civil code0101

EXCLUDED PROPERTY

G.R. No. 120594 TAN vs. COURT OF APPEALS June 10, 1997

Facts:
Petitioner ChiaoLiong Tan claims to be the owner of a motor vehicle, particularly described

as Isuzu Elf van, 1976 Model that he purchased in March 1987. As owner thereof, petitioner says he
has been in possession, enjoyment and utilization of the said motor vehicle until his older brother,
Tan Ban Yong, the private respondent, took it from him.

Petitioner relies principally on the fact that the van is registered in his name under Certificate
of Registration. He claims in his testimony before the trial court that the said motor vehicle was
purchased from Balintawak Isuzu Motor Center for a price of over P100, 000. 00; that he sent his
brother to pay for the van and the receipt fro payment was placed in his name because it was his
money that was used to pay for the vehicle; that he allowed his brother to use the van because the
latter was working for his company, the CLT Industries; and that his brother later refused to return
the van to him and appropriated the same for himself.

On the other hand, private respondent testified that CLT Industries is a family business that
was placed in petitioner‘s name because at that time he was then leaving for the United Stated and
petitioner remaining Filipino in the family residing in the Philippines. When the family business

needed a vehicle in 1987 for use in the deliver of machinery to its customers, he asked petitioner to
look for a vehicle and gave him the amount of P5,000.00 to be deposited as down payment for the
van, which would be available in about a month. After a month, he himself paid the whole price out
of a loan of P140, 000.00 from his friend Tan Pit Sin. Nevertheless, respondent allowed the
registration of the vehicle in petitioner‘s name. It was also their understanding that he would keep
the van for himself because CLT Industries was not in a position to pay him. Hence, from the time
of the purchase, he had been in possession of the vehicle including the original registration papers
thereof, but allowing petitioner from time to time to use the van for deliveries of machinery.

After hearing, the trial court found for the private respondent. Finding no merit in the
appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trail court.

Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner-appellant established proof of ownership over the subject

motor vehicle.

Ruling:
No. Petitioner did not have in his possession the Certificate of Registration of the motor

vehicle and the official receipt of payment for the same, thereby lending credence to the claim of
private respondent who has possession thereof, that he owns the subject motor vehicle. A certificate
of registration of a motor vehicle in one‘s name indeed creates a strong presumption of ownership.
For all practical purposes, the person in whose favor it has been issued is virtually the owner thereof

unless proved otherwise. In other words, such presumption is rebuttable by competent proof.

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The New Civil Code recognizes cases of implied trusts other than those enumerated therein.
Thus, although no specific provision could be cited to apply to the parties herein, it is undeniable
that an implied trust was created when the certificate of registration of the motor vehicle was placed
in the name of the petitioner although the price thereof was not paid by him but by private
respondent. The principle that a trustee who puts a certificate of registration in his name cannot
repudiate the trust relying on the registration is one of the well-known limitations upon a title. A
trust, which derives its strength from the confidence one reposes on another especially between
brothers, does not lose that character simply because of what appears in a legal document.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

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DISSOLUTION

IN RE ELENA BUEANAVENTURA MULLER vs. HELMUT MULLER

GR. No. 149615 August 29, 2006

Facts:
Elena Muller, petitioner, got married in to Helmut Muller, a German national, on Hamburg

dated Sept. 22, 1989. Then they resided there in a house owned by Helmut‘ s parents but later on
sometime 1992 they permanently resided in the Philippines. Helmut inherited the house in Germany
from his parents which he subsequently sold and used the proceeds for the purchase of a parcel of
land in Antipolo as well as for the construction of a house. That property was registered in the name
of Elena Muller. During their marriage they had some incompatibilities and Helmut was alleged
womanizing, drinking, and maltreatment. With that, the spouses eventually got separated. On
September 26, 1994, Helmut, respondent, filed a petition for separation of properties before the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.

RTC terminated the regime of absolute community of property. It ruled that the separation
of properties shall be applied between the petitioner and respondent. The RTC ordered the equal
partition of personal properties located within the Philippines, except those acquired by gratuitous
title during their marriage. In relation to the property, respondent cannot recover his funds expensed
since it was a violation of Section7, Article XII of the Constitution which prohibits aliens from
procuring private lands.

The Court of Appeals ruled that there was no provision in the Constitution which
specifically prevents Helmut from procuring private land. With that decision it also ordered Elena to
reimburse him accordingly.

Issue:
Whether or not Helmut Muller, respondent, is entitled to be reimbursed by Elena Muller,

petitioner, with the funds used to purchase the property in Antipolo and to construct the house.

Ruling:
No, Helmut cannot seek reimbursement because it was clear that he willingly and knowingly

bought the property using the proceeds of his sold inherited property in Germany despite the
constitutional prohibition. It is provided in the Constitution that alien can‘t own lands here in the
Philippines and this provision is absolute only to the exception of lands here in the Philippines
inherited. With that violation he is not favored in any way in the case. Also, reimburse is considered
a fruit of the property, with that Helmut can‘t claim the fruits as well.

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COMPONENTS OF CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP GAINS

ANTONIA R. DELA PEÑA vs GEMMA REMILYN C. AVILA
G.R. No. 187490 February 8, 2012

Facts:
A parcel of residential land, together with the improvements in Marikina City was previously

registered in the name of petitioner Antonia R. Dela Peña (Antonia), ―married to Antegono A. Dela
Peña‖ (Antegono). On 7 May 1996, Antonia obtained from A.C. Aguila & Sons, Co. (Aguila) a loan
in the sum of P250,000.00 secured by a Promissory Note and notarized Deed of Real Estate
Mortgage over the property.

On 4 November 1997, Antonia executed a notarized Deed of Absolute Sale over the property
to Gemma Remilyn C. Avila (Gemma with that it resulted to naming Gemma as the owner of the
subject realty on the Registry of Deeds. On 26 November 1997, Gemma also constituted a real
estate mortgage over said parcel to Far East Bank and Trust Company [now Bank of the Philippine
Islands] (FEBTC-BPI), to secure a loan facility evidenced by the Promissory Notes

On 3 March 1998, in the meantime, Antonia filed with the Register of Deeds of Marikina
an Affidavit of Adverse Claim that she was the true and lawful owner of the property which had
been titled in the name of Gemma. Gemma failed to pay the principal as well as the accumulated
interest and penalties on the loans she obtained hence, FEBTC-BPI caused the extrajudicial
foreclosure of the real estate mortgage constituted over the property. FEBTC-BPI later
consolidated its ownership over the realty and caused the same to be titled in its name.

On 18 May 1998, Antonia and her son filed against Gemma the complaint for annulment of
deed, claiming that the subject realty was conjugal property.

Issue:
Whether or not the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Antonia to Gemma is null and void

Whether or not the FEBTC-BPI is a mortgagee/purchaser in bad faith.

Ruling:
No, Pursuant to Article 160 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, all property of the marriage

is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to
the husband or to the wife. Although it is not necessary to prove that the property was acquired
with funds of the partnership, proof of acquisition during the marriage is an essential condition for
the operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership.

Since foreclosure of the mortgage is but the necessary consequence of non-payment of the
mortgage debt,FEBTC-BPI was, likewise, acting well within its rights as mortgagee when it
foreclosed the real estate mortgage on the property upon Gemma‘s failure to pay the loans secured
thereby.

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COMPONENTS OF CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP GAINS

TITAN CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION vs. MANUEL DAVID SR.
G.R. No. 169548 March 15, 2010

Facts:
Manuel A. David, Sr. (Manuel) and Martha S. David (Martha) were married on March 25,

1957. In 1970, the spouses acquired a lot located at White Plains, Quezon City. In 1976, the spouses
separated, and no longer communicated with each other. March 1995, Manuel discovered that
Martha had previously sold the property to Titan Construction Corporation (Titan) with which the
previous title registered in the Register of Deeds was replaced. March 13, 1996, Manuel filed a
Complaintfor Annulment of Contract against Titan CC. Manuel alleged that the sale executed by
Martha in favor of Titan was without his knowledge therefore void. He prayed that the Deed of Sale
be invalidated, that the property be returned to the spouses with a new title be issued in their names.

Titan claimed that it was a buyer in good faith and for value because it relied on a Special
Power of Attorney (SPA) by Manuel which authorized Martha to dispose of the property on behalf
of the spouses. Manuel claimed that the SPA was spurious, and that the signature purporting to be
his was a forgery; hence, Martha was wholly without authority to sell the property. Subsequently,
Manuel filed a Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaintwhich was granted by the trial
court. Thus, on October 15, 1996, Manuel filed an Amended Complaint. Martha failed to file an
answer so she was declared in default.

Issue:
Whether or not the deed of sale is null and void.

Ruling:
Yes, since the property was undoubtedly part of the conjugal partnership, the sale to Titan

required the consent of both spouses. Article 165 of the Civil Code expressly provides that ―the
husband is the administrator of the conjugal partnership‖. Likewise, Article 172 of the Civil Code
ordains that ―the wife cannot bind the conjugal partnership without the husband‘s consent, except in
cases provided by law‖. Similarly, Article 124 of the Family Code requires that any disposition or
encumbrance of conjugal property must have the written consent of the other spouse, otherwise,
such disposition is void.

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LIABILITIES/ CHARGES

AYALA INVESTMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORP. vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 1185305 February 12, 1998

Facts:
Petitioner Ayala Investment and Development Corporation (AIDC) granted a loan to

Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM) amounting P50,300,000.00 loan. Respondent Alfredo Ching,
Exec. Vice President PBM, executed security agreements on December 1980 and March 1981
making him jointly and severally liable with PBM‘s indebtedness to AIDC. PBM failed to pay the
loan with that, AIDC filed a complaint against PBM and Ching.

