civil code0101

suffered mental anguish, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, and social humiliation as a
proximate result of petitioner‘s abusive, scandalous, and insulting language. Nestor, therefore is
entitled to damages.

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Persons and Family Relation

RIGHT TO PRIVACY

PADALHIN vs. LAVINA November 14, 2012
G.R. No. 183026

Facts:
Lavina and Nestor were both diplomats assigned in Kenya as Ambassador and Consul

General, respectively. In the course of their stay at Kenya , the residence of Lavina was raided twice.
Prior to the raids, BienvenidoPasturan delivered messages to the Filipino household helpers in the
ambassador‘s residence instructing them to allow the entry of an officer who would come to take
photographs of the ivory souvenirs kept therein. The first raid was conducted while Lavina and his
wife were attending a diplomatic dinner. Officials from the Criminal Investigation Division
Intelligent Office of Kenya took picture of Lavina‘s house with the aid of Lavina‘shouse helpers.
The second raid again took place when Lavina was not present at the house, pictures were taken.

Lavina received information from the DFA in Manila that an investigation team was sent to
Kenya to inquire into the complaints filed against him by the employees of the Philippine Embassy
in Kenya, own one hand, and his own complaint against the spouses Padalhin. The investigating
team comprised by Manalo, Ebdalin, and Dizon entered the Lavina residence without any search
warrant, court order or letter from the DFA Secretary. Lavina alleged that the team destroyed
cabinet locks, damaged furniture and took three sets of carved ivory tusk. Lavina subsequently filed
before the RTC for damages against the spouses Padalhin, and the 3 members of the investigation
team.

Issue:
Whether or not the unwarranted search and seizure made by the petitioners violated Lavina‘s

right to privacy.

Ruling:
The Article 26 of the civil code state the instances when a person‘s right are disturbed. There

is no doubt that the unwarranted seizures done where against Lavina‘s privacy rights. The act was
defended by Padalhin stating that he had no malice or bad faith when he ordered the search and
seizure. The Supreme Court ruled that Nestor‘s surreptitious acts negate his allegation of good faith.
If it were true that Lavina kept the ivories in his diplomatic residence then, his behavior deserves
condemnation. However, that is not the issue in the case at bar. Nestor violated the New Civil Code
prescriptions concerning the privacy of one‘s residence and he cannot hide behind the cloak of his
supposed benevolent intentions to justify the invasion. Damages are in order against the Padalhins.

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Persons and Family Relation

NON-FEASANCE, MISFEASANCE, MALFEASANCE

PHILEX MINING CORPORATION vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE

G.R. No. 125704 August 28, 1998

Facts:
On August 5, 1992, the BIR sent a letter to Philex asking it to settle its tax liability for the

2nd, 3rd, and 4th quarter of 1991 as well as the 1st and 2nd of 1992 in the total amount of P123,821.52.
In a letter dated August 1992, Philex protested the demand for payment of the tax liabilities stating it
has pending claims for VAT input/refund for taxes it paid for the years 1989 to 1991 in the amount
of P119,977,032.02 plus interest. Therefore these claims for tax credit/refund should be applied
against the tax liabilities. BIR stated that it was the mistake of its employees who in investigating tax
claims are seen to drag their feet needlessly.

Issue:
Whether or not the malfeasance of the employee justified the non-payment of the taxes due

by Philex.

Ruling:
The BIR being a collector of taxes has the right to demand for due taxes. The non-payment

of Philex cannot be justified by the lapse of duty by the tax collector. The Officer having a mistake
cannot be a reason not to pay because it was in neglect of his duty. Philex regardless has to pay the
taxes. The taxes in the first place could not be subject to legal compensation because taxes cannot be
offset against claims of taxes by the government; the relationship of the government and its
taxpayers is not a debtor-creditor relationship.

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Persons and Family Relation

CIVIL LIABILITY ARISING FROM ACQUITTAL

MANANTAN vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 107125 January 29, 2001

Facts:
In the morning of September 25, 1982, Fiscal WilfredoAmbrocio decided to catch shrimps

at the irrigation canal at his farm. He invited the deceased, Ruben Nicolas, who told him that they
should borrow the Ford Fiera of George Manantan. So Ambrocio and Manantan came to get
Nicolas at the Manantan Technical School.

When they arrived at the farm they had drank beer. At about 12:00 they went home. Then at
about 2:00 or 3:00 P.M., Miguel Tabangin (Defense Witness), Nicolas, and Ambrocio returned home
with a duck. They ate and drank up to 8:00 in the evening. Manantan, soon after, invited the others
to go bowling in Santiago. They went to Santiago and were not able to bowl but rather decided to go
to a night club. They decided to go home after the festivities.

Manantan drove the car. Tabangin sat with Manantan at the front seat while Nicolas and
Ambrocio sat at the back seats. Manantan was driving at a speed of about 40 kilometers per hour
along the middle of the highway because he was about to overtake a tricycle when they met a
jeepney with bright lights on. Manantan tried to swerve the car to the right to avoid the collision but
was no able to avoid the oncoming vehicle and the two vehicles collided with each other at the
center of the road. The men were brought to the hospital but unfortunately Nicolas died. Ambrocio
suffered minor injuries to his head and legs.

The parents of the deceased filed a criminal case against Manantan but the case was ruled in
favor of Manantan for lack of proof beyond reasonable doubt. The parents of the Ruben Nicolas
now seek for the enforcement of civil liability against Manantan. Manantan argues that he can be
held no longer be civilly liable since he was acquitted of the crime.

Issue:
Whether or not a suit for civil action for damages is barred by the acquittal of an accused.

Ruling:
The answer at the case at bar is in the affirmative. The acquittal of Manantan was due to

reasonable doubts therefore civil action can prosper. There exist two types of acquittal, the first is
acquittal because the accused was not the author of the crime or there is no crime while the second
is the acquittal due to reasonable doubts. In the former the criminal and civil liability is extinguished
while in the latter the criminal aspect is the only one extinguished since civil liability merely requires
preponderance of evidence. The case prospers in pursuance of article 29 of the New Civil Code.

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Persons and Family Relation

EXTINGUISHMENT OF CIVIL LIABILITY BY ACUITTAL

NUGUID vs. NICDAO

G.R. No. 150785 September 15, 2006

Facts:
The accused, Clarita Nicdao is charged with fourteen counts of violation of Batas

PambansaBilang 22 otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law. Sometime 1996 from April to
August thereof, Clarita Nicdao and her husband went to Emma Nuguid. The petitioner asked if they
could borrow money to settle some obligations. Due to their close relationship, Nuguid lent the
Nicdao spouses money.

Nuguid released the loan in installment of One Hundred Thousand Pesos until the amount
reached to an aggregate of One Million One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos. Nuguid, to show good
faith in her part, issued Hermosa Saving Bank open-dated check in the same amount as the loan.
The checks are to be deposited in Nuguid‘s account upon non-payment of the amount within one
year. In June 1997, Nuguid, together with Samson Ching, demanded payment of the loan but
Nicdao refused to acknowledge the indebtedness. Nuguid then decided to deposit the checks in her
account in Ching‘s account since it was Ching whom Nuguid got the money to loan to Nicdao. The
checks were all dishonored because of it being drawn against insufficient funds (DAIF).

A verbal and written notice of dishonor was sent to Nicdao. This was to give them chance to
make good on their loan as represented in the checks. The notice was for naught. Hence, a
complaint was brought against Nicdao for violation of the Bouncing Checks Law. In the Regional
Trial Court Nicdao was found guilty of and was sentenced to pay the principal plus interest and
suffer imprisonment of one year per bouncing check for a total of 14 years. The Court of Appeals
reversed the decision due to substantial fact that was overlooked by the trial court. Nuguid now filed
for a petition to the Supreme Court raising the issue for civil liability.

Issue:
a) Whether or not the civil liability was also extinguished upon the acquittal of Nicdao of the
violation of B.P. 22.
b) Whether or not interest is enforceable in the contract.

Ruling:
The civil liability was extinguished due to the findings of the Supreme Court that Nicdao has

already made overpayments of the amount due. The acquittal was due to the reason that the crime
was non-existent already since payment were made over and above what was agreed upon. The
criminal and civil liability will not persist since there the checks were only to be deposited upon non-
compliance of the payment of the principal debt

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Interest was being enforced by the Nuguid in the case. It was one of the reasons why the
debt of Nicdao was continually rising as payment are applied first to interest. The interest was
unconscionable. The Court ruled that since the interest was not stipulated in writing, the debt
remained in its principal amount. The principal was actually paid in full already as per Article 1956 of
the Civil Code.

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Persons and Family Relation

CIVIL LIABILITY ARISING FROM DELICT

PEOPLE vs. AGACER

G.R. No. 177751 January 7, 2013

Facts:
The victim, CesarioAgacer, was clearing and preparing the soil bedding section of his farm in

preparation for the rice seedlings intended for the coming planting season. Genesis Delanter, his
brother Andy, Rafael, and brother Roden were at the nearby rice field harvesting the palay that
Cesario had raised.

