civil code0101

From the documents she presented, the marriage license was issued almost one year after the
ceremony took place. Article 80 of the Civil Code is clearly applicable in this case, there being no
claim of exceptional character enumerated in articles 72-79 of the Civil Code. The marriage between
petitioner and private respondent is void from the beginning. The remaining issue on the
psychological capacity is now mooted by the conclusion of this court that the marriage of petitioner
to respondent is void ab initio for lack of marriage license at the time their marriage was solemnized.

Petition is granted. The marriage celebrated on November 15, 1973 between petitioner
Filipina Sy and private respondent Fernando Sy is hereby declared void ab initio for lack of marriage
license at the time of celebration.

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MARRIAGE LICENSE

JAIME O. SEVILLA vs. CARMELITA N. CARDENAS July 31, 2006
G.R. No. 167684

Facts:
On 19 May 1969, through machinations, duress and intimidation employed upon him by

Carmelita N. Cardenas and the latter's father, retired Colonel Jose Cardenas of the Armed forces of
the Philippines, Jaime and Carmelita went to the City Hall of Manila and they were introduced to a
certain Reverend Cirilo D. Gonzales, a supposed Minister of the Gospel. On the said date, the father
of Carmelita caused Jaime and Carmelita to sign a marriage contract before the said Minister of the
Gospel. According to Jaime, he never applied for a marriage license for his supposed marriage to
Carmelita and never did they obtain any marriage license from any Civil Registry, consequently, no
marriage license was presented to the solemnizing officer.

On March 28, 1994, a complaint was filed by Jaime O. Sevilla before the RTC. In its
Decision dated January 25, 2002, the RTC declared the nullity of the marriage of the parties for lack
of the requisite marriage license. Carmelita filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. In a Decision
dated 20 December 2004, the Court of Appeals disagreed with the trial court. Jaime filed a Motion
for Reconsideration dated 6 January 2005 which the Court of Appeals denied in a Resolution dated
6 April 2005.

This denial gave rise to the present Petition filed by Jaime.

Issue:
Whether or not a valid marriage license was issued in accordance with law to the parties

herein prior to the celebration of the marriages in question?

Ruling:
Given the documentary and testimonial evidence to the effect that utmost efforts were not

exerted to locate the logbook where Marriage License No. 2770792 may have been entered, the
presumption of regularity of performance of official function by the Local Civil Registrar in issuing
the certifications, is effectively rebutted.

Moreover, the absence of the logbook is not conclusive proof of non-issuance of Marriage
License No. 2770792. It can also mean, as we believed true in the case at bar, that the logbook just
cannot be found. In the absence of showing of diligent efforts to search for the said logbook, we
cannot easily accept that absence of the same also means non-existence or falsity of entries therein.

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Finally, the rule is settled that every intendment of the law or fact leans toward the validity of
the marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds. The courts look upon this presumption with
great favor. It is not to be lightly repelled; on the contrary, the presumption is of great weight.

Therefore, the instant petition is denied.

MARRIAGE LICENSE

SYED AZHAR ABBAS vs. GLORIA GOO ABBAS

G.R. No. 183896 January 30, 2013

Facts:
Syed, a Pakistani citizen, testified that he met Gloria, a Filipino citizen, in Taiwan in 1991,

and they were married on August 9, 1992 at the Taipei Mosque in Taiwan. He arrived in the
Philippines in December of 1992. On January 9, 1993, at around 5 o‘clock in the afternoon, he was
at his mother-in-law‘s residence, located at 2676 F. Muñoz St., Malate, Manila, when his mother-in-
law arrived with two men. He testified that he was told that he was going to undergo some
ceremony, one of the requirements for his stay in the Philippines, but was not told of the nature of
said ceremony. During the ceremony he and Gloria signed a document. He claimed that he did not
know that the ceremony was a marriage until Gloria told him later. He further testified that he did
not go to Carmona, Cavite to apply for a marriage license, and that he had never resided in that area.
In July of 2003, he went to the Office of the Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, to check on their
marriage license, and was asked to show a copy of their marriage contract wherein the marriage
license number could be found. The Municipal Civil Registrar, Leodivinia C. Encarnacion, issued a
certification on July 11, 2003 to the effect that the marriage license number appearing in the
marriage contract he submitted, Marriage License No. 9969967, was the number of another marriage
license issued to a certain Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan.

In its October 5, 2005 Decision, the Pasay City RTC held that no valid marriage license was
issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite in favor of Gloria and Syed thus their
marriage on January 9, 1993 was void ab initio. Gloria filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated
November 7, 2005, but the RTC denied the same, prompting her to appeal the questioned decision
to the Court of Appeals.

The CA gave credence to Gloria‘s arguments, and granted her appeal. It held that the
certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar failed to categorically state that a diligent search for the
marriage license of Gloria and Syed was conducted, and thus held that said certification could not be
accorded probative value. The CA ruled that there was sufficient testimonial and documentary
evidence that Gloria and Syed had been validly married and that there was compliance with all the
requisites laid down by law.

Syed then filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated April 1, 2008 but the same was denied
by the CA in a Resolution dated July 24, 2008 hence, this petition.

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Persons and Family Relation

Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in reversing and setting aside the decision of the

RTC granting the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage?

Ruling:
The Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, where the marriage license of Gloria and

Syed was allegedly issued, issued a certification to the effect that no such marriage license for Gloria
and Syed was issued, and that the serial number of the marriage license pertained to another couple,
Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan. A certified machine copy of Marriage License No. 9969967
was presented, which was issued in Carmona, Cavite, and indeed, the names of Gloria and Syed do
not appear in the document.

As to the motive of Syed in seeking to annul his marriage to Gloria, it may well be that his
motives are less than pure, that he seeks to evade a bigamy suit. Be that as it may, the same does not
make up for the failure of the respondent to prove that they had a valid marriage license, given the
weight of evidence presented by petitioner. The lack of a valid marriage license cannot be attributed
to him, as it was Gloria who took steps to procure the same. The law must be applied. As the
marriage license, a formal requisite, is clearly absent, the marriage of Gloria and Syed is void ab
initio.

The petition is therefore granted.

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Persons and Family Relation

MARRIAGES EXEMPT FROM MARRIAGE LICENSE REQUIREMENT

HERMINIA BORJA-MANZANO vs. JUDGE ROQUE R. SANCHEZ
A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329 March 8, 2001

Facts:
Herminia Borja-Manzano avers that she was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano,

having been married to him on 21 May 1966 in San Gabriel Archangel Parish, Araneta Avenue,
Caloocan City. Four children were born out of that marriage. On 22 March 1993, however, her
husband contracted another marriage with one Luzviminda Payao before respondent Judge. When
respondent Judge solemnized said marriage, he knew or ought to know that the same was void and
bigamous, as the marriage contract clearly stated that both contracting parties were ―separated.‖ For

this act, complainant Herminia Borja-Manzano charges respondent Judge with gross ignorance of
the law in a sworn Complaint-Affidavit filed with the Office of the Court Administrator on 12 May
1999.

After an evaluation of the Complaint and the Comment, the Court Administrator
recommended that respondent Judge be found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and be ordered
to pay a fine of P2,000.00, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt
with more severely.

Respondent Judge filed a Manifestation reiterating his plea for the dismissal of the
complaint.

Issue:
Whether or not the Respondent Judge is guilty of gross ignorance of the law?

Ruling:
Respondent Judge knew or ought to know that a subsisting previous marriage is a diriment

impediment, which would make the subsequent marriage null and void. In fact, in his Comment, he
stated that had he known that the late Manzano was married he would have discouraged him from
contracting another marriage. And respondent Judge cannot deny knowledge of Manzano‘s and
Payao‘s subsisting previous marriage, as the same was clearly stated in their separate affidavits which
were subscribed and sworn to before him.

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Clearly, respondent Judge demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when he solemnized a
void and bigamous marriage. The maxim ―ignorance of the law excuses no one‖ has special
application to judges, who, under Rule 1.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, should be the
embodiment of competence, integrity, and independence. It is highly imperative that judges be
conversant with the law and basic legal principles. And when the law transgressed is simple and
elementary, the failure to know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.

