civil code0101

ADOPTED CHILDREN

GR. No. 100835 REPUBLIC vs. COURT OF APPEALS October 26, 1993

Facts:
James Hughes, a natural born citizen of the UnitedStates of America, married Lenita

Mabunay, a Filipino Citizen,who herself was later naturalized as a citizen of that country.The
spouses jointly filed a petition with the RTC to adopt theminor niece and nephews of Lenita, who
had been living withthe couple even prior to the filing of the petition. The minors, aswell as their
parents, gave consent to the adoption. The RTCrendered a decision granting the petition.

Issue:
Whether or not Can the spouses adopt the minors.

Ruling:
While James Anthony unquestionably is not permitted to adopt under any of the exceptional

cases, Lenita, however, can qualify. Lenita may not thus adopt alone since Article 185 requires a joint
adoption by the husband and the wife, a condition that must be read alongtogether with Article 184.
Art 185 provides: Husband and wife must jointly adopt, except in the following cases: (1) When one

spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child; or (2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the
legitimate child of the other. As amended by Executive Order 91, Presidential Decree No. 603 had
thus made it mandatory for both the spouses to jointly adopt when one of them was an alien. The
law was silent when both spouses were of the same nationality. The Family Code has resolved any
possible uncertainty. Article 185 thereof now expresses the necessity for joint adoption by the
spouses except in only two instances: (1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own legitimate child;
or (2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other. It is in the foregoing cases
when Article 186 of the Code, on the subject of parental authority, can aptly find governance.
Article 186. In case husband and wife jointly adaptor one spouse adopts the legitimate child of the
other, joint parental authority shall be exercised by the spouses in accordance with this Code.

450

Persons and Family Relation

ADOPTED CHILDREN

REPUBLIC vs. TOLEDANO

GR.No. 94147 June 8, 1994

Facts:
Spouses Alvin A. Clouse and Evelyn A. Clouse who are aliens filed a petition to adopt the

minor, Solomon Joseph Alcala. They are physically, mentally, morally, and financially capable of
adopting Solomon, a twelve (12) year old minor. Since 1981 to 1984, then from November 2, 1989
upto the present, Solomon Joseph Alcala was and has been under the care and custody of private
respondents. Solomon gave his consent to the adoption. His mother, Nery Alcala, a widow, likewise
consented to the adoption due to poverty and inability to support and educate her son. The RTC
granted the petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the spouses can adopt Solomon.

Ruling:
Under Articles 184 and 185 of Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as "The Family

Code of the Philippines", private respondents spouses Clouse are clearly barred from adopting
Solomon Joseph Alcala.Article 184, paragraph three of Executive Order No. 209expressly
enumerates the persons who are not qualified to adopt, An alien, except: (a) A former Filipino
citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by consanguinity; (b) One who seeks to adopt the legitimate
child of his or her Filipino spouse; or (c) One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt
jointly with his or her spouse a relative by consanguinity of the latter. Aliens not included in the
foregoing exceptions may adopt Filipino children in accordance with the rules on inter-country
adoption as may be provided by law. Private respondent Evelyn A. Clouse, on the other hand, may
appear to qualify pursuant to paragraph three of Article 184 of E.O. 209. She was a former Filipino
citizen. She sought to adopt her younger brother. Unfortunately, the petition for adoption cannot be
granted in her favor alone without violating Article 185 which mandates a joint adoption by the
husband and wife. It reads: Article 185. Husband and wife must jointly adopt, except in the
following cases: (1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child; or (2) When one
spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other. Article 185 requires a joint adoption by the
husband and wife, a condition that must be read along together with Article 184.

451

Persons and Family Relation

ADOPTED CHILDREN

REPUBLIC vs. ALARCON VERGARA

GR. No. 95551 March 20, 1997

Facts:
On June 25, 1990, the spouses Samuel R. Dye, Jr. and Rosalina Due Dye filed a petition

before the RegionalTrialCourtofAngelesCity to adopt Maricel R. Due and Alvin R. Due, ages 13 and
12 years old, respectively, younger siblings of Rosalina. Samuel R. Dye, Jr, a member of the United
States Air Force, is an American citizen who resided at the Clark Air Base in Pampanga. His wife
Rosalina is a former Filipino who became a naturalized American. They have two children. Maricel
and Alvin Due, as well as their natural parents, gave their consent to the adoption.

The Republic filed this petition for review on a pure question of law, contending that the
spouses Dye are not qualified under the law to adopt Maricel and Alvin Due. As a general rule,
aliens cannot adopt Filipino citizens.

Samuel Robert Dye, Jr. who is an American and, therefore, an alien is disqualified from
adopting the minors Maricel and Alvin Due because he does not fall under any of the three afore
quoted exceptions in the law. He is not a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by
consanguinity. Nor does he seek to adopt his wife's legitimate child. Although he seeks to adopt
with his wife her relatives by consanguinity, he is not married to a Filipino citizen, for Rosalina was
already a naturalized American at the time the petition was filed, thus excluding him from the
coverage of the exception. The law here does not provide for an alien who is married to a former
Filipino citizen seeking to adopt jointly with his or her spouse a relative by consanguinity, as an
exception to the general rule that aliens may not adopt.

On her own, Rosalina Dye cannot adopt her brother and sister for the law mandates joint

adoption by husband and wife, subject to exceptions. Article 29 of Presidential Decree No. 603
(Child and Youth Welfare Code) retained the Civil Code provision that husband and wife may
jointly adopt. The Family Code amended this rule by scrapping the optional character of joint
adoption and making it now mandatory.

Issue:
Whether or not the adoption is valid.

Ruling:
Article 185 of the Family Code provides: Husband and wife must adopt, except in the

following cases:
(1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child;
(2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other."

452

Persons and Family Relation

None of the above exceptions applies to Samuel and Rosalina Dye, for they did not petition
to adopt the latter's child but her brother and sister. Accordingly, the law should be construed
liberally, in a manner that will sustain rather than defeat said purpose. The law must also be applied
with compassion, understanding and less severity in view of the fact that it is intended to provide
homes, love, care and education for less fortunate children. Regrettably, the Court is not in a
position to affirm the trial court's decision favoring adoption in the case at bar, for the law is clear
and it cannot be modified without violating the proscription against judicial legislation. Until such
time however, that the law on the matter is amended, we cannot sustain the respondent-spouses'
petition for adoption.

453

Persons and Family Relation

REQUIREMENTS FOR ADOPTION

IN RE: ADOPTION OF MICHELLE LIM AND MICHAEL JUDE LIM

GR No. 168992-93 May 21, 2009

Facts:
Monina Lim, petitioner, who was an optometrist was married with Primo Lim but were

childless. Minor children, were entrusted to them by Lucia, whose parents were unknown as shown
by a certification of DSWD. The spouses registered the children making it appears as if they were
the parents. Unfortunately, in 1998, Primo died. She then married an American Citizen, Angel
Olario in December 2000. Petitioner decided to adopt the children by availing of the amnesty given
under RA 8552 to individuals who simulated the birth of a child. In 2002, she filed separate
petitions for adoption of Michelle and Michael before the trial court. Michelle was then 25 years old
and already married and Michael was 18 years and seven months old. Michelle and her husband
including Michael and Olario gave their consent to the adoption executed in an affidavit.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner who has remarried can singly adopt.

Ruling:
Petition was denied. The time the petitions were filed, petitioner had already remarried.

Husband and wife shall jointly adopt except in 3 instances which was not present in the case at bar.
In case spouses jointly adopts, they shall jointly exercise parental authority. The use of the word
―shall‖ signifies that joint adoption of husband and wife is mandatory. This is in consonance with
the concept of joint parental authority since the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a
legitimate child, it is but natural to require spouses to adopt jointly. The affidavit of consent given
by Olario will not suffice since there are certain requirements that he must comply as an American
Citizen. He must meet the qualifications set forth in Sec7 of RA8552. The requirements on
residency and certification of the alien‘s qualification to adopt cannot likewise be waived pursuant to
Sec 7. Parental authority is merely just one of the effects of legal adoption. It includes caring and
rearing the children for civic consciousness and efficiency and development of their moral mental
and physical character and well-being.

454

Persons and Family Relation

REQUIREMENTS FOR ADOPTION

LANDINGIN vs. REPUBLIC

GR No. 164948 June 27, 2006

Facts:
Diwata Ramos Landingin, a US citizen of Filipino parentage filed a petition for the adoption

of 3 minors, natural children of Manuel Ramos, the former‘s brother, and Amelia Ramos. She
alleged in her petition that when her brother died, the children were left to their paternal
grandmother for their biological mother went to Italy, re-married there and now has 2 children by
her second marriage and no longer communicates from the time she left up to the institution of the
adoption. After the paternal grandmother passed away, the minors were being supported by the
petitioner and her children abroad and gave their written consent for their adoption. A Social
Worker of the DSWD submitted a Report recommending for the adoption and narrated that
Amelia, the biological mother was consulted with the adoption plan and after weighing the benefits
of adoption to her children, she voluntarily consented. However, petitioner failed to present the said
social worker as witness and offer in evidence the voluntary consent of Amelia Ramos to the
adoption. Petitioner also failed to present any documentary evidence to prove that Amelia assent to
the adoption.

Issue:
Whether or not a petition for adoption be granted without the written consent of the

adoptee‘s biological mother

Ruling:
No. Section 9, par (b) of RA 8552, provides that the consent of the biological parent(s) of

the child, if known is necessary to the adoption. The written consent of the legal guardian will
suffice if the written consent of the biological parents cannot be obtained. The general requirement
of consent and notice to the natural parents is intended to protect the natural parental relationship
from unwarranted interference by interlopers, and to insure the opportunity to safeguard the best
interests of the child in the manner of the proposed adoption. The written consent of the biological
parents is indispensable for the validity of the decree of adoption. Indeed, the natural right of a
parent to his child requires that his consent must be obtained before his parental rights and duties
may be terminated and re-establish in adoptive parents. In this case, petitioner failed to submit the

455

Persons and Family Relation

written consent of Amelia Ramos to adopt. Moreover, abandonment means neglect and refusal to
perform the filial and legal obligations of love and support. Merely permitting the child to remain for
a time undisturbed in the care of others is not such abandonment. To dispense with the
requirements of consent, the abandonment must be shown to have existed at the time of adoption.

REQUIREMENTS FOR ADOPTION

CANG vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 105308 September 25, 1998

Facts:
Petitioner Herbert Cang and Anna Marie Clavano who were married on January 27, 1973,

begot three children, namely: Keith, born on July 3, 1973; Charmaine, born on January 23, 1977, and
Joseph Anthony, born on January 3, 1981. During the early years of their marriage, the Cang
couple‘s relationship was undisturbed. Not long thereafter, however, Anna Marie learned of her
husband‘s alleged extramarital affair with Wilma Soco, a family friend of the Clavanos.