Suddenly, Florencio, Eddie, Elynor, Franklin, and Eric, all surnamed Agacer, came out of
the nearby banana plantation and went in the direction of Cesario. The group of men then
surrounded Cesario and intimidated him. Cesario felt the hostilities and tried to get away. But the
accused started fire on Cesario‘s harvest which prompted Cesario to return for his burning crops.
While Cesario was trying to put the fire out, Florencio ordered to go near Cesario. Eddie did what
was told and pulled out a shotgun from the rice sack that he was holding and shot Cesario on the
left portion of his chest. As Cesario fell, they fired then another shot inflicting mortal wounds on
Cesario. The gang of men then fled the scene. The Supreme Court affirmed the guilt of the accused.

Issue:
Whether or not the civil liability of the brother‘s arose upon the final judgment of the

Supreme Court of their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court found them guilty and since the civil action for damages was deemed

instituted in the criminal action then their civil liability has also been proven. According to Article
100 of the Revised Penal Code, Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. Also
Article 20 of the Civil Code states that every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently
causes damage to another shall indemnify the latter for the same. And the same is strengthened
finally by Article 1161 of the Civil Code which states that civil obligation arising from criminal
offenses shall be governed by the penal laws. Underlying this principle is that a person who is
criminally liable is also civilly liable is the view that from the standpoint of its effects, a crime has
dual character; First, as an offense against the state because of the disturbance of the social order,
and second as an offense against the private person injured by the crime.

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Persons and Family Relation

DEATH AS A MODE OF EXTINGUISMENT OF CIVIL LIABILITY

PEOPLE vs. BAYOTAS

G.R. No. 102007 September 2, 1994

Facts:
The accused, Rogelio Bayotas, was charged with rape and eventually convicted on June 19,

1991 in a decision penned by Judge Manuel Autajay. Pending appeal of his conviction the accused
died. The findings of the National Bilibid Hospital declared him dead on February 4, 1992.

The Supreme Court in its resolution dated May 20, 1992 dismissed the criminal aspect of the
appeal but then required the Solicitor General to file its comment on Bayotas‘ civil liability arising
from the crime. In the Solicitor General‘s comment the civil liability hasn‘t yet expired. The solicitor
general based its judgment on the case of People vs. Sendaydiego. The counsel of the accused-
appellant had a different view; where the death occurred after final judgment the criminal and civil
liability shall be extinguished.

Issue:
Whether or not the death of Bayotas extinguished his criminal and civil liability.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the accused. According to the Supreme Court, the

controlling statute was Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code. The provision states that death
extinguishes the criminal aspect. In the case at bar, there was no reservation of an independent civil
action against the accused; the criminal and civil aspects are therefore considered as instituted in the
criminal action. Since the civil action was anchored with the criminal case then it follows that the
death dissolves both civil and criminal liability.

The Solicitor General‘s dependence on the Sendaydiego case was misplaced. What was
contemplated in the Sendaydiego case was the civil liability arising from other sources of obligation
other than delicts. It is therefore safe to say that what death extinguishes is criminal liability and civil
liability arising from delict only.

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Persons and Family Relation

INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION

CANCIO vs. ISIP

G.R. No. 133978 November 12, 2002

Facts:
The accused, EmerenciaIsip, was charged with 3 counts of violation of B.P. 22, also known

as the Bouncing Checks Law and 3 cases of Estafa. One of the B.P. 22 cases was dismissed due to it
being deposited before 90 days from the date written on the check. The other two cases of B.P. 22
were filed with the Regional Trial Court of Guagua, Pampanga and were then dismissed due to the
failure of the prosecution to prosecute the crime.

Meanwhile the three cases of Estafa were filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga.
After failing to present its second witness, the prosecution dismissed the Estafa case. The
prosecution reserved its right to file a separate civil action from the said criminal cases. The court
granted the reservation. The criminal case of Estafa was then dismissed without prejudice to the civil
action. On December 15, 1997, petitioner filed the instant case for the collection of the sum of
money, seeking to recover the amount of the check subject to the Estafa cases. Respondent then
filed a motion to dismiss the complaint contending that the petition is already barred by the doctrine
of Res Judicata.

Issue:
Whether or not the respondents can file a separate civil action regardless of the dismissal of

the criminal case of estafa.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that the civil action can prosper. The reservation for civil action

was made by the prosecution on time. According to Section 1, Rule 111 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure states that civil liability is deemed instituted with the criminal case unless there is a
reservation of the right to file a separate civil action.

In the case at bar, the complaint is clearly based on culpa contractual. The cause of action
was the breach of the respondent‘s breach of the contractual obligation. Evidently, the petitioner
was seeking to make good the value written on the checks in exchange for cash. The case was not
anchored the criminal aspect of estafa but on the civil aspect of culpa contractual. As such, it is
distinct and independent from the estafa case filed against the offender and may proceed regardless
of the result of the criminal proceedings.

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Persons and Family Relation

CIVIL LIABILITY ARISING FROM ACQUITTAL

HEIRS OF GUARING vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 108395 March 7, 1997

Facts:
On November 7, 1987, the car driven by TeodoroGuaring Jr. collided with the Philippine

Rabbit Bus driven by Angelo Cuevas and with a Toyota Cressida Car driven by Eligio Enriquez,
along the North Luzon Expressway in San Rafael, Mexico Pampanga. As a consequence, Guaring
died.The trial court ruled in favor of herein petitioners, but lost in the Court of Appeals where the
accused was acquitted based on reasonable doubt. This was because it was found out that the
deceased was the one who acted negligently. The accused the claimed appealed in the court that the
civil case filed against him be extinguished since the extinguishment of his criminal liability
necessarily follows the extinguishment of his civil liability, since his civil liability aroused from his
criminal liability. The petitioners disagreed on this ground, claiming that the civil case should pursue.
This was then appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issue:
Whether or not the civil liability of the accused is extinguished due to his acquittal.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that the acquittal of the bus driver was based on reasonable doubt,

which means that the civil case for damages was not barred since the cause of action of the heirs was
based on quasi-delict. Even if damages are sought on the basis of crime and not quasi-delict, the
acquittal of the bus driver will not bar recovery of damages because the acquittal was based not on a
finding that he was not guilty but only on reasonable doubt. Thus, it has been held that the
judgment of acquittal extinguishes the liability of the accused for damages only when it includes a
declaration that the facts from which the civil might arise did not exist. Thus, the civil liability is not
extinguished by acquittal where the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of
evidence is required in civil cases; where the court expressly declares that the liability of the accused
is not criminal but only civil in nature as, for instance, in the felonies of estafa, theft, and malicious
mischief committed by certain relatives who thereby incur only civil liability; and, where the civil
liability does not arise from or is not based upon the criminal act of which the accused was
acquitted.Therefore, the Supreme Court ruled that the proceedings for the civil case of the said
incident must continue for the recovery of damages of the victim‘s heirs. The case was remanded to
the trial court to determine the civil liability of the accused.

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INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION (DEFAMATION)

ARAFILES vs. PHILIPPINE JOURNALISTS, INC. March 25, 2004
G.R. No. 150256

Facts:
Petitioner CatalinoArafiles seeks a review of the CA decision which dismissed his complaint

for damages against respondent‘s publisher Philippine Journalists Inc, Manuel Villareal Jr., Editor
Max Buan Jr. and reporter Romy Morales. Respondent Morales wrote a report that appeared on
People‘s Journal Tonight, which related how EmelitaDespuig, an employee of the National Institute
of Atmospheric Sciences (NAIS) of PAG-ASA, lodged a complaint against petitioner, a NAIS
director, for forcible abduction with rape and forcible abduction with attempted rape and the
supposed details of the rape. About a year after the report was published, Arafiles instituted the
complaint for damages, alleging that on account of the ―grossly malicious and overly sensationalized
reporting in the news item‖, his reputation as a director of NAIS was injured, that he became the
object of public contempt and ridicule as he was depicted as a sex-crazed stalker and serial rapist and
that the news deferred his promotion.

Issue:
Whether or not the article published constitute a libelous material, which would make the

editors liable for defamation.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that the news article is not malicious.In actions for damages for

libel, it is axiomatic that the published work alleged to contain libelous material must be examined
and viewed as a whole.In order to ascertain the meaning of a published article, the whole of the
article must be considered, each phrase must be construed in the light of the entire publication. The
headlines of a newspaper must also be read in connection with the language which follows.The
presentation of the news item subject of petitioner‘s complaint may have been in a sensational
manner, but it is not per se illegal.

Respondents could of course have been more circumspect in their choice of words as the
headline and first seven paragraphs of the news item give the impression that a certain director of
the NIAS actually committed the crimes complained of by Emelita. The succeeding paragraphs, in
which petitioner and complainant Emelita were eventually identified, sufficiently convey to the
readers, however, that the narration of events was only an account of what Emelita had reported at
the police headquarters.Every citizen of course has the right to enjoy a good name and reputation,
but we do not consider that the respondents, under the circumstances of this case, had violated said
right or abused the freedom of the press.

