civil code0101

Issue:
Whether the subject marriage may be annulled on the ground of vitiated consent

Ruling:
The Court is not convinced that appellant‘s apprehension of danger to his person is so

overwhelming as to deprive him of the will to enter voluntarily to a contract of marriage. It is not
disputed that at the time he was allegedly being harassed, appellant worked as a security guard in a
bank. Given his employment at that time, it is reasonable to assume that appellant knew the
rudiments of self-defense, or, at the very least, the proper way to keep himself out of harm‘s way.
For sure, it is even doubtful if threats were indeed made to bear upon appellant, what with the fact
that he never sought the assistance of the security personnel of his school nor the police regarding
the activities of those who were threatening him. And neither did he inform the judge about his
predicament prior to solemnizing their marriage.

IMPOTENCY, ARTICLE 45 PARAGRAPH 5, FC

G.R. No. L-12790 JOEL JIMENEZ vs. REMEDIOS CAÑIZARES August 31, 1960

Facts:
Plaintiff Joel Jimenez in a complaint prays for a decree annulling his marriage to the

defendant Remedios Cañizares upon the ground that the office of her genitals or vagina was too
small to allow the penetration of a male organ or penis for copulation; that the condition of her
genitals as described above existed at the time of marriage and continues to exist; and that for that
reason he left the conjugal home two nights and one day after they had been married.

Defendant however failed to submit her answer within the required period. Thereafter, the
Court entered an order requiring the defendant to submit to a physical examination by a competent
lady physician to determine her physical capacity for copulation. This was not followed by the
defendant however. Moreover, the defendant was not present during the scheduled hearings.
Because of this, the judge ordered a judgment annulling the marriage of the parties. The city attorney
then filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground that defendant‘s impotency has not been

satisfactorily proven since the defendant refused to undergo the physical examination.

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Issue:
Whether the marriage in question may be annulled on the strength only of the lone

testimony of the husband-plaintiff.

Ruling:
Marriage in this country is an institution in which the community is deeply interested. The

state has surrounded it with safeguards to maintain its purity, continuity and permanence. The
security and stability of the state are largely dependent upon it. It is the interest of each and every
member of the community to prevent the bringing about of a condition that would shake its
foundation and ultimately lead to its destruction. The incidents of the status are governed by law,
not by will of the parties. The law specifically enumerates the legal grounds that must be proved to
exist by indubitable evidence, to annul a marriage.

In the case at bar, the annulment of the marriage in question was decreed upon the sole
testimony of the husband who was expected to give testimony tending or aiming at securing the
annulment of his marriage he sought and seeks. Whether the wife is really impotent cannot be
deemed to have been satisfactorily established, because from the commencement of the proceedings
until the entry of the decree she had abstained from taking part therein. Although her refusal to be
examined or failure to appear in court show indifference on her part, yet from such attitude the
presumption arising out of the suppression of evidence could not arise or be inferred because
women of this country are by nature coy, bashful and shy and would not submit to a physical
examination unless compelled to by competent authority.

"Impotency being an abnormal condition should not be presumed. The presumption is in
favor of potency." The lone testimony of the husband that his wife is physically incapable of sexual
intercourse is insufficient to tear asunder the ties that have bound them together as husband and
wife.

GROUNDS FOR LEGAL SEPARATION

ONG ENG KIAM a.k.a. WILLIAM ONG vs. LUCITA G. ONG

G.R. No. 153206 October 23, 2006

Facts:
Ong Eng Kiam, also known as William Ong and Lucita G. Ong were married on July 13,

1975 They have three children: Kingston, Charleston, and Princeton who are now all of the age of
majority. Thereafter, Lucita filed a Complaint for Legal Separation alleging that her life with William
was marked by physical violence, threats, intimidation and grossly abusive conduct; William would
also scold and beat the children at different parts of their bodies using the buckle of his belt;
whenever she tried to stop William from hitting the children, he would turn his ire on her and box
her; on December 9, 1995, William hit her on the stomach and she bent down because of the pain,
he hit her on the head then pointed a gun at her and asked her to leave the house; she then went to
her sister‘s house in Binondo where she was fetched by her other siblings and brought to their
parents house in Dagupan; the following day, she went to her parent‘s doctor, Dr. Vicente Elinzano
for treatment of her injuries.

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William for his part denied all the allegations. While he admits that he and Lucita quarreled
on December 9, 1995, at their house at Tondo, he claimed that he left the same, stayed in their
Greenhills condominium and only went back to their Tondo house to work in their office below.

Both the lower courts and the appellate court issued a decree of legal separation due to the
repeated physical abuses felt by both Lucita and their children. William on the other hand maintains
that the real motive of Lucita and her family in filing the case is to wrest control and ownership of
properties belonging to the conjugal partnership which were acquired through his sole efforts also,
William reiterated that Lucita cannot file the petition since it Lucita who abandoned their conjugal
dwelling.

Issue:
Whether nor not the defenses of William are valid.

Ruling:
William posits that the real motive of Lucita in filing the case for legal separation is in order

for her side of the family to gain control of the conjugal properties; that Lucita was willing to
destroy his reputation by filing the legal separation case just so her parents and her siblings could
control the properties he worked hard for. The Court finds such reasoning hard to believe. What
benefit would Lucita personally gain by pushing for her parents‘ and siblings‘ financial interests at
the expense of her marriage? What is more probable is that there truly exists a ground for legal
separation, a cause so strong, that Lucita had to seek redress from the courts. The claim of William
that a decree of legal separation would taint his reputation and label him as a wife-beater and child-
abuser also does not elicit sympathy from this Court. If there would be such a smear on his
reputation then it would not be because of Lucita‘s decision to seek relief from the courts, but
because he gave Lucita reason to go to court in the first place.

Also without merit is the argument of William that since Lucita has abandoned the family, a
decree of legal separation should not be granted, following Art. 56, par. (4) of the Family Code
which provides that legal separation shall be denied when both parties have given ground for legal
separation. The abandonment referred to by the Family Code is abandonment without justifiable
cause for more than one year. As it was established that Lucita left William due to his abusive
conduct, such does not constitute abandonment contemplated by the said provision.

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Persons and Family Relation

GROUNDS FOR LEGAL SEPARATION

FROILAN C. GANDIONCO vs. HON. SENEN C. PEÑARANDA
G.R. No. 79284 November 27, 1987

Facts:
Private respondent, the legal wife of the petitioner, filed a complaint against petitioner for

legal separation, on the ground of concubinage, with a petition for support and payment of damages.
Private respondent also filed a criminal complaint against petitioner for concubinage. Respondent
Judge then issued a decree ordering petitioner to provide support to the private respondent.

In this recourse, petitioner contends that the civil action for legal separation and the
incidents consequent thereto, such as, application for support pendente lite, should be suspended in
view of the criminal case for concubinage filed against him the private respondent since the civil
action arises from the criminal action of concubinage. Petitioner also argues that his conviction for

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concubinage will have to be first secured before the action for legal separation can prosper or
succeed, as the basis of the action for legal separation is his alleged offense of concubinage.

Issue:
Whether or not the contention of petitioner is valid, that the civil action for legal separation

should first be suspended and that he must first be convicted before deciding upon the said civil
action.

Ruling:
A civil action for legal separation, based on concubinage, may proceed ahead of, or

simultaneously with, a criminal action for concubinage, because said civil action is not one "to
enforce the civil liability arising from the offense" even if both the civil and criminal actions arise
from or are related to the same offense. Such civil action is one intended to obtain the right to live
separately, with the legal consequences thereof, such as, the dissolution of the conjugal partnership
of gains, custody of offsprings, support, and disqualification from inheriting from the innocent
spouse, among others. An action for legal separation is not to recover civil liability, in the main, but
is aimed at the conjugal rights of the spouses and their relations to each other.

Also, a decree of legal separation, on the ground of concubinage, may be issued upon proof
by preponderance of evidence in the action for legal separation. No criminal proceeding or
conviction is necessary. To this end, the doctrine in Francisco vs. Tayao has been modified, as that case
was decided under Act. No. 2710, when absolute divorce was then allowed and had for its grounds
the same grounds for legal separation under the New Civil Code, with the requirement, under such
former law, that the guilt of defendant spouses had to be established by final judgment in a criminal
action. That requirement has not been reproduced or adopted by the framers of the present Civil
Code, and the omission has been uniformly accepted as a modification of the stringent rule in
Francisco v. Tayao.

GROUNDS FOR LEGAL SEPARATION

PRIMA PARTOSA-JO vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and HO HANG
G.R. No. 82606 December 18, 1992

Facts:
Petitioner was legally married to Jose Jo alias Ho Hang.However, in 1980, the petitioner filed

a complaint against Jo for judicial separation of conjugal property, in addition to an earlier action for
support, also against him. The two cases were consolidated and tried jointly. Thereafter, the judge
rendered a decision of legal separation between the spouses and further ordered the payment of
support by Ho Hang to petitioner. However, there was no definite disposition for the judicial
separation of their property. Hence, the petitioner filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals

seeking for the judicial separation of their conjugal properties.

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Persons and Family Relation

The Court of Appeals however dismissed the complaint for judicial separation of property
for lack of a cause of action and on the ground that separation by agreement was not covered by
Article 178 of the Civil Code since the separation of the conjugal property was agreed by the
spouses.When their motions for reconsideration were denied, both parties came to this Court for
relief.

Issue:
Whether or not the courts erred in finding that the judicial separation of property was not

allowed.

Ruling:
A spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other when he or she has left the conjugal

dwelling without any intention of returning. The spouse who has left the conjugal dwelling for a
period of three months or has failed within the same period to give any information as to his or her
whereabouts shall be prima facie presumed to have no intention of returning to the conjugal
dwelling.Under the this provision, the aggrieved spouse may petition for judicial separation on either
of these grounds: 1. Abandonment by a spouse of the other without just cause; and 2. Failure of one
spouse to comply with his or her obligations to the family without just cause, even if she said spouse
does not leave the other spouse.

The record shows that as early as 1942, the private respondent had already rejected the
petitioner, whom he denied admission to their conjugal home in Dumaguete City when she returned
from Zamboanguita. The fact that she was not accepted by Jo demonstrates all too clearly that he
had no intention of resuming their conjugal relationship. Moreover, beginning 1968 until the
determination by this Court of the action for support in 1988, the private respondent refused to give
financial support to the petitioner. The physical separation of the parties, coupled with the refusal by
the private respondent to give support to the petitioner, sufficed to constitute abandonment as a
ground for the judicial separation of their conjugal property.

In addition, the petitioner may also invoke the second ground allowed by Article 128, for the
fact is that he has failed without just cause to comply with his obligations to the family as husband
or parent. Apart from refusing to admit his lawful wife to their conjugal home in Dumaguete City,
Jo has freely admitted to cohabiting with other women and siring many children by them. It was his
refusal to provide for the petitioner and their daughter that prompted her to file the actions against
him for support and later for separation of the conjugal property, in which actions, significantly, he
even denied being married to her. The private respondent has not established any just cause for his
refusal to comply with his obligations to his wife as dutiful husband.

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Persons and Family Relation

CONDONATION/PARDON

EDUARDO ARROYO, JR. vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 96602 November 19, 1991

Facts:
Dr. Jorge B. Neri filed a criminal complaint for adultery against his wife, Ruby Vera Neri,

and Eduardo Arroyo committed on 2 November 1982 in the City of Baguio. Both defendants
pleaded not guilty and after trial, the RTC convicted petitioner and Mrs. Ruby Vera Neri of adultery.
According to the facts of the case, the accused Ruby Neri in the company of a friend went to Baguio

City and proceeded at Mines View Park Condominium. At 7:00 in the evening, co-accused Eduardo
Arroyo entered the unit and thereafter proceeded inside the master's bedroom where Ruby Neri and

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her friend was waiting. Ruby Neri's friend was thereafter instructed to leave the room. After 45
minutes, both Ruby Neri and Eduardo Arroyo came out from the room and joined Ruby Neri's
friend at the living room.

Both Ruby Neri and Eduardp Arroyo filed a motion for reconsideration contending that a
pardon has been extended by Ruby Neri's husband and that her husband had later contracted
marriage with another woman. As proof of this, Ruby Neri showed the Affidavit of Desistance
made by Dr. Neri.

Issue:
Whether or not the Affidavit of Desitance executed by Dr. Neri signifies pardon.

