civil code0101

Ruling:

First. The trial court held that the fact that the victims were passengers of the M/V Don
Juan was sufficiently proven by private respondent Ramon Miranda, who testified that he purchased
tickets numbered 74411, 74412, 74413, and 74414 at P131.30 each from the Makati office of
petitioner for Voyage No. 47-A of the M/V Don Juan, which was leaving Manila on April 22,
1980. This was corroborated by the passenger manifest (Exh. E) On which the numbers of the
tickets and the names of Ardita Miranda and her children and Elfreda de la Victoria appear.

Second. In finding petitioner guilty of negligence and in failing to exercise the extraordinary
diligence required of it in the carriage of passengers, both the trial court and the appellate court
relied on the findings of this Court in Mecenas v. Intermediate Appellate Court, which case was
brought for the death of other passengers. In that case it was found that although the proximate
cause of the mishap was the negligence of the crew of the M/T Tacloban City, the crew of the Don
Juan was equally negligent as it found that the latter‘s master, Capt. Rogelio Santisteban, was playing
mahjong at the time of collision, and the officer on watch, Senior Third Mate Rogelio De Vera,
admitted that he failed to call the attention of Santisteban to the imminent danger facing them. This
Court found that Capt. Santisteban and the crew of the M/V Don Juan failed to take steps to
prevent the collision or at least delay the sinking of the ship and supervise the abandoning of the
ship.

Third. The next issue is whether petitioner is liable to pay damages notwithstanding the total
loss of its ship. The issue is not one of first impression. The rule is well-entrenched in our
jurisprudence that a ship-owner may be held liable for injuries to passengers notwithstanding the
exclusively real and hypothetic nature of maritime law if fault can be attributed to the ship-owner.

Fourth. Petitioner contends that, assuming that the Mecenas case applies, private
respondents should be allowed to claim only P43,857.14 each as moral damages because in the
Mecenas case, the amount of P307,500.00 was awarded to the seven children of the Mecenas
couple. Under petitioner‘s formula, Ramon Miranda should receive P43, 857.14, while the De la
Victoria spouses should receive P97, 714.28.

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LAW OF THE CASE

FULGENCIO vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION

G.R. No. 141600 September 12, 2003

Facts:
Petitioners failed to indicate in their petition with the CA the dates showing when they

received notice of the NLRC‘s June 16, 1998 Decision, and the date when they filed a motion for
reconsideration therefrom, in violation of Section 3, Rule 46 of the Revised Rules of Court, as
amended. Petitioners also failed to include in their petition the required explanation under Section
11, Rule 13 of the same Rules as to why personal service upon the respondents was not resorted to;

hence, the dismissal thereof by the CA.

Issue:
Whether or not strict adherence to technicalities in the application of the provisions of the

Rules of Court impede the cause of justice.

Ruling:
Rules of procedure applied in a very rigid, technical sense override substantial justice. It is a

far better and more prudent course of action for the court to excuse a technical lapse the parties a
review of the case on appeal to attain the ends of justice rather than dispose of the case on
technicality and cause a grave injustice to the parties, giving a false impression of speedy disposal of
cases while actually resulting in more delay, if not a miscarriage of justice.

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Persons and Family Relation

OBITER DICTUM

VILLANUEVA vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 142947 March 19, 2002

Facts:
In April 1988, Orly married Lilia before a trial court judge in Puerto Princesa. In November

1992, Orly filed to annul the marriage. He claimed that threats of violence and duress forced him to
marry Lilia. He said that he had been receiving phone calls threatening him and that Lilia even hired
the service of a certain Ka Celso, a member of the NPA, to threaten him. Orly also said he was
defrauded by Lilia by claiming that she was pregnant hence he married her but he now raises that he

never impregnated Lilia prior to the marriage. Lilia on the other hand denied Orly‘s allegations and
she said that Orly freely cohabited with her after the marriage and she showed 14 letters that shows
Orly‘s affection and care towards her.

Issue:
Whether or not there is duress and fraud attendant in the case at bar.

Ruling:
The SC ruled that Orly‘s allegation of fraud and intimidation is untenable. On its face, it is

obvious that Orly is only seeking to annul his marriage with Lilia so as to have the pending appealed
bigamy case to be dismissed. On the merits of the case, Orly‘s allegation of fear was not concretely
established. He was not able to prove that there was a reasonable and well-grounded reason for fear
to be created in his mind by the alleged intimidation being done against him by Lilia and her party.
Orly is a security guard who is well abreast with self-defense and that the threat he so described
done against him is not sufficient enough to vitiate him from freely marrying Lilia. Fraud cannot be
raised as a ground as well. His allegation that he never had an erection during their sexual
intercourse is incredible and is an outright lie. Also, there is a prolonged inaction on the part of Orly
to attack the marriage. It took him 4 and half years to file an action which brings merit to Lilia‘s
contention that Orly freely cohabited with her after the marriage.

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Persons and Family Relation

OBITER DICTUM

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 146486 March 4, 2005

Facts:
The enumeration in the Constitution of the impeachable officers is exclusive. The

Ombudsman is only one man, not including his Deputies. Thus, only the Ombudsman, not his
deputies, is impeachable.

On 29 December 1999, twenty- two officials and employees of the Office of the Deputy

Ombudsman for the Visayas, led by its two directors, filed a complaint with the Office of the
Ombudsman requesting an investigation on the basis of allegations that then Deputy Ombudsman
for the Visayas, herein private respondent Arturo Mojica, committed (1) sexual harassment against
Rayvi Padua- Varona, mulcting money from confidential employees: James Alueta and Eden
Kiamco and (3) oppression against all employees in not releasing P7,200.00 in benefits of OMB-
Visayas employees on the date the said amount was due for release. Fact-finding investigation was
conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman and the report was referred by the Ombudsman to a
constituted Committee of Peers which initially recommended that the investigation be converted
into one solely for purposes of impeachment. However, this recommendation was denied by the
Office of the Ombudsman and following the stand of the Office of the Ombudsman that the
Deputy Ombudsmen and The Special Prosecutor are not removable through impeachment. On 18
December 2000, despite the expiration of private respondent Mojica's term of office, the Court of
Appeals nevertheless rendered the assailed Decision on the grounds of public interest. CA ruled that
the Deputy Ombudsman is an impeachable officer. Thus, OMB's appeal.

Issues:
a) Whether or not the Ombudsman‘s Deputies are impeachable.
b) Whether or not the Deputy Ombudsman may be held criminally and/or administratively
liable.

Ruling:
Order of the CA is reversed and set aside. The complaints in Criminal Case No.OMB-0-00-

0616 and Administrative Case No. OMB-ADM-0-00-0316 is reinstated and the Office of the
Ombudsman is ordered to proceed with the investigation relative to the above cases. The Deputy
Ombudsman is not an impeachable officer. Sec. 2, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution states that
―The President, the Vice- President, the members of the Supreme Court, the members of the
Constitutional Commissions and the Ombudsman may be removed from office, on impeachment
for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption,
other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and employees may be
removed from Office as provided by law, but not by impeachment‖.

Records of the Constitutional Commission, as well as the opinions of leading commentators
in Constitutional Law reveal that the term Ombudsman in Sec. 2, Article XI of the 1987
Constitution refer to the rank in itself. The Ombudsman is only one man, not including his
Deputies. Leading legal luminaries on the Constitution are one in their opinion as to whether or not
the Deputy Ombudsman is impeachable. All of them agree that the enumeration impeachable
officers in Section 2, Article XI of the 1986 Constitution, are exclusive. In their belief, only the

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Persons and Family Relation

Ombudsman, not his deputies, is impeachable. Thus, where the issue involved was not raised nor
presented to the court and not passed upon by the court in the previous case, the decision in the
previous case is not stare decisis of the question presented.

Criminal and Administrative Liability of Deputy Ombudsman As to whether or not the
private respondent, then Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas, may be held criminally and/or
administratively liable, we likewise resolve the issue in favor of the petitioner. The rule that an
impeachable officer cannot be criminally prosecuted for the same offenses which constitute grounds
for impeachment presupposes his continuance in office. Hence, the moment he is no longer in
office because of his removal, resignation, or permanent disability, there can be no bar to his
criminal prosecution in the courts. Nor does retirement bar an administrative investigation from
proceeding against the private respondent, given that, as pointed out by the petitioner, the former‘s
retirement benefits have been placed on hold in view of the provisions of Sections 12 and 13 of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

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Persons and Family Relation

OBITER DICTUM

AYALA CORPORATION vs. ROSA-DIANA REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT

G.R. No. 134284 CORPORATION December 1, 2000

Facts:
Petitioner Ayala Corporation was the registered owner of a parcel of land located in Alfaro

Street, Salcedo Village, Makati City. On April 20, 1976, Ayala sold the lot to Manuel Sy married to
Vilma Po and Sy Ka Kieng married to Rosa Chan. The Deed of Sale executed between Ayala and
the buyers contained Special Conditions of Sale and Deed Restrictions. Among the Special

Conditions of Sale were: a) the vendees shall build on the lot and submit the building plans to the
vendor before September 30, 1976 for the latter‘s approval b) the construction of the building shall
start on or before March 30, 1977 and completed before 1979. Before such completion, neither
the deed of sale shall be registered nor the title released even if the purchase price shall have been
fully paid and c) there shall be no resale of the property.

Issue:
Whether or not the deed of restriction can be enforced by Ayala Corporation.

Ruling:
Contractual obligations between parties have the force of law between them and absent

any allegation that the same are contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public
policy, they must be complied with in good faith. The party guilty of violating the deed of
restrictions may only be held alternatively liable for substitute performance of its obligation, that is,
for the payment of damages.

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Persons and Family Relation

DURA LEX SED LEX

PEOPLE vs. VENERACION

G.R. No. 119987-88 October 12, 1995

Facts:
On August 2, 1994, four accused were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape with

homicide of a seven year old girl in the RTC presided by Judge Lorenzo P. Veneracion. Respondent
judge however, refused to impose the corresponding penalty of death and he rather imposed
reclusion perpetua to each of the accused. The city prosecutor filed a motion for reconsideration
praying that the penalty of death be imposed upon the four accused. The respondent judge refused

to act.

Issue:
Whether or not respondent judge can impose penalty lower than that prescribed by law.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court mandates that after an adjudication of guilt, the judge should impose

the proper penalty provided for by the law on the accused regardless of his own religious or moral
beliefs. In this case the respondent judge must impose the death penalty. This is consistent in the
rule laid down in the Civil Code Article 9 that no judge or court shall decline to render judgment by
reason of the silence, obscurity, or insufficiency of the laws.

