civil code0101

TENDER AGE PRESUMPTION RULE

GAMBOA-HIRSCH vs. COURT OF APPEALS July 11, 2007
G.R. No. 174485

Facts:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 which seeks to set aside the decision of the CA

which granted private respondent Franklin joint custody with petitioner Agnes of their minor
daughter Simone.

Spouses Franklin and Agnes started to have marital problems as Agnes wanted to stay in
Makati City, while Franklin insisted that they stay in Boracay Island. When Agnes came to their
conjugal home in Boracay, and asked for money and for Franklin‘s permission for her to bring their
daughter to Makati City for a brief vacation she has an intention not to come back to Boracay.

Franklin then filed a petition for habeas corpus before the CA for Agnes to produce Simone
in court; CA issued a Resolution which ordered that a writ of habeas corpus be issued ordering that
Simone be brought before said court. CA granted Franklin joint custody with Agnes of their minor
child. Agnes filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied.

Issue:
Whether or not the CA acted with grave abuse of discretion when it granted joint custody in

utter disregard of the provisions of the Family Code, as to minors seven (7) years of age and below.

Ruling:
The court held that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it granted joint

custody of the minor child to both parents. The so-called "tender-age presumption" under Article
213 of the Family Code may be overcome only by compelling evidence of the mother‘s unfitness.
The mother is declared unsuitable to have custody of her children in one or more of the following
instances: neglect, abandonment, unemployment, immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug addiction,
maltreatment of the child, insanity, or affliction with a communicable disease. Here, the mother was
not shown to be unsuitable or grossly incapable of caring for her minor child. All told, no
compelling reason has been adduced to wrench the child from the mother‘s custody. Sole custody
over Simone Noelle Hirsch is hereby AWARDED to the mother, petitioner Agnes Gamboa-Hirsch.

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Persons and Family Relation

TENDER AGE PRESUMPTION RULE

PABLO-GUALBERTO vs. GUALBERTO June 28, 2005
G.R. No. 154994

Facts:
Crisanto Rafaelito G. Gualberto V filed before the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity

of his marriage to Joycelyn w/ an ancillary prayer for custody pendente lite of their almost 4 year old
son, Rafaello, whom her wife took away w/ her from their conjugal home and his school when she
left him.

The RTC granted the ancillary prayer for custody pendente lite, since the wife failed to
appear despite notice. A house helper of the spouses testified that the mother does not care for the
child as she very often goes out of the house and even saw her slapping the child. Another witness
testified that after surveillance he found out that the wife is having lesbian relations.

The judge issued the assailed order reversing her previous order, and this time awarded the
custody of the child to the mother. Finding that the reason stated by Crisanto not to be a compelling
reason as provided in Art 213 of the Family Code.

Issue:
Whether or not the custody of the minor child should be awarded to the mother.

Ruling:
Article 213 of the Family Code provided: ―Art 213. In case of separation of parents parental

authority shall be exercised by the parent des granted by the court. The court shall take into account
all relevant consideration, especially the choice of the child over seven years of age, unless the parent
chosen is unfit.‖ No child under seven yrs of age shall be separated from the mother unless the
court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise,‖ This Court has held that when the parents
separated, legally or otherwise, the foregoing provision governs the custody of their child. Article
213 takes its bearing from Article 363 of the Civil Code, which reads: ―Art 363. In all question on
the care, custody, education and property pf children, the latter welfare shall be paramount. No
mother shall be separated from her child under seven years of age, unless the court finds compelling
reason for such measure.‖

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Persons and Family Relation

TENDER AGE PRESUMPTION RULE

G.R. No. 113054 SANTOS vs. COURT OF APPEALS March 16, 1995

Facts:
Petitioner Leouel Santos, Sr., an army lieutenant, and Julia Bedia a nurse by profession, were

married in Iloilo City in 1986. Their union beget only one child, Leouel Santos, Jr. who was born
July 18, 1987. From the time the boy was released from the hospital until sometime thereafter, he
had been in the care and custody of his maternal grandparents, private respondents herein,
Leopoldo and Ofelia Bedia.

On September 2, 1990, petitioner along with his two brothers, visited the Bedia household,
where three-year old Leouel Jr. was staying. Private respondents contend that through deceit and
false pretensions, petitioner abducted the boy and clandestinely spirited him away to his hometown
in Bacong, Negros Oriental.

The spouses Bedia then filed a "Petition for Care, Custody and Control of Minor Ward
Leouel Santos Jr.," before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, with Santos, Sr. as respondent.
After an ex-parte hearing on October 8, 1990, the trial court issued an order on the same day
awarding custody of the child Leouel Santos, Jr. to his grandparents, Leopoldo and Ofelia Bedia.
Petitioner appealed this Order to the Court of Appeals. In its decision dated April 30, 1992,
respondent appellate court affirmed the trial court's order.

Petitioner assails the decisions of both the trial court and the appellate court to award
custody of his minor son to his parents-in-law, the Bedia spouses on the ground that under Art. 214
of the Family Code, substitute parental authority of the grandparents is proper only when both
parents are dead, absent or unsuitable. Petitioner's unfitness, according to him, has not been
successfully shown by private respondents.

Issue:
Who should properly be awarded custody of the minor Leouel Santos, Jr.

Ruling:
The minor should be given to the legitimate father. When a parent entrusts the custody of a

minor to another, such as a friend or godfather, even in a document, what is given is merely
temporary custody and it does not constitute a renunciation of parental authority. Only in case of
the parents' death, absence or unsuitability may substitute parental authority be exercised by the

surviving grandparent.

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The court held the contentions of the grandparents are insufficient as to remove petitioner's
parental authority and the concomitant right to have custody over the minor. Private respondents'
demonstrated love and affection for the boy, notwithstanding, the legitimate father is still preferred
over the grandparents.

The latter's wealth is not a deciding factor, particularly because there is no proof that at the
present time, petitioner is in no position to support the boy. While petitioner's previous inattention
is inexcusable, it cannot be construed as abandonment. His appeal of the unfavorable decision
against him and his efforts to keep his only child in his custody may be regarded as serious efforts to
rectify his past misdeeds. To award him custody would help enhance the bond between parent and
son. The Court also held that his being a soldier is likewise no bar to allowing him custody over the
boy. So many men in uniform, who are assigned to different parts of the country in the service of
the nation, are still the natural guardians of their children.

Also, petitioner's employment of trickery in spiriting away his boy from his in-laws, though
unjustifiable, is likewise not a ground to wrest custody from him.

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Persons and Family Relation

TENDER AGE PRESUMPTION RULE

G.R. No. 124724 GOLANGCO vs. COURT OF APPEALS
December 22, 1997

Facts:
A petition for annulment of marriage was filed by private respondent Lucia Carlos Golangco

against petitioner Rene Uy Golangco before the Regional Trial Court of Makati. The couple had two
children, Justin Rene and Stefan Rafael. During the proceedings of the case, a hearing for custody
pendente lite of the two children was held. In an order dated July 21, 1994, the trial court awarded
the two children to Lucia while Rene was given visitation rights of at least one week in a month.
Thereafter Rene questioned the order dated July 21, 1994 with the Court of Appeals. The Court of
Appeals, however, dismissed the petition and instead affirmed the order of the trial court. Not
contented, Rene appealed the resolution of the Court of Appeals affirming the order dated July 21,

1994 before this Court. On July 17, 1995, the Court resolved to dismiss the petition for failure of
petitioner Rene to show that grave abuse of discretion had been committed by the appellate court.

On August 15, 1995, Lucia filed with the trial court a motion for reconsideration with prayer
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. She sought redress due to an alleged incident on
July 5, 1995, in which her estranged husband physically abused their son Justin. Due to the incident,
a criminal complaint for slight physical injuries was filed on July 1995 against Rene by his son Justin
with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati on the basis of Justin‘s complaint-affidavit. On August
16, 1995, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order against him and set the hearing of the
motion. After it was decided in favor of Luisa, Rene filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Revised Rules of Court before the Court of Appeals, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the trial court in issuing the October 4, 1995 order.

Issue:
Whether or not Rene is denied of due process of law.

Ruling:
The trial court gave both parties the opportunity to present their respective evidence and

witnesses. An adequate hearing was conducted and, based on the evidence, the trial court deemed it
proper to grant the writ of preliminary injunction.

The assessment and evaluation of evidence in the issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunction involves findings of facts ordinarily left to the trial court for its conclusive determination.

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Persons and Family Relation

It is a fundamental and settled rule that conclusions and findings of fact by the trial court are entitled
to great weight and should not be disturbed on appeal, unless strong and cogent reasons dictate
otherwise. This is because the trial court is in a better position to examine the real evidence, as well
as to observe the conduct of the witnesses while testifying in the case.

This Supreme Court finds no justifiable reason or exception sufficient to cause the reversal
of the trial court‘s declaration in granting the writ of preliminary injunction against petitioner. The
petition was partially granted.

TENDER AGE PRESUMPTION RULE

G.R. No. 111180 DAVID vs. COURT OF APPEALS November 16, 1995

Facts:
Petitioner Daisie T. David worked as secretary of private respondent Ramon R. Villar, a

businessman in Angeles City. Private respondent is a married man and the father of four children, all
grown-up. After a while, the relationship between petitioner and private respondent developed into
an intimate one, as a r esult of which a son, Christopher J., was born on March 9, 1985 to them.
Christo pher J. was followed by two more children, both girls, namely Christine, born on
June 9, 1986, and Cathy Mae on April 24, 1988.