In the RTC‘s decision it ordered PBM and Ching to jointly and severally pay AIDC the
principal amount plus the interests. RTC issued a writ of execution of pending appeal. Then, deputy
sheriff Magsajo caused issuance and service upon respondents- Ching spouses of a notice of sheriff
sale on three of their conjugal properties.

Spouses Ching filed a case of injunction against petitioner alleging that petitioner cannot
enforce the judgment against conjugal partnership levied on the ground that the subject loan did not
redound to the benefit of the said conjugal partnership. Upon application of private respondents,
the RTC issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) to prevent Magsajo from proceeding with
the enforcement of the writ of execution and with the sale of the said properties at public auction.

Issue:
Whether or not the loan acquired by PBM from Ayala Investments as guaranteed by Alfredo

Ching be redounded to the conjugal partnership of the spouses.

Ruling:
The loan procured from AIDC was for the advancement and benefit of PBM and not for

the benefit of the conjugal partnership of Ching. AIDC failed to prove that Ching contracted the
debt for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains. PBM as a corporation has a personality
distinct and separate from the family of Ching despite the fact that they happened to be
stockholders of said corporate entity. Clearly, the debt was a corporate debt and right of recourse to
Ching as surety is only to the extent of his corporate ownership.

The contract of loan between AIDC and PMB guaranteed by Ching was clearly for the
benefit of PMB and not for the Ching with his family. Ching only signed as a surety for the loan
contracted with AIDC in behalf of PBM. Signing as a surety is certainly not an exercise of an
industry or profession. With that, the conjugal partnership should not be made liable for the surety
agreement which was clearly for the benefit of PBM.

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DISPOSITION

THE HEIRS OF PROTACIO GO, SR. vs. ESTER L. SERVACIO
G.R. No. 157537 September 7, 2011

Facts:
Jesus B. Gaviola sold two parcels of land to Protacio B. Go, Jr. (Protacio Jr.). Twenty three

years later Protacio, Jr. executed an Affidavit of Renunciation and Waiver, whereby he affirmed
under oath that it was his father, Protacio Go Sr. (Protacio Sr.), not he, who had purchased the two
parcels of land (the property). Marta Barola Go died wife of Protacio, Sr. Protacio, Sr. and his son
Rito B. Go sold a portion of the property to Ester L. Servacio (Servacio).

The petitioners, Heirs of Go Sr., demanded the return of the property, but Servacio did not
follow their demand in which the petitioners decided to sue Servacio. According to the petitioners,
they contend that with the Protacio Jr.‘s renunciation, the property became conjugal property of the
spouses Go Sr. and his wife. They also contend that the sale of the property to Servacio without the
prior liquidation of the community property between spouses Go Sr. and his Marta was null and
void.

RTC affirmed the validity of the sale declaring that the property was the conjugal property of
Protacio Sr. and Marta, not then exclusive property of Protacio Sr., because the sale includes the
children of Marta, that the participation had been by virtue of their being heirs of the late Marta-
that under Article 160 of the Civil Code. The law states that when the property all property acquired
by either spouse during the marriage is conjugal unless there is a proof that the property thus
acquired pertained exclusively.

Issue:
Whether or not the sale by Protacio Sr with some of his children to Servacio was void

because it was made without prior liquidation.

Ruling:
No. Since Protacio, Sr. and Marta were married prior to the affectivity of the Family Code.

Their property relation was properly considered as a conjugal partnership governed by the Civil
Code. With Marta‘s death, the conjugal partnership was dissolved pursuant to Article175 (1) of the
Civil Code, and an implied ordinary co-ownership ensued among Protacio, Sr. and the other heirs of
Marta with respect to her share in the assets of the conjugal partnership pending a liquidation
following its liquidation. Protacio, Sr., although becoming a co-owner with his children in respect of
Marta‘s share in the conjugal partnership, could not claim title to any specific portion of Marta‘s
share without an actual partition of the property being first done either by agreement or by judicial
decree. Until then, all that he had was an ideal or abstract quota in Marta‘s share and as a co-owner
he could sell his undivided share, he had the right to freely sell and dispose of his undivided interest,
but not the interest of his co-owners.

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DISPOSITION

JOE A. ROS vs. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK - LAOAG BRANCH

G.R. No. 170166 April 6, 2011

Facts:
Joe Ros obtained a loan of P115,000.00 from PNB Laoag Branch on October 14, 1974 and

as security for the loan, petitioner, Ros, executed a real estate mortgage involving a parcel of land
with all the. Upon maturity, the loan remained outstanding. As a result, PNB instituted extrajudicial
foreclosure proceedings on the mortgaged property. After the extrajudicial sale, a Certificate of Sale
was issued in favor of PNB, Laoag as the highest bidder. After the lapse of one (1) year without the
property being redeemed, the property was consolidated and registered in the name of PNB, Laoag
Branch on August 10, 1978.

Estrella Agueta, wife of Joe Ros claims that she has no knowledge of the loan obtained by
her husband nor she consented to the mortgage instituted on the conjugal property. On January 13,
1983, spouses Ros and Agueta filed to annul the proceedings pertaining to the mortgage, sale and
consolidation of the property – interposing the defense that her signatures affixed on the documents
were forged and that the loan did not redound to the benefit of the family. PNB seeks for the
dismissal of the complaint for lack of cause of action, and insists that it was petitioners‘ own acts of
omission that bar them from recovering the subject property on the ground of estoppel, laches,

abandonment and prescription.

The Trial Court ruled in favor of the petitioners declaring deed of real estate mortgage Null
and Void and ordered the Register of Deeds to rename the title of the lot to the petitioners. Upon
PNB‘s appeal, the Appellate Court reversed the decision of the Trial Court and dismissed the
complaint of the petitioners. The Petitioner‘s then petitioned for review to the Supreme Court.

Issue:
Whether or not the debt/loan was chargeable to the conjugal property.

Ruling:
Yes. At the time of the mortgage the Civil Code was the applicable law. Article 161 of the

Civil Code enumerated the instances of which the spouses-conjugal partnership shall be liable and
paragraph (1) one of the said provision states ―all debts and obligations contracted by the husband
for the benefit of the conjugal partnership, and those contracted by the wife, also for the same
purpose, in the cases where she may legally bind the partnership‖. The loan was used for additional
working capital for their family business hence, it is considered that such loan was acquired for the
benefit of the conjugal partnership and not merely for the benefit of Ros.

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DISPOSITION

G.R. No. 169900 MARIO SIOCHI vs. ALFREDO GOZON March 18, 2010

Facts:
A parcel of land was registered TCT No. 5357 in the name of

AlfredoGozon. On 23 December 1991, Elvira Gozon, Alfredo‘s wife, filed a petition for legal
separation against her husband Alfredo. After a month, Elvira filed a notice of lis pendens, which
was then annotated on the title of the land. While the legal separation case of the spouses was still
pending, Alfredo and Mario Siochi entered into an Agreement to Buy and Sell which was also
annotated on the title of the land. After granting the decree of legal separation, Alfredo executed a
Deed of Donation over the property in favor of their daughter, Winifred Gozon. The Register of
Deeds of Malabon, cancelled TCT No. 5357 and issued TCT No. M-10508 in the name of Winifred,
without annotating the Agreement and the notice of lis pendis on TCT No.M-10508.

October 26, 1994 when Alfredo sold the property to Inter-Dimensional Realty, Inc (IDRI).
Through a Special Power of Attorney executed in favor of Winifred. Subsequently, the Register of
Deeds of Malabon cancelled TCT No. M-10508 and issued TCT No. M-10976 to IDRI. Mario then
filed a complaint for Specific Performance and Damages, Annulment of Donation and Sale with
Preliminary Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order.

Issues:
a) Whether or not Mario can invoke his right over the property due to the Agreement to Buy
and Sell he entered with Alfredo.
b) Whether or not IDRI can invoke right over the property due to the Sale entered with
Alfredo.

Ruling:
No. Alfredo was the sole administrator of the conjugal property because Elvira, with whom

Alfredo was separated in fact, was unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal
property. Still, Alfredo can‘t sell said property without the written consent of Elvira or given
authority of the court. Without consent or authority, the agreement is void.

No. IDRI is not a buyer in good faith. IDRI had actual knowledge of facts regarding the
property hence it should seek further inquiries about the vendor‘s title to the property. Besides, had
IDRI been more prudent before buying the property, it would have discovered that Alfredo‘s
donation of the property to Winifred was without the consent of Elvira. Under Article 125 of the
Family Code, a conjugal property cannot be donated by one spouse without the consent of the other
spouse. Clearly, IDRI was not a buyer in good faith.

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DISPOSITION

G.R. No. 165803 SPOUSES AGGABAO vs. PARULAN, JR.
September 1, 2010

Facts:
Real estate broker Marta Atanacio offered 2 lots to the spouses Aggabao on January 1991.

On February 2, 1991, the petitioners met up with Elena Parulan at the site of the property and
showed them the following documents: (a.) Owner‘s original copy of the TCT of the 2 lots; (b.) tax
declarations; (c.) a copy of the special power of attorney dated January 7, 1991 executed by Dionisio
Parulan authorizing Elena to sell the property. On March 18, 1991, the petitioners delivered the
final amount of their balance to Elena, who executed a deed of absolute sale in their favor.
However, Elena did not turn over the owner‘s duplicate copy of the TCT claiming that said copy
was in the possession of a relative who was then in Hongkong. She assured them that the owner‘s
duplicate copy of TCT would be turned over after a week.

