civil code0101

months. In August 1991, upon her return to Manila, she discovered that while she was in Japan,
Rodolfo brought into their conjugal home her cousin, Lecita Rose A. Besina, as his
concubine. Aurora alleged that Rodolfo‘s cohabitation with her cousin led to the disintegration of
their marriage and their eventual separation. In May 1992, Rodolfo abandoned their conjugal home
to live with Besina. Aurora claimed custody of the children.

Psychiatric evaluation by Dr. Eduardo Maaba revealed that both parties suffered
psychological handicaps traced from unhealthy maturational development. Both had strict,
domineering, disciplinarian role models. However, respondent‘s mistrust, shallow heterosexual
relationships resulted in incapacitation in her ability to comply with the obligation of marriage. RTC
found the parties psychologically incapacitated. The CA reversed and set aside the decision.

Issue:
Whether or not the parties are psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential

marital obligations.

Ruling:
No. Psychological incapacity is not mere ―difficulty‖, ―refusal‖, or ―neglect‖. Noteworthy, as

aptly pointed out by the appellate court, Rodolfo and Aurora initially had a blissful marital union for
several years. They married in 1982, and later affirmed the ceremony in church rites in 1983,
showing love and contentment with one another after a year of marriage. The letter of petitioner
dated April 1, 1990 addressed to respondent revealed the harmonious relationship of the couple
continued during their marriage for about eight years from the time they married each other.

From this, it can be inferred that they were able to faithfully comply with their obligations to
each other and to their children. Aurora was shown to have taken care of her children and remained
faithful to her husband while he was away. She even joined sales activities to augment the family
income. She appeared to be a very capable woman who traveled a lot and pursued studies here and
abroad. It was only when Rodolfo‘s acts of infidelity were discovered that the marriage started to
fail. While disagreements on money matters would, no doubt, affect the other aspects of one‘s
marriage as to make the wedlock unsatisfactory, this is not a ground to declare a marriage null and
void. At this juncture while this Court is convinced that indeed both parties were both found to
have psychological disorders, nevertheless, there is nothing in the records showing that these
disorders are sufficient to declare the marriage void due to psychological incapacity. Incurability was
not proven. Incompatibility or irreconcilable differences could not be equated with psychological
incapacity.

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G.R. No. 174451 ALCAZAR vs. ALCAZAR October 13, 2009

Facts:
Petitioner Veronica Cabacungan Alcazar alleged in her Complaint that she was married to

respondent Rey C. Alcazar on 11 October 2000 by Rev. Augusto G. Pabustan (Pabustan), at the
latter‘s residence. After their wedding, petitioner and respondent lived for five days in San Jose,
Occidental Mindoro, the hometown of respondent‘s parents. Thereafter, the newlyweds went back
to Manila, but respondent did not live with petitioner at the latter‘s abode at 2601-C Jose Abad
Santos Avenue, Tondo, Manila. On 23 October 2000, respondent left
for Riyadh, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, where he worked as an upholsterer in a furniture shop. While
working in Riyadh, respondent did not communicate with petitioner by phone or by
letter. Petitioner tried to call respondent for five times but respondent never answered. About a
year and a half after respondent left for Riyadh, a co-teacher informed petitioner that respondent
was about to come home to the Philippines. Petitioner was surprised why she was not advised by
respondent of his arrival.

Petitioner further averred in her Complaint that when respondent arrived in the Philippines,
the latter did not go home to petitioner at 2601-C Jose Abad Santos Avenue,
Tondo, Manila. Instead, respondent proceeded to his parents‘ house in San Jose, Occidental

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Mindoro. Upon learning that respondent was in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, petitioner went to
see her brother-in-law in Velasquez St., Tondo, Manila, who claimed that he was not aware of
respondent‘s whereabouts. Petitioner traveled to San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, where she was
informed that respondent had been living with his parents since his arrival in March 2002.

Petitioner asserted that from the time respondent arrived in the Philippines, he never
contacted her. Thus, petitioner concluded that respondent was physically incapable of
consummating his marriage with her, providing sufficient cause for annulment of their marriage
pursuant to paragraph 5, Article 45 of the Family Code of the Philippines (Family Code). There was
also no more possibility of reconciliation between petitioner and respondent.

During trial, petitioner presented herself, her mother Lolita Cabacungan (Cabacungan), and
clinical psychologist Nedy L. Tayag (Tayag) as witnesses. The psychologist diagnosed the respondent
to have Narcissistic Personality Disorder. The RTC denied petitioner‘s complaint for annulment of
her marriage. The petitioner moved for reconsideration but was denied. The CA affirmed RTC‘s
decision.

Issue:
Whether or not Rey is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital

obligations.

Ruling:

No. Article 46 of the Family Code contemplates an annulment of marriage on the ground
ofincapacity to consummate specifically denoting the permanent disability on the spouses to
perform and complete the act of sexual intercourse. What petitioner was actually seeking was the
declaration of nullity of marriage contemplated by Article 36 of the Family Code. Nevertheless,
Article 36should refer, rather, to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a
party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage. Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a)
gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. Petitioner‘s evidence, particularly her and her
mother‘s testimonies, merely established that respondent left petitioner soon after their wedding to
work in Saudi Arabia; that when respondent returned to the Philippines a year and a half later, he
directly went to live with his parents in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, and not with petitioner in
Tondo, Manila; and that respondent also did not contact petitioner at all since leaving for
abroad. These testimonies though do not give us much insight into respondent‘s psychological
state. Tayag, in evaluating respondent‘s psychological state, had to rely on information provided by
petitioner.

Hence, we expect Tayag to have been more prudent and thorough in her evaluation of
respondent‘s psychological condition, since her source of information, namely, petitioner, was hardly
impartial. The psychologist failed to trace Rey‘s experiences in childhood, did not describe the
―pattern of behavior‖ that led her to conclude that, indeed, Rey was suffering from Narcissistic
Personality disorder; and did not relate how this rendered him ―truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage.‖

Psychological incapacity must be more than just a ―difficulty,‖ a ―refusal,‖ or a ―neglect‖ in the
performance of some marital obligations.

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OTHER JURISPRUDENCE ON PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY

G.R. No. 164817 NAJERA vs. NAJERA July 3, 2009

Facts:

On January 27, 1997, petitioner filed with the RTC a verified Petition for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage with Alternative Prayer for Legal Separation, with Application for Designation as
Administrator Pendente Lite of the Conjugal Partnership of Gains.Petitioner alleged that she and
respondent are residents of Bugallon, Pangasinan, but respondent is presently living in the United
States of America (U.S.A). They were married on January 31, 1988. They are childless. Petitioner
claimed that at the time of the celebration of marriage, respondent was psychologically incapacitated
to comply with the essential marital obligations of the marriage, and such incapacity became
manifest only after marriage.

On June 29, 1998, the RTC issued an Orderterminating the pre-trial conference after the parties
signed a Formal Manifestation/Motion, which stated that they had agreed to dissolve their conjugal
partnership of gains and divide equally their conjugal properties.Psychologist Cristina Gates testified
that the chances of curability of respondent‘s psychological disorder were nil. Its
curability depended on whether the established organic damage was minimal -- referring to the

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malfunction of the composites of the brain brought about by habitual drinking and marijuana,
which possibly afflicted respondent with borderline personality disorder and uncontrollable
impulses.Further, SPO1 Sonny Dela Cruz, a member of the PNP, Bugallon, Pangasinan, testified
that on July 3, 1994, he received a complaint from petitioner that respondent arrived at their house
under the influence of liquor and mauled petitioner without provocation on her part, and that
respondent tried to kill her. The complaint was entered in the police blotter.

Issue:
Whether or not the totality of petitioner‘s evidence was able to prove that respondent is

psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage warranting the
annulment of their marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals that the totality of the evidence

submitted by petitioner failed to satisfactorily prove that respondent was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage .The root cause of respondent‘s
alleged psychological incapacity was not sufficiently proven by experts or shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable.

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OTHER JURISPRUDENCE ON PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY

G.R. No. 165424 HALILI vs. SANTOS- HALILI June 9, 2009

Facts:
Petitioner and the respondent married on July 4, 1995 at the City Hall of Manila. After the

wedding, they continued to live with their respective parents and never lived together but
maintained their relationship nonetheless.Petitioner filed in the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City a
petition for the nullity of their marriage on the ground that the respondent was psychologically
incapacitated to fulfill his essential marital obligations. He also pointed out that they never lived
together as husband and wife and they never consummated their marriage. On April 17, 1998, the
Regional Trial Court declared thatthe marriage between the petitioner and the respondent is null and
void. The respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals, on January 26, 2004. The Court of Appeals
reversed and set aside the decision of the Regional Trial Court on the ground that totality of
the evidence presented failed to established petitioner's psychological incapacity. The petitioner
appealed to the Supreme Court for reconsideration. On June 9, 2009, the Supreme Court set aside
the decision of the Court of Appeals and reinstated the decision of the Regional Trial Court.

Issue:
Whether or not the totality of evidence presented is sufficient to prove that the petitioner

suffered from psychological incapacitywhich effectively prevented him to comply from his
essential marital obligations.

Ruling:
Yes, because ultimately the psychologist sufficiently established that petitioner had

psychological condition that was grave andincurable and had a deeply rooted cause and that already
existed at the time of the celebration of his marriage to the respondent.

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G.R. No 147824 PARAS vs. PARAS August 2, 2007

Facts:
On May 21, 1964, petitioner Rosa Yap married respondent Justo J. Paras in Bindoy, Negros

Oriental. They begot four (4)children, namely: Raoul (deceased), Cindy Rose (deceased), Dahlia, and
Reuel. Twenty-nine (29) years thereafter, or on May 27, 1993,Rosa filed with the Regional Trial
Court a complaint for annulment of her marriage with Justo,under Article 36 of the Family Code,
docketed as Civil Case No. 10613. She was then a student of San Carlos University, Cebu City. He
courted her, frequently spending time at her "Botica." Eventually, in 1964, convinced that he loved
her, she agreed to marry him. Their wedding was considered one of the "most celebrated" marriages
in Bindoy. Sometime in 1975, their daughter Cindy Rose was afflicted with leukemia. It was her
family who paid for her medication. Also in 1984, their son Raoul was electrocuted while Justo was
in their rest house with his "barkadas." He did not heed her earlier advice to bring Raoul in the rest
house as the latter has the habit of climbing the rooftop. To cope with the death of the children, the
entire family went to the United States. However, after three months, Justo abandoned them and
left for the Philippines. Upon her return to the Philippines, she was shocked to find her "Botica"
and other businesses heavy in debt and he disposed without her consent a conjugal piece of land.
At other times, he permitted the municipal government to take gasoline from their gas station free
of charge. His act of maintaining a mistress and siring an illegitimate child was the last straw that

prompted her to file the present case. She found that after leaving their conjugal house in 1988,
Justo lived with Jocelyn Ching. Their cohabitation resulted in the birth of a babygirl, Cyndee Rose,
obviously named after her (Rosa) and Justo‗s deceased daughter Cindy Rose Paras.