Ruling:
The rule on pardon is found in Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code which provides:

"ART. 344. The crime of adultery and concubinage shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint
filed by the offended spouse. The offended party cannot institute criminal prosecution without
including both parties, if they are both alive, nor in any case, if he shall have consented or pardoned
the offenders."

While there is a conceptual difference between consent and pardon in the sense that consent
is granted prior to the adulterous act while pardon is given after the illicit affair, nevertheless, for
either consent or pardon to benefit the accused, it must be given prior to the filing of a criminal
complaint. In the present case, the affidavit of desistance was executed only on 23 November 1988
while the compromise agreement was executed only on 16 February 1989, after the trial court had
already rendered its decision dated 17 December 1987 finding petitioners guilty beyond reasonable
doubt.

It should also be noted that while Article 344 of the Revise Penal Code provides that the
crime of adultery cannot be prosecuted without the offended spouse's complaint, once the
complaint has been filed, the control of the case passes to the public prosecutor. Enforcement of
our law on adultery is not exclusively, nor even principally, a matter of vindication of the private
honor of the offended spouse; much less is it a matter merely of personal or social hypocrisy. Such
enforcement relates, more importantly, to protection of the basic social institutions of marriage and
the family in the preservation of which the State has the strongest interest; the public policy here
involved is of the most fundamental kind.

The same sentiment has been expressed in the Family Code of the Philippines in Article 149:
"The family, being the foundation of the ration, is a basic social institution which public policy
cherishes and protects." Consequently, family relations are governed by law and no custom, practice
or agreement destructive of the family shall be recognized or given effect.

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Persons and Family Relation

CONDONATION/PARDON

G.R. No. L-10033 BENJAMIN BUGAYONG vs. LEONILA GINEZ December 28, 1956

Facts:
Benjamin Bugayong, a serviceman in the United States Navy, was married to defendant

Leonila Ginez. Immediately after their marriage, the couple lived with their sisters who later moved
to Sampaloc, Manila. After some time, Leonila Ginez left the dwelling of her sister-in-law and
informed her husband by letter that she had gone to reside with her mother in Asingan, Pangasinan.

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Persons and Family Relation

Afterwards, Benjamin Bugayong began receiving letters from some anonymous writers
informing him of alleged acts of infidelity of his wife. Benjamin Bugayong then went to Asingan,
Pangasinan and sought for his wife. Both husband and wife then proceeded to the house of Pedro
Bugayong, a cousin of Benjamin, where they stayed and lived for 2 nights and 1 day as husband and
wife. Then they returned to the plaintiff's house and again passed the night therein as husband and
wife. On the third day, Benjamin tried to verify from his wife the truth of the information he
received that she had committed adultery but, instead of answering his query, she merely packed up
and left, which he took as a confirmation of the acts of infidelity imputed on her. After that and
despite such belief, plaintiff exerted efforts to locate her.

Benjamin then filed a complaint for legal separation against his wife, who timely filed an
answer vehemently denying the averments of the complaint and stating than she was condoned by
her husband.

Issue:
Whether or not there was condonation in this case.

Ruling:
Condonation is the forgiveness of a marital offense constituting a ground for legal

separation. A detailed examination of the testimony of the plaintiff-husband, clearly shows that there
was a condonation on the part of the husband for the supposed "acts of infidelity amounting to

adultery" committed by defendant-wife. Admitting for the sake of argument that the infidelities
amounting to adultery were committed by the defendant, a reconciliation was effected between her
and the plaintiff. The act of the latter in persuading her to come along with him, and the fact that
she went with him and consented to be brought to the house of his cousin Pedro Bugayong and
together they slept there as husband and wife for one day and one night, and the further fact that in
the second night they again slept together in their house likewise as husband and wife — all these
facts have no other meaning in the opinion of this court than that a reconciliation between them was
effected and that there was a condonation of the wife by the husband. The reconciliation occurred
almost ten months after he came to know of the acts of infidelity amounting to adultery.It has been
held in a long line of decisions of the various supreme courts of the different states of the U. S. that
'a single voluntary act of sexual intercourse by the innocent spouse after discovery of the offense is
ordinarily sufficient to constitute condonation, especially as against the husband'. In the lights of the
facts testified to by the plaintiff-husband, of the legal provisions above quoted, and of the various
decisions above-cited, the inevitable conclusion is that there is condonation.

CONDONATION/PARDON

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GUADALUPE ZAPATA

G.R. No. L-3047 May 16, 1951

Facts:
A complaint for adultery was filed by Andres Bondoc against Guadalupe Zapata, his wife,

and Dalmacio Bondoc, her paramour, for cohabiting and having repeated sexual intercourse during
the period from the year 1946 to 1947. The complaint was filed on March 14, 1947 whereby

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Persons and Family Relation

Dalmacio Bondoc knows his codefendant to be a married woman. The defendant wife entered the
plea of guilty and was sentenced to suffer four months which penalty she served. In the same court,
on September 17, 1948, the offended husband filed another complaint for adulterous acts
committed by his wife and her paramour from March 1947 to September 1948. Each of the
defendants filed a motion to quash the complaint of the ground that they would be twice put in
jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. The trial court upheld the contention of the
defendants and quashed the second complaint.

Issue:
Whether or not the second complaint be quashed for double jeopardy.

Ruling:
A second complaint charging the commission of adulterous acts not included in the first

complaint does not constitute a violation of the double jeopardy clause of the constitution is that, if
the second complaint places the defendants twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense,
the adultery committed by the male defendant charged in the second complaint, should he be
absolved from, or acquitted of, the first charge upon the evidence that he did not know that his
codefendant was a married woman, would remain or go unpunished. The defense set up by him
against the first charge upon which he was acquitted would no longer be available, because at the
time of the commission of the crime charged in the second complaint, he already knew that this
defendant was a married woman and he continued to have carnal knowledge of her.

Even if the husband should pardon his adulterous wife, such pardon would not exempt the
wife and her paramour from criminal liability for adulterous acts committed after the pardon was
granted because the pardon refers to previous and not to subsequent adulterous acts.

The order appealed from, which quashed the second complaint for adultery, is hereby
reversed and set aside, and trial court directed to proceed with the trial of the defendants in
accordance with law, with costs against the appellees.

CONDONATION/PARDON

JOSE DE OCAMPO vs. SERAFINA FLORENCIANO

G.R. No. L-13553 February 23, 1960

Facts:
Plaintiff and defendant were married in April 5, 1938. They begot several children who are

now living with plaintiff. In March, 1951, plaintiff discovered on several occasions that his wife was
betraying his trust by maintaining illicit relations with one Jose Arcalas. Having found the defendant

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carrying marital relations with another man plaintiff sent her to Manila in June 1951 to study beauty
culture, where she stayed for one year. Again, plaintiff discovered that while in the said city
defendant was going out with several other men, aside from Jose Arcalas. Towards the end of June,
1952, when defendant had finished studying her course, she left plaintiff and since then they had
lived separately.

On June 18, 1955, plaintiff surprised his wife in the act of having illicit relations with another
man by the name of Nelson Orzame. Plaintiff signified his intention of filing a petition for legal
separation, to which defendant manifested her conformity provided she is not charged with adultery
in a criminal action. Accordingly, plaintiff a petition for legal separation. Defendant poses as defense
that plaintiff condoned her adulterous acts with Nelson Orzame since plaintiff never sought for her
after having discovered her adulterous acts.

Issue:
Whether or not plaintiff condoned the acts of defendant.

Ruling:
We do not think plaintiff's failure actively to search for defendant and take her home (after

the latter had left him in 1952) constituted condonation or consent to her adulterous relations with
Orzame. It will be remembered that she "left" him after having sinned with Arcalas and after he had
discovered her dates with other men. Consequently, it was not his duty to search for her to bring her
home. Hers was the obligation to return.

Two decisions are cited wherein from apparently similar circumstances, this Court inferred
the husband's consent to or condonation of his wife's misconduct. However, upon careful
examination, a vital difference will be found: in both instances, the husband had abandoned his wife;
here it was the wife who "left" her husband.

Wherefore, finding no obstacles to the aggrieved husband's petition we hereby reverse the
appealed decision and decree a legal separation between these spouse, all the consequent effects.

CONSENT AND FORMS

G.R. No. L-11766 SOCORRO MATUBIS vs. ZOILO PRAXEDES October 25, 1960

Facts:
Plaintiff and defendant were legally married on January 10, 1943. For failure to agree on how

they should live as husband and wife, the couple agreed to live separately from each other, which

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status remained unchanged until the present. On April 3, 1948, plaintiff and defendant entered into
an agreementwhich provides among others that ―neither of them can prosecute the other for
adultery or concubinage or any other crime arising from their separation.‖

In January, 1955, defendant began cohabiting with one Asuncion Rebulado and said
Asuncion gave birth to a child. It was shown also that defendant and Asuncion deported themselves
as husband and wife and were generally reputed as such in the community.

Plaintiff thereafter filed an action for legal separation against the defendant. The trial court
however dismissed the action on the ground that under Art. 102 of the new Civil Code, an action
for legal separation cannot be filed except within one year from and after the date on which the
plaintiff became cognizant of the cause and within five years from and after the date when the cause
occurred. The plaintiff became aware of the illegal cohabitation of her husband with Asuncion
Rebulado in January, 1955. The complaint was filed on April 24, 1956. The present action was,
therefore, filed out of time. Also, article 100 of the new Civil Code provides that the legal separation
may be claimed only by the innocent spouse, provided there has been no condonation of or consent
to the adultery or concubinage. As shown in the facts, the plaintiff has consented to the commission
of concubinage by her husband as proven by their ―agreement.‖

Issue:
Whether or not the plaintiff condoned the acts of the defendant.

Ruling:
An action for legal separation cannot be filed except within one year from and after the date

on which the plaintiff became cognizant of the cause and within five years from after the date when
cause occurred.The complaint was filed outside the periods provided for by the above Article. By
the very admission of plaintiff, she came to know the ground (concubinage) for the legal separation
in January, 1955. She instituted the complaint only on April 24, 1956. It is to be noted that appellant
did not even press this matter in her brief.

The very wording of the ―agreement‖ gives no room for interpretation other than that given
by the trial judge. Condonation and consent on the part of plaintiff are necessarily the import of the
agreement. The condonation and consent here are not only implied but expressed. Article 100 Civil
Code, specifically provides that legal separation may be claimed only by the innocent spouse,
provided there has been no condonation of or consent to the adultery or concubinage. Having
condoned and/or consented in writing, the plaintiff is now undeserving of the court's sympathy.

CONSENT AND FORMS

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RODOLFO A. SCHNECKENBURGER, ET AL

G.R. No. L-48183 November 10, 1941

Facts:

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Persons and Family Relation

On March 16, 1926, the accused Rodolfo A. Schneckenburger married the compliant Elena
Ramirez Cartagena and after seven years of martial life, they agreed, for reason of alleged
incompatibility of character, to live separately each other and on May 25, 1935 they executed a
document which in part recites ―en completa libertad de accion en calquier acto y todos concepto.‖

On June 15, 1935, the accused Schneckenburger, secured a decree of divorce from the civil
court of Juarez, Bravos District, State of Chihuahua, Mexico. Subsequently, he contracted another
marriage with his co-accused, Julia Medel and since then they lived together as husband and wife.
Complainant then instituted two actions against the accused, one for bigamy and the other for
concubinage. The accused posed as defense the act of condonation made by the complainant.

Issue:
Whether or not there was a valid condonation in this case.

RULING:
The Court believes and so holds that the accused should be acquitted of the crime of

concubinage. The document executed by and between the accused and the complaint in which they
agreed to be "en completa libertad de accion en cualquier acto y en todos conceptos," while illegal
for the purpose for which it was executed, constitutes nevertheless a valid consent to the act of
concubinage within the meaning of section 344 of the Revised Penal Code. There can be no doubt
that by such agreement, each party clearly intended to forego to illicit acts of the other.

The second paragraph of article 344 of the Revised Penal Code provides: The offended party
cannot institute criminal prosecution without including both the guilty parties, if they are both alive,
nor, in any case, if he shall have consented or pardoned the offenders.As the term "pardon"
unquestionably refers to the offense after its commission, "consent" must have been intended
agreeably with its ordinary usage, to refer to the offense prior to its commission. No logical
difference can indeed be perceived between prior and subsequent consent, for in both instances as
the offended party has chosen to compromise with his/her dishonor, he/she becomes unworthy to
come to court and invoke its aid in the vindication of the wrong. We, therefore, hold that the prior
consent is as effective as subsequent consent to bar the offended party from prosecuting the
offense.