Upon learning of her husband‘s alleged illicit liaison, Anna Marie filed a petition for legal
separation with alimony pendente lite with the then Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of
Cebuwhich rendered a decision approving the joint manifestation of the Cang spouses providing
that they agreed to ―live separately and apart or from bed and board. Petitioner then left for the
United States where he sought a divorce from Anna Marie before the Second Judicial District Court
of the State of Nevada. Said court issued the divorce decree that also granted sole custody of the
three minor children to Anna Marie, reserving ―rights of visitation at all reasonable times and
places‖ to petitioner.

Thereafter, petitioner took an American wife and thus became a naturalized American
citizen. In 1986, he divorced his American wife and never remarried.Upon learning of the petition
for adoption, petitioner immediately returned to the Philippines and filed an opposition thereto,
alleging that, although private respondents Ronald and Maria Clara Clavano were financially capable

of supporting the children while his finances were ―too meager‖ compared to theirs, he could not
―in conscience, allow anybody to strip him of his parental authority over his beloved children.‖

Pending resolution of the petition for adoption, petitioner moved to reacquire custody over
his children alleging that Anna Marie had transferred to the United States thereby leaving custody of
their children to private respondents. On January 11, 1988, the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City,
Branch 19, issued an order finding that Anna Marie had, in effect, relinquished custody over the
children and, therefore, such custody should be transferred to the father. The court then directed
the Clavanos to deliver custody over the minors to petitioner.

Issue:
Can minor children be legally adopted without the written consent of a natural parent on the

ground that the latter has abandoned them?

456

Persons and Family Relation

Ruling:
This Court finds that both the lower court and the Court of Appeals failed to appreciate

facts and circumstances that should have elicited a different conclusion on the issue of whether
petitioner has so abandoned his children, thereby making his consent to the adoption unnecessary.
In its ordinary sense, the word ―abandon‖ means to forsake entirely, to forsake or renounce utterly.
The dictionaries trace this word to the root idea of ―putting under a ban.‖ The emphasis is on the
finality and publicity with which a thing or body is thus put in the control of another, hence, the
meaning of giving up absolutely, with intent never to resume or claim one‘s rights or interests. In
reference to abandonment of a child by his parent, the act of abandonment imports ―any conduct of
the parent which evinces a settled purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental
claims to the child.‖ It means ―neglect or refusal to perform the natural and legal obligations of care
and support which parents owe their children.‖

In the instant case, records disclose that petitioner‘s conduct did not manifest a settled
purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims over his children as to
constitute abandonment. Physical estrangement alone, without financial and moral desertion, is not
tantamount to abandonment. While admittedly, petitioner was physically absent as he was then in
the United States, he was not remiss in his natural and legal obligations of love, care and support for
his children. He maintained regular communication with his wife and children through letters and
telephone. He used to send packages by mail and catered to their whims. t abandoned them.The
questioned Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals, as well as the decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Cebu, are SET ASIDE thereby denying the petition for adoption of Keith, Charmaine
and Joseph Anthony, all surnamed Cang, by the spouse respondents Ronald and Maria Clara
Clavano. This Decision is immediately executory.

457

Persons and Family Relation

REQUIREMENTS FOR ADOPTION

DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL WELFARE AND DEVELOPMENT vs. JUDGE

ANTONIO M. BELEN

A.M. No. RTJ-96-1362 July 18, 1997

Facts:
Spouses Desiderio Soriano and Aurora Bernardo-Soriano, both of whom are naturalized

American citizens, filed a verified petition for adoption of their niece, the minor Zhedell Bernardo
Ibea. Respondent Judge Belen granted the petition after finding that petitioner spouses were highly
qualified to adopt the child as their own, basing his decree primarily on the "findings and
recommendation of the DSWD that the adopting parents on the one hand and the adoptee on the
other hand have already developed love and emotional attachment and parenting rules have been
demonstrated to the minor." On these considerations, respondent judge decided and proceeded to
dispense with trial custody. He asserted that the DSWD findings and recommendations are
contained in the "Adoptive Home Study Report" and "Child Study Report" prepared by the local
office of the DSWD through respondent Elma P. Vedaña. However, when the minor Zhedell
Bernardo Ibea sought to obtain the requisite travel clearance from the DSWD in order to join her
adoptive parents in the United States, the DSWD found that it did not have any record in its files
regarding the adoption and that there was never any order from respondent judge for the DSWD to
conduct a "Home and Child Study Report" in the case. Furthermore, there was no directive from
respondent judge for the social welfare officer of the lower court to coordinate with the DSWD on
the matter of the required reports for said minor's adoption.

Issue:
May a decree of adoption be granted on the basis of case study reports made by a social

welfare officer of the court?

Ruling:
No. Article 33 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code provides in no uncertain terms that:

No petition for adoption shall be granted unless the Department of Social Welfare, or the Social
Work and Counseling Division, in case of Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts, has made a case

458

Persons and Family Relation

study of the child to be adopted, his natural parents as well as the prospective adopting parents, and
has submitted its report and recommendations on the matter to the court hearing such petition. The
Department of Social Welfare shall intervene on behalf of the child if it finds, after such case study,
that the petition should be denied. Circular No. 12, as a complementary measure, was issued by this
Court precisely to obviate the mishandling of adoption cases by judges, particularly in respect to the
aforementioned case study to be conducted in accordance with Article 33 of Presidential Decree No.
603 by the DSWD itself and involving the child to be adopted, its natural parents, and the adopting
parents. It definitively directs Regional Trial Courts hearing adoption cases:

(1) To NOTIFY the Ministry of Social Services and Development, thru its local agency, of
the filing of adoption cases or the pendency thereof with respect to those cases already filed;
(2) To strictly COMPLY with the requirement in Article 33 of the aforesaid decree . . .

The Staff Assistant V. (Social Worker) of the Regional Trial Courts, if any, shall coordinate
with the Ministry of Social Services and Development representatives in the preparation and
submittal of such case study. .The error on the part of both respondent judge and social worker is
thus all too evident. Pursuant to Circular No. 12, the proper course that respondent judge should
have taken was to notify the DSWD at the outset about the commencement of Special Proceeding
No. 5830 so that the corresponding case study could have been accordingly conducted by said
department which undoubtedly has the necessary competence, more than that possessed by the
court social welfare officer, to make the proper recommendation. Moreover, respondent judge
should never have merely presumed that it was routinely for the social welfare officer to coordinate
with the DSWD regarding the adoption proceedings. It was his duty to exercise caution and to see
to it that such coordination was observed in the adoption proceedings, together with all the other
requirements of the law.

By respondent's failure to do so, he may well have wittingly or unwittingly placed in jeopardy
the welfare and future of the child whose adoption was under consideration. Adoption, after all, is in
a large measure a legal device by which a better future may be accorded an unfortunate childlike
Zhedell Bernardo Ibea in this case. Treading on equally sensitive legal terrain, the social welfare
officer concerned, respondent Elma P. Vedaña, arrogated unto herself a matter that pertained
exclusively to the DSWD, her task being to coordinate with the DSWD in the preparation and
submission of the relevant case study reports, and not to make the same and recommend by herself
the facts on which the court was to act.

ACCORDINGLY, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the
future shall be dealt with more severely by this Court, respondent Judge Antonio M. Belen of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 38, of Lingayen, Pangasinan is hereby CENSURED for violating
Article 33 of Presidential Decree No. 603 and Circular No. 12 of this Court; and respondent Elma
P. Vedaña, Social Welfare Officer II of the Office of the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court of
Lingayen, Pangasinan, is REPRIMANDED for violating Circular No. 12.

459

Persons and Family Relation

NATURE AND EFFECTS OF ADOPTION

REPUBLIC vs. HERNANDEZ

GR No. 117209 February 9, 1996

Facts:
The RTC granted the petition for adoption of Kevin Earl Bartolome Moran and

simultaneously granted the prayer therein for the change of the first name of said adoptee to Aaron
Joseph, to complement the surname Munson y Andrade which he acquired consequent to his
adoption. Petitioner opposed the inclusion of the relief for change of name in the same petition for
adoption objecting to the joinder of the petition for adoption and the petitions for the change of
name in a single proceeding, arguing that these petition should be conducted and pursued as two
separate proceedings.

Petitioner argues that a petition for adoption and a petition for change of name are two
special proceedings which, in substance and purpose, are different from and are not related to each
other, being respectively governed by distinct sets of law and rules. Petitioner further contends that
what the law allows is the change of the surname of the adoptee, as a matter of right, to conform
with that of the adopter and as a natural consequence of the adoption thus granted. If what is sought
is the change of the registered given or proper name, and since this would involve a substantial
change of one‘s legal name, a petition for change of name under Rule 103 should accordingly be
instituted, with the substantive and adjective requisites therefor being conformably satisfied.

Private respondents, on the contrary, admittedly filed the petition for adoption with a prayer
for change of name predicated upon Section 5, Rule 2 which allows permissive joinder of causes of
action in order to avoid multiplicity of suits and in line with the policy of discouraging protracted
and vexatious litigations. It is argued that there is no prohibition in the Rules against the joinder of
adoption and change of name being pleaded as two separate but related causes of action in a single
petition.

Issue:

460

Persons and Family Relation

Whether or not respondent judge erred in granting prayer for the change of the given or
proper name if the adoptee in a petition for adoption.

Ruling:
No. Par (1), Art. 189 of the Family Code provides one of the legal effect of adoption: (1) For

civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a legitimate child of the adopters and both shall
acquire the reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship of parent and child,
including the right of the adopted to use the surname of the adopters;

The law allows the adoptee, as a matter of right and obligation, to bear the surname of the
adopter, upon issuance of the decree of adoption. It is the change of the adoptee‘s surname to
follow that of the adopter which is the natural and necessary consequence of a grant of adoption
and must specifically be contained in the order of the court, in fact, even if not prayed for by
petitioner. However, the given or proper name, also known as the first or Christian name, of the
adoptee must remain as it was originally registered in the civil register. The creation of an adoptive
relationship does not confer upon the adopter a license to change the adoptee‘s registered Christian
or first name. The automatic change thereof, premised solely upon the adoption thus granted, is
beyond the purview of a decree of adoption. Neither is it a mere incident in nor an adjunct of an
adoption proceeding, such that a prayer therefor furtively inserted in a petition for adoption, as in
this case, cannot properly be granted.

The official name of a person whose birth is registered in the civil register is the name
appearing therein. If a change in one‘s name is desired, this can only be done by filing and strictly
complying with the substantive and procedural requirements for a special proceeding for change of
name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, wherein the sufficiency of the reasons or grounds
therefor can be threshed out and accordingly determined. A petition for change of name being a
proceeding in rem, strict compliance with all the requirements therefor is indispensable in order to
vest the court with jurisdiction for its adjudication. It is an independent and discrete special
proceeding, in and by itself, governed by its own set of rules. A fortiori, it cannot be granted by
means of any other proceeding. To consider it as a mere incident or an offshoot of another special
proceeding would be to denigrate its role and significance as the appropriate remedy available under
our remedial law system.