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Persons and Family Relation

CONCEPT OF CUSTOMS

YAO KEE vs. SY GONZALES

G.R. No. L-55960 November 24, 1988

Facts:
Sy Kiat, a Chinese national, died on January 17, 1977 leaving behind properties here in the

Philippines.Thereafter, Aida Sy-Gonzales et al filed a petition for the grant of letters of
administration alleging that they are the children of the deceased with Asuncion Gillego. The
petition was opposed by Yao Kee et al alleging that Yao Kee is the lawful wife of the deceased
whom he married in China. The trial court rendered decision in favor of the opposition. On appeal,

the Court of Appeals rendered a decision, modifying the decision declaring the marriage of Sy Kiat
to Yao Kee as not has been proven valid in accordance with the laws of China. Hence, both parties
moved for reconsideration to which the Supreme Court granted.

Issue:
Whether or not the marriage of Yao Kee and Sy Kiat is valid in accordance with Philippine

laws.

Ruling:
Well-established in this jurisdiction is the principle that Philippine courts cannot take

judicial notice of foreign laws. They must be alleged and proven as any other fact. To establish the
validity of marriage, the existence of foreign law as a question of fact and the alleged marriage must
be proven by clear and convincing evidence.For failure to prove the foreign law or custom and
consequently of the marriage, the marriage between Yao Kee and Sy Kiat in China cannot be
recognized in the jurisdiction of Philippine courts.

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Persons and Family Relation

EQUITY IN THE APPLICATION OF LAW

G.R. No. L-30642 FLORESCA vs. PHILEX MINING CORP.
April 30, 1985

Facts:
Floresca et al are the heirs of the deceased employees of Philex Mining Corporation

(hereinafter referred to as Philex), who, while working at its copper mines underground operations
at Tuba, Benguet on June 28, 1967, died as a result of the cave-in that buried them in the tunnels of
the mine. Specifically, the complaint alleges that Philex, in violation of government rules and
regulations, negligently and deliberately failed to take the required precautions for the protection of

the lives of its men working underground. Floresca et al moved to claim their benefits pursuant to
the Workmen‘s Compensation Act before the Workmen‘s Compensation Commission. They also
petitioned before the regular courts and sue Philex for additional damages. Philex invoked that they
can no longer be sued because the petitioners have already claimed benefits under the WCA.

Issue:
Whether or not Floresca et al can claim benefits and at the same time sue.

Ruling:
Under the law, Floresca et al could only do either one. If they filed for benefits under the

WCA then they will be estopped from proceeding with a civil case before the regular courts.
Conversely, if they sued before the civil courts then they would also be estopped from claiming
benefits under the WCA. The SC however ruled that Floresca et al are excused from this deficiency
due to ignorance of the fact. Had they been aware of such then they may have not availed of such a
remedy. However, if in case they‘ll win in the lower court whatever award may be granted, the
amount given to them under the WCA should be deducted. The SC emphasized that if they would
go strictly by the book in this case then the purpose of the law may be defeated. Idolatrous
reverence for the letter of the law sacrifices the human being. The spirit of the law insures man‘s
survival and ennobles him. As Shakespeare said, the letter of the law killeth but its spirit giveth life.

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Persons and Family Relation

EQUITY IN THE APPLICATION OF LAW

URSUA vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 112170 April 10, 1996

Facts:
Petitioner Cesario Ursua was convicted for violation of Sec. 1 of CA No. 142, as amended

by RA 6085 otherwise known as ―An Act to Regulate the Use of Aliases‖ by the RTC of Davao City
which was affirmed by the CA. Allegedly petitioner when asked by his counsel to take his letter of
request to the Office of the Ombudsman because his law firm‘s messenger Oscar Perez had
personal matters to attend to, instead of writing his name wrote the name ―Oscar Perez‖ when he

was requested to sign. However, Loida Kahulugan who gave him the copy of complaint was able to
know through Josefa Amparo that petitioner is not Oscar Perez. Loida reported the matter to the
Deputy Ombudsman who recommended that petitioner be accordingly charged. Petitioner comes
for review of his conviction to the SC as he reasserts his innocence.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner Cesario Ursua should be acquitted on the ground that he was

charged under the wrong law.

Ruling:
The SC held that petitioner be acquitted of the crime charged. Time and again the SC has

decreed that the statutes are to be construed in the light of the purposes to be achieved and the evil
sought to be remedied. Thus in construing a statute the reason for its enactment should be kept in
mind and the statute should be construed with reference to the intended scope and purpose. The
court may consider the spirit and reason of the statute, where a literal meaning would lead to
absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or would defeat the clear purpose of the law makers.

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APPLICATION OF PENAL LAWS, EXCEPTION

G.R. No. L-24170 ASAALI vs. COMMISSION OF CUSTOMS
December 16, 1968

Facts:
The SC held that petitioner be acquitted of the crime charged. Time and again the SC has

decreed that the statutes are to be construed in the light of the purposes to be achieved and the evil
sought to be remedied. Thus in construing a statute the reason for its enactment should be kept in
mind and the statute should be construed with reference to the intended scope and purpose. The
court may consider the spirit and reason of the statute, where a literal meaning would lead to

absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or would defeat the clear purpose of the law makers.

Issue:
Whether or not the interception and seizure by custom officials on the high seas is valid on

the contention that the seizure was affected outside our territorial waters.

Ruling:
The SC held that it is a settled doctrine of International Law that a state has the right to

protect itself and its revenues, a right not limited to its own territory but extending to the high seas.
The Revised Penal Code leaves no doubt as to its application and enforceability not only within the
Philippines, its interior waters and maritime zone but also outside of its jurisdiction while on
Philippine ship.

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NATIONALITY/CITIZENSHIP THEORY

G.R. No. 124371 LLORENTE vs. COURT OF APPEALS
November 23, 2000

Facts:
Petitioner Paula Llorente was married to a US Navy enlisted serviceman Lorenzo Llorente,

in Nabua, Camarines Sur, on February 22, 1937. Before the outbreak of war, Lorenzo departed for
the US and Paula stayed in the conjugal home in Nabua. Lorenzo became an American citizen on
November 30, 1943. Upon the liberation of the Philippines (1945), Lorenzo was granted by the US
Navy to visit his wife in the Philippines and found out that Paula was living in with Lorenzo‘s
brother Ceferino. In December 1945, Paula gave birth to Crisologo with the birth certificate saying
that the child was illegitimate, and the father‘s name was left blank.

On February 2, 1946, Paula and Lorenzo had a written agreement, dissolving their marital
union, suspending his support upon her, and waiving his authority to file a case of adultery against
her. Lorenzo returned to the US and filed for a divorce in 1951 which was granted in 1952.On
January 16, 1958, Lorenzo married Alicia Fortuno, in the Philippines; after which, they bore three
children: Raul, Luz, and Beverly. In 1981, Lorenzo executed a will, bequeathing all his property to
Alicia and three children. Before the proceeding could be terminated, Lorenzo died in 1985.

On Sept. 4, 1985, Paula filed with the RTC of Iriga a petition for letters of administration
over Lorenzo‘s estate, contending that she was Lorenzo‘s surviving spouse.In 1987, the RTC
granted her petition, stating that Lorenzo‘s divorce decree was void and inapplicable in
the Philippines and therefore his marriage to Alicia was void. The RTC entitled Paula to one-half of
their conjugal properties, and one-third of the estate – the two-thirds would be divided equally
among the illegitimate children. Paula was appointed as legal administrator of the estate.

Issue:
Whether or not Paula Llorente was entitled to inherit from the estate of Lorenzo Llorente.

Ruling:
Since Lorenzo was an American citizen, issues arising from the case are governed by foreign

law. The CA and RTC called to the for the renvoi doctrine, where the case was referred back to the
law of the decedent‘s domicile, in this case, the Philippine law. Most US laws follow the domiciliary
theory. Thus, the Philippine law applies when determining the validity of Lorenzo‘s will. The case
was remanded to the RTC for the ruling on the intrinsic validity of the will of the deceased.

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INCIDENTS OF SUCCESSION, EXCEPTION

MICIANO vs. BRIMO

G.R. No. L-22595 November 1, 1927

Facts:
Joseph G. Brimo, a citizen of Turkey, died and left a partition of the estate. Juan Miciano,

the judicial administrator of the estate left filed a scheme of partition. However, Andre Brimo, one
of the brothers of the deceased, opposed it. Brimo‘s opposition is based on the fact that the
partition in question puts into effect the provisions of Joseph Brimo‘s will which are not in
accordance with the laws of his Turkish nationality, for which reason they are void as being in

violation of Article 10 of the Civil Code.

Issue:
Whether or not the national law of the testator is the one to govern his testamentary

disposition.

Ruling:
Joseph Brimo, a Turkish citizen, though he declared in his will that Philippine laws must

govern the disposition of his estate; however, it must not prejudice the heir or legatee of the testator.
Therefore, the testator‘s national law must govern in accordance with Article 10 of the Civil
Code.Though the last part of the second clause of the will expressly said that ―it be made and
disposed of in accordance with the laws in force in the Philippine Island‖, this condition, described
as impossible conditions, shall be considered as not imposed and shall not prejudice the heir or
legatee in any manner whatsoever, even should the testator otherwise provide. Impossible
conditions are further defined as those contrary to law or good morals. Thus, national law of the
testator shall govern in his testamentary dispositions.

The court approved the scheme of partition submitted by the judicial administrator, in such
manner as to include Andre Brimo, as one of the legatees.

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RENVOI

AZNAR vs. GARCIA

G.R. No. L-16749 January 31, 1963

Facts:
Edward Christensen was born in New York but he migrated to California where he resided

for a period of 9 years. In 1913, he came to the Philippines where he became a domiciliary until his
death. In his will, he instituted an acknowledged natural daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen
(legitimate), as his only heir, but left a legacy sum of money in favor of Helen Christensen Garcia
(illegitimate). Counsel for Helen claims that under Article 16, paragraph 2 of the Civil Code,

California law should be applied; that under California law, the matter is referred back to the law of
the domicile. On the other hand, counsel for Maria, averred that the national law of the deceased
must apply, illegitimate children not being entitled to anything under California law.

Issue:
Whether or not the national law of the deceased should be applied in determining the

successional rights of his heirs.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court deciding to grant more successional rights to Helen said in effect that

there are two rules in California on the matter; the internal law which applies to Californians
domiciled in California and the conflict rule for Californians domiciled outside of California.
Christensen being domiciled in the Philippines, the law of his domicile must be followed. The case
was remanded to the lower court for further proceedings – the determination of the successional
rights under Philippine law only.

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RENVOI

BELLIS vs. BELLIS

G.R. No. L-23678 June 6, 1967

Facts:
Amos Bellis was a citizen of the State of Texas, and of the United States. By his first wife

whom he divorced he had five legitimate children, by his second wife, who survived him, he had
three legitimate children, and three illegitimate children. Before he died, he made two wills, one
disposing of his Texas properties and the other disposing his Philippine properties. In both wills, his
illegitimate children were not given anything. The illegitimate children opposed the will on the

ground that they have been deprived of their legitimates to which they should be entitled, if
Philippine law were to be applied.