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The newspapers should be given such leeway and tolerance as to enable them to
courageously and effectively perform their important role in our democracy. In the preparation of
stories, press reporters and editors usually have to race with their deadlines; and consistently with
good faith and reasonable care, they should not be held to account, to a point of suppression, for
honest mistakes or imperfection in the choice of words.

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INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION (DEFAMATION)

INTERNATIONAL FLAVORS AND FRAGANCES vs. ARGOS

G.R. No. 130362 September 10, 2001

Facts:
Merlin J. Argos and Jaja C. Pineda, general manager and commercial director respectively of

the International Flavors and Fragrances Incorporated (IFFI) filed a libel case against Hernan H.
Costa, the managing director of IFFI after being described by the latter as pesona non grata in his
personal announcement after termination of their services. They later filed a separate civil case for
damages against Costa and IFFI in its subsidiary capacity as employer with the Regional Trial Court
of Pasig wherein IFFI moved to dismiss the complaint. The Regional Trial Court granted IFFI‘s
motion to dismiss for respondent‘s failure to reserve its right to institute a separate civil action.
Upon a motion for reconsideration, the Regional Trial Court granted Argos and Pineda‘s petition
which was later affirmed by the appellate court.

Issue:
Whether or not Argos and Pineda could sue IFFI for damages based on subsidiary liability in

an independent civil action.

Ruling:
IFFI, petitioner contends that respondents did not allege that IFFI was primarily liable

for damages and on the contrary, the complaint was replete with references that IFFI was being
sued for its subsidiary capacity. Article 33 of the New Civil Code provides that in cases of
defamation, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be
brought by the injured party. As ruled in Joaquin vs. Aniceto however, article 33 contemplates an
action against the employee in his primary capacity. It does not apply to an action against the
employer to enforce its subsidiary civil liability as such liability arises only after conviction of the
employee in the criminal case or when the employee adjudged guilty of the wrongful act. Thus, the
Supreme Court granted IFFI‘s petition for dismissal.

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INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION (DEFAMATION)

RUIZ vs. UCOL

G.R. No.L-454404 August 7, 1987

Facts:
AgustinaTagaca, laundry-woman for plaintiff-appellant Atty. Jesus B. Ruiz filed an

administrative charge against defendant-appelleeEncarnacionUcol, a midwife in the health center of
Sarratt, Ilocos Norte. In an answer to the charges, Ucol alleged that Tagaca was a mere tool used by
Atty. Ruiz to get back to her because of a case filed by Ucol‘s husband against Ruiz. She was also
alleged to have made remarks that Ruiz instigated the complaint and fabricated the charges. The said
case was dismissed but Ruiz decided to file his own criminal case against Ucol based on the alleged
libelous portions of Ucol‘s answer. After the trial, the lower court rendered judgment acquitting
Ucol on the ground that her guilt was not established beyond reasonable doubt. Instead of appealing
the civil aspects of the case, Ruiz filed a separate complaint for damages. Ucol moved for a motion
to dismiss on the ground of res judicata which was then granted by the Court of First Instance of
Ilocos Norte after being remanded by the Court of Appeals.

Issue:
Whether or not Ruiz is barred by the criminal case of libel from filing a separate civil action

for damages.

Ruling:
Ruiz contends that there can be no res judicata in the case, since the decision of the trial

court did not pass upon the civil aspect of the criminal case. Article 33 of the Civil Code which gives
an offended party in cases of defamation, among others, the right to file a civil action distinct from
the criminal proceedings is not without limitations. The Supreme Court found that the appeal of
Ruiz is without merit as records of the trial court manifest that the suit being charged by Ruiz to be
a harassment suit on the followinggrounds. (1)Ruiz had something to do with the administrative
complaint, (2) Ruiz filed a criminal case for libel against Mrs. Ucol‘s answer in the administrative
case after the administrative case‘s dismissal, (3) Ruiz acted as a private prosecutor in the criminal
caseactively handling as a lawyer the very case where he was the complainant, and (4) After Ucol was
acquitted, Ruiz pursued his anger at the Ucols by filing a civil action for damages.

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INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION (VIOLATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS)

VINZONS-CHATO vs. FORTUNE TOBACCO

G.R. No. 141309 June 19, 2007

Facts:
On June 10, 1993, the legislature enacted RA 7654, which provided that locally

manufactured cigarettes which are currently classified and taxed at 55% shall be charged an ad
valorem tax of 55% provided that the maximum tax shall not be less than Five Pesos per pack. Prior
to the effectivity of RA 7654, Liwayway issued a rule, reclassifying ―Champion,‖ ―Hope,‖ and
―More‖, all manufactured by Fortune, as locally manufactured cigarettes bearing foreign brand
subject to the 55% Ad Valorem tax. Thus, when RA 7654 was passed, these cigarette brands were
already covered. In a case filed against Liwayway with the RTC, Fortune contended that the issuance
of the rule violated its constitutional right against deprivation of property without due process of law
and the right to equal protection of the laws. For her part, Liwayway contended in her motion to
dismiss that respondent has no cause of action against her because she issued RMC 37-93 in the
performance of her official function and within the scope of her authority. She claimed that she
acted merely as an agent of the Republic and therefore the latter is the one responsible for her acts.
She also contended that the complaint states no cause of action for lack of allegation of malice or
bad faith.

Issue:
Whether or not an independent civil action under Article 32 of the Civil Code would prosper

against the petitioner.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that the petitioner can be subject to a civil action under Article 32

of the Civil Code. The general rule is that a public officer is not liable for damages which a person
may suffer arising from the just performance of his official duties and within the scope of his
assigned tasks. An officer who acts within his authority to administer the affairs of the office which
he/she heads is not liable for damages that may have been caused to another, as it would virtually be
a charge against the Republic, which is not amenable to judgment for monetary claims without its
consent. However, a public officer is by law not immune from damages in his/her personal capacity
for acts done in bad faith which, being outside the scope of his authority, are no longer protected by
the mantle of immunity for official actions. Under Sec. 38, Book I, Administrative Code, civil
liability may arise where there is bad faith, malice, or gross negligence on the part of a superior
public officer. And, under Sec. 39 of the same Book, civil liability may arise where the subordinate
public officer‘s act is characterized by willfulness or negligence.

The decisive provision is Article 32, it being a special law, which prevails over a general law,
the Administrative Code. A quasi-delict has been defined as the commission or omission of an act

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by one, without right, whereby another receives some injury, directly or indirectly, in person,
property or reputation. There are cases in which it has been stated that civil liability in quasi-delict is
determined by the conduct and not by the mental state of the offender, and there are circumstances
under which the motive of the defendant has been rendered immaterial. The reason sometimes
given for the rule is that otherwise, the mental attitude of the alleged wrongdoer, and not the act
itself, would determine whether the act was wrongful. Presence of good motive, or rather, the
absence of an evil motive, does not render lawful an act which is otherwise an invasion of another‘s
legal right; that is, liability in tort in not precluded by the fact that defendant acted without evil
intent.

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INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION (VIOLATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS)

COJUANGCO vs. COURT OF APPEALS July 2, 1999
G.R. No. 119398

Facts:
Eduardo Cojuangco is a known businessman-sportsman owing several racehorses which he

entered in the sweepstake races on March 6, 1986 to September 18, 1989. Several of his horses won
the races on various dates, landing first, second or third places, respectively, and winning prizes
together with the 30% due for trainer and grooms. Unfortunately, the winnings were being withheld
on the advice of Presidential Commission on Good Government Commissioner Ramon A. Diaz.

The Chairman of PCSO and the Private Respondent, Fernando O. Carrascoso, offered to
give back the winnings but it was refused by the petitioner for the reason that the matter is already in
court. The trial court held that Carrascoso had no authority to withhold the winnings since there was
no writ of sequestration evidencing the orders of PCGG. Carrascoso feared that if he did not
withhold the winning he would be liable for neglect of duty. Carrascoso maintained that bad faith
did not attend his acts therefore he is not liable for damages. In fact, Carrascoso stated that he
returned the principal amount of the winning evidencing his good faith. Petitioner begs to differ.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner is entitled to damages for the violation of his constitutional rights

to due process.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that petitioner is entitled for damages in accordance with Article 32

of the Civil Code. Article 32(6) of the Civil Code provides that any public officer or employee, or
any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstruct, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes
or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for
damages, in this case the right against deprivation of property without due process of law.

Carrascoso's decision to withhold petitioner's winnings could not be characterized as
arbitrary or whimsical, or even the product of ill will or malice. He had particularly sought from
PCGG a clarification of the extent and coverage of the sequestration order issued against the
properties of petitioner. Although it is true that a public officer shall not be liable by way of moral
and exemplary damages for acts done in the performance of official duties, the Court nevertheless
states that bad faith is not necessary in praying for damages in Article 32 of the Civil Code. Under
the Article, it is not necessary that the public officer acted with malice or bad faith.To be liable, it is
enough that there was a violation of the constitutional rights of petitioner, even on the pretext of
justifiable motives or good faith in the performance of one's duties.