The recommendation of the Court Administrator is hereby ADOPTED,with
theMODIFICATIONthat the amount of fine to be imposed upon respondent Judge Roque
Sanchez is increased to P20,000.00.

.

MARRIAGES EXEMPT FROM MARRIAGE LICENSE REQUIREMENT

ENGRACE NIÑAL vs. NORMA BAYADOG March 14, 2000
G.R. No. 133778

Facts:
Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of their

marriage were born herein petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her death on April
24, 1985. One year and 8 months thereafter or on December 11, 1986, Pepito and respondent
Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma
executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived together as husband and
wife for at least five years and were thus exempt from securing a marriage license. On February 19,
1997, Pepito died in a car accident. After their father's death, petitioners filed a petition for
declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for
lack of a marriage license. The case was filed under the assumption that the validity or invalidity of
the second marriage would affect petitioner's successional rights. Norma filed a motion to dismiss
on the ground that petitioners have no cause of action since they are not among the persons who
could file an action for "annulment of marriage" under Article 47 of the Family Code.

Issues:

a) Whether or not the second marriage is covered by the exception to the requirement of a
Marriage license?

b) Whether or not the petitioners have the personality to file a petition to declare their father‘s
marriage void after his death?

Ruling:
The second marriage involved in this case is not covered by the exception to the

requirement of a marriage license, it is void ab initio because of the absence of such element. In this
case, at the time of Pepito and respondent's marriage, it cannot be said that they have lived with
each other as husband and wife for at least five years prior to their wedding day. From the time
Pepito's first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with respondent, only about twenty
months had elapsed. Even assuming that Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, and
thereafter both Pepito and respondent had started living with each other that has already lasted for

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five years, the fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation
contemplated by law. It should be in the nature of a perfect union that is valid under the law but
rendered imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract. Pepito had a subsisting marriage at
the time when he started cohabiting with respondent. It is immaterial that when they lived with each
other, Pepito had already been separated in fact from his lawful spouse. The subsistence of the
marriage even where there was actual severance of the filial companionship between the spouses
cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being one as "husband and
wife".Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any proper interested party may attack
a void marriage. Void marriages have no legal effects except those declared by law concerning the
properties of the alleged spouses, regarding co-ownership or ownership through actual joint
contribution,and its effect on the children born to such void marriages as provided in Article 50 in
relation to Article 43 and 44 as well as Article 51, 53 and 54 of the Family Code. On the contrary,
the property regime governing voidable marriages is generally conjugal partnership and the children
conceived before its annulment is legitimate.

MARRIAGES EXEMPT FROM MARRIAGE LICENSE REQUIREMENT

JUVY N. COSCA vs. HON. LUCIO P. PALAYPAYON, JR.
A.M. No. MTJ-92-721 September 30, 1994

Facts:
In an administrative complaint filed with the Office of the Court Administrator on October

5, 1992, herein respondents were charged with the following offenses, to wit: (1) illegal
solemnization of marriage; (2) falsification of the monthly reports of cases; (3) bribery in
consideration of an appointment in the court; (4) non-issuance of receipt for cash bond received; (5)
infidelity in the custody of detained prisoners; and (6) requiring payment of filing fees from
exempted entities.

Complainants allege that respondent judge solemnized marriages even without the requisite
marriage license. Thus, these couples were able to get married by the simple expedient of paying the
marriage fees to respondent Baroy, despite the absence of a marriage license. It is alleged that
respondent judge made it appear that he solemnized seven (7) marriages in the month of July, 1992,
when in truth he did not do so or at most those marriages were null and void; that respondents
likewise made it appear that they have notarized only six (6) documents for July, 1992, but the
Notarial Register will show that there were one hundred thirteen (113) documents which were
notarized during that month; and that respondents reported a notarial fee of only P18.50 for each
document, although in fact they collected P20.00 therefor and failed to account for the difference.
Complainants allege that because of the retirement of the clerk of court, respondent judge
forwarded to the Supreme Court the applications of Rodel Abogado, Ramon Sambo, and Jessell
Abiog. However, they were surprised when respondent Baroy reported for duty as clerk of court on
October 21, 1991. They later found out that respondent Baroy was the one appointed because she
gave a brand-new air-conditioning unit to respondent judge. Finally, respondents are charged with
collecting docket fees from the Rural Bank of Tinambac, Camarines Sur, Inc. although such entity is
exempt by law from the payment of said fees, and that while the corresponding receipt was issued,
respondent Baroy failed to remit the amount to the Supreme Court and, instead, she deposited the

same in her personal account.

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Persons and Family Relation

Issue:
Whether or not the Respondent Judge and the clerk of court were responsible of the

complaints charged?

Ruling:
The conduct and behavior of everyone connected with an office charged with the

dispensation of justice, from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk, should be circumscribed with
the heavy burden of responsibility. His conduct, at all times, must not only be characterized by
propriety and decorum but, above all else, must be beyond suspicion. Every employee should be an
example of integrity, uprightness and honesty.Integrity in a judicial office is more than a virtue, it is a
necessity. It applies, without qualification as to rank or position, from the judge to the least of its
personnel, they being standard-bearers of the exacting norms of ethics and morality imposed upon a
Court of justice.

On the charge regarding illegal marriages the Family Code pertinently provides that the
formal requisites of marriage are, inter alia, a valid marriage license except in the cases provided for
therein. Complementarily, it declares that the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites
shall generally render the marriage void ab initio and that, while an irregularity in the formal
requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage, the party or parties responsible for the
irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable.

The Court hereby imposes a FINE of P20,000.00 on respondent Judge Lucio P. Palaypayon.
Jr., with a stern warning that any repetition of the same or similar offenses in the future will
definitely be severely dealt with. Respondent Nelia Esmeralda-Baroy is hereby dismissed from the
service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and with prejudice to employment in any branch,
agency or instrumentality of the Government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations.

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Persons and Family Relation

MARRIAGE CEREMONY

LUCIO MORIGO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 145226 February 6, 2004

Facts:
Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were board mates at the house of Catalina Tortor at

Tagbilaran City, Province of Bohol, for a period of four (4) years (from 1974-1978). After school
year 1977-78, LucioMorigo and Lucia Barrete lost contact with each other. In 1984, LucioMorigo
was surprised to receive a card from Lucia Barrete from Singapore. The former replied and after an
exchange of letters, they became sweethearts. In 1986, Lucia returned to the Philippines but left
again for Canada to work there. While in Canada, they maintained constant communication. In
1990, Lucia came back to the Philippines and proposed to petition appellant to join her in Canada.
Both agreed to get married, thus they were married on August 30, 1990 at the Iglesia de Filipina
Nacional at Catagdaan, Pilar, Bohol. On September 8, 1990, Lucia reported back to her work in
Canada leaving appellant Lucio behind. On August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario Court a
petition for divorce against appellant which was granted by the court on January 17, 1992 and to
take effect on February 17, 1992. On October 4, 1992, appellant Lucio Morigo married Maria
Jececha Lumbago at the Virgensa Barangay Parish, Tagbilaran City, Bohol.

On September 21, 1993, accused filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of
marriage in the Regional Trial Court of Bohol to seek the declaration of nullity of accused‘s marriage
with Lucia, on the ground that no marriage ceremony actually took place. On October 19, 1993,
appellant was charged with Bigamy in the Information filed by the City Prosecutor of Tagbilaran
City, with the Regional Trial Court of Bohol. The RTC of Bohol rendered a decision finding Lucio
Morigo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy. Meanwhile, on October 23, 1997, or while CA-
G.R. CR No. 20700 was pending before the appellate court, the trial court rendered a decision in
Civil Case No. 6020 declaring the marriage between Lucio and Lucia void ab initio since no marriage

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ceremony actually took place. No appeal was taken from this decision, which then became final and
executory. The Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the RTC decision on the criminal case.

Issue:
Whether or not Lucio Morigo is guilty of bigamy?

Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that there was no actual marriage ceremony performed between

Lucio and Lucia by a solemnizing officer. Instead, what transpired was a mere signing of the
marriage contract by the two, without the presence of a solemnizing officer. The trial court thus held
that the marriage is void ab initio, in accordance with Articles 3 and 4 of the Family Code. As the
dissenting opinion in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, correctly puts it, "This simply means that there was
no marriage to begin with; and that such declaration of nullity retroacts to the date of the first
marriage. In other words, for all intents and purposes, reckoned from the date of the declaration of
the first marriage as void ab initio to the date of the celebration of the first marriage, the accused
was, under the eyes of the law, never married."