On March 19, 1991, TCT was cancelled and a new one was issued in the name of the
petitioners. Elena did not turn over the duplicate owner‘s copy of TCT as promised. Thus, on April
15, 1991, Dionisio commenced an action vs Elena Parulan and the Aggabao spouses praying for the
declaration of the nullity of the deed of absolute sale executed by Ma. Elena, and the cancellation of
the title issued to the petitioners by virtue thereof. In turn, the petitioners, Aggabao spouses and
Elena Parulan, filed on July 12, 1991 their own action for specific performance with damages against
the respondent. On July 26, 2000, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 136, in Makati City
annulled the deed of absolute sale executed in favor of the petitioners.

Issue:
Which between Article 173 of the Civil Code and Article 124 of the Family Code should

apply to the sale of the conjugal property executed without the consent of Dionisio?

Ruling:
The sale was made on March 18, 1991, or after August 3, 1988, the effectivity of the Family

Code. The proper law to apply is, therefore, Article 124 of the Family Code, for it is settled that any
alienation or encumbrance of conjugal property made during the effectivity of the Family Code is
governed by Article 124 of the Family Code.
Article 124 of the Family Code provides:

―The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to
both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband‘s decision shall prevail, subject to
recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from
the date of the contract implementing such decision. In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or
otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse
may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include disposition or
encumbrance without authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the
absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the

transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the

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third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or
authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.‖

Next, according to Article 256 of the Family Code, the provisions of the Family Code may
apply retroactively provided no vested rights are impaired. Herein, however, the petitioners did not
show any vested right in the property acquired prior to August 3, 1988 that exempted their situation
from the retroactive application of the Family Code. Also, the petitioners failed to substantiate their
contention that Dionisio, while holding the administration over the property, had delegated to his
brother, Atty. Parulan, the administration of the property, considering that they did not present in
court the SPA granting to Atty. Parulan the authority for the administration.

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DISPOSITION

MANUEL FUENTES vs. CONRADO ROCA

G.R. No. 178902 April 21, 2010

Facts:
Sabina Tarroza owned a land in Canelar, Zamboanga City and she sold it to her son,

Tarciano T. Roca (Tarciano) under a deed of absolute sale. Six years later in 1988, Tarciano offered
to sell the lot to petitioners Manuel and Leticia Fuentes (the Fuentes spouses) and eventually they
entered into an agreement. After 6 months, a new title was issued in the name of the spouses who
immediately constructed a building on the lot. Thereafter Tarciano passed away, followed by his wife
Rosario who died nine months afterwards.

Eight years later in 1997, the children of Tarciano and Rosario, namely, respondents
(collectively, the Rocas), filed an action for annulment of sale and re-conveyance of the land against
the Fuentes spouses before the RTC. The Rocas claimed that the sale to the spouses was void since
Tarciano‘s wife, Rosario, did not give her consent to it. Her signature on the affidavit of consent had
been forged. They thus prayed that the property be reconvened to them upon reimbursement of the
price that the Fuentes spouses paid Tarciano.The spouses denied the Rocas‘ allegations. They

presented Atty. Plagata who testified that he personally saw Rosario sign the affidavit at her
residence. All the same, the Fuentes spouses pointed out that the claim of forgery was personal to
Rosario and she alone could invoke it. Besides, the four-year prescriptive period for nullifying the
sale on ground of fraud had already lapsed.

Issues:
a) Whether or not the signature of Rosario representing her consent was forged.
b) Whether or not the Rocas‘ action for the declaration of nullity of that sale to the spouses
already prescribed?
c) Whether or not only Rosario, the wife whose consent was not had, could bring the action to
annul that sale?

Ruling:
Yes it was forged as the Supreme Court ruled. A defective notarization will merely strip the

document of its public character and reduce it to a private instrument that falsified jurat, taken
together with the marks of forgery in the signature, dooms such document as proof of Rosario‘s
consent to the sale of the land. That the Fuentes spouses honestly relied on the notarized affidavit as
proof of Rosario‘s consent does not matter. The sale is still void without an authentic consent.

No. Although Tarciano and Rosario got married in 1950, Tarciano sold the conjugal
property to the Fuentes spouses on January 11, 1989, a few months after the Family Code took
effect on August 3, 1988. The Family Code applied for this case. The Family Code took effect on
August 3, 1988. Its Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of Gains expressly superseded Title VI, Book
I of the Civil Code on Property Relations between Husband and Wife. Further, the Family Code

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provisions were also made to apply to already existing conjugal partnerships without prejudice to
vested rights. Article 124 of the Family Code does not provide a period within which the wife who
gave no consent may assail her husband‘s sale of the real property. It simply provides that without
the other spouse‘s written consent or a court order allowing the sale, the same would be void. Here,
the Rocas filed an action against the Fuentes spouses in 1997 for annulment of sale and re-
conveyance of the real property that Tarciano sold without their mother‘s (his wife‘s) written
consent. The passage of time did not erode the right to bring such an action.

Yes. As stated above, that sale was void from the beginning. Consequently, the land
remained the property of Tarciano and Rosario despite that sale. When the two died, they passed on
the ownership of the property to their heirs.

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DISSOLUTION

METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST CO.vs. NICHOLSON PASCUAL

G.R. No. 163744 February 29, 2008

Facts:
Respondent Nicholson Pascual and Florencia Nevalga got married on 1985. During the

union, Florencia bought from spouses Clarito and Belen Sering a 250-square meter lot in with an
apartment standing thereon. On year 1994, Florencia filed suit for the declaration of nullity of
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity on part of Nelson under Article 36 of the Family
Code. RTC declared the marriage null and void. Also, it ordered the dissolution and liquidation of
the ex- spouses' conjugal partnership of gains. The spouses weren‘t able to liquidate their conjugal
partnership even after the declaration of their legal separation.

Sometime in 1997, Florencia with Sps. Norberto and Elvira Oliveros obtained a loan from
petitioner, Metrobank secured the obligation several Real Estate Mortgage (REM) on their
properties including one involving the lot bought from Sering and showed a waiver made in favor of
Florencia, covering the conjugal properties with her ex-husband, but did not incidentally include the
lot in question (bought from Sering).

When Florencia and Sps. Oliveros failed to pay their loan due, Metrobank initiated
foreclosure proceedings and caused the publication of auction sale on 3 issues of the REM‘s.
Nicholson filed a Complaint to declare the nullity of the mortgage of the disputed property alleging
that the property, which is conjugal, was mortgaged without his consent. Metrobank in its answer:
Alleged that the lot registered in the name of Florencia was paraphernalia. Metrobank also asserted
having approved the mortgage in good faith. Florencia was declared in default for failure to file an
answer within reglementary period. RTc declared the REM Invalid and Metrobank is mortgagee in
bad faith on account of negligence. The CA affirmed the RTC‘s decision. Petitioner then appealed
to the Supreme Court.

Issues:
a) Whether or not the declaration of nullity of marriage between the respondents dissolved the
regime of community of property of the spouses.
b) Whether the lot in question was conjugal and rendered the REM over the lot invalid.

Ruling:
No. The mere declaration of nullity of marriage, without more, does not authomatically

result in a regime of complete separation when it is shown that there was no liquidation of the
conjugal assets.While the declared nullity of marriage of Nicholson and Florencia severed their
marital bond and dissolved the conjugal partnership, the character of the properties acquired before

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such declaration continues to subsist as conjugal properties until and after the liquidation and
partition of the partnership.

No.Art. 493 of the Civil Code shall govern the property relationship between the former
spouses, where:―Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and
benefits pertaining thereto and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute
another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the
alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may
be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.‖

Florencia has the right to mortgage or even sell her ½ undivided interests in the disputed
party even without the consent of Nicholson. However, the rights of Metrobank, as mortgagee, are
limited only to the 1/2 undivided portion that Florencia owned. Accordingly, the mortgage contract
insofar as it covered the remaining 1/2 undivided portion of the lot is null and void, Nicholson not
having consented to the mortgage of his undivided half.

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Persons and Family Relation

LIQUIDATION

G.R. No. 176556 BRIGIDO QUIOA vs. RITA QUIAO July 4, 2012

Facts:
Respondent Rita Quiao, the offended spouse, filed a legal separation against the petitioner

Brigido Quiao on October 26, 2000 before the RTC. The decision of the court dated October 10,
2005 declared the legal separation, custody of children to Rita, equal partition on the personal and
real properties, and forfeiture on the part of Brigido the net profits earned from the conjugal
properties in favor of the common children. Neither party filed a Motion for Reconsideration and
appealed within the required period for legal separation. December 12, 2005, Rita filed a Motion for
Execution and was later on granted.

Brigido file a Motion for Clarification on the ―net profit earned‖. The Court defined it asthe
remainder of the properties of the parties after deducting the separate properties of each [of the]
spouse and the debts basing on Articles 63 and 43 of the Family Code. Brigido filed a Motion for
Reconsideration on September 8, 2006. Though the petition was after the required prescriptive
period, the court granted the petition since its purpose was to clarify the meaning of the ―net profit
earned‖. With that on November 8, 2006 the court ordered that the ―net profit earned‖ be based on
the Article 102 of the family Code.

November 21, 2006, the respondent, Rita, filed a Motion for Reconsideration (MR) praying
for the reversal of the Nov. 8, 2006 court order. The Court then granted the MR. Brigido then filed
a Petition for Review questioning the following: dissolution and liquidation of the common
properties, meaning of the ―net profit earned‖, and the law governing the property relation between
him and Rita.

Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner can question decision by the RTC dated October 10, 2005.