The Court reiterate that the agreement should be misconstrued as legalizing an agreement to
do an illicit act, in violation of law. Our view must be taken only to mean that an agreement of the
tenor entered into between the parties herein, operates, within the plain language and manifest
policy of the law, to bar the offended party from prosecuting the offense. If there is anything
morally condemnatory in a situation of his character, the remedy lies not with us but with the
legislative department of the government. What the law is, not what it should be, defines the limits
of our authority.

CONSENT AND FORMS

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs. URSULA SENSANO

G.R. No. L-37720 March 27, 1933

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Persons and Family Relation

Facts:
Ursula Sensano and Mariano Ventura were married on April 29, 1919. They had one child.

Shortly after the birth of his child, the husband left his wife to go to the Province of Cagayan where
he remained for three years without writing to his wife or sending her anything for the support of
herself and their son. Poor and illiterate, without relatives upon whom she could call, she struggled
for an existence for herself and her son until a fatal day when she met the accused Marcelo Ramos
who took her and the child to live with him.

On the return of the husband (in 1924), he filed a charge against his wife and Marcelo
Ramos for adultery and both were sentenced to four months and one day. The court, in its decision,
stated the following: "In the opinion of the court, the husband of the accused has been somewhat
cruel in his treatment of his wife having abandoned her as he did." After completing her sentence,
the accused left her wife. She thereupon appealed to this municipal president and the justice of the
peace to send for her husband so that she might ask his pardon and beg him to take her back. At the
house of the president she begged his pardon and promised to be a faithful wife if he would take her
back.

He refused to pardon her to live with her and said she could go where she wished, that he
would have nothing more to do with her, and she could do as she pleased. Abandoned for the
second time, she and her child went back to her co-accused Marcelo Ramos (this was in the year
1924) and they have lived with him ever since. The husband, knowing that she resumed living with
her codefendant in 1924, did nothing to interfere with their relations or to assert his rights as

husband. Shortly thereafter he left for the Territory of Hawaii where she remained for seven years
completely abandoning his said wife and child. On his return to these Islands, he presented the
second charge of adultery here involved with the sole purpose, as he declared, of being able to
obtain a divorce.

Issue:
Whether or not the husband is still entitled to his relief

Ruling:
The offended party cannot institute criminal prosecution without including both the guilty

parties, if they are both alive, nor, in any case, if he shall have consented or pardoned the offenders.
Apart from the fact that the husband in this case was assuming a mere pose when he signed the
complaint as the "offended" spouse, we have come to the conclusion that the evidence in this case
and his conduct warrant the inference that he consented to the adulterous relations existing between
the accused and therefore he is not authorized by law to institute this criminal proceeding.We
cannot accept the argument of the Attorney-General that the seven years of acquiescence on his part
in the adultery of his wife is explained by his absence from the Philippine Islands during which
period it was impossible for him to take any action against the accused. There is no merit in the
argument that it was impossible for the husband to take any action against the accused during the
said seven years.

RATIONALE OF RECRIMINATION/MUTUAL GUILT

G.R. NO. L-1056 BENEDICTO vs. DE LA RAMA December 8, 1903

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Persons and Family Relation

Facts:
Plaintiff and Defendant were married on July 1891.Both were happily living together until

August of 1892 when the defendant without any previous warning, took his wife to the house of her
parents and left her there. It was found out that in plaintiff‘s complaint for separation, she charges
defendant of committing adultery with Gregoria Bemejo. The lower courts believed such adulterous
acts committed by the defendant.

On the part of the defendant however, he stated that the reason why he left his wife was
because he received a letter made by the plaintiff herself, addressed to a Spanish civil guard named
Zabal who was her lover. When the defendant asked plaintiff regarding the said letter, she admitted
the genuineness of the letter, fell upon her knees, and implored him to pardon her. That same day
he took her to the home of her parents, told what had occurred, and left her there. The mother
testified that about a year after her daughter was returned to her she heard that the defendant
believed that illicit relations existed between Zabal and the plaintiff on account of a certain letter.

Issue:
Whether or not mutual guilt was committed by both parties in this case

Ruling:
It is expressly provided in Law 8, title 2, partida 4, as follows: ―For the sin of each one of

them is of itself a bar to an accusation against the other.‖The Court‘s conclusion is that neither one
of the parties is entitled to a divorce. Section 497authorizes us in cases of this kind "to make such
findings upon the facts and render such final judgment as justice and equity require." The judgment
below is reversed, and we find from the evidence the following facts: The allegations of the
complaint as to the marriage of the parties and as to the acts of adultery committed by the defendant
are true as therein stated except as to the date of the adultery committed with Gregoria Bermejo.
The plaintiff, in the summer of 1892, at Talisay, in the Province of Occidental Negros, committed
adultery with one Zabal, a corporal of the civil guard.

As conclusion of law from the foregoing facts we hold that neither party is entitled to
judgment of divorce against the other; that judgment be entered that the plaintiff take nothing by
her action or the defendant by his cross demand, and that neither party recover of the other any
costs either in this court or the Court of First Instance.

JOSE DE OCAMPO vs. SERAFINA FLORENCIANO COLLUSION
315
Persons and Family Relation

G.R. No. L-13553 February 23, 1960

Facts:
Plaintiff and defendant were married in April 5, 1938. They begot several children who are

now living with plaintiff. In March, 1951, plaintiff discovered on several occasions that his wife was
betraying his trust by maintaining illicit relations with one Jose Arcalas. Having found the defendant
carrying marital relations with another man plaintiff sent her to Manila in June 1951 to study beauty
culture, where she stayed for one year. Again, plaintiff discovered that while in the said city
defendant was going out with several other men, aside from Jose Arcalas. Towards the end of June,
1952, when defendant had finished studying her course, she left plaintiff and since then they had
lived separately.

On June 18, 1955, plaintiff surprised his wife in the act of having illicit relations with another
man by the name of Nelson Orzame. Plaintiff signified his intention of filing a petition for legal
separation, to which defendant manifested her conformity provided she is not charged with adultery
in a criminal action. Accordingly, plaintiff filed on July 5, 1955, a petition for legal separation.

Issue:
Whether or not collusion existed in this case.

Ruling:
Collusion in divorce or legal separation means the agreement between husband and wife for

one of them to commit, or to appear to commit, or to be represented in court as having committed,
a matrimonial offense, or to suppress evidence of a valid defense, for the purpose of enabling the
other to obtain a divorce. This agreement, if not express, may be implied from the acts of the
parties. It is a ground for denying the divorce.

In this case, there would be collusion if the parties had arranged to make it appear that a
matrimonial offense had been committed although it was not, or if the parties had connived to bring
about a legal separation even in the absence of grounds therefor. Here, the offense of adultery had
really taking place, according to the evidence. The defendant could not have falsely told the
adulterous acts to the Fiscal, because her story might send her to jail the moment her husband
requests the Fiscal to prosecute. She could not have practiced deception at such a personal risk.

In this connection, it has been held that collusion may not be inferred from the mere fact
that the guilty party confesses to the offense and thus enables the other party to procure evidence
necessary to prove it

PRESCRIPTION
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Persons and Family Relation

WILLIAM H. BROWN vs. JUANITA YAMBAO October 18, 1957
G.R. No. L-10699

Facts:
On July 14, 1955, William H. Brown filed suit in the Court of First Instance of Manila to

obtain legal separation from his lawful wife Juanita Yambao. He alleged under oath that while
interned by the Japanese invaders, from 1942 to 1945, at the University of Sto. Tomas internment
camp, his wife engaged in adulterous relations with one Carlos Field of whom she begot a baby girl.
Brown learned of his wife‘s misconduct only in 1945, upon his release from internment. Thereafter
the spouse lived separately. Yambao however testified that after liberation, Brown lived martially
with another woman and had begotten children by her.

The court denied the legal separation filed on the ground that Brown‘s action had already
prescribed.

Issue:
Whether or not the action had already prescribed.

Ruling:
The court below also found, and correctly held that the appellant's action was already barred,

because Brown did not petition for legal separation proceedings until ten years after he learned of
his wife's adultery, which was upon his release from internment in 1945. Under Article 102 of the
new Civil Code, action for legal separation cannot be filed except within one (1) year from and after
the plaintiff became cognizant of the cause and within five years from and after the date when such
cause occurred. Appellant's brief does not even contest the correctness of such findings and
conclusion.

The courts can take cognizance of prescription as a defense because actions seeking a decree
of legal separation, or annulment of marriage, involve public interest and it is the policy of our law
that no such decree be issued if any legal obstacles thereto appear upon the record.

PRESCRIPTION
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Persons and Family Relation

JOSE DE OCAMPO vs. SERAFINA FLORENCIANO

G.R. No. L-13553 February 23, 1960

Facts:
Plaintiff and defendant were married in April 5, 1938. They begot several children who are

now living with plaintiff. In March, 1951, plaintiff discovered on several occasions that his wife was
betraying his trust by maintaining illicit relations with one Jose Arcalas. Having found the defendant
carrying marital relations with another man plaintiff sent her to Manila in June 1951 to study beauty
culture, where she stayed for one year. Again, plaintiff discovered that while in the said city
defendant was going out with several other men, aside from Jose Arcalas. Towards the end of June,
1952, when defendant had finished studying her course, she left plaintiff and since then they had
lived separately.

On June 18, 1955, plaintiff surprised his wife in the act of having illicit relations with another
man by the name of Nelson Orzame. Plaintiff signified his intention of filing a petition for legal
separation, to which defendant manifested her conformity provided she is not charged with adultery
in a criminal action. Accordingly, plaintiff filed on July 5, 1955, a petition for legal separation. Both
lower and appellate courts denied the petition on the ground that there was confession of judgment.

Issue:
Whether or not there was confession of judgment.

Ruling:
Art. 100 of the Civil Code do not exclude, as evidence, any admission or confession made by

the defendant outside of the court. It merely prohibits a decree of separation upon a confession of
judgment. Confession of judgment usually happens when the defendant appears in court and
confesses the right of plaintiff to judgment or files a pleading expressly agreeing to the plaintiff's
demand. This is not present in this case. Yet, even supposing that the above statement of defendant
constituted practically a confession of judgment, inasmuch as there is evidence of the adultery
independently of such statement, the decree may and should be granted, since it would not be based
on her confession, but upon evidence presented by the plaintiff. What the law prohibits is a
judgment based exclusively or mainly on defendant's confession. If a confession defeats the action
ipso facto, any defendant who opposesthe separation will immediately confess judgment, purposely
to prevent it.

The mere circumstance that defendants told the Fiscal that she "like also" to be legally
separated from her husband, is no obstacle to the successful prosecution of the action. When she
refused to answer the complaint, she indicated her willingness to be separated. Yet, the law does not
order the dismissal. Allowing the proceeding to continue, it takes precautions against collusion,
which implies more than consent or lack of opposition to the agreement.

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Persons and Family Relation

PRESCRIPTION

ELENA CONTRERAS vs. CESAR J. MACARAIG May 29, 1970
G.R. No. L-29138

Facts:
Plaintiff and defendant were married on March 16, 1952. Out of their Marriage, three

children were born. All the children are in the care of plaintiff wife.In September, 1962, Avelino
Lubos, driver of the family car, told plaintiff that defendant was living in Singalong with one Lily
Ann Alcala. Defendant would be away for a month, and would be home for three days. During
these times defendant was home, plaintiff refrained from verifying Lubos‘ report in her desire not to
anger defendant.

Plaintiff also heard rumors that Lily Ann Alcala gave birth to a baby. Plaintiff then entreated
her father-in-law, Lucilo Macaraig, to intercede with defendant and to convince him to return to his
family. Defendant however told his father that he could not do anything. Thereafter, plaintiff met
with Lili Ann Alcala. The latter informed that former that she was willing to give defendant but it
was defendant who refused to break relationship with her.

In the early part of December, 1963, plaintiff went to talk to defendant at his place of work
where plaintiff pleaded with defendant to give up Lily Ann Alcala and to return to the conjugal
home, assuring him that she was willing to forgive him. Defendant informed plaintiff that he could
no longer leave Lily Ann and refused to return to his legitimate family.On December 14, 1963,
plaintiff instituted the present action for legal separation.