He also denied forging her signature in one mortgage transaction. He maintained that he did
not dispose of a conjugal property and that he and Rosa personally signed the renewal of a sugar
crop loan before the bank‘s authorized employee. He did not abandon his family in the United
States. For his part, he was granted only three (3) months leave as municipal mayor of Bindoy, thus,
he immediately returned to the Philippines. He spent for his children‘s education. At first, he
resented supporting them because he was just starting his law practice and besides, their conjugal
assets were more than enough to provide for their needs. He admitted though that there were times
he failed to give them financial support because of his lack of income. What caused the inevitable
family break-out was Rosa‘s act of embarrassing him during his birthday celebration in 1987. She did
not prepare food for the guests. When confronted, she retorted that she has nothing to do with his
birthday. This convinced him of her lack of concern. This was further aggravated when she denied
his request for engine oil when his vehicle broke down in a mountainous and NPA-infested area. As
to the charge of concubine, he alleged that Jocelyn Ching is not his mistress, but her secretary in his
Law Office. She was impregnated by her boyfriend, a certain GrelleLeccioness. Cyndee Rose
Ching Leccioness is not his daughter.

After trial or on February 28, 1995, the RTC rendered a Decision upholding the validity of
the marriage. On December 8, 2000, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC Decision in the present
case, holding that "the evidence of the plaintiff (Rosa) falls short of the standards required by law to
decree a nullity of marriage." It ruled that Justo‘s alleged defects oridiosyncrasies "were sufficiently

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explained by the evidence," Rosa contends that this Court‘s factual findings in A.C. No.
5333 fordisbarment are conclusive on the present case. Consequently, the Court of Appeals erred
in rendering contrary factual findings. Also, she argues that she filed the instant complaint sometime
in May, 1993

Issues:
a) Whether the factual findings of this Court in A.C. No. 5333 are conclusive on the present
case;
b) Whether a remand of this case to the RTC for reception of expert testimony on the root
cause of Justo‘s alleged psychologicalincapacity is necessary; and
c) Whether the totality of evidence in the case shows psychological incapacity on the part of
Justo.

Ruling:
A reading of the Court of Appeals‘ Decision shows that she has no reason to feel aggrieved.

In fact, the appellate court evenassumed that her charges "are true," but concluded that they are
insufficient to declare the marriage void on the ground of psychological incapacity. Justo's alleged
infidelity, failure to support his family and alleged abandonment of their family home are true,such
traits are at best indicators that he is unfit to become an ideal husband and father. However, by
themselves, these grounds areinsufficient to declare the marriage void due to an incurable
psychological incapacity. These grounds, we must emphasize, do notmanifest that he was truly in
cognitive of the basic marital covenants that he must assume and discharge as a married person.
Whilethey may manifest the "gravity" of his alleged psychological incapacity, they do not necessarily
show ‗incurability‘, such that while hisacts violated the covenants of marriage, they do
not necessarily show that such acts show an irreparably hopeless state of psychological incapacity
which prevents him from undertaking the basic obligations of marriage in the future.

The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified,
(b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts, and (d) clearly explained in
the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacitymust be psychological -- not
physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must
convince thecourt that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent
that the person could not have known theobligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not
have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of suchincapacity need be given here
so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis, neverthelesssuch root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may begiven by qualified psychiatrists and
clinical psychologists.

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G.R. No. 141917 ZAMORA vs. ZAMORA February 7, 2007

Facts:
Petitioner and respondent were married on June 4, 1970 in Cebu City. After their marriage,

they lived together at No. 50-AGorordo Avenue, Cebu City. The union did not produce any
child. In 1972, private respondent left for the United States to work as anurse. She returned to the
Philippines for a few months, and then left again in 1974. Thereafter, she made periodic visits
to Cebu Cityuntil 1989, when she was already a U.S. citizen. Petitioner filed a complaint for
declaration of nullity of marriage anchored on thealleged "psychological incapacity" of private
respondent, as provided for under Article 36 of the Family Code. To support his position,he alleged
that his wife was "horrified" by the mere thought of having children as evidenced by the fact that
she had not bornepetitioner a child. Furthermore, he also alleged that private respondent abandoned
him by living in the United States and had in fact become an American citizen; and that throughout
their marriage they lived together for not more than three years. Respondentdenied that she refused
to have a child. She portrayed herself as one who loves children as she is a nurse by profession and
that shewould from time to time borrow her husband‘s niece and nephews to care for them.
She also faulted her husband for the breakup of their marriage, alleging that he had been unfaithful
to her. He allegedly had two affairs with different women, and he begot at leastthree children with
them. On June 22, 1995, the trial court rendered its decision. The plaintiff consented to defendant‘s

trip to theUnited States in 1974. She [defendant] wanted to earn money there because she wanted to
help her husband build a big house at theBeverly Hills, Cebu City. The plaintiff himself admitted
that he has a child, and the court is also convinced that he has two children.However, nothing in the
evidence of plaintiff shows that the defendant suffered from any psychological incapacity or that she
failed tocomply with her essential marital obligations. There is no evidence of psychological
incapacity on the part of defendant so that shecould not carry out the ordinary duties required in
married life. Neither has it been shown that there was an incurable defect on thepart of defendant.

Issues:
a) Whether or not the Court of Appeals misapplied facts of weight and substance affecting the
result of the present case;
b) Whether or not the presentation of psychologists and/or psychiatrists is still desirable, if
evidence in this case already showsthe psychological incapacity of private respondent;
c) Whether or not private respondent‘s refusal to live with petitioner under one roof for more
than twenty (20) years, her refusalto bear children with petitioner, and her living a solitary
life in the United States for almost three (3) decades are enough indications of psychological
incapacity to comply with essential marital obligations under Article 36 of the Family Code.

Ruling:
The Courts merely said in that case that "the well-considered opinions of psychiatrists,

psychologists, and persons withexpertise in psychological disciplines might be helpful or even
desirable." However, no expert opinion is helpful or even desirable todetermine whether private
respondent has been living abroad and away from her husband for many years; whether she has a
child;and whether she has made her residence abroad permanent by acquiring U.S. citizenship.

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Article 36 of the Family Code provides that a marriage contracted by any party who, at
the time of the celebration, waspsychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if suchincapacity becomes manifest only after
its solemnization.

A petition under Article 36 of the Family Code shall specifically allege the complete facts
showing that either or both partieswere psychologically incapacitated from complying with the
essential marital obligations of marriage at the time of the celebration of marriage even if such
incapacity becomes manifest only after its celebration.

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OTHER JURISPRUDENCE ON PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY

G.R. No. 162368 FERRARIS vs. FERRARIS July 17, 2006

Facts:
Armida and Brix are a showbiz couple. The couple‘s relationship before the marriage and

even during their brief union (for well about a year or so) was not all bad. During that relatively
short period of time, Armida was happy and contented with her life in the company of Brix.
Armida even admits that Brix was a responsible and loving husband. Their problems began when
Armida started doubting Brix‘ fidelity. It was only when they started fighting about the calls from
women that Brix began to withdraw into his shell and corner, and failed to perform his so-called
marital obligations. Brix could not understand Armida‘s lack of trust in him and her constant
naggings. He thought her suspicions irrational. Brix could not relate to her anger, temper and
jealousy. Armida presented a psychological expert (Dr. Dayan) who finds Brix to be a schizoid and
a dependent and avoidant type. This is evidenced by Brix‘s ―leaving-the-house‖ attitude whenever
they quarreled, the violent tendencies during epileptic attacks, the sexual infidelity, the abandonment
and lack of support, and his preference to spend more time with his band mates than his family.

Issue:
How shall psychological incapacity be proven?

Ruling:
The term "psychological incapacity" to be a ground for the nullity of marriage under Article

36 of the Family Code, refers to aserious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the
celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanentas to deprive one of
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. As all
people may have certain quirks and idiosyncrasies, or isolated characteristics associated with certain
personality disorders, there is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine
the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.
It is for this reason that the Court relies heavily on psychological experts for its understanding of the
human personality. However, the rootcause must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature must be fully explained, which petitioner failed to convincingly
demonstrate.Quite apart from being plainly self-serving, petitioner‘s evidence showed that
respondent‘s alleged failure to perform his so-called marital obligations was not at all a manifestation
of some deep-seated, grave, permanent and incurable psychological malady. To be sure, the
couple‘s relationship before the marriage and even during their brief union (for well about a year or
so) was not all bad. During that relatively short period of time, petitioner was happy and contented
with her life in the company of respondent.

Infact, by petitioner‘s own reckoning, respondent was a responsible and loving husband.
Their problems began when petitionerstarted doubting respondent‘s fidelity. It was only when they
started fighting about the calls from women that respondent began towithdraw into his shell and
corner, and failed to perform his so- called marital obligations. Respondent could not
understandpetitioner‘s lack of trust in him and her constant naggings. He thought her suspicions

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irrational. Respondent could not relate to heranger, temper and jealousy.At any rate, Dr. Dayan
did not explain how she arrived at her diagnosis that respondent has a mixed personality disorder
called"schizoid," and why he is the "dependent and avoidant type." Notably, when asked as to the
root cause of respondent‘s alleged psychological incapacity, Dr. Dayan‘s answer was vague, evasive
andinconclusive. She replied that such disorder "can be part of his family upbringing" She stated
that there was a history of respondent‘s parents having difficulties in their relationship. But this
input on the supposed problematic history of respondent‘sparents also came from petitioner. Nor
did Dr. Dayan clearly demonstrate that there was really "a natal or supervening disablingfactor" on
the part of respondent, or an "adverse integral element" in respondent‘s character that effectively
incapacitated him fromaccepting, and, thereby complying with, the essential marital obligations. We
find respondent‘s alleged mixed personality disorder, the "leaving-the-house" attitude whenever
they quarreled, the violenttendencies during epileptic attacks, the sexual infidelity, the abandonment
and lack of support, and his preference to spend moretime with his band mates than his family, are
not rooted on some debilitating psychological condition but a mere refusal orunwillingness to
assume the essential obligations of marriage.

While petitioner‘s marriage with the respondent failed and appears to be without hope of
reconciliation, the remedy however isnot always to have it declared void ab initio on the ground of
psychological incapacity. An unsatisfactory marriage, however, is not anull and void marriage. No
less than the Constitution recognizes the sanctity of marriage and the unity of the family; it
decreesmarriage as legally "inviolable" and protects it from dissolution at the whim of the parties.
Both the family and marriage are to be"protected" by the state. Petition dismissed with finality.

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OTHER JURISPRUDENCE ON PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY

G.R. No. 155800 ANTONIO vs. REYES March 10, 2006

Facts:
Leonilo Antonio, 26 years of age, and Marie Ivonne Reyes, 36 years of age met in 1989.