The relationship became known to private respondent's wife when Daisie took Christopher
J, to Villar's house at Villa Teresa in Angeles City sometime in 1986 and introduced him to Villar's
legal wife. After this, the children of Daisie were freely brought by Villar to his house as they were
eventually accepted by his legal family.In the summer of 1991, Villar asked Daisie to allow
Christopher J., then six years of age, to go with his family to Boracay. Daisie agreed, but after th e
trip, Villar refused to give back the child. Villar said he had enrolled Christopher J. at the Holy
Family Academy for the next school year. On July 30, 1991, Daisie filed a petition for habeas corpus
on behalf of Christopher J.

Issue:
Whether or not Daisie is entitled to the custody of the child.

Ruling:
Yes. Daisie in turn filed this petition for review of the appellate court's decision. Rule 102, §1

of the Rules of Court provides that "the writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal
confinement or detention by which any person is d eprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful
custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto." It is indeed true, as the Court of
Appeals observed, that the determination of the right to the custody of minor children is relevant in
cases where the parents, who are married to each other, are for some reason separated from each
other. It does not follow, however, that it cannot arise in any other situation. For example, in the
case of Salvaña v. Gaela, it was held that the writ of habeas corpus is the proper remedy to enable

parents to regain the custody of a minor daughter even though the latter be in the custody of a third
person of her free will because the parents were compelling her to marry a man against her will.

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Persons and Family Relation

In the case at bar, Christopher J. is an illegitimate child since at the time of his conception,
his father, private respondent Ramon R. Villar, was married to another woman other than the child's
mother. As such, pursuant to Art. 176 of the Family Code, Christopher J. is under the parental
authority of his mother, the herein petitioner, who, as a consequence of such authority, is entitled
to have custody of him. 2 Since, admittedly, petitioner has been deprived of her rightful custody of
her child by private respondent, she is entitled to issuance of the writ of habeas corpus.

Indeed, Rule 1021 §1 makes no distinction between the case of a mother who is separated
from her husband and is entitled to the custody of her child and that of a mother of an illegitimate
child who, by law, is vested with sole parental authority, but is deprived of her rightful custody of
her child.

The fact that private respondent has recognized the minor child may be a ground for
ordering him to give support to the latter, but not for giving him custody of the child. Under
Art.213 of the Family Code, "no child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother
unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise."

Although the question of support is proper in a proceeding for that purpose, the grant of
support in this case is justified by the fact that private respondent has expressed willingness to
support the minor child. The order for payment of allowance need not be conditioned on the grant
to him of custody of the child. Under Art. 204 of the Family Code, a person obliged to give support
can fulfill his obligation either by paying the allowance fixed by the court or by receiving and
maintaining in the family dwelling the person who is entitled to support unless, in the latter case,
there is "a moral or legal obstacle thereto."

In the case at bar, as has already been pointed out, Christopher J., being less than seven years
of age at least at the time the case was decided by the RTC, cannot be taken from the mother's
custody. Even now that the child is over seven years of age, the mother's custody over him will have
to be upheld because the child categorically expressed preference to live with his mother. Under Art.
213 of the Family Code, courts must respect the "choice of the child over seven years of age, unless
the parent chosen is unfit" and here it has not been shown that the mother is in any way unfit to
have custody of her child. Indeed, ifprivate respondent loves his child, he should not condition the
grant of support for him on the award of his custody to him (private respondent).

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Persons and Family Relation

TENDER AGE PRESUMPTION RULE

G.R. No. 115640 ESPIRITU vs. COURT OF APPEALS
March 15, 1995

Facts:
Petitioner Reynaldo Espiritu and respondent Teresita Masauding first met in Iligan City

where Reynaldo was employed by the National Steel Corporation and Teresita was employed as a
nurse in a local hospital. Teresita left for Los Angeles, California to work as a nurse. Reynaldo was
sent by his employer, the National Steel Corporation, to Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania as its liaison
officer and Reynaldo and Teresita then began to maintain a common law relationship of husband

and wife. On 1986, their daughter, Rosalind Therese, was born. While they were on a brief vacation
in the Philippines, Reynaldo and Teresita got married, and upon their return to the United States,
their second child, a son, this time, and given the name Reginald Vince, was born on 1988.

The relationship of the couple deteriorated until they decided to separate. Instead of giving
their marriage a second chance as allegedly pleaded by Reynaldo, Teresita left Reynaldo and the
children and went back to California. Reynaldo brought his children home to the Philippines, but
because his assignment in Pittsburgh was not yet completed, he was sent back by his company to
Pittsburgh. He had to leave his children with his sister, Guillerma Layug and her family.

Teresita, meanwhile, decided to return to the Philippines and filed the petition for a writ of
habeas corpus against herein two petitioners to gain custody over the children, thus starting the
whole proceedings now reaching this Court. The trial court dismissed the petition for habeas corpus.
It suspended Teresita's parental authority over Rosalind and Reginald and declared Reynaldo to have
sole parental authority over them but with rights of visitation to be agreed upon by the parties and
to be approved by the Court.

Issue:
Whether or not the petition for a writ of habeas corpus to gain custody over the children be

granted.

Ruling:
Supreme Court dismissed the writ of habeas corpus petition by the mother and retain the

custody of the children to the father. The illicit or immoral activities of the mother had already

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Persons and Family Relation

caused emotional disturbances, personality conflicts, and exposure to conflicting moral values
against the children.

The children are now both over seven years old. Their choice of the parent with whom they
prefer to stay is clear from the record. From all indications, Reynaldo is a fit person. The children
understand the unfortunate shortcomings of their mother and have been affected in their emotional
growth by her behavior.

TENDER AGE PRESUMPTION RULE

G.R.No. 118870 PEREZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS March 29, 1996

Facts:
Ray Perez is a doctor practicing in Cebu while Nerissa, his wife, (petitioner) is a registered

nurse. After six miscarriages, two operations and a high-risk pregnancy, Nerissa finally gave birth to
Ray Perez II in New York on July 20, 1992. Ray stayed with her in the U.S. twice and took care of
her when she became pregnant. Unlike his wife, however, he had only a tourist visa and was not
employed.

On January 17, 1993, the couple and their baby arrived in Cebu. After a few weeks, only
Nerissa returned to the U.S. She alleged that they came home only for a five-week vacation and that
they all had round-trip tickets. However, her husband stayed behind to take care of his sick mother
and promised to follow her with the baby. According to Ray, they had agreed to reside permanently
in the Philippines but once Nerissa was in New York, she changed her mind and continued
working. She was supposed to come back immediately after winding up her affairs there.

When Nerissa came home a few days before Ray II‘s first birthday, the couple was no longer

on good terms. They had quarrels. Nerissa did not want to live near her in-laws and rely solely on
her husband‘s meager income of P5,000.00. On the other hand, Ray wanted to stay here, where he
could raise his son even as he practiced his profession. He maintained that it would not be difficult
to live here since they have their own home and a car. Despite mediation by the priest, the couple
failed to reconcile.

Nerissa filed a petition to surrender the custody of their son to her. The trial court issued an
Order awarding custody to Nerissa citing the second paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code
which provides that no child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother, unless the
court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise. Upon appeal by Ray Perez, the Court of Appeals
reversed the trial court‘s order and held that granting custody to the boy‘s father would be for the
child‘s best interest and welfare.

Issue: 508

Persons and Family Relation

Whether or not Nerissa has rightful custody of a child?

Ruling:
Yes. Aside from Article 213 of the Family Code, the Revised Rules of Court also contains a

similar provision. Rule 99, Section 6 (Adoption and Custody of Minors) provides: ―SEC. 6.
Proceedings as to child whose parents are separated.Appeal. - When husband and wife are divorced
or living separately and apart from each other, and the questions as to the care, custody, and control
of a child or children of their marriage is brought before a Court of First Instance by petition or as
an incident to any other proceeding, the court, upon hearing the testimony as may be pertinent, shall
award the care, custody, and control of each such child as will be for its best interest, permitting the
child to choose which parent it prefers to live with if it be over ten years of age, unless the parent
chosen be unfit to take charge of the child by reason of moral depravity, habitual drunkenness,
incapacity, or poverty x x x. No child under seven years of age shall be separated from its mother,
unless the court finds there are compelling reasons therefor.‖

The provisions of law quoted above clearly mandate that a child under seven years of age
shall not be separated from his mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise.
The use of the word ―shall‖ in Article 213 of the Family Code and Rule 99, Section 6 of the Revised
Rules of Court connotes a mandatory character.

The general rule that a child under seven years of age shall not be separated from his mother
finds its reason in the basic need of a child for his mother‘s loving care. Only the most compelling
of reasons shall justify the court‘s awarding the custody of such a child to someone other than his
mother, such as her unfitness to exercise sole parental authority. In the past the following grounds
have been considered ample justification to deprive a mother of custody and parental authority:
neglect, abandonment, unemployment and immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug addiction,
maltreatment of the child, insanity and being sick with a communicable disease.