Issue:
Whether or not the national law of the deceased should determine the successional rights of

the illegitimate children.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that the said children are not entitled to their legitimes under the

Texas Law, being the national law of the deceased, there are no legitimes.The parties admit that the
decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and that under the laws of
Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision
of the will and the amount of successional rights are to be determined under Texas law, the
Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.

Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national law of the
decedent, in intestate or testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a) the order of
succession; (b) the amount of successional rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the
will; and (d) the capacity to succeed.

Intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to
the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be
regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may
be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.

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RENVOI

PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK vs. ESCOLIN

G.R. No. L-27860 March 29, 1974

Facts:
Linnie Jane Hodges, a married woman and a citizen of Texas, USA, was a domiciliary of the

Philippines at the moment of her death. With respect to the validity of certain testamentary
provisions she had made in favor of her husband, a question arose as to what exactly were the laws
of Texas on the matter at the precise moment of her death (for while one group contended that the
Texan law should result to renvoi, the other group contended that no renvoi was possible).

Issue:
Whether or not Texas Law should apply.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that for what the Texas law is on the matter, is a question of fact to

be resolved by the evidence that would be presented in the probate court. Texas law at the time of
her death (and not said law at any other time).

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Persons and Family Relation

FORMS, SOLEMNITIES OF CONTRACTS, AND WILLS

ALICE REYES VAN DORN vs. HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR.

G.R. No. L-68470 October 8, 1985

Facts:
Petitioner Alice Reyes Van Dorn is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent is a

citizen of the United States; they were married in Hong Kong in 1972. Thereafter, they established
their residence in the Philippines and begot two children born on April 4, 1973 and December 18,
1975. Subsequently, they were divorced in Nevada, United States, in 1982, and that petitioner has re-
married also in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn.

Dated June 8, 1983, private respondent filed suit against petitioner in Civil Case No. 1075-P
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch CXV, in Pasay City, stating that petitioner‘s business in Ermita,
Manila is their conjugal property; that petitioner he ordered to render accounting of the business and
that private respondent be declared to manage the conjugal property. Petitioner moved to dismiss
the case contending that the cause of action is barred by the judgment in the divorce proceedings
before the Nevada Court wherein respondent had acknowledged that he and petitioner had "no
community property" as of June 11, 1982. The denial now is the subject of the certiorari proceeding.

Issue:
Whether or not the divorce obtained by the parties is binding only to the alien spouse.

Ruling:
Is it true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code,

only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being
considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to
their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage
from the standards of American Law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage.

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband petitioner.
He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner‘s husband entitled to exercise
control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the decision of his own country‘s court, which
validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is stopped by
his own representation before said court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.

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FORMS, SOLEMNITIES OF CONTRACTS, AND WILLS

BANK OF AMERICA, NT and SA vs. AMERICAN REALTY CORPORATION

G.R. No. 133876 December 29, 1999

Facts:
Petitioner Bank of America NT & SA (BANTSA) is an international banking and financing

institution duly licensed to do business in the Philippines. As borne by the records, BANTSA and
BAIL on several occasions granted three major multi-million United States (US) Dollar loans to the
following corporate borrowers: (1) Liberian Transport Navigation, S.A.; (2) El Challenger S.A. and
(3) Eshley Compania Naviera S.A., all of which are existing under and by virtue of the laws of the
Republic of Panama and are foreign affiliates of private.

As security, the latter mortgaged a property located in the Philippines owned by herein
respondent ARC. ARC is a third party mortgagor executed two real estate mortgages, dated 17
February 1983 and 20 July 1984, over its parcels of land including improvements thereon, located at
Barrio Sto. Cristo, San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan, and which are covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title Nos. T-78759, T-78760, T-78761, T-78762 and T-78763.

The debtors failed to pay. Thus, petitioner filed collection suits in foreign courts to enforce
the loan. Subsequently, it filed a petition in the Sheriff to extra-judicially foreclose the said mortgage,
which was granted.

On 12 February 1993, private respondent filed before the Pasig RTC, Branch 159, an action
for damages against the petitioner, for the latter‘s act of foreclosing extra-judicially the real estate
mortgages despite the pendency of civil suits before foreign courts for the collection of the principal
loan.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner‘s act of filing a collection suit against the principal debtors for the

recovery of the loan before foreign courts constituted a waiver of the remedy of foreclosure.

Ruling:
Yes.In the absence of express statutory provisions, a mortgage creditor may institute against

the mortgage debtor either a personal action or debt or a real action to foreclose the mortgage. In
other words, he may pursue either of the two remedies, but not both. By such election, his cause of
action can by no means be impaired, for each of the two remedies is complete in itself.In the instant
case, assuming arguendo that the English Law on the matter were properly pleaded and proved in
said foreign law would still not find applicability.Thus, when the foreign law, judgment or contract is
contrary to a sound and established public policy of the forum, the said foreign law, judgment or
order shall not be applied.

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Additionally, prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which
have for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective
by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign
country.The public policy sought to be protected in the instant case is the principle imbedded in our
jurisdiction proscribing the splitting up of a single cause of action.

Moreover, foreign law should not be applied when its application would work undeniable
injustice to the citizens or residents of the forum. To give justice is the most important function of
law; hence, a law, or judgment or contract that is obviously unjust negates the fundamental
principles of Conflict of Laws.Clearly then, English Law is not applicable.

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PRINCIPLE OF ABUSE OF RIGHTS

UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST vs. ROMEO A. JADER

G.R. No. 132344 February 17, 2000

Facts:
Romeo Jader graduated at UE College of law from 1984-19988. During his last year, 1st

semester, he failed to take the regular final examination in Practical Court 1where he was given an
incomplete grade remarks. He filed an application for removal of the incomplete grade given by
Prof. Carlos Ortega on February 1, 1988 which was approved by Dean Celedonio Tiongson after
the payment of required fees. He took the exam on March 28, 1988 and on May 30, 1988 the
professor gave him a grade of 5.The commencement exercise of UE College of law was held April
16, 1988, 3PM. In the invitation, his name appeared. In preparation for the bar exam, he took a
leave of absence from work from April 20- Sept 30, 1988. He had his pre-bar class review in FEU.
Upon learning of such deficiency, he dropped his review classes and was not able to take the bar
exam. Jader sued UE for damages resulting to moral shock, mental anguish, and serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, and sleepless nights when he was not able to take the
1988 bar examinations due to UE‘s negligence.

Issue:
Whether UE should be held liable for misleading a student into believing JADER satisfied

all the requirements for graduation when such is not the case. Can he claim moral damages?

Ruling:
Supreme Court held that petitioner was guilty of negligence and this liable to respondent for

the latter‘s actual damages. Educational institutions are duty-bound to inform the students of their
academic status and not wait for the latter to inquire from the former. However, respondent should
not have been awarded moral damages though JADER suffered shock, trauma, and pain when he
was informed that he could not graduate and will not be allowed to take the bar examinations as
what Court of Appeals held because it‘s also respondent‘s duty to verify for himself whether he has
completed all necessary requirements to be eligible for the bar examinations. As a senior law student,
he should have been responsible in ensuring that all his affairs specifically those in relation with his
academic achievement are in order. Before taking the bar examinations, it doesn‘t only entail a
mental preparation on the subjects but there are other prerequisites such as documentation and
submission of requirements which prospective examinee must meet. Wherefore, the assailed
decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed with modification. Petitioner is ordered to pay
respondent the sum of Thirty-five Thousand Four Hundred Seventy Pesos (P35,470.00), with legal
interest of 6% per annum computed from the date of filing of the complaint until fully paid; the
amount of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) as attorney's fees; and the costs of the suit. The award
of moral damages is deleted.

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PRINCIPLE OF ABUSE OF RIGHTS

GF EQUITY, INC. vs. VALENZONA

G.R. No. 156841 June 30, 2005

Facts:
GF Equity, represented by its Chief Financial Officer, W. Steven Uytengsu, hired Valenzona

as head coach of the Alaska basketball team in the PBA under a contract of employment. He was
tasked to coach at all practices and games scheduled for the Alaska team, coach exhibition games,
coach if invited to participate in any all-star game, attending every event conducted, play-off games,
etc.

He was also tasked to comply with all requirements respecting to the conduct of its team and
players, to implement. He also agreed to report from time to time as fixed by the corporation in
good physical condition, give his best services, loyalty, to be neatly and fully attired in public and to
conduct himself on and off the court according to the highest standards of honesty, morality, fair
play and sportsmanship, and not to do anything detrimental to the best interest of the corporation.

He also agreed to endorse the corporation‘s products in commercial advertising,
promotions, will allow himself to be taken pictures with others for still photographs, motion
pictures or TV. For his services, he will be paid P35, 000.00 monthly, net of taxes, provide him with
a service vehicle and gasoline allowance. The contract was for two (2) years starting January 1, 1988
to December 31, 1989, with the condition that if at any time during the contract, the coach fails to
exhibit sufficient skill or competitive ability to coach the team, the contract can be terminated by the
corporation. (Paragraph 3)

Before signing the contract, Valenzona consulted his lawyer who pointed out that the
contract was one-sided, but still, Valenzona acceded to the terms of the contract as he had trust and
confidence in Uytengsu who recommended him to GF Equity.

Alaska placed third both in the open and all-Filipino PBA Conference in 1988, he was
advised of the termination of his services by way of a letter dated September 26, 1988, invoking their
right as specified in paragraph 3 of the contract and to return the service vehicle no later than
September 30, 1984. He will still be paid the balance of P75, 868.38 for his services. Six (6) years
after or on July 30, 1994, Valenzona‘s counsel demanded from GF Equity payment of compensation
arising from the arbitrary and unilateral termination of his employment. But GF Equity refused the
claim. Valenzona filed before the RTC of Manila a complaint for breach of contract with damages,
ascribing bad faith, malice and disregard to fairness and to the rights of the plaintiff by unilaterally
and arbitrarily pre-terminating the contract without just cause and legal and factual basis. He prayed
award for damages, moral damages, exemplary damages, attorney‘s fees and cost of the suit. He
challenged the condition in paragraph 3 as lacking the elements of mutuality of a contract, a clear

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transgression of Art. 1308 of the NCC and reliance thereon did not warrant his unjustified and
arbitrary dismissal.

GF Equity maintained that it merely exercised its right under the contract to pre-terminate
Valenzona due to incompetence, and that he was guilty of laches, in any event, complaint should be
instituted before a labor arbiter. The trial court dismissed the complaint on June 28, 1997 and it
declared Valenzona as fully aware of the bargain. The CA reversed the RTC‘s decision and ordered
GF Equity to pay him damages. The CA concluded that GF Equity abused its right by arbitrarily
terminating Valenzona‘s employment, finding Valenzona‘s claim for damages as valid. The court
ordered GF Equity to pay compensatory damages, moral damages, exemplary damages and
attorney‘s fees.