461

Persons and Family Relation

NATURE AND EFFECTS OF ADOPTION

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 103695 March 15, 1996

Facts:
The petition below was filed on September 21 1988 by private respondents spouses Jaime B.

Caranto and Zenaida P. Caranto for the adoption of Midael C. Mazon, then fifteen years old, who
had been living with private respondent Jaime B. Caranto since he was seven years old. When
private respondents were married on January 19, 1986, the minor Midael C. Mazon stayed with them
under their care and custody. Private respondents prayed that judgment be rendered:

a) Declaring the child Michael C. Mazon the child of petitioners for all intents and purposes;
b.) Dissolving the authority vested in the natural parents of the child; and
c) That the surname of the child be legally changed to that of the petitioners and that the
first name this was mistakenly registered as ―MIDAEL‖ be corrected to ―MICHAEL."

The Solicitor General appealed to the Court of Appeals reiterating his contention that the
correction of names cannot be effected in the same proceeding for adoption. As additional ground
for his appeal, he argued that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the case for adoption
because in the notice published in the newspaper, the name given was "Michael," instead of
"Midael," which is the name of the minor given in his Certificate of Live Birth.

On January 23, 1992, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC. The
Court of Appeals ruled that the case of Cruz v. Republic, invoked by the petitioner in support of its
plea that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case, was inapplicable because that case
involved a substantial error. Like the trial court, it held that to require the petitioners to file a
separate petition for correction of name would entail "additional time and expenses for them as well
as for the Government and the Courts."

Issue:
Does the trial court have jurisdiction over the present case?

Ruling:

462

Persons and Family Relation

The Supreme Court held that the RTC correctly granted the petition for adoption of the
minor Midael C. Mazon and the Court of Appeals, in affirming the decision of the trial court,
correctly did so. With regard to the second assignment of error in the petition, we hold that both the
Court of Appeals and the trial court erred in granting private respondents' prayer for the correction
of the name of the child in the civil registry. Contrary to what the trial court thought, Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court applies to this case and because its provision was not complied with, the decision
of the trial court, insofar as it ordered the correction of the name of the minor, is void and without
force or effect. The trial court was clearly in error in holding Rule 108 to be applicable only to the
correction of errors concerning the civil status of persons

NATURE AND EFFECTS OF ADOPTION

IN RE: ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE GARCIA

G.R. No. 148311 March 31, 2005

Facts:
Honorato B. Catindig filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Astorga

Garcia. He averred that Stephanie was born on June 26, 1994; that Stephanie had been using her
mother‘s middle name and surname; and that he is now a widower and qualified to be her adopting
parent. He prayed that Stephanie‘s middle name be changed to Garcia, her mother‘s surname, and
that her surname ―Garcia‖ be changed to ―Catindig‖ his surname.

The RTC granted the petition for adoption, and ordered that pursuant to article 189 of the
Family Code, the minor shall be known as Stephanie Nathy Catindig. Honorato filed a motion for
classification and/or reconsideration praying that Stephanie be allowed to use the surname of her
natural mother (Garcia) as her middle name. The lower court denied petitioner‘s motion for
reconsideration holding that there is no law or jurisprudence allowing an adopted child to use the
surname of his biological mother as his middle name.

Issue:
Whether or not an illegitimate child may use the surname of her mother as her middle name

when she is subsequently adopted by her natural father.

Ruling:
One of the effects of adoption is that the adopted is deemed to be a legitimate child of the

adapter for all intents and purposes pursuant to Article 189 of the Family Code and Section 17 of
Article V of RA 8557.

Being a legitimate by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled to all the
rights provided by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including the right to
bear the surname of her father and her mother. This is consistent with the intention of the members

463

Persons and Family Relation

of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees. In fact, it is a Filipino custom that the initial or
surname of the mother should immediately precede the surname of the father.

NATURE AND EFFECTS OF ADOPTION

TEOTICO vs. DEL VAL

G.R. No. L-18753 March 26, 1965

Facts:
Rene Teotico, married to the testatrix's niece named Josefina Mortera. The testatrix Josefina

Mortera as her sole and universal heir to all the remainder of her properties not otherwise disposed
of in the will. Vicente Teotico filed a petition for the probate of the will before the CIF of Manila
which was set for hearing after the requisite publication and service to all parties concerned.

Ana del Val Chan, claiming to be an adopted child of Francisca Mortera, a deceased sister of
the testatrix, as well as an acknowledged natural child of Jose Mortera, a deceased brother of the
same testatrix, filed an opposition to the probate of the will alleging the following grounds. Vicente
B. Teotico, filed a motion to dismiss the opposition alleging that the oppositor had no legal
personality to intervene. The probate court, allowed the oppositor to intervene as an adopted child
of Francisca Mortera, and the oppositor amended her opposition by alleging the additional ground
that the will is inoperative as to the share of Dr. Rene Teotico.

After the parties had presented their evidence, the probate court rendered its decision
admitting the will to probate but declaring the disposition made in favor of Dr. Rene Teotico void
with the statement that the portion to be vacated by the annulment should pass to the testatrix's
heirs by way of intestate succession.

Issue:
Whether or not oppositor Ana del Val Chan has the right to intervene in this proceeding.

Ruling:

464

Persons and Family Relation

Oppositor has no right to intervene because she has no interest in the estate either as heir,
executor, or administrator, nor does she have any claim to any property affected by the will, because
it nowhere appears therein any provision designating her as heir, legatee or devisee of any portion of
the estate. She has also no interest in the will either as administratrix or executrix. Neither has she
any claim against any portion of the estate because she is not a co-owner thereof.

The oppositor cannot also derive comfort from the fact that she is an adopted child of
Francisca Mortera because under our law the relationship established by adoption is limited solely to
the adopter and the adopted and does not extend to the relatives of the adopting parents or of the
adopted child except only as expressly provided for by law. Hence, no relationship is created
between the adopted and the collaterals of the adopting parents. As a consequence, the adopted is
an heir of the adopter but not of the relatives of the adopter.

RESCISSION OF ADOPTION

G.R. No. 143989 LAHOM vs. SIBULO July 14, 2003

Facts:
A sad turn of events came many years later. Eventually, in December of 1999, Mrs. Lahom

commenced a petition to rescind the decree of adoption before the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 22, of Naga City. In her petition, she averred. That despite the proddings and pleadings of
said spouses, respondent refused to change his surname from Sibulo to Lahom, to the frustrations
of petitioner particularly her husband until the latter died, and even before his death he had made
known his desire to revoke respondent's adoption, but was prevented by petitioner's supplication,
however with his further request upon petitioner to give to charity whatever properties or interest
may pertain to respondent in the future. Respondent continued using his surname Sibulo to the utter
disregard of the feelings of herein petitioner, and his records with the Professional Regulation
Commission showed his name as Jose Melvin M. Sibulo originally issued in 1978 until the present,
and in all his dealings and activities in connection with his practice of his profession, he is Jose
Melvin M. Sibulo.

That herein petitioner being a widow, and living alone in this city with only her household
helps to attend to her, has yearned for the care and show of concern from a son, but respondent
remained indifferent and would only come to Naga to see her once a year. for the last three or four
years, the medical check-up of petitioner in Manila became more frequent in view of a leg ailment,
and those were the times when petitioner would need most the care and support from a love one,
but respondent all the more remained callous and utterly indifferent towards petitioner which is not
expected of a son.

465

Persons and Family Relation

That herein respondent has recently been jealous of petitioner's nephews and nieces
whenever they would find time to visit her, respondent alleging that they were only motivated by
their desire for some material benefits from petitioner.

That in view of respondent's insensible attitude resulting in a strained and uncomfortable
relationship between him and petitioner, the latter has suffered wounded feelings, knowing that after
all respondent's only motive to his adoption is his expectancy of his alleged rights over the
properties of herein petitioner and her late husband, clearly shown by his recent filing of Civil Case
No. 99-4463 for partition against petitioner, thereby totally eroding her love and affection towards
respondent, rendering the decree of adoption, considering respondent to be the child of petitioner,
for all legal purposes, has been negated for which reason there is no more basis for its existence,
hence this petition for revocation,"

Issue:
Can the adoption be rescinded?

Ruling:
While R.A. No. 8552 has unqualifiedly withdrawn from an adopter a consequential right to

rescind the adoption decree even in cases where the adoption might clearly turn out to be
undesirable, it remains, nevertheless, the bounden duty of the Court to apply the law. Dura lex sed
lex would be the hackneyed truism that those caught in the law have to live with. It is still
noteworthy, however, that an adopter, while barred from severing the legal ties of adoption, can
always for valid reasons cause the forfeiture of certain benefits otherwise accruing to an undeserving
child. For instance, upon the grounds recognized by law, an adopter may deny to an adopted child
his legitime and, by a will and testament, may freely exclude him from having a share in the
disposable portion of his estate.

466

Persons and Family Relation

SUPPORT

LAM vs. CHUA

G.R. No. 131286 March 18, 2004

Facts:
A petition for declaration of nullity of marriage by Adriana Chua against Jose Lam in the

Regional Trial Court of Pasay City (Branch 109). Adriana alleged in the petition that: she and Jose
were married on January 13, 1984; out of said marriage, they begot one son, John Paul Chua Lam;
Jose was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage
but said incapacity was not then apparent; such psychological incapacity of Jose became manifest
only after the celebration of the marriage when he frequently failed to go home, indulged in
womanizing and irresponsible activities, such as, mismanaging the conjugal partnership of gains; in
order to save what was left of the conjugal properties, she was forced to agree with Jose on the
dissolution of their conjugal partnership of gains and the separation of present and future properties;
said agreement was approved by the Regional Trial Court of Makati City (Branch 149) in a Decision
dated February 28, 1994; they had long been separated in bed and board; they have agreed that the
custody of their child will be with her, subject to visitation rights of Jose. Adriana prayed that the
marriage between her and Jose be declared null and void but she failed to claim and pray for the
support of their child, John Paul.

Issue:
Should Jose give the corresponding support

Ruling:

467

Persons and Family Relation

The Pasay RTC should have been aware that in determining the amount of support to be
awarded, such amount should be in proportion to the resources or means of the giver and the
necessities of the recipient, pursuant to Articles 194, 201 and 202 of the Family Code. It is
incumbent upon the trial court to base its award of support on the evidence presented before it. The
evidence must prove the capacity or resources of both parents who are jointly obliged to support
their children as provided for under Article 195 of the Family Code; and the monthly expenses
incurred for the sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and transportation of
the child.