Barely a year after their first meeting, they got married at Manila City Hall and then a subsequent
church wedding at Pasig in December 1990. A child was born but died 5 months later. Reyes
persistently lied about herself, the people around her, her occupation, income, educational
attainment and other events or things. She even did not conceal bearing an illegitimate child, which
she represented to her husband as adopted child of their family. They were separated in August
1991 and after attempt for reconciliation, he finally left her for good in November 1991. Petitioner
then filed in 1993 a petition to have his marriage with Reyes declared null and void anchored in
Article 36 of the Family Code.

Issue:
Whether Antonio can impose Article 36 of the Family Code as basis for declaring their

marriage null and void.

Ruling:
Psychological incapacity pertains to the inability to understand the obligations of marriage as

opposed to a mere inability to comply with them. The petitioner, aside from his own testimony
presented a psychiatrist and clinical psychologist who attested that constant lying and extreme
jealousy of Reyes is abnormal and pathological and corroborated his allegations on his wife‘s
behavior, which amounts to psychological incapacity. Respondent‘s fantastic ability to invent,
fabricate stories and letters of fictitious characters enabled her to live in a world of make-believe that
made her psychologically incapacitated as it rendered her incapable of giving meaning and
significance to her marriage. The root causes of Reyes‘ psychological incapacity have been medically
or clinically identified that was sufficiently proven by experts. The gravity of respondent‘s
psychological incapacity was considered so grave that a restrictive clause was appended to the
sentence of nullity prohibited by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal from contracting
marriage without their consent. It would be difficult for an inveterate pathological liar to commit
the basic tenets of relationship between spouses based on love, trust and respect. Furthermore,
Reyes‘ case is incurable considering that petitioner tried to reconcile with her but her behavior
remain unchanged.

Hence, the court concludes that petitioner has established his cause of action for declaration
of nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code.

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OTHER JURISPRUDENCE ON PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY

G.R. No. 158896 CARATING-SIAYNGCO vs. SIAYNGCO October 27, 2004

Facts:
Juanita Carating-Siayngco was married to Manuel Siayngco. Their marriage did not produce

children however, the adopted a boy. Manuel, after being married for 24 years filed a petition to the
court seeking the nullification of their marriage by reason of psychological incapacity exhibited
through over domineering attitude and causing him embarrassment and humiliation. The lower
court denied his petition. The CA on the other hand reversed the decision relying on the doctor‘s
findings that both parties are psychologically incapacitated.

Issue:
Whether or not one or both of the parties were proven psychologically incapacitated

sufficient to warrant the nullification of their marriage.

Ruling:
The court ruled in the negative. Manuel‘s relationship with another was caused merely by his

sexual infidelity which does not fall within the purview of psychological incapacity. This action
caused by his desire to have children which he himself admitted. The testimonies of the
doctor failed to show that this infidelity is caused by a psychological illness or disorder. It is

necessary that it his by reason of a psychological disorder that he will be completely unable to
perform his marital obligations. With regard to Juanita, Manuel failed to show that her actions
constitute psychological incapacity that would render her unable to perform her marital obligations
and that a doctor has in fact stated otherwise. The evidence adduced failed to show sufficiently that
the couple or either of the spouse were psychologically incapacitated, rather it showed that they were
merely having the marital trouble of becoming strangers to each other and wanting to get out of it.
The marriage thus cannot be declared null and void

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OTHER JURISPRUDENCE ON PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY

G.R. No. 167206 VILLALON vs. VILLALON
November 18, 2005

Facts:
On July 12, 1996, petitioner Jaime F. Villalon filed a petition for the annulment of his

marriage to respondent Ma. Corazon N. Villalon before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City where
it was docketed as JDRC No. 3917 and raffled to Branch 69. As ground therefor, petitioner cited his
psychological incapacity which he claimed existed even prior to his marriage.On September 25,
1996, respondent filed an answerdenying petitioner‘s allegations. She asserted that her 18-year
marriage to petitioner has been ―fruitful and characterized by joy, contentment and hopes for more
growth in their relationship‖ and that their marital squabbles were normal based on community
standards. Petitioner‘s success in his professional life aided him in performing his role as husband,
father, and provider. Respondent claimed that petitioner‘s commitment to his paternal and marital
responsibilities was beyond reproach.

Petitioner presented Dr. Natividad Dayan, a clinical psychologist, to testify on his alleged
psychological disorder of ―Narcissistic Histrionic Personality Disorder‖ with ―Casanova Complex‖.
Dr. Dayan described the said disorder as ―a pervasive maladaptation in terms of interpersonal and
occupational functioning‖ with main symptoms of ―grand ideation about oneself, self-centeredness,
thinking he is unique and wanting to always be the one followed, the I personality.‖ A person

afflicted with this disorder believes that he is entitled to gratify his emotional and sexual feelings and
thus engages in serial infidelities. Likewise, a person with ―Casanova Complex‖ exhibits habitual
adulterous behavior and goes from one relationship to another.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the appellate court‘s decision which was
denied in an order dated October 28, 2004. Thus, petitioner took this recourse under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, asserting that the Court of Appeals erred in finding that he failed to prove his
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.

Issue:
Whether or not the marriage of Villalon is null and void on the grounds of psychological

incapacity of the husband.

Ruling:
No, the totality of the evidence in this case does not support a finding that petitioner is

psychologically incapacitated to fulfill his marital obligations. On the contrary, what is evident is the
fact that petitioner was a good husband to respondent for a substantial period of time prior to their
separation, a loving father to their children and a good provider of the family. Although he engaged
in marital infidelity in at least two occasions, the same does not appear to be symptomatic of a grave
psychological disorder which rendered him incapable of performing his spousal obligations. The
same appears as the result of a general dissatisfaction with his marriage rather than a psychological
disorder rooted in petitioner‘s personal history. The petition has no merit.

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OTHER JURISPRUDENCE ON PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY

BUENAVENTURA vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 127358 March 31, 2005

Facts:
July 12 1992, Noel Buenaventura filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage on

the ground that he and his wife were psychologically incapacitated. The Regional Trial Court in its
decision declared the marriage entered into between petitioner and respondent is void ab initio. The
court ordered the liquidation of the assets of the conjugal partnership property; ordered petitioner a
regular support in favor of his son in the amount of 15,000 monthly, subject to modification as the
necessity arises, and awarded the care and custody of the minor to his mother. Petitioner appealed
before the Court of Appeals and while the appeal was pending, the Court of Appeals, upon
respondent‘s motion issued a resolution increasing the support pendants like to P20, 000. The Court
of Appeals dismissal petitioner appeal for lack of merit and affirmed in to the RTC decision.
Petitioner motion for reconsideration was denied, hence this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not co-ownership is applicable to valid marriage.

Ruling:
The general rule applies, which is in case a marriage is declared void ab initio, the property

regime applicable to be liquidated, partitioned and distributed is that of equal co-ownership. Since
the properties ordered to be distributed by the court were there, both by the Regional Trial Court
and the Court of Appeals, to have been acquired during the union of the parties, the same would be
covered by the co-ownership. No fruits of a separate property of one of the parties appear to have
been included or involved in said distribution.

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OTHER JURISPRUDENCE ON PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY

REPUBLIC vs. QUINTERO-HAMANO
GR No. 149498 May 20, 2004

Facts:
Lolita Quintero-Hamano filed a complaint in 1996 for declaration of nullity of her marriage

with Toshio Hamano, a Japanese national, on the ground of psychological incapacity. She and
Toshio started a common-law relationship in Japan and lived in the Philippines for a month.
Thereafter, Toshio went back to Japan and stayed there for half of 1987. Lolita then gave birth on
November 16, 1987. In 1988, Lolita and Toshio got married in MTC-Bacoor, Cavite. After a month
of their marriage, Toshio returned to Japan and promised to return by Christmas to celebrate the
holidays with his family. Toshio sent money for two months and after that he stopped giving
financial support. She wrote him several times but never respondent. In 1991, she learned from her
friend that Toshio visited the country but did not bother to see her nor their child.

Toshio was no longer residing at his given address thus summons issued to him remained
unserved. Consequently, in 1996, Lolita filed an ex parte motion for leave to effect service of
summons by publication. The motion was granted and the summons, accompanied by a copy of the
petition, was published in a newspaper of general circulation giving Toshio 15 days to file his
answer. Toshio filed to respond after the lapse of 60 days from publication, thus, Lolita filed a
motion to refer the case to the prosecutor for investigation.

Issue:
Whether or not abandonment by one spouse tantamount to psychological incapacity.

Ruling:
The court find that the totality of evidence presented fell short of proving that Toshio was

psychologically incapacitated to assume his marital responsibilities. Toshio‘s act of abandonment
was doubtlessly irresponsible but it was never alleged nor proven to be due to some kind of
psychological illness. After respondent testified on how Toshio abandoned his family, no other
evidence was presented showing that his behavior was caused by a psychological disorder.

Abandonment is also a ground for legal separation. There was no showing that the case at
bar was not just an instance of abandonment in the context of legal separation. It cannot presume
psychological defect from the mere fact that Toshio abandoned his family immediately after the
celebration of the marriage. It is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility
and duty as a married person; it is essential that he must be shown to be incapable of doing so due
to some psychological, not physical, illness. There was no proof of a natal or supervening disabling
factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively
incapacitates a person from accepting and complying with the obligations essential to marriage. In
proving psychological incapacity, the court finds no distinction between an alien spouse and a
Filipino spouse. It cannot be lenient in the application of the rules merely because the spouse alleged
to be psychologically incapacitated happens to be a foreign national. The medical and clinical rules

to determine psychological incapacity were formulated on the basis of studies of human behavior in

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general. Hence, the norms used for determining psychological incapacity should apply to any person
regardless of nationality.

OTHER JURISPRUDENCE ON PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY

DEDEL vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 151867 January 29, 2004

Facts:
David Dedel and Sharon Corpuz were married on September 28, 1996 and May 20, 1967 in

a civil and church wedding, respectively. They had four children. David instituted a case for
the nullity of their marriage on account of Sharon‘s psychological incapacity to perform basic marital
obligations. He claimed that Sharon had extra-marital affairs with several men including a dentist in
the AFP, a lieutenant in the Presidential Security Command, and a Jordanian national. Despite the
treatment by a clinical psychiatrist, Sharon did not stop her illicit relationship with the Jordanian,
whom she married and with whom she had two children. When the Jordanian national left the
country, Sharon returned to David bringing along her two children by the Jordanian national. David
accepted her back and even considered the illegitimate children as his own. However, Sharon
abandoned David to join the Jordanian national with her two children. Since then, Sharon would
only return to the country on special occasions. Dra. Natividad Dayan testified that she conducted
a psychological evaluation of David and found him to be conscientious, hardworking, diligent, a
perfectionist who wants all tasks and projects completed up to the final detail and who exerts his

best in whatever he does.