Hence, this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not, the CA concluded wrongly from established facts in a manner violative of

applicable laws and established jurisprudence.

Ruling:
GF Equity argued that it entered into a contract protected by law, as it was not contract to

law, morals, good customs public policy or public order, hence, no bad faith. Valenzona is guilty of
laches for his unexplained inaction of six (6) years.

In the case at bar, paragraph 3 gives GF Equity the unbridled prerogative to pre-terminate
the contract irrespective of the soundness, fairness, or reasonableness, or even lack of bass of its
opinion. To validate the paragraph would open the gate for arbitrary and illegal dismissals, for void
contractual stipulations would be used as justification therefor.

Laches applies to equity, prescription applies to law. The claims was filed within the
statutory period of prescription, doctrine of laches cannot be applied. The action was filed for
breach of contract, way well within the prescriptive period of ten (10) years, considering he filed the
action six (6) years from the date of his cause of action.

Valenzona is entitled to recover actual damages, however, award for moral damages,
exemplary damages, must be set aside, as there is no showing that GF Equity acted in a wanton,
fraudulent, reckless, oppressive manner. Attorney‘s fees are awarded because GF Equity refused to
pay the balance of Valenzona‘s salaries therefore to protect himself, was compelled to litigate.

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PRINCIPLE OF ABUSE OF RIGHTS

GO vs. CORDERO

G.R. No. 164703 May 4, 2010

Facts:
Sometime in 1996, Mortimer F. Cordero, Vice-President of Pamana Marketing Corporation

(Pamana), ventured into the business of marketing inter-island passenger vessels. After contacting
various overseas fast ferry manufacturers from all over the world, he came to meet Tony Robinson,
an Australian national based in Brisbane, Australia, who is the Managing Director of Aluminium
Fast Ferries Australia (AFFA).

After negotiations with Felipe Landicho and Vincent Tecson, lawyers of Allan C. Go who is
the owner/operator of ACG Express Liner of Cebu City, a single proprietorship; Cordero was able
to close a deal for the purchase of two (2) SEACAT 25 as evidenced by the Memorandum of
Agreement dated August 7, 1997. Accordingly, the parties executed Shipbuilding Contract No. 7825
for one (1) high-speed catamaran (SEACAT 25) for the price of US$1,465,512.00. Per agreement
between Robinson and Cordero, the latter shall receive commissions totaling US$328,742.00, or
22.43% of the purchase price, from the sale of each vessel.

However, Cordero later discovered that Go was dealing directly with Robinson when he was
informed by Dennis Padua of Wartsila Philippines that Go was canvassing for a second catamaran
engine from their company which provided the ship engine for the first SEACAT 25. Padua told
Cordero that Go instructed him to fax the requested quotation of the second engine to the Park
Royal Hotel in Brisbane where Go was then staying. Cordero tried to contact Go and Landicho to
confirm the matter but they were nowhere to be found, while Robinson refused to answer his calls.
Cordero immediately flew to Brisbane to clarify matters with Robinson, only to find out that Go and
Landicho were already there in Brisbane negotiating for the sale of the second SEACAT 25.
Despite repeated follow-up calls, no explanation was given by Robinson, Go, Landicho and Tecson
who even made Cordero believe there would be no further sale between AFFA and ACG Express
Liner.

On August 21, 1998, Cordero instituted Civil Case No. 98-35332 seeking to hold Robinson,
Go, Tecson and Landicho liable jointly and solidarily for conniving and conspiring together in
violating his exclusive distributorship in bad faith and wanton disregard of his rights, thus depriving
him of his due commissions. Robinson filed a motion to dismiss grounded on lack of jurisdiction
over his person and failure to state a cause of action, asserting that there was no act committed in
violation of the distributorship agreement. Said motion was denied by the trial court on December
20, 1999. Robinson was likewise declared in default for failure to file his answer within the period
granted by the trial court. As for Go and Tecson, their motion to dismiss based on failure to state a
cause of action was likewise denied by the trial court on February 26, 1999. Subsequently, they filed

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their Answer denying that they have anything to do with the termination by AFFA of Cordero‘s
authority as exclusive distributor in the Philippines. On the contrary, they averred it was Cordero
who stopped communicating with Go in connection with the purchase of the first vessel from
AFFA and was not doing his part in making progress status reports and airing the client‘s grievances
to his principal, AFFA, such that Go engaged the services of Landicho to fly to Australia and attend
to the documents needed for shipment of the vessel to the Philippines. In any case, Cordero no
longer had cause of action for his commission for the sale of the second vessel under the
memorandum of agreement dated August 7, 1997 considering the termination of his authority by
AFFA‘s lawyers on June 26, 1998.

On May 31, 2000, the trial court rendered its judgment in favor of Plaintiff and against
defendants Allan C. Go, Tony Robinson, Felipe Landicho, and Vincent Tecson. On January 29,
2001, the CA rendered judgment granting the petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 60354 and
setting aside the trial court‘s orders of execution pending appeal.The case before the Supreme Court
is a consolidation of the petitions for review under Rule 45 separately filed by Go (G.R. No. 164703)
and Cordero (G.R. No. 164747).

Issue:
a) Whether petitioner Cordero has the legal personality to sue the respondents for breach of
contract; and
b) Whether the respondents may be held liable for damages to Cordero for his unpaid
commissions and termination of his exclusive distributorship appointment by the principal,
AFFA.

Ruling:
While it is true that a third person cannot possibly be sued for breach of contract because

only parties can breach contractual provisions, a contracting party may sue a third person not for
breach but for inducing another to commit such breach. The elements of tort interference are: (1)
existence of a valid contract; (2) knowledge on the part of the third person of the existence of a
contract; and (3) interference of the third person is without legal justification.

The presence of the first and second elements is not disputed. Through the letters issued by
Robinson attesting that Cordero is the exclusive distributor of AFFA in the Philippines, respondents
were clearly aware of the contract between Cordero and AFFA represented by Robinson. In fact,
evidence on record showed that respondents initially dealt with and recognized Cordero as such
exclusive dealer of AFFA high-speed catamaran vessels in the Philippines. In that capacity as
exclusive distributor, petitioner Go entered into the Memorandum of Agreement and Shipbuilding
Contract No. 7825 with Cordero in behalf of AFFA.

The rule is that the defendant found guilty of interference with contractual relations cannot
be held liable for more than the amount for which the party who was inducted to break the contract

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can be held liable. Respondents Go, Landicho and Tecson were therefore correctly held liable for
the balance of petitioner Cordero‘s commission from the sale of the first SEACAT 25, in the
amount of US$31,522.09 or its peso equivalent, which AFFA/Robinson did not pay in violation of
the exclusive distributorship agreement, with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from June 24,
1998 until the same is fully paid. Respondents having acted in bad faith, moral damages may be
recovered under Article 2219 of the Civil Code.

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PRINCIPLE OF ABUSE OF RIGHTS

TITUS B. VILLANUEVA vs. EMMA M. ROSQUETA

G.R. No. 180764 January 19, 2010

Facts:
Respondent Emma M. Rosqueta (Rosqueta), formerly Deputy Commissioner of the

Revenue Collection and Monitoring Group of the Bureau of Customs (the Bureau), tendered her
courtesy resignation from that post on January 23, 2001, shortly after President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo assumed office. But five months later on June 5, 2001, she withdrew her resignation,
claiming that she enjoyed security of tenure and that she had resigned against her will on orders of

her superior.

Meantime, on July 13, 2001 President Arroyo appointed Gil Valera (Valera) to respondent
Rosqueta‘s position. Challenging such appointment, Rosqueta filed a petition for prohibition, quo
warranto, and injunction against petitioner Titus B. Villanueva (Villanueva), then Commissioner of
Customs, the Secretary of Finance, and Valera with the Regional Trial Court. Petitioner Villanueva,
Valera, and the Secretary of Finance challenged the injunction order before the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. SP 66070. On September 14, 2001 the CA issued its own TRO, enjoining the
implementation of the RTC‘s injunction order. But the TRO lapsed after 60 days and the CA
eventually dismissed the petition before it.

But the RTC dismissed respondent Rosqueta‘s complaint, stating that petitioner Villanueva
committed no wrong and incurred no omission that entitled her to damages. The RTC found that
Villanueva had validly and legally replaced her as Deputy Commissioner seven months before the
Bureau‘s centennial anniversary. But the CA reversed the RTC‘s decision, holding instead that
petitioner Villanueva‘s refusal to comply with the preliminary injunction order issued in the quo
warranto case earned for Rosqueta the right to recover moral damages from him.

Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in holding petitioner Villanueva liable in damages to

respondent Rosqueta for ignoring the preliminary injunction order that the RTC issued in the quo
warranto case (Civil Case 01-101539), thus denying her of the right to do her job as Deputy

Commissioner of the Bureau and to be officially recognized as such public officer.

Ruling:
Under the abuse of right principle found in Article 19 of the Civil Code, a person must, in

the exercise of his legal right or duty, act in good faith. He would be liable if he instead acts in bad
faith, with intent to prejudice another. Complementing this principle are Articles 20 and 21 of the
Civil Code which grant the latter indemnity for the injury he suffers because of such abuse of right
or duty.

But petitioner Villanueva cannot seek shelter in the alleged advice that the OSG gave him.
Surely, a government official of his rank must know that a preliminary injunction order issued by a
court of law had to be obeyed, especially since the question of Valera‘s right to replace respondent
Rosqueta had not yet been properly resolved. That petitioner Villanueva ignored the injunction
shows bad faith and intent to spite Rosqueta who remained in the eyes of the law the Deputy
Commissioner.

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PRINCIPLE OF ABUSE OF RIGHTS

ALFONSO T. YUCHENGCO vs. THE MANILA CHRONICLE PUBLISHING

G.R. No. 184315 CORPORATION November 25, 2009

Facts:
In his Complaint, plaintiff Alfonso T. Yuchengco alleges that in the last quarter of 1994,

Chronicle Publishing Corporation ("Chronicle Publishing" for brevity) published in the Manila
Chronicle a series of defamatory articles against him. In two of the subject articles (November 10
and 12, 1993 issues), he was imputed to be a "Marcos crony" or a "Marcos-Romualdez crony,"

which term according to him is commonly used and understood in Philippine media to describe an
individual who was a recipient of special and underserving favors from former President Ferdinand
E. Marcos and/or his brother-in-law Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez due to special and extra-
ordinary closeness to either or both, and which favors allowed an individual to engage in illegal and
dishonorable business activities.

The subject articles insinuated that he personally and intentionally caused the failure of
Benguet Corporation and that if even if he ever assumed control of Oriental, it would suffer the
same fate as the former. According to him, at the time he assumed chairmanship of Benguet
Corporation, it was already experiencing financial downturns caused by plummeting world prices of
gold and unprofitable investments it ventured into. Moreover, one of the articles portrayed him as
being an unfair and uncaring employer when the employees of Grepalife Corporation, of which he is
the Chairman, staged a strike, when the truth being that he had nothing to do with it. And that if his
group takes over Oriental, it will experience the same labor problems as in Grepalife.