It has long been settled that in custody cases, the foremost consideration is always the
welfare and best interest of the child. In fact, no less than an international instrument, the
Convention on the Rights of the Child provides: ―In all actions concerning children, whether
undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities
or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.

In the case, financial capacity is not a determinative factor inasmuch as both parties have
demonstrated that they have ample means. Nerissa‘s present work schedule is not so unmanageable
as to deprive her of quality time with her son. Quite a number of working mothers who are away
from home for longer periods of time are still able to raise a family well, applying time management
principles judiciously. Also, delegating child care temporarily to qualified persons who run day-care
centers does not detract from being a good mother, as long as the latter exercises supervision, for
even in our culture, children are often brought up by housemaids under the eagle eyes of the
mother.

Although Ray‘s is a general practitioner, the records show that he maintains a clinic, works
for several companies on retainer basis and teaches part-time. He cannot possibly give the love and
care that a mother gives to his child.

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Persons and Family Relation

RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF PERSONS EXERCISING PARENTAL AUTHORITY

LIBI vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

G.R.No. 70890 September 18, 1992

Facts:
On January 14, 1979, Julie Ann Gotiong and Wendell Libi died, each from a single gunshot

wound from a revolver licensed in the name of petitioner Cresencio Libi. The respondents, parents
of Julie Ann, filed a case against the parents of Wendell to recover damages arising from the latter‘s
vicarious liability under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. The trial court dismissed the complaint. On
appeal, the IAC set aside the judgment of the lower court dismissing the complaint of Julie Ann‘s
parents.

Issue:
Whether or not Article 2180 of the Civil Code was correctly interpreted by the respondent

Court to make petitioners liable for vicarious liability.

Ruling:
Yes. The petitioners were gravely remiss in their duties as parents in not diligently

supervising the activities of their son. Both parents were wanting in their duty and responsibility in
monitoring and knowing the activities of their son. The petitioners utterly failed to exercise all the
diligence of a good father of a family in preventing their son from committing the crime by means
of the gun which was freely accessible to Wendell Libi because they have not regularly checked
whether the gun was still under lock, but learned that it was missing from the safety deposit box
only after the crime had been committed. The civil liability of parents for quasi-delicts of their minor
children, as contemplated in Article 2180, is primary and not subsidiary.

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Persons and Family Relation

RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF PERSONS EXERCISING PARENTAL AUTHORITY

TAMARGO vs. COURT OF APPEALS June 3, 1992
G.R.No. 85044

Facts:
Domestic Adoption Act of 1998; Adelberto Bundoc, then a minor of 10 years of age, shot

Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle causing injuries which resulted in her death. Accordingly, a civil
complaint for damages was filed with the RTC of Ilocos Sur by petitioner Macario Tamargo,
Jennifer's adopting parent and petitioner spouses Celso and Aurelia Tamargo, Jennifer's natural
parents against respondent spouses Victor and Clara Bundoc, Adelberto's natural parents with
whom he was living at the time of the tragic incident.

Prior to the incident, the spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura had filed a petition to adopt the
minor Adelberto Bundoc in Special Proceedings before the then CIF of Ilocos Sur. This petition for
adoption was granted that is, after Adelberto had shot and killed Jennifer. Respondent spouses
Bundoc, Adelberto's natural parents, reciting the result of the foregoing petition for adoption,
claimed that not they, but rather the adopting parents, namely the spouses Sabas and Felisa
Rapisura, were indispensable parties to the action since parental authority had shifted to the
adopting parents from the moment the successful petition for adoption was filed.

Petitioners in their reply contended that since Adelberto Bundoc was then actually living
with his natural parents, parental authority had not ceased nor been relinquished by the mere filing
and granting of a petition for adoption. The trial court dismissed petitioners' complaint, ruling that
respondent natural parents of Adelberto indeed were not indispensable parties to the action.

Issues:
a) Whether or not petitioners, notwithstanding loss of their right to appeal, may still file the
instant petition.
b) Whether the Court may still take cognizance of the case even through petitioners' appeal had
been filed out of time.

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Ruling:
Supreme Court granted the petition. Retroactive affect may perhaps be given to the granting

of the petition for adoption where such is essential to permit the accrual of some benefit or
advantage in favor of the adopted child. In the instant case, however, to hold that parental authority
had been retroactively lodged in the Rapisura spouses so as to burden them with liability for a
tortious act that they could not have foreseen and which they could not have prevented would be
unfair and unconscionable.

Parental liability is a natural or logical consequence of duties and responsibilities of parents,
their parental authority which includes instructing, controlling and disciplining the child. In the case
at bar, during the shooting incident, parental authority over Adelberto was still lodged with the
natural parents. It follows that they are the indispensable parties to the suit for damages. ―Parents
and guardians are responsible for the damage caused by the child under their parental authority in
accordance with the civil code‖.

SPECIAL PARENTAL AUTHORITY

AQUINAS SCHOOL vs. INTON

G.R. No. 184202 January 26, 2011

Facts:
This case is about the private school‘s liability for the outside catechist‘s act of shoving a

student and kicking him on the legs when he disobeyed her instruction to remain in his seat and not
move around the classroom. In 1998, Jose Luis Inton (Jose Luis) was a grade three student at
Aquinas School (Aquinas). Respondent Sister Margarita Yamyamin (Yamyamin), a religion teacher
who began teaching at that school only in June of that year, taught Jose Luis‘ grade three religion
class. Jose Luis left his seat and went over to a classmate to play a joke of surprising him. Yamyamin
noticed this and sent him back to his seat. After a while, Jose Luis got up again and went over to the
same classmate. Yamyamin approached the Jose Luis and kicked him on the legs several times. She
also pulled and shoved his head on the classmate‘s seat. She also made the child copy the notes on
the blackboard while seating on the floor. Respondents Jose and Victoria Inton (the Intons) filed an
action for damages on behalf of their son Jose Luis against Yamyamin and Aquinas before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City in Civil Case 67427. The Intons also filed a criminal action
against Yamyamin for violation of Republic Act 7610 to which she pleaded guilty and was sentenced
accordingly. With regard to the action for damages, the Intons sought to recover actual, moral, and
exemplary damages, as well as attorney‘s fees, for the hurt that Jose Luis and his mother Victoria
suffered. The RTC dismissed Victoria‘s personal claims but ruled in Jose Luis‘ favor, holding
Yamyamin liable to him for moral damages of P25,000.00, exemplary damages of P25,000.00, and
attorney‘s fees of P10,000.00 plus the costs of suit. They elevated the case to the CA to increase the
award of damages and hold Aquinas solidarily liable with Yamyamin.

Issue:
Whether or not the CA was correct in holding Aquinas solidarily liable with Yamyamin for

the damages awarded to Jose Luis.

Ruling:

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No. The school directress testified that Aquinas had an agreement with a congregation of
sisters under which, in order to fulfill its ministry, the congregation would send religion teachers to
Aquinas to provide catechesis to its students. Aquinas insists that it was not the school but
Yamyamin‘s religious congregation that chose her for the task of catechizing the school‘s grade three
students, much like the way bishops designate the catechists who would teach Religion in public
schools. Aquinas did not have control over Yamyamin‘s teaching methods. The Intons had not
refuted the school directress‘ testimony in this regard. Aquinas still had the responsibility of taking
steps to ensure that only qualified outside catechists are allowed to teach its young students. In this
regard, it cannot be said that Aquinas took no steps to avoid the occurrence of improper conduct
towards the students by their religion teacher. They showed records, certificates and diploma that
Yamyamin is qualified to teach. There is no question that she came from a legitimate congregation
of sisters. They provided Faculty Staff Manual in handling the students. They pre-approved the
content of the course she wanted to teach. They have a classroom evaluation program for her
unfortunately, she was new, therefore do not have sufficient opportunity to observe her.

SPECIAL PARENTAL AUTHORITY

ST. JOSEPH’S COLLEGE vs. MIRANDA June 29, 2010
G.R. No. 182353

Facts:
While inside the premises of St. Joseph‘s College, the class where respondent Miranda

belonged was conducting a science experiment about fusion of sulfur powder andiron fillings under
the tutelage of Rosalinda Tabugo, she being the teacher and the employee, while the adviser is
Estafania Abdan.

Tabugo left her class while it was doing the experiment without having adequately secured it
from any untoward incident or occurrence. In the middle of the experiment, Jayson, who was the
assistant leader of one of the class groups, checked the result of the experiment by looking into the
test tube with magnifying glass. The test tube was being held by one of his group mates who moved
it close and towards the eye of Jayson. At that instance, the compound in the test tube spurted out
and several particles of which hit Jayson‘s eye and the different parts of the bodies of some of his
group mates. As a result thereof, Jayson‘s eyes were chemically burned, particularly his left eye, for
which he had to undergo surgery and had to spend for his medication. Upon filing of this case [in]
the lower court, his wound had not completely healed and still had to undergo another surgery.

Upon learning of the incident and because of the need for finances, [Jayson‘s] mother, who
was working abroad, had to rush back home for which she spent P36,070.00 for her fares and had to
forego her salary from November 23, 1994 to December 26, 1994, in the amount of at least
P40,000.00.