Issue:
Whether or not prescription has already set in

Ruling:
The requirement of the law that a complaint for legal separation be filed within one year

after the date plaintiff become cognizant of the cause is not of prescriptive nature, but is of the
essence of the cause of action. It is consonant with the philosophy that marriage is an inviolable
social institution so that the law provides strict requirements before it will allow a disruption of its
status.The only question to be resolved is whether the period of one year provided for in Article 102
of the Civil Code should be counted, as far as the instant case is concerned from September 1962 or
from December 1963. After a careful review of the record, We are persuaded that, in the eyes of the
law, the only time when appellant really became cognizant of the infidelity of her husband was in the
early part of December 1963 when plaintiff pleaded the defendant to give up Lily Ann Alcala.

From all the foregoing We conclude that it was only on the occasion mentioned in the
preceding paragraph when her husband admitted to her that he was living with and would no longer
leave Lily Ann to return to his legitimate family that appellant must be deemed to be under
obligation to decide whether to sue or not to sue for legal separation, and it was only then that the
legal period of one year must be deemed to have commenced. The one year prescriptive period is

thus followed in this case.

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Persons and Family Relation

PROCEDURE OF ACTION FOR LEGAL SEPARATION

AIDA P. BAÑEZ vs. GABRIEL B. BAÑEZ

G.R. No. 132592 January 23, 2002

Facts:
On September 23, 1996, the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch 20, decided Civil Case

No. CEB-16765, decreeing among others the legal separation between petitioner Aida Bañez and
respondent Gabriel Bañez on the ground of the latter‘s sexual infidelity; the dissolution of their
conjugal property relations and the division of the net conjugal assets; the forfeiture of respondent‘s
one-half share in the net conjugal assets in favor of the common children.

Defendant then filed a Notice of Appeal before the appellate court. Petitioner however
contends that an action for legal separation is among the cases where multiple appeals may be taken.
She concludes that respondent‘s appeal should have been dismissed for his failure to file the record
on appeal within the reglementary period.

Issue:
Whether or not multiple appeals form part of the procedure for legal separation cases.

Ruling:
In said case, the two issues raised by therein petitioner that may allegedly be the subject of

multiple appeals arose from the same cause of action, and the subject matter pertains to the same
lessor-lessee relationship between the parties. Hence, splitting the appeals in that case would only be
violative of the rule against multiplicity of appeals.

The same holds true in an action for legal separation. The issues involved in the case will
necessarily relate to the same marital relationship between the parties. The effects of legal separation,
such as entitlement to live separately, dissolution and liquidation of the absolute community or
conjugal partnership, and custody of the minor children, follow from the decree of legal separation.
They are not separate or distinct matters that may be resolved by the court and become final prior to
or apart from the decree of legal separation. Rather, they are mere incidents of legal separation.
Thus, they may not be subject to multiple appeals.

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Persons and Family Relation

PROCEDURE OF ACTION FOR LEGAL SEPARATION

CARMEN LAPUZ SYvs. EUFEMIO S. EUFEMIO alias EUFEMIO SY UY
G.R. No. L-30977 January 31, 1972

Facts:
On 18 August 1953, Carmen O. Lapuz Sy filed a petition for legal separation against

Eufemio S. Eufemio, alleging that they were married civilly on 21 September 1934; that they had
lived together as husband and wife continuously until 1943 when her husband abandoned her; that
they had no child; and that she discovered her husband cohabiting with a Chinese woman named
Go Hiok at 1319 Sisa Street, Manila, on or about March 1949. She prayed for the issuance of a
decree of legal separation, which, among others, would order that the defendant Eufemio S.
Eufemio should be deprived of his share of the conjugal partnership profits.

Respondent Eufemio S. Eufemio however counter-claimed for the declaration of nullity ab
initio of his marriage with Carmen O. Lapuz Sy, on the ground of his prior and subsisting marriage,
celebrated according to Chinese law and customs, with one Go Hiok, alias Ngo Hiok. On May 31,
1969, petitioner died in a vehicular accident. Respondent moved to dismiss the case on the ground
that the death abated the action for legal separation.

Issue:
Whether or not the death of the plaintiff before final decree, in an action for legal

separation, abate the action

Ruling:
An action for legal separation which involves nothing more than the bed-and-board

separation of the spouses is purely personal. The Civil Code of the Philippines recognizes this in its
Article 100, by allowing only the innocent spouse (and no one else) to claim legal separation; and in
its Article 108, by providing that the spouses can, by their reconciliation, stop or abate the
proceedings and even rescind a decree of legal separation already rendered. Being personal in
character, it follows that the death of one party to the action causes the death of the action itself “...
When one of the spouses is dead, there is no need for divorce, because the marriage is dissolved.
The heirs cannot even continue the suit, if the death of the spouse takes place during the course of
the suit (Article 244, Section 3).‖ The action is absolutely dead

Marriage is a personal relation or status, created under the sanction of law, and an action for
divorce is a proceeding brought for the purpose of effecting a dissolution of that relation. The
action is one of a personal nature. In the absence of a statute to the contrary, the death of one of the
parties to such action abates the action, for the reason that death has settled the question of
separation beyond all controversy and deprived the court of jurisdiction, both over the persons of
the parties to the action and of the subject-matter of the action itself. For this reason the courts are
almost unanimous in holding that the death of either party to a divorce proceeding, before final

decree, abates the action.

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Persons and Family Relation

However, it is apparent that the right to the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains
(or of the absolute community of property), the loss of right by the offending spouse to any share of
the profits earned by the partnership or community, or his disqualification to inherit by intestacy
from the innocent spouse as well as the revocation of testamentary provisions in favor of the
offending spouse made by the innocent one, are all rights and disabilities that, by the very terms of
the Civil Code article, are vested exclusively in the persons of the spouses; and by their nature and
intent, such claims and disabilities are difficult to conceive as assignable or transmissible. Hence, a
claim to said rights is not a claim that "is not thereby extinguished" after a party dies, under Section
17, Rule 3, of the Rules of Court, to warrant continuation of the action through a substitute of the
deceased party.

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Persons and Family Relation

MANDATORY COOLING-OFF PERIOD

LUIS MA. ARANETA vs. HONORABLE HERMOGENES CONCEPCION
G.R. No. L-9667 July 31, 1956

Facts:
The main action was brought by the husband against his wifefor legal separation on the

ground of adultery. The wife however filed an omnibus petition to secure custody of their three
minor children, a monthly support of P5,000 for herself and said children, and the return of her
passport. The husband opposed the petition, denying the misconduct imputed to him and alleging
that the wife had abandoned the children. The respondent judge resolved the omnibus petition
granting custody of the children to the wife and a monthly allowance of P2,300.00 for support for
her and her children.

The main reason given by the judge, for refusing the huisband‘s request that evidence be
allowed to be introduced on the issues, is the prohibition contained in Article 103 of the Civil Code,
which reads as follows: ―ART. 103. An action for legal separation shall in no case be tried before six
months shall have elapsed since the filing of the petition.‖

Issue:
Whether or not the six month cooling-off period be followed

Ruling:
It is conceded that the period of six months fixed therein Article 103 (Civil Code) is

evidently intended as a cooling off period to make possible a reconciliation between the spouses.
The recital of their grievances against each other in court may only fan their already inflamed
passions against one another, and the lawmaker has imposed the period to give them opportunity
for dispassionate reflection. But this practical expedient, necessary to carry out legislative policy,
does not have the effect of overriding other provisions such as the determination of the custody of
the children and alimony and support pendente lite according to the circumstances. (Article 105,
Civil Code.) The law expressly enjoins that these should be determined by the court according to the
circumstances. If these are ignored or the courts close their eyes to actual facts, rank in justice may
be caused.

Take the case at bar, for instance. Why should the court ignore the claim of adultery by the
husband in the face of express allegations under oath to that effect, supported by circumstantial
evidence consisting of letter the authenticity of which cannot be denied. And why assume that the
children are in the custody of the wife, and that the latter is living at the conjugal dwelling, when it is
precisely alleged in the petition and in the affidavits, that she has abandoned the conjugal abode?
Evidence of all these disputed allegations should be allowed that the discretion of the court as to the

custody and alimony pendente lite may be lawfully exercised.

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Persons and Family Relation

Thus the determination of the custody and alimony should be given effect and force
provided it does not go to the extent of violating the policy of the cooling off period. That is,
evidence not affecting the cause of the separation, like the actual custody of the children, the means
conducive to their welfare and convenience during the pendency of the case, these should be
allowed that the court may determine which is best for their custody.

MANDATORY COOLING-OFF PERIOD

LUCY SOMOSA-RAMOS vs. THE HONORABLE CIPRIANO VAMENTA, JR.

G.R. No. L-34132 July 29, 1972

Facts:
On June 18, 1971, petitioner filed in the sala of respondent Judge against respondent

Clemente Ramos for legal separation, on concubinage on the respondent's part and an attempt by
him against her life being alleged. She likewise sought the issuance of a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction for the return to her of what she claimed to be her paraphernal and exclusive
property, then under the administration and management of respondent Clemente Ramos. There
was an opposition to the hearing of such a motion based on Article 103 of the Civil Code.
Thereafter, petitioner received an order of respondent Judge granting the motion of respondent
Ramos to suspend the hearing of the petition for a writ of mandatory preliminary injunction. That is
the order complained of in this petition for certiorari.

Issue:
Whether or not Article 103 of the Civil Code prohibiting the hearing of an action for legal

separation before the lapse of six months from the filing of the petition, would likewise preclude the
court from acting on a motion for preliminary mandatory injunction applied for as an ancillary
remedy to such a suit.

Ruling:
After a careful consideration of the legal question presented, it is the holding of this Court

that Article 103 the Civil Code is not an absolute bar to the hearing motion for preliminary
injunction prior to the expiration of the six-month period.The court where the action is pending
according to Article 103 is to remain passive. It must let the parties alone in the meanwhile. It is
precluded from hearing the suit. There is then some plausibility for the view of the lower court that
an ancillary motion such as one for preliminary mandatory injunction is not to be acted on. If it were
otherwise, there would be a failure to abide by the literal language of such codal provision. That the
law, however, remains cognizant of the need in certain cases for judicial power to assert itself are
discernible from what is set forth in the following article. It reads thus: "After the filing of the
petition for legal separation, the spouse shall be entitled to live separately from each other and
manage their respective property. The husband shall continue to manage the conjugal partnership
property but if the court deems it proper, it may appoint another to manage said property, in which
case the administrator shall have the same rights and duties as a guardian and shall not be allowed to
dispose of the income or of the capital except in accordance with the orders of the court."There
would appear to be then recognition that the question of management of their respective property
need not be left unresolved even during such six-month period. An administrator may even be

appointed for the management of the property of the conjugal partnership. The absolute limitation
from which the court suffers under the preceding article is thereby eased. The parties may in the

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Persons and Family Relation

meanwhile be heard. There is justification then for the petitioner's insistence that her motion for
preliminary mandatory injunction should not be ignored by the lower court. There is all the more
reason for this response from respondent Judge, considering that the husband whom she accused of
concubinage and an attempt against her life would in the meanwhile continue in the management of
what she claimed to be her paraphernal property, an assertion that was not specifically denied by
him.

MANDATORY COOLING-OFF PERIOD

ENRICO L. PACETE vs. HON. GLICERIO V. CARRIAGA, JR.
G.R. No. L-53880 March 17, 1994

Facts:
In Concepcion Alanis‘ complaint, she averred that she was married to Pacete on 30 April

1938; that Pacete subsequently contracted (in 1948) a second marriage with Clarita de la
Concepcion; that she learned of such marriage only on 01 August 1979; that during her marriage to
Pacete, the latter acquired vast property consisting of large tracts of land, fishponds and several
motor vehicles; that he fraudulently placed the several pieces of property either in his name and
Clarita or in the names of his children with Clarita and other dummies.

The defendants asked for a motion of extension if their time to file their answers, which was
granted by the judge. However, defendants still failed to file their respective answers. Thus, Alanis
asked that defendants be declared in default which was approved by the judge. Thereafter, Alanis
submitted all evidences favoring her. Thus, this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the declaration of default is proper

Ruling:
Art. 101. No decree of legal separation shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by

confession of judgment.In case of non-appearance of the defendant, the court shall order the
prosecuting attorney to inquire whether or not collusion between the parties exists. If there is no
collusion, the prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the State in order to take care that the
evidence for the plaintiff is not fabricated.