WHO IS ENTITLED TO SUPPORT

G.R. No. 156343 BRIONES vs. MIGUEL October 18, 2004

Facts:
On March 5, 2002, petitioner Joey D. Briones filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus against

respondents Maricel Pineda Miguel and Francisca Pineda Miguel, to obtain custody of his minor
child Michael Kevin Pineda. On April 25, 2002, the petitioner filed an Amended Petition to include
Loreta P. Miguel, the mother of the minor, as one of the respondents.

A Writ of Habeas Corpus was issued by this Court on March 11, 2002 ordering the
respondents to produce before this Court the living body of the minor Michael Kevin Pineda on
March 21, 2002 at 2:00 o‘clock in the afternoon.

The petitioner alleges that the minor Michael Kevin Pineda is his illegitimate son with
respondent Loreta P. Miguel. He was born in Japan on September 17, 1996 as evidenced by his
Birth Certificate. The respondent Loreta P. Miguel is now married to a Japanese national and is
presently residing in Japan. Respondent Loreta P. Miguel prays that the custody of her minor child
be given to her and invokes Article 213, Paragraph 2 of the Family Code and Article 363 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines

Issue:

468

Persons and Family Relation

Whether or not as the natural father, may be denied the custody and parental care of his own
child in the absence of the mother who is away.

Ruling:
Petitioner concedes that Respondent Loreta has preferential right over their minor child. He

insists, however, that custody should be awarded to him whenever she leaves for Japan and during
the period that she stays there. In other words, he wants joint custody over the minor, such that the
mother would have custody when she is in the country. But when she is abroad, he -- as the
biological father -- should have custody.

According to petitioner, Loreta is not always in the country. When she is abroad, she cannot
take care of their child. The undeniable fact, he adds, is that she lives most of the time in Japan, as
evidenced by her Special Power of Attorney dated May 28, 2001, granting to her sister temporary
custody over the minor.

At present, however, the child is already with his mother in Japan, where he is studying,9 thus
rendering petitioner‘s argument moot. While the Petition for Habeas Corpus was pending before the
CA, petitioner filed on July 30, 2002, an "Urgent Motion for a Hold Departure Order," alleging
therein that respondents were preparing the travel papers of the minor so the child could join his
mother and her Japanese husband. The CA denied the Motion for lack of merit.

Having been born outside a valid marriage, the minor is deemed an illegitimate child of
petitioner and Respondent Loreta. Article 176 of the Family Code of the Philippines explicitly
provides that "illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of
their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code." This is the rule
regardless of whether the father admits paternity

469

Persons and Family Relation

WHO IS ENTITLED TO SUPPORT

QUIMIGING vs. ICAO

G.R. No. L-26795 July 31, 2970

Facts:
Carmen Quimiguing, the petitioner, and Felix Icao, the defendant, were neighbors in

Dapitan City and had close and confidential relations. Despite the fact that Icao was married, he
succeeded to have carnal intercourse with plaintiff several times under force and intimidation and
without her consent. As a result, Carmen became pregnant despite drugs supplied by defendant and
as a consequence, Carmen stopped studying. Plaintiff claimed for support at P120 per month,
damages and attorney‘s fees. The complaint was dismissed by the lower court in Zamboanga del
Norte on the ground lack of cause of action. Plaintiff moved to amend the complaint that as a
result of the intercourse, she gave birth to a baby girl but the court ruled that ―no amendment was
allowable since the original complaint averred no cause of action‖.

Issue:
Whether or not, the CFI erred in dismissing Carmen‘s complaint.

Ruling:
Yes. The Supreme Court held that ―a conceive child, although as yet unborn, is given by law

a provisional personality of its own for all purposes favorable to it, as explicitly provided in Article
40 of the Civil Code of the Philippines‖. The conceive child may also receive donations and be

470

Persons and Family Relation

accepted by those persons who will legally represent them if they were already born as prescribed in
Article 742.

Lower court‘s theory on article 291 of the civil code declaring that support is an obligation
of parents and illegitimate children does not contemplate support to children as yet unborn violates
article 40 aforementioned.

Another reason for reversal of the order is that Icao being a married man forced a woman
not his wife to yield to his lust and this constitutes a clear violation of Carmen‘s rights. Thus, she is
entitled to claim compensation for the damage caused.

WHEREFORE, the orders under appeal are reversed and set aside. Let the case be
remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings conformable to this decision. Costs against
appellee Felix Icao.

WHO IS ENTITLED TO SUPPORT

G.R. No. 43794 FRANCISCO vs. ZANDUETA August 9, 1935

Facts:
Eugenio Francisco, represented by his natural mother and curator ad litem, Rosario Gomez,

instituted an action for support against petitioner Luis Francisco in a separate case, alleging that he is

the latter‘s acknowledged son and as such is entitled to support. Luis denied the allegation, claimed
that he never acknowledged Eugenio as his son and was not present at his baptism and that he was
married at time of Eugenio‘s birth.

Despite the denial of paternity however, respondent judge Francisco Zandueta issued an
order granting Eugenio monthly pension, pendente lite. Luis moved for reconsideration but was
denied, hence the writ for certiorari. Praying to have the trial transferred, counsel of herein
petitioner, in compromise, agreed that his client would pay the monthly pension during the
pendency of the case.

Issue:
Whether or not Eugenio Francisco is entitled to support without first establishing his status

as petitioner‘s son

471

Persons and Family Relation

Ruling:
No. The answer as to whether or not petitioner‘s counsel really agreed to have him pay the

pension during the case‘s pendency is not necessary to the solution of the case. As in the case
of Yangco vs Rohde, the fact of the civil status must be proven first before a right of support can be
derived. The Court ruled that it is necessary for Eugenio to prove, through his guardian ad litem, his
civil status as the petitioner‘s son. As such, no right of support can be given because the very civil
status of sonship, from which the right is derived, is in question.

It held that ―(t)here is no law or reason which authorizes the granting of support to a person
who claims to be a son in the same manner as to a person who establishes by legal proof that he is
such son. In the latter case the legal evidence raises a presumption of law, while in the former there
is no presumption, there is nothing but a mere allegation, a fact in issue, and a simple fact in issue
must not be confounded with an established right recognized by a final judgment.‖ Additionally, the
respondent judge was without jurisdiction to order for the monthly support in light of herein private
respondent‘s absence of aforementioned status.

WHO IS ENTITLED TO SUPPORT

G.R. No. L-61700 SANTERO vs. COURT OF APPEALS
September 14, 1987

Facts:
Pablo Santero, the only legitimate son of Pascual and Simona Santero, had three children

with Felixberta Pacursa namely, Princesita, Federico and Willie (herein petitioners). He also had four
children with Anselma Diaz namely, Victor, Rodrigo, Anselmina, and Miguel (herein private
respondents). These children are all natural children since neither of their mothers was married to
their father. In 1973, Pablo Santero died.

During the pendency of the administration proceedings with the CFI-Cavite involving the
estate of the late Pablo Santero, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court
questioning the decision of CFI-Cavite granting allowance (allegedly without hearing) in the amount
of Php 2,000.00, to private respondents which includes tuition fees, clothing materials and
subsistence out of any available funds in the hands of the administrator. The petitioners opposed
said decision on the ground that private respondents were no longer studying, that they have
attained the age of majority, that all of them except for Miguel are gainfully employed, and the

administrator did not have sufficient funds to cover the said expenses.

472

Persons and Family Relation

Before the Supreme Court could act on saod petition, the private respondents filed another
motion for allowance with the CFI-Cavite which included Juanita, Estelita and Pedrito, all surnamed
Santero, as children of the late Pablo Santero with Anselma Diaz, praying that a sum of Php
6,000.00 be given to each of the seven children as their allowance from the estate of their father.
This was granted by the CFI-Cavite.

Later on, the CFI-Cavite issued an amended order directing Anselma Diaz, mother of
private respondents, to submit a clarification or explanation as to the additional three children
included in the said motion. She said in her clarification that in her previous motions, only the last
four minor children were included for support and the three children were then of age should have
been included since all her children have the right to receive allowance as advance payment of their
shares in the inheritance of Pablo Santero. The CFI-Cavite issued an order directing the
administrator to get back the allowance of the three additional children based on the opposition of
the petitioners.

Issue:
a) Are the private respondents entitled to allowance?
b) Was it proper for the court a quo to grant the motion for allowance without hearing?

Ruling:
Yes, they are entitled. Being of age, gainfully employed, or married should not be regarded as

the determining factor to their right to allowance under Articles 290 and 188 of the New Civil Code.

Records show that a hearing was made. Moreover, what the said court did was just to follow
the precedent of the court which granted previous allowance and that the petitioners and private
respondents only received Php 1,500.00 each depending on the availability of funds.

WHO IS ENTITLED TO SUPPORT

G.R. No. 165166 GOTARDO vs. BULING August 15, 2012

Facts:

On September 6, 1995, respondent Divina Buling filed a complaint with the Regional Trial

Court (RTC) of Maasin, Southern Leyte, Branch 25, for compulsory recognition and

support 473endent lite, claiming that the petitioner is the father of her child Gliffze. In his answer,

the petitioner denied the imputed paternity of Gliffze. For the parties‘ failure to amicably settle the

dispute, the RTC terminated the pre-trial proceedings. Trial on the merits ensued.

The respondent testified for herself and presented Rodulfo Lopez as witness. Evidence for the
respondent showed that she met the petitioner on December 1, 1992 at the Philippine Commercial
and Industrial Bank, Maasin, Southern Leyte branch where she had been hired as a casual employee,
while the petitioner worked as accounting supervisor.

The respondent responded by filing a complaint with the Municipal Trial Court of Maasin,
Southern Leyte for damages against the petitioner for breach of promise to marry. Later, however,
the petitioner and the respondent amicably settled the case. The respondent gave birth to their son

473

Persons and Family Relation

Gliffze on March 9, 1995. When the petitioner did not show up and failed to provide support to
Gliffze, the respondent sent him a letter on July 24, 1995 demanding recognition of and support for
their child. When the petitioner did not answer the demand, the respondent filed her complaint for
compulsory recognition and support 474endent lite.

The petitioner took the witness stand and testified for himself. He denied the imputed
paternity, claiming that he first had sexual contact with the respondent in the first week of August
1994 and she could not have been pregnant for twelve (12) weeks (or three (3) months) when he
was informed of the pregnancy on September 15, 1994. During the pendency of the case, the RTC,
on the respondent‘s motion, granted a P2, 000.00 monthly child support, retroactive from March
1995.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner should provide support.

Ruling:
One can prove filiation, either legitimate or illegitimate, through the record of birth

appearing in the civil register or a final judgment, an admission of filiation in a public document or a
private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned, or the open and continuous
possession of the status of a legitimate or illegitimate child, or any other means allowed by the Rules
of Court and special laws. We have held that such other proof of one‘s filiation may be a ―baptismal
certificate, a judicial admission, a family bible in which [his] name has been entered, common
reputation respecting [his] pedigree, admission by silence, the [testimonies] of witnesses, and other
kinds of proof [admissible] under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. Since filiation is beyond question,
support follows as a matter of obligation; a parent is obliged to support his child, whether legitimate
or illegitimate. Support consists of everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing,
medical attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the
family.