Jason and his parents suffered sleepless nights, mental anguish and wounded feelings as a
result of his injury due to the petitioner‘s fault and failure to exercise the degree of care and diligence
incumbent upon each one of them. Thus, they should be held liable for moral damages.

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Persons and Family Relation

Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners were liable for the accident.

Ruling:
Yes. As found by both lower courts, proximate cause of the Jason‘s injury was the

concurrent failure of petitioners to prevent to foreseeable mishap that occurred during the conduct
of the science experiment. Petitioners were negligent by failing to exercise the higher degree of care,
caution and foresight incumbent upon the school, its administrators and teachers. "The defense of
due diligence of a good father of a family raised by [petitioner] St. Joseph College will not exculpate
it from liability because it has been shown that it was guilty of inexcusable laxity in the supervision
of its teachers despite an apparent rigid screening process for hiring and in the maintenance of what
should have been a safe and secured environment for conducting dangerous experiments. Petitioner
school is still liable for the wrongful acts of the teachers and employees because it had full
information on the nature of dangerous science experiments but did not take affirmative steps to
avert damage and injury to students. Schools should not simply install safety reminders and
distribute safety instructional manuals. More importantly, schools should provide protective gears
and devices to shield students from expected risks and anticipated dangers.

SPECIAL PARENTAL AUTHORITY

ST. MARY’S ACADEMY vs. CARPITANOS

G.R. No. 143363 February 6, 2002

Facts:
Defendant-appellant St. Mary‘s Academy of Dipolog City conducted an enrollment drive for

the school year 1995-1996. A facet of the enrollment campaign was the visitation of schools from
where prospective enrollees were studying. As a student of St. Mary‘s Academy, Sherwin Carpitanos
was part of the campaigning group.

Accordingly, on the fateful day, Sherwin, along with other high school students were riding
in a Mitsubishi jeep owned by defendant Vivencio Villanueva on their way to Larayan Elementary
School, Dapitan City. The jeep was driven by James Daniel II then 15 years old and a student of the
same school. Allegedly, the latter drove the jeep in a reckless manner and as a result the jeep turned
turtle. Sherwin Carpitanos died as a result of the injuries he sustained from the accident. The parents
of Sherwin filed a case against James Daniel II and his parents, James Daniel Sr. and Guada Daniel,
the vehicle owner, Vivencio Villanueva and St. Mary‘s Academy before the RTC of Dipolog City
and claimed for damages.

Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner St. Mary‘s Academy is liable for damages for the death of

Sherwin Carpitanos.

Ruling:
GRANTED and REMANDED to the RTC for determination of any liability of the school.

The Court held that for the school to be liable there must be a finding that the act or omission
considered as negligent was the proximate cause of the injury caused because of negligence, must
have causal connection to the accident. There is no showing of such.

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Persons and Family Relation

Hence, with the overwhelming evidence presented by petitioner and the respondent Daniel
spouses that the accident occurred because of the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the
jeep, it is not the school, but the registered owner of the vehicle who shall be held responsible for
damages for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos.

SPECIAL PARENTAL AUTHORITY

AMADORA vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. L-47745 April 15, 1988

Facts:
Like any prospective graduate, Alfredo Amadora was looking forward to the commencement

exercises where he would ascend the stage and in the presence of his relatives and friends receive his
high school diploma. As it turned out, though, fate would intervene and deny him that awaited
experience. While they were in the auditorium of their school, the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, a
classmate, Pablito Damon, fired a gun that mortally hit Alfredo, ending all his expectations and his
life as well.

Daffon was convicted of homicide thru reckless imprudence. Additionally, the herein
petitioners, as the victim's parents, filed a civil action for damages under Article 2180 of the Civil
Code against the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, its rector the high school principal, the dean of
boys, and the physics teacher, together with Daffon and two other students, through their respective
parents. The complaint against the students was later dropped. After trial, the CIF of Cebu held the
remaining defendants liable to the plaintiffs. On appeal to the respondent court, however, the
decision was reversed and all the defendants were completely absolved.

Issue:
Whether or not teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for the

death of Alfredo Amadora.

Ruling:

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Persons and Family Relation

The Court has come to the conclusion that the provision in question (Art. 2180) should
apply to all schools, academic as well as non-academic. Following the canon of reddendo singular
singuli, where the school is academic, responsibility for the tort committed by the student will attach
to the teacher in charge of such student. This is the general rule. Reason: Old academic schools, the
heads just supervise the teachers who are the ones directly involved with the students.

Where the school is for arts and trades, it is the head and only he who shall be held liable as
an exception to the general rule. Reason: Old schools of arts and trades saw the masters or heads of
the school personally and directly instructed the apprentices.

Therefore, the heads are not liable. The teacher-in-charge is not also liable because there‘s no
showing that he was negligent in enforcing discipline against the accused or that he waived
observance of the rules and regulations of the school, or condoned their non-observance. Also, the
fact that he wasn‘t present can‘t be considered against him because he wasn‘t required to report on
that day. Classes had already ceased.

SPECIAL PARENTAL AUTHORITY

G.R. No. L-70458 SALVOSA vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT October 5, 1988

Facts:
Petitioners in this case were impleaded in the civil case for damages filed against Abon.

Salvosa being the (Executive Vice President of BCF).Jimmy Abon was a commerce student of the
Baguio Colleges Foundation. He was also appointed as armorer of the school‘s ROTC Unit. As
armorer of the ROTC Unit, Jimmy B. Abon received his appointment from the AFP. He received

orders from Captain Roberto C. Ungos, the Commandant of the Baguio Colleges Foundation
ROTC Unit, concurrent Commandant of other ROTC units in Baguio and an employee (officer) of
the AFP. On 3 March 1977, at around 8:00 p.m., in the parking space of BCF, Jimmy B. Abon shot
Napoleon Castro a student of the University of Baguio with an unlicensed firearm which the former
took from the armory of the ROTC Unit of the BCF. As a result, Napoleon Castro died and Jimmy
B. Abon was prosecuted for, and convicted of the crime of Homicide by Military Commission No.
30, AFP.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioners can be held solidarity liable with Jimmy B. Abon for damages

under Article2180 of the Civil Code, as a consequence of the tortious act of Jimmy B. Abon.

Ruling:

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Persons and Family Relation

Teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades are liable for "damages caused by
their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody." The rationale of
such liability is that so long as the student remains in the custody of a teacher, the latter "stands, to a
certain extent, in loco parentis [as to the student] and [is]called upon to exercise reasonable
supervision over the conduct of the [student]."

Likewise, "the phrase used in[Art. 2180— 'so long as (the students) remain in their custody
means the protective and supervisory custody that the school and its heads and teachers exercise
over the pupils and students for as long as they are at attendance in the school , including recess
time." In line with the case of Palisoc , a student not "at attendance in the school" cannot be in
"recess" thereat. A"recess," as the concept is embraced in the phrase "at attendance in the school,"
contemplates a situation of temporary adjournment of school activities where the student still
remains within call of his mentor and is not permitted to leave the school premises, or the area
within which the school activity is conducted. Recess by its nature does not include dismissal.

Likewise, the mere fact of being enrolled or being in the premises of a school without more
does not constitute "attending school" or being in the "protective and supervisory custody' of the
school, as contemplated in the law.

Upon the foregoing considerations, we hold that Jimmy B. Abon cannot be considered to
have been "at attendance in the School," or in the custody of BCF, when he shot Napoleon Castro. .
Logically, therefore, petitioners cannot under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code be held solidarity liable
with Jimmy B. Abon for damages resulting from his acts

SPECIAL PARENTAL AUTHORITY

PHILIPPINE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION VS. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 84698 February 4, 1992

Facts:
Carlitos Bautista was a third year student at the Philippine School of Business

Administration. Assailants, who were not members of the school‘s academic community, while in
the premises of PSBA, stabbed Bautista to death. This incident prompted his parents to file a suit
against PSBA and its corporate officers for damages due to their alleged negligence, recklessness and
lack of security precautions, means and methods before, during and after the attack on the victim.
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that the compliant states no cause of action
against them based on quasi-delicts, as the said rule does not cover academic institutions. The trial
court denied the motion to dismiss. Their motion for reconsideration was likewise dismissed, and
was affirmed by the appellate court. Hence, the case was forwarded to the Supreme Court.

Issue:
Whether or not PSBA is liable for the death of the student.

Ruling:
Because the circumstances of the present case evince a contractual relation between the

PSBA and Carlitos Bautista, the rules on quasi-delict do not really govern. A perusal of Article 2176

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Persons and Family Relation

shows that obligations arising from quasi-delicts or tort, also known as extra-contractual obligations,
arise only between parties not otherwise bound by contract, whether express or implied. However,
this impression has not prevented this Court from determining the existence of a tort even when
there obtains a contract.

Article 2180, in conjunction with Article 2176 of the Civil Code, establishes the rule in in
loco parentis. Article 2180 provides that the damage should have been caused or inflicted by pupils
or students of the educational institution sought to be held liable for the acts of its pupils or students
while in its custody. However, this material situation does not exist in the present case for, as earlier
indicated, the assailants of Carlitos were not students of the PSBA, for whose acts the school could
be made liable. But it does not necessarily follow that PSBA is absolved form liability.