The policy of Article 101 of the new Civil Code, calling for the intervention of the state
attorneys in case of uncontested proceedings for legal separation (and of annulment of marriages,
under Article 88), is to emphasize that marriage is more than a mere contract; that it is a social
institution in which the state is vitally interested, so that its continuation or interruption cannot be
made to depend upon the parties themselves.

It is consonant with this policy that the inquiry by the Fiscal should be allowed to focus
upon any relevant matter that may indicate whether the proceedings for separation or annulment are
fully justified or not. Article 103 of the Civil Code, now Article 58 of the Family Code, further
mandates that an action for legal separation must "in no case be tried before six months shall have
elapsed since the filing of the petition," obviously in order to provide the parties a "cooling-off"
period. In this interim, the court should take steps toward getting the parties to reconcile.

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Persons and Family Relation

The significance of the above substantive provisions of the law is further underscored by the
inclusion of the following provision in Rule 18 of the Rules of Court: Sec. 6. No defaults in actions
for annulments of marriage or for legal separation. — If the defendant in an action for annulment of
marriage or for legal separation fails to answer, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to
investigate whether or not collusion between the parties exists, and if there is no collusion, to
intervene for the State in order to see to it that the evidence submitted is not fabricated.

The special prescriptions on actions that can put the integrity of marriage to possible
jeopardy are impelled by no less than the State's interest in the marriage relation and its avowed
intention not to leave the matter within the exclusive domain and the vagaries of the parties to alone
dictate.

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Persons and Family Relation

NECESSITY OF TRIAL AND INTERVENTION OF STATE

ENRICO L. PACETE vs. HON. GLICERIO V. CARRIAGA, JR.
G.R. No. L-53880 March 17, 1994

Facts:
Concepcion Alanis filed a complaint on October 1979, for the Declaration of Nullity of

Marriage between her erstwhile husband Enrico Pacete and one Clarita de la Concepcion, as well as
for legal separation between her and Pacete, accounting and separation of property. She averred in
her complaint that she was married to Pacete on April 1938 and they had a child named Consuelo;
that Pacete subsequently contracted a second marriage with Clarita de la Concepcion and that she
learned of such marriage only on August 1979. Reconciliation between her and Pacete was
impossible since he evidently preferred to continue living with Clarita.

The defendants were each served with summons. They filed an extension within which to
file an answer, which the court partly granted. Due to unwanted misunderstanding, particularly in
communication, the defendants failed to file an answer on the date set by the court. Thereafter, the
plaintiff filed a motion to declare the defendants in default, which the court forthwith granted. The
court received plaintiffs‘ evidence during the hearings held on February 15, 20, 21, and 22, 1980.
After trial, the court rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiff on March 17,1980.

Issue:
Whether or not the RTC gravely abused its discretion in denying petitioner‘s motion for

extension of time to file their answer, in declaring petitioners in default and in rendering its decision
on March 17, 1980 which decreed the legal separation of Pacete and Alanis and held to be null and
void the marriage of Pacete to Clarita.

Ruling:
The Civil Code provides that ―no decree of legal separation shall be promulgated upon a

stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment. In case of non-appearance of the defendant, the
court shall order the prosecuting attorney to inquire whether or not collusion between parties exists.
If there is no collusion, the prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the State in order to take care
that the evidence for the plaintiff is not fabricated.‖ The above stated provision calling for the
intervention of the state attorneys in case of uncontested proceedings for legal separation (and of
annulment of marriages, under Article 88) is to emphasize that marriage is more than a mere
contract.

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Persons and Family Relation

Article 103 of the Civil Code, now Article 58 of the Family Code, further mandates that an
action for legal separation must ―in no case be tried before six months shall have elapsed since the
filing of the petition,‖ obviously in order to provide the parties a ―cooling-off‖ period. In this
interim, the court should take steps toward getting the parties to reconcile. The significance of the
above substantive provisions of the law is further or underscored by the inclusion of a provision in
Rule 18 of the Rules of Court which provides that no defaults in actions for annulments of marriage
or for legal separation. Therefore, ―if the defendant in an action for annulment of marriage or for
legal separation fails to answer, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to investigate whether
or not a collusion between the parties exists, and if there is no collusion, to intervene for the State in
order to see to it that the evidence submitted is not fabricated.‖

LEGAL SEPARATION PENDENTE LITE

SAMSON T. SABALONES vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and REMEDIOS GAVIOLA-
SABALONES

G.R. No. 106169 February 14, 1994

Facts:
As a member of our diplomatic service assigned to different countries during his successive

tours of duties, petitioner Samson T. Sabalones left to his wife, herein respondent Remedios
Gaviola-Sabalones, the administration of some of their conjugal, properties for fifteen years.
Sabalones retired as ambassador in 1985 and came back to the Philippines but not to his wife and
their children. Four years later, he filed an action for judicial authorization to sell a building and lot

located at #17 Eisenhower St., Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila, belonging to the conjugal
partnership. He claimed that he was sixty-eight years old, very sick and living alone without any
income, and that his share of the proceeds of the sale to defray the prohibitive cost of his
hospitalization and medical treatment. In her answer, the private respondent opposed the
authorization and filed a counterclaim for legal separation.

The Court notes that the wife has been administering the subject properties for almost
nineteen years now, apparently without complaint on the part of the petitioner. He has not alleged,
much less shown, that her administration has caused prejudice to the conjugal partnership. What he
merely suggests is that the lease of the Forbes Park property could be renewed on better terms, or
he should at least be given his share of the rentals.

In her prayer, she asked the court to grant the decree of legal separation and order the
liquidation of their conjugal properties, with forfeiture of her husband's share therein because of his
adultery. She also prayed that it enjoin the petitioner and his agents from a) disturbing the occupants
of the Forbes Park property and b) disposing of or encumbering any of the conjugal properties. The
petitioner now assails this order, arguing that since the law provides for a joint administration of the
conjugal properties by the husband and wife, no injunctive relief can be issued against one or the
other because no right will be violated. In support of this contention, he cites Art. 124 of the Family
Code.

Issue:
Whether or not the injunction ha permanently installed the respondent wife as the

administrator of the whole mass of conjugal assets.

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Ruling:
The Court has carefully considered the issues and the arguments of the parties and finds that

the petition has no merit. We agree with the respondent court that pending the appointment of an
administrator over the whole mass of conjugal assets, the respondent court was justified in allowing
the wife to continue with her administration. It was also correct, taking into account the evidence
adduced at the hearing, in enjoining the petitioner from interfering with his wife's administration
pending resolution of the appeal.

The law does indeed grant to the spouses joint administration over the conjugal properties as
clearly provided in the above-cited Article 124 of the Family Code. However, Article 61, also above
quoted, states that after a petition for legal separation has been filed, the trial court shall, in the
absence of a written agreement between the couple, appoint either one of the spouses or a third
person to act as the administrator.

While it is true that no formal designation of the administrator has been made, such
designation was implicit in the decision of the trial court denying the petitioner any share in the
conjugal properties (and thus also disqualifying him as administrator thereof). That designation was
in effect approved by the Court of Appeals when it issued in favor of the respondent wife the
preliminary injunction now under challenge.

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LEGAL SEPARATION PENDENTE LITE

REYNALDO ESPIRITU and GUILLERMA LAYUG vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
TERESITA MASAUDING

G.R. No. 115640 March 15, 1995

Facts:
Petitioner Reynaldo Espiritu and respondent Teresita Masauding first met in Iligan City

where Reynaldo was employed by the National Steel Corporation and Teresita was employed as a
nurse in a local hospital. Teresita left for Los Angeles, California to work as a nurse. Reynaldo was

sent by his employer, the National Steel Corporation, to Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania as its liaison
officer and Reynaldo and Teresita then began to maintain a common law relationship of husband
and wife. On 1986, their daughter, Rosalind Therese, was born. While they were on a brief vacation
in the Philippines, Reynaldo and Teresita got married, and upon their return to the United States,
their second child, a son, this time, and given the name Reginald Vince, was born on 1988.

The relationship of the couple deteriorated until they decided to separate. Instead of giving
their marriage a second chance as allegedly pleaded by Reynaldo, Teresita left Reynaldo and the
children and went back to California. Reynaldo brought his children home to the Philippines, but
because his assignment in Pittsburgh was not yet completed, he was sent back by his company to
Pittsburgh. He had to leave his children with his sister, Guillerma Layug and her family.

Teresita, meanwhile, decided to return to the Philippines and filed the petition for a writ of
habeas corpus against herein two petitioners to gain custody over the children, thus starting the
whole proceedings now reaching this Court. The trial court dismissed the petition for habeas corpus.
It suspended Teresita's parental authority over Rosalind and Reginald and declared Reynaldo to have
sole parental authority over them but with rights of visitation to be agreed upon by the parties and
to be approved by the Court.

Issue:
Whether or not the petition for a writ of habeas corpus to gain custody over the children be

granted.

Ruling:

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The SC dismissed the writ of habeas corpus petition by the mother and retain the custody of
the children to the father. The illicit or immoral activities of the mother had already caused
emotional disturbances, personality conflicts, and exposure to conflicting moral values against the
children.

The children are now both over seven years old. Their choice of the parent with whom they
prefer to stay is clear from the record. From all indications, Reynaldo is a fit person. The children
understand the unfortunate shortcomings of their mother and have been affected in their emotional
growth by her behavior.

LEGAL SEPARATION PENDENTE LITE

CARMEN LAPUZ SY vs.EUFEMIO S. EUFEMIO

G.R. No. L-30977 January 31, 1972

Facts:
Carmen Lapuz-Sy filed a petition for legal separation against Eufemio Eufemio on August

1953. They were married civilly on September 21, 1934 and canonically after nine days. They had
lived together as husband and wife continuously without any children until 1943 when her husband
abandoned her. They acquired properties during their marriage. Petitioner then discovered that her
husband cohabited with a Chinese woman named Go Hiok on or about 1949. She prayed for the
issuance of a decree of legal separation, which among others, would order that the defendant
Eufemio should be deprived of his share of the conjugal partnership profits.

Eufemio counterclaimed for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Lapuz-Sy on the
ground of his prior and subsisting marriage with Go Hiok. Trial proceeded and the parties adduced
their respective evidence. However, before the trial could be completed, respondent already
scheduled to present surrebuttal evidence, petitioner died in a vehicular accident on May 1969. Her
counsel duly notified the court of her death. Eufemio moved to dismiss the petition for legal
separation on June 1969 on the grounds that the said petition was filed beyond the one-year period
provided in Article 102 of the Civil Code and that the death of Carmen abated the action for legal
separation. Petitioner‘s counsel moved to substitute the deceased Carmen by her father, Macario
Lapuz.

Issue:
Whether the death of the plaintiff, before final decree in an action for legal separation, abate

the action and will it also apply if the action involved property rights.

Ruling:
An action for legal separation is abated by the death of the plaintiff, even if property rights

are involved. These rights are mere effects of decree of separation, their source being the decree
itself; without the decree such rights do not come into existence, so that before the finality of a
decree, these claims are merely rights in expectation. If death supervenes during the pendency of the

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action, no decree can be forthcoming, death producing a more radical and definitive separation; and
the expected consequential rights and claims would necessarily remain unborn.

The petition of Eufemio for declaration of nullity is moot and academic and there could be
no further interest in continuing the same after her demise, that automatically dissolved the
questioned union. Any property rights acquired by either party as a result of Article 144 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines 6 could be resolved and determined in a proper action for partition by either
the appellee or by the heirs of the appellant.

DECREE OF LEGAL SEPARATION

ELISEA LAPERAL vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHIPPINES
G.R. No. L-18008 October 30, 1962

Facts:
On May 10, 1960, Elisea Laperal filed in the Court of First Instance of Baguio (Sp Proc. No.