Ruling:
No. Brigido wasn‘t able to timely appeal the decision of the court dated October 10, 2005,

thus, the decision on that date is deemed final and executory hence, he had slept on his right to
question.The respondent tied the marital knot on January 6, 1977. Since at the time of the exchange
of marital vows, the operative law was the Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A. No. 386) and since
they did not agree on a marriage settlement, the property relations between the petitioner and the
respondent is the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gain. And under this
property relation, "the husband and the wife place in a common fund the fruits of their separate
property and the income from their work or industry." The husband and wife also own in common
all the property of the conjugal partnership of gains. the time of the dissolution of the petitioner and
the respondent's marriage the operative law is already the Family Code, the same applies in the
instant case and the applicable law in so far as the liquidation of the conjugal partnership assets and
liabilities is concerned is Article 129 of the Family Code in relation to Article 63(2) of the Family

Code. The latter provision is applicable because according to Article 256 of the Family Code "this

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Persons and Family Relation

Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights
in accordance with the Civil Code or other law."

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Persons and Family Relation

VOID MARRIAGES OR LIVE-IN RELATIONSHIPS

G.R. No. 178044 ALAIN DIÑO vs. MA CARIDAD DIÑO January 19, 2011

Facts:
Petitioner Alain M. Diño and respondent Caridad L. Diño have beenchildhood friends and s

weethearts. They lived together for ten years thenseparated. After two years, they reunited and later
on decided to get married. However, Alain filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of marriage
based on the psychological incapacity (Article 36 of the Family Code) of Caridad.

Healleged that Caridad failed to give him love and support throughout theirmarriage and was
irresponsible, unfaithful, and prodigal. He also alleged that Caridad tends to be violent toward him.
Extrajudicial service of summons was sent to Caridad who was living in the United Stated at that
time. She did file any answer within the reglementary period. It was also learned that she already
filed a divorce in the United States, which was granted by the Superior Court of California, and is
now married to another man. The prosecutor of Las Piñas declared that there was no collusion
between the two parties.

A psychological report was submitted stating that Caridad was suffering from
Narcissistic Personality Disorder which rooted from her early formative years and which was
founded to be long-lasting and incurable.

Issue:
Whether or not the trial court erred when it ordered that a decree of absolute nullity of

marriage shall only be issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties‘ properties
under Article 147 of the Family Code.

Ruling:
Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the following elements must be present: 1. The man

and the woman must be capacitated to marry each other; 2. They live exclusively with each other as
husband and wife; and 3. Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void.
All these elements are present in this case and there is no question that Article 147 of the Family
Code applies to the property relations between Alian and Caridad. The Court agrees with Alain that
the trial court erred in ordering that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall be issued only after
liquidation, partition and distribution of the parties‘ properties under Article 147 of theFamily
Code. The ruling has no basis because Section 19(1) of the Rule does not apply to cases governed
under Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code. Section19(1) of the Rule provides: Sec. 19.

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Persons and Family Relation

368

Persons and Family Relation

PROPERTY REGIME OF UNIONS WITHOUT MARRIAGE

MARGARET MAXEY vs THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-45870 May 11, 1984

Facts:
Melbourne Maxey and Regina Morales started living together in 1903. They were united in

1903 in a marriage performed "in the military fashion". During the period of their (Melbourne and
Regina) cohabitation, or in 1911 and 1912, respectively, the late Melbourne Maxey acquired the
parcels of land before their 1919 church marriage. Regina Morales Maxey died in 1919 sometime
after the church wedding. The husband remarried and in 1953, his second wife Julia Pamatluan,
using a power of attorney, sold the properties to the respondent spouses, Mr. and Mrs. Beato C.
Macayra.

Plaintiffs, children of Maxey and Morales, instituted the present case on January 26, 1962,
before the Court of First Instance of Davao, praying for the annulment of the documents of sale
covering the subject parcels of land and to recover possession thereof with damages from the herein
defendants-spouses, alleging, among others, that the aforesaid realties were common properties of
their parents, having been acquired during their lifetime and through their joint effort and capital.

The trial court applied Article 144 of the Civil Code which provide ―When a man and a
woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not married, or their marriage is void from
the beginning, the property acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry or
their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.‖ Thus, the property in
question is owned both by Maxey and Morales in which the sale of the property by Maxey alone was
invalid.

The Court of Appeals adjudged that the property was exclusive property of Melbourne
Maxey thus the sale was valid making the buyer, Spouses Macayra, the absolute owner of the land.

Issues:
a) Whether or not the ―military fashion‖ marriage of Maxey and Morales was recognized as
valid.
b) Whether or not the property in question is co-owned by Maxey and Morales applying
Article 144 of the Civil Code.

Ruling:
No. Maxey and Morales were legally married at a church wedding solemnized on February

16, 1919. Since Act No. 3613 was approved on December 4, 1929 and took effect six months
thereafter, it could not have applied to a relationship commenced in 1903 and legitimized in 1919
through a marriage performed according to law. The marriage law in 1903 was General Order No.
70. There is no provision in General Order No. 68 as amended nor in Act No. 3613 which would
recognize as an exception to the general rule on valid marriages, a so called "Military fashion"
ceremony or arrangement.

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Persons and Family Relation

Yes. As far as there was no vested right that would be impaired or prejudiced by applying
Article 144 then it shall be applied retroactively. The properties were sold in 1953 when the new
Civil Code was already in full force and effect. Neither can this be said of the rights of the private
respondents as vendees insofar as one half of the questioned properties are concerned as this was
still open to controversy on account of the legitimate claim of Regina Morales to a share under the
applicable law. The disputed properties were owned in common by Melbourne Maxey and the estate
of his late wife, Regina Morales, when they were sold. Technically speaking, the petitioners should
return one-half of the purchase price of the land while the private respondents should pay some
form of rentals for their use of one-half of the properties. Equitable considerations, however, lead
us to rule out rentals on one hand and return on the other.

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Persons and Family Relation

PROPERTY REGIME OF UNIONS WITHOUT MARRIAGE

SUSAN NICDAO CARIÑO vs. SUSAN YEE CARIÑO
GR No. 132529 February 2, 2001

Facts:
SPO4 Santiago CAriño married petitioner Susan Nicdao on June 20, 1969, with whom he

had two children, Sahlee and Sandee. On November 10, 1982, SPO4 Cariño also married
respondent Susan Yee. In 1988, SPO4 Cariño became bedridden due to diabetes and tuberculosis,
and died on November 23, 1992, under the care of Susan Yee who spent for his medical and burial
expenses. Both Susans filed claims for monetary benefits and financial assistance from various
government agencies pertaining to the deceased. Nicdao was able to collect P146,000 from MBAI,
PCCVI, commutation, NAPOLCOM and Pag-ibig, while Yee received a total of P21,000 from GSIS
burial and SSS burial insurance.

On December 14, 1993, Yee filed for collection of money against NIcdao, praying that
Nicdao be ordered to return to her at least one-half of the P146,000 NIcdao had collected. For
failing to file her answer, NIcdao was declared in default.

Yee admitted that her marriage to the deceased took place during the subsistence of and
without first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of the marriage between Nicdao and Cariño.
But she claimed good faith, having no knowledge of the previous marriage until at the funeral where
she met Nicdao who introduced herself as the wife of the deceased. Yee submitted that Cariño‘s
marriage to Nicdao was void because it was solemnized without the required marriage license.

Issues:
a) Whether or not the subsequent marriage is null and void.
b) Whether or not, if yes to above, the wife of the deceased is entitled to collect the death
benefits from government agencies despite the nullity of their marriage.

Ruling:
No. Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked

for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such marriage void.
Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of
contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be free
from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void. However, for
purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute
nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to the determination of heirship, legitimacy or
illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that
matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even after the death of the parties thereto,
and even in a suit not directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is
essential to the determination of the case. Under the Civil Code which was the law in force when the
marriage of petitioner and the deceased was solemnized in 1969, a valid marriage license is a
requisite of marriage, and the absence therof, subject to certain exceptions, renders the marriage

void ab initio.

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Persons and Family Relation

No. It does not follow, however, that since the marriage of Nicdao and the deceased was
void ab initio, the death benefits would now be awarded to Yee. To reiterate, under Article 40 of
the Family Code, for purposes of remarriage, there must be a prior judicial declaration of the nullity
of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage; otherwise, the
second marriage would also be void. One of the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage is
the separation of the property of the spouses according to the applicable property regime.
Considering that the two marriages are void ab initio, the applicable property regime would be not
absolute community nor conjugal partnership of property, but governed by the provisions of
Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code, on Property Regime of Unions Without Marriage.

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Persons and Family Relation

PROPERTY REGIME OF UNIONS WITHOUT MARRIAGE

ANTONIO VALDES vs. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT July 31, 1996
G.R. No. 122749

Facts:
Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married in 1971 and begotten 5 children.

Valdez filed a petition in 1992 for a declaration of nullity of their marriage pursuant to Article 36 of
the Family Code, which was granted hence, marriage is null and void on the ground of their mutual
psychological incapacity. Stella and Joaquin are placed under the custody of their mother while the
other 3 siblings are free to choose which they prefer.

Gomez sought a clarification of that portion in the decision regarding the procedure for the
liquidation of common property in ―unions without marriage‖. During the hearing on the motion,
the children filed a joint affidavit expressing desire to stay with their father.

Issue:
Whether or not the property regime should be based on co-ownership.

Ruling:
Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that in a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the

property relations of the parties are governed by the rules on co-ownership. Any property acquired
during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party
who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall be considered as having contributed
thereto jointly if said party‘s efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family.