The records show that no appeal was taken from the decision of the trial court in Civil Case
No. 6020, hence, the decision had long become final and executory. The first element of bigamy as a
crime requires that the accused must have been legally married. But in this case, legally speaking, the
petitioner was never married to Lucia Barrete. Thus, there is no first marriage to speak of. Under the
principle of retroactivity of a marriage being declared void ab initio, the two were never married
"from the beginning." The contract of marriage is null; it bears no legal effect. Taking this argument
to its logical conclusion, for legal purposes, petitioner was not married to Lucia at the time he
contracted the marriage with Maria Jececha. The existence and the validity of the first marriage being
an essential element of the crime of bigamy, it is but logical that a conviction for said offense cannot
be sustained where there is no first marriage to speak of. The petitioner, must, perforce be acquitted
of the instant charge.

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Persons and Family Relation

THREE-FOLD LIABILITY

MARILOU NAMA MORENO vs. JUDGE JOSE C. BERNABE

A.M. No. MJT-94-963 July 14, 1995

Facts:
On October 4, 1993, Marilou and Marcelo Moreno were married before respondent Judge

Bernabe. Marilou avers that Respondent Judge assured her that the marriage contract will be
released ten (10) days after October 4, 1993. Complainant then visited the office of the Respondent
Judge on October 15, 1993 only to find out that she could not get the marriage contract because the
Office of the Local Civil Registrar failed to issue a marriage license. She claims that Respondent
Judge connived with the relatives of Marcelo Moreno to deceive her.

In his comment,Respondent denied that he conspired with the relatives of Marcelo Moreno
to solemnize the marriage for the purpose of deceiving the complainant.The Respondent Judge
contends that he did not violate the law nor did he have the slightest intention to violate the law
when he, in good faith, solemnized the marriage, as he was moved only by a desire to help a begging
and pleading complainant who wanted some kind of assurance or security due to her pregnant
condition. In order to pacify complainant, Marcelo Moreno requested him to perform the marriage
ceremony, with the express assurance that "the marriage license was definitely forthcoming since the
necessary documents were complete.

In its Memorandum dated January 17, 1995, the Office of the Court Administrator
recommended that Respondent be held liable for misconduct for solemnizing a marriage without a
marriage license and that the appropriate administrative sanctions be imposed against him.

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Persons and Family Relation

Issue:
Whether or not the Respondent Judge is guilty of grave misconduct and gross ignorance of

the law by solemnizing the marriage without the required marriage license?

Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that Respondent Judge, by his own admission that he solemnized

the marriage between complainant and Marcelo Moreno without the required marriage license, has
dismally failed to live up to his commitment to be the "embodiment of competence, integrity and
independence"and to his promise to be "faithful to the law."

Respondent cannot hide behind his claim of good faith and Christian motives which, at
most, would serve only to mitigate his liability but not exonerate him completely. Good intentions
could never justify violation of the law. Respondent is hereby ordered to pay a fine of P10,000.00
and is sternly warned that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

THREE-FOLD LIABILITY

RODOLFO NAVARRO vs. JUDGE HERNANDO C. DOMAGTAY

A.M. No. MJT-96-1088 July 19, 1996

Facts:
On September 27, 1994, respondent judge solemnized the wedding between Gaspar A.

Tagadan and Arlyn F. Borga, despite the knowledge that the groom is merely separated from his first
wife. It is also alleged that he performed a marriage ceremony between FlorianoDadorSumaylo and
Gemma G. del Rosario outside his court's jurisdiction on October 27, 1994. Respondent judge holds
office and has jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta. Monica-Burgos, Surigaodel
Norte. The wedding was solemnized at the respondent judge's residence in the municipality of
Dapa, which does not fall within his jurisdictional area of the municipalities of Sta. Monica and
Burgos, located some 40 to 45 kilometers away from the municipality of Dapa, Surigaodel Norte.

Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigaodel Norte, Rodolfo G. Navarro filed a complaint
respondent Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge Hernando Domagtoy for exhibiting gross
misconduct as well as inefficiency in office and ignorance of the law.

Issue:
Whether or not Respondent Judge is guilty of gross misconduct, as well as inefficiency in

office and ignorance of the law?

Ruling:

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The Supreme Court finds respondent to have acted in gross ignorance of the law. The legal
principles applicable in the cases brought to our attention are elementary and uncomplicated;
prompting us to conclude that respondent's failure to apply them is due to a lack of comprehension
of the law. The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not experts, are at least, proficient
in the law they are sworn to apply, more than the ordinary laymen. They should be skilled and
competent in understanding and applying the law. It is imperative that they be conversant with basic
legal principles like the ones involved in instant case. It is not too much to expect them to know and
apply the law intelligently. Otherwise, the system of justice rests on a shaky foundation indeed,
compounded by the errors committed by those not learned in the law. While magistrates may at
times make mistakes in judgment, for which they are not penalized, the respondent judge exhibited
ignorance of elementary provisions of law, in an area which has greatly prejudiced the status of
married persons.

The marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and ArlynBorga is considered bigamous and void,
there being a subsisting marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Ida Peñaranda. The Office of the
Court Administrator recommends, in its Memorandum to the Court, a six-month suspension and a
stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
Considering that one of the marriages in question resulted in a bigamous union and therefore void,
and the other lacked the necessary authority of respondent judge, the Court adopts said
recommendation. Respondent is advised to be more circumspect in applying the law and to cultivate
a deeper understanding of the law.

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Persons and Family Relation

MARRIAGE CERTIFICATE

TOMASA VDA. DE JACOB vs. COURT OF APPEALS ET AL.

G.R. No. 135216 August 19, 1999

Facts:

Tomasa Vda. de Jacob claimed to be the surviving spouse of deceased Dr. Alfredo E. Jacob
and was appointed Special Administratix for the various estates of the deceased by virtue of a
reconstructed Marriage Contract between herself and the deceased. Defendant-appellee on the other
hand, claimed to be the legally-adopted son of Alfredo. In support of his claim, he presented an
Order dated 18 July 1961 issued by then Presiding Judge Jose L. Moya, CFI, Camarines Sur, granting
the petition for adoption filed by deceased Alfredo in favor of Pedro Pilapil. During the proceedings
for the settlement of the estate of the deceased Alfredo, the defendant-appellee Pedro sought to
intervene therein claiming his share of the deceased‘s estate as Alfredo's adopted son and as his sole
surviving heir. Pedro questioned the validity of the marriage between appellant Tomasa and his
adoptive father Alfredo. Appellant Tomasa opposed the Motion for Intervention and filed a
complaint for injunction with damages questioning appellee's claim as the legal heir of Alfredo. The
Regional Trial Court rendered a decision in favor of Pedro Pilapil and against TomasaGuison. Such
decision was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals.

Issues:

a) Whether or not the marriage between the plaintiff TomasaVda. De Jacob and deceased
Alfredo E. Jacob was valid?

b) Whether or not defendant Pedro Pilapil is the legally adopted son of Alfredo E. Jacob?

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Ruling:

The Supreme Court held that the existence of a valid marriage is established. It has been
established that Dr. Jacob and petitioner lived together as husband and wife for at least five years.
An affidavit to this effect was executed by Dr. Jacob and petitioner. Clearly then, the marriage was
exceptional in character and did not require a marriage license under Article 76 of the Civil
Code.The Civil Code governs this case, because the questioned marriage and the assailed adoption
took place prior the effectivity of the Family Code.

