to the legitimate children in terms of successional rights;
3) There will be the problem of public scandal, unless social mores change;
4) It is too violent to grant the privilege of legitimation to adulterous children as it will destroy the
sanctity of marriage;
5) It will be very scandalous, especially if the parents marry many years after the birth of the child.

449

Persons and Family Relation