On the other hand, Dra. Dayan declared that Sharon was suffering from Anti-Social
Personality Disorder exhibited by her blatant display of infidelity; that she committed several
indiscretions and had no capacity for remorse even bringing with her the two children of the
Jordanian to live with David. Such immaturity and irresponsibility in handling the marriage like her
repeated acts of infidelity and abandonment of her family are indications of the said disorder
amounting to psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage. The trial
court declared their marriage null and void on the ground of the psychological incapacity of Sharon
to perform the essential obligations of marriage. While the Court of Appeals set aside the trial
court‘s judgment and ordered the dismissal of the petition. David‘s motion for reconsideration was
denied. Hence, he appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issue:
Whether or not Sharon‘s infidelity is equivalent to psychologically incapacity.

Ruling:
No. Sharon‘s infidelity is not equivalent to psychologically incapacity. Psychological

incapacity should refer to no less than a mental, not physical, incapacity that causes a party to be
truly in cognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged
by the parties to the marriage which as so expressed in Article 68 of the Family Code, include their
mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support.

The law intended to confine the meaning of ―psychological incapacity‖ to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity of inability to give meaning and

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significance to the marriage. Sharon‘s sexual infidelity or perversion and abandonment do not by
themselves constitute psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code.Neither
could her emotional immaturity and irresponsibility be equated with psychological incapacity.

It must be shown that these acts are manifestations of a disordered personality, which make
the respondent completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state, not
merely due to her youth, immaturity or sexual promiscuity. At best, the circumstances relied upon
by David are grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code not for declaring a
marriage void. The grounds for legal separation, which need not be rooted in psychological
incapacity, include physical violence, moral pressure, civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual
alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment, and the like. Decision affirmed. Petition is denied.

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OTHER JURISPRUDENCE ON PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY

G.R. No. 109975 REPUBLIC v. DAGDAG February 9, 2001

Facts:
On September 7, 1975, Erlinda Matias, 16 years old, married Avelino Parangan Dagdag, 20

years old, at the Iglesia Filipina Independent Church in Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija. The marriage
certificate was issued by the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of on October 20,
1988. Erlinda and Avelino begot two children. The birth certificates were issued by the Office of the
Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija also on October 20, 1988. A week
after the wedding, Avelino started leaving his family without explanation. He would disappear for
months, suddenly re-appear for a few months, and then disappear again. During the times when he
was with his family, he indulged in drinking sprees with friends and would return home drunk. He
would force his wife to submit to sexual intercourse and if she refused, he would inflict physical
injuries to her.

In October 1993, he left his family again and that was the last that they heard from
him. Erlinda learned that Avelino was imprisoned for some crime, and that he escaped from jail and
remains at large to-date. In July 1990, Erlinda filed with the RTC of Olongapo City a petition for
judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. Since Avelino
could not be located, summons was served by publication in the Olongapo News, a newspaper of
general circulation. On the date set for presentation of evidence, only Erlinda and her counsel
appeared. Erlinda testified and presented her sister-in-law as her only witness.

The trial court issued an Order giving the investigating prosecutor until January 2, 1991 to
manifest in writing whether or not he would present controverting evidence, and stating that should
he fail to file said manifestation, the case would be deemed submitted for decision. The Investigating
Prosecutor conducted an investigation and found that there was no collusion between the parties.

However, he intended to intervene in the case to avoid fabrication of evidence. Without
waiting for the investigating prosecutor‘s manifestation, the trial court declared the marriage of
Erlinda and Avelino void under Article 36. The investigating prosecutor filed a Motion to Set Aside
Judgment on the ground that the decision was prematurely rendered since he was given until January
2, 1991 to manifest whether he was presenting controverting evidence. The Office of the Solicitor
General likewise filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the decision on the ground that the same is
not in accordance with the evidence and the law. Since the trial court denied the Motion for
Reconsideration, the Solicitor General appealed to the CA. The CA affirmed the decision of the trial
court holding that ―Avelino Dagdag is psychologically incapacitated not only because he failed to
perform the duties and obligations of a married person but because he is emotionally immature and
irresponsible, an alcoholic, and a criminal.‖

Issue:
Whether or not Avelino Dagdag is psychologically incapacitated.

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Ruling:
Erlinda Matias and Avelino Dagdag contracted marriage on September 7, 1975. They begot

two children. A week after the wedding, Avelino started leaving his family without explanation. He
would from time to time, disappear and suddenly reappear for a few months. He was always drunk
and would force his wife to submit to sexual intercourse and inflict physical injuries on her if she
refused. On October 1993, he left his family and was never heard from him again. Erlinda was
forced to work and learned that Avelino was imprisoned and that he escaped from jail. Erlinda filed
a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage on the grounds of psychological incapacity. Since
Avelino could not be located, summons was served by publication. Upon trial, Erlinda presented
Virginia Dagdag who attested to the psychological incapacity of Avelino. The trial court rendered a
decision in favor of respondent without waiting for the prosecutor‘s manifestation. The Court of
Appeals affirmed trials‘ court decision. The court contented that Erlinda failed to comply with
guideline No. 2 which requires that the root cause of psychological incapacity must be medically or
clinically identified and sufficiently proven by experts, since no psychiatrist or medical doctor
testified as to the alleged psychological incapacity of her husband. Furthermore, the allegation that
the husband is a fugitive from justice was not sufficiently proven. The investigating prosecutor was
likewise not given an opportunity to present controversy evidence since the trial court‘s decision was
prematurely rendered.

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OTHER JURISPRUDENCE ON PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY

G. R. No. 136921 PESCA vs. PESCA April 17, 2001

Facts:
The case at bar is a petition for certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals.

Petitioner and private respondent married in 1975, a union that begot four children. She contends
that respondent surprisingly showed signs of ―psychological incapacity‖ to perform his marital
obligations starting 1988. His ―true color‖ of being an emotionally immature and irresponsible
husband became apparent. He was cruel and violent. He was a habitual drinker, staying with friends
daily from 4:00 o‘clock in the afternoon until 1:00 o‘clock in the morning. When cautioned to stop
or, to at least, minimize his drinking, respondent would beat, slap and kick her. At one time, he
chased petitioner with a loaded shotgun and threatened to kill her in the presence of the children.
The children themselves were not spared from physical violence.

Petitioner and her children left the conjugal abode to live in the house of her sister in
Quezon City as they could no longer bear his violent ways. Two months later, she returned home to
give him a chance to change. But, to her dismay, things did not so turn out as expected. On the
morning of 22 March 1994, respondent assaulted petitioner for about half an hour in the presence
of the children. She was battered black and blue. He was imprisoned for 11 days for slight physical
injuries.

Petitioner sued respondent before the Regional Trial Court for the declaration of nullity of
their marriage invoking psychological incapacity. The trial court declared their marriage to be null
and void ab initio on the basis of psychological incapacity on the part of respondent and ordered the
liquidation of the conjugal partnership.

Respondent appealed the decision of the trial court to the Court of Appeals, which in turn
reversed the decision of the trial court. Thus, the marriage of respondent and petitioner still subsists.

Issues:
a) Whether or not the appellate court erred in reversing the decision of the trial court.
b) Whether or not the guidelines in the case of Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Molina
should be taken to be merely advisory and not mandatory in nature.

Ruling:
The appellate court did not err in its assailed decision for there was absolutely no evidence

showed and proved by petitioner the psychological incapacity on the part of respondent. Article 36
of the Code has not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as extremely
low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances. Psychological incapacity, as laid down in the
case of Santos vs. Court of Appeals and further explained in Republic vs. Court of Appeals and
Molina, refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by

the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their
mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support.

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The ―doctrine of stare decisis,‖ ordained in Article 8 of the Civil Code, expresses that judicial
decisions applying or interpreting the law shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines. The
rule follows the settled legal maxim – ―legis interpretado legis vim obtinet‖ – that the interpretation
placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force of law. The interpretation or
construction placed by the courts establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent of the law. The
latter as so interpreted and construed would thus constitute a part of that law as of the date the
statute is enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of this Court finds itself later overruled, and a
different view is adopted, that the new doctrine may have to be applied prospectively in favor of
parties who have relied on the old doctrine and have acted in good faith in accordance therewith
under the familiar rule of ―lex prospicit, non respicit.‖ The petition was denied.

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GROUNDS FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE

GR No. 141528 MALLION vs. ALCANTARA October 31, 2006

Facts:
Oscar Mallion filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court seeking a declaration of nullity

oh his marriage with Editha Alcantara due to psychological incapacity. The RTC denied the petition.
As the decision attained finality, Mallion filed another petition for a declaration of nullity of
marriage, this time alleging that his marriage was null and void due to the fact that it was celebrated
without a valid marriage license.

Issue:
Does a previous final judgment denying a petition for declaration of nullity on the ground of

psychological incapacity bar a subsequent petition for declaration of nullity on the grounds ogf lack
of marriage license?

Ruling:
Res judicataapplies.

Mallion is simply invoking different grounds for the same cause of action which is the nullity
of marriage. When the second case was filed based on another ground, there is a splitting of a cause
of action which is prohibited. He is estopped from asserting that the first marriage had no marriage
license because in the first case he impliedly admitted the same when he did not question the
absence of a marriage license.

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PROPER ACTION AND PROCEDURE FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF
MARRIAGE

LEONOR vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R No. 112597 April 2, 1996

Facts:
The petitioner filed a petition for certiorari assailing the validity of the judgment of the lower

court. It was shown that she was married to the private respondent and they had three kids. While
her husband was studying and working abroad, he cohabited with another woman. This prompted
her to file for separation and alimony against her husband. Her husband in return filed a divorce
case against her in Swiss Courts, contending that their marriage was void for absence of valid
marriage certificate. The Swiss Court held infavour of the private respondent. Subsequently the
Private Respondent filed a petition for the cancellation of the marriage certificate in the Philippines.
The trial court granted his petition and denied Petitioner‘s appeal. The Petitioner filed a special civil
action for certiorari in the CA, but the latter denied the same. She filed this petition with the
Supreme Court to assail the validity of CA‘s decision.

Issue:
Whether or not the lower court erred in declaring the marriage null and void?

Ruling:
Yes. Rule 108 as the basis of the private respondent‘s contention is untenable. The Court

explained that the Rule only applies to cases concerning typographical or other clerical errors in the
marriage contract. It does not apply to cases where the status of the parties and their children shall
be affected. The Supreme Court held in favour of the petitioner contending that ―A void judgment
for want of jurisdiction is no judgment at all‖.

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PARTIES FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE

G.R. No. 169766 LLAVE vs. REPUBLIC March 30, 2011

Facts:
Around 11 months before his death, Sen. Tamano married Estrellita twice – initially under

the Islamic laws and tradition on May 27, 1993 in Cotabato City and, subsequently, under a civil
ceremony officiated by an RTC Judge at Malabang, Lanao del Sur on June 2, 1993. In their marriage
contracts, Sen. Tamano s civil status was indicated as ―divorced‖. Since then, Estrellita has been
representing herself to the whole world as Sen. Tamano‘s wife, and upon his death, his widow.