When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment, there is established a contract
between them, resulting in bilateral obligations which both parties is bound to comply with. For its
part, the school undertakes to provide the student with an education that would presumably suffice
to equip him with the necessary tools and skills to pursue higher education or a profession. This
includes ensuring the safety of the students while in the school premises. On the other hand, the
student covenants to abide by the school's academic requirements and observe its rules and
regulations.

Failing on its contractual and implied duty to ensure the safety of their student, PSBA is
therefore held liable for his death.

Petition denied.

USE OF SURNAME BY WOMEN, ARTICLES 370-373, CIVIL CODE

REMO vs. SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS March 5, 2010
G.R. No. 169202

Facts:
Petitioner Maria Virginia V. Remo is a married Filipino citizen whose Philippine passport

was then expiring on 27 October 2000. Petitioner being married to Francisco R. Rallonza, the
following entries appears in her passport: ―Rallonza‖ as her surname, ―Maria Virginia‖ as her given
name, and ―Remo‖ as her middle name. Prior to the expiry of the validity of her passport, petitioner,
whose marriage still subsists, applied for the renewal of her passport with the Department of
Foreign Affairs (DFA) office in Chicago, Illinois, U.S.A., with a request to revert to her maiden
name and surname in the replacement passport.
However, the petitioner‘s request has been denied. With this reason, she filed a petition to change
her surname to her middle name in the Supreme Court.

Issue:
Whether or not Maria Virginia can change her surname ―Rallonza‖ to her middle name

―Remo‖ in her passport.

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Persons and Family Relation

Ruling:
No. The Supreme Court ruled that once a married woman opted to adopt her husband‘s

surname in her passport, she may not revert to the use of her maiden name, except in the cases
enumerated in section 5(d) of RA 8239. these instances are: (1) death of husband, (2) divorce, (3)
annulment, or (4) nullity of marriage. since petitioner‘s marriage to her husband subsists, she may
not resume her maiden name in the replacement passport. otherwise stated, a married woman's
reversion to the use of her maiden name must be based only on the severance of the marriage.

Even assuming RA 8239 conflicts with the civil code, the provisions of RA 8239 which is a
special law specifically dealing with passport issuance must prevail over the provisions of title xiii of
the civil code which is the general law on the use of surnames. a basic tenet in statutory
construction is that a special law prevails over a general law.

Wherefore, the court denied the petition andaffirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals.

USE OF SURNAME BY WOMEN, ARTICLES 370-373, CIVIL CODE

G.R. No. 94986 YASIN vs. JUDGE SHARI’A DISTRICT COURT February 23, 1995

Facts:
Petitioner after the dissolution of her marriage by divorce under the Code of Muslim Law of

the Philippines, filed a petition to the respondent court, a petition to resume the use of her maiden
name and surname. The petition was denied by the respondent court on the ground that the petition
is substantially for change of name and that compliance with the provisions of Rule 103 Rules of
Court on change of name is necessary if the position is to be granted as it would result in the
resumption of the use of petitioners maiden name and surname.

Issue:
Whether or not petition for resumption of maiden name and surname is also a petition for

change of name.

Ruling:

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Persons and Family Relation

The court rules in the negative. Rule 103 of the Rules of Court on change of name should
not be applied to judicial conformation of the right of divorced woman to resume her maiden name
and surname. Wherefore the petition is granted.

USE OF SURNAME BY CHILDREN, ARTICLES 364-369, CIVIL CODE

IN RE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA

G.R. No. 148311 March 31, 2005

Facts:
On August 31, 2000, Honorato B. Catindig, herein petitioner, filed a petition to adopt his

minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. He alleged therein among others, that
Stephanie was born on June 26, 1994, that her mother is Gemma Astorga Garcia; that Stephanie has
been using her mother‘s middle name and surname, and that she is now a widower and qualified to
be her adopting parent. He prayed that Stephanie‘s middle name Astorga be changed to Garcia her
mother‘s surname and that her surname Garcia be changed to Catindig, his Surname.

The trial court rendered the assailed decision granting the adoption, however, the trial Court
did not allow the use of her mother‘s surname as her middle name. Thus, petitioner filed a motion
for clarification and reconsideration praying that Stephanie should be allowed to use the surname of
her natural mother (Garcia) as her middle name.

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Persons and Family Relation

Issue:
Whether or not an illegitimate child may use the surname of her mother, as her middle

name, when she subsequently adopted by her natural father.

Ruling:
As correctly submitted by parties, there is no law regulating the use of a middle name.

Notably, the law is likewise silent as to what middle name an adoptee may use. The Court ruled that
since no law granting an illegitimate child adopted by her natural father, as in this case, to use as
middle name the mother‘s surname, the Court found no reason why Stephanie should not allowed
to use her mother‘s surname Garcia as her middle name.

NAMES AND SURNAMES: USE OF SURNAME BY CHILDREN

GR.No.159966 IN RE JULIAN LIN WANG March 30, 2005

Facts:
Petitioner Julian Lin Wang a minor represented by his mother Anna Lisa Wang filed a

petition dated 19 September 2002 for change of name of entry in the civil registry of Julian Lin
Wang. Petitioner sought to drop his middle name and have his registered name changed from Julian
Lin Carulasan Wang to Julian Lin Wang. Petitioner theorizes that it would be for his best interest to
drop his middle name as this would help him adjust more easily to integrate himself into
Singaporean society.

Issue:
Whether or not the law the law provides for his middle name to be changed.

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Persons and Family Relation

Ruling:
The touchstone for the grant of a change of name is that there be proper and reasonable

cause for which the change is sought. to justify a request for the change of name, the petitioner must
show not only some proper reason therefore but also that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true
and official name. Among the grounds for the change of name which have been held valid are:

a.) When the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce.
b.) When the change results as a legal consequence
c.) When the change will avoid confusion.
d.) When one has continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name
and was not aware of the alien parentage.
e.) A sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name and
f.) When the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change
of name was for a fraudulent purpose.

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Persons and Family Relation

NAMES AND SURNAMES: USE OF SURNAME BY CHILDREN

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME OF MARIA
ESTRELLA VERONICA PRIMITIVA DUTERTE, ESTRELLA S. ALFON

G.R. No. L-51201 May 29, 1980

Facts:
This is verified petition filed on April 28, 1978 by petitioner Maria Estrella Veronica

Primitiva Duterte through her counsel, Atty. Rosauro Alvarez, praying that her name be changed
from Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte to Estrella S. Alfon.

The notice setting the petition for hearing on December 14, 1978 at 8:30 o'clock in the
morning was published in the Times Journal in its issues of July 28, August 5 and 11, 1978 and a
copy thereof together with a copy of the petition was furnished the Office of the Solicitor General
(Exhibits C, C-1, C-2 and C-3).

At the hearing of the petition on December 14, 1978, Atty. Rosauro Alvarez appeared for
the petitioner and Fiscal Donato Sor. Suyat, Jr. represented the office of the Solicitor General, Upon
motion of counsel for the petitioner, without objection on the part of Fiscal Suyat, the Deputy Clerk
of Court was appointed commissioner to receive the evidence and to submit the same for resolution
of the Court.

From the testimonial and document evidence presented, it appears that petitioner Maria
Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte was born on May 15, 1952 at the U.S.T. Hospital (Exhibit A).
She was registered at the local Civil Registrar's Office as Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte
On June 15, 1952; she was baptized as Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte at the St. Anthony
de Padua Church Singalong, Manila. Her parents are Filomeno Duterte and Estrella Veronica
Primitiva Duterte has been taken care of by Mr. and Mrs. Hector Alfon. Petitioner and her uncle,
Hector Alfon, have been residing at 728 J.R. Yulo Street corner Ideal Street, Mandaluyong, Metro
Manila for twenty-three (23) years. When petitioner started schooling, she used the name Estrella S.
Alfon. She attended her first grade up to fourth year high school at Stella Maris College using the
name Estrella S. Alfon (Exhibits E, E-1, E-2 and E-3). After graduating from high school she
enrolled at the Arellano University and finished Bachelor of Science in Nursing. Her scholastic
records from elementary to college show that she was registered by the name of Estrella S. Alfon.
Petitioner has exercised her right of suffrage under the same name. She has not committed any
felony or misdemeanor.

Issue:
Whether or not she may be allowed for the change of name and her surname.

Ruling:
Upon satisfactory proof in open court on the date fixed in the order that such order has

been published as directed and that the allegations of the petition are true, the court shall if proper
and reasonable cause appears for changing the name of the petitioner adjudge that such name be
changed in accordance with the prayer of the petition.

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Persons and Family Relation

The evidence submitted shows that the change of name from Maria Estrella Veronica
Primitiva Duterte to Estrella Alfon is not proper and reasonable with respect to the surname. The
fact that petitioner has been using a different surname and has become known with such surname
does not constitute proper and reasonable cause to legally authorize and change her surname to
Alfon. The birth certificate clearly shows that the father of petitioner is Filomeno Duterte. Petitioner
likewise admitted this fact in her testimony. To allow petitioner to change her surname from Duterte
to Alfon is equivalent to allowing her to use her mother's surname. Article 364 of the Civil Code
provides:

Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the father. If another
purpose of the petitioner is to carry the surname of Alfon because her uncle who reared her since
childhood has the surname "Alfon" then the remedy is not a petition for change of name.