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Persons and Family Relation

PROPERTY REGIME OF UNIONS WITHOUT MARRIAGE

NOEL BUENAVENTURA vs. COURT OF APPEALS March 31, 2005
G.R. Nos. 127358 &G.R. Nos. 127449

Facts:
Noel Buenaventura filed a position for the declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground

that both he and his wife were psychologically incapacitated. The RTC in its decision, declared the
marriage entered into between petitioner and respondent null and violation ordered the liquidation
of the assets of the conjugal partnership property; ordered petitioner a regular support in favor of
his son in the amount of 15,000 monthly, subject to modification as the necessity arises, and
awarded the care and custody of the minor to his mother. Petitioner appealed before the CA. While
the appeal was pending, the CA, upon respondent‘s motion issued a resolution increasing the
support pendants. The CA dismissal petitioner appeal for lack of merit and affirmed in to the RTC
decision. Petitioner motion for reconsideration was denied, hence this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not co-ownership is applicable to valid marriage.

Ruling:
Yes. Since the present case does not involve the annulment of a bigamous marriage, the

provisions of article 50 in relation to articles 41, 42 and 43 of the Family Code, providing for the
dissolution of the absolute community or conjugal partnership of gains, as the case maybe, do not
apply. Rather the general rule applies, which is in case a marriage is declared void ab initio, the
property regime applicable to be liquidated, partitioned and distributed is that of equal co-
ownership.

Since the properties ordered to be distributed by the court a quo were found, both by the
RTC and the CA, to have been acquired during the union of the parties, the same would be covered
by the co-ownership. No fruits of a separate property of one of the parties appear to have been
included or involved in said distribution.

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Persons and Family Relation

VOID MARRIAGES

VIRGILIO MAQUILAN vs. DITA MAQUILAN

G.R. No. 155409 June 8, 2007

Facts:
Herein petitioner and herein private respondent are spouses who once had a blissful

married life and out of which were blessed to have a son. However, their once sugar coated romance
turned bitter when petitioner discovered that private respondent was having illicit sexual affair with
her paramour, which thus, prompted the petitioner to file a case of adultery against private
respondent and the latter's paramour. Consequently, both accused were convicted of the crime
charged.

Thereafter, private respondent, through counsel, filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage, Dissolution and Liquidation of Conjugal Partnership of Gains and Damages imputing
psychological incapacity on the part of the petitioner. During the pre-trial of the said case, petitioner
and private respondent entered into a COMPROMISE AGREEMENT.

Subsequently, petitioner filed a motion for the repudiation of the AGREEMENT. This
motion was denied. Petitioner then filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with the Court of
Appeals on the ground that the conviction of the respondent of the crime of adultery disqualify her
from sharing in the conjugal property. The Petition was dismissed.

Issue:
Is the conviction of the respondent of the crime of adultery a disqualification for her to

share in the conjugal property?

Ruling:
No. The conviction of adultery does not carry the accessory of civil interdiction. Article 34

of the Revised Penal Code provides for the consequences of civil interdiction:

Art. 34. Civil Interdiction. — Civil interdiction shall deprive the offender during the time of his sentence of
the rights of parental authority, or guardianship, either as to the person or property of any ward, of marital authority,
of the right to manage his property and of the right to dispose of such property by any act or any conveyance inter vivos.

Under Article 333 of the same Code, the penalty for adultery is prision correccional in its
medium and maximum periods. Article 333 should be read with Article 43 of the same Code. The
latter provides:

Art. 43. Prision correccional — Its accessory penalties. — The penalty of prision correccional shall carry
with it that of suspension from public office, from the right to follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual
special disqualification from the right of suffrage, if the duration of said imprisonment shall exceed eighteen months.
The offender shall suffer the disqualification provided in this article although pardoned as to the principal penalty,
unless the same shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon.

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Persons and Family Relation

It is clear, therefore, and as correctly held by the CA that the crime of adultery does not
carry the accessory penalty of civil interdiction which deprives the person of the rights to manage
her property and to dispose of such property inter vivos.

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Persons and Family Relation

VOID MARRIAGES

BARRETO GONZALES vs. GONZALES

G.R. No. 159521 March 7, 1933

Facts:
The plaintiff & defendant were both citizens of the Philippines, married & lived together

fromJanuary 1919 until Spring of 1926. After which they voluntary separated & have not lived
together as man & wife, they had 4 minor children together. After negotiations, both parties
mutually agreed to allow Manuela Barreto (plaintiff) for her & her children‘s support of P500 (five
hundred pesos) monthly which to be increased in cases of necessity & illness, and that the title of
certain properties be put in her name.

Shortly after the agreement, Augusto Gonzales (defendant), when to Reno, Nevada &
secured inthat jurisdiction an absolute divorce on the ground of desertion dated November 28,
1927. Onthat same date he went through the forms of marriage with another Filipino citizen as well
& had 3children with her. When Gonzales left the Philippines, he reduced the amount he had agreed
to pay monthly for thesupport of Manuela Barreto & her children & has not made the payments
fixed in the Renodivorce as alimony. Gonzales came back to the Philippines in August 1928 and
shortly after, Barreto brought anaction at the CFI-Manila requesting to confirm & ratify the decree
of divorce issued by the courtsof Nevada & invoked sec 9 of Act 2710. Such is requested to be

enforced, and deliver to theGuardian ad litem the equivalent of what would have been due to their
children as their legalportion from respective estates had their parents died intestate on November
28, 1927, they alsoprayed that the marriage existing between Barreto & Gonzales be declared
dissolved & Gonzalesbe ordered to pay Barreto P500 per month, counsel fees of P5000 & all the
expenses incurred ineducating the 3 minor sons. The guardians of the children also filed
as intervenors in the case.

After the hearing, the CFI-Manila granted the judgement in favor of the plaintiff &
intervenors, butreduced the attorney‘s fees to P3000 instead & also granted the costs of the action
against thedefendant, Hence, this appeal by Gonzales saying that the lower court erred in their
decision.

Issue:
Whether or not any foreign divorce, relating to citizens of the Philippine Islands, will be

recognized in this jurisdiction, except it be for a cause, and under conditions for which the courts of
the PhilippineIslands would grant a divorce.

Ruling:
No. The lower court erred in granting the relief as prayed for on granting the divorce,

because:The court said that securing the jurisdiction of the courts to recognize & approve the
divorcedone in Reno, Nevada cannot be done according to the public policy in this jurisdiction on
thequestion of divorce. It‘s clear in Act No. 2710 & court decisions on cases such as Goitia VS.

Campos Rueda that theentire conduct of the parties from the time of their separation until the case
was submitted prayingthe ratification of the Reno Divorce was clearly a circumvention of the law

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Persons and Family Relation

regarding divorce & willbe done under conditions not authorized by our laws. The matrimonial
domicile of the couple had always been the Philippines & the residence acquiredby the husband in
Reno, Nevada was a bona fide residence & did not confer jurisdiction upon thecourt of that state to
dissolve the matrimonial bonds in which he had entered in 1919.

Art 9 & Art 11 of the Civil Code & The Divorce Law of the Philippines does not allow such
to bedone, the effect of foreign divorce in the Philippines says that litigants cannot compel thecourts
to approve of their own actions or permit the personal relations of the Citizens of the Philippines to
be affected by decrees of divorce of foreign courts in manner which out government believes is
contrary to public order & good morals.

378

Persons and Family Relation

VOID MARRIAGES

MERCADO-FEHR vs. FEHR

G.R. No. 152716 October 23, 2003

Facts:
In March 1983, after 2 years of long-distance courtship, Elna left Cebuand moved in with

Bruno in Manila. They had their first child in December thesame year. They purchased a
condominium unit (Suite 204) at LGCcondominium by a contract TO sell dated July 26, 1983. They
got married inMarch 1985. In 1998, trial court declared the marriage between Elna and Bruno,void
ab initio under FC 36 and subsequently ordered the liquidation of theirconjugal partnership. The
court found Suite 204 to be exclusive property of Bruno because it was purchased on installment
basis using Brunos exclusivefunds prior to the marriage. Their properties werealso divided into 3
(1/3-Elna;1/3-Bruno; 1/3-2 children).

Issue:
Whether or not Suite 204 is Bruno‘s exclusive property

Ruling:
No. The Family Code, Article 147 applies in this case because 1) both of them were

capacitated tomarry each other; 2) they lived exclusively as husband and wife; and 3) theirunion is
without the benefit of marriage or their marriage is void. Evidenceshows that the property was
acquired during their cohabitation and in applyingFC 147, the rules on co-ownership should govern.
Suite 204 must be consideredas common property of Elna and Bruno. 3-way partition of properties
does not apply also. Property regime should be divided in accordance with the law on co-ownership

379

Persons and Family Relation

BIGAMOUS, ADULTEROUS, ETC. RELATIONSHIPS

SUSAN NICDAO-CARINO vs. SUSAN YEE CARINO
GR No. 132529 February 2, 2001

Facts:
SPO4 Santiago CAriño married petitioner Susan Nicdao on June 20, 1969, with whom he

had two children, Sahlee and Sandee. On November 10, 1982, SPO4 Cariño also married
respondent Susan Yee. In 1988, SPO4 Cariño became bedridden due to diabetes and tuberculosis,
and died on November 23, 1992, under the care of Susan Yee who spent for his medical and burial
expenses. Both Susans filed claims for monetary benefits and financial assistance from various
government agencies pertaining to the deceased. Nicdao was able to collect P146,000 from MBAI,
PCCVI, commutation, NAPOLCOM and Pag-ibig, while Yee received a total of P21,000 from GSIS
burial and SSS burial insurance.

On December 14, 1993, Yee filed for collection of money against NIcdao, praying that
Nicdao be ordered to return to her at least one-half of the P146,000 NIcdao had collected. For
failing to file her answer, Nicdao was declared in default.Yee admitted that her marriage to the

deceased took place during the subsistence of and without first obtaining a judicial declaration of
nullity of the marriage between Nicdao and Cariño. But she claimed good faith, having no
knowledge of the previous marriage until at the funeral where she met Nicdao who introduced
herself as the wife of the deceased. Yee submitted that Cariño‘s marriage to Nicdao was void
because it was solemnized without the required marriage license.