On November 23, 1994, private respondents Haja Putri Zorayda A. Tamano (Zorayda) and
her son Adib Ahmad A. Tamano (Adib), in their own behalf and in behalf of the rest of Sen.
Tamano‘s legitimate children with Zorayda, filed a complaint with the RTC of Quezon City for the
declaration of nullity of marriage between Estrellita and Sen. Tamano for being bigamous. The
complaint alleged that Sen. Tamano married Zorayda on May 31, 1958 under civil rites, and that this
marriage remained subsisting when he married Estrellita in 1993.

Issue:
Whether the marriage between Estrellita and the late Sen. Tamano was bigamous.

Ruling:
Yes. The civil code governs the marriage of Zorayda and late Sen. Tamano; their marriage

was never invalidated by PD 1083. Sen. Tamano subsequent marriage to Estrellita is void ab initio.

The marriage between the late Sen. Tamano and Zorayda was celebrated in 1958, solemnized
under civil and Muslim rites. The only law in force governing marriage relationships between
Muslims and non-Muslims alike was the Civil Code of 1950, under the provisions of which only one
marriage can exist at any given time. Under the marriage provisions of the Civil Code, divorce is not
recognized except during the effectivity of Republic Act No. 394 which was not availed of during its
effectivity.

As far as Estrellita is concerned, Sen. Tamano s prior marriage to Zorayda has been severed
by way of divorce under PD 1083, the law that codified Muslim personal laws. However, PD 1083
cannot benefit Estrellita. Firstly, Article 13(1) thereof provides that the law applies to ―marriage and
divorce wherein both parties are Muslims, or wherein only the male party is a Muslim and the
marriage is solemnized in accordance with Muslim law or this Code in any part of the Philippines.‖
But Article 13 of PD 1083 does not provide for a situation where the parties were married both in
civil and Muslim rites.‖

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G.R. No. 173614 PARTIES FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE
ENRICO vs. HEIRS OF MEDINACELI

September 28, 2007

Facts:
Spouses Uelogio Medinaceli and Trinidad Catli-medicani were married on June 14 1962.

They had seven children, herein respondents. Trinidad died on may 1 2004 and on august 26 2004,
Eulogio marries petitioner Lolita Enrico on february 10 2005. respondent filed an action for
declaration of nullity of marriage between Eulogio and Lolita on two grounds:

1) that the marriage was entered into without the requisite marriage license and
2) lack of a marriage ceremony due to Eulogio's illness.

Enrico contended that she has been living with Eulogio for 21 years hence exempt from
getting a marriage license under Art. 34 of the Family Code. More importantly, she sought the
dismissal of his action on the ground that it is only the contracting parties while living who can file
an action for the declaration of nullity of marriage pursuant to AM 02-11-10 SC which provides in
sec. 2 (a) that the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of a void marriage may be filled solely
by the husband or the wife. The heirs invoked the ruling in the case of Ninal vs. Bayadog.

Issue:
a) Whether or not the marriage between Eulogio and Enrico is exempt from securing marriage
license.
b) Whether or not the respondent heirs can assail the validity of said marriage after the death of
Eulogio.

Ruling:
Petition is dismissed.

Under Art. 34 of the family code, a man and a woman who have been living together for at
least five years without any legal impediments are exempt from securing a marriage license. The said
exemption cannot possibly apply because the second marriage contracted by Eulogio with Enrico

took place barely 3 months after Trinidad dies. Moreover, the respondent heirs have no standing to
assail the validity of the second marriage even after te death of their father, Eulogio.

While it is true that Ninal vs. Bayadog allowed the heirs therein to file a petition for the
declaration of nullity of the Father's 2nd marriage after the death, the court held that the same rule
cannot be applied for the reason that the impugned marriage therein was solemnized prior to the
effectivity of the family code.

Nonetheless, the heirs are not left without remedy. They can still protect their successional
rights as compulsory or intestate heirs of Eulogio by questioning the validity of his second marriage
with Enrico, not in a proceeding for declaration of nullity, but in a proceeding for the settlement of
the estate deceased father filed in the regular courts.

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Persons and Family Relation

PARTIES FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE

G.R. No. 167109 CATALAN vs. COURT OF APPEALS February 6, 2007

Facts:
Petitioner Felicitas Amor-Catalan married respondent Orlando on June 4, 1950 in Mabini,

Pangasinan. Thereafter, they migrated to the United States of America and allegedly became
naturalized citizens thereof. After 38 years of marriage, Felicitas and Orlando divorced in April 1988.
On June 16, 1988, Orlando married respondent Merope in Calasiao, Pangasinan.

Petitioner contends that said marriage was bigamous since Merope had a prior subsisting
marriage with Eusebio Bristol. She filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage with
damages in the RTC of Dagupan City against Orlando and Merope.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner has the personality to file a petition for the declaration of nullity

of marriage of the respondents on the ground of bigamy?

Ruling:
A petition to declare the nullity of marriage, like any other actions, must be prosecuted or

defended in the name of the real party in interest and must be based on a cause of action. A petition
for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the

wife. Petitioner‘s personality to file the petition to declare the nullity of marriage cannot be
ascertained because of the absence of the divorce decree and the foreign law allowing it. After all,
she may have the personality to file the petition if the divorce decree obtained was a limited divorce
or a mensa et thoro; or the foreign law may restrict remarriage even after the divorce decree becomes
absolute. We note that it was the petitioner who alleged in her complaint that they acquired
American citizenship and that respondent Orlando obtained a judicial divorce decree. It is settled
rule that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere allegation is not evidence

Hence, a remand of the case to the trial court for reception of additional evidence is
necessary to determine whether respondent Orlando was granted a divorce decree and whether the
foreign law which granted the same allows or restricts remarriage. If it is proved that a valid divorce
decree was obtained and the same did not allow respondent Orlando‘s remarriage, then the trial
court should declare respondents‘ marriage as bigamous and void ab initio.

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Persons and Family Relation

PARTIES FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE

NIÑAL vs. BAYADOG

G.R. No. 133778 March 14, 2000

Facts:
Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of their

marriage were born herein petitioners. Pepito resulting to her death on April 24, 1985 shot Teodulfa.
One year and 8 months thereafter or on December 24, 1986, Pepito and respondent Norma

Bayadog got married without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an
affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived together as husband and wife for at
least 5 years and were thus exempt from securing a marriage license.

After Pepito‘s death on February 19, 1997, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of
nullity of the marriage of Pepito and Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a
marriage license.

Issue:
What nature of cohabitation is contemplated under Article 76 of the Civil Code (now Article

34 of the Family Code) to warrant the counting of the 5-year period in order to exempt the future
spouses from securing a marriage license.

Ruling:
The 5-year common law cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of

celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of the
marriage. This 5-year period should be the years immediately before the day of the marriage and it
should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity-meaning no third party was involved
at any time within the 5 years and continuity is unbroken.

Any marriage subsequently contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse shall be illegal
and void, subject only to the exception in cases of absence or where the prior marriage was
dissolved or annulled.

In this case, at the time Pepito and respondent‘s marriage, it cannot be said that they have
lived with each other as husband and wife for at least 5 years prior to their wedding day. From the
time Pepito‘s first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with respondent, only about 20
months had elapsed. Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting with
respondent. It is immaterial that when they lived with each other, Pepito had already been separated
in fact from his lawful spouse.

The subsistence of the marriage even where there is was actual severance of the filial
companionship between the spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with any third
party as being one as ―husband and wife‖.

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Having determined that the second marriage involve in this case is not covered by the
exception to the requirement of a marriage license, it is void ab initio because of the absence of such
element.

PARTIES FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE

CARLOS vs. SANDOVAL

G.R. No. 179922 December 16, 2008

Facts:
Teofilo Carlos and petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos were brothers who each have three

parcels of land by virtue of inheritance. Later Teofilo died intestate. He was survived by respondents
Felicidad Sandoval and their son, Teofilo Carlos II. Upon Teofilo‘s death, two parcels of land were
registered in the name of Felicidad and Teofilo II. In August 1995, Carlos commenced an action
against respondents before the court a quo. In his complaint, Carlos asserted that the marriage
between his late brother and Felicidad was a nullity in view of the absence of the required marriage
license. He likewise maintained that his deceased brother was neither the natural nor the adoptive
father of Teofilo Carlos II. He argued that the properties covered by such certificates of title,
including the sums received by respondents as proceeds, should be reconveyed to him.

Issue:
a) Whether or not Court of Appeals should apply the Rule 35 of the Rules of Court
b) Whether or not both parties should file for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages

Ruling:
The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage must be proved. Neither

judgment on the pleadings nor summary judgment is allowed. So is confession of judgment
disallowed. Carlos argues that the CA should have applied Rule 35 of the Rules of Court governing
summary judgment, instead of the rule on judgment on the pleadings. Petitioner is misguided.
Whether it is based on judgment on the pleadings or summary judgment, the CA was correct in
reversing the summary judgment rendered by the trial court. Both the rules on judgment on the
pleadings and summary judgments have no place in cases of declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage and even in annulment of marriage

A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the
husband or wife. Exceptions: (1) Nullity of marriage cases commenced before the effectivity of A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC; and (2) Marriages celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil Code. Under
the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages, the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may not be filed by any party
outside of the marriage. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed
solely by the husband or the wife. Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition
for annulment of voidable marriages or declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such
petition cannot be filed by compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. The

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Committee is of the belief that they do not have a legal right to file the petition. Compulsory or

intestate heirs have only inchoate rights prior to the death of their predecessor, and, hence, can only

question the validity of the marriage of the spouses upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for

the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts. PARTIES

G.R. No. 158298 ABLAZA vs. REPUBLIC August 11, 2010

Facts:

On October 17, 2000, the petitioner filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Cataingan,
Masbate a petition for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the marriage contracted on
December 26, 1949 between his late brother Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Honato.

The petitioner alleged that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila had been
celebrated without a marriage license, due to such license being issued only on January 9, 1950,
thereby rendering the marriage void ab initio for having been solemnized without a marriage license.
He insisted that his being the surviving brother of Cresenciano who had died without any issue
entitled him to one-half of the real properties acquired by Cresenciano before his death, thereby
making him a real party in interest; and that any person, himself included, could impugn the validity
of the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila at any time, even after the death of Cresenciano,
due to the marriage being void ab initio.

Issue:
Whether a person may bring an action for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the

marriage of his deceased brother

Ruling:
Considering that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila was contracted on

December 26, 1949, the applicable law was the old Civil Code, the law in effect at the time of the
celebration of the marriage. Hence, the rule on the exclusivity of the parties to the marriage as
having the right to initiate the action for declaration of nullity of the marriage under A.M. No. 02-

11-10-SC had absolutely no application to the petitioner.