WHEREFORE, the petition insofar as the first name is granted but denied with respect to
the surname. Petitioner is authorized to change her name from Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva
Duterte to Estrella Alfon Duterte.

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Persons and Family Relation

NAMES AND SURNAMES: USE OF A DIFFERENT NAME

G.R. No. 164368 PEOPLE vs. ESTRADA April 2, 2009

Facts:
December 27, 1994, at the St. John‘s Cathedral, Dagupan City, while the sacrament of

confirmation was being performed by the Bishop, a man from the crowd walked towards the center
of the altar and sat on the Bishop‘s chair. Crisanto Santillan, who was an assistant, saw this. He
requested the accused to vacate, but the latter refused. They called on the guard. Despite repeated
request, he did not move. As the guard was attempting to strike the victim with his nightstick to
make him leave accused-appellant drew a knife and stabbed Mararac. He repeated it a lot. After, he
got up and shouted via the mic; No one can beat me here! SPO1 Francisco saw a man, with red
stains on his shirt and a knife in one hand sitting on a chair. He advised him to drop the knife.
Accused-appellant obeyed, Mararac, the security guard, was brought to the hospital where he
expired a few minutes upon arrival.

Accused-appellant, filed a ―Demurrer to Evidence‖ where he claims that: prosecution failed
to prove murder; that there was unlawful aggression by the victim; and that accused-appellant was of
unsound mind. Inspector Valdez (Jail warden) requested the court to allow accused-appellant, to be
treated at the Baguio General Hospital to determine whether he should remain in jail or be
transferred to some other institution. While motion for reconsideration was pending, counsel for

accused-appellant filed a ―Motion to Confine Accused for Physical, Mental and Psychiatric
Examination.‖ Appellant‘s counsel informed the court that accused-appellant had been exhibiting
abnormal behavior for the past weeks. There were 2 letters of the warden requesting the same. The
trial court denied reconsideration of the order denying the ―Demurrer to Evidence.‖ Dr. Maria
Soledad Gawidan, a resident physician in the Department of Psychiatry at the Baguio General
Hospital, testified to the accused being confined and diagnosed with ―Schizophrenic Psychosis,
Paranoid Type—schizophrenia, paranoid, chronic, paranoid type.‖

The trial court rendered a decision on June 23, 1997. It upheld the prosecution evidence and
found accused-appellant guilty of the crime charged and thereby sentenced him to death,

Issue:
Whether or not he was indeed insane

Ruling:
When a person commits a felonious act the act is presumed to have been done voluntarily.

In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the law presumes that every person is of sound mind and
that all acts are voluntary. An insane person is exempt from criminal liability unless he has acted
during a lucid interval. In the eyes of the law, insanity exists when there is a complete deprivation of
intelligence in committing the act. Mere abnormality of the mental faculties will not exclude
imputability. Since the presumption is always in favor of sanity, he who invokes insanity as an
exempting circumstance must prove it by clear and positive evidence. There are certain

circumstances that should have placed the trial court on notice that appellant may not have been in
full possession of his mental faculties e.g. when he attacked Mararac, then went up the microphone.

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Persons and Family Relation

Accused-appellant‘s history of mental illness was brought to the courts.

To test whether the accused would have a fair trial there are two distinct matters to be
determined (1) whether defendant is coherent to provide his counsel with information necessary (2)
whether he is able to comprehend the significance of the trial and his relation to it. To put a legally
incompetent person on trial or to convict and sentence him is a violation of the constitutional rights
to a fair trial. The determination of whether a sanity investigation or hearing should be ordered rests
generally in the discretion of the trial court. In the case at bar, when accused-appellant moved for
suspension of the arraignment on the ground of accused‘s mental condition, the trial court denied
the motion after finding that the questions propounded on appellant were intelligently answered by
him. The fact that accused-appellant was able to answer the questions asked by the trial court is not
conclusive evidence that he was competent enough to stand trial and assist in his defense. The trial
court took it solely upon itself to determine the sanity of accused-appellant. The trial judge is not a
psychiatrist or psychologist or some other expert equipped with the specialized knowledge. If the
medical history was not enough to create a reasonable doubt in the judge‘s mind of accused-
appellant‘s competency to stand trial, subsequent events should have done so. One month after the
prosecution rested its case, there were letters requesting that accused be confined in hospital, as well
as the counsel‘s filing of motion. And despite all the overwhelming indications of accused-
appellant‘s state of mind, the judge persisted in his personal assessment and never even considered
subjecting accused-appellant to a medical examination. To top it all, the judge found appellant guilty
and sentenced him to death!

At this late hour, a medical finding alone may make it impossible for us to evaluate
appellant‘s mental condition at the time of the crime‘s commission for him to avail of the exempting
circumstance of insanity. Nonetheless, under the present circumstances, accused-appellant‘s
competence to stand trial must be properly ascertained to enable him to participate in his trial
meaningfully. Remanded to the court a quo for the conduct of a proper mental examination on
accused-appellant, a determination of his competency to stand trial, and for further proceedings.

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Persons and Family Relation

NAMES AND SURNAMES: USE OF A DIFFERENT NAME

URSUA vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 112170. April 10, 1996

Facts:
Petitioner wrote the name ―Oscar Perez‖ in the visitor‘s logbook and used the same in

receiving the copy of a complaint against him at the Office of the Ombudsman. This was discovered
and reported to the Deputy Ombudsman who recommended that the petitioner be accordingly
charged. Trial Court found the petitioner guilty of violating Sec.1 of C.A. No. 142 as amended by
R.A. No. 6085 otherwise known as ‖An Act to Regulate the Use of Aliases―. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the conviction with some modification of sentence.

Issue:
Whether or not the use of alias in isolated transaction falls within the prohibition of

Commonwealth Act No. 142.

Ruling:
No. The questioned decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the RTC was

reversed and set aside and petitioner was acquitted of the crime charged.

An alias is a name or names used by a person or intended to be used by him publicly and
habitually usually in business transactions in addition to his real name by which he is registered at
birth or baptized the first time or substitute name authorized by a competent authority. A man‘s
name is simply the sound or sounds by which he is commonly designated by his fellows and by
which they distinguish him but sometimes a man is known by several different names and these are
known as aliases. Hence, the use of a fictitious name or a different name belonging to another
person in a single instance without any sign or indication that the user intends to be known by this
name in addition to his real name from that day forth does not fall within the prohibition contained
in C.A. No. 142 as amended. This is so in the case at bench.

Time and again [courts] have decreed that statutes are to be construed in the light of the
purposes to be achieved and the evils sought to be remedied. Thus in construing a statute the
reason for its enactment should be kept in mind and the statute should be construed with reference
to the intended scope and purpose. The court may consider the spirit and reason of the statute,
where a literal meaning would lead to absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or would defeat the clear
purpose of the lawmakers.

While the act of petitioner may be covered by other provisions of law, such does not
constitute an offense within the concept of C.A. No. 142 as amended under which he is prosecuted.
Moreover, as C.A. No. 142 is a penal statute, it should be construed strictly against the State and in
favor of the accused. The reason for this principle is the tenderness of the law for the rights of
individuals and the object is to establish a certain rule by conformity to which mankind would be

safe, and the discretion of the court limited.

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Persons and Family Relation

AMENDMENTS/CORRECTION OF ENTRIES

REPUBLIC vs. COSETENG-MAGPAYO

G.R. No. 189476 February 2, 2012

Facts:
Born in Makati on September 9, 1972, Julian Edward Emerson Coseteng Magpayo

(respondent) is the son of Fulvio M. Magpayo Jr. and Anna Dominique Marquez-Lim Coseteng
who, as respondent‘s certificate of live birth shows, contracted marriage on March 26,
1972. Claiming, however, that his parents were never legally married, respondent filed on July 22,
2008 at the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City a Petition to change his name to Julian
Edward Emerson Marquez Lim Coseteng. In support of his petition, respondent submitted a
certification from the National Statistics Office stating that his mother Anna Dominique "does not
appear in [its] National Indices of Marriage.‖ Respondent also submitted his academic records from
elementary up to college showing that he carried the surname "Coseteng," and the birth certificate of
his child where "Coseteng" appears as his surname. In the 1998, 2001 and 2004 Elections,
respondent ran and was elected as Councilor of Quezon City‘s 3rd District using the name
"JULIAN M.L. COSETENG."

On order of Branch 77 of the Quezon City RTC, respondent amended his petition by
alleging therein compliance with the 3-year residency requirement under Section 2, Rule 103] of the
Rules of Court. The notice setting the petition for hearing on November 20, 2008 was published in
the newspaper Broadside in its issues of October 31-November 6, 2008, November 7-13, 2008, and
November 14-20, 2008. And a copy of the notice was furnished the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG).

No opposition to the petition having been filed, an order of general default was entered by
the trial court which then allowed respondent to present evidence ex parte. By Decision of January
8, 2009, the trial court granted respondent‘s petition. The Republic of the Philippines (Republic)
filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the trial court by Order of July 2, 2009,
hence, it, thru the OSG, lodged the present petition for review to the Court on pure question of
law.

Issue:
a) Whether or not the petition for change of name involving change of civil status should be
made through appropriate adversarial proceedings.
b) Whether or not the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction when it directed the deletion of the
name of respondent‘s father from his birth certificate.