On the second issue some considerations cast doubt on the claim of respondent. The alleged
Order was purportedly made in open court. In his Deposition, however, Judge Moya declared that
he did not dictate decisions in adoption cases. The only decisions he made in open court were
criminal cases, in which the accused pleaded guilty.Moreover, Judge Moya insisted that the branch
where he was assigned was always indicated in his decisions and orders; yet the questioned Order
did not contain this information. Furthermore, Pilapil‘s conduct gave no indication that he
recognized his own alleged adoption, as shown by the documents that he signed and other acts that
he performed thereafter. In the same vein, no proof was presented that Dr. Jacob had treated him as
an adopted child. Likewise, both the Bureau of Records Management in Manila and the Office of
the Local Civil Registrar of Tigaon, Camarines Sur, issued Certifications that there was no record
that Pedro Pilapil had been adopted by Dr. Jacob. Taken together, these circumstances inexorably
negate the alleged adoption of respondent. The burden of proof in establishing adoption is upon the
person claiming such relationship. This Respondent Pilapil failed to do. Moreover, the evidence
presented by petitioner shows that the alleged adoption is a sham.

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Persons and Family Relation

FOREIGN DIVORCE

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CRASUS L. IYOY

G.R. No. 152577 September 21, 2005

Facts:

Respondent Crasus married Fely on 16 December 1961 at Bradford Memorial Church, Jones
Avenue, Cebu City. As a result of their union, they had five children – Crasus, Jr., Daphne, Debbie,
Calvert, and Carlos – who are now all of legal ages. After the celebration of their marriage,
respondent Crasus discovered that Fely was "hot-tempered, a nagger and extravagant." In 1984, Fely
left the Philippines for the United States of America (U.S.A.), leaving all of their five children, the
youngest then being only six years old, to the care of respondent Crasus. Barely a year after Fely left
for the U.S.A., respondent Crasus received a letter from her requesting that he sign the enclosed
divorce papers; he disregarded the said request. Sometime in 1985, respondent Crasus learned,
through the letters sent by Fely to their children, that Fely got married to an American, with whom
she eventually had a child. In 1987, Fely came back to the Philippines with her American family,
staying at Cebu Plaza Hotel in Cebu City. Respondent Crasus did not bother to talk to Fely because
he was afraid he might not be able to bear the sorrow and the pain she had caused him. Fely
returned to the Philippines several times more: in 1990, for the wedding of their eldest child, Crasus,
Jr.; in 1992, for the brain operation of their fourth child, Calvert; and in 1995, for unknown reasons.
Fely continued to live with her American family in New Jersey, U.S.A. She had been openly using
the surname of her American husband in the Philippines and in the U.S.A. For the wedding of
Crasus, Jr., Fely herself had invitations made in which she was named as "Mrs. Fely Ada Micklus."
At the time the Complaint was filed, it had been 13 years since Fely left and abandoned respondent

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Crasus, and there was no more possibility of reconciliation between them. Respondent Crasus finally
alleged in his Complaint that Fely‘s acts brought danger and dishonor to the family, and clearly
demonstrated her psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage. Such
incapacity, being incurable and continuing, constitutes a ground for declaration of nullity of marriage
under Article 36, in relation to Articles 68, 70, and 72, of the Family Code.

On 30 October 1998, the RTC promulgated its Judgment declaring the marriage of
respondent Crasus and Fely null and void ab initio. The Court of Appeals rendered its decision
affirming the trial court‘s declaration of the nullity of the marriage of the parties.

Issues:
a) Whether or not the totality of evidence presented during trial is insufficient to support the
finding of psychological incapacity of Fely?
b) Whether or not Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines is applicable to
the case at bar?

Ruling:

The only substantial evidence presented by respondent Crasus before the RTC was his
testimony, which can be easily put into question for being self-serving, in the absence of any other
corroborating evidence. He submitted only two other pieces of evidence: (1) the Certification on the
recording with the Register of Deeds of the Marriage Contract between respondent Crasus and Fely,
such marriage being celebrated on 16 December 1961; and (2) the invitation to the wedding of
Crasus, Jr., their eldest son, in which Fely used her American husband‘s surname. Even considering
the admissions made by Fely herself in her Answer to respondent Crasus‘s Complaint filed with the
RTC, the evidence is not enough to convince this Court that Fely had such a grave mental illness
that prevented her from assuming the essential obligations of marriage.

As it is worded, Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a special situation wherein one of the
couple getting married is a Filipino citizen and the other a foreigner at the time the marriage was
celebrated. By its plain and literal interpretation, the said provision cannot be applied to the case of
respondent Crasus and his wife Fely because at the time Fely obtained her divorce, she was still a
Filipino citizen. Although the exact date was not established, Fely herself admitted in her Answer
filed before the RTC that she obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus sometime after she left for
the United States in 1984, after which she married her American husband in 1985. In the same
Answer, she alleged that she had been an American citizen since 1988. At the time she filed for
divorce, Fely was still a Filipino citizen, and pursuant to the nationality principle embodied in Article
15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, she was still bound by Philippine laws on family rights and
duties, status, condition, and legal capacity, even when she was already living abroad. Philippine laws,
then and even until now, do not allow and recognize divorce between Filipino spouses. Thus, Fely
could not have validly obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus.

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FOREIGN DIVORCE

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III

G.R. No. 154380 October 5, 2005

Facts:

On May 24, 1981, CiprianoOrbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United
Church of Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage was blessed with a son
and a daughter, KristofferSimbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido. In 1986,
Cipriano‘s wife left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years later,
Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen. Sometime in 2000,
Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree and then married a certain
Innocent Stanley.

Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit in the petition,
the court granted the same. The Republic, herein petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), sought reconsideration but it was denied.

Issue:
Whether or not CiprianoOrbecido III can remarry under Article 26 of the Family Code?

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Ruling:

The Supreme Court held that for his plea to prosper, respondent herein must prove his
allegation that his wife was naturalized as an American citizen. Likewise, before a foreign divorce
decree can be recognized by our own courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact
and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. Such foreign law must also be proved
as our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other fact, such laws must be
alleged and proved. Furthermore, respondent must also show that the divorce decree allows his
former wife to remarry as specifically required in Article 26. Otherwise, there would be no evidence
sufficient to declare that he is capacitated to enter into another marriage. Nevertheless, we are
unanimous in our holding that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code (E.O. No. 209, as
amended by E.O. No. 227), should be interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen, who has been divorced
by a spouse who had acquired foreign citizenship and remarried, also to remarry. However,
considering that in the present petition there is no sufficient evidence submitted and on record, we
are unable to declare, based on respondent‘s bare allegations that his wife, who was naturalized as an
American citizen, had obtained a divorce decree and had remarried an American, that respondent is
now capacitated to remarry. Such declaration could only be made properly upon respondent‘s
submission of the aforecited evidence in his favor.

EFFECTS OF FOREIGN DIVORCE

ALICE REYES VAN DORN vs. HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR.

G.R. No. L-68470 October 8, 1985

Facts:

The petitioner is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent is a citizen of the

United States; that they were married in Hongkong in 1972; that, after the marriage, they established
their residence in the Philippines; that they begot two children born on April 4, 1973 and December
18, 1975, respectively; that the parties were divorced in Nevada, United States, in 1982; and that
petitioner has re-married also in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn.

Dated June 8, 1983, private respondent filed suit against petitioner in Civil Case No. 1075-P
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch CXV, in Pasay City, stating that petitioner's business in Ermita,
Manila, (the Galleon Shop, for short), is conjugal property of the parties, and asking that petitioner
be ordered to render an accounting of that business, and that private respondent be declared with
right to manage the conjugal property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the
cause of action is barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court
wherein respondent had acknowledged that he and petitioner had "no community property" as of

June 11, 1982. The Court below denied the Motion to Dismiss in the mentioned case on the ground
that the property involved is located in the Philippines so that the Divorce Decree has no bearing in
the case. The denial is now the subject of this certiorari proceeding.

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Issue:
Whether or not the divorce decree affected the property regime of the parties?

Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer

the husband of petitioner. The case involved a marriage between a foreigner and his Filipino wife,
which marriage was subsequently dissolved through a divorce obtained abroad by the latter.
Claiming that the divorce was not valid under Philippine law, the alien spouse alleged that his
interest in the properties from their conjugal partnership should be protected. The Court, however,
recognized the validity of the divorce and held that the alien spouse had no interest in the properties
acquired by the Filipino wife after the divorce.

To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be
considered still married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article
109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with,
observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should not
continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be
discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.