Pursuant to the provisions of the old Civil Code, the presence of descendants, ascendants, or
illegitimate children of the deceased excludes collateral relatives like the petitioner from succeeding
to the deceased's estate. Necessarily, therefore, the right of the petitioner to bring the action hinges
upon a prior determination of whether Cresenciano had any descendants, ascendants, or children
(legitimate or illegitimate), and of whether the petitioner was the late Cresenciano's surviving heir.
The petition is returned to the RTC for further proceedings of the case.

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APPEARANCE OF THE STATE

VIRGILIO MAQUILAN vs. DITA MAQUILAN June 8, 2007
G.R. No. 155409

Facts:
Herein petitioner and herein private respondent are spouses who once had a blissful married

life and out of which were blessed to have a son. However, their once sugar coated romance turned
bitter when petitioner discovered that private respondent was having illicit sexual affair with her
paramour, which thus, prompted the petitioner to file a case of adultery against private respondent
and the latter‘s paramour. Consequently, both the private respondent and her paramour were
convicted of the crime charged and were sentenced to suffer an imprisonment ranging from one (1)
year, eight (8) months, minimum of prision correccional as minimum penalty, to three (3) years, six
(6) months and twenty one (21) days, medium of prision correccional as maximum penalty.

Thereafter, private respondent, through counsel, filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage, Dissolution and Liquidation of Conjugal Partnership of Gains and Damages on June 15,
2001 with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 3 of Nabunturan, Compostela Valley, docketed as Civil
Case No. 656, imputing psychological incapacity on the part of the petitioner.

During the pre-trial of the said case, petitioner and private respondent entered into a
Compromise Agreement. The said Compromise Agreement was given judicial imprimatur by the
respondent judge in the assailed Judgment On Compromise Agreement, which was erroneously
dated January 2, 2002.

Issue:
Whether the partial voluntary separation of property made by the spouses pending the

petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is valid.

Ruling:
A sworn statement of the fact and circumstances of reappearance shall be recorded in the

civil registry of the residence of the parties to the subsequent marriage at the instance of any
interested person, with due notice to the spouses of the subsequent marriage and without prejudice
to the fact of reappearance being judicially determined in case such fact is disputed. Where a
subsequent marriage is terminated because of the reappearance of an absent spouse; while Article 63
applies to the effects of a decree of legal separation. The present case involves a proceeding where
the nullity of the marriage is sought to be declared under the ground of psychological capacity.

Article 2035 of the Civil Code is also clearly inapplicable. The Compromise Agreement
partially divided the properties of the conjugal partnership of gains between the parties and does not
deal with the validity of a marriage or legal separation. It is not among those that are expressly

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prohibited by Article 2035. Moreover, the contention that the Compromise Agreement is
tantamount to a circumvention of the law prohibiting the guilty spouse from sharing in the conjugal
properties is misplaced. Existing law and jurisprudence do not impose such disqualification.

Under Article 143 of the Family Code, separation of property may be effected voluntarily or
for sufficient cause, subject to judicial approval. The questioned Compromise Agreement which was
judicially approved is exactly such a separation of property allowed under the law. This conclusion
holds true even if the proceedings for the declaration of nullity of marriage was still pending.
However, the Court must stress that this voluntary separation of property is subject to the rights of
all creditors of the conjugal partnership of gains and other persons with pecuniary interest pursuant
to Article 136 of the Family Code.

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APPEARANCE OF THE STATE

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. NORMA CUISON-MELGAR

G.R. No. 139676 March 31, 2006

Facts:
On March 27, 1965, Norma and Eulogio were married before the Catholic Church in

Dagupan City. Their union begot five children. On August 19,1996, Norma filed for declaration of
nullity of her marriage on the ground of Eulogio‘s psychological incapacity to comply with his
essential marital obligations. According to Norma the manifestations of Eulogio‘s psychological
incapacity are his immaturity, habitual alcoholism, unbearable jealousy, maltreatment, laziness, and
abandonment of his family since December 27, 1985.

Issue:
Whether or not the alleged psychological incapacity of respondent is in the nature

contemplated by Article 36.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court set aside and reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals. The

marriage between Norma and Eulogio is valid. The immaturity, habitual alcoholism, laziness,
jealousy and abandonment of respondent do not constitute psychological incapacity. The Court
ruled that it is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a
married person; it is essential that he or she must be shown to be incapable of doing so because of
some psychological, not physical, illness. In other words, proof of a natal or supervening disabling
factor in the person – an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively
incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential
to marriage – had to be shown. A cause has to be shown and linked with the manifestations of the
psychological incapacity.

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APPEARANCE OF THE STATE

FLORENCE MALCAMPO-SIN vs. PHILIPP T. SIN
G.R. No. 137590 March 26, 2001

Facts:
On January 4, 1987, Florence and respondent Philipp Sin, a Portuguese citizen, were married

at St. Jude Catholic Parish in San Miguel, Manila. On September 20, 1994, Florence filed with the
RTC, Pasig City, a complaint for ―declaration of nullity of Marriage‖ against Philipp. Trial ensued
and the parties presented their respective evidences.

Issue:
Whether or not the court erred in not ordering a prosecuting attorney or fiscal on behalf of

the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not
fabricated or suppressed.

Ruling:
Article 48 of the Family Code states that ―in all cases of annulment or declaration of

absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to
appear on behalf of the state to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care
that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. The trial court should have ordered the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor-General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be
handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification briefly stating his reasons for his
agreement or opposition as the case may be, to the petition. The records are bereft of an evidence
that the State participated in the prosecution of the case thus, the case is remanded for proper trial.

The Supreme Court reversed and set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals.

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APPEARANCE OF THE STATE

EMILIO R. TUASON vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 116607 April 10, 1996

Facts:
Maria Victoria Lopez and Emilio Tuason were married on June 3,1972. Lopez alleged that at

the time of the marriage. Emilio was already psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations that became manifested afterwards. The same resulted in violent fights.
Emilio was also said to be using prohibited drugs, he was a womanizer and gave minimal support to
the family. Likewise, he became spendthrift and abusive of his administration of the conjugal
partnership by alienating some of their assets without Victoria‘s consent. Attempts for reconciliation
failed because Emilio‘s refusal to reform. In the prayer of Victoria for annulment of marriage, she

further prayed for powers of administration to save the conjugal properties from further dissipation.
At variance, Emilio denied the imputation against him. Thereafter, trial ensued and Victoria
presented four witnesses including documentary evidence consisting of newspaper articles of
Emilio‘s relationship with other women, his apprehension for illegal possession of drugs and copies
of prior church annulment decree. After Victoria rested her case, reception for Emilio‘s evidence
was scheduled. It was postponed and on the reset date, he failed to appear. The court then declared
Emilio to have waived his right to present evidence and deemed the case submitted for decision.

On June 29, 1990, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the nullity of Victoria‘s
marriage to Emilio and awarded custody of the children to Ms. Lopez. Emilio filed a petition for
relief from judgment but was denied.

Issue:
Whether or not a petition for relief from judgment is warranted under the circumstance of

the case where petitioner was declared in default due to non-appearance during the hearing.

Ruling:
Rule 38, Section 2 of the Revised Rules of Court, governs a petition for relief from

judgment. Under the rules, a final and executor judgment or order of the Regional Trial Court may
be set aside on the ground of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence. In addition, the
petitioner must assert facts showing that he has a good, substantial and meritorious defense or cause
of action. If the petition is granted, the court shall proceed to hear and determine the case as if a

timely motion for new trial had been granted therein. Furthermore, the failure of counsel to notify
his client on time of an adverse judgment to enable the latter to appeal there from is negligence that

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is not excusable. Similarly inexcusable is the failure of a counsel to inform the trial court of his
client‘s confinement and medical treatment as the reason for his non-appearance at the scheduled
hearings. Indeed, a petition for relief from judgment is an equitable remedy, allowed only in
exceptional cases where there is no other available or adequate remedy.

APPEARANCE OF THE STATE

MARGIE MACIAS CORPUS vs. JUDGE WILFREDO G. OCHOTORENA
A.M. No. RTJ-04-1861 July 30, 2004

Facts:
Mrs. Macias asserts before the Court that the respondent judge's actuations constitute bias,

partiality and conduct unbecoming a judge. Moreover, according to her, what is more glaring and
conclusive from the records is that the respondent is grossly ignorant of the law and procedure. For
these administrative lapses, Mrs. Macias concludes that the Court should sanction him.

The conclusion is amply supported by the Court of Appeals' Decision which states that the
respondent judge totally disregarded Mrs. Macias' right to due process when he proceeded with the
trial on the merits of the case completely ignoring the fact that her Motion to Dismiss, which was
filed within the 30-day reglementary period, was still pending resolution.

The respondent judge disregarded the provisions of Section 1, Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules on
Civil Procedure, which states that: "After the last pleading has been served and filed, it shall be the
duty of the plaintiff to promptly move ex-parte that the case be set for pre-trial." Considering that
the last pleading was Mrs. Macias' Motion to Dismiss, the respondent judge should have first
resolved the motion and then waited for Mr. Macias' motion to set the case for pre-trial.

Issue:
Whether or not Judge Wilfredo G. Ochotorena is found guilty of gross ignorance of the law

and incompetence.

Ruling:
Under Section 3 in relation to Section 10 of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, gross ignorance

of the law is considered a serious offense, for which a penalty of either dismissal from the service
with forfeiture of benefits, suspension from office for more than three (3) months but not exceeding
six (6) months or a fine of more than Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) but not exceeding Forty
Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00) may be imposed. With this, Judge Wilfredo G. Ochotorena is found
GUILTY of gross ignorance of the law and incompetence and is hereby FINED the amount of
Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) to be taken from the amount earlier withheld from his

retirement benefits. The Fiscal Management Office of the OCA is DIRECTED to immediately

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release to the respondent judge the remaining balance of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) from
the aforesaid retained amount, unless there are other valid reasons for its further retention.

DEFAULT JUDGMENT AND JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

G.R. No. L-53880 PACETE vs. CARRIAGA March 17, 1994

Facts:
Concepcion Alanis filed a complaint on October 1979, for the Declaration of Nullity of

Marriage between her erstwhile husband Enrico Pacete and one Clarita de la Concepcion, as well as
for legal separation between her and Pacete, accounting and separation of property. She averred in
her complaint that she was married to Pacete on April 1938 and they had a child named Consuelo;

that Pacete subsequently contracted a second marriage with Clarita de la Concepcion and that she
learned of such marriage only on August 1979. Reconciliation between her and Pacete was
impossible since he evidently preferred to continue living with Clarita.