In their Answer, the defendants deny liability claiming that the subject articles were not
defamatory since they were composed and published in good faith and only after having ascertained
their contents. In any event, they claim that these articles are privileged and/or constitute reasonable
and balance[d] comments on matters of legitimate public interest which cannot serve as basis for the
finding of libel against them. They likewise alleged that they were acting within the bounds of
constitutionally guaranteed freedom of speech and of the press.

Issue:
Whether or not respondent is guilty of libel.

Ruling:
In sum, this Court upholds the ruling of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that the

subject articles contain defamatory imputations. All of the following imputations: (1) the labeling of
Yuchengco as a Marcos crony, who took advantage of his relationship with the former President to
gain unwarranted benefits; (2) the insinuations that Yuchengco induced others to disobey the lawful
orders of SEC; (3) the portrayal of Yuchengco as an unfair and uncaring employer due to the strike
staged by the employees of Grepalife; (4) the accusation that he induced RCBC to violate the
provisions of the General Banking Act on DOSRI loans; and (5) the tagging of Yuchengco as a
"corporate raider" seeking to profit from something he did not work for, all exposed Yuchengco to
public contempt and ridicule, for they imputed to him a condition that was dishonorable.

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There is, thus, a presumption of malice in the case of every defamatory imputation, where
there is no showing of a good intention or justifiable motive for making such imputation.In the
instant case, there is preponderance of evidence showing that there exists malice in fact in the
writing and publication of the subject libelous articles. When malice in fact is proven, assertions and
proofs that the libelous articles are qualifiedly privileged communications are futile, since being
qualifiedly privileged communications merely prevents the presumption of malice from attaching to
a defamatory imputation.

Neither is there any reason for this Court to reverse the findings of the trial court and the
Court of Appeals that there was actual malice on the part of the respondents. As held by the courts
a quo, Yuchengco was able to show by the attendant circumstances that respondents were animated
by a desire to inflict unjustifiable harm on his reputation, as shown by the timing and frequency of
the publication of the defamatory articles. Finally, even if we assume for the sake of argument that
actual malice was not proven in the case at bar, we nevertheless cannot adhere to the finding of the
Court of Appeals in the Amended Decision that the subject articles were fair commentaries on
matters of public interest, and thus fell within the scope of the third type of qualifiedly privileged
communications.

In view of the foregoing, this Court is constrained to grant the instant Petition and reinstate
the Decision of the trial court, as previously affirmed by the Court of Appeals in its original
Decision. This Court, however, finds the award of damages in the total amount of One Hundred
Million Pesos by the trial court to be rather excessive given the circumstances.

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DAMNUM ABSQUE INJURIA

CUSTODIO vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 116100 February 9, 1996

Facts:
Respondents owned a parcel of land wherein a two-door apartment was erected. Said

property was surrounded by other immovables owned by petitioners, spouses Custodio and spouses
Santos. As an access to P. Burgos Street from the subject property, there are two possible
passageways. The first passageway is approximately one meter wide and is about 20 meters distant
from Mabasa‘s residence to P. Burgos Street. Such path is passing in between the previously

mentioned row of houses. The second passageway is about 3 meters in width and length from
plaintiff Mabasa‘s residence to P. Burgos Street; it is about 26 meters. In passing thru said
passageway, a less than a meter wide path through the septic tank and with 5-6 meters in length, has
to be traversed. Petitioners constructed an adobe fence in the first passageway making it narrower in
width. Said adobe fence was first constructed by defendants Santoses along their property which is
also along the first passageway. Defendant Morato constructed her adobe fence and even extended
said fence in such a way that the entire passageway was enclosed. As a result, the tenants left the
apartment because there was no longer a permanent access to the public street. Respondents then
filed an action for the grant of an easement of right of way. The trial court ordered the petitioner to
give respondents a permanent access to the public street and that in turn, the respondent will pay a
sum of Php 8,000.00 to the petitioner as an indemnity for the permanent use of the passageway. On
appeal by the respondent to the CA, the decision of the trial court was affirmed, such that a right of
way and an award of actual, moral and exemplary damages were given to the respondents. Hence,
this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the award of damages is proper?

Ruling:
No. To warrant the recovery of damages, there must be both a right of action for a legal

wrong inflicted by the defendant, and damage resulting to the plaintiff therefrom. Wrong without
damage, or damage without wrong, does not constitute a cause of action, since damages are merely

part of the remedy allowed for the injury caused by a breach or wrong. There is a material
distinction between damages and injury. Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is the
loss, hurt, or harm which results from the injury, and damages are the recompense or compensation
awarded for the damage suffered. Thus, there can be damage without injury in those instances in
which the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty. These situations are often
called damnum absque injuria. In order that a plaintiff may maintain an action for the injuries of
which he complains, he must establish that such injuries resulted from a breach of duty which the
defendant owed to the plaintiff. There must be a concurrence of injury to the plaintiff and legal
responsibility by the person causing it.

In the instant case, although there was damage, there was no legal injury. Contrary to the
claim of respondents, petitioners could not be said to have violated the principle of abuse of right.
In order that the principle of abuse of right provided in Article 21 of the Civil Code can be applied,
it is essential that the following requisites concur: (1) The defendant should have acted in a manner
that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy; (2) The acts should be willful; and (3)

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There was damage or injury to the plaintiff. The act of petitioners in constructing a fence within
their lot is a valid exercise of their right as owners, hence not contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy. The law recognizes in the owner the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without
other limitations than those established by law. It is within the right of petitioners, as owners, to
enclose and fence their property. Article 430 of the Civil Code provides that ―(e)very owner may
enclose or fence his land or tenements by means of walls, ditches, live or dead hedges, or by any
other means without detriment to servitudes constituted thereon.‖

At the time of the construction of the fence, the lot was not subject to any servitudes. There
was no easement of way existing in favor of private respondents, either by law or by contract. The
fact that respondents had no existing right over the said passageway is confirmed by the very
decision of the trial court granting a compulsory right of way in their favor after payment of just
compensation. It was only that decision which gave private respondents the right to use the said
passageway after payment of the compensation and imposed a corresponding duty on petitioners
not to interfere in the exercise of said right. The proper exercise of a lawful right cannot constitute a
legal wrong for which an action will lie, although the act may result in damage to another, for no
legal right has been invaded. One may use any lawful means to accomplish a lawful purpose and
though the means adopted may cause damage to another, no cause of action arises in the latter‘s
favor. An injury or damage occasioned thereby is damnum absque injuria. The courts can give no
redress for hardship to an individual resulting from action reasonably calculated to achieve a lawful
means.

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DAMNUM ABSQUE INJURIA

EQUITABLE BANKING CORPORATION vs. CALDERON

GR. No. 156168 December 14, 2004

Facts:
Jose T. Calderon is a businessman engaged in several business activities here and abroad,

either in his capacity as President or Chairman of the Board thereon. He is also a stockholder of
PLDT and a member of the Manila Polo Club, among others. He is a seasoned traveler, who travels
at least seven times a year in the U.S., Europe and Asia. On the other hand, Equitable Banking
Corporation is one of the leading commercial banking institutions in the Philippines, engaged in

commercial banking, such as acceptance of deposits, extension of loans and credit card facilities,
among others.Sometime in September 1984, Calderon applied and was issued an Equitable
International Visa card. The said Visa card can be used for both peso and dollar transactions within
and outside the Philippines.

The credit limit for the peso transaction is twenty thousand pesos; while in the dollar
transactions, Calderon is required to maintain a dollar account with a minimum deposit of $3,000.00,
the balance of dollar account shall serve as the credit limit.In April 1986, Calderon together with
some reputable business friends and associates went to Hongkong for business and pleasure trips.
Specifically on 30 April 1986, Calderon accompanied by his friend, Ed De Leon went to Gucci
Department Store located at the basement of the Peninsula Hotel Hongkong. There and then,
Calderon purchased several Gucci items (t-shirts, jackets, a pair of shoes, etc.). The cost of his total
purchase amounted to HK$4,030.00 or equivalent to US$523.00. Instead of paying the said items in
cash, he used his Visa card to effect payment thereof on credit. He then presented and gave his
credit card to the saleslady who promptly referred it to the store cashier for verification.

Shortly thereafter, the saleslady, in the presence of his friend, Ed De Leon and other
shoppers of different nationalities, informed him that his Visa card was blacklisted. Calderon sought
the reconfirmation of the status of his Visa card from the saleslady, but the latter simply did not
honor it and even threatened to cut it into pieces with the use of a pair of scissors.Deeply
embarrassed and humiliated, and in order to avoid further indignities, Calderon paid cash for the
Gucci goods and items that he bought.

Issue:
Whether or not Calderon can be indemnify with damages.

Ruling:
Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss, hurt or harm which results

from the injury; and damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage
suffered. Thus, there can be damage without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was
not the result of a violation of a legal duty. In such cases the consequences must be borne by the
injured person alone, the law affords no remedy for damages resulting from an act which does not
amount to a legal injury or wrong. These situations are often called damnum absque injuria.

In other words, in order that a plaintiff may maintain an action for the injuries of which he
complains, he must establish that such injuries resulted from a breach of duty which the defendant
owed to the plaintiff- a concurrence of injury to the plaintiff and legal responsibility by the person

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causing it. The underlying basis for the award of tort damages is the premise that an individual was
injured in contemplation of law. Thus, there must first be a breach of some duty and the imposition
of liability for that breach before damages may be awarded; and the breach of such duty should be
the proximate cause of the injury.

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VOLENTI NON FIT INJURIA

HOTEL NIKKO vs. REYES

GR. No. 154259 February 28, 2005

Facts:
This case is a petition for review on certiorari regarding the reversing decision of the Court

of Appeals in the decision of the Trial Court and thus, making the petitioners liable for damages
through the abusive conduct of petitioner Lim, imposing upon them P200,000 as exemplary
damages, P200,000 as moral damages, and P10,000 as attorney‘s fees.

Plaintiff Roberto Reyes (Amay Bisaya) was having coffee at the Nikko Hotel lobby on
October 13, 1994 at around six in the morning when Dr. Violeta Filart, a long-time friend,
approached him and invited him to a party at the penthouse where the hotel‘s former manager‘s
birthday was being celebrated. He consented and carried the latter‘s present. At the party, when he
was helping himself at the buffet table, Ruby Lim, one of the petitioners, approached him and asked
him to leave in a loud voice enough to be heard by those around the buffet table. Then, a Makati
policeman accompanied the embarrassed Amay Bisaya in leaving the penthouse.