A little exercise of prudence would have disclosed that there was no writ issued specifically
for the sequestration of the racehorse winnings of petitioner. There was apparently no record of any

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such writ covering his racehorses either. The issuance of a sequestration order requires the showing
of a prima facie case and due regard for the requirements of due process.The withholding of the
prize winnings of petitioner without a properly issued sequestration order clearly spoke of a
violation of his property rights without due process of law.

117

Persons and Family Relation

INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION (VIOLATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS)

G.R. No. 182976 MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY vs. CASTILLO January 14, 2013

Facts:
Respondents are spouses engaged in the business of manufacturing and selling fluorescent

fixtures, office steel cabinets and related metal fabrication under the name and style of Permanent
Light Manufacturing Enterprise. In the afternoon of April 19, 1994, Joselito Ignacio and Peter
Legaspi , Fully Phased Inspectors of Meralco sought permission to inspect Permanent Lights electric
meter. Ignacio and Legaspi, together with an employee of Permanent Light, proceeded to check the
electric meter. Upon inspection, the MERALCO inspectors noticed that the electric meter was
tampered and right there and then took down the meter. It was found out that indeed the meter has
been tampered with.

Permanent Light agreed to pay the deficient bills. MERALCO installed a new electric meter.
The respondents alleged that the electric meter registered unusually high readings. The petitioners
are now requesting that the old electric meter be re-installed since it shows a more accurate reading.
The respondents also pray for damages since the electric meter was allegedly removed without
following the required procedure. The RTC ruled in favor of respondents entitled to damages. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision stating that the petitioner abused its rights when it
disconnected the electricity of Permanent Light. The petitioners raise the issue of damages to the
Supreme Court.

Issue:
Whether or not MERALCO is liable for damages in for the violation of the constitutional

rights of the respondent.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that Permanent Light is entitled to exemplary damages for the

violation of their constitutional rights. The Supreme Court based its judgment on Section 4 of
Republic Act 7832 which provides that taking down of tampered electric meter should be personally
witnessed and attested to by an officer of the law or a duly authorized representative of the Energy
Regulatory Board. MERALCO failed to show evidence that there was an officer of the law or a duly
authorized representative of ERB therefore there is no prima facie evidence that the meter is
tampered and they have no right to disconnect the electric meter. Besides, even if there is prima
facie evidence of illegal use of electricity, Section 6 of Republic Act No. 7832 provides that even if
flagrante delicto, there must be still be a written notice or warning to the owner of the house or the
establishment concerned. In light or the following the Supreme Court awards exemplary damages to
Permanent Light for the recompense of their injured rights. Article 32 of the Civil Code provides for
awards of damages in cases where the rights of individuals, including the right against deprivation of
property without due process of law are violated.

118

Persons and Family Relation

INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION (QUASI-DELICTS/TORTS)

G.R. No. 48006 BARREDO vs. GARCIA July 8, 1942

Facts:
At about 1:30am on May 3, 1936, Fontanilla‘s taxi collided with a horse-drawn carriage

thereby killing the 16 year old Faustino Garcia. Faustino‘s parents filed a criminal suit against
Fontanilla and reserved their right to file a separate civil suit. Fontanilla was eventually convicted.
After the criminal suit, Garcia filed a civil suit against Barredo, the owner of the taxi and the
employer of Fontanilla. The suit was based on Article 1903 of the civil code which provides that
negligence of employers in the selection of their employees can be civilly liable. Barredo assailed the
suit arguing that his liability is only subsidiary and that the separate civil suit should have been filed
against Fontanilla primarily and not him.

Issue:
Whether or not Barredo can be civilly liable for the crime committed by his employee.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that Barredo can be civilly liable. He is primarily liable under

Article 1903 which is a separate civil action against negligent employers. Garcia is well within his
rights in suing Barredo. He reserved his right to file a separate civil action and this is more
expeditious because by the time of the SC judgment Fontanilla is already serving his sentence and
has no property. It was also proven that Barredo is negligent in hiring his employees because it was
shown that Fontanilla had had multiple traffic infractions already before he hired him, something he
failed to overcome during hearing. Had Garcia not reserved his right to file a separate civil action,
Barredo would have only been subsidiarily liable. Further, Barredo is not being sued for damages
arising from a criminal act, but rather for his own negligence in selecting his employee under Article
1903.

119

Persons and Family Relation

G.R. No. 165732 INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION (QUASI-DELICTS/TORTS)
SAFEGUARD SECURITY AGENCY vs. TANGCO

December 14, 2006

Facts:
On November 3, 1997, Evangeline Tangco went to Ecology Bank, Katipunan Branch,

Quezon City, to renew her time deposit per advice of the bank's cashier as she would sign a
specimen card. Evangeline, a duly licensed firearm holder with corresponding permit to carry the
same outside her residence, approached security guard Pajarillo, who was stationed outside the bank,
and pulled out her firearm from her bag to deposit the same for safekeeping. Suddenly, Pajarillo shot
Evangeline with his service shotgun hitting her in the abdomen instantly causing her death.

Respondent filed a complaint for damages against Pajarillo for negligently shooting
Evangeline and against Safeguard for failing to observe the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent the damage committed by its security guard. Respondents prayed for actual, moral and
exemplary damages and attorney's fees.

Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner is liable for damages under quasi-delicts.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that respondent is entitled to damages. It ruled that while it may be

conceded that Safeguard had perhaps exercised care in the selection of its employees, particularly of
Pajarillo, there was no sufficient evidence to show that Safeguard exercised the diligence of a good
father of a family in the supervision of its employee; that Safeguard's evidence simply showed that it
required its guards to attend trainings and seminars which is not the supervision contemplated under
the law; that supervision includes not only the issuance of regulations and instructions designed for
the protection of persons and property, for the guidance of their servants and employees, but also
the duty to see to it that such regulations and instructions are faithfully complied with.

120

Persons and Family Relation

PREJUDICIAL QUESTION

G.R. No. 125646 CITY OF PASIG vs. COMELEC September 10, 1999

Facts:
On April 22, 1996, upon petition of the residents of Karangalan Village that they be

separated from its mother Barangay Manggahan and Dela Paz, City of Pasig, and to be converted
and separated into a distinct barangay to be known as Barangay Karangalan, the City of Pasig passed
and approved Ordinance No. 21, Series of 1996, creating Barangay Karangalan in Pasig City.
Plebiscite on the creation of said barangay was thereafter set for June 22, 1996.

Meanwhile on Sep. 9, 1996, the City of Pasig similarly issued Ordinance No. 52 creating
Barangay Napico in Pasig City. Plebiscite for this purpose was set for March 15, 1997.Immediately
upon learning of such Ordinances, the Municipality of Cainta moved to suspend or cancel the
respective plebiscites scheduled, and filed Petitions with the COMELEC on June 19, 1996, and
March 12, 1997, respectively. In both Petitions, the Municipality of Cainta called the attention of the
COMELEC to a pending case before the RTC of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch 74, for settlement of
boundary dispute. According to the Municipality of Cainta, the proposed barangays involve areas
included in the boundary dispute subject of said pending case. Hence, the scheduled plebiscites
should be suspended or cancelled until after the said case shall have been finally decided by the
court.

Issue:
Whether or not the plebiscites scheduled for the creation of Barangays Karangalan and

Napico should be suspended or cancelled due to a prejudicial question of territory.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that this is an exception to the general rule of prejudicial questions

and that the suspension or cancellation of the plebiscite be granted. A case involving a boundary
dispute between Local Government Units presents a prejudicial question which must first be
decided before plebiscites for the creation of the proposed barangays may be held.While it may be
the general rule that a prejudicial question contemplates a civil and criminal action and does not
come into play where both cases are civil, in the interest of good order, the SC can very well suspend
action on one case pending the outcome of another case closely interrelated/linked to the first.

A requisite for the creation of a barangay is for its territorial jurisdiction to be properly
identified by metes and bounds or by more or less permanent natural boundaries. Primarily
becauseterritorial jurisdiction is an issue raised in a pending civil case, until and unless such issue is
resolved with finality, to define the territorial jurisdiction of the proposed barangays would only be
an exercise in futility.

121

Persons and Family Relation

PREJUDICIAL QUESTION

BELTRAN vs. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 137567 June 20, 2000

Facts:
Petitioner was married to Charmaine Felix on June 16, 1973. After 24 years of marriage and

having four children, petitioner filed a petition for nullity of marriage on ground of psychological
incapacity. Charmaine on the other hand filed a criminal complaint for concubinage against
petitioner and his paramour. To forestall the issuance of a warrant of arrest from the criminal
complaint, petitioner filed for the suspension of the criminal case on concubinage arguing that the

civil case for the nullification of their marriage is a prejudicial question.

Issue:
Whether or not the civil case for nullity of marriage under psychological incapacity is a

prejudicial question to the criminal case of concubinage.