The defendants were each served with summons. They filed an extension within which to
file an answer, which the court partly granted. Due to unwanted misunderstanding, particularly in
communication, the defendants failed to file an answer on the date set by the court. Thereafter, the
plaintiff filed a motion to declare the defendants in default, which the court forthwith granted. The
court received plaintiffs‘ evidence during the hearings held on February 15, 20, 21, and 22, 1980.
After trial, the court rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiff on March 17, 1980.

Issue:
Whether or not the RTC gravely abused its discretion in denying petitioner‘s motion for

extension of time to file their answer, in declaring petitioners in default and in rendering its decision.

Ruling:
The Civil Code provides that ―no decree of legal separation shall be promulgated upon a

stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment. In case of non-appearance of the defendant, the
court shall order the prosecuting attorney to inquire whether or not collusion between parties exists.
If there is no collusion, the prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the State in order to take care
that the evidence for the plaintiff is not fabricated.‖

The above stated provision calling for the intervention of the state attorneys in case of
uncontested proceedings for legal separation (and of annulment of marriages, under Article 88) is to

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emphasize that marriage is more than a mere contract. Article 103 of the Civil Code, now Article 58
of the Family Code, further mandates that an action for legal separation must ―in no case be tried
before six months shall have elapsed since the filing of the petition,‖ obviously in order to provide
the parties a ―cooling-off‖ period. In this interim, the court should take steps toward getting the
parties to reconcile.

The significance of the above substantive provisions of the law is further or underscored by
the inclusion of a provision in Rule 18 of the Rules of Court which provides that no defaults in
actions for annulments of marriage or for legal separation. Therefore, ―if the defendant in an action
for annulment of marriage or for legal separation fails to answer, the court shall order the
prosecuting attorney to investigate whether or not collusion between the parties exists, and if there is
no collusion, to intervene for the State in order to see to it that the evidence submitted is not
fabricated.

FINAL JUDGMENT AND SUBSEQUENT PROCEEDINGS

MARBELLA-BOBIS vs. BOBIS

G.R. No. 138509 July 31, 2000

Facts:
On October 21, 1985, respondent contracted a first marriage with one Maria Dulce Javier.

Without said marriage having been annulled the same respondent contracted a second marriage with
petitioner Imelda Marbella- Bobis on January 25, 1996 and allegedly a third marriage with a certain

Julia Sally Hernandez. Based on petitioner‘s complaint a n information for bigamy was files against
respondent. Sometime thereafter, respondent initiated a civil action for the judicial declaration of
absolute nullity of his first marriage on the ground that it was celebrated without a marriage license.
Respondent filed a motion to suspend the proceedings in the criminal case for bigamy invoking the
pending civil case as a prejudicial question.

Issue:
Whether or not the pendency of the civil case for declaration of nullity of the marriage

posed a prejudicial question to the determination of the criminal case of respondent

Ruling:
The Supreme Court ordered the Trial Court to immediately proceed with the Criminal Case.

A pending civil case is not a prejudicial question. A prejudicial question is one which arises in a case
the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein. I t is a question based
on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines
the guilt or innocence of the accused.

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FINAL JUDGMENT AND SUBSEQUENT PROCEEDINGS

G.R. No. 127406 TY vs. COURT OF APPEALS November 27, 2000

Facts:
In 1977, private respondent Edgardo Reyes married Ana Maria Regina Villanueva in a civil

ceremony. A church wedding ensued. However, the Juvenile and Domestic Relatives want to declare
their marriage null and void ab initio lack of a valid marriage license. The church wedding was also
declared null and void ab initio for lack of consent of the parties.

In 1979, before the decree was issued nullifying his marriage to Anna Maria, Edgardo Reyes
married Ofelia Ty in a ceremony officiated by a judge, then a church wedding followed. In 1991,
Edgardo reyes filed a civil case with the Regional Trial Court praying that his marriage with Ofelia
be declared null and void on the ground that here was no marriage license when they got married.
He also averred at that time he married Ofelia, the decree of nullity of the marriage to Anna Maria
was rendered only when his civil marriage to petitioner, Ofelia Ty, null and void ab initio. The Court
of Appeals affirmed the decision

Issue:
Whether or not the decree of nullity of the first marriage is required before a subsequent

marriage can be entered into validly

Ruling:
The second marriage of private respondent was entered into in 1979, before the case of

Wiegel. At that time, the prevailing rule was found in Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon, wherein there
was no need for judicial declaration of nullity of a marriage for lack of license and consent, before
such person may contract a second marriage. The first marriage of private respondent being void for
lack of license and consent, there was no need for judicial declaration of its nullity before he could
contract a second marriage. In this case therefore, the Court concluded that private respondent‘s

second marriage to Ofelia Ty is valid.

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Moreover, the provision of the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied where to do so
would prejudice the vested rights of a party and her children. As held in Jison versus Court of
Appeals, the Family Code has retroactive effect unless there is impairment of vested rights.

Petition granted, judgment and resolution declared valid and subsisting.

EFFECTS

VALDES vs. RTC AND VALDES

G.R. No. 122749 July 31, 1996

Facts:
Antonio Valdes and Consuelo Gomez were married on January 5, 1971. Begotten during

their marriage were five children. In a petition dated June 22, 1992, Valdes sought the declaration of
nullity of the marriage pursuant to article 36 of the Family Code. After hearing the parties following
the joinder of issues, the marriage of Antonio Valdes and Consuelo Gomez is declared null and void
under Article 36 of the Family Code, on the ground of their mutual Psychological Incapacity to
comply with their essential marital obligations. The three older children shall choose which parent
they would want to stay with, the younger children shall be placed in the custody of their mother.
The petitioner and respondent are directed to start proceedings on the liquidation of their common
properties.

Consuelo Gomez sought a clarification on that portion directing compliance with Articles
50, 51 and 52 of the Family Code. She asserted that the Family Code contained no provisions on the
procedure for the liquidation of common property in ―unions without marriage.‖ Parenthetically,
during the hearing on the motion, the children filed a joint affidavit expressing their desire to remain
with their father Antonio Valdes.

Issue:
Whether the trial court failed to apply the correct law that should govern the disposition of a

family dwelling in a situation wherein a marriage is declared null and null and void because of
Psychological Incapacity on the part of either or both parties to the contract.

Ruling:
The trial court correctly applied the law. In a void marriage, regardless of cause thereof, the

property relation of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed by the provisions of
Article 137 or Article 148. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have

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obtained through their joint efforts.The rules set up to govern liquidation of either the absolute
community or the conjugal partnership of gains, the property regimes recognized for valid and
voidable marriages are irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-ownership that exist between common-
law spouses.

EFFECTS

G.R. No. 178044 ALAIN M. DIÑO vs. MA. CARIDAD L. DIÑO January 19, 2011

Facts:

Alain M. Diño and Ma. Caridad L. Diño were childhood friends and sweethearts. They
started living together in 1984 until they decided to separate in 1994. In 1996, petitioner and
respondent decided to live together again. On 14 January 1998, they were married before Mayor
Vergel Aguilar of Las Piñas City. Petitioner filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
against respondent. Extrajudicial service of summons was effected upon respondent who, at the
time of the filing of the petition, was already living in the United States of America. Despite receipt
of the summons, respondent did not file an answer to the petition within the reglementary period.
Petitioner later learned that respondent filed a petition for divorce/dissolution of her marriage with
petitioner, which was granted by the Superior Court of California on 25 May 2001. Petitioner also
learned that on 5 October 2001, respondent married a certain Manuel V. Alcantara. The Office of
the Las Piñas prosecutor found that there were no indicative facts of collusion between the parties
and the case was set for trial on the merits. Dr. Nedy L. Tayag (Dr. Tayag), a clinical psychologist,
submitted a psychological report establishing that respondent was suffering from Narcissistic
Personality Disorder which was deeply ingrained in her system since her early formative years. Dr.
Tayag found that respondent's disorder was long-lasting and by nature, incurable. In its 18 October
2006 Decision, the trial court granted the petition on the ground that respondent was
psychologically incapacited to comply with the essential marital obligations at the time of the
celebration of the marriage.

Issue:
Whether or not the trial court made mistake when it ordered that a decree of absolute nullity

of marriage shall only be issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties' properties.

Ruling:

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Yes, petitioner's marriage to respondent was declared void under Article 36 of the Family
Code and not under Article 40 or 45. What governs the liquidation of properties owned in common
by petitioner and respondent are the rules on co-ownership. The property relations of parties in a
void marriage during the period of cohabitation are governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of
the Family Code. The rules on co-ownership apply and the properties of the spouses should be
liquidated in accordance with the Civil Code provisions on co-ownership. Partition may be made by
agreement between the parties or by judicial proceedings. It is not necessary to liquidate the
properties of the spouses in the same proceeding for declaration of nullity of marriage.

FRAUD, ARTICLES 45 PARAGRAPH 3 AND 46, FC

VILLANUEVA vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 132955 October 27, 2006

Facts:
Respondent Villadores is one of the accused in the crime of Illegal Falsification of Public

Documents. It appears that petitioner Villanueva filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against several
parties and among them is the IBC 13. The labor arbiter ruled in favor of the petitioner. IBC 13
appealed to National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). IBC 13 filed a surety bond but this
document was found to be falsified. The two complaints for falsification of document was brought
before Manila prosecutor‘s office and dismissed the charges against Atty. Eulalio Diaz III and
respondent Villadores. The petitioned filed for review of the case with the DOJ, the latter affirmed
the dismissal of Atty. Diaz III but ordered the inclusion of respondent Villadores as an accused in
the two criminal cases. Accordingly, the original informations were amended to include the
respondent among those charged. Following the arraignment, the private prosecutor, Rico and
Associates, filed a new Motion to Admit Amended Informations alleging damages sustained by the
petitioner as a result of the crimes committed by the accused. The motion was admitted by the trial
court. The respondent moved for reconsideration but the same was denied. Subsequently,
respondent moved for the disqualification of Rico and Associates and the appellate court
pronounced that petitioner did not sustain any damages for the crime committed by the respondent
and the same has redounded to his benefit. Rico and Associates opposed such pronouncement since
it is a mere obiter dictum.

Issue:
Whether or not the pronouncement of appellate court that petitioner Villanueva is not an

offended party is a mere obiter dictum.

Ruling:

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The pronouncement of appellate court that petitioner Villanueva is not an offended party is
not a mere obiter dictum. An adjudication on any point within the issue presented by the case
cannot be considered as obiter dictum, and this rule applies to all pertinent questions, although
incidentally involved, which are presented and decided in the regular course of the consideration of
the case and led up to the final conclusion and to any statement as to matter on which the decision
is predicated. Hence, in the instant case, the pronouncement of the appellate court is not an obiter
dictum as it touched upon a matter clearly raised by respondent Villadores in his petition assailing
the admission of the amended informations. Argument on whether petitioner Villanueva was the
offended party was, thus, clearly raised by respondent. The body of decision contains the discussion
on that point and it clearly mentioned certain principles of law.