Ruby Lim accepted the fact that she asked Mr. Reyes to leave but not in the manner he
claimed. She said she politely asked Mr. Reyes to finish his food and leave the party as the celebrant
wants the party to be intimate, and that he was not invited. On the other hand, Dr. Filart denied
Amay Bisaya‘s claim that she invited him to the party.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner Lim‘s conduct was abusive enough to make the petitioners liable for
damages caused to plaintiff.

Ruling:
No. The Supreme Court ruled that any damage which Mr. Reyes might have suffered

through Ms. Lim‘s exercise of a legitimate right done within the bounds of propriety and good faith,
must be his to bear alone.

The plaintiff failed in proving the ill-motive of the petitioners. It was from his confession
that when Ms. Lim approached him, they were very close that they nearly kissed each other.
Considering the closeness of defendant Lim to plaintiff when she requested the latter to leave the
party, it is apparent that the request was meant to be heard by him only and there could have been
no intention on her part to cause him embarrassment. It was plaintiff‘s reaction to the request that
must have made the other guests aware of what transpired between them. Had plaintiff simply left
the party as requested, there was no need for the police to take him out. Therefore, we find the
petitioners not guilty of violating Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code.

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Persons and Family Relation

LIABILITY EX-MALEFICIO OR EX-DELICTO

EDUARDO MANUEL vs. PEOPLE

GR. No. 165842 November 29, 2005

Facts:
This case is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of Court of Appeals affirming

the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, convicting the petitioner for the crime of
bigamy.

Eduardo P. Manuel, herein petitioner, was first married to Rubylus Gaña on July 18, 1975,

who, according to the former, was charged with estafa in 1975 and thereafter imprisoned and was
never seen again by him after his last visit. Manuel met Tina B. Gandalera in January 1996 when the
latter was only 21 years old. Three months after their meeting, the two got married through a civil
wedding in BaguioCity without Gandalera‘s knowledge of Manuel‘s first marriage. In the course of
their marriage, things got rocky and Gandalera learned that Eduardo was in fact already married
when he married him. She then filed a criminal case of bigamy against Eduardo Manuel. The latter‘s
defense being that his declaration of ―single‖ in his marriage contract with Gandalera was done
because he believed in good faith that his first marriage was invalid and that he did not know that he
had to go to court to seek for the nullification of his first marriage before marrying Tina. The
Regional Trial Court ruled against him sentencing him of imprisonment of from 6 years and 10
months to ten years, and an amount 0f P200,000.00 for moral damages.

Eduardo appealed the decision to the CA where he alleged that he was not criminally liable
for bigamy because when he married the private complainant, he did so in good faith and without
any malicious intent. The CA ruled against the petitioner but with modification on the RTC‘s
decision. Imprisonment was from 2 years, months and 1 day to ten years. Pecuniary reward for
moral damages was affirmed.

Hence, this petition.

Issues:

a) Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed reversible error of law when it ruled that
petitioner‘s wife cannot be legally presumed dead under Article 390 of the Civil Code as
there was no judicial declaration of presumptive death as provided for under Article 41 of
the Family Code.

b) Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed reversible error of law when it affirmed the
award of Php200,000.00 as moral damages as it has no basis in fact and in law.

Ruling:
The petition is denied for lack of merit. The petitioner is presumed to have acted with malice

or evil intent when he married the private complainant. As a general rule, mistake of fact or good
faith of the accused is a valid defense in a prosecution for a felony by dolo; such defense negates
malice or criminal intent. However, ignorance of the law is not an excuse because everyone is
presumed to know the law. Ignorantia legis neminem excusat. Where a spouse is absent for the
requisite period, the present spouse may contract a subsequent marriage only after securing a
judgment declaring the presumptive death of the absent spouse to avoid being charged and

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convicted of bigamy; the present spouse will have to adduce evidence that he had a well-founded
belief that the absent spouse was already dead. Such judgment is proof of the good faith of the
present spouse who contracted a subsequent marriage; thus, even if the present spouse is later
charged with bigamy if the absentee spouse reappears, he cannot be convicted of the crime. The
court rules against the petitioner.

The Court rules that the petitioner‘s collective acts of fraud and deceit before, during and
after his marriage with the private complainant were willful, deliberate and with malice and caused
injury to the latter. The Court thus declares that the petitioner‘s acts are against public policy as they
undermine and subvert the family as a social institution, good morals and the interest and general
welfare of society. Because the private complainant was an innocent victim of the petitioner‘s
perfidy, she is not barred from claiming moral damages. Considering the attendant circumstances of
the case, the Court finds the award of P200,000.00 for moral damages to be just and reasonable.

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Persons and Family Relation

LIABILITY EX-MALEFICIO OR EX-DELICTO

SONNY D. ROMERO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 167546 July 17, 2009

Facts:
On April 1, 1999 at around 12:00 noon, the JC Liner driven by petitioner Sonny Romero

and the Apego Taxi driven by Jimmy Padua figured in a head-on collision along Governor Jose
Fuentebella Highway at Barangay Hibago, Ocampo, Camarines Sur. The bus was bound for Naga
City while the taxi was going in the opposite direction of Partido Area. The collision resulted in the
death of Gerardo Breis, Sr., Arnaldo Breis, Gerardo Breis, Jr., Rene Montes, Erwin Breis and Jimmy
Padua. Luckily, Edwin Breis and his son Edmund Breis survived although they sustained serious
injuries.

As a consequence, petitioner was charged with the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in
multiple homicide and multiple serious physical injuries with damage to property in the Municipal
Trial Court (MTC) of Ocampo, Camarines Sur. After trial on the merits, the MTC acquitted
petitioner of the crime charged in a decision dated November 9, 2000. Petitioner was, however, held
civilly liable and was ordered to pay the heirs of the victims the total amount of P3,541,900 by way
of actual damages, civil indemnity for death, moral damages, temperate damages and loss of earning
capacity.

Petitioner appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Pili, Camarines Sur which on July 17,
2001, affirmed the MTC judgment in toto. Refusing to give up, petitioner appealed to the Court of
Appeals. On March 3, 2005, the CA rendered the assailed decision affirming the RTC.

Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner‘s acquittal freed him of civil liability?

Ruling:

In view of the pronouncements of the MTC and the RTC, the Supreme Court agrees with
the conclusion of the CA that petitioner was acquitted not because he did not commit the crime
charged but because the RTC and the MTC could not ascertain with moral conviction the wanton
and reckless manner by which petitioner drove the bus at the time of the accident. Put differently,
petitioner was acquitted because the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
However, his civil liability for the death, injuries and damages arising from the collision is another
matter. While petitioner was absolved from criminal liability because his negligence was not proven
beyond reasonable doubt, he can still be held civilly liable if his negligence was established by
preponderance of evidence. In other words, the failure of the evidence to prove negligence with
moral certainty does not negate (and is in fact compatible with) a ruling that there was preponderant
evidence of such negligence. And that is sufficient to hold him civilly liable.

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Persons and Family Relation

ACTS CONTRA BONOS MORES

CECILIO PE ET AL. vs. ALFONSO PE

G.R. No.L-17396 May 30, 1962

Facts:
Plaintiffs are the parents, brothers and sisters of one Lolita Pe. At the time of her

disappearance on April 14, 1957, Lolita was 24 years old and unmarried. Defendant is a married man
and works as agent of the La Perla Cigar and Cigarette Factory. He used to stay in the town of
Gasan, Marinduque, in connection with his aforesaid occupation. Lolita was staying with her parents
in the same town. Defendant was an adopted son of a Chinaman named Pe Beco, a collateral
relative of Lolita's father. Because of such fact and the similarity in their family name, defendant
became close to the plaintiffs who regarded him as a member of their family. Sometime in 1952,
defendant frequented the house of Lolita on the pretext that he wanted her to teach him how to
pray the rosary. The two eventually fell in love with each other and conducted clandestine trysts not
only in the town of Gasan but also in Boac where Lolita used to teach in a barrio school. They
exchanged love notes with each other the contents of which reveal not only their infatuation for
each other but also the extent to which they had carried their relationship. The rumors about their
love affairs reached the ears of Lolita's parents sometime, in 1955, and since then defendant was
forbidden from going to their house and from further seeing Lolita. The plaintiffs even filed
deportation proceedings against defendant who is a Chinese national. The affair between defendant
and Lolita continued nonetheless.

Sometime in April, 1957, Lolita was staying with her brothers and sisters at their residence at
54-B España Extension, Quezon City. On April 14, 1957, Lolita disappeared from said house. After
she left, her brothers and sisters checked up her thing and found that Lolita's clothes were gone.
However, plaintiffs found a note on a crumpled piece of paper inside Lolita's aparador. Said note,
written on a small slip of paper approximately 4" by 3" in size, was in a handwriting recognized to be
that of defendant's. The disappearance of Lolita was reported to the police authorities and the NBI
but up to the present there is no news or trace of her whereabouts. The trial court said: "In the
absence of proof on this point, the court may not presume that it was the defendant who
deliberately induced such relationship. We cannot be unmindful of the uncertainties and sometimes
inexplicable mysteries of the human emotions. It is a possibility that the defendant and Lolita simply
fell in love with each other, not only without any desire on their part, but also against their better
judgment and in full consciousness of what it will bring to both of them. This is specially so with
respect to Lolita, being an unmarried woman, falling in love with defendant who is a married man."

Issue:
Whether or not the plaintiffs are entitled to moral, compensatory, exemplary and corrective

damages.

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Persons and Family Relation

Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that the circumstances under which defendant tried to win Lolita's

affection cannot lead, to any other conclusion than that it was he who, thru an ingenious scheme or
trickery, seduced the latter to the extent of making her fall in love with him. This is shown by the
fact that defendant frequented the house of Lolita on the pretext that he wanted her to teach him
how to pray the rosary. Because of the frequency of his visits to the latter's family who was allowed
free access because he was a collateral relative and was considered as a member of her family, the
two eventually fell in love with each other and conducted clandestine love affairs not only in Gasan
but also in Boac where Lolita used to teach in a barrio school. When the rumors about their illicit
affairs reached the knowledge of her parents, defendant was forbidden from going to their house
and even from seeing Lolita. Plaintiffs even filed deportation proceedings against defendant who is a
Chinese national. Nevertheless, defendant continued his love affairs with Lolita until she
disappeared from the parental home. Indeed, no other conclusion can be drawn from this chain of
events than that defendant not only deliberately, but through a clever strategy, succeeded in winning
the affection and love of Lolita to the extent of having illicit relations with her. The wrong he has
caused her and her family is indeed immeasurable considering the fact that he is a married man.
Verily, he has committed an injury to Lolita's family in a manner contrary to morals, good customs
and public policy as contemplated in Article 21 of the new Civil Code.

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Persons and Family Relation

BREACH OF PROMISE TO MARRY

FRANCISCO HERMOSISIMA vs.THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS ET AL.