Ruling:
The rationale on the existence of prejudicial questions is to avoid two conflicting issues. Its

requisites are 1) that a civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue in the
criminal action and 2) the resolution of the issue determines whether or not the criminal action will
proceed. In the present case, the accused need not present a final judgment declaring his marriage
void for he can adduce evidence in the criminal case of the nullity of his marriage other than the
proof of a final judgment. More importantly, parties to a marriage should not be allowed to judge
for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the competent courts. So long as there
is no such final judgment the presumption is that the marriage exists for all intents and purposes.
Therefore he who cohabits with a woman not his wife risks being prosecuted for concubinage.

122

Persons and Family Relation

PREJUDICIAL QUESTION

MERCED vs. DIEZ

G.R. No. L-15315 August 26, 1960

Facts:
Petitioner filed a complaint for annulment of his marriage to Elizabeth Ceasar alleging that

he married Elizabeth by reason of force, threat and intimidation upon his persons by Elizabeth‘s
relatives. Elizabeth on the other hand filed a criminal complaint alleging that petitioner has been
previously married to one Eufrocina Tan. He now files a petition for the suspension of the criminal
case on grounds of prejudicial question.

Issue:
Whether or not an action to annul the second marriage is a prejudicial question.

Ruling:
In order that a person may be held liable for the crime of bigamy, the subsequent marriage

must have all the essential elements of a valid marriage, were it not for the subsistence of the first
marriage. One of the essential elements of a valid marriage is that the consent thereto of the
contracting parties must be freely given. Without the element of consent a marriage would be illegal
and void. Since the validity of the second marriage is in question, subject of the action for bigamy,
cannot be determined in the criminal case and since prosecution for bigamy does not lie unless all
the elements concur, it is necessary then that a decision in a civil action must first be secured.

123

Persons and Family Relation

PREJUDICIAL QUESTION

DONATO vs. LUNA

G.R. No. L-53642 April 15, 1988

Facts:
An information for bigamy against herein petitioner was filed. It is alleged that petitioner

married Rosalindo Maluping on June 30, 1978, he however married for the second time with Paz
Abayan on September 26, 1978. Prior to the trial for the criminal case, petitioner filed a motion to
suspend on grounds of a prejudicial question. He claims that the civil case for the nullity of his
second marriage is a prejudicial question.

Issue:
Whether or not the civil case for nullity of marriage is a prejudicial question to the criminal

case of bigamy.

Ruling:
The issue of the nullity of the marriage in the civil case is not determinative of petitioner‘s

guilt or innocence in the crime of bigamy. It is noteworthy that the complaint for annulment of the
second marriage on the ground that her consent was obtained through deceit was filed by Paz
Abayan, the second wife. He who contracts a second marriage before a judicial declaration of nullity
of marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy. The case for annulment of marriage
can only be considered as a prejudicial question to the bigamy case against the accused only if it is
proved that the petitioner‘s consent to marriage was obtained through duress, violence or
intimidation. Such is not the case at bar. Petitioner merely raised the issue of prejudicial question to
evade the prosecution of the criminal case. Records reveal that prior to petitioner‘s second marriage
he had been living with private respondent as husband and wife for more than five years. He only
came up with the story that his consent to the marriage was secured through force, threat and
intimidation one year from the solemnization of the second marriage.

124

Persons and Family Relation

PREJUDICIAL QUESTION

TENEBRO vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 150758 February 18, 2004

Facts:
Petitioner contracted marriage with Leticia Ancajas on April 10, 1990. Less than a year after,

petitioner told Leticia that he has been previously married and that he is leaving to live with his first
wife, Hilda Villareyes. On January25, 1993 petitioner contracted yet another marriage with Nilda
Villegas. Ancajas learned of this third marriage she verified if the petitioner is truly married to Hilda,
to which it was affirmative. She then filed a criminal complaint of bigamy against herein petitioner.

His marriage to Ancajas however was subsequently nullified on ground of psychological incapacity
while the criminal complaint was pending. He now raises the defense that the bigamy is not
committed in lieu of the nullity of the marriage.

Issue:
Whether or not the declaration of the nullity of marriage on ground of psychological

incapacity bars the prosecution of the crime of bigamy.

Ruling:
A marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void; the

nullity of the second marriage is not per se an argument for avoidance of criminal liability for
bigamy. The declaration of nullity is absolutely no moment insofar as the State‘s penal laws are
concerned. There is no cogent reason for distinguishing between a subsequent marriage that is null
and void purely because it is a second marriage, and a subsequent marriage that is null and void on
ground of psychological incapacity. Although the judicial declaration for nullity of marriage retroacts
to the date of the celebration of marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is concerned,
the marriage is not without legal effects. Among these effects is the liability of incurring criminal
liability for bigamy.

125

Persons and Family Relation

PRESUMPTIVE CIVIL PERSONALITY

GELUZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R.No . L-16439 July 20, 1961

Facts:
Peitioner and Nita Villanueva were lovers. Before they were married Nita got pregnant to

which she had got an abortion from private respondent Oscar Lazo. After Nita‘s marriage with
plaintiff, she again became pregnant but due to her work priorities, she again had again had abortion
with the same doctor. She had a third abortion done by the same. The plaintiff now sues an award
for damages against Doctor Oscar alleging that he did not know of, nor gave his consent to the

abortions. He is suing for damages for the unborn child.

Issue:
Whether or not an action for damages can be instituted on behalf of the unborn child.

Ruling:
No action for damages could be instituted in behalf of the unborn child on account of the

injuries it received; no such action could derivatively accrue to its parents. No transmission of rights
can take place from on due to the lack of juridical personality. Article 40 of the Civil Code limits the
application of the presumptive civil personality by imposing the condition that the child should be
subsequently born alive. However, moral damages could be awarded for the illegal arrest of the
normal development of the fetus on account of distress and anguish attendant to is lost, and the
disappointment of their parental expectations. The records do not bear such case. It is clear that the
husband is only intent on recovering money from the doctor.

126

Persons and Family Relation

RESTRICTIONS OR MODIFICATION ON CAPACITY TO ACT

G.R. No. 159567 CATALAN vs. BASA July 31, 2007

Facts:
Feliciano Catalan was discharged from military service due to his psychological incapacity of

schizophrenia on October 20, 1948. He married Corazon Cerezo on September 1949. On June 1951
he donated a parcel of land to his sister Mercedes Catalan. On December 1953 Feliciano was
declared incompetent and BPI was appointed as his guardian. Mercedes sold the properties to herein

respondents in 1979. In 1997, BPI, acting as Feliciano‘s guardian filed an action or declaration of
nullity od documents and recovery of possession and ownership alleging that the donation to
Mercedes was void ab initio as Feliciano not of sound mind when he effected the donation, ipso
facto, the sale to herein respondents are void ab initio.

Issue:
Whether or not Feliciano‘s donation is void for lack of consent due to incapacity.

Ruling:
In order for a donation to be valid, the donor‘s capacity to give consent at the time of the

donation is existing. There lies no doubt that insanity impinges on consent freely given. However
the burden of proving such incapacity rests upon the person who alleges it, if no sufficient proof to
this effect is presented, capacity is presumed. The evidence presented by petitioners was insufficient
to overcome the presumption that Feliciano was competent when he donated the property in
question. A study of the nature of schizophrenia will show that Feliciano could still be presumed
capable of attending to his rights.

127

Persons and Family Relation

RESTRICTIONS OR MODIFICATION ON CAPACITY TO ACT

DOMINGO vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 127540 October 17, 2001

Facts:
Paulina Rigonan owns three parcels of land. She allegedly sold them to spouses Felipe and

Concepcion Rigonan who claim to be her relatives. In 1966, herein petitioners who claim to be her
closest surviving relatives allegedly took possession of the properties. Petitioners claim that the sale
was void for being spurious as well as lacking consideration.

Issue:
Whether or not the sale was void.

Ruling:
At the time of the execution of the alleged contract, Paulina Rigonan was already of

advanced age and senile. She died an octogenarian. The general rule is that a person is not
incompetent to contract merely because of advanced years or by reason of physical infirmities.
However when such age or infirmities have impaired the mental faculties so as to prevent the person
from properly , intelligently and firmly protecting her property rights then she is undeniably
incapacitated. The unrebutted testimony shows that at the time of the execution of the deed,
Paulina was already incapacitated physically and mentally. She played with her waste and urinated in
bed. Given these circumstances, there is sufficient reason to seriously doubt that she consented to
the sale of and the price for her parcels of land.

128

Persons and Family Relation

RESTRICTIONS OR MODIFICATION ON CAPACITY TO ACT

MENDEZONA vs. OZAMIZ

G.R. No. 143370 February 6, 2002

Facts:
Petitioners own a parcel of land and to remove a cloud on their said respective titles caused

by the inscription thereon of a notice of lis pendens initiated a suit. They ultimately trace their
ownership to a deed of sale executed by Carmen Ozamiz. Respondents are now impugning the deed
of sale, alleging that Carmen Ozamiz was incapacitated at the time of the execution of the sale.

Issue:
Whether or not the deed of sale is void due to the incapacity of the seller.