EFFECTS OF FOREIGN DIVORCE

EDGAR SAN LUIS vs. FELICIDAD SAN LUIS

G.R. No. 133743 February 6, 2007

Facts:
The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis, who was the

former governor of the Province of Laguna. During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three
marriages. His first marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were born six
children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita and Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia
predeceased Felicisimo.

Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a
son, Tobias. However, on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a Complaint for
Divorce before the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii, United States of America
(U.S.A.), which issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child Custody on
December 14, 1973. On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis, then
surnamed Sagalongos, before Rev. Fr. William Meyer, Minister of the United Presbyterian at
Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. He had no children with respondent but lived

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with her for 18 years from the time of their marriage up to his death on December 18, 1992.
Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the settlement
of Felicisimo‘s estate. On December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for letters of administration before
the Regional Trial Court of Makati City. Respondent alleged that she is the widow of Felicisimo;
that, at the time of his death, the decedent was residing at 100 San Juanico Street, New Alabang
Village, Alabang, Metro Manila; that the decedent‘s surviving heirs are respondent as legal spouse,
his six children by his first marriage, and son by his second marriage; that the decedent left real
properties, both conjugal and exclusive, valued at P30,304,178.00 more or less; that the decedent
does not have any unpaid debts. Respondent prayed that the conjugal partnership assets be
liquidated and that letters of administration be issued to her. On February 4, 1994, petitioner
Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children of Felicisimo by his first marriage, filed a motion to dismiss
on the grounds of improper venue and failure to state a cause of action. Rodolfo claimed that the
petition for letters of administration should have been filed in the Province of Laguna because this
was Felicisimo‘s place of residence prior to his death. He further claimed that respondent has no
legal personality to file the petition because she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at
the time of his death, was still legally married to Merry Lee. On February 15, 1994, Linda invoked
the same grounds and joined her brother Rodolfo in seeking the dismissal of the petition. On
February 28, 1994, the trial court issued an Order denying the two motions to dismiss.

On September 12, 1995, the trial court dismissed the petition for letters of administration. It
held that, at the time of his death, Felicisimo was the duly elected governor and a resident of the
Province of Laguna. Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside the
orders of the trial court in its assailed Decision dated February 4, 1998

Issues:
a) Whether or not the venue was properly laid in the case
b) Whether or not respondent Felicidad has legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters
of administration?

Ruling:
The Supreme Court finds that Felicisimo was a resident of Alabang, Muntinlupa for

purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate. Consequently, the subject petition for
letters of administration was validly filed in the Regional Trial Court which has territorial jurisdiction
over Alabang, Muntinlupa. The subject petition was filed on December 17, 1993. At that time,
Muntinlupa was still a municipality and the branches of the Regional Trial Court of the National
Capital Judicial Region which had territorial jurisdiction over Muntinlupa were then seated in Makati
City as per Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 3. Thus, the subject petition was validly filed
before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City.

On the second issue, the Supreme Court held that respondent would qualify as an interested
person who has a direct interest in the estate of Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation, the
existence of which was not denied by petitioners. If she proves the validity of the divorce and

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Felicisimo‘s capacity to remarry, but fails to prove that her marriage with him was validly performed
under the laws of the U.S.A., then she may be considered as a co-owner under Article 144 of the
Civil Code. This provision governs the property relations between parties who live together as
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void from the beginning. It
provides that the property acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry or their
wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. In a co-ownership, it is not
necessary that the property be acquired through their joint labor, efforts and industry. Any property
acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts.
Hence, the portions belonging to the co-owners shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary is
proven. The case therefore is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings on the evidence to
prove the validity of the divorce between Felicisimo and Merry Lee.

ACTION FOR RECOGNITION AND PROOF

GERBERT R. CORPUZ vs. DAISYLYN TINOL STO. TOMAS

G.R. No. 186571 August 11, 2010

Facts:

Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship through
naturalization on November 29, 2000. On January 18, 2005, Gerbert married respondent Daisylyn
T. Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City. Due to work and other professional commitments, Gerbert
left for Canada soon after the wedding. He returned to the Philippines sometime in April 2005 to
surprise Daisylyn, but was shocked to discover that his wife was having an affair with another man.
Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert returned to Canada and filed a petition for divorce. The Superior
Court of Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada granted Gerbert‘s petition for divorce on December 8,
2005. The divorce decree took effect a month later, on January 8, 2006. Two years after the divorce,
Gerbert has moved on and has found another Filipina to love. Desirous of marrying his new Filipina
fiancée in the Philippines, Gerbert went to the Pasig City Civil Registry Office and registered the
Canadian divorce decree on his and Daisylyn‘s marriage certificate. Despite the registration of the
divorce decree, an official of the National Statistics Office (NSO) informed Gerbert that the
marriage between him and Daisylyn still subsists under Philippine law; to be enforceable, the foreign

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divorce decree must first be judicially recognized by a competent Philippine court, pursuant to NSO
Circular No. 4, series of 1982.

Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or
declaration of marriage as dissolved (petition) with the RTC. Although summoned, Daisylyn did not
file any responsive pleading but submitted instead a notarized letter/manifestation to the trial court.
She offered no opposition to Gerbert‘s petition and, in fact, alleged her desire to file a similar case
herself but was prevented by financial and personal circumstances. She, thus, requested that she be
considered as a party-in-interest with a similar prayer to Gerbert‘s. In its October 30, 2008 decision,
the RTC denied Gerbert‘s petition. The RTC concluded that Gerbert was not the proper party to
institute the action for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree as he is a naturalized
Canadian citizen. It ruled that only the Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy, under the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, in order for him or her to be able to remarry under
Philippine law.

Issue:
Whether or not the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code extends to aliens the

right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign divorce decree?

Ruling:

The Supreme Court qualifies its conclusion that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens – with the complementary statement that this
conclusion is not sufficient basis to dismiss Gerbert‘s petition before the RTC. In other words, the
unavailability of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not necessarily
strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce decree.
The foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the alien‘s national law
have been duly proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of right
in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides for the
effect of foreign judgments.

In Gerbert‘s case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien,
recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to be official acts of a sovereign
authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court comes into play. This Section requires proof,
either by (1) official publications or (2) copies attested by the officer having legal custody of the
documents. If the copies of official records are not kept in the Philippines, these must be (a)
accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine
Foreign Service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by
the seal of his office. The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of the divorce
decree, as well as the required certificates proving its authenticity, but failed to include a copy of the
Canadian law on divorce. Under this situation, we can, at this point, simply dismiss the petition for

insufficiency of supporting evidence, unless we deem it more appropriate to remand the case to the
RTC to determine whether the divorce decree is consistent with the Canadian divorce law. The
petition was granted and the case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.

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ACTION FOR RECOGNITION AND PROOF

GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO vs. REDERICK A. RECIO

G.R. No. 138322 October 2, 2001

Facts:
Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in

Malabon, Rizal, on March 1, 1987.They lived together as husband and wife in Australia. On May 18,
1989, a decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving the marriage, was issued by an Australian family
court. On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen, as shown by a "Certificate of
Australian Citizenship" issued by the Australian government. Petitioner – a Filipina – and
respondent were married on January 12, 1994 in Our Lady of Perpetual Help Church in Cabanatuan
City.In their application for a marriage license, respondent was declared as "single" and "Filipino."
Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived separately without prior judicial
dissolution of their marriage. While the two were still in Australia, their conjugal assets were divided
on May 16, 1996, in accordance with their Statutory Declarations secured in Australia.

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On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage in the
court a quo, on the ground of bigamy – respondent allegedly had a prior subsisting marriage at the
time he married her on January 12, 1994. She claimed that she learned of respondent's marriage to
Editha Samson only in November, 1997.The trial court declared the marriage dissolved on the
ground that the divorce issued in Australia was valid and recognized in the Philippines. It deemed
the marriage ended, but not on the basis of any defect in an essential element of the marriage; that is,
respondent's alleged lack of legal capacity to remarry. Rather, it based its Decision on the divorce
decree obtained by respondent. The Australian divorce had ended the marriage; thus, there was no
more martial union to nullify or annual.

Issues:
a) Whether or not the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson was proven?
b) Whether or not the respondent was proven to be legally capacitated to marry petitioner?

Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that the divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson

appears to be an authentic one issued by an Australian family court.However, appearance is not
sufficient; compliance with the aforemetioned rules on evidence must be demonstrated. Fortunately
for respondent's cause, when the divorce decree of May 18, 1989 was submitted in evidence, counsel
for petitioner objected, not to its admissibility, but only to the fact that it had not been registered in
the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City.The trial court ruled that it was admissible, subject to
petitioner's qualification.Hence, it was admitted in evidence and accorded weight by the judge.
Indeed, petitioner's failure to object properly rendered the divorce decree admissible as a written act
of the Family Court of Sydney, Australia. Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the
Family Code is not necessary; respondent was no longer bound by Philippine personal laws after he
acquired Australian citizenship in 1992.Naturalization is the legal act of adopting an alien and
clothing him with the political and civil rights belonging to a citizen. Naturalized citizens, freed from
the protective cloak of their former states, don the attires of their adoptive countries. By becoming
an Australian, respondent severed his allegiance to the Philippines and the vinculum juris that had tied
him to Philippine personal laws.

On the second issue, the Supreme Court held that there is absolutely no evidence that
proves respondent's legal capacity to marry petitioner. A review of the records before this Court
shows that only the following exhibits were presented before the lower court: (1) for petitioner: (a)
Exhibit "A" – Complaint;(b) Exhibit "B" – Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick A. Recio
(Filipino-Australian) and Grace J. Garcia (Filipino) on January 12, 1994 in Cabanatuan City, Nueva
Ecija;(c) Exhibit "C" – Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick A. Recio (Filipino) and Editha D.
Samson (Australian) on March 1, 1987 in Malabon, Metro Manila;(d) Exhibit "D" – Office of the
City Registrar of Cabanatuan City Certification that no information of annulment between Rederick

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A. Recio and Editha D. Samson was in its records;and (e) Exhibit "E" – Certificate of Australian
Citizenship of Rederick A. Recio;(2) for respondent: (Exhibit "1" – Amended Answer;(b) Exhibit
"S" – Family Law Act 1975 Decree Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage in the Family Court of
Australia;(c) Exhibit "3" – Certificate of Australian Citizenship of Rederick A. Recio;(d) Exhibit "4"
– Decree Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage in the Family Court of Australia Certificate;and Exhibit
"5" – Statutory Declaration of the Legal Separation Between Rederick A. Recio and Grace J. Garcia
Recio since October 22, 1995. Based on the records, the Supreme Court cannot conclude that
respondent, who was then a naturalized Australian citizen, was legally capacitated to marry petitioner
on January 12, 1994. The Court agrees with petitioner's contention that the court a quo erred in
finding that the divorce decree ipso facto clothed respondent with the legal capacity to remarry
without requiring him to adduce sufficient evidence to show the Australian personal law governing
his status; or at the very least, to prove his legal capacity to contract the second marriage. The case is
thus remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.

NO MARRIAGE LICENSE

LUPO ALMODIEL ATIENZA vs. JUDGE FRANCISCO F. BRILLANTES, JR.

A.M. No. MTJ-92-706 March 29, 1995

Facts:
Complainant alleges that he has two children with Yolanda De Castro, who are living

together at No. 34 Galaxy Street, Bel-Air Subdivision, Makati, Metro Manila. In December 1991,
upon opening the door to his bedroom, he saw respondent sleeping on his (complainant's) bed.
Thereafter, respondent prevented him from visiting his children and even alienated the affection of
his children for him. Complainant claims that respondent is married to one Zenaida Ongkiko with
whom he has five children, as appearing in his 1986 and 1991 sworn statements of assets and
liabilities.

For his part, respondent alleges that complainant was not married to De Castro and that the
filing of the administrative action was related to complainant's claim on the Bel-Air residence, which

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was disputed by De Castro. Respondent also denies having been married to Ongkiko, although he
admits having five children with her. He alleges that while he and Ongkiko went through a marriage
ceremony before a Nueva Ecija town mayor on April 25, 1965, the same was not a valid marriage
for lack of a marriage license. Upon the request of the parents of Ongkiko, respondent went
through another marriage ceremony with her in Manila on June 5, 1965. Again, neither party applied
for a marriage license. Ongkiko abandoned respondent 17 years ago, leaving their children to his
care and custody as a single parent.

Respondent claims that when he married De Castro in civil rites in Los Angeles, California
on December 4, 1991, he believed, in all good faith and for all legal intents and purposes, that he
was single because his first marriage was solemnized without a license.

Issue:
Whether or not Article 40 of the Family Code apply to respondent considering that his first

marriage took place in 1965 and was governed by the Civil Code of the Philippines; while the second
marriage took place in 1991 and governed by the Family Code.

Ruling:
Under the Family Code, there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous

marriage before a party thereto can enter into a second marriage. Article 40 of said Code provides:
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for the purposes of remarriage on the
basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.

Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the effectivity of the Family Code on
August 3, 1988 regardless of the date of the first marriage. Besides, under Article 256 of the Family
Code, said Article is given "retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or
acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws." This is particularly true with Article
40, which is a rule of procedure. Respondent has not shown any vested right that was impaired by
the application of Article 40 to his case. The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the
litigants' rights may not preclude their retroactive application to pending actions. Respondent made a
mockery of the institution of marriage and employed deceit to be able to cohabit with a woman,
who beget him five children. Respondent passed the Bar examinations in 1962 and was admitted to
the practice of law in 1963. It is evident that respondent failed to meet the standard of moral fitness
for membership in the legal profession.

The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of a whiff of
impropriety, not only with respect to his performance of his judicial duties but also as to his
behavior as a private individual. There is no duality of morality. A public figure is also judged by his
private life. A judge, in order to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the
judiciary, must behave with propriety at all times, in the performance of his judicial duties and in his
everyday life. These are judicial guideposts too self-evident to be overlooked. No position exacts a
greater demand on moral righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a seat in the judiciary.

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BIGAMOUS/POLYGAMOUS MARRIAGES

MEROPE ENRIQUEZ VDA. DE CATALAN vs. LOUELLA A. CATALAN-LEE
G. R. No. 183622 February 8, 2012

Facts:
Orlando B. Catalan was a naturalized American citizen. After allegedly obtaining a divorce in

the United States from his first wife, Felicitas Amor, he contracted a second marriage with petitioner
herein. On November 18, 2004, Orlando died intestate in the Philippines.Thereafter, petitioner filed
a Petition for the issuance of letters of administration for her appointment as administratrix of the
intestate estate of Orlando. Respondent Louella A. Catalan-Lee, one of the children of Orlando
from his first marriage, filed a similar petition. The two cases were subsequently consolidated.

On the other hand, respondent alleged that petitioner was not considered an interested person
qualified to file a petition for the issuance of letters of administration of the estate of Orlando. In

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support of her contention, respondent alleged that a criminal case for bigamy was filed against
petitioner. On 6 August 1998, the RTC had acquitted petitioner of bigamy. Furthermore, it took
note of the action for declaration of nullity then pending action with the trial court in Dagupan City
filed by Felicitas Amor against the deceased and petitioner.

On June 26, 2006, Branch 70 of the RTC of Burgos, Pangasinan dismissed the Petition for
the issuance of letters of administration filed by petitioner and granted that of private respondent.
The CA held that petitioner undertook the wrong remedy. Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of
this Decision. On June 20, 2008, the CA denied her motion.Hence, this Petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the divorce is valid.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that under the principles of comity, our jurisdiction recognizes a

valid divorce obtained by a spouse of foreign nationality. This doctrine was established as early as
1985 in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. wherein we said:It is true that owing to the nationality principle
embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against
absolute divorces, the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality.
However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided
they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private
respondent from the marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves
the marriage.

Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, the document must first
be presented and admitted in evidence. A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree
itself. Indeed the best evidence of a judgment is the judgment itself. The decree purports to be a
written act or record of an act of an official body or tribunal of a foreign country.

Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be
proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a
copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept
in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper
diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in
which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.

Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family Code is not necessary;
respondent was no longer bound by Philippine personal laws after he acquired Australian citizenship
in 1992. Naturalization is the legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him with the political and
civil rights belonging to a citizen. Naturalized citizens, freed from the protective cloak of their
former states, don the attires of their adoptive countries. By becoming an Australian, respondent
severed his allegiance to the Philippines and the vinculum juris that had tied him to Philippine personal
laws.