G.R. No. L-14628 September 30, 1960

Facts:
Complainant Soledad Cagigas, was born in July 1917. Since 1950, Soledad then a teacher in

the Sibonga Provincial High School in Cebu, and petitioner, who was almost ten (10) years younger
than she, used to go around together and were regarded as engaged, although he had made no
promise of marriage prior thereto. In 1951, she gave up teaching and became a life insurance
underwriter in the City of Cebu, where intimacy developed among her and the petitioner, since one
evening in 1953, when after coming from the movies; they had sexual intercourse in his cabin on
board M/V "Escaño," to which he was then attached as apprentice pilot. In February 1954, Soledad
advised petitioner that she was in the family way, whereupon he promised to marry her. Their child,
Chris Hermosisima, was born on June 17, 1954, in a private maternity and clinic. However,
subsequently, or on July 24, 1954, defendant married one Romanita Perez. On October 4, 1954,
Soledad Cagigas filed with said of her child, Chris Hermosisima, as natural child and moral damages
for alleged breach of promise. Petitioner admitted the paternity of child and expressed willingness to
support the latter, but denied having ever promised to marry the complainant. Upon her motion,
said court ordered petitioner, on October 27, 1954, to pay, by way of alimony pendente lite, P50.00 a
month, which was, on February 16, 1955, reduced to P30.00 a month.

The judgment of the RTC is hereby rendered, declaring the child, Chris Hermosisima, as the
natural daughter of defendant, and confirming the order pendente lite, ordering defendant to pay to
the said child, through plaintiff, the sum of thirty pesos (P30.00), payable on or before the fifth day
of every month sentencing defendant to pay to plaintiff the sum of four thousand five hundred
pesos (P4,500.00) for actual and compensatory damages; the sum of five thousand pesos (P5,000.00)
as moral damages; and the further sum of five thousand pesos (P500.00) as attorney's fees for
plaintiff, with costs against defendant. On appeal taken by petitioner, the Court of Appeals affirmed
this decision, except as to the actual and compensatory damages and the moral damages, which were
increased to P5,614.25 and P7,000.00, respectively.

Issue:
Whether or not moral damages are recoverable, under our laws, for breach of promise to

marry?

Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that seduction does not exist in the present case thus the petitioner

is not morally guilty of seduction, not only because he is approximately ten (10) years younger than
the complainant — who around thirty-six (36) years of age, and as highly enlightened as a former
high school teacher and a life insurance agent are supposed to be — when she became intimate with
petitioner, then a mere apprentice pilot, but, also, because, the court of first instance found that,

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Persons and Family Relation

complainant "surrendered herself" to petitioner because, "overwhelmed by her love" for him, she
"wanted to bind" "by having a fruit of their engagement even before they had the benefit of clergy."
Thus the complainant is not entitled to award of damages.

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Persons and Family Relation

BREACH OF PROMISE TO MARRY

BEATRIZ GALANG vs.THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS ET AL.

G.R. No.L-17248 January 29, 1962

Facts:
Rodrigo courted Beatriz in 1953 and they, thereafter, became engaged, albeit Rodrigo's

mother was opposed to their marriage; that on April 15, 1955 Rodrigo and his father went to her
house and her marriage with Rodrigo were arranged, with the concurrence of her mother, appellant
Maximino Quinit having agreed to give dowry and to defray the expenses of the marriage, with the
exception of the wedding dress of appellee; that they agreed to have the marriage celebrated in
Baguio, for which reason on April 27, 1955, appellee, Rodrigo and the latter's father left for Baguio;
that upon arriving at Colorado Falls, however, Maximino made them alight from the bus and took
them to the house of Adolfo Dagawan with whom Maximino agreed that appellee and Rodrigo
would stay in said house, Maximino to pay P5.00 daily for their lodging and asked Dagawan to make
all arrangements for their wedding in Baguio and to act as their sponsor; that after making these
arrangements Maximino left, while appellee and Rodrigo remained in Dagawan's house where they
lived as husband and wife until May 9, that on May 7, appellee and Rodrigo, accompanied by
Dagawan, went to Baguio to secure a marriage license but failed because Rodrigo did not have a
residence certificate, although both prospective contracting parties signed the corresponding
application; that on May 9, on the pretext that he going to their hometown to get his residence
certificate, Rodrigo left Colorado Falls and never returned; that when appellee returned to their
hometown (Sison, Pangasinan), she found out that Rodrigo's parents had sprinted him away
because, in their opinion, appellee's reputation was unsavory.

The Court of First Instance sustained plaintiff's pretense, but the Court of Appeals
considered her evidence unworthy of credence, and, hence, absolved Maximino Quinit.

Issues:
Whether or not Rodrigo and Maximo Quinit are liable for damages due to the alleged breach

of promise to marry?

Ruling:
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals for the reason that mere

breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong.In the light of the clear and manifest intent
of our law making body not to sanction actions for breach of promise to marry, the award of moral
damages made by the Court of First Instance is, accordingly, untenable.

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Persons and Family Relation

BREACH OF PROMISE TO MARRY

GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 97336 February 19, 1993

Facts:
Private respondent, Marilou Gonzales, filed a complaint dated October 27, 1987 for

damages against the petitioner for the alleged breach of their agreement to get married. She met the
petitioner in Dagupan where the latter was an Iranian medical exchange student who later courted
her and proposed marriage. The petitioner even went to Marilou‘s house to secure approval of her
parents. The petitioner then forced the respondent to leave with him in his apartment. Marilou was

a virgin before she lived with him. After a week, she filed a complaint because the petitioner started
maltreating and threatening her. He even tied the respondent in the apartment while he was in
school and drugged her. Marilou at one time became pregnant but the petitioner administered a
drug to abort the baby.

Petitioner repudiated the marriage agreement and told Marilou to not live with him since he
is already married to someone in Bacolod. He claimed that he never proposed marriage or agreed to
be married neither sought consent and approval of Marliou‘s parents. He claimed that he asked
Marilou to stay out of his apartment since the latter deceived him by stealing money and his
passport. The private respondent prayed for damages and reimbursements of actual expenses.

Issue:
Whether breach of promise to marry can give rise to cause for damages.

Ruling:
The existing rule is that breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. The

court held that when a man uses his promise of marriage to deceive a woman to consent to his
malicious desires, he commits fraud and willfully injures the woman. In that instance, the court
found that petitioner‘s deceptive promise to marry led Marilou to surrender her virtue and
womanhood.

Moral damages can be claimed when such promise to marry was a deceptive ploy to have
carnal knowledge with the woman and actual damages should be paid for the wedding preparation
expenses. Petitioner even committed deplorable acts in disregard of the laws of the country.

Therefore, SC set aside the decision of CA awarding damages to the respondent.

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Persons and Family Relation

BREACH OF PROMISE TO MARRY

WASSMER vs. VELEZ

G.R. No. L-20089 December 26, 1964

Facts:
Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer, following their mutual promise of love, decided to get

married and set Sept. 4, 1954 as the big day. On Sept. 2, 1954, Velez left a note for his bride-to-be
saying that he wants to postpone the marriage as his mother opposes it and that he is leaving. But
the next day, Sept. 3, he sent her a telegram and told her that nothing has changed, that he is
returning and he apologizes. Thereafter, Velez did not appear nor was he heard from again.

Wassmer sued him for damages. Velez filed no answer and was declared in default.

Issue:
Is the case at bar a mere breach of promise to marry?

Ruling:
Surely, this is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. As stated, mere breach of

promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through all the
preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is
quite different. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which defendant
must be held answerable in damages in accordance with Art. 21 of the NCC which provides that
"any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage."

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Persons and Family Relation

BREACH OF PROMISE TO MARRY

NATIVIDAD vs. TUNAC

G.R. No. 143130 July 10, 2000

Facts:
Petitioner Elsa Natividad and respondent Ronald Tunac grew up together in Barangay

Quiling, Talisay, Batangas where their respective parents resided. At age nineteen (19), the two
became lovers. One day, Ronald asked Elsa to go with him to his boarding house in Pasig City to get
the bio-data which he needed in connection with his application for employment. Upon arrival at
the boarding house, they found no one there. Ronald asked Elsa to go with him inside his room and,

once inside, started kissing Elsa until he succeeded in making love with her. Elsa cried at the loss of
her virginity, but Ronald appeased her by promising to marry her.

Their intimate relations continued, resulting in Elsa getting pregnant sometime in June 1992.
Ronald reassured her, again promising her marriage. True enough, on October 31, 1992, Ronald and
his parents, accompanied by several relatives numbering twenty in all, went to Elsa's house and
asked her parents for the hand of their daughter.The two families agreed to have the wedding in
January 1993 but Elsa's sister had gotten married that year so they postponed it. Meanwhile, Elsa
started living with Ronald in the house of the latter's family while waiting for the baby to be born.
Unfortunately, on December 19, 1992, Elsa gave birth to a premature baby which died after five (5)
hours in the incubator. After Elsa's discharge from the hospital, the two families decided that Elsa
should go back to her parents so her mother could take care of her during her postnatal period.
During said period, Ronald occasionally slept in Elsa's house.

It seems that after Elsa's miscarriage, a marked change in Ronald's attitude towards the
former occurred. In January of 1993, the Natividads confronted the Tunacs. In that meeting, Ronald
informed Elsa that he no longer wanted to get married to her. Petitioners succinctly contend they
are suing respondents not merely because Elsa became pregnant but because Ronald reneged on his
promise to marry her after their agreement had already been much publicized in their town.

Issue:
Whether or not Ronald performs moral seduction.

Ruling:
In the case at bar, it is clear that no moral seduction was employed by Ronald, much less by

his parents. Form the narration of the trial court, the evident conclusion is that the two became
lovers before they engaged in any sexual intercourse. Also, the moral seduction contemplated by the
Code Commission in drafting Article 21 of the Civil Code is one where the defendant is in a
position of moral ascendancy in relation to the plaintiff. We fail to see any of these circumstances in
this case.

In addition, as the trial court noted, marriage plans were in fact arranged between the
families of the parties. That their relationship turned sour afterwards, or immediately after Elsa's
miscarriage, is already beyond the punitive scope of our laws. This is simply a case of a relationship
gone awry.

For the foregoing reasons, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. 93

Persons and Family Relation

UNJUST ENRICHMENT

SHINRYO (PHILIPPINES) COMPANY, INC. vs. RRN INC.

G.R. No. 172525 October 20, 2010

Facts:
Petitioner Shinryo (Philippines) Company, Inc. (hereinafter petitioner) is a domestic

corporation organized under Philippine laws. Private respondent RRN Incorporated (hereinafter
respondent) is likewise a domestic corporation organized under Philippine laws. Respondent filed a
claim for arbitration against petitioner before CIAC for recovery of unpaid account which consists
of unpaid portions of the sub-contract, variations and unused materials in the total sum of P5,

275,184.17 and legal interest in the amount of P442, 014.73. Petitioner filed a counterclaim for
overpayment in the amount of P2, 512,997.96. The parties admitted several facts before the CIAC.
It was shown that petitioner and respondent executed an Agreement and Conditions of Sub-
contract. Respondent signified its willingness to accept and perform for petitioner in any of its
projects, a part or the whole of the works more particularly described in Conditions of Sub-Contract
and other Sub-contract documents.