Ruling:
The testimonies on record all made sweeping statements which failed to show the true state

of mind of Carmen Ozamiz at the time of the execution of the disputed document. It has been held
that a person is not incapacitated to contract merely because of advanced years or by reason of
physical infirmity. Only when such age or infirmity impair her mental faculties to such extent as to
prevent her from properly, intelligently and fairly protecting her property rights is she considered
incapacitated. Respondents utterly failed to show adequate proof that at the time of the sale on April
28, 1989 Carmen Ozamiz has allegedly lost control of her mental faculties.

129

Persons and Family Relation

RESTRICTIONS OR MODIFICATION ON CAPACITY TO ACT

G.R. No. 101083 OPOSA vs. FACTORAN July 10, 1993

Facts:
Petitioners are all minor duly represented and joined by their respective parents. The minors

further asseverate that they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn. They seek
to cancel all existing timber license agreements and restrain the Secretary of DENR from issuing
anymore TLAs in the protection of our forest reserves and nature in general.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioners have the requisite standing and capacity to sue.

Ruling:
Petitioner minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations yet

unborn. The court finds no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for other of their
generations and for succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their personality in behalf of the
succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar
as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned.

130

Persons and Family Relation

KINDS OF DOMICILE

ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 119976 September 18, 1995

Facts:
Petitioner filed for the candidacy of the position of Representative of the First District of

Leyte. Private respondent who was then the incumbent representative filed a petition for the
cancellation and disqualification alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement
for residency.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner satisfies the residency requirement or not.

Ruling:
Domicile includes the twin elements of 1) the fact of residing or physical presence in a fixed

place and 2) animus manendi or the intention of returning there permanently. Residence implies the
factual relationship of an individual to a certain place. It is the physical presence of a person in a
given area. The essential distinction between residence and domicile in law is that residence involves
the intent to leave when the purpose which the resident has taken up his abode ends. If a person‘s
intent be to remain, it becomes his domicile. It is thus quite normal for an individual to have
different residences but have only one domicile. These concepts however have evolved in political
law to be used synonymously. When the Constitution however speaks of residence in election law, it
actually means only domicile. An individual does not lose his domicile even if he has lived and
maintained residences in different places. Based on the evidence, petitioner clearly only had
numerous residences, but maintained her domicile to be in Leyte.

131

Persons and Family Relation

RETROACTIVE APPLICATION

G.R. No. 112193 ARUEGO vs. COURT OF APPEALS March 13, 1996

Facts:
Jose Aruego Sr. had an amorous relationship with Luz Fabian out of this were born two

children. Jose died on March 30 1982. After his death private respondents filed a case for declaration
of acknowledgement as illegitimate children. Petitioners herein are challenging such action
interposing that under the Family code the method by which respondents can prove their filiation

has already prescribed, that his while the putative parent is alive.

Issue:
Whether or not the Family code finds a retroactive application in the case.

Ruling:
Respondents are establishing their filiation by ―open and continuous possession of the

status of a legitimate child‖ under the Civil Code which provides for four years before the
attainment of age of majority. The Family Code on the other hand provides that such manner of
establishing filiation can only be brought within the lifetime of the parent. The Family Code cannot
be applied in the case. Retroactive application cannot be applied if a vested right is impaired or
prejudiced in the process. The right of action of the minor child for recognition has been vested by
the filing of complaint in court under the regime of the Civil Code and prior effectively of the
Family Code.

132

Persons and Family Relation

RETROACTIVE APPLICATION

BERNABE vs. ALEJO

G.R. No. 140500 January 21, 2002

Facts:
Fiscal Ernesto Bernabe allegedly fathered a son with his secretary Carolina Alejo. The son

was born on September 1981. The Fiscal died on August 1993. On May 1994, Carolina in behalf of
Adrian filed a complaint for Adrian to be declared and acknowledged illegitimate son of Fiscal

Bernabe and such entitled to his share in the estate. Petitioners are challenging the petition on
grounds that the action has prescribed on ground that the Family code has retroactive application
and hence, the manner of proving filiation by ―open and continuous possession of a status of a
legitimate child‖ must have been brought within the lifetime of the putative parent.

Issue:
Whether or not the Family code finds a retroactive application in the case.

Ruling:
The right to an action for recognition which was granted by Article 285 of the Civil Code

has already vested to Adrian prior the enactment of the Family Code. A vested right is one which is
absolute, complete and unconditional to the exercise of which no obstacle exists and which is
immediate and perfect in itself and not dependent upon a contingency. Certainly the retroactive
effect of the family code finds no application in this case.

133

Persons and Family Relation

DEFINITION AND NATURE OF MARRIAGE

ANCHETA vs. ANCHETA

G.R. No. 145370 March 4, 2004

Facts:
Petitioner and respondent got married on March 1959. They had eight children. On

December 1992, respondent left the conjugal home and abandoned petitioner and their children. On
January 1994, petitioner filed a separate case for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership and
judicial separation of property with a plea for support and pendent lite. On April 1994 the parties
executed a compromise agreement. Respondent wanting to marry again filed a declaration of nullity

of his marriage with petitioner on ground of psychological incapacity. Petitioner was never served
the summons because of misrepresentation. She was declared in default and the marriage declared
void and null. Petitioner now seeks a new trial and nullification of the decision declaring the
marriage void on ground of lack of jurisdiction.

Issue:
Whether or not there is basis for a new trial.

Ruling:
Petitioner was never served the summons; the trial court never gained jurisdiction of her,

hence the decision null and void. Article 48 of the Family Code states that in cases of annulment or
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage the court shall order the appearance of the prosecuting
attorney to avoid collusion and in Rule 18 Section 6 of the Rules of Court, it is expressly stated that
there can be no defaults in actions for annulments of marriage or legal separation. The court just did
the opposite as mandated by the aforementioned provisions of law. Our Constitution is committed
to the basic policy of strengthening the family as a basic social institution. Our family law is based on
the policy that marriage is not a mere contract but a social institution in which the State is vitally
interested. The motion for a new trial is granted.

134

Persons and Family Relation

DEFINITION AND NATURE OF MARRIAGE

ABADILLA vs. TABILIRAN

A.M. No. MTJ-92-716 October 25, 1995

Facts:
Petitioner is the assigned clerk of court at the sala of herein respondent Judge. Respondent

stands charged with gross immorality, deceitful conduct and corruption unbecoming of a Judge. It is
alleged that he has scandalously and publicly cohabited with Priscilla Baybayan during the existence
of a previous marriage, represented himself as single in the marriage contract with Priscilla. He also
caused the registration of his three illegitimate children as legitimate.

Issue:
Whether or not respondent is guilty of the charges.

Ruling:
Respondent is guilty of gross immorality for having scandalously and openly cohabited with

said Priscilla Baybayan during the existence of his marriage with Teresita Tabiliran. It makes
mockery of the inviolability and sanctity of marriage as a basic social institution. It is not only a civil
contract, but is a new relation, an institution on the maintenance of which the public is deeply
interested. Consequently every intendment of the law leans towards legalizing matrimony.
Respondent Judge is dismissed from service.

135

Persons and Family Relation

PRESUMPTION IN FAVOR OF EXISTENCE AND VALIDITY OF MARRIAGE

DELA ROSA vs. HEIRS OF RUSTIA VDA. DE GUZMAN

G.R. No. 155733 January 27, 2006

Facts:
Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado died not only intestate, but they died without

descendants. Guillermo outlived Josefa by two years. Herein petitioners and respondents are their
respective relatives claiming rights to their intestate estate. The alleged heirs of Josefa consist of her
half and full-blood siblings, nephews. On Guillermo‘s side, his sisters, nephews and nieces,
illegitimate child and de facto adopted child. The petitioner for letters of administration stated that

Guillermo and Rustia were never married. Josefa Delgado estate claimants are her natural siblings.
Josefa was the daughter of Felisa by one Lucio Ocampo with five other children without the benefit
of marriage. Felisa had another son by way of Ramon Osorio who is Luis Delgado, one of the
claimants in Josefa‘s estate. If Luis Delgado is the legitimate child of Felisa she is barred from
inheriting from Josefa by the principle of absolute separation between the legitimate and illegitimate
families.

Issue:
Whether or not there was a valid marriage between Guillermo and Josefa and between Felisa

and Ramon.

Ruling:
Every intendment of the law leans towards legitimizing matrimony. Persons dwelling

together apparently in marriage are presumed to be in fact married. Semper praesumitur pro
matrimonio.Always presume marriage. Several circumstances give rise to the presumption that a valid
marriage existed between Guillermo and Josefa. Their cohabitation of more than 50 years cannot be
doubted. Although a marriage contract is considered primary evidence of marriage, its absence is not
always proof that no marriage in fact took place. Once the presumption of marriage arises other
evidences may be presented just as herein. The certificate of identity issued to Josefa as Mrs.
Guillermo Rustia, the passport issued to her as Josefa Rustia, the declaration under oath of
Guilermo that he was married to Josefa buttress the presumption of the existence of marriage.
Guillermo and Josefa are married. Anent the marriage of Felisa by Ramon, the factors and evidence

presented sufficiently overcame the rebuttable presumption of marriage. Hence Luis Delgado can
inherit from Josefa.