Thus, the amount of support is variable and, for this reason, no final judgment on the
amount of support is made as the amount shall be in proportion to the resources or means of the
giver and the necessities of the recipient. It may be reduced or increased proportionately according
to the reduction or increase of the necessities of the recipient and the resources or means of the
person obliged to support.

474

Persons and Family Relation

WHEN IS SUPPORT DEMANDABLE

LACSON vs. LACSON

G.R. No. 150644 August 28, 2006

Facts:
The sisters Maowee Daban Lacson and Maonaa Daban Lacson are legitimate daughters of

petitioner Edward V. Lacson and his wife, Lea Daban Lacson. Maowee was born on December 4,
1974, while Maonaa, a little less than a year later. Not long after the birth of Maonaa, petitioner left
the conjugal home in Molo, Iloilo City, virtually forcing mother and children to seek, apparently for
financial reason, shelter somewhere else. For a month, they stayed with Lea‘s mother-in-law, Alicia
Lacson, then with her (Lea‘s) mother and then with her brother Noel Daban. After some time, they
rented an apartment only to return later to the house of Lea‘s mother. As the trial court aptly
observed, the sisters and their mother, from 1976 to 1994, or for a period of eighteen (18) years,
shuttled from one dwelling place to another not their own.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner is obliged to give support.

475

Persons and Family Relation

Ruling:
Petitioner admits being obliged, as father, to provide support to both respondents, Maowee

and Maonaa. It is his threshold submission, however, that he should not be made to pay support in
arrears, i.e., from 1976 to 1994, no previous extrajudicial, let alone judicial, demand having been
made by the respondents. He invokes the following provision of the Family Code to complete his
point:Article 203 – The obligation to give support shall be demandable from the time the person
who has a right to receive the same needs it for maintenance, but it shall not be paid except from the
date of judicial or extrajudicial demand.

To petitioner, his obligation to pay under the afore quoted provision starts from the filing of
Civil Case No. 22185 in 1995, since only from that moment can it be said that an effective demand
for support was made upon him

WHO MUST PAY SUPPORT

G.R. No. 163209 LIM vs. LIM October 30, 2009

Facts:
In 1979, respondent Cheryl S. Lim (Cheryl) married Edward Lim (Edward), son of

petitioners. Cheryl bore Edward three children, respondents Lester Edward, Candice Grace and
Mariano III. Cheryl, Edward and their children resided at the house of petitioners in Forbes Park,
Makati City, together with Edward‘s ailing grandmother, Chua Giak and her husband Mariano Lim
(Mariano). Edward‘s family business, which provided him with a monthly salary of P6,000,
shouldered the family expenses. Cheryl had no steady source of income.

On 14 October 1990, Cheryl abandoned the Forbes Park residence, bringing the children
with her (then all minors), after a violent confrontation with Edward whom she caught with the in-
house midwife of Chua Giak in what the trial court described "a very compromising situation."
Cheryl, for herself and her children, sued petitioners, Edward, Chua Giak and Mariano (defendants)

476

Persons and Family Relation

in the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 140 (trial court) for support. The trial court
ordered Edward to provide monthly support of P6,000 pendente lite.

Issue:
Whether petitioners are concurrently liable with Edward to provide support to respondents.

Ruling:
By statutory and jurisprudential mandate, the liability of ascendants to provide legal support

to their descendants is beyond cavil. Petitioners themselves admit as much – they limit their petition
to the narrow question of when their liability is triggered, not if they are liable. Relying on
provisions found in Title IX of the Civil Code, as amended, on Parental Authority, petitioners
theorize that their liability is activated only upon default of parental authority, conceivably either by
its termination or suspension during the children‘s minority. Because at the time respondents sued
for support, Cheryl and Edward exercised parental authority over their children, petitioners submit
that the obligation to support the latter‘s offspring ends with them.

WHO MUST PAY SUPPORT

VERCELES vs. POSADA

G.R. No. 159785 April 27, 2007

Facts:
Respondent Maria Clarissa Posada (Clarissa), young lass from the barrio of Pandan,

Catanduanes, sometime in 1986 met a close family friend, petitioner Teofisto I. Verceles, mayor of
Pandan. He then called on the Posadas and at the end of the visit, offered Clarissa a job. Clarissa
accepted petitioner‘s offer and worked as a casual employee in the mayor‘s office starting on
September 1, 1986. From November 10 to 15 in 1986, with companions Aster de Quiros, Pat del
Valle, Jaime and Jocelyn Vargas, she accompanied petitioner to Legaspi City to attend a seminar on
town planning. They stayed at the Mayon Hotel.

On November 11, 1986, at around 11:00 a.m., petitioner fetched Clarissa from "My
Brother‘s Place" where the seminar was being held. Clarissa avers that he told her that they would

477

Persons and Family Relation

have lunch at Mayon Hotel with their companions who had gone ahead. When they reached the
place her companions were nowhere. After petitioner ordered food, he started making amorous
advances on her. She panicked, ran and closeted herself inside a comfort room where she stayed
until someone knocked. She said she hurriedly exited and left the hotel. Afraid of the mayor, she
kept the incident to herself. She went on as casual employee. One of her tasks was following-up
barangay road and maintenance projects.

Issue:
Whether or not there is proof of filiation.

Ruling:
Articles 172 and 175 of the Family Code are the rules for establishing filiation. They are as

follows:
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed
by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same
evidence as legitimate children.

The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when the
action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be brought
during the lifetime of the alleged parent.

The letters, one of which is quoted above, are private handwritten instruments of petitioner
which establish Verna Aiza‘s filiation under Article 172 (2) of the Family Code. In addition, the array
of evidence presented by respondents, the dates, letters, pictures and testimonies, to us, is
convincing, and irrefutable evidence that Verna Aiza is, indeed, petitioner‘s illegitimate child.

Petitioner not only failed to rebut the evidence presented, he himself presented no evidence
of his own. His bare denials are telling. Well-settled is the rule that denials, if unsubstantiated by
clear and convincing evidence, are negative and self-serving which merit no weight in law and
cannot be given greater evidentiary value over the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on
affirmative matters

478

Persons and Family Relation

WHO MUST PAY SUPPORT

G.R. No. 125041 MANGONON vs. COURT OF APPEALS June 30, 2006

Facts:
On 17 March 1994, petitioner Ma. Belen B. Mangonon filed, in behalf of her then minor children

Rica and Rina, a Petition for Declaration of Legitimacy and Support, with application for support pendente
lite with the RTC Makati. In said petition, it was alleged that on 16 February 1975, petitioner and respondent
Federico Delgado were civilly married by then City Court Judge Eleuterio Agudo in Legaspi City, Albay. At
that time, petitioner was only 21 years old while respondent Federico was only 19 years old. As the marriage
was solemnized without the required consent per Article 85 of the New Civil Code, it was annulled on 11
August 1975 by the Quezon City Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court.

On 25 March 1976, or within seven months after the annulment of their marriage, petitioner
gave birth to twins Rica and Rina. According to petitioner, she, with the assistance of her second

479

Persons and Family Relation

husband Danny Mangonon, raised her twin daughters as private respondents had totally abandoned
them. At the time of the institution of the petition, Rica and Rina were about to enter college in the
United States of America (USA) where petitioner, together with her daughters and second husband,
had moved to and finally settled in. Rica was admitted to the University of Massachusetts (Amherst)
while Rina was accepted by the Long Island University and Western New England College. Despite
their admissions to said universities, Rica and Rina were, however, financially incapable of pursuing
collegiate education because of the following:

i) The average annual cost for college education in the US is about US$22,000/year, broken
down as follows:
Tuition Fees US$13,000.00
Room & Board 5,000.00
Books 1,000.00
Yearly Transportation &
Meal Allowance 3,000.00
Total US$ 22,000.00
Or a total of US$44,000.00, more or less, for both Rica and Rina

Issue:
Whether or not Federico is obliged to provide support

Ruling:
In this case, this Court believes that respondent Francisco could not avail himself of the

second option. From the records, we gleaned that prior to the commencement of this action, the
relationship between respondent Francisco, on one hand, and petitioner and her twin daughters, on
the other, was indeed quite pleasant. The correspondences exchanged among them expressed
profound feelings of thoughtfulness and concern for one another‘s well-being. The photographs
presented by petitioner as part of her exhibits presented a seemingly typical family celebrating
kinship. All of these, however, are now things of the past. With the filing of this case, and the
allegations hurled at one another by the parties, the relationships among the parties had certainly
been affected. Particularly difficult for Rica and Rina must be the fact that those who they had
considered and claimed as family denied having any familial relationship with them. Given all these,
we could not see Rica and Rina moving back here in the Philippines in the company of those who
have disowned them.

Finally, as to the amount of support pendente lite, we take our bearings from the provision
of the law mandating the amount of support to be proportionate to the resources or means of the
giver and to the necessities of the recipient. Guided by this principle, we hold respondent Francisco
liable for half of the amount of school expenses incurred by Rica and Rina as support pendente lite.
As established by petitioner, respondent Francisco has the financial resources to pay this amount
given his various business endeavors.

480

Persons and Family Relation

WHO MUST PAY SUPPORT

G.R. No. 156013 DE GUZMAN vs. PEREZ July 25, 2006

Facts:
Petitioner and private respondent Shirley F. Aberde became sweethearts while studying law

in the University of Sto. Tomas. Their studies were interrupted when private respondent became
pregnant. She gave birth to petitioner‘s child, Robby Aberde de Guzman, on October 2, 1987.
Private respondent and petitioner never got married. In 1991, petitioner married another woman
with whom he begot two children.

Petitioner sent money for Robby‘s schooling only twice — the first in 1992 and the second
in 1993. In 1994, when Robby fell seriously ill, petitioner gave private respondent P7,000 to help

481

Persons and Family Relation

defray the cost of the child‘s hospitalization and medical expenses. Other than these instances,
petitioner never provided any other financial support for his son.

In 1994, in order to make ends meet and to provide for Robby‘s needs, private respondent
accepted a job as a factory worker in Taiwan where she worked for two years. It was only because of
her short stint overseas that she was able to support Robby and send him to school. However, she
reached the point where she had just about spent all her savings to provide for her and Robby‘s
needs. The child‘s continued education thus became uncertain.