On June 11, 2002, the parties executed a "Supply of Manpower, Tools/Equipment,
Consumables for the Electrical Works-Power and Equipment Supply, Bus Duct Installation" for the
Phillip Morris Greenfield Project (hereafter Project) covered by Purchase Order Nos. 4501200300-
000274 and 4501200300-000275 amounting to P15,724,000.00 and P9,276,000.00 respectively, or a
total amount of P25,000,000.00. The parties also agreed that respondent will perform variation
orders in the Project. In connection with the Project, petitioner supplied manpower chargeable
against respondent. Respondent was not able to finish the entire works with petitioner due to
financial difficulties. Petitioner paid respondent a total amount of P26,547,624.76. On June 25, 2005
[should read 2003], respondent, through its former counsel sent a letter to petitioner demanding for
the payment of its unpaid balance amounting to P5,275,184.17. Petitioner claimed material back
charges in the amount of P4,063,633.43. On September 26, 2003, respondent only acknowledged
P2,371,895.33 as material back charges. Thereafter, on October 16, 2003, respondent sent another
letter to petitioner for them to meet and settle their dispute. On January 8, 2004, respondent sent
another letter to petitioner regarding the cost of equipment rental and the use of scaffolding.
Thereafter, on August 12, 2004, petitioner sent a letter to respondent denying any unpaid account

and the failure in their negotiations for amicable settlement.

Issue:
Whether or not the Claimant's claim for inventory of excess materials is constitutes to unjust

enrichment.

Ruling:
No, the court of appeals committed a grave reversible error in affirming that the CIAC

award for the values of inventoried materials considering that respondent RRN has no basis to claim
because Engr. Bonifacio admitted that respondent RRN failed to establish whether the materials
came from respondent or from petitioner and that it was petitioner that actually installed the said
materials as part of remaining works that the petitioner took over from respondent rrn. The claim
for the value of inventoried materials is a doubled claim or a doubled entry because in the
computation of the final account, respondent RRN was credited the full contract price and the cost
of variations which included the inventoried materials.

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Despite petitioner's attempts to make it appear that it is advancing questions of law, it is
quite clear that what petitioner seeks is for this Court to recalibrate the evidence it has presented
before the CIAC. It insists that its evidence sufficiently proves that it is entitled to payment for
respondent's use of its manlift equipment, and even absent proof of the supposed agreement on the
charges petitioner may impose on respondent for the use of said equipment, respondent should be
made to pay based on the principle of unjust enrichment. Petitioner also questions the amounts
awarded by the CIAC for inventoried materials, and costs incurred by petitioner for completing the
work left unfinished by respondent.

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Persons and Family Relation

UNJUST ENRICHMENT

CAR COOL Philippines, Inc. v. USHIO Realty and Development Corporation

G.R. NO. 138088 January 23, 2006

Facts:
On December 19, 2005, USHIO Realty and Development Corporation filed an ejectment

case against CAR COOL Philippines Inc., to recover the possession of a parcel of land at Quezon
Avenue. USHIO Realty contends that despite several and repeated demands and notices from the
former owners of the land, spouses Lopez, and also from the new owners, USHIO Realty, CAR
COOL still failed to vacate the property. On December 3, 1995 USHIO Realty sent the final

demand to CAR COOL, giving a non extendable 15 days within which to vacate the property. CAR
COOL refused to vacate the property, hence the ejectment case.

The Metropolitan Trial Court rendered in the ejectment case in favor of USHIO Realty.
CAR COOL appealed to the Regional Trial Court which rendered a decision affirming the decision
of the MeTC. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court‘s decision with modification, granting
rentals to USHIO Realty.

Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in awarding damages by way of rentals and

attorney‘s fees in favor of USHIO Realty

Ruling:
USHIO Realty as the new owner of the property has a right to physical possession of the

said property. Since CAR COOL deprived USHIO Realty of its property, CAR COOL should pay
USHIO Realty rental as a reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the property.
Contrary to CAR COOL‘s contention the payment of damages in the form of rentals for the
property does not constitute unjust enrichment.

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Persons and Family Relation

UNJUST ENRICHMENT

G.R. No. 181995 ELEGIR vs. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC. July 16, 2012

Facts:
Petitioner Bibiano C. Elegir was hired by Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL) as a commercial

pilot, specifically designated as HS748 Limited First Officer, on March 16, 1971. In 1995, PAL
embarked on a refleeting program and acquired new and highly sophisticated aircrafts. Subsequently,
PAL posts a bid for the opening of slots for the crew of the new aircrafts. Elegir was one of those
awarded with the opportunity.

Elegir, along with 7 other pilot, were sent for training in Seattle, Washington, United States
of America on May 8, 1995 for the necessary training of his skills and knowledge to handle the new
aircraft. He completed his training on September 19, 1995. On November 5, 1996 after rendering 25
years, 8 months, and 20 days of continuous service, the petitioner applied for an optional retirement
authorized under the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between PAL and the Airline Pilots
Association of the Philippines (ALPAP). PAL asked him to reconsider his retirement in that the
company has yet to recover the cost of his training. In the event that he finally decides to leave, PAL
will deduct the unrecovered cost of his training from his Retirement Pay. He decided to leave
thereafter. Elegir‘s counsel sent PAL a letter of correspondence stating that the cost of training
should not be deducted from his retirement pay.

Issue:
Whether or not PAL had the right to reimburse themselves from Elegir‘s retirement pay the

amount unrecovered from his training.

Ruling:
PAL had the right to be reimbursed. According to Article 22-23 of the New Civil Code, they

had the right to demand payment since Elegir will unjustly enrich himself at the expense of PAL.
Unjustly enriching is unduly profiting one‘s self on something which does not meritoriously belong
to him, this is well enshrined in the Latin maxim, ―Nemo cum alteriusdetrimentolocupletaripotest‖.
Elgir has the right to retire since he has reached a certain number of flight hours which is considered
a long stay in PAL, but his bid for the vacancy and his subsequent training sponsored by PAL was
put to waste when he decides to have an early retirement from PAL after his training. It would be
unfair for PAL if Elegir has gained new skills for the service of PAL but then leave even after PAL
has still not even recovered the cost of training.

97

Persons and Family Relation

PARENS PATRIAE DOCTRINE

VALENZUELA vs. COURT OF APPEALS December 22, 1988
G.R. No. L-56168

Facts:
Carlos Telosa is a farmer and a fisherman. He had very limited education. Telosa initiated a

loan with the Rural Bank of Lucena with a contract of mortgage. The mortgage covered a parcel of
land measuring 50,000 square meters. Several months later the Rural Bank of Lucena experienced
financial distress. The Central Bank appraised Rural Bank of Lucian‘s shareholders. It was found out
in its investigation that key officers of the bank had certain anomalies or had resorted to unsound
banking practices which were prejudicial to the government, the public, and its creditors.

Rural Bank of Lucena has then undergone liquidation. It had received orders to turn its non-
monetary assets into cash to satisfy claims. Among one of the accounts it decides to liquidate was
the Telosa account in the amount of Php 5000.00. Rural Bank of Lucena sent for a demand letter
asking for the payment of the account. Carlos Telosa thought that he owes the bank only Php
300.00 and not Php 5000.00, so Telosa filed a protest on the demand received. Meanwhile Carlos
Telosa died in January 13, 1968. The rural bank claiming that the payment was not fully paid
petitioned the foreclosure the Telosa‘s land to satisfy the claim. The lot was then sold to the highest
bidder and was consequently registered in the Registry of Deeds on September 11, 1972. Telosa now
pray for the annulment of the land back to them because they have already paid the loan of Php
300.00.

Issue:
Whether or not the state can intervene via parenspatriae for the return of the Telosa‘s land.

Ruling:
The state can protect its citizens; it is a supreme power the state can exercise at any time the

rights of its citizen is being prejudiced. The bank took advantage of the Telosa‘s by making a
document that was not the contract that they have agreed upon. Needless to state in this regard the
particular transaction was one of the fraudulent and anomalous transactions involving the officer of
the Rural Bank of Lucena, Inc. The state can intervene because there has been a preponderance of
proof that the loan only amounts to Php 300.00 and not Php 5000.00. By virtue of the power of the
state the bank was ordered to return the land it extra judicially settled.

98

Persons and Family Relation

RIGHT TO PRIVACY

CONCEPCION vs. COURT OF APPEALS January 31, 2000
G.R. No. 120706

Facts:
Sometime in 1985, the spouses Nestor Nicolas and Allem Nicolas are living in an apartment

being leased to them by Florence ―Bing‖ Concepcion, who also resides in the same compound
where the apartment was located. Nestor was engaged in the business of supplying government
agencies and private entities with office equipment, appliances and other fixtures on a cash or credit
basis. Bing joined the venture and contributed capital on the condition that after her capital
investment was returned to her, any profit earned would be divided equally between her and Nestor.

Sometime in the second week of July 1985, Rodrigo Concepcion the brother of the deceased
husband of Bing accosted Nestor at the latter‘s apartment and accusing him of having adulterous
relationship with Bing. Rodrigo threatened that should something happen to Rodrigo‘s sick mother,
in case the latter learned of the affair, he would kill Florence.

As a result of the incident, Nestor felt extreme embarrassment and shame to the extent that
he could no longer face his neighbors. Florence also ceased to do business with him by not
contributing capital anymore so much so that the business venture was no longer feasible. To make
matters worse, the relationship between Allem and Nestor has soured from the doubt of fidelity and
frequent bickering and quarrels. Allem even expressed her desire to leave her husband. Nestor was
forced to demand from Rodrigo damages and a public apology.

Issue:
Whether or not Nestor‘s right to privacy had been shattered by Rodrigo and is Nestor

entitled to damages.

Ruling:
The court has ruled that Nestor is entitled to damages. Although the defendant claims that

there was neither violation done that was enlisted under Article 26 and 2219 of the New Civil Code
which constitute libel, slander, or any other form of defamation nor does it involve prying into the
privacy of another‘s residence, it was still adjudged that the act done was form of that manner. The
Code commission stresses in no uncertain terms that the human personality must be exalted. The
sacredness of human personality is a concomitant consideration of every plan for human
amelioration. The touchstone of every system of law, of the culture and civilization of every county,
is how far it dignifies man. If the statutes insufficiently protect a person from being unjustly
humiliated, in short if human personality is not exalted then the laws are indeed defective, thus,
under this article, the right of persons are amply protected, and damages are provided for violations
of a person‘s dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind. There is no question that Nestor

99

Persons and Family Relation