136

Persons and Family Relation

PRESUMPTION IN FAVOR OF EXISTENCE AND VALIDITY OF MARRIAGE

EUGENIO vs. VELEZ

G.R. No. 85140 May 17, 1990

Facts:
Herein private respondents filed a petition for habeas corpus alleging that their sister,

Vitaliana, was forcibly taken from her residence sometime in 1987 and was confined by herein
petitioner in his residence in Misamis Occidental. Unknown to respondents, Vitaliana has died and
petitioner refused to surrender the body of Vitaliana reasoning that the corpse cannot be the subject
of habeas corpus proceedings. As her common law husband, petitioner now claims custody over

Vitaliana‘s body.

Issue:
Whether or not the common law husband has custody over Vitaliana‘s body instead of the

immediate relatives.

Ruling:
Philippine law does not recognize common law marriages. A man and woman not legally

married who cohabit for years as husband and wife may be considered legally mauled in common
law jurisdictions but not in the Philippines. Notwithstanding, such relationship produces a
community of property and interest and there is authority in case law that exists to the effect that
such form of co-ownership requires that the man and the woman living together must not in any
way be incapacitated to contract marriage. Herein petitioner had a subsisting marriage with another
woman, a legal impediment which disqualified him from legally marrying Vitaliana. Custody of the
dead body must be awarded to the surviving brothers and sisters pursuant to Section 1103 of the
Revised Administrative Code.

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Persons and Family Relation

PRESUMPTION IN FAVOR OF EXISTENCE AND VALIDITY OF MARRIAGE

BALOGBOG vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 83598 March, 7, 1997

Facts:
Petitioners are the children of Basilio Balogbog and Geneveva Arnibal who died intestate.

They had an older brother named Gavino but he died predeceasing their parents. Private
respondents on the other hand are the alleged children of Gavino with Catalina Ubas and as such
are entitled to inherit from the estate of their grandparents. Petitioners aver that Gavino did not
marry hence barring respondents from inheriting from the estate.

Issue:
Whether or not there the presumption of marriage between Gavino and Catalino was

successfully overcome.

Ruling:
Under the Rules of Court, the presumption is that a man and a woman conducting

themselves as husband and wife are legally married. This presumption is rebutted only by cogent
proof of which the petitioners failed to do so. Although a marriage contract is considered primary
evidence of marriage the failure to present it is no proof that no marriage took place. Private
respondents proved through testimonial evidence that Gavino and Catalina were married and that
their children were recognized as legitimate children of Gavino. The law favors the validity of
marriage because the State is interested in the preservation of the family and the sanctity of it is a
matter of constitutional concern.

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Persons and Family Relation

LEGAL CAPACITY

SILVERIO vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 174689 October 22, 2007

Facts:
Petitioner avers that he is a male transsexual. He underwent psychological examination,

hormone treatment and breast augmentation culminating with sex reassignment surgery in Thailand.
From then on, petitioner deposed himself as female and got engaged. He now seeks to have his
name in his birth certificate changed and his sex from male to female.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner can change the entry of sex in his birth certificate.

Ruling:
Petitioner‘s basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex reassignment.

However a change of name does not alter one‘s legal capacity or civil status. R.A. 9048 does not
sanction such change of name under such cause. It is further a substantial change for which the
applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. However no reasonable interpretation of the
provision can justify the conclusion that it covers the correction on the ground of sex reassignment.
A person‘s sex is an essential requisite in marriage and family relations. It is a part of a person‘s legal
capacity and civil status. To grant the changes sought by the petitioner will substantially reconfigure

and greatly alter the laws on marriage and family relations. It will allow the union of a man with
another man who has undergone sex reassignment.

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Persons and Family Relation

LEGAL CAPACITY

G.R. No. 166676 REPUBLIC vs. CAGANDAHAN
September 12, 2008

Facts:
Petitioner was born on January 1981 and was registered as a female in the birth certificate.

While growing up she developed secondary male characteristics and was diagnosed with Congenital
Adrenal Hyperplasia which is a condition where a person thus afflicted possess both male and
female characteristics. While maturing it was the male characteristics that continued to develop and
be pronounced and hence, he deposed himself as a male person. He now seeks to alter his name of
Jennifer to Jeff.

Issue:
Whether or not the petition for the change of name can be effected.

Ruling:
Respondent undisputedly has CAH which involves intersex anatomy. The court is of the

view that where the person is biologically or naturally intersex, the determining factor in his gender
classification would be what the individual, like respondent, having reached the age of majority, with
good reasons thinks of his/her sex. Respondent here thinks of himself as a male and considering
that his body produces high levels of male hormones there is preponderant biological support for
considering him as being male. The petition is granted.

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Persons and Family Relation

AUTHORITY OF SOLEMNIZING OFFICER

A.M. No. MTJ-99-1211 BESO vs. DAGUMAN January 28, 2000

Facts:
Petitioner and Bernardito Yman got married on August 28, 1997 by herein respondent

Judge. After the wedding herein petitioner was abandoned by her husband hence prompting her to
check with the Civil Registrar to inquire regarding the marriage contract to which it was found out
that the marriage was no registered. She now filed this administrative complaint against herein
respondent Judge alleging that the marriage was solemnized outside of his jurisdiction.

Issue:
Whether or not the Judge has authority to solemnize the marriage.

Ruling:
Article 7 of the Family Code provides that the Judge can solemnize a marriage within the

court jurisdiction. Considering that the respondent Judge‘s jurisdiction covers the municipality of
Sta. Margarita-Tarangan-Pagsanjan Samar only, he was not clothed with authority to solemnize the
marriage in the City of Calabayog where herein marriage was solemnized.

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Persons and Family Relation

AUTHORITY OF A SOLEMNIZING OFFICER

MERCEDITA MATA ARAÑES vs. JUDGE SALVADOR M. OCCIANO
A.M. No.MTJ-02-1390 April 11, 2002

Facts:
On 17 February 2000, respondent judge solemnized petitioner‘s marriage to her late groom

Dominador B. Orobia without the requisite marriage license and at Nabua, Camarines Sur which is
outside his territorial jurisdiction.

They lived together as husband and wife on the strength of this marriage until her husband
passed away. However, since the marriage was a nullity, petitioner‘s right to inherit the ―vast
properties‖ left by Orobia was not recognized. She was likewise deprived of receiving the pensions
of Orobia, a retired Commodore of the Philippine Navy.

Issue:
Whether or not the respondent judge should be sanctioned for solemnizing marriage with

lack of marriage license and beyond his jurisdiction?

Ruling:

Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, or B.P.129, the authority of the regional
trial court judges and judges of inferior courts to solemnize marriages is confined to their territorial
jurisdiction as defined by the Supreme Court. In the case at bar, the territorial jurisdiction of
respondent judge is limited to the municipality of Balatan, Camarines Sur. His act of solemnizing the
marriage of petitioner and Orobia in Nabua, Camarines Sur therefore is contrary to law and subjects
him to administrative liability. His act may not amount to gross ignorance of the law for he allegedly
solemnized the marriage out of human compassion but nonetheless, he cannot avoid liability for
violating the law on marriage.

The respondent Judge Salvador M. Occiano, Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of
Balatan, Camarines Sur, is fined P5,000.00pesos with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the
same or similar offense in the future will be dealt with more severely.

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Persons and Family Relation

MARRIAGE LICENSE

RESTITUTO M. ALCANTARAvs.ROSITA A. ALCANTARA and
COURT OF APPEALS
GR No. 167746 August 28, 2007

Facts:
On December 8,1982, Rosita Alcantara (respondent) and Restituto Alcantara (petitioner)

went to the Manila City Hall for the purpose of looking for a person who could arrange a marriage
for them. They met a person ―fixer‖ who arranged their wedding before a certain Rev. Aquilino
Navarro, a minister of the Gospel of the CDCC BR Chapel. The marriage was likewise celebrated
without the parties securing a marriage license. The wedding took place at the stairs in Manila City
Hall and not in CDCC BR Chapel. However, there was a marriage license obtained in Carmona,
Cavite but neither of the parties is a resident of Carmona, Cavite and they never went to the said
place to apply for a license with its local civil registrar. Petitioner and respondent went through
another marriage ceremony at the San Jose de Manuguit Church in Tondo, Manila on March 26,
1983 utilizing the same marriage license. The marriage license number ―7054133‖ is not identical
with the marriage license number which appears in their marriage contract. There is also a case filed
by the respondent against herein petitioner before the MTC of Mandaluyong for concubinage.

Issue:
Whether or not the marriage between the petitioner and respondent is void.