Issue:
May a parent who fails or refuses to do his part in providing his child the education his

station in life and financial condition permit, be charged for neglect

Ruling:
The law is clear. The crime may be committed by any parent. Liability for the crime does not depend

on whether the other parent is also guilty of neglect. The law intends to punish the neglect of any parent,
which neglect corresponds to the failure to give the child the education which the family‘s station in life and
financial condition permit. The irresponsible parent cannot exculpate himself from the consequences of his
neglect by invoking the other parent‘s faithful compliance with his or her own parental duties.
Petitioner‘s position goes against the intent of the law. To allow the neglectful parent to shield
himself from criminal liability defeats the prescription that in all questions regarding the care,
custody, education and property of the child, his welfare shall be the paramount consideration.
However, while petitioner can be indicted for violation of Article 59(4) of PD 603, the charge
against him cannot be made in relation to Section 10(a) of RA 7610 which provides:

SEC. 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation and Other Conditions Prejudicial to the
Child’s Development. –
(a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty or exploitation or be responsible for
other conditions prejudicial to the child’s development including those covered by Article 59 of PD No. 603,
as amended, but not covered by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall suffer the penalty ofprision
mayor in its minimum period.

The law expressly penalizes any person who commits other acts of neglect, child abuse,
cruelty or exploitation or be responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the child‘s development
including those covered by Article 59 of PD 603 "but not covered by the Revised Penal Code." The
"neglect of child" punished under Article 59(4) of PD 603 is also a crime (known as "indifference of
parents") penalized under the second paragraph of Article 277 of the Revised Penal Code. Hence, it
is excluded from the coverage of RA 7610.

482

Persons and Family Relation

RIGHTS OF THIRD PERSONS WHO PAY

G.R. No. 150644 LACSON vs. LACSON August 28, 2006

Facts:
The sisters Maowee Daban Lacson and Maonaa Daban Lacson are legitimate daughters of

petitioner Edward V. Lacson and his wife, Lea Daban Lacson. Maowee was born onDecember 4,
1974, while Maonaa, a little less than a year later. Not long after the birth of Maonaa, petitioner left
the conjugal home in Molo, Iloilo City, virtually forcing mother and children to seek, apparently for
financial reason, shelter somewhere else. For a month, they stayed with Lea‘s mother-in-law, Alicia
Lacson, then with her (Lea‘s) mother and then with her brother Noel Daban. After some time, they

rented an apartment only to return later to the house of Lea‘s mother. As the trial court aptly

483

Persons and Family Relation

observed, the sisters and their mother, from 1976 to 1994, or for a period of eighteen (18) years,
shuttled from one dwelling place to another not their own.

It appears that from the start of their estrangement, Lea did not badger her husband Edward
for support, relying initially on his commitment memorialized in a note dated December 10, 1975 to
give support to his daughters. As things turned out, however, Edward reneged on his promise of
support, despite Lea‘s efforts towards having him fulfill the same. Lea would admit, though, that
Edward occasionally gave their children meager amounts for school expenses. Through the years
and up to the middle part of 1992, Edward‘s mother, Alicia Lacson, also gave small amounts to help
in the schooling of Maowee and Maonaa, both of whom eventually took up nursing at St. Paul‘s
College in Iloilo City. In the early part of 1995 when Lea, in behalf of her two daughters, filed a
complaint against Edward for support before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 33,
Maowee was about to graduate.

In that complaint dated January 30, 1995, as amended, docketed as Civil Case No. 22185,
Maowee and Maonaa, thru their mother, averred that their father Edward, despite being gainfully
employed and owning several pieces of valuable lands, has not provided them support since 1976.
They also alleged that, owing to years of Edward‘s failure and neglect, their mother had, from time
to time, borrowed money from her brother Noel Daban. As she would later testify, Lea had
received from Noel, by way of a loan, as much as P400,000.00to P600,000.00.

In his Answer, Edward alleged giving to Maowee and Maonaa sufficient sum to meet their
needs. He explained, however, that his lack of regular income and the unproductivity of the land he
inherited, not his neglect, accounted for his failure at times to give regular support. He also blamed
financial constraint for his inability to provide the P12,000.00 monthly allowance prayed for in the
complaint.

As applied for and after due hearing, the trial court granted the sisters Maowee and Maonaa
support pendente lite at P12,000.00 per month, subject to the schedule of payment and other
conditions set forth in the court‘s corresponding order of May 13, 1996. The RTC rendered on June
26, 1997 judgment finding for the plaintiff sisters, as represented by their mother. In that judgment,
the trial court, following an elaborate formula set forth therein, ordered their defendant father
Edward to pay them a specific sum which represented 216 months, or 18 years, of support in
arrears. In time, Edward moved for reconsideration, but his motion was denied by the appellate
court.

Issue:
Whether or not the Noel Daban can rightfully exact reimbursement from the petitioner.

Ruling:
Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. Pursuant to Article

207 of the Family Code, Noel Daban can rightfully exact reimbursement from the petitioner. The
provision reads:

484

Persons and Family Relation

When the person obliged to support another unjustly refuses or fails to give support when
urgently needed by the latter, any third person may furnish support to the needy individual, with
right of reimbursement from the person obliged to give support.

Mention may also be made that, contextually, the resulting juridical relationship between the
petitioner and Noel Daban is a quasi-contract, an equitable principle enjoining one from unjustly
enriching himself at the expense of another.

Petitioner, unlike any good father of a family, has been remiss in his duty to provide
respondents with support practically all throughout their growing years. At bottom, the sisters have
been deprived by a neglectful father of the basic necessities in life as if it is their fault to have been
born. This disposition is thus nothing more than a belated measure to right a wrong done the herein
respondents who are no less petitioner‘s daughters.

SUPPORT PENDENT LITE

G.R. No. 118671 ESTATE OF RUIZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS January 29, 1996

Facts:

Hilario Ruiz executed a holographic will where he named the following as his heirs: (a.)
Edmond Ruiz – only son; (b.) Maria Pilar Ruiz – adopted daughter; (c.) Maria Cathryn,

Candice Albertine and Maria Angeline - 3 granddaughters, all daughters of Ruiz. Testator
bequeathed to his heirs substantial cash, personal and real properties and named Edmond Ruiz

485

Persons and Family Relation

executor of his estate. Hilario Ruiz died and the cash component of his estate was immediately
distributed among Ruiz and respondents. Edmond, the named executor, did not take any action for
the probate of his father's holographic will. Four years after, Pilar filed before the RTC a petition for
the probate and approval of the deceased‘s will and for the issuance of letters testamentary to
Edmond Ruiz. Edmond opposed the petition on the ground that the will was executed under undue
influence. The house and lot in Valle Verde, Pasig which the testator bequeathed to the 3
granddaughters was leased out by Edmond to third persons. Probate court ordered Edmond to
deposit with the Branch Clerk of Court the rental deposit and payments totalling P540,000.00
representing the one-year lease of the Valle Verde property. Edmond moved for the release of
P50,000.00 to pay the real estate taxes on the real properties of the estate. The probate court
approved the release of P7,722.00. Edmond withdrew his opposition to the probate of the will.
Probate court admitted the will to probate and ordered the issuance of letters testamentary to
Edmond conditioned upon the filing of a bond in the amount of P50,000.00 Testate Estate of
Hilario Ruiz, with Edmond Ruiz as executor, filed an "Ex-Parte Motion for Release of Funds.
Prayed for release of the rent payments deposited with the Branch Clerk of Court. Montes opposed
and praying that the release of rent payments be given to the 3 granddaughters. Probate court denied
the release of funds and granted the motion of Montes due to Edmond‘s lack of opposition. Probate
Court ordered the release of the funds to Edmond but only "such amount as may be necessary to
cover the expenses of administration and allowances for support" of the testator's three
granddaughters subject to collation and deductible from their share in the inheritance. CA sustained
probate court‘s order.

Issues:
Whether or not the probate court, after admitting the will to probate but before payment of

the estate's debts and obligations, has the authority:
a) to grant an allowance from the funds of the estate for the support of the testator's
grandchildren
b) to order the release of the titles to certain heirs
c) to grant possession of all properties of the estate to the executor of the will.

Ruling:
No. Grandchildren are not entitled to provisional support from the funds of the decedent's

estate. The law clearly limits the allowance to "widow and children" and does not extend it to the
deceased's grandchildren, regardless of their minority or incapacity.

Section 3 of Rule 83 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: Allowance to widow and family. —
The widow and minor or incapacitated children of a deceased person, during the settlement of the estate, shall receive
therefrom under the direction of the court, such allowance as are provided by law.

In settlement of estate proceedings, the distribution of the estate properties can only be
made:

a. after all the debts, funeral charges, expenses of administration, allowance to the widow, and estate
tax have been paid; or

b. before payment of said obligations only if the distributees or any of them gives a bond in a sum fixed

by the court conditioned upon the payment of said obligations within such time as the court directs, or
when provision is made to meet those obligations.

486

Persons and Family Relation

In the case at bar, the probate court ordered the release of the titles to the Valle Verde
property and the Blue Ridge apartments to the private respondents after the lapse of six months
from the date of first publication of the notice to creditors

c. Hilario Ruiz allegedly left no debts when he died but the taxes on his estate had not hitherto been
paid, much less ascertained.

d. The estate tax is one of those obligations that must be paid before distribution of the estate.
i. If not yet paid, the rule requires that the distributees post a bond or make such provisions
as to meet the said tax obligation in proportion to their respective shares in the inheritance.
ii. at the time the order was issued the properties of the estate had not yet been inventoried and
appraised.

The probate of a will is conclusive as to its due execution and extrinsic validity and settles
only the question of whether the testator, being of sound mind, freely executed it in accordance with
the formalities prescribed by law

e. Questions as to the intrinsic validity and efficacy of the provisions of the will, the legality of any
devise or legacy may be raised even after the will has been authenticated
i. The intrinsic validity of Hilario's holographic will was controverted by petitioner before the
probate court in his Reply to Montes' Opposition to his motion for release of funds and his
motion for reconsideration of the August 26, 1993 order of the said court.
ii. Therein, petitioner assailed the distributive shares of the devisees and legatees inasmuch as
his father's will included the estate of his mother and allegedly impaired his legitime as an
intestate heir of his mother.
iii. The Rules provide that if there is a controversy as to who are the lawful heirs of the
decedent and their distributive shares in his estate, the probate court shall proceed to hear
and decide the same as in ordinary cases.

The right of an executor or administrator to the possession and management of the real and
personal properties of the deceased is not absolute and can only be exercised "so long as it is
necessary for the payment of the debts and expenses of administration

SUPPORT DURING PROCEEDINGS

G.R. No. L-48219 REYES vs. INES-LUCIANO February 28, 1979

Facts:
Manuel Reyes attacked his wife twice with the intent to kill. A complaint was filed on June 3,

1976: the first attempt on March was prevented by her father and the second attempt, wherein she
was already living separately from her husband, was stopped only because of her driver‘s
intervention. She filed for legal separation on that ground and prayed for support pendente lite for

487

Persons and Family Relation

herself and her three children. The husband opposed the application for support on the ground that
the wife committed adultery with her physician. The respondent Judge Ines-Luciano of the lower
court granted the wife pendente lite. The husband filed a motion for reconsideration reiterating that
his wife is not entitled to receive such support during the pendency of the case, and that even if she
is entitled to it, the amount awarded was excessive. The judge reduced the amount from P5000 to
P4000 monthly. Husband filed a petition for certiorari in the CA to annul the order granting
alimony. CA dismissed the petition which made the husband appeal to the SC.