FRAUD, ARTICLES 45 PARAGRAPH 3 AND 46, FC

G.R. No. L-27930 ANAYA vs. PALAROAN November 26, 1970

Facts:
Plaintiff Aurora and defendant Fernando were married on December 4, 1953; that defendant

Fernando filed an action for annulment of the marriage on January 7, 1954 on the ground that his
consent was obtained through force and intimidation. Fernando had divulged to Aurora that several
months prior to their marriage he had a pre-marital relationship with a close relative of his; and that
―the non divulgement to her of the aforementioned pre-marital secret on the part of the defendant
that definitely wrecked their marriage, which apparently doomed to fail even before it had hardly
commenced…Plaintiff herein from going thru the marriage that was solemnized between them
constituted ‗FRAUD‘‘ in obtaining her consent, She prayed for the annulment of the marriage and
for moral damages.

Issue:
Whether or not the non-disclosure to a wife by her husband of his pre-marital relationship

with anither woman is a ground for annulment of marriage

Ruling:
Non-disclosure of a husband‘s pre-marital relationship with another woman is not one of

the enumerated circumstances that would constitute a ground for annulment; and it is further
excluded by the last paragraph of the Article, providing that ―no other misrepresentation or deceit as
to chastity‖ shall give ground for an action to annul a marriage.

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FRAUD, ARTICLES 45 PARAGRAPH 3 AND 46, FC

BUCCAT vs. MANGONON DE BUCCAT

G.R. NO. 47101 April 25, 1941

Facts:
On March 1938, Godofredo Buccat and Luida Mangonon de Buccat first met, then they

came engaged September of the same year. After few months later, on November 26, 1938, they got
married.However, after 89 days of their marriage dated February 23, 1939, Luida gave birth to a son.
After knowing this, Godofredo left Luida and never returned to married life with her. On March 23,
1939, he filed for an annulment of their marriage on the grounds that when he agreed to married
Luida, she assured him that she was a virgin.

The Lower court decided in favor of Luida.

Issue:
Should the annulment for Godofredo Buccat‘s marriage be granted on the grounds that

Luida concealed her pregnancy before the marriage?

Ruling:
No. Clear and authentic proof is needed in order to nullify a marriage, a sacred institution in

which the State is interested and where society rests.In this case, the court did not find any proof
that there was concealment of pregnancy constituting fraud as a ground for annulment. It was
unlikely that Godofredo, a first-year law student, did not suspect anything about Luida‘s condition

considering that she was in an advanced stage of pregnancy (highly developed physical
manifestation, ie. enlarged stomach ) when they got married.

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SC affirmed the lower court‘s decision. Costs to plaintiff-appellant.

FORCE, INTIMIDATION, UNDUE INFLUENCE

G.R. No. 132955 VILLANUEVA vs. COURT OF APPEALS October 27, 2006

Facts:
Respondent Villadores is one of the accused in the amended in formations in Criminal Cases

entitled, ―People of the Philippines v. Atty. Tomas Bernardo, Roque Villadores, Alberto Adriano
and Rolando Advincula for Falsification of Public Document before the RTC of Manila. It appears
that petitioner Villanueva Jr. filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against several parties among them
IBC 13.When the labor arbiter ruled in favor of petitioner Villaneva Jr. IBC 13 appealed to the
National Labor Relations Commission. Thus the two complaints for falsification of public
document were filed before the Manila City Prosecutor‘s Office. The charges against Respondent
Villadores and Atty. Eulalio Diaz 111 were dismissed by the City Prosecutors Office.

Issue:
Whether or not the court erred in failing to appreciate that Francisco Villanueva Jr. was in

fact an aggrieved party.

Ruling:
Francisco Villanueva is not the offended party in these cases. It must be underscored that it

was IBC 13 who secured the falsified surety bond for the purpose of the appeal it had taken from an
adverse judgment of the labor case filed by Villanueva. We see no reason how Villanueva could have
sustained damages as a result of the falsification of the surety appeal bond and its confirmation letter

when it could have redounded to his own benefit if the appeal would be dismissed as a result of the
forgery. If there be anyone who was prejudiced, it was IBC 13 when it purchased a fake surety bond.

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FORCE, INTIMIDATION, UNDUE INFLUENCE

MACCARUBO vs. MACCARUBO

A.C. No. 6148 February 27, 2004

Facts:
This is a disbarment case against Atty. Edmundo Maccarrubo. Complainant Florencie

Maccarrubo averred that she was started courting by respondent Atty. Edmundo Maccarrubo in
April 1991, he representing himself as a bachelor; that they eventually contracted marriage which
was celebrated on two occasions administered by Rev. Rogelio J. Bolivar, the first on December 18,
1991 in the latter‘s Manila office, and the second on December 28, 1991 at the Asian Institute of
Tourism Hotel in Quezon City; and that although respondent admitted that he was married to Helen
Esparza on June 16, 1982, he succeeded in convincing complainant, her family and friends that his
previous marriage was void. Complainant further averred that respondent entered into a third
marriage with one Josephine T. Constantino; and that he abandoned complainant and their children
without providing them any regular support up to the present time, leaving them in precarious living
conditions. But respondent filed a petition for nullity of marriage since it was contracted with
vitiated consent.

Issue:
Whether or not the disbarment case be dismissed basing it from the court‘s declaration of

nullity of the marriage.

Ruling:

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While the marriage between complainant and respondent has been annulled by final
judgment, this does not cleanse his conduct of every tinge of impropriety. He and complainant
started living as husband and wife in December 1991 when his first marriage was still subsisting, as it
was only on August 21, 1998 that such first marriage was annulled, rendering him liable for
concubinage. Such conduct is inconsistent with the good moral character that is required for the
continued right to practice law as a member of the Philippine bar. It imports moral turpitude and is
a public assault upon the basic social institution of marriage. Hence the respondent was disbarred
for gross misconduct.

FORCE, INTIMIDATION, UNDUE INFLUENCE

REYES VS. ZABALLERO

G.R. No. L-3561 May 23, 1951

Facts:
This case originated from a loan of P6,500 with interest at 10 per cent per annum payable in

advance, made by Dr. Ceasar Reyes to Agripino Zaballero on October 1, 1942. Zaballero secured
the payment with a first mortgage on ten parcels of land.

The installments due for 1942 and 1943 totaling the sum of P1,300 plus interest were paid in
Japanese Military Script and the Payments were unreservedly accepted. On November 30, 1944,
Zaballero offered to pay the third installments and its interests which fell due on October of the
same year, but Reyes refused to accept on the ground that it was immoral and unjust that the
payment be made in Japanese Military notes which had considerably devaluated, and that he had an
option according to the contract to have the payment in Philippine or United States currency.
Zaballero announced that the next day he would tender the whole balance. Reyes, acting upon
advice given by his attorneys to whom he had meanwhile resorted for guidance, received the money
and executed the notarial deed of release of the real estate mortgage. On the same day, he received
payment, the mortgagee (Reyes), executed an affidavit in secret, without defendants‘ knowledge,
before a Notary Public stating that he had accepted under protest the payment of P5,200 plus

interest in the sum of P612, and that he had deposited the whole amount paid by the debtors.

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Issue:
What constitutes Duress or Intimidation?

Ruling:
According to the Civil Code, there is Duress or intimidation when one of the contracting

parties is inspired by a rational and well-grounded fear or suffering an imminent and serious injury
to his person or property, of his spouse, descendants and ascendants. Mere reluctance does not
detract from the voluntariness of one‘s acts. There is a distinction between a case where a person
gives his consent reluctantly and even against his good sense and judgment, and where he, in reality,
gives no consent at all, as where he executed a contract or performs an act against a pressure which
he cannot resist. It is clear that one acts as voluntarily and independently in the eye of the law when
he acts reluctantly and with hesitation as when he acts spontaneously and joyously. Legally speaking
he acts as voluntarily and freely when he acts wholly against his better sense and judgment as when
he acts in conformity with them. Between the two acts there is no difference in law.

IMPOTENCY, ARTICLE 45 PARAGRAPH 5, FC

G.R. No. 174451 ALACAZAR vs. ALACAZAR October 13, 2009

Facts:
On October 17, 2000, the petitioner filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Cataingan,

Masbate a petition for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the marriage contracted on
December 26, 1949 between his late brother Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Honato. The
petitioner alleged that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila had been celebrated without a
marriage license, due to such license being issued only on January 9, 1950, thereby rendering the
marriage void ab initio for having been solemnized without a marriage license. He insisted that his
being the surviving brother of Cresenciano who had died without any issue entitled him to one-half
of the real properties acquired by Cresenciano before his death, thereby making him a real party in
interest; and that any person, himself included, could impugn the validity of the marriage between
Cresenciano and Leonila at any time, even after the death of Cresenciano, due to the marriage being
void ab initio.

Issue:
Whether a person may bring an action for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the

marriage of his deceased brother

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Ruling:
`Considering that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila was contracted on

December 26, 1949, the applicable law was the old Civil Code, the law in effect at the time of the
celebration of the marriage. Hence, the rule on the exclusivity of the parties to the marriage as
having the right to initiate the action for declaration of nullity of the marriage under A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC had absolutely no application to the petitioner.

Pursuant to the provisions of the old Civil Code, the presence of descendants, ascendants, or
illegitimate children of the deceased excludes collateral relatives like the petitioner from succeeding
to the deceased's estate. Necessarily, therefore, the right of the petitioner to bring the action hinges
upon a prior determinationof whether Cresenciano had any descendants, ascendants, or children
(legitimate or illegitimate), and of whether the petitioner was the late Cresenciano's surviving heir.
The petition is returned to the RTC for further proceedings of the case.

IMPOTENCY, ARTICLE 45 PARAGRAPH 5, FC

VILLANUEVA vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 132955 October 27, 2006

Facts:
Petitioner Orlando Villanueva and private respondent Lilia Canalita-Villanueva got married

on April 13, 1988 in Puerto Princesa, Palawan. On November 17, 1992, Orlando filed with the trial
court a petition for annulment of his marriage alleging that threats of violence and duress forced him
into marrying Lilia, who was already pregnant; that he did not get her pregnant prior to the marriage;
that he never cohabited with her after the marriage; and that he later learned that private
respondent's child died during delivery on August 29, 1988.

On January 12, 1996, the trial court rendered judgment the dispositive portion of which
states:1) Dismissing the above-entitled case; and 2) Ordering the plaintiff to pay the defendant moral
damages in the amount of P100,000.00, exemplary damages in the amount of P50,000.00, and
attorney's fees in the amount of P20,000.00, plus the costs of suit. The Court of Appeals affirmed
the trial court‘s dismissal of the petition and the award of attorney‘s fees and costs, but reduced the
award of moral and exemplary damages to P50,000.00 and P25,000.00, respectively. The Court of

Appeals denied petitioner‘s motion for reconsideration, hence, the instant petition for review based
on the following assigned errors:

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