Ruling:

The marriage involved herein having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of Family
Code, the applicable law would be the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of its
celebration. A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code, the
absence of which renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3) in relation to Article
53 of the same Code. The law requires that the absence of such marriage license must be apparent
on the marriage contract, or at the very least, supported by a certification from the local civil
registrar that no such marriage license was issued to the parties. In the case at bar, the marriage
contract between the petitioner and respondent reflects a marriage license number. Moreover, the
certification issued by the local civil registrar specifically identified the parties to whom the marriage
license was issued further validating the fact that a license was issued to the parties herein.

Issuance of a marriage license in a city or municipality, not the residence of either of the
contracting parties, and issuance of a marriage license despite the absence of publication or prior to
the completion of the 10-day period for publication are considered mere irregularities that do not
affect the validity of the marriage. The court still holds that there is no sufficient basis to annul their
marriage. An irregularity in any of the formal requisites of marriage does not affect its validity but
the parties or party responsible for the irregularity are civilly, criminally, administratively liable.

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The discrepancy between the marriage license number in the certification of the Municipal
civil registrar, which states that the marriage license number issued to the parties is No. 7054133,
while the marriage contract states that the marriage license number of the parties is number
7054033. It is not impossible to assume that the same is a mere typographical error. It therefore
does not detract from our conclusion regarding the existence and issuance of said marriage license
to the parties.

The authority of the solemnizing officer shown to have performed a marriage ceremony will
be presumed in the absence of any showing to the contrary. The solemnizing officer is not duty-
bound to investigate whether or not a marriage license has been duly and regularly issued by the
local civil registrar. All the said officer needs to know is that the license has been duly and regularly
issued by the competent official. Lastly, the church ceremony was confirmatory of their civil
marriage, thereby cleansing whatever irregularities or defect attended the civil wedding.
The instant petition is denied for lack of merit. The decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the
decision of the RTC of Makati City is affirmed.

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Persons and Family Relation

MARRIAGE LICENSE

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINESvs.COURT OF APPEALS and
ANGELINA M. CASTRO
GR No. 103047 September 2, 1994

Facts:
Angelina Castro, with her parents unaware, contracted a civil marriage with Edwin

Cardenas. They did not immediately live together and it was only upon Castro found out that she
was pregnant that they decided to live together wherein the said cohabitation lasted for only 4
months. Thereafter, they parted ways and Castro gave birth that was adopted by her brother with
the consent of Cardenas.

The baby was brought in the US and in Castro‘s earnest desire to follow her daughter
wanted to put in order her marital status before leaving for US. She filed a petition seeking a
declaration for the nullity of her marriage. Her lawyer then found out that there was no marriage
license issued prior to the celebration of their marriage proven by the certification issued by the Civil
Registrar of Pasig.

Issue:
Whether or not the documentary and testimonial evidence resorted to by Castro is sufficient

to establish that no marriage license was issued to the parties prior to the solemnization of their
marriage?

Rulings:
The court affirmed the decision of Court of Appeals that the certification issued by the Civil

Registrar unaccompanied by any circumstances of suspicion sufficiently prove that the office did not
issue a marriage license to the contracting parties. Albeit the fact that the testimony of Castro is not
supported by any other witnesses is not a ground to deny her petition because of the peculiar
circumstances of her case. Furthermore, Cardenas was duly served with notice of the proceedings,
which he chose to ignore.

Under the circumstances of the case, the documentary and testimonial evidence presented by
private respondent Castro sufficiently established the absence of the subject marriage license.

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Persons and Family Relation

MARRIAGE LICENSE

GR No. 132529 SUSAN NICDAO CARIÑOvs.SUSAN YEE CARIÑO February 2, 2001

Facts:
During the lifetime of the late SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño, he contracted two marriages; the

first was on June 20, 1969, with petitioner Susan Nicdao Cariño, with whom he had two children.
And the second was on November 10, 1992, with respondent Susan Yee Cariño with whom he had
no children in their almost ten year cohabitation starting way back in 1982. In November 23, 1992,
SPO4 Santiago Cariño passed away under the care of Susan Yee, who spent for his medical and
burial expenses. Both petitioner and respondent filed claims for monetary benefits and financial
assistance pertaining to the deceased from various government agencies.

On December 14, 1993, respondent filed the instant case for collection of sum of money
against the petitioner praying that petitioner be ordered to return to her at least one-half of the one

hundred forty-six thousand pesos. To bolster her action for collection of sum of money, respondent
contended that the marriage of petitioner and the deceased is void ab initio because the same was
solemnized without the required marriage license confirmed by the marriage certificate of the
deceased and the petitioner which bears no marriage license number and a certification dated March
9, 1994, from the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Manila stating that they have no record of
marriage license of the spouses Santiago Cariño and Susan Nicdao Cariño who allegedly married in
the said municipality on June 20, 1969.

Issue:
Whether or not the two marriages contracted by the deceased SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño are

valid in determining the beneficiary of his death benefits?

Ruling:
Under the Civil Code which was the law in force when the marriage of petitioner Susan

Nicdao and the deceased was solemnized in 1969, a valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage
and the absence thereof, subject to certain exceptions, renders a marriage void ab initio. In the case
at bar, there is no question that the marriage of petitioner and the deceased does not fall within the
marriages exempt from the license requirement. A marriage license was indispensable to the validity
of their marriage. The records reveal that the marriage contract of petitioner and the deceased bears
no marriage license number and as certified by the Local Civil registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila,
their office has no record of such marriage license. The certification issued by the local civil registrar
enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data to the

issuance of a marriage license. Therefore, the marriage between petitioner Susan Nicdao and the

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deceased having been solemnized without the necessary marriage license, and not being one of the
marriages exempt from the said requirement, is undoubtedly void ab initio.

The declaration in the instant case of nullity of the previous marriage of the deceased and
petitioner does not validate the second marriage of the deceased with respondent Susan Yee. The
fact remains that their marriage was solemnized without first obtaining a judicial decree declaring the
marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased void. Hence, the marriage of respondent
Susan Yee and the deceased is, likewise, void ab initio. To reiterate, under article 40 of Family Code,
for purposes of remarriage, there must first be a prior judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous
marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage, otherwise, the second
marriage would also be void.

Considering that the two marriages are void ab initio, the applicable property regime would
not be absolute community or conjugal partnership of property, but rather, is governed by the
provisions of articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code, wherein, the properties acquired by the
parties through their actual joint contribution shall belong to the co-ownership. By intestate
succession, the said ―death benefits‖ of the deceased shall pass to his legal heirs and respondent, not
being the legal wife is not one of them. Conformably, even if the disputed ―death benefits‖ were
earned by the deceased alone as a government employee, Article 147 creates a co-ownership,
entitling the petitioner to share one-half thereof. There is no allegation of bad faith in the present
case; both parties of the first marriage are presumed in good faith. Thus, one-half of the subject
―death benefits‖ under scrutiny shall go to the petitioner as her share in the property regime, and the
other half pertaining to the deceased shall pass by, intestate succession, to his legal heirs, namely, his
children.

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Persons and Family Relation

MARRIAGE LICENSE

GR No. 127263 FILIPINA SYvs.COURT OF APPEALS April 12, 2000

Facts:
Petitioner Filipina Sy and private respondent Fernando Sy contracted marriage on

November 15, 1973 at the Church of our Lady of Lourdes in Quezon City. Both were then 22 years
old. Their union was blessed with two children. On September 15, 1983, Fernando left their
conjugal dwelling. Since then, the spouses lived separately and their two children were in the custody
of their mother. On February 11, 1987, Filipina filed a petition for legal separation before the RTC
of San Fernando, Pampanga and was later amended to a petition for separation of property.
Judgment was rendered dissolving their conjugal partnership of gains and approving a regime of

separation of properties based on the Memorandum of Agreement executed by the spouses. In May
1988, Filipina filed a criminal action for attempted parricide against her husband. RTC Manila
convicted Fernando only of the lesser crime of slight physical injuries and sentenced him to 20 days
imprisonment. Petitioner filed a petition for the declaration of absolute nullity of her marriage to
Fernando on the ground of psychological incapacity on August 4, 1992. RTC and Court of Appeals
denied the petition and motion for reconsideration. Hence, this appeal by certiorari, petitioner for
the first time, raises the issue of the marriage being void for lack of a valid marriage license at the
time of its celebration. The date of issue of marriage license and marriage certificate is contained in
their marriage contract which was attached in her petition for absolute declaration of absolute nullity
of marriage before the trial court. The date of the actual celebration of their marriage and the date of
issuance of their marriage certificate and marriage license are different and incongruous.

Issues:
a) Whether or not the marriage between petitioner and private respondent is void from the
beginning for lack of marriage license at the time of the ceremony?
b) Whether or not the private respondent is psychologically incapacitated at the time of said
marriage celebration to warrant a declaration of its absolute nullity?

Ruling:
A marriage license is a formal requirement; its absence renders the marriage void ab initio.

The pieces of evidence presented by petitioner at the beginning of the case, plainly and indubitably
show that on the day of the marriage ceremony, there was no marriage license. The marriage
contract also shows that the marriage license number 6237519 was issued in Carmona, Cavite yet
neither petitioner nor respondent ever resided in Carmona.

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Persons and Family Relation