Ruling:
The petition is impressed with merit. A person can effect a change of name under Rule 103

(CHANGE OF NAME) using valid and meritorious grounds including (a) when the name is
ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change results as
a legal consequence such as legitimation; (c) when the change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has
continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of alien

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parentage; (e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good
faith and without prejudicing anybody; and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is
no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of
name would prejudice public interest. Respondent‘s reason for changing his name cannot be
considered as one of, or analogous to, recognized grounds, however.

The present petition must be differentiated from Alfon v. Republic of the Philippines. In
Alfon, the Court allowed the therein petitioner, Estrella Alfon, to use the name that she had been
known since childhood in order to avoid confusion. Alfon did not deny her legitimacy, however.
She merely sought to use the surname of her mother which she had been using since childhood.
Ruling in her favor, the Court held that she was lawfully entitled to use her mother‘s surname,
adding that the avoidance of confusion was justification enough to allow her to do so. In the present
case, however, respondent denies his legitimacy.

The change being sought in respondent‘s petition goes so far as to affect his legal status in
relation to his parents. It seeks to change his legitimacy to that of illegitimacy. Rule 103 then would
not suffice to grant respondent‘s supplication. As earlier stated, however, the petition of respondent
was filed not in Makati where his birth certificate was registered but in Quezon City. And as the
above-mentioned title of the petition filed by respondent before the RTC shows, neither the civil
registrar of Makati nor his father and mother were made parties thereto.

Rule 103 regarding change of name and in Rule 108 concerning the cancellation or
correction of entries in the civil registry are separate and distinct. Aside from improper venue, he
failed to implead the civil registrar of Makati and all affected parties as respondents in the case."A
petition for a substantial correction or change of entries in the civil registry should have as
respondents the civil registrar, as well as all other persons who have or claim to have any interest
that would be affected thereby."

Rule 108 clearly mandates two sets of notices to different "potential oppositors." The first
notice is that given to the "persons named in the petition" and the second (which is through
publication) is that given to other persons who are not named in the petition but nonetheless may be
considered interested or affected parties, such as creditors. That two sets of notices are mandated
under the above-quoted Section 4 is validated by the subsequent Section 5, also above-quoted,
which provides for two periods (for the two types of "potential oppositors") within which to file an
opposition (15 days from notice or from the last date of publication). The purpose precisely of
Section 4, Rule 108 is to bind the whole world to the subsequent judgment on the petition. The
sweep of the decision would cover even parties who should have been impleaded under Section 3,
Rule 108 but were inadvertently left out.

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Persons and Family Relation

AMENDMENTS/CORRECTION OF ENTRIES

LEE vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 118387 October 11, 2001

Facts:
On 15 November 1985, a complainant for sum of money was filed by the International

Corporate Bank, Inc. against Sacoba Manufacturing Corp., Pablo Gonzales Jr., and Tomas Gonzales
who, in turn, filed a third party complaint against Alfa Integrated Textile Mills (ALFA), Ramon C.
Lee (ALFA's president) and Antonio DM. Lacdao (ALFA's vice president) on 17 March 1986. On
17 September 1987, Lee and Lacdao filed a motion to dismiss the third party complaint which the
Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 58 denied in an Order dated 27 June 1988. On 18 July 1988,
Lee and Lacdao filed their answer to the third party complaint. Meanwhile, on 12 July 1988, the trial
issued an order requiring the issuance of an alias summons upon ALFA through the DBP as a
consequence of Lee and Lacdao's letter informing the court that the summons for ALFA was
erroneously served upon them considering that the management of ALFA had been transferred to
the DBP. In a manifestation dated 22 July 1988, the DBP claimed that it was not authorized to
receive summons on behalf of ALFA since the DBP had not taken over the company which has a
separate and distinct corporate personality and existence. On 4 August 1988, the trial court issued an

order advising Sacoba Manufacturing, et. al. to take the appropriate steps to serve the summons to
ALFA. On 16 August 1988, Sacoba Manufacturing, et. al. filed a Manifestation and Motion for the
Declaration of Proper Service of Summons which the trial court granted on 17 August 1988.

On 12 September 1988, Lee and Lacdao filed a motion for reconsideration submitting that
the Rule 14, section 13 of the Revised Rules of Court is not applicable since they were no longer
officers of ALFA and Sacoba Manufacturing, et. al. should have availed of another mode of service
under Rule 14, Section 16 of the said Rules, i.e., through publication to effect proper service upon
ALFA. On 2 January 1989, the trial court upheld the validity of the service of summons on ALFA
through Lee and Lacdao, thus, denying the latter's motion for reconsideration and requiring ALFA
to file its answer through Lee and Lacdao as its corporate officers. On 19 January 1989, a second
motion for reconsideration was filed by Lee and Lacdao reiterating their stand that by virtue of the
voting trust agreement they ceased to be officers and directors of ALFA, hence, they could no
longer receive summons or any court processes for or on behalf of ALFA. In support of their
second motion for reconsideration, Lee and Lacdao attached thereto a copy of the voting trust
agreement between all the stockholders of ALFA (Lee and Lacdao included), on the one hand, and
the DBP, on the other hand, whereby the management and control of ALFA became vested upon
the DBP. On 25 April 1989, the trial court reversed itself by setting aside its previous Order dated 2
January 1989 and declared that service upon Lee and Lacdao who were no longer corporate officers
of ALFA cannot be considered as proper service of summons on ALFA. On 15 May 1989, Sacoba
Manufacturing, et. al. moved for a reconsideration of the Order which was affirmed by the court in
is Order dated 14 August 1989 denying Sacoba Manufacturing, et. al.'s motion for reconsideration.

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Persons and Family Relation

On 18 September 1989, a petition for certiorari was belatedly submitted by Sacoba
Manufacturing, et. al. before the Court of Appeals which, nonetheless, resolved to give due course
thereto on 21 September 1989. On 17 October 1989, the trial court, not having been notified of the
pending petition for certiorari with the appellate court issued an Order declaring as final the Order
dated 25 April 1989. Sacoba Manufacturing, et. al. in the said Order were required to take positive
steps in prosecuting the third party complaint in order that the court would not be constrained to
dismiss the same for failure to prosecute. Subsequently, on 25 October 1989 Sacoba Manufacturing,
et. al. filed a motion for reconsideration on which the trial court took no further action. On 19
March 1990, after Lee and Lacdao filed their answer to Sacoba Manufacturing, et. al.'s petition for
certiorari, the appellate court rendered its decision, setting aside the orders of trial court judge dated
25 April 1989 and 14 August 1989. On 11 April 1990, Lee and Lacdao moved for a reconsideration
of the decision of the appellate court which resolved to deny the same on 10 May 1990. Lee and
Lacdao filed the petition for certiorari. In the meantime, the appellate court inadvertently made an
entry of judgment on 16 July 1990 erroneously applying the rule that the period during which a
motion for reconsideration has been pending must be deducted from the 15-day period to appeal.
However, in its Resolution dated 3 January 1991, the appellate court set aside the aforestated entry
of judgment after further considering that the rule it relied on applies to appeals from decisions of
the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals, not to appeals from its decision to the Supreme
Court pursuant to the Supreme Court's.

Issue:
a) Whether the execution of the voting trust agreement by Lee and Lacdao whereby all their
shares to the corporation have been transferred to the trustee deprives the stockholder of
their positions as directors of the corporation.
b) Whether the five-year period of the voting trust agreement in question had lapsed in 1986 so
that the legal title to the stocks covered by the said voting trust agreement ipso facto
reverted to Lee and Lacdao as beneficial owners pursuant to the 6th paragraph of section 59
of the new Corporation Code.
c) Whether there was proper service of summons on ALFA through Lee and Lacdao, to bind
ALFA.

Ruling:

Lee and Lacdao, by virtue of the voting trust agreement executed in 1981 disposed of all
their shares through assignment and delivery in favor of the DBP, as trustee. Consequently, Lee and
Lacdao ceased to own at least one share standing in their names on the books of ALFA as required
under Section 23 of the new Corporation Code. They also ceased to have anything to do with the
management of the enterprise. Lee and Lacdao ceased to be directors. Hence, the transfer of their
shares to the DBP created vacancies in their respective positions as directors of ALFA. The transfer
of shares from the stockholders of ALFA to the DBP is the essence of the subject voting trust
agreement. Considering that the voting trust agreement between ALFA and the DBP transferred
legal ownership of the stocks covered by the agreement to the DBP as trustee, the latter because the
stockholder of record with respect to the said shares of stocks. In the absence of a showing that the
DBP had caused to be transferred in their names one share of stock for the purpose of qualifying as
directors of ALFA, Lee and Lacdao can no longer be deemed to have retained their status as officers

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of ALFA which was the case before the execution of the subject voting trust agreement. There is no
dispute from the records that DBP has taken over full control and management of the firm.