Issue:
Whether or not support can be administered during the pendency of an action.

Ruling:
Yes – provided that adultery is established by competent evidence. Mere allegations will not

bar her right to receive support pendente lite. Support can be administered during the pendency of
such cases. In determining the amount, it is not necessary to go into the merits of the case. It is
enough that the facts be established by affidavits or other documentary evidence appearing in the
record. [The SC on July, 1978 ordered the alimony to be P1000/month from the period of June to
February 1979, after the trial, it was reverted to P4000/month based on the accepted findings of the
trial court that the husband could afford it because of his affluence and because it wasn‘t excessive.

CHARACTERISTICS OF PARENTAL AUTHORITY

SILVA vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 114742 July 17, 1997

Facts:

Carlitos Silva and Suzanne Gonzales had a live-in relationship and they had two children,
namely, Ramon Carlos and Rica Natalia. Silva and Suzanne eventually separated. Silva and Suzanne

488

Persons and Family Relation

had an understanding that Silva would have the children in his company on weekends. The legal
conflict began when Silva claimed that Suzanne broke that understanding on visitation rights. Silva
filed a petition for custodial rights over the children before the Regional Trial Court Branch 78 of
Quezon City. The petition was opposed by Gonzales who claimed that Silva often engaged in
"gambling and womanizing" which she feared could affect the moral and social values of the
children. The Quezon City RTC ruled in favor of Silva giving him visitorial rights to his children
during Saturdays and/or Sundays.

The court however explicitly stated that in no case should Silva take the children out without
the written consent of Suzanne. Suzanne filed an appeal from the RTC‘s decision to the Court of
Appeals. In the meantime, Suzanne had gotten married to a Dutch national. She eventually
immigrated to Holland with her children Ramon Carlos and Rica Natalia.

The Court of Appeals overturned the ruling of the Quezon City RTC. The CA, stated that as
alleged by Suzanne, Silva‘s womanizing would have a negative influence on the children.

Issues:
a) Whether or not Silva has visitation rights.
b) Whether or not the mother has parental authority over the children.

Ruling:
The High Court set aside the ruling of the Court of Appeals and reinstated the Quezon City

RTC‘s decision favoring Silva‘s visitation rights on weekends with Suzanne‘s written permission.
The Supreme Court ruled that the biological father has visitorial right over his illegitimate children in
view of the constitutionally protected inherent and natural right of parents over their children. The
Court clarified: ―Parents have the natural right, as well as the moral and legal duty, to care for their
children, see to their proper upbringing and safeguard their best interest and welfare. This authority
and responsibility may not be unduly denied the parents; neither may it be renounced by them. Even
when the parents are estranged and their affection for each other is lost, their attachment to and
feeling for their offspring remain unchanged. Neither the law nor the courts allow this affinity to
suffer, absent any real, grave or imminent threat to the well-being of the child.‖

The mother has exclusive parental authority over her illegitimate child (Art. 176 of the
Family Code). The biological father has visitorial right over his illegitimate children in view of the
constitutionally protected inherent and natural right of parents over their children. This right is
personal to the father; no other person, like grandparents, can exercise this right for him. Silva (the
father) may have won with the Supreme Court‘s upholding of his visitation rights, but this favorable
decision did not prevent Suzanne (the mother) in the exercise of her parental authority from
immigrating to Holland with her two children. The right to visitation and the duty to pay child
support are distinct and separate. If the mother and the father of the illegitimate child can agree on
the terms and conditions of the visitation, then there will be no problem. In case of disagreement
however, the father must file a petition asking the court to settle the terms and conditions.

489

Persons and Family Relation

PARENTAL AUTHORITY AND CUSTODY

TONOG vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 122906 February 7, 2002
Facts:

490

Persons and Family Relation

In 1989, Dinah B. Tonog gave birth to Gardin Faith Belarde Tonog, her illegitimate
daughter with Edgar V. Daguimol. A year after the birth of Gardin, Dinah left for the USA where
she found a work as a registerednurse. Gardin was left in the care of her father and paternal
grandparents.

Edgar filed a petition forguardianship over Gardin in the RTC of Quezon City. In March
1992, the court granted the petition and appointed Edgar as legal guardian of Gardin. In May 1992,
Dinah filed a petition for relief from judgment. She averred that she learned of the judgment only on
April 1, 1992. The trial court set aside its original judgment and allowed Dinah to file her opposition
to Edgar's petition. Edgar, in turn, filed a motion for reconsideration.

In 1993, Dinah filed a motion to remand custody of Gardin to her. In 1994, the trial court
issued a resolution denying Edgar's motion for reconsideration and granting Dinah's motion for
custody of Gardin. Dinah moved for the immediate execution of the resolution.

Edgar, thus, filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals. The CA dismissed the
petition for lack of merit. Upon motion for reconsideration, CA modified its decision and let Gardin
remain in the custody of Edgar until otherwise adjudged. Dinah appealed to the Supreme Court,
contending that she is entitled to the custody of the minor, Gardin, as a matter of law. First, as the
mother of Gardin Faith, the law confers parental authority upon her as the mother of the illegitimate
minor. Second, Gardin cannot be separated from her since she had not, as of then, attained the age
of seven. Employing simple arithmetic however, it appears that Gardin Faith is now twelve years

old.

Issue:
Who is entitled to the temporary custody of the child pending the guardianship proceeding?

Ruling:
In custody disputes, it is axiomatic that the paramount criterion is the welfare and well-being

of the child. Statute sets certain rules to assist the court in making an informed decision. Insofar as
illegitimate children are concerned, Article 176 of the Family Code provides that illegitimate children
shall be under the parental authority of their mother. Likewise, Article 213 of the Family Code
provides that ―[n]o child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother, unless the
court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise.‖ It will be observed that in both provisions, a
strong bias is created in favor of the mother. This is especially evident in Article 213 where it may
be said that the law presumes that the mother is the best custodian. As explained by the Code
Commission: The general rule is recommended in order to avoid many a tragedy where a mother has
seen her baby torn away from her. No man can sound the deep sorrows of a mother who is
deprived of her child of tender age. The exception allowed by the rule has to be for ―compelling
reasons‖ for the good of the child.

For these reasons, even a mother may be deprived of the custody of her child who is below
seven years of age for ―compelling reasons.‖ Instances of unsuitability are neglect, abandonment,
unemployment and immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of the child,
insanity, and affliction with a communicable illness. If older than seven years of age, a child is
allowed to state his preference, but the court is not bound by that choice. The court may exercise its

491

Persons and Family Relation

discretion by disregarding the child‘s preference should the parent chosen be found to be unfit, in
which instance, custody may be given to the other parent, or even to a third person.

In the case at bar, we are being asked to rule on the temporary custody of the minor, Gardin
Faith, since it appears that the proceedings for guardianship before the trial court have not been
terminated, and no pronouncement has been made as to who should have final custody of the
minor. Bearing in mind that the welfare of the said minor as the controlling factor, we find that the
appellate court did not err in allowing her father to retain in the meantime parental custody over her.
Meanwhile, the child should not be wrenched from her familiar surroundings, and thrust into a
strange environment away from the people and places to which she had apparently formed an
attachment.

Moreover, whether a mother is a fit parent for her child is a question of fact to be properly
entertained in the special proceedings before the trial court. It should be recalled that in a petition
for review on certiorari, we rule only on questions of law. We are not in the best position to assess
the parties‘ respective merits vis-à-vis their opposing claims for custody. Yet another sound reason
is that inasmuch as the age of the minor, Gardin Faith, has now exceeded the statutory bar of seven
years, a fortiori, her preference and opinion must first be sought in the choice of which parent
should have the custody over her person.

For the present and until finally adjudged, temporary custody of the subject minor should
remain with her father, the private respondent herein pending final judgment of the trial court.

PARENTAL AUTHORITY AND CUSTODY

G.R. No. 132223 VANCIL vs. BELMES June 19, 2001

492

Persons and Family Relation

Facts:
Bonifacia Vancil, is the mother of Reeder C. Vancil, a US Navy serviceman who died on

1986. During his lifetime, Reeder had two children named Valerie and Vincent by his common-law
wife, Helen G. Belmes. Bonifacia obtained a favorable court decision appointing her as legal and
judicial guardian over the persons and estate of Valerie and Vincent.

On August 13, 1987, Helen submitted an opposition to the subject guardianship proceedings
asseverating that she had already filed a similar petition for guardianship before the RTC of Pagadian
City. On June 27, 1988, Helen followed her opposition with a motion for the Removal of Guardian
and Appointment of a New One, asserting that she is the natural mother in actual custody of and
exercising parental authority over the subject minors at Dumingag, Zamboanga del Sur where they
are permanently residing. She also states that at the time the petition was filed, Bonifacia was a
resident of Colorado, U.S.A. being a naturalized American citizen.

On October 12, 1988, the trial court rejected and denied Helen‘s motion to remove and/or
to disqualify Bonifacia as guardian of Valerie and Vincent Jr. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
rendered its decision reversing the RTC. Since Valerie had reached the age of majority at the time
the case reached the Supreme Court, the issue revolved around the guardianship of Vincent.

Issue:
Who between the mother and grandmother of minor Vincent should be his guardian?

Ruling:
Respondent Helen Belmes, being the natural mother of the minor, has the preferential right

over that of petitioner Bonifacia to be his guardian. Article 211 of the Family Code provides: "Art.
211. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the persons of their
common children. In case of disagreement, the father‘s decision shall prevail, unless there is a
judicial order to the contrary. xxx." Indeed, being the natural mother of minor Vincent, Helen has
the corresponding natural and legal right to his custody.

"Of considerable importance is the rule long accepted by the courts that ‗the right of parents
to the custody of their minor children is one of the natural rights incident to parenthood,‘ a right
supported by law and sound public policy. The right is an inherent one, which is not created by the
state or decisions of the courts, but derives from the nature of the parental relationship."

Bonifacia contends that she is more qualified as guardian of Vincent. Bonifacia‘s claim to be
the guardian of said minor can only be realized by way of substitute parental authority pursuant to
Article 214 of the Family Code, thus: "Art. 214. In case of death, absence or unsuitability of the
parents, substitute parental authority shall be exercised by the surviving grandparent. xxx."

Bonifacia, as the surviving grandparent, can exercise substitute parental authority only in case
of death, absence or unsuitability of Helen. Considering that Helen is very much alive and has
exercised continuously parental authority over Vincent, Bonifacia has to prove, in asserting her
right to be the minor‘s guardian, Helen‘s unsuitability. Bonifacia, however, has not proffered
convincing evidence showing that Helen is not suited to be the guardian of Vincent. Bonifacia

493

Persons and Family Relation

merely insists that Helen is morally unfit as guardian of Valerie considering that her live-in partner
raped Valerie several times. But Valerie, being now of major age, is no longer a subject of this
guardianship proceeding.