Issues:
a) Whether or not the subsequent marriage is null and void;
b) Whether or not, if yes to above, the wife of the deceased is entitled to collect the death
benefits from government agencies despite the nullity of their marriage.

Ruling:
Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for

purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such marriage void.
Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of
contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be free
from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void.

However, for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a
marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to the determination of
heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or
a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even after the death
of the parties thereto, and even in a suit not directly instituted to question the validity of said
marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of the case.

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Persons and Family Relation

Under the Civil Code which was the law in force when the marriage of petitioner and the
deceased was solemnized in 1969, a valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage, and the absence
therof, subject to certain exceptions, renders the marriage void ab initio.It does not follow, however,
that since the marriage of Nicdao and the deceased was void ab initio, the death benefits would now
be awarded to Yee. To reiterate, under Article 40 of the Family Code, for purposes of remarriage,
there must be a prior judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a
party can enter into a second marriage; otherwise, the second marriage would also be void.

One of the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage is the separation of the property.

381

Persons and Family Relation

BIGAMOUS, ADULTEROUS, etc. RELATIONSHIPS

GUILLERMA TUMLOS vs.SPOUSES MARIO FERNANDEZ and LOURDES

G.R. No. 137650 FERNANDEZ April 12, 2000

Facts:
On July 5, 1996, the said spouses alleged that they are the absolute owners of an apartment

building located at ARTE SUBDIVISION III, Lawang Bato, Valenzuela, Metro Manila; that
through tolerance they had allowed Guillerma, petitioner, Toto and Gina Tumlos to occupy the
apartment building for the last seven (7) years, since 1989, without the payment of any rent; that it
was agreed upon that after a few months, defendant Guillerma Tumlos will pay P1,600.00 a month
while the other promised to pay P1,000.00 a month, both as rental, which agreement was not
complied with by the said defendants.

She averred therein that the Fernandez spouses had no cause of action against her, since she
is a co-owner of the subject premises as evidenced by a Contract to Sell wherein it was stated that
she is a co-vendee of the property in question together with Mario Fernandez.

Mario Fernandez and Guillerma had an amorous relationship, and that they acquired the
property in question as their love nest. It was further alleged that they lived together in the said
apartment building with their two (2) children for around ten (10) years, and that Guillerma
administered the property by collecting rentals from the lessees of the other apartments, until she
discovered that Mario deceived her as to the annulment of his marriage.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner Guillerma Tumlos is the co-owner of the property by virtue of

cohabiting with Mario Fernandez who is legally married to Lourdez Fernandez.

Ruling:
In the present case Article 148 of the family Code shall apply. Article 148 states that ―In

cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only the properties acquired by both of
the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by
them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the
contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and
presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit.

If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership shall
accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage.‖

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Persons and Family Relation

Guillerma Tumlos fail to present an evidence of her actual contribution to the purchase of
the property. In Article 148 did not include also administration of the property as contribution, it is
unsubstantiated.

383

Persons and Family Relation

BIGAMOUS, ADULTEROUS, etc. RELATIONSHIPS

JOSEFINA C. FRANCISCO vs. MASTER IRON WORKS
G.R. No. 151967 February 16, 2005

Facts:
On January 15, 1983, Eduardo and Josefina Francisco got married. On August 31, 1984,

Josefina purchased two parcels of lands. The Registry of Deeds issued Transfer Certificate of title in
the name of ―Josefina Castillo Francisco married to Eduardo G. Francisco‖. On January 13, 1986,
Josefina mortgaged the said property to Leonila Cando. It appears that Eduardo affixed his marital
conformity to the deed.

On June 11, 1990, Eduardo bought 7,500 bags of cement from Master Iron Works and
Construction Corporation (MIWCC) but failed to pay the same. The court issued writ of execution
levying the two parcel of land as for payment to MIWCC.

On July 3, 1994, Josefina executed an Affidavit of Third Party Claim over the two parcel of
land in which she claimed that they were her paraphernal property, and that her husband had no
proprietary right or interest over them as evidenced by his affidavit of waiver, a copy of which she
attached to her affidavit.

Before she could commence presenting her evidence against MIWCC, Josefina filed a
petition to annul her marriage to Eduardo in the RTC of Parañaque, on the ground that when they
were married on January 15, 1983, Eduardo was already married to one Carmelita Carpio.

On September 9, 1996, the RTC of Parañaque rendered judgment, declaring the marriage
between Josefina and Eduardo as null and void for being bigamous.

Issue:
Whether or not the subject properties were paraphernal property of Josefina and cannot be

held liable for the Eduardo‘s personal obligations.

Ruling:
No. The subject properties are not the paraphernal property of Josefina and can be held to

answer the liabilities of Eduardo.

Even though Eduardo and Josefina‘s marriage is bigamous, the properties cannot be held
conjugal, Josefina failed to adduce preponderance of evidence that she contributed money, property
or industry in the acquisition of the subject property and hence, is not a co-owner of such. Also, the
Court doubted that when she acquired the property at 23 years of age, she had enough funds to pay
for it. Her claim that the funds for the property were provided by her mother and sister, the Court
believed, was just an afterthought.

384

Persons and Family Relation

BIGAMOUS, ADULTEROUS, etc. RELATIONSHIPS

MILAGROS JOAQUINO a.k.a. MILAGROS J. REYES vs. LOURDES REYES,
MERCEDES, MANUEL, MIRIAM and RODOLFO JR.

G.R. No. 154645 July 13, 2004

Facts:

In the marriage between Lourdes Reyes and the deceased husband Rodolfo Reyes, Rodolfo
has an illicit relationship with Milagros Joaquino. The deceased allegedly "put into custody" some of
the couple's conjugal properties to Milagros.

On July 12,1979, there is a transfer of property in favor of the petitioner and for which
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 90293 of the Register of Deeds of Metro Manila, District IV was
issued in the name of petitioner Milagros B. Joaquino. The complainant alleges that that the funds
used to purchase the property were conjugal funds and earnings of the deceased.

The complaint finally alleges that the deceased had two cars in petitioner‘s possession and
that the real and personal properties in petitioner‘s possession are conjugal partnership properties of
the spouses Lourdes P. Reyes and Rodolfo A. Reyes and one-half belongs exclusively to respondent
Lourdes P. Reyes and the other half to the estate of Rodolfo A. Reyes to be apportioned among the
other respondents as his forced heirs. Respondents therefore, pray that the property covered by

T.C.T. No. 90293 be declared conjugal property of the spouses Lourdes P. Reyes and Rodolfo A.
Reyes and that petitioner be ordered to reconvey the property in respondents‘ favor; that the two
cars in petitioner‘s possession be delivered to respondents and that petitioner be made to pay actual,
compensatory and moral damages to respondents as well as attorney‘s fees.

Issue:
Whether or not the common law relationship between Milagros Joaquino and the deceases

validates her claim of ownership.

Ruling:
No. Under Article 145 of the Civil Code, a conjugal partnership of gains (CPG) is created

upon marriage and lasts until the legal union is dissolved by death, annulment, legal separation or
judicial separation of property. Conjugal properties are by law owned in common by the husband
and wife. As to what constitutes such properties are laid out in Article 153 of the Code, which we
quote:

"(1) That which is acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the expense of the
common fund, whether the acquisition be for the partnership, or for only one of the
spouses;
(2) That which is obtained by the industry, or work, or as salary of the spouses, or of either
of them;
(3) The fruits, rents or interests received or due during the marriage, coming from the

common property or from the exclusive property of each spouse."

385

Persons and Family Relation

Moreover, under Article 160 of the Code, all properties of the marriage, unless proven to
pertain to the husband or the wife exclusively, are presumed to belong to the CPG. For the
rebuttable presumption to arise, however, the properties must first be proven to have been acquired
during the existence of the marriage.

In default of Article 144 of the Civil Code, Article 148 of the Family Code has been applied.
Thus, when a common-law couple has a legal impediment to marriage, only the property acquired by
them -- through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry -- shall be owned by
them in common and in proportion to their respective contributions. Milagros likewise failed to
prove that she was indeed financially capable of purchasing the house and lot, that she actually
contributed to the payments, and that she was employed any time after 1961 when the property was
purchased. The Certification and Affidavits stating that she borrowed money from her siblings and
had earnings from a jewelry business were also deemed to have no probative values, they were not
cross-examined by the respondents.

386

Persons and Family Relation

BIGAMOUS, ADULTEROUS, etc. RELATIONSHIPS

JACINTO SAGUID vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS June 10, 2003
G.R. No. 150611

Facts:
Gina S. Rey, private respondent and seventeen years old, was married but separated de facto

from her husband. Sometime in July 1987, she met Jacinto, petitioner, after a brief courtship they
decided to cohabit as husband and wife. In 1996, the couple decided to end up their nine-year
cohabitation.

On January 9, 1997, respondent filed a complaint for Partition and Recovery of Personal
Property with Receivership against the petitioner in the RTC. She prayed that she be declared the
sole owner of the personal properties she contributed during her cohabitation with Jacinto and the
amount of 70,000.00 representing her contribution to the construction of their house be reimbursed
to her.

Issue:
Whether or not Gina Rey is entitled to the ownership of the personal properties and

reimbursement of her contributions to the construction of their house.

Ruling:

Yes, Gina is entitled to the ownership of the personal properties and reimbursement of her
contributions to the construction of their house.