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Thus, it is imperative for the trial court to first determine the validity of the divorce to
ascertain the rightful party to be issued the letters of administration over the estate of Orlando B.
Catalan.

BIGAMOUS/POLYGAMOUS MARRIAGES

FE D. QUITA vs. COURT OF APPEALS and BLANDINA DANDAN
G.R. No. 124862 December 22, 1998

Facts:
Fe D. Quita and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married in the Philippines on 18 May

1941. Somewhere along the way their relationship soured. Eventually Fe sued Arturo for divorce in
San Francisco, California, U.S.A. On July 23, 1954 she obtained a final judgment of divorce. Three

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(3) weeks thereafter she married a certain Felix Tupaz in the same locality but their relationship also
ended in a divorce. Still in the U.S.A., she married for the third time, to a certain Wernimont.

On April 16, 1972 Arturo died. He left no will. Javier Inciong filed a petition with the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for issuance of letters of administration concerning the estate
of Arturo in favor of the Philippine Trust Company. Respondent Blandina Dandan, claiming to be
the surviving spouse of Arturo Padlan, and Claro, Alexis, Ricardo, Emmanuel, Zenaida and Yolanda,
all surnamed Padlan, named in the children of Arturo Padlan opposed the petition and prayed for
the appointment instead of Atty. Leonardo Casaba, which was resolved in favor of the latter. Upon
motion of the oppositors themselves, Atty. Cabasal was later replaced by Higino Castillon. Later
Ruperto T. Padlan, claiming to be the sole surviving brother of the deceased Arturo, intervened.

On the scheduled hearing, the trial court required the submission of the records of birth of
the Padlan children within ten (10) days from receipt thereof, after which, with or without the
documents, the issue on the declaration of heirs would be considered submitted for resolution. The
prescribed period lapsed without the required documents being submitted. On November 27, 1987
only petitioner and Ruperto were declared the intestate heirs of Arturo.

On motion for reconsideration, Blandina and the Padlan children were allowed to present
proofs that the recognition of the children by the deceased as his legitimate children, except Alexis
who was recognized as his illegitimate child, had been made in their respective records of birth.
Private respondent was not declared an heir. Although it was stated in the aforementioned records
of birth that she and Arturo were married on April 22, 1947, their marriage was clearly void since it
was celebrated during the existence of his previous marriage to petitioner.

Issues:
a) Whether or not the case should be remanded to the lower court for further proceedings.
b) Who between petitioner and private respondent is the proper heir of the decedent is one of
law which can be resolved in the present petition based on establish facts and admissions of
the parties?

Ruling:
If there is a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased

person or as to the distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the
controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases. Reading between the lines, the
implication is that petitioner was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of her divorce from Arturo.
This should have prompted the trial court to conduct a hearing to establish her citizenship. The
purpose of a hearing is to ascertain the truth of the matters in issue with the aid of documentary and
testimonial evidence as well as the arguments of the parties either supporting or opposing the
evidence. Instead, the lower court perfunctorily settled her claim in her favor by merely applying the
ruling in Tenchavez v. Escaño. The doubt persisted as to whether she was still a Filipino citizen
when their divorce was decreed. The trial court must have overlooked the materiality of this aspect.
Once proved that she was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of their divorce, Van Dorn would
become applicable and petitioner could very well lose her right to inherit from Arturo.

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She and Arturo were married on 22 April 1947 while the prior marriage of petitioner and
Arturo was subsisting thereby resulting in a bigamous marriage considered void from the beginning
under Arts. 80 and 83 of the Civil Code. Consequently, she is not a surviving spouse that can inherit
from him as this status presupposes a legitimate relationship.

The decision of respondent Court of Appeals ordering the remand of the case to the court
of origin for further proceedings and declaring null and void its decision holding petitioner Fe D.
Quita and Ruperto T. Padlan as intestate heirs is AFFIRMED. The order of the appellate court
modifying its previous decision by granting one-half (1/2) of the net hereditary estate to the Padlan
children, namely, Claro, Ricardo, Emmanuel, Zenaida and Yolanda, with the exception of Alexis, all
surnamed Padlan, instead of Arturo's brother Ruperto Padlan, is likewise AFFIRMED. The Court
however emphasizes that the reception of evidence by the trial court should be limited to the
hereditary rights of petitioner as the surviving spouse of Arturo Padlan.

The motion to declare petitioner and her counsel in contempt of court and to dismiss the
present petition for forum shopping is denied.

BIGAMOUS/POLYGAMOUS MARRIAGES

VERONICO TENEBRO vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 150758 February 18, 2004

Facts:

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Petitioner in this case, Veronico Tenebro, contracted marriage with private complainant
Leticia Ancajas on April 10, 1990. The two were wed by Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. Tenebro and
Ancajas lived together continuously and without interruption until the latter part of 1991, when
Tenebro informed Ancajas that he had been previously married to a certain Hilda Villareyes on
November 10, 1986. Invoking this previous marriage, petitioner thereafter left the conjugal dwelling
which he shared with Ancajas, stating that he was going to cohabit with Villareyes.
On January 25, 1993, petitioner contracted yet another marriage, this one with a certain Nilda
Villegas, before Judge German Lee, Jr. When Ancajas learned of this third marriage, she verified
from Villareyes whether the latter was indeed married to petitioner which was confirmed by
Villareyes.

Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against petitioner. On November 10, 1997,
the Regional Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City, Branch 54, rendered a decision finding the accused
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. Petitioner‘s motion for
reconsideration was denied for lack of merit.

Issues:
a) Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the decision of the Court a quo convicting
petitioner of the crime of bigamy despite non-existence of the first marriage and
insufficiency of evidence.
b) Whether or not the Court erred in convicting the petitioner for the crime of bigamy despite
the clear proof that the marriage between the accused and private complainant had been
declared null and void.

Ruling:
The Court held that after a careful review of the evidence on record, we find no cogent

reason to disturb the assailed judgment. Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the elements
of the crime of Bigamy are:

(1) that the offender has been legally married;
(2) that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is
absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;
(3) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and
(4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.

First, the prosecution presented sufficient evidence, both documentary and oral, to prove
the existence of the first marriage between petitioner and Villareyes. All three of these documents
fall in the category of public documents, and the Rules of Court provisions relevant to public
documents are applicable to all. The documents issued by the National Statistics Office merely attest
that the respective issuing offices have no record of such a marriage. The marriage contract
presented by the prosecution serves as positive evidence as to the existence of the marriage between
Tenebro and Villareyes, which should be given greater credence than documents testifying merely as
to absence of any record of the marriage, especially considering that there is absolutely no
requirement in the law that a marriage contract needs to be submitted to the civil registrar as a
condition precedent for the validity of a marriage. As such, this Court rules that there was sufficient

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evidence presented by the prosecution to prove the first and second requisites for the crime of
bigamy.

Petitioner makes much of the judicial declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity, invoking Article 36 of the Family Code. The State‘s penal laws
protecting the institution of marriage are in recognition of the sacrosanct character of this special
contract between spouses, and punish an individual‘s deliberate disregard of the permanent character
of the special bond between spouses, which petitioner has undoubtedly done.

Moreover, the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity is not an indicator that petitioner‘s marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential
requisites for validity. The requisites for the validity of a marriage are classified by the Family Code
into essential (legal capacity of the contracting parties and their consent freely given in the presence
of the solemnizing officer) and formal (authority of the solemnizing officer, marriage license, and
marriage ceremony wherein the parties personally declare their agreement to marry before the
solemnizing officer in the presence of at least two witnesses).Under Article 5 of the Family Code,
any male or female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of the impediments
mentioned in Articles 37and 38may contract marriage.As such, we rule that the third and fourth
requisites for the crime of bigamy are present in this case, and affirm the judgment of the Court of
Appeals.

As a final point, we note that based on the evidence on record, petitioner contracted
marriage a third time, while his marriages to Villareyes and Ancajas were both still subsisting. The
act of the accused displays a deliberate disregard for the sanctity of marriage, and the State does not
look kindly on such activities. Marriage is a special contract, the key characteristic of which is its
permanence. When an individual manifests a deliberate pattern of flouting the foundation of the
State‘s basic social institution, the State‘s criminal laws on bigamy step in.