433) a petition which reads: That petitioner's maiden name is ELISEA LAPERAL; that on March

24, 1939, she married Mr. Enrique R. Santamaria; that in a partial decision entered on this
Honorable Court on January 18, 1958, in Civil Case No. 356 of this Court, entitled 'Enrique R.
Santamaria vs. Elisea L. Santamaria' Mr. Enrique Santamaria was given a decree of legal separation
from her; that the said partial decision is now final; That during her marriage to Enrique R.
Santamaria, she naturally used, instead of her maiden name, that of Elisea L. Santamaria; that aside
from her legal separation from Enrique R. Santamaria, she has also ceased to live with him for many
years now; That in view of the fact that she has been legally separated from Mr. Enrique R.
Santamaria and has likewise ceased to live with him for many years, it is desirable that she be allowed
to change her name and/or be permitted to resume using her maiden name, to wit: ELISEA
LAPERAL.

Petitioner respectfully prayed that after the necessary proceedings are had, she be allowed to
resume using her maiden name of Elisea Laperal. The petition was opposed by the City Attorney of
Baguio on the ground that the same violates the provisions of Article 370 (should be 372) of the
Civil Code, and that it is not sanctioned by the Rules of Court.

Issue:
Whether Rule 103 which refers to change of name in general will prevail over the specific

provision of Art. 372 of the Civil Code with regard to married woman legally separated from his
husband.

Ruling:
In legal separation, the married status is unaffected by the separation, there being no

severance of the vinculum. The finding that petitioner‘s continued use of her husband surname may

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cause undue confusion in her finances was without basis. It must be considered that the issuance of
the decree of legal separation in 1958, necessitate that the conjugal partnership between her and
Enrique had automatically been dissolved and liquidated. Hence, there could be no more occasion
for an eventual liquidation of the conjugal assets.

Furthermore, applying Rule 103 is not a sufficient ground to justify a change of the name of
Elisea for to hold otherwise would be to provide for an easy circumvention of the mandatory
provision of Art. 372.

Petition was dismissed.

DECREE OF LEGAL SEPARATION

SIOCHI vs. GOZON

G.R. No. 169900 March 18, 2010

Facts:
Alfredo and Elvira are married. Winifred is their daughter. The property involved in this case

is a 30,000 sq. m. lot in Malabon which is registered in the name of Alfredo. The property regime of
the couple is conjugal partnership of gains.Elvira filed for legal separation. B filed a notice of lis
pendens over the title of the lot in Malabon. While the legal separation case was still pending,
Alfredo entered into an agreement with Mario who paid P5 million in earnest money and took
possession of the property. Title still with notice of lis pendens.

Cavite RTC granted legal separation. CPG was dissolved and liquidated. Alfredo, the guilty
spouse, did not receive his share in the net profits, which instead went to their daughter, Winifred.
Cavite RTC ruled land in Malabon as conjugal property. Alfred executed a Deed of Donation over
the property in favour of Winifred. Malabon RTC issued new TCT in the name of Winifred without
annotating the agreement between Alfredo and Mario Siochi, nor the notice of lis pendens filed by
Elvira, the wife. Then, through an SPA, Winifred gave authority to her father, Alfred, to sell the lot.
Alfred sold it to Inter-Dimensional Realty for P18 million. A TCT was issued to Inter-Dimensional
Realty. Mario filed a case with Malabon RTC (property was in Malabon) to Annul donation to
Winifred, Annul the Sale to Inter-Dimensional, and to remove notice of lis pendens over title of
land. Malabon RTC upheld original agreement to buy and sell between Mario and Alfredo and
declared void the sale by Alfredo and Winifred to Inter-Dimensional. However, Court of Appeals
said agreement between Mario and Alfredo is void because (1) it was entered into without the
consent of Elvira, Alfredo‘s wife; and, (2) Alfredo‘s ½ undivided share has been forfeited in favour
of Winifred by the grant of legal separation by the Cavite RTC.

Issue:
Whether or not the agreement between Mario and Alfredo valid?

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Persons and Family Relation

Ruling:
The SC says the CA was right in declaring the sale between Mario and Alfredo as void.

Under Art 124 of the Family Code, if one of the spouses was incapacitated or otherwise unable to
participate in the administration of the properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of
administration. These powers, however do not include the power to dispose or encumber the
properties which require a court order or the written consent of the other spouse. The agreement is
void in its entirety, not just to the share of the husband, Alfredo. The Court however said that the
CA erred in saying that the ½ undivided share of Alfredo was forfeited in favour of Winifred. As
regards Mario‘s contention that the Agreement is a continuing offer which may be perfected by
Elvira‘s acceptance before the offer is withdrawn, the fact that the property was subsequently
donated by Alfredo to Winifred and then sold to IDRI clearly indicates that the offer was already
withdrawn.

The Court said the CA erred in saying that Alfredo forfeited his ½ share in the conjugal
property as a result of the grant of legal separation by the Cavite RTC. Art 63 (Effects of legal
separation) in relation to Art 43(2) (Effects of termination of subsequent marriage) provides that the
guilty spouse in legal separation forfeits his share in the net profits of the property. The Court said,
―Clearly, what is forfeited in favor of Winifred is not Alfredo‘s share in the conjugal partnership
property but merely in the net profits of the conjugal partnership property.‖ Thus, as regards this
point, the CA erred. Inter-Dimensional says it is a buyer in good faith. SC says no. Inter-
Dimensional knew of the notice of lis pendens.

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Persons and Family Relation

RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF SPOUSES

G.R. No. 129295 PELAYO vs. LAURON August 15, 2001

Facts:
On November 23, 1906, a physician named Arturo Pelayo filed a complaint against Marelo

Lauron and Juana Abellana. On the night of October 13th of the same year, the plaintiff was called
to render medical assistance to the defendant‘s daughter-in-law, who was about to gie birth. After
the consultation of Dr. Escaño, it was deemed that the operation was going to be difficult for child
birth, but regardless, Dr. Pelayo proceeded with the job of operating on the subject and also
removed the afterbirth. The operation went on until morning, and on the same day, visited several
times and billed the defendants the just amount of P500 for the services rendered to which
defendants refused to pay. In answer to the complaint, counsel for the defendants denied all of the
allegation and alleged as a special defense, that their daughter-in-law had died in consequence of the
said childbirth, that when she was alive she lived with her husband independently and in a separate
house without any relation whatever with them, and that, if on the day when she gave birth she was
in the house of the defendants, her stay their was accidental and due to fortuitous circumstances.
Therefore, he prayed that the defendants be absolved of the complaint with costs against the
plaintiff.

Issue:
Can the defendants be held liable to pay for the obligation?

Ruling:
No. According to article 1089 of the Civil Code, obligations are created by law, by contracts,

by quasi-contracts, and by illicit acts and omissions or by those in which any kind of fault or
negligence occurs. Obligations arising from law are not presumed. Those expressly determined in
the code or in special laws, etc., are the only demandable ones. Obligations arising from contracts
have legal force between the contracting parties and must be fulfilled in accordance with their
stipulations. (Arts. 1090 and 1091.) The rendering of medical assistance in case of illness was
comprised among the mutual obligations to which the spouses were bound by way of mutual
support. (Arts. 142 and 143.) If every obligation consists in giving, doing or not doing something
(art. 1088), and spouses were mutually bound to support each other, there can be no question but
that, when either of them by reason of illness should be in need of medical assistance, the other was
under the unavoidable obligation to furnish the necessary services of a physician in order that health
may be restored, and he or she may be freed from the sickness by which life is jeopardized. The
party bound to furnish such support was therefore liable for all expenses, including the fees of the
medical expert for his professional services. In the face of the above legal precepts, it was
unquestionable that the person bound to pay the fees due to the plaintiff for the professional
services that he rendered to the daughter-in-law of the defendants during her childbirth, was the
husband of the patient and not her father and mother- in-law of the defendants herein.

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Persons and Family Relation

RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF SPOUSES

G.R. No. 114791 NANCY GO and ALEX GO vs COURT OF APPEALS May 29, 1997

Facts:
In 1981, Hermogenes Ong and Jane Ong contracted with Nancy Go for the latter to film

their wedding. After the wedding, the newlywed inquired about their wedding video but Nancy Go
said it‘s not yet ready. She advised them to return for the wedding video after their honeymoon. The
newlywed did so but only to find out that Nancy Go can no longer produce the said wedding video
because the copy has been erased. The Ongs then sued Nancy Go for damages. Nancy‘s husband,
Alex Go, was impleaded. The trial court ruled in favor of the spouses Ong and awarded in their
favor, among others, P75k in moral damages. In her defense on appeal, Nancy Go said: that they
erased the video tape because as per the terms of their agreement, the spouses are supposed to claim
their wedding tape within 30 days after the wedding, however, the spouses neglected to get said
wedding tape because they only made their claim after two months; that her husband should not be
impleaded in this suit.

Issue:
Whether or not Nancy Go is liable for moral damages.

Ruling:

Yes. Her contention is bereft of merit. It is shown that the spouses Ong made their claim
after the wedding but were advised to return after their honeymoon. The spouses advised Go that
their honeymoon is to be done abroad and won‘t be able to return for two months. It is contrary to
human nature for any newlywed couple to neglect to claim the video coverage of their wedding; the
fact that the Ongs filed a case against Nancy Go belies such assertion. Considering the sentimental
value of the tapes and the fact that the event therein recorded — a wedding which in our culture is a
significant milestone to be cherished and remembered — could no longer be reenacted and was lost
forever, the trial court was correct in awarding the Ongs moral damages in compensation for the
mental anguish, tortured feelings, sleepless nights and humiliation that the Ongs suffered and which
under the circumstances could be awarded as allowed under Articles 2217 and 2218 of the Civil
Code. Anent the issue that Nancy Go‘s husband should not be included in the suit, this argument is
valid. Under Article 73 of the Family Code, the wife may exercise any profession, occupation or
engage in business without the consent of the husband. In this case, it was shown that it was only
Nancy Go who entered into a contract with the spouses Ong hence only she (Nancy) is liable to pay
the damages awarded in favor of the Ongs.

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Persons and Family Relation

RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF SPOUSES

G.R. No. 17014 ARROYO vs. VASQUEZ-ARROYO August 29, 1921

Facts:
Plaintiff Mariano and defendant Dolores were married in 1910, and lived in Iloilo City. They

lived together with a few short intervals of separation. On July 4, 1920, defendant Dolores went
away from their common home and decided to live separately from plaintiff. She claimed that she
was compelled to leave on the basis of cruel treatment on the part of her husband. She in turn
prayed for a decree of separation, a liquidation of their conjugal partnership, and an allowance for
counsel fees and permanent separate maintenance. CFI ruled in favor of the defendant and she was
granted alimony amounting to P400, also other fees Plaintiff then asked for a restitution of conjugal
rights, and a permanent mandatory injunction requiring the defendant to return to the conjugal
home and live with him as his wife.

Issues:
a) Whether or not defendant had sufficient cause for leaving the conjugal home
b) Whether or not plaintiff may be granted the restitution of conjugal rights or absolute order
or permanent mandatory injunction

Ruling:

The wife had sufficient cause for leaving the conjugal home. Cruelty done by plaintiff to
defendant was greatly exaggerated. The wife was inflicted with a disposition of jealousy towards her
husband in an aggravated degree. No sufficient cause was present. Courts should move with caution
in enforcing the duty to provide for the separate maintenance of the wife since this recognizes the
de facto separation of the two parties. Continued cohabitation of the pair must be seen as
impossible, and separation must be necessary, stemming from the fault of the husband. She is under
obligation to return to the domicile. ―When people understand that they must live together…they
learn to soften by mutual accommodation that yoke which they know they cannot shake off; they
become good husbands and wives…necessity is a powerful master in teaching the duties which it
imposes…‖ (Evans v. Evans)

On granting the restitution of conjugal rights. It is not within the province of the courts to
compel one of the spouses to cohabit with, and render conjugal rights to, the other. In the case of
property rights, such an action may be maintained. Said order, at best, would have no other purpose
than to compel the spouses to live together. Other countries, such as England and Scotland have
done this with much criticism. Plaintiff is entitled to a judicial declaration that the defendant
absented herself without sufficient cause and it is her duty to return. She is also not entitled to
support.