It is not disputed that Gina and Jacinto were not capacitated to marry each other because the
former was validly married to another man at the time of her cohabitation with the latter. Their
property regime therefore is governed by Article 148 of the Family Code, which applies to bigamous
marriages, adulterous relationships, relationships in a state of concubinage, relationships where both
man and woman are married to other persons, and multiple alliances of the same married man.
Under this regime, "…only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint
contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to
their respective contributions..."Proof of actual contribution is required.

The fact that the controverted property was titled in the name of the parties to an adulterous
relationship is not sufficient proof of co-ownership absent evidence of actual contribution in the
acquisition of the property.

While there is no question that both parties contributed in their joint account deposit, there
is, however, no sufficient proof of the exact amount of their respective shares therein. Pursuant to
Article 148 of the Family Code, in the absence of proof of extent of the parties‘ respective
contribution, their share shall be presumed to be equal.

387

Persons and Family Relation

BIGAMOUS, ADULTEROUS, etc. RELATIONSHIPS

VICTOR JUANIZA vs. EUGENIO JOSE March 3, 1979
G.R. No. L-50127-28

Facts:
In November 23, 1967, the defendant Jose, registered owner and operator of a passenger

jeepney, involved in an accident of collision with a freight train of the Philippine National Railways
which resulted in the death to seven (7) and physical injuries to five (5) of its passengers. At that
time the defendant is legally married to Socorro Ramos but had been cohabiting with Rosalia Arroyo
for sixteen years.

The court charged the defendant and Rosalia Arroyo for damages.

Motion for reconsideration was filed by Rosalia Arroyo praying that the decision be
reconsidered insofar as it condemns her to pay damages jointly and severally with her co-defendant,
but was denied. The lower court based her liability on the provision of Article 144 of the Civil Code.

Issue:
Whether or not Article 144 of the Civil Code is applicable in a case where one of the parties

in a common-law relationship is incapacitated to marry.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that the co-ownership contemplated in Article 144 of the Civil

Code requires that the man and the woman living together must not in any way be incapacitated to
contract marriage. Since Eugenio Jose is legally married to Socorro Ramos, there is an impediment
for him to contract marriage with Rosalia Arroyo. Under the provision of the Civil Code, Arroyo
cannot be a co-owner of the jeepney. The jeepney belongs to the conjugal partnership of Jose and
his legal wife. There is therefore no basis for the liability of Arroyo for damages arising from the
death of, and physical injuries suffered by, the passengers of the jeepney, which figured in the
collision.

388

Persons and Family Relation

BIGAMOUS, ADULTEROUS, etc. RELATIONSHIPS

MARINO, RENATO, LETICIA, IMELDA, ALICIA, LIGAYA, and ZENAIDA, all
surnamed ADRIANO vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 124118 March 27, 2000

Facts:
On October 29, 1933 Lucio Adriano and Gliceria Dorado got married. Sometime in 1942

or prior thereto, Lucio and Gliceria separated, and Gliceria settled in Rizal, Laguna where she died
on June 11, 1968. On November 22, 1968, or five months after the death of Gliceria, Lucio married
Vicenta. On October 10, 1980, Lucio executed a last will and testament disposing of all his
properties, and assigning among others, his second wife Vicenta and all his children by his first and
second marriage as devisees and legatees.

On February 11, 1981, Lucio died and private respondent Celestina Adriano, who was
instituted in Lucio's will as its executrix, filed a petition for the probate of the will on February 18,
1981 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lucena City. The RTC allowed the probate of the
will.

On August 17, 1988, and while the proceedings for settlement of estate were pending before
the RTC, petitioners instituted an action for annulment of Lucio Adriano's will. In the complaint
plaintiffs-petitioners alleged that before the marriage of Lucio and their mother, Vicenta, on
November 22, 1968, the two lived together as husband and wife and as such, acquired properties
which became the subject of inventory and administration.

Issue:
Whether or not the estate of Lucio are conjugal properties of his first marriage.

Ruling:
Yes. The co-ownership in Article 144 of the Civil Code requires that the man and woman

living together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage must not in any way be
incapacitated to marry. Considering that the property was acquired in 1964, or while Lucio's
marriage with Gliceria subsisted, such property is presumed to be conjugal unless it be proved that it
pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. As found by both the trial court and respondent
court in this case, not only did petitioners fail to overcome the presumption of conjugality of the
disputed property, private respondents have also presented sufficient evidence to support their
allegation that the property was in fact purchased by Lucio with proceeds of the conjugal fund of his
first marriage.

Although in cases of common-law relations where an impediment to marry exists, equity
would dictate that property acquired by the man and woman through their joint endeavor should be
allocated to each of them in proportion to their respective efforts, petitioners in the instant case
have not submitted any evidence that Vicenta actually, contributed to the acquisition of the property
in question.

389

Persons and Family Relation

390

Persons and Family Relation

COVERAGE OF FAMILY RELATIONS

GAUDENCIO GUERRERO vs. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ILOCOS NORTE
G.R. No. 109068 January 10, 1994

Facts:
Guerrero and Pedro are brothers in law, their respective wives being sisters. Filed by

petitioner as an accion publicana against private respondent, this case assumed another dimension
when it was dismissed by respondent Judge on the ground that the parties being brother-in-law the
complaint should have alleged that earnest efforts were first exerted towards a compromise.

Issue:
Whether or not brothers by affinity are considered members of the same family.

Ruling:
Considering that Art. 151 starts with the negative word ―No‖, the requirement is mandatory

for that the complaint or petition, which must be verified, should allege that earnest efforts towards
a compromise have been made but that the same failed, so that ―If it is shown that no such efforts
were in fact made, the case must be dismissed.

No. The court already ruled in Gayon v. Gayon that the enumeration of ―brothers and
sisters‖ as members of the same family does not comprehend ―sisters-in-law‖

391

Persons and Family Relation

SUITS AMONG MEMBERS OF THE SAME FAMILY

HIYAS SAVINGS and LOAN BANK, INC. vs. HON. EDMUNDO T. ACUÑA
G.R. No. 154132 August 31, 2006

Facts:
On November 24, 2000, Alberto Moreno (private respondent) filed with the RTC of

Caloocan City a complaint against Hiyas Savings and Loan Bank, Inc. (petitioner), his wife
Remedios, the spouses Felipe and Maria Owe and the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City for
cancellation of mortgage contending that he did not secure any loan from petitioner, nor did he sign
or execute any contract of mortgage in its favor; that his wife, acting in conspiracy with Hiyas and
the spouses Owe, who were the ones that benefited from the loan, made it appear that he signed the
contract of mortgage; that he could not have executed the said contract because he was then
working abroad.

On May 17, 2001, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that private
respondent failed to comply with Article 151 of the Family Code wherein it is provided that no suit
between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified
complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same
have failed.

Issue:
Whether or not necessity of earnest effort is needed.

Ruling:
No. Article 151 of the Family Code provides as follows: ―No suit between members of the

same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified complaint or petition that earnest
efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed. If it is shown that no
such efforts were in fact made, the case must be dismissed.‖ This rule shall not apply to cases which
may not be the subject of compromise under the Civil Code. Article 222 of the Civil Code from
which Article 151 of the Family Code was taken, essentially contains the same provisions, to wit:
―No suit shall be filed or maintained between members of the same family unless it should appear
that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed, subject to
the limitations in Article 2035.‖ In the case of Martinez v. Martinez ruled that Article 151 of the
Family Code applies to cover when the suit is exclusively between or among family members.

Hence, once a stranger becomes a party to a suit involving members of the same family, the
law no longer makes it a condition precedent that earnest efforts be made towards a compromise
before the action can prosper.

392

Persons and Family Relation

SUITS AMONG MEMBERS OF THE SAME FAMILY

SPOUSES AUGUSTO HONTIVEROS and MARIA HONTIVEROS vs. REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT, and, SPOUSES GREGORIO HONTIVEROS and TEODORA AYSON

G.R. No. 125465 June 29,1999

Facts:
Petitioner spouses Augusto and Maria Hontiveros filed a complaint for damages against

private respondents Gregorio Hontiveros and Teodora Ayson. The petitioners alleged that they are
the owners of a parcel of land in Capiz and that they were deprived of income from the land as a
result of the filing of the land registration case.

In the reply, private respondents denied that they were married and alleged that Gregorio
was a widower while Teodora was single. They also denied depriving petitioners of possession of
and income from the land. On the contrary, according to the private respondents, the possession of
the property in question had already been transferred to petitioners by virtue of the writ of
possession. Trial court denied petitioner‘s motion that while in the amended complaint, they alleged
that earnest efforts towards a compromise were made, it was not verified as provided in Article 151.

Issue:
Whether or not the court can validly dismissed the complaint due to lack of efforts exerted

towards a compromise as stated in Article 151.

Ruling:
No. Supreme Court held that the inclusion of private respondent Teodora Ayson as

defendant and Maria Hontiveros as petitioner take the case out of the scope of Article 151. Under
this provision, the phrase "members of the same family" refers to the husband and wife, parents and
children, ascendants and descendants, and brothers and sisters, whether full or half-blood. Religious
relationship and relationship by affinity are not given any legal effect in this jurisdiction.

Consequently, private respondent Ayson, who is described in the complaint as the spouse of
respondent Hontiveros, and petitioner Maria Hontiveros, who is admittedly the spouse of petitioner
Augusto Hontiveros, are considered strangers to the Hontiveros family.

393

Persons and Family Relation

SUITS AMONG MEMBERS OF THE SAME FAMILY

PILAR S. VDA. DE MANALO, ANTONIO S. MANALO, ORLANDO S. MANALO, and
ISABELITA MANALO vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 129242 January 16, 2001

Facts:
Troadio Manalo died intestate on February 14, 1992. His wife, Pilar S. Manalo, and his

eleven children, who are all of legal age, survived him. At the time of his death, Troadio Manalo left
several real properties located in Manila and in the province of Tarlac including a business under the
name and style Manalo's Machine Shop.