Even assuming that Helen is unfit as guardian of minor Vincent, still Bonifacia cannot
qualify as a substitute guardian. She is an American citizen and a resident of Colorado. Obviously,
she will not be able to perform the responsibilities and obligations required of a guardian. In fact, in
her petition, she admitted the difficulty of discharging the duties of a guardian by an expatriate, like
her. To be sure, she will merely delegate those duties to someone else who may not also qualify as a
guardian.

There is nothing in the law which requires the courts to appoint residents only as
administrators or guardians. However, notwithstanding the fact that there are no statutory
requirements upon this question, the courts, charged with the responsibilities of protecting the
estates of deceased persons, wards of the estate, etc., will find much difficulty in complying with this
duty by appointing administrators and guardians who are not personally subject to their jurisdiction.
Notwithstanding that there is no statutory requirement; the courts should not consent to the
appointment of persons as administrators and guardians who are not personally subject to the
jurisdiction of our courts here.

PARENTAL AUTHORITY AND CUSTODY

494

Persons and Family Relation

G.R. No. 140817 BONDAGJY vs. FOUZI ALI BONDAGJY December 7, 2001

Facts:
Respondent Fouzi (then 31 years of age) and Sabrina (then 20 years of age) were married on

February 3,1988, at the Manila Hotel, Ermita, Manila under Islamic rites. On October 21, 1987, or
four (4) months before her marriage, Sabrina became a Muslim by conversion. However, the
conversion was not registered with the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines. Out of
their union, they begot two (2) children, namely, Abdulaziz, born on June 13, 1989, and Amouaje,
born on September 29, 1990. The children were born in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. At the time of their
marriage, unknown to petitioner, respondent was still married to a Saudi Arabian woman whom he
later divorced.

After their marriage, the couple moved in with respondent's family in Makati City. In 1990,
the parties migrated and settled in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia where they lived for more than two years.
Sometime in December 1995, the children lived in the house of Sabrina's mother in 145 Tanguile
Street, Ayala Alabang. Fouzi alleged that he could not see his children until he got an order from the
court. Even with a court order, he could only see his children in school at De La Salle-Zobel,
Alabang, Muntinlupa City .

On December 15, 1996, Sabrina had the children baptized as Christians and their names
changed from Abdulaziz Bondagjy to Azziz Santiago Artadi and from Amouaje Bondagjy to
Amouage Selina Artadi. Respondent alleged that on various occasions Sabrina was seen with
different men at odd hours in Manila,and that she would wear short skirts, sleeveless blouses, and
bathing suits. Such clothing are detestable under Islamic law on customs. Fouzi claimed that Sabrina
let their children sweep their neighbor's house for a fee of P40.00 after the children come home
from school. Whenever Fouzi sees them in school, the children would be happy to see him but they
were afraid to ride in his car. Instead, they would ride the jeepney in going home from school.

Petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 256, Muntinlupa City an action for
nullity of marriage, custody and support, ordered the parties to maintain status quo until further
orders from said court. On March 2, 1999, petitioner filed another motion to dismiss on the ground
of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case since P.D. No. 1083 is applicable only to
Muslims. On March 3, 1999, Fouzi filed an opposition to the motion to dismiss and argued that at
the inception of the case, both parties were Muslims, Fouzi by birth and Sabrina by conversion.

The Shari'a District Court held that P.D. No. 1083 on Custody and Guardianship does not
apply to this case because the spouses were not yet divorced. The Shari' a District Court found
petitioner unworthy to care for her children. The Shari'a Court found that respondent Fouzi was
capable both personally and financially to look after the best interest of his minor children.

Issue:
Whether or not a wife, a Christian who converted to Islam before her marriage to a Muslim

and converted back to Catholicism upon their separation, still bound by the moral laws of Islam in
the determination of her fitness to be the custodian of her children?
Ruling:

495

Persons and Family Relation

The Supreme Court in the case stated that the welfare of the minors is the controlling
consideration on the issue. The Court also said that the factors that determine the fitness of any
parent are: [1] the ability to see to the physical, educational, social and moral welfare of the children,
and [2] the ability to give them a healthy environment as well as physical and financial support taking
into consideration the respective resources and social and moral situations of the parents.

The standard in the determination of sufficiency of proof, however, is not restricted to
Muslim laws. The Family Code shall be taken into consideration in deciding whether a non-Muslim
woman is incompetent. What determines her capacity is the standard laid down by the Family Code
now that she is not a Muslim.

Indeed, what determines the fitness of any parent is the ability to see to the physical,
educational, social and moral welfare of the children, and the ability to give them a healthy
environment as well as physical and financial support taking into consideration the respective
resources and social and moral situations of the parents. Article 211 of the Family Code provides
that the father and mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the persons of their common
children.

Similarly, P.D. No. 1083 is clear that where the parents are not divorced or legally separated,
the father and mother shall jointly exercise just and reasonable parental authority and fulfill their
responsibility over their legitimate children.

496

Persons and Family Relation

PARENTAL AUTHORITY AND CUSTODY

G.R. No. 116773 SAGALA-ESLAO vs. COURT OF APPEALS January 16, 1997

Facts:
Maria Paz Cordero-Ouye and Reynaldo Eslao were married. After their marriage, the couple

stayed with Teresita Eslao, mother of Reynaldo. The couple had two children namely Leslie and
Angelica. Leslie was entrusted to the care and custody of Maria's mother while Angelica was
entrusted with her parents at Teresita's house. Reynaldo died 4 years later. Maria intended to bring
Angelica to her mother's place but Teresita prevailed and entrusted to the custody of Angelica.
Maria returned to her mother's house and stayed with Leslie. Years later, Maria married James
Manabu-Ouye, a Japanese-American orthodontist, and she migrated to US with him. A year after the
marriage, Maria returned to the Philippines to be reunited with her children and bring them to US.
Teresita, however, resisted by way of explaining that the child was entrusted to her when she was 10
days old and accused Maria of having abandoned Angelica. The trial court rendered a decision where
Teresita was directed to cause the immediate transfer of custody of the child to Maria. CA affirmed
with the lower court's decision.

Issue:
Whether or not Teresita has the right to the custody of the child?

Ruling:
Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and may not be transferred or renounced

except in cases authorized by law. The right attached to parental authority, being purely personal, the
law allows a waiver of parental authority only in cases of adoption, guardianship and surrender to a
children's home or an orphan institution. When a parent entrusts the custody of a minor to another,
such as a friend or godfather, even in a document, what is given is merely temporary custody and it
does not constitute a renunciation of parental authority. Even if a definite renunciation is manifest,
the law still disallows the same.

The father and mother, being the natural guardians of unemancipated children, are duty-
bound and entitled to keep them in their custody and company. In this case, when Maria entrusted
the custody of her minor child to Teresita, what she gave to the latter was merely temporary custody
and it did not constitute abandonment or renunciation of parental authority.

Thus, Teresita does not have the right to the custody of the child.

497

Persons and Family Relation

PARENTAL AUTHORITY AND CUSTODY

SOMBONG vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 111876 January 31, 1996

Facts:
Petitioner was the mother of Arabella O. Sombong who was born on April 23, 1987 in

Taguig, Metro Manila. Sometime in November, 1987, Arabella, then only six months old, was
brought to the Sir John Clinic, owned by Ty located at Caloocan City, for treatment. Petitioner did
not have enough money to pay the hospital bill in the balance of P300.00. Arabella could not be
discharged as a result.

Petitioner said that she paid 1,700 for the release even if the bill was only 300. The spouses
Ty, who had custody of the daughter, would not give Arabella to her. Petitioner filed a petition with
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for the issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus against the
spouses Ty. She alleged that Arabella was being unlawfully detained and imprisoned at the Ty
residence. The petition was denied due course and summarily dismissed, without prejudice, on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction given that the detention was in Caloocan.

Ty claimed that Arabella was with them for some time, but given to someone who claimed
to be their guardian.The Office of the City Prosecutor of Kalookan City, on the basis of petitioner‘s
complaint, filed an information against the spouses Ty for Kidnapping and Illegal Detention of a
Minor before the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City. Ty then revealed that the child may be
found in quezon city. When Sombong reached the residence, a small girl named Christina Grace
Neri was found. Sombong claimed the child to be hers even if she wasn‘t entirely sure that it was
Arabella.

On October 13, 1992, petitioner filed a petition for the issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus
with the Regional Trial Court. The court ruled in Sombong‘s favor and ordered the respondents to
deliver the child. The Appellate Court took cognizance of the following issues raised by respondent:
(1) The propriety of the habeas corpus proceeding vis-a-vis the problem respecting the identity of
the child subject of said proceeding; (2) If indeed petitioner be the mother of the child in question,
what the effect would proof of abandonment be under the circumstances of the case; and (3) Will
the question of the child‘s welfare be the paramount consideration in this case which involves child
custody.

The RTC decision was reversed. Hence, this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not habeas corpus is the proper remedy for taking back Arabella?

Ruling:

498

Persons and Family Relation

Yes but the requisites are not met. In general, the purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to
determine whether or not a particular person is legally held. A prime specification of an application
for a writ of habeas corpus, in fact, is an actual and effective, and not merely nominal or moral,
illegal restraint of liberty. ―The writ of habeas corpus was devised and exists as a speedy and
effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient
defense of personal freedom. A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus is
restraint of liberty. The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all
manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if
such restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient.

To justify the grant of the writ of habeas corpus, the restraint of liberty must be in the nature
of an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action. This is the basic requisite under the
first part of Section 1, Rule 102, of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides that ―except as
otherwise expressly provided by law, the writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal
confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty.‖

In the second part of the same provision, however, Habeas Corpus may be resorted to in
cases where ―the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto.‖ Thus,
although the Writ of Habeas Corpus ought not to be issued if the restraint is voluntary, we have
held time and again that the said writ is the proper legal remedy to enable parents to regain the
custody of a minor child even if the latter be in the custody of a third person of her own free will.
It may even be said that in custody cases involving minors, the question of illegal and involuntary
restraint of liberty is not the underlying rationale for the availability of the writ as a remedy; rather,
the writ of habeas corpus is prosecuted for the purpose of determining the right of custody over a
child.

The foregoing principles considered, the grant of the writ in the instant case will all depend
on the concurrence of the following requisites: (1) that the petitioner has the right of custody over
the minor; (2) that the rightful custody of the minor is being withheld from the petitioner by the
respondent; and (3) that it is to the best interest of the minor concerned to be in the custody of
petitioner and not that of the respondent.

Petition is dismissed.

499

Persons and Family Relation