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RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF SPOUSES

G.R. No. 139789 ILUSORIO vs. BILDNER May 12, 2000

Facts:
Erlinda Kalaw and Potenciano Ilusorio contracted matrimony and lived together for a period

of thirty years. Out of their marriage, the spouses had six children. In 1972, they separated from bed
and board for undisclosed reasons. Potenciano lived in Makati when he was in Manila and in
Ilusorio penthouse when he was in Baguio City. On the other hand, Erlinda lived in Antipolo City.
When Potenciano arrived from United States and lived with Erlinda in Antipolo City for five
months. The children, Sylvia and Lin, alleged that their mother overdosed their father with an
antidepressant drug which the latter‘s health deteriorated. Erlinda filed with RTC of Antipolo City a
petition for guardianship over the person and property of her husband due to the latter‘s advanced
age, frail health, poor eyesight and impaired judgment. Potenciano did not return to Antipolo City
and instead lived in a condominium in Makati City after attending a corporate meeting in Baguio
City. With these, Erlinda filed with CA a petition for habeas corpus to have custody of her husband
and also for the reason that respondent refused petitioner‘s demands to see and visit her husband
and prohibiting Potenciano from living with her in Antipolo City.

Issue:
Whether or not Erlinda Ilusorio may secure a writ of habeas corpus to compel her husband

to live with her in conjugal bliss.

Ruling:
The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of

involuntary restraint, and to relieve a person there from if such restraint is illegal. To justify the grant
of the petition, the restraint of liberty must be an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of
action. The illegal restraint of liberty must be actual and effective, not merely nominal or moral. No
court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband to live with his wife. Coverture
cannot be enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus carried out by sheriffs or by any other
means process. That is a matter beyond judicial authority and is best left to the man and woman‘s
free choice. Therefore, a petition for writ of habeas corpus is denied.

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Persons and Family Relation

RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF SPOUSES

G.R. No. 11263 GOITIA vs. CAMPOS-RUEDA November 2, 1916

Facts:
The parties were legally married in the city of Manila on January 7, 1915, and immediately

thereafter established their residence at 115 Calle San Marcelino, where they lived together for about
a month, when the plaintiff returned to the home of her parents. Eloisa Goitia, plaintiff-appellant,
and Jose Campos-Rueda, defendant, were legally married in the city of Manila. They established their
residence 115 Calle San Marcelino, where they lived together. The allegations of the complaint were
that the defendant, one month after they had contracted marriage, demanded plaintiff to perform
unchaste and lascivious acts on his genital organs in which the latter reject the said demands. With
these refusals, the defendant got irritated and provoked to maltreat the plaintiff by word and deed.
Unable to induce the defendant to desist from his repugnant desires and cease of maltreating her,
plaintiff was obliged to leave the conjugal abode and take refuge in the home of her parents. The
plaintiff appeals for a complaint against her husband for support outside of the conjugal domicile.
However, the defendant objects that the facts alleged in the complaint do not state a cause of action.

Issue:
Whether or not Goitia can claim for support outside of the conjugal domicile.

Ruling:
Marriage is something more than a mere contract. It is a new relation, the rights, duties and

obligations of which rest not upon the agreement of the parties but upon the general law which
defines and prescribes those rights, duties and obligations. When the object of a marriage is defeated
by rendering its continuance intolerable to one of the parties and productive of no possible good to
the community, relief in some way should be obtainable. The law provides that defendant, who is
obliged to support the wife, may fulfill this obligation either by paying her a fixed pension or by
maintaining her in his own home at his option. However, the option given by law is not absolute.
The law will not permit the defendant to evade or terminate his obligation to support his wife if the
wife was forced to leave the conjugal abode because of the lewd designs and physical assaults of the
defendant, Beatriz may claim support from the defendant for separate maintenance even outside of
the conjugal home.

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Persons and Family Relation

RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF SPOUSES: MARITAL COMMUNICATION RULE

CUENCA vs. CUENCA

G.R. No. L-72321 December 8, 1988

Facts:
Private respondents Restituto Cuenca and Meladora Cuenca claimed ownership over the

subject parcels of land on the ground that they are the legitimate children of Agripino Cuenca and
Maria Bangahon, both deceased, owners of the subject parcels of land. They alleged that some of the
parcels are paraphernal property of Maria while all the others are conjugal properties of Maria and
Agripino They also alleged that Agripino Cuenca and Engracia Basadre were not legally married
because at the time they lived together Agripino was married to a certain Jesusa Pagar.

On the other hand, the petitioners (defendants below) Diosdidit, Baldomero, Filomeno
Elpidio, Aida, Anita and Engracia Vda.de Cuenca denied the legitimacy of the marriage between
Agripino Cuenca and Maria Bangahon as well as the legitimacy of the plaintiffs as children of the
couple. They claimed that Agripino Cuenca and their mother Engracia Basadre were legally married
and that they are the legitimate children of the couple. They contend that the subject parcels of lands
are conjugal properties of Agripino and Engracia.

That parcel of land situated in Rendon, Butuan, Agusan, planted to rice with irrigation under
the present possession of the heirs, bounded on the North by Mariano Agagdang on the East by
Clerencia Tagonsod on the South by Suatan River and on the West by Mariano Agagdang containing
an area of 1.2500 hectares, more or less, under Tax Dec. 3055, assessed at P250.00 by the property
records of Agusan.

That parcel of land situated in Rendon, Butuan, Agusan, planted to coconut, under the
present possession of the heirs, bounded on the North by Maximo Bangahon, on the East, by Sergio
Pagar, on the South, by Macaria Agagdang on the West, by Folgencio Buyan, containing an area of
1.1722 hectares, more or less, assessed at P670.00 by Tax Dec. No. 4026 of Agusan belong to Maria
Bangahon as her inheritance from her parents. This declaration against interest is further reiterated
by Agripino Cuenca in that judicial settlement and sale executed by him on October 19, 1950. These
two documents, as rightly contended by the plaintiffs, are ample proofs that the properties in
question described in par. 2 of the complaint, belong exclusively to Maria Bangahon as her
paraphernal property, a fact declared by no less than the husband himself in a declaration against his
interest. It was error for the trial court to unceremoniously brush aside the importance of the
declaration of Agripino Cuenca in the extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Maria Bangahon.
These public documents carry sufficient evidentiary weight to prove the origin of the properties in
question and the nature of their ownership as properties brought into the marriage by Maria
Bangahon to Agripino Cuenca as against the bare testimony of the defendants and their witnesses,
More importantly, Juan Buyan and former Judge Francisco Ro.

Issue:
Whether or not the parcels of lands are conjugal properties of Agripino and Engracia

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Persons and Family Relation

Ruling:
The records show that defendant Bartolome Sanchez upon manifestation of his counsel is

no longer a necessary party as Engracia Basadre-Cuenca has repurchased that portion of the land in
question sold to Bartolome Sanchez making plaintiffs' claim against defendant Bartolome Sanchez
moot and academic.

Our review of the evidence shows that Agripino Cuenca in his lifetime expressed in the
extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Maria Bangahon executed on June 13, 1950 before Notary
Public Francisco Ro. Cupin (Exh. "C") that:

Parcel of agricultural land situated in Pinamangculan Butuan, Agusan, planted to coconut,
under the present possession of the heirs of Maria Bangahon, bounded on the North, Lot No. 3062,
Lucio Plaza, Lot No. 4319, A. Cuenca, portion of Lot No. 3063, in the possession of A. Cuenca, on
the south Road, on the West by Lot No. 3057, S. Dumanon 3058, B. Adormio, 3059, A. Cuenca and
east portion of Lot No. 3063, containing an area of six (6) hectares, more or less (This is a portion
of Lot No. 3063, Pls-22 of Cad. of Municipality of Butuan which parcel of land belongs exclusively
to Maria Bangahon during her lifetime and which property is separate from the conjugal property of
the marriage of said Maria Bangahon and Agripino Cuenca. Article 160 of the New Civil Code
provides that "All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless
it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife," In the cases of Philippine
National Bank v. Court of Appeals, (153 SCRA 435 [August 31, 1987); Magallon v. Montejo (146
SCRA 282 [December 16, 1986]) and Maramba v. Lozano (20 SCRA 474 [June 29, 1967]) this Court
ruled that the presumption refers only to the property acquired during marriage and does not
operate when there is no showing as to when property alleged to be conjugal was acquired.

In the case at bar, the documents sought to be presented as newly discovered evidence do
not show that the claims to the subject parcels consisting of homestead lands were perfected during
the marriage of Agripino Cuenca and petitioner Engracia Basadre. The perfection of the homestead
claims is considered the time of acquisition of the properties. The fact that these parcels were
surveyed for Agripino Cuenca and approved during the marriage of Agripino Cuenca and petitioner
Engracia Basadre is not determinative of the issue as to whether or not the parcels were the conjugal
properties of Agripino and Engracia. Moreover, the documents show that 5 of the 8 parcels covered
by the documents are titled in the name of either respondent Meladora Cuenca or respondent
Restituto Cuenca. The presumption cannot prevail "when the title is in the name of only one spouse
and the rights of innocent third parties are involved. Under the circumstances of this case, the non-
applicablility of the presumption should also be upheld.

In the light of these findings a new trial would only be an unnecessary exercise and
ineffective. The documents sought to be presented during a new trial would not in any way change
the result. The motion for new trial was correctly denied although not for the reason given by the
respondent court.

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Persons and Family Relation

RELATION BETWEEN SPOUSES: PROHIBITION AGAINST DONATION TO EACH
OTHER

ARCABA vs. VDA. DE BATOCAEL

G.R. No. 146683 November 22, 2001

Facts:
Francisco Comille and his wife Zosima Montallana became the registered owners of two lots

in Zamboanga del Norte. After the death of Zosima, Francisco and his mother-in-law executed a
deed of extrajudicial partition with waiver of rights, in which the latter waived her ¼ share of the
property. Thereafter, Francisco registered the lot in his name. Having no children to take care of
him after his retirement, Francisco asked his niece Leticia, the latter‘s cousin Luzviminda and
petitioner Cirila Arcaba, to take care of his house and store.

Conflicting testimonies were offered as to the nature of the relationship between Cirila and
Francisco. Leticia said that the previous party was lovers since they slept in the same room while
Erlinda claimed that Francisco told her that Cirila was his mistress. On the other hand, Cirila said
she was mere helper and that Francisco was too old for her.

A few months before Francisco‘s death, he executed an instrument denominated ―Deed of
Donation Inter Vivos‖ in which he ceded a portion of the lot together with is house to Cirila, who
accepted the donation in the same instrument. The deed stated that the donation was being made in

consideration of the ―faithful services she had rendered over the past ten years.‖ Thereafter,
Francisco died and the respondents filed a complaint against Cirila for declaration of nullity of a
deed of donation inter vivos, recovery of possession and damages. Respondents, who are nieces,
nephews and heirs by intestate succession of Francisco, alleged that Cirila was the common-law wife
of Francisco and the donation inert vivos is void under Article 87 of the Family Code.

Issue:
Whether or not the deed of donation inter vivos executed by the late Francisco Comille be

declared void under Article 87 of the Family Code.

Ruling:
Where it has been established by preponderance of evidence that two persons lived together

as husband and wife without a valid marriage, the inescapable conclusion is that the donation made
by one in favor of the other is void under Article 87 of the Family Code.

Therefore, respondents having proven by preponderance of evidence that Cirila and
Francisco lived together as husband and wife without a valid marriage, the donation inter vivos is
considered null and void.

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Persons and Family Relation

RELATION BETWEEN SPOUSES: PROHIBITION AGAINST DONATION TO EACH
OTHER

MATABUENA vs. CERVANTES

G.R. No. L-28771 March 31, 1971

Facts:
Felix Matabuena cohabitated with Respondent. During this period, Felix Matabuena

donated to respondent a parcel of land. Later the two were married. After the death of Felix
Matabuena, his sister, Petitioner, sought the nullification of the donation citing Art.133 of the
Civil Code ―Every donation between the spouses during the marriage shall be void.‖

The trial court ruled that this case was not covered by the prohibition because the donation
was made at the time the deceased and Respondent were not yet married and were simply
cohabitating.

Issue:
Whether or not the prohibition applies to donations between live-in partners.

Ruling:
Yes. It is a fundamental principle in statutory construction that what is within the spirit of

the law is as much a part of the law as what is written. Since the reason

for the ban on donations between spouses during the marriage is to prevent the possibility of
undue influence and improper pressure being exerted by one spouse on the other, there is no reason
why this prohibition shall not apply also to common-law relationships. The court, however, said
that the lack of the donation made by the deceased to Respondent does not necessarily mean
that the Petitioner will have exclusive rights to the disputed property because the relationship
between Felix and Respondent were legitimated by marriage.