The eight of the surviving children of the late Troadio Manalo filed a petition with the
respondent Regional Trial Court of Manila of the judicial settlement of the estate of their late father
and for the appointment of their brother, Romeo Manalo, as administrator.

The trial court issued an order and set the reception of evidence of the petitioners therein. However,
the trial court upon motion of set this order of general default aside herein petitioners who were
granted then 10 days within which to file their opposition to the petition. Several pleadings were
subsequently filed by herein petitioners, through counsel, culminating in the filling of an Omnibus
Motion.

Issue:
Whether or not the case at bar is covered under Article 151 where earnest efforts toward

compromise should first be made prior the filing of the petition.

Ruling:
It is a fundamental rule that in the determination of the nature of an action or proceeding,

the averments and the character of the relief were sought in the complaint or petition, shall be
controlling. The careful scrutiny of the petition for the issuance of letters of administration,
settlement and distribution of the estate belies herein petitioners‘ claim that the same is in the nature
of an ordinary civil action. The provision of Article 151 is applicable only to ordinary civil actions.
It is clear from the term ―suit‖ that it refers to an action by one person or persons against another or
other in a court of justice in which the plaintiff pursues the remedy that the law affords him for the
redress of an injury or enforcement of a right.

It is also the intention of the Code Commission as revealed in the Report of the Code
Commission to make the provision be applicable only to civil actions. The petition for issuance of
letters of administration, settlement, and distribution of estate is a special proceeding and as such a
remedy whereby the petitioners therein seek to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. Hence,
it must be emphasized that herein petitioners are not being sued in such case for any cause of action
as in fact no defendant was pronounced.

394

Persons and Family Relation

SUITS AMONG MEMBERS OF THE SAME FAMILY

NICANOR T. SANTOS vs. COURT OF APPEALS, CONSUELAO T. SANTOS-

G.R. No. 134787 GUERRERO and ANDRES GUERRERO November 15, 2005

Facts:

Petitioner Nicanor T. Santos and private respondent Consuelo T. Santos-Guerrero are
brother and sister, born to spouses Urbano Santos and Candelaria Santos, now both deceased.
Sometime in 1956, Nicanor, Consuelo and eight of their siblings, executed a "Basic Agreement of
Partition" covering properties they inherited from their parents.

Two years later, Consuelo, joined by her husband, herein respondent Andres Guerrero
(collectively, the "Guerreros"), filed suit with the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal against
petitioner Nicanor and two (2) other brothers, for recovery of inheritance.

Issue:
Whether or not Article 222 of the New Civil Code in relation to Section 1(j), Rule 16 of the

Rules of Court has no application

Ruling:
A lawsuit between close relatives generates deeper bitterness than between strangers.Thus,

the provision making honest efforts towards a settlement a condition precedent for the maintenance
of an action between members of the same family. As it were, a complaint in ordinary civil actions
involving members of the same family must contain an allegation that earnest efforts toward a
compromise have been made pursuant to Article 222of the Civil Code, now pursuant to Article 151
of the Family Code.Otherwise, the complaint may be dismissed under Section 1(j), Rule 16 of the
Rules of Court.Admittedly, the complaint filed in this case contains no such allegation. But a
complaint otherwise defective on that score may be cured by the introduction of evidence effectively
supplying the necessary averments of a defective complaint.

395

Persons and Family Relation

PROHIBITED COMPROMISE

CECILIO MENDOZA vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and LUISA DE
LA ROSA MENDOZA

G.R. No. L-23102 April 24, 1967

Facts:
In the complaint, private respondent, Luisa De La Rosa Mendoza averred that she was

married to Cecilio Mendoza on 2 September 1953, that they lived together as husband and wife until
14 July 1954, when the husband departed for the United States to further his studies and practice his
profession. Since then, defendant Mendoza, without justifiable cause or reason deliberately
abandoned and neglected plaintiff and despite repeated demands by plaintiff, defendant has failed
and refused, and still fails and refuses, to provide for the maintenance and support of plaintiff, who
is allegedly to be pregnant, sickly and without any source of revenue, while defendant (now
petitioner) is employed in a hospital in the United States.

Issue:
Whether or not the case at bar is covered under Article 151 where earnest efforts toward

compromise should first be made prior the filing of the petition, and invoking Article 222 of the
New Civil Code of the Philippines.

Ruling:

Article 222 of the Civil Code of the Philippines requires that before a suit between members
of the same family (in this case between husband and wife) is filed or maintained, it must appear that
earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, and the only way to make it so appear when
the suit isfiledis by a proper averment to that effect in the complaint. Since the law forbids a suit
being initiated filed or maintained unless such efforts at compromise appear, the showing that
efforts in question were made is a condition precedent to the existence of the cause of action. It
follows that the failure of the complaint to plead that plaintiff previously tried in earnest to reach a
settlement out of court renders it assailable for lack of cause of action and it may be so attacked at
any stage of the case even on appeal.

While the Supreme Court agree that petitioner's position represents a correct statement of
the general rule on the matter, we are nevertheless constrained to hold that the Court of Appeals
and the Court of First Instance committed no error in refusing to dismiss the complaint, for on its
face, the same involved a claim for future supportthat under Article 2035 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines cannot be subject of a valid compromise, and is, therefore, outside the sphere of
application of Article 222 of the Code upon which petitioner relies. This appears from the last
proviso of said Article 222, future support.

396

Persons and Family Relation

FAMILY HOME

JUANITA TRINIDAD RAMOS vs. DANILO PANGILINAN July 20, 2010
G.R. No. 185920

Facts:
Respondents filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against E.M. Ramos Electric, Inc., a

company owned by Ernesto M. Ramos, the patriarch of herein petitioners. The labor arbiter ordered
Ramos and the company to pay the respondents‘ back-wages, separation pay, 13th month pay &
service incentive leave pay. The decision became final and executory so a writ of execution was
issued which the Deputy Sheriff of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) implemented
by levying a property in Ramos‘ name situated in Pandacan.

Alleging that the Pandacan property was the family home, hence, exempt from execution to
satisfy the judgment award, Ramos and the company moved to quash the writ of execution.
Respondents argued that it is not the family home there being another one in Antipolo and that the
Pandacan address is actually the business address. The motion was denied and the appeal was
likewise denied by the NLRC.

Issue:
Whether or not the levy upon the Pandacan property was valid.

Ruling:
Yes. For the family home to be exempt from execution, distinction must be made as to what

law applies based on when it was constituted and what requirements must be complied with by the
judgment debtor or his successors claiming such privilege. Hence, two sets of rules are applicable. If
the family home was constructed before the effectivity of the Family Code or before August 3, 1988,
then it must have been constituted either judicially or extra-judicially as provided under Articles 225,
229-231 and 233 of the Civil Code. Meanwhile, Articles 240 to 242 governs extrajudicial
constitution.

On the other hand, for family homes constructed after the effectivity of the Family Code on
August 3, 1988, there is no need to constitute extra judicially or judicially, and the exemption is
effective from the time it was constituted and lasts as long as any of its beneficiaries under Art. 154
actually reside therein. Moreover, the family home should belong to the absolute community or
conjugal partnership, or if exclusively by one spouse, its constitution must have been with consent
of the other, and its value must not exceed certain amounts depending upon the area where it is
located. Further, the debts incurred for which the exemption does not apply as provided under Art.
155 for which the family home is made answerable must have been incurred after August 3, 1988. In
both instances, the claim for exemption must be proved.

In the present case, since petitioners claim that the family home was constituted prior to
August 3, 1988, or as early as 1944, they must comply with the procedure mandated by the Civil
Code. There being absolutely no proof that the Pandacan property was judicially or extra judicially
constituted as the Ramos‘ family home, the law protecting the family home cannot apply thereby
making the levy upon the Pandacan property valid.

397

Persons and Family Relation

398

Persons and Family Relation

FAMILY HOME

JOSE MODEQUILLO vs. HON. AUGUSTO V. BREVA FRANCISCO SALINAS
G.R. No. 86355 May 31, 1990

Facts:
The sheriff levied on a parcel of residential land located at Poblacion Malalag, Davao del Sur

on July 1988, registered in the name of Jose Mondequillo and a parcel of agricultural land located at
Dalagbong Bulacan, Malalag, Davao del Sur also registered in the latter‘s name. A motion to quash
was filed by the petitioner alleging that the residential land is where the family home is built since
1969 prior the commencement of this case and as such is exempt from execution, forced sale or
attachment under Article 152 and 153 except for liabilities mentioned in Article 155 thereof, and
that the judgment sought to be enforced against the family home is not one of those enumerated.
With regard to the agricultural land, it is alleged that it is still part of the public land and the transfer
in his favor by the original possessor and applicant who was a member of a cultural minority. The
residential house in the present case became a family home by operation of law under Article 153.

Issue:
Whether or not the subject property is deemed to be a family home.

Ruling:
The petitioner‘s contention that petitioner and his family should consider it a family home

from the time it was occupied in 1969 is not well taken. Under Article 162 of the Family Code, it
provides that the provisions of this Chapter shall govern existing family residences insofar as said
provisions are applicable. It does not mean that Article 152 and 153 shall have a retroactive effect
such that all existing family residences are deemed to have been constituted as family homes at the
time of their occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family Code and are exempt from the
execution for payment of obligations incurred before the effectivity of the Code. The said article
simply means that all existing family residences at the time of the effectivity of the Family Code, are
considered family homes and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home
under the Family Code. The debt and liability, which was the basis of the judgment, was incurred
prior the effectivity of the Family Code. This does not fall under the exemptions from execution
provided in the Family Code.

399

Persons and Family Relation