The 6th paragraph of section 59 of the new Corporation Code reads that "Unless expressly
renewed, all rights granted in a voting trust agreement shall automatically expire at the end of the
agreed period, and the voting trust certificates as well as the certificates of stock in the name of the
trustee or trustees shall thereby be deemed cancelled and new certificates of stock shall be reissued
in the name of the transferors." However, it is manifestly clear from the terms of the voting trust
agreement between ALFA and the DBP that the duration of the agreement is contingent upon the
fulfillment of certain obligations of ALFA with the DBP. Had the five-year period of the voting
trust agreement expired in 1986, the DBP would not have transferred an its rights, titles and
interests in ALFA "effective June 30, 1986" to the national government through the Asset
Privatization Trust (APT) as attested to in a Certification dated 24 January 1989 of the Vice
President of the DBP's Special Accounts Department II. In the same certification, it is stated that
the DBP, from 1987 until 1989, had handled s account which included ALFA's assets pursuant to a
management agreement by and between the DBP and APT. Hence, there is evidence on record that
at the time of the service of summons on ALFA through Lee and Lacdao on 21 August 1987, the
voting trust agreement in question was not yet terminated so that the legal title to the stocks of
ALFA, then, still belonged to the DBP.

It is a basic principle in Corporation Law that a corporation has a personality separate and
distinct from the officers or members who compose it. Thus, the role on service of processes on a
corporation enumerates the representatives of a corporation who can validly receive court processes
on its behalf. Not every stockholder or officer can bind the corporation considering the existence of
a corporate entity separate from those who compose it. The rationale of the rule is that service must
be made on a representative so integrated with the corporation sued as to make it a priori
supposable that he will realize his responsibilities and know what he should do with any legal papers
served on him. Herein, Lee and Lacdao do not fall under any of the enumerated officers. The
service of summons upon ALFA, through Lee and Lacdao, therefore, is not valid. To rule otherwise
will contravene the general principle that a corporation can only be bound by such acts which are
within the scope of the officer's or agent's authority.

532

Persons and Family Relation

AMENDMENTS/CORRECTION OF ENTRIES

IN RE CHARGE OF NAME OF JULIAN WANG
G.R. No. 159966 March 30, 2005

Facts:
Petitioner Julian Lin Carulasan Wang, a minor, represented by his mother Anna Lisa Wang,

filed a petition dated 19 September 2002 for change of name and/ or correction/ cancellation of
entry in the Civil Registry of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang. Petitioner sought to drop his middle name
and have his registered name changed from Julian Lin Carulasan Wang to Julian Lin Wang.
Petitioner theorizes that it would be for his best interest to drop his middle name as this would help
him to adjust easily to and integrate himself into Singaporean society.

Issue:
Whether or not the law allows one to drop the middle name from his registered name on the

cause mentioned.

Ruling:
The touchstone for the grant of a change of name is that there be ‗proper and reasonable

cause‘ for which the change is sought. To justify a request for change of name, petitioner must show
not only some proper or compelling reason therefore but also that he will be prejudiced by the use
of his true and official name. Among the grounds for change of name which have been held valid
are:

a.) When the name is ridiculous, dishonorable r extremely difficult to write or pronounce;
b.) When the change results as a legal consequence, as in legitimation;
c.) When the change will avoid confusion;
d.) When the one has continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name,

and was unaware of alien parentage;
e.) A sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith

and without prejudicing anybody; and
f.) When the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of

name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public
interest.

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Persons and Family Relation

AMENDMENTS/CORRECTION OF ENTRIES

SILVERIO vs. REPUBLIC
G.R. No. 174689 October 22, 2007

Facts:
Rommel Silverio filed a petition for the change of his gender and first name in his birth

certificate to facilitate his marriage with his fiancé. A year before, Silverio has underwent sex re-
assignment surgery in Bangkok, Thailand. In his petition, he wants to change his first name from
―Rommel‖ to ―Mely.‖

Issue:
Should the court allow the change of name?

Ruling:
No. The SC said that considering that there is no law recognizing sex re-assignment, the

determination of a person‘s sex at the time of birth, if not attended by error, is immutable. It held
that ―while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and appearance through the
intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the civil registry
for that reason. There is no special law in the country governing sex reassignment and its effect. This
is fatal to petitioner‘s cause.‖

The Court said that the change in gender sought by petitioner ―will have serious and wide-ranging
legal and public policy consequences,‖ i.e., substantially reconfigure and greatly alter the laws on
marriage and family relations and substantially affect the public policy in relation to women in laws
such as the provisions of the Labor Code on employment of women, certain felonies under the
Revised Penal Code, etc.

534

Persons and Family Relation

AMENDMENTS/CORRECTION OF ENTRIES

REPUBLIC OF THEPHILIPPINES vs. JENNIFER CAGANDAHAN
G.R. No. 166676 September 12, 2008

Facts:
On December 11, 2003, respondent Jennifer Cagandahan filed a petition for Correction of

Entries in Birth Certificate before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33, of Siniloan, Laguna; such
that, her name be changed to ―Jeff‖ and her gender to ―male‖.

She was born in January 13, 1981, and was registered as female, having the name ―Jennifer
Cagandahan‖. While growing up, she was diagnosed to have Congenital Adrenal Hyperpplasia
(CAH), a condition where the person thus afflicted possesses both male and female characteristics.
She was also diagnosed to have clitoral hypertrophy, small ovaries, no breast, and menstrual
development. She alleged that for all interests and appearances as well as in mind and emotion, she
has become a male person.

Issue:
Whether or not the correction of entries in her birth certificate be granted.

Ruling:
Yes. The court considered the compassionate calls for recognition of the various degrees of

intersex as variations which should not be subject to outright denial. The Court views that where a
person is biologically or naturally intersex, the determining factor in his gender classification would
be what the individual, having reached the age of maturity, with good reason thinks of his/her sex.
The respondent here thinks of himself as a male considering that his body produces high levels of
male hormones. There is preponderant biological support for considering him as a male.

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Persons and Family Relation

AMENDMENTS/CORRECTION OF ENTRIES

MA. CRISTINA TORRES BRAZA vs. THE CITY CIVIL REGISTRAR OF

G.R. No. 181174 HIMAMAYLAN CITY, NEGROS OCCIDENTAL December 4, 2009

Facts:
Petitioner, Ma. Cristina‘s husband, Pablo died on April 15, 2002 in a vehicular accident in

Indonesia. During the wake following the repatriation of his remains to the Philippines, respondent
Lucille Titular began introducing her co-respondent minor Patrick Alvin Titular Braza (Patrick)
as her and Pablo's son. Petitioner thereupon made inquiries with the Local Civil Registrar of

Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental. Onthe annotation of Patrick‘s birth certificate reflects Patrick
as having been acknowledged by Pablo (or Pablito)as son on January 13, 1997, that he was
legitimated by virtue of subsequent marriage of his parents on April 22,1998 at Manila, and that he
shall be known as Patrick Titular Braza.Ma. Cristina likewise obtained a copy of a marriage contract
showing that Pablo and Lucille were married on April 22, 1998, drawing her and her co-petitioners
(her three legitimate children with Pablo) to file on December 23, 2005 before the Regional Trial
Court of Himalayan City, Negros Occidental a petition to correct the entries in the birth record of
Patrick in the Local Civil Register.

Contending that Patrick could not have been legitimated by the supposed marriage between
Lucille andPablo, said marriage being bigamous on account of the valid and subsisting marriage
between Ma. Cristinaand Pablo, petitioners prayed for (1) thecorrection of the entriesin Patrick's
birth record with respect to hislegitimation, the name of the father and his acknowledgment, and the
use of the last name "Braza"; 2) adirective to Leon, Cecilia and Lucille, all surnamed Titular, as
guardians of the minor Patrick, tosubmit Patrick to DNA testingto determine his paternity and
filiations; and 3) the declaration of nullity of the legitimation of Patrick as stated in his birth
certificate and, for this purpose, thedeclaration of the marriage of Lucille andPablo as bigamous. TC
dismissed the petition, holding that in a special proceeding for correction of entry, the court, which
is notacting as a family court under the Family Code, has no jurisdiction over an action to annul the
marriage of Lucille and Pablo, impugn the legitimacy of Patrick, and order Patrick to be subjected to
a DNA test, hence, the controversy should be ventilated in an ordinary adversarial action.MR was
denied.

Issue:

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Whether or not the courtmay pass upon the validity of marriage and questions on legitimacy
even in anaction to correct entries in the civil registrar.

Ruling:
No. In a special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation or

Correction of Entries in the Original Registry), the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages
and rule on legitimacyand filiations.

Rule 108 of the Rules of Courtvis a visArticle 412 of the Civil Code charts the procedure by
which anentry in the civil registry may be cancelled or corrected. The proceeding contemplated
therein may generallybe used only to correct clerical, spelling, typographical and other innocuous
errors in the civil registry. Aclerical error is one which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the
understanding; an error made by a clerk ora transcriber; a mistake in copying or writing, or a
harmless change such as a correction of name that isclearly misspelled or of a misstatement of the
occupation of the parent. Substantial or contentiousalterations may be allowed only in adversarial
proceedings, in which all interested parties are impleaded anddue process is properly observed. The
petitioners‘ cause of action is actually to seek the declaration of Pablo and Lucille‘s marriage as
void forbeing bigamous and impugn Patrick‘s legitimacy, which causes of action are governed not by
Rule 108 butby A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which took effect on March 15, 2003, and Art. 171 of the
Family Code, respectively,hence, the petition should be filed in a Family Court as expressly provided
in said Code.It is well to emphasize that, doctrinally, validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and
filiation can bequestioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party, and not
through collateral attacksuch as the petition filed before the courta quo.

537

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