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Persons and Family Relation

RELATION BETWEEN SPOUSES: PROHIBITION AGAINST DONATION TO EACH
OTHER

HARDING vs. COMMERCIAL UNION ASSURANCE COMPANY
G.R. No. 12707 August 10, 1918

Facts:
In February 1916, Mrs. Harding applied for car insurance for a Studebaker she received as a

gift from her husband. She was assisted by Smith, Bell and Co which was the duly authorized
representative (insurance agent) of Commercial Union in the Philippines. The car‘s value was
estimated with the help of an experienced mechanic (Mr. Server) of the Luneta Garage. The car was
bought by Mr. Harding for P2,800.00. The mechanic, considering some repairs done, estimated the
value to be at P3,000.00. This estimated value was the value disclosed by Mrs. Harding to Smith, Bell
and Co. She also disclosed that the value was an estimate made by Luneta Garage (which also acts as
an agent for Smith, Bell and Co).

In March 1916, a fire destroyed the Studebaker. Mrs. Harding filed an insurance claim but
Commercial Union denied it as it insisted that the representations and averments made as to the cost
of the car were false; and that said statement is a warranty. Commercial Union also stated that the
car does not belong to Mrs. Harding because such a gift [from her husband] is void under the Civil
Code.

Issue:
Whether or not Mrs. Harding is entitled to the insurance claim.

Ruling:
Yes. Commercial Union is not the proper party to attack the validity of the gift made by Mr.

Harding to his wife.

The statement made by Mrs. Harding as to the cost of the car is not a warranty. The
evidence does not prove that the statement is false. In fact, the evidence shows that the cost of the
car is more than the price of the insurance. The car was bought for P2,800.00 and then thereafter,
Luneta Garage made some repairs and body paints which amounted to P900.00. Mr. Server attested
that the car is as good as new at the time the insurance was effected.

Commercial Union, upon the information given by Mrs. Harding, and after an inspection of
the automobile by its examiner, having agreed that it was worth P3,000, is bound by this valuation in
the absence of fraud on the part of the insured. All statements of value are, of necessity, to a large
extent matters of opinion, and it would be outrageous to hold that the validity of all valued policies
must depend upon the absolute correctness of such estimated value.

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Persons and Family Relation

ABSOLUTE COMMUNITY PROPERTY (COMPONENTS)

G.R. No 153788 NAVARRO vs. ESCOBIDO November 27, 2009

Facts:
Private respondent (Karen Go) files a complaint with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of

replevin against petitioner (Navarro) for the seizure of 2 motor vehicles under lease agreement.
Petitioner maintains among others in the case at bar that the complaints were premature because no
prior demand was made on him to comply with the provisions of the lease agreements before the
complaints for replevin were filed.

Issue:
Whether or not prior demand is a condition precedent to an action for a writ of replevin.

Ruling:
No. Petitioner erred in arguing that prior demand is required before an action for a writ of

replevin is filed since we cannot liken a replevin action to an unlawful detainer.

For a writ of replevin to issue, all that the applicant must do is to file an affidavit and bond,
pursuant to Section 2, Rule 60 of the Rules, which states:

Sec. 2.Affidavit and bond.
The applicant must show by his own affidavit or that of some other person who

personally knows the facts:
(a) That the applicant is the owner of the property claimed, particularly describing it, or is
entitled to the possession thereof;
(b) That the property is wrongfullydetained by the adverse party, alleging the cause of
detention thereof according to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief;
(c) That the property has not been distrained or taken for a tax assessment or a fine pursuant
to law, or seized under a writ of execution or preliminary attachment, or otherwise placed
under custodialegis, or if so seized, that it is exempt from such seizure or custody; and
(d) The actual market value of the property.

The applicant must also give a bond, executed to the adverse party in double the value of the
property as stated in the affidavit aforementioned, for the return of the property to the adverse party
if such return be adjudged, and for the payment to the adverse party of such sum as he may recover
from the applicant in the action.

The SC held that there is nothing in the afore-quoted provision which requires the applicant
to make a prior demand on the possessor of the property before he can file an action for a writ of
replevin. Thus, prior demand is not a condition precedent to an action for a writ of replevin.

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Persons and Family Relation

ABSOLUTE COMMUNITY PROPERTY (COMPONENTS)

VILLANUEVA MIJARES vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 143286 April 12, 2000

Facts:
Felipe Villanueva left a 15,336-square-meter parcel of land in Kalibo, Capiz to his eight

children: Simplicio, Benito, Leon, Eustaquio, Camila, Fausta and Pedro. In 1952, Pedro declared
under his name 1/6 portion of the property (1,905 sq. m.). He held the remaining properties in trust
for his co-heirs who demanded the subdivision of the property but to no avail. After Leon‘s death in
1972, private respondents discovered that the shares of Simplicio, Nicolasa, Fausta and Maria
Baltazar had been purchased by Leon through a deed of sale dated August 25, 1946 but registered
only in 1971. In July 1970, Leon also sold and partitioned the property in favor of petitioners, his
children, who thereafter secured separate and independent titles over their respective pro- indiviso
shares.

Private respondents, who are also descendants of Felipe, filed an action for partition with
annulment of documents and/or reconveyance and damages against petitioners. They contended
that Leon fraudulently obtained the sale in his favor through machinations and false pretenses. The
RTC declared that private respondents‘ action had been barred by res judicata and that petitioners
are the ―legal owners of the property in question in accordance with the individual titles issued to
them.

Issue:
Whether or not laches apply against the minor‘s property that was held in trust.

Ruling:
No. At the time of the signing of the Deed of Sale of August 26,1948, private respondents

Procerfina, Prosperedad, Ramon and Rosa were minors. They could not be faulted for their failure
to file a case to recover their inheritance from their uncle Leon, since up to the age of majority, they
believed and considered Leon their co-heir administrator. It was only in 1975, not in 1948, that they
became aware of the actionable betrayal by their uncle. Upon learning of their uncle‘s actions, they
filed for recovery. Hence, the doctrine of stale demands formulated in Tijam cannot be applied here.
They did not sleep on their rights, contrary to petitioner‘s assertion.

Furthermore, when Felipe Villanueva died, an implied trust was created by operation of law
between Felipe‘s children and Leon, their uncle, as far as the 1/6 share of Felipe. Leon‘s fraudulent
titling of Felipe‘s 1/6 share was a betrayal of that implied trust.

346

Persons and Family Relation

ABSOLUTE COMMUNITY PROPERTY (COMPONENTS)

IMANI vs. METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST COMPANY
G.R. No. 187023 November 17, 2010

Facts:
On August 28, 1981, Evangeline D. Imani (petitioner) signed a Continuing Suretyship

Agreement in favor of respondent Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company (Metrobank), with Cesar P.
Dazo, Nieves Dazo, Benedicto C. Dazo, Cynthia C. Dazo, Doroteo Fundales, Jr., and Nicolas
Ponce as her co-sureties. As sureties, they bound themselves to pay Metrobank whatever
indebtedness C.P. Dazo Tannery, Inc. (CPDTI) incurs, but not exceeding Six Million Pesos (P6,
000,000.00).

Later, CPDTI obtained loans of P100,000.00 and P63,825.45, respectively. The loans were
evidenced by promissory notes signed by Cesar and Nieves Dazo. CPDTI defaulted in the payment
of its loans. Metrobank made several demands for payment upon CPDTI, but to no avail. This
prompted Metrobank to file a collection suit against CPDTI and its sureties, including herein
petitioner. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 15717.

After due proceedings, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of Metrobank.

The dispositive portion of the (1) Under the First Cause of Action, the sum of P175,451.48
plus the stipulated interest, penalty charges and bank charges from March 1, 1984 and until the
whole amount is fully paid; (2) Under the Second Cause of Action, the sum of P92,158.85 plus the
stipulated interest, penalty charges and bank charges from February 24, 1985, and until the whole
amount is fully paid; (3) The sum equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the total amount due under the
First and Second Cause of Action; and (4) Ordering the defendants to pay the costs of suit and
expenses of litigation.

Issue:
Whether or not the RTC erred in ruling the levy on execution and the auction sale, and for

canceling the certificate of sale that occurs in the petitioners‘ conjugal partnership.

Ruling:
Petitioner takes exception to the CA ruling that she committed a procedural gaffe in seeking

the annulment of the writ of execution, the auction sale, and the certificate of sale. The issue on the
conjugal nature of the property, she insists, can be adjudicated by the executing court; thus, the RTC
correctly gave due course to her motion. She asserts that it was error for the CA to propose the
filing of a separate case to vindicate her claim.

We agree with petitioner.

The CA explained the faux pas committed by petitioner in this Under [Section 16, Rule 39],
a third-party claimant or a stranger to the foreclosure suit, can opt to file a remedy known as terceria
against the sheriff or officer effecting the writ by serving on him an affidavit of his title and a copy
thereof upon the judgment creditor. By the terceria, the officer shall not be bound to keep the

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Persons and Family Relation

property and could be answerable for damages. A third-party claimant may also resort to an
independent ―separate action,‖ the object of which is the recovery of ownership or possession of the
property seized by the sheriff, as well as damages arising from wrongful seizure and detention of the
property despite the third-party claim. If a ―separate action‖ is the recourse, the third-party claimant
must institute in a forum of competent jurisdiction an action, distinct and separate from the action
in which the judgment is being enforced, even before or without need of filing a claim in the court
that issued the writ. Both remedies are cumulative and may be availed of independently of or
separately from the other. Availment of the terceria is not a condition sine qua non to the institution
of a ―separate action.‖

It is worthy of note that Sina Imani should have availed of the remedy of ―terceria‖
authorized under Section 16 of Rule 39 which is the proper remedy considering that he is not a party
to the case against petitioner. Instead, the trial court allowed [petitioner] to file an urgent motion to
cancel and nullify the levy of execution the auction sale and certificate of sale over TCT No. T27957
[P](M).Petitioner then argues that it is the ministerial duty of the levying officer to release the
property the moment a third-party claim is filed.

It is true that once a third-party files an affidavit of his title or right to the possession of the
property levied upon, the sheriff is bound to release the property of the third-party claimant unless
the judgment creditor files a bond approved by the court. Admittedly, [petitioner‘s] motion was
already pending in court at the time that they filed the Affidavit of Crisanto Origen, the former
owner, dated July 27, 2005.

348

Persons and Family Relation

ABSOLUTE COMMUINTY PARTY (EXCLUDED PROPERTY)

G.R. No. 124642 CHING vs. COURT OF APPEALS February 23, 2004

Facts:
On September 1978, Philippine Blooming Mills Company (PBMCI) obtained a 9-million

peso loan from Allied Banking Corporation (ABC).Alfredo Ching together with two other persons
executed a continuing guarantee with ABC binding themselves jointly and severally liable for the
PBMCI obligations.The extent of their guarantee is up to 38 million pesos.
PBMCI failed to settle the loans which amounted to P12,612,972.88 (exclusive of interests, penalties
and other bank charges.)Together with the writ of preliminary attachment, the sheriff levied (seized)
the 100,000 common shares of City Corporation stocks registered solely to Alfredo Ching.Mrs.
Ching filed a petition to set aside the levy of the 100,000 common shares.According to her, the
shares were purchased out of the conjugal funds.She also argued that the loan of PBMCI did not
redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership (or family).

Issue:
Whether or not the argument of Mrs. Ching is tenable.

Ruling:
Yes.. ABC has the burden of proof to show that the common shares registered solely to the

name of Alfredo Ching were owned by the latter. Just because Mr. Ching‘s name appeared as the
sole registrant of the shares in the corporate books of CityCorp, that doesn‘t mean that it is his
exclusive property and not to the conjugal partnership.

As held in the case of Ayala Investment and Development Corporation vs. Court of
Appeals, the court said that ―signing as a surety is certainly not an exercise of an industry or
profession. It is not embarking in a business.‖

For the conjugal partnership to become liable, it is important to show that the family
received benefits and advantages from the liability incurred. There is no presumption that when a
husband entered into an accommodation agreement or a contract of surety, the conjugal partnership
would be benefited.

The benefits must be those directly resulting from the loan.

Therefore, Mr. Alfredo Ching‘s common shares must not be levied because he is not the
sole owner of such stocks. The shares belong to the conjugal partnership.
Under Article 121 of the Family Code.

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Persons and Family Relation