BIGAMOUS/ POLYGAMOUS MARRIAGES

VICTORIA S. JARILLO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

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G.R. No. 164435 September 29, 2009

Facts:
On May 24, 1974, Victoria Jarillo and Rafael Alocillo were married in a civil wedding

ceremony. On May 4, 1975, Victoria Jarillo and Rafael Alocillo again celebrated marriage in a church
wedding ceremony. Appellant Victoria Jarillo thereafter contracted a subsequent marriage with
Emmanuel Ebora Santos Uy. In 1999, Emmanuel Uy filed against the appellant Civil Case No. 99-
93582 for annulment of marriage before the Regional Trial Court of Manila.

Thereafter, appellant Jarillo was charged with bigamy before the Regional Trial Court of
Pasay City. The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the same court. On appeal to the
CA, petitioner‘s conviction was affirmed in toto. In the meantime, the RTC of Makati City, Branch
140, rendered a Decision dated March 28, 2003, declaring petitioner‘s 1974 and 1975 marriages to
Alocillo null and void ab initio on the ground of Alocillo‘s psychological incapacity. Said decision
became final and executory on July 9, 2003. In her motion for reconsideration, petitioner invoked
said declaration of nullity as a ground for the reversal of her conviction. Hence, the present petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in rendering their decision.

Ruling:
Under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until

declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding. In this case, even if petitioner eventually obtained a
declaration that his first marriage was void ab initio, the point is, both the first and the second
marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was annulled.

Petitioner‘s conviction of the crime of bigamy must be affirmed. The subsequent judicial
declaration of nullity of petitioner‘s two marriages to Alocillo cannot be considered a valid defense
in the crime of bigamy. The moment petitioner contracted a second marriage without the previous
one having been judicially declared null and void, the crime of bigamy was already consummated
because at the time of the celebration of the second marriage, petitioner‘s marriage to Alocillo,
which had not yet been declared null and void by a court of competent jurisdiction, was deemed
valid and subsisting. Neither would a judicial declaration of the nullity of petitioner‘s marriage to Uy
make any difference. Petitioner‘s defense of prescription is likewise doomed to fail.

Finally, petitioner avers that the RTC and the CA imposed an erroneous penalty under the
Revised Penal Code. Again, petitioner is mistaken. The Indeterminate Sentence Law provides that
the accused shall be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty, the maximum term of which shall be
that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the Revised
Penal Code, and the minimum of which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower than that
prescribed by the Code for the offense, without first considering any modifying circumstance
attendant to the commission of the crime. However, for humanitarian purposes, and considering
that petitioner‘s marriage to Alocillo has after all been declared by final judgment to be void ab initio

on account of the latter‘s psychological incapacity, by reason of which, petitioner was subjected to
manipulative abuse, the Court deems it proper to reduce the penalty imposed by the lower courts.

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Thus, petitioner should be sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment
from Two (2) years, Four (4) months and One (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to 8
years and 1 day of prision mayor, as maximum.

BIGAMOUS/ POLYGAMOUS MARRIAGES

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FLORENCE TEVES MACARRUBO vs. ATTY. EDMUNDO L. MACARRUBO

A.C. No. 6148 February 27, 2004

Facts:
Florence Teves Macarrubo (complainant), by herself and on behalf of her two children, filed

on June 6, 2000 a verified complaint for disbarment against Atty. Edmundo L. Macarubbo
(respondent) with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), alleging that respondent deceived her
into marrying him despite his prior subsisting marriage with a certain Helen Esparza.

Complainant averred that he started courting her in April 1991, he representing himself as a
bachelor; that they eventually contracted marriage which was celebrated on two occasions; and that
although respondent admitted that he was married to Helen Esparza on June 16, 1982, he succeeded
in convincing complainant, her family and friends that his previous marriage was void. Complainant
further averred that respondent entered into a third marriage with one Josephine T. Constantino;
and that he abandoned complainant and their children without providing them any regular support
up to the present time, leaving them in precarious living conditions. After hearing during which both
complainant and respondent took the witness stand, the Investigating Commissioner rendered a
Report and Recommendation that the said respondent is suspended for three months for gross
misconduct reflecting unfavorably on the moral norms of the profession.

The final disposition of the present administrative case is now before this Court.

Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Edmundo Macarrubo is guilty of gross misconduct.

Ruling:
Thus, if the acquittal of a lawyer in a criminal action is not determinative of an administrative

case against him, or if an affidavit of withdrawal of a disbarment case does not affect its course,then
the judgment of annulment of respondent's marriage does not also exonerate him from a
wrongdoing actually committed. So long as the quantum of proof - clear preponderance of evidence
- in disciplinary proceedings against members of the bar is met, then liability attaches.

The disturbing fact that respondent was able to secure the annulment of his first two
marriages and is in the process of procuring the annulment of his third bears noting. Contrary to the
finding of the Investigating Commissioner, respondent, by his own admission, contracted a third
marriage.

Such pattern of misconduct by respondent undermines the institutions of marriage and
family, institutions that this society looks to for the rearing of our children, for the development of
values essential to the survival and well-being of our communities, and for the strengthening of our
nation as a whole. This must be checked if not stopped. As officers of the court, lawyers must not
only in fact be of good moral character but must also be perceived to be of good moral character
and must lead a life in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community. The moral

delinquency that affects the fitness of a member of the bar to continue as such, including that which

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makes a mockery of the inviolable social institution of marriage, outrages the generally accepted
moral standards of the community.

There can then be no other fate that awaits respondent, as a consequence of his grossly
immoral conduct, than to be disbarred or suspended from the practice of law.

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BIGAMOUS/ POLYGAMOUS MARRIAGES

LILIA OLIVA WIEGEL vs. THE HONORABLE ALICIA V. SEMPIO-DIY

G.R. No. L-53703 August 19, 1986

Facts:
In an action (Family Case No. 483) filed before the erstwhile Juvenile and Domestic

Relations Court of Caloocan City, herein respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel (plaintiff therein) asked for
the declaration of Nullity of his marriage (celebrated on July, 1978 at the Holy Catholic Apostolic
Christian Church Branch in Makati, Metro Manila) with herein petitioner Lilia Oliva Wiegel (Lilia,
for short, and defendant therein) on the ground of Lilia's previous existing marriage to one Eduardo
A. Maxion, the ceremony having been performed on June 25, 1972 at our Lady of Lourdes Church
in Quezon City. Lilia, while admitting the existence of said prior subsisting marriage claimed that
said marriage was null and void, she and the first husband Eduardo A. Maxion having been allegedly
forced to enter said marital union.

Issue:
Was said prior marriage void or was it merely voidable?

Ruling:
The Supreme Court finds the petition devoid of merit.There is no need for petitioner to prove

that her first marriage was vitiated by force committed against both parties because assuming this to
be so, the marriage will not be void but merely viodable (Art. 85, Civil Code), and therefore valid
until annulled. Since no annulment has yet been made, it is clear that when she married respondent
she was still validly married to her first husband, consequently, her marriage to respondent is VOID
(Art. 80, Civil Code).

There is likewise no need of introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of her
first husband at the time they married each other, for then such a marriage though void still needs
according to this Court a judicial declaration of such fact and for all legal intents and purposes she
would still be regarded as a married woman at the time she contracted her marriage with respondent
Karl Heinz Wiegel); accordingly, the marriage of petitioner and respondent would be regarded
VOID under the law.

The petition is dismissed.

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BIGAMOUS/ POLYGAMOUS MARRIAGES

MERLINDA CIPRIANO MONTAÑES vs. LOURDES TAJOLOSA CIPRIANO.

G.R. No. 181089 October 22, 2012

Facts:
On April 8, 1976, respondent married Socrates Flores (Socrates) in Lezo, Aklan. On January

24, 1983, during the subsistence of the said marriage, respondent married Silverio V. Cipriano
(Silverio) in San Pedro, Laguna. In 2001, respondent filed with the RTC of Muntinlupa, Branch
256, a Petition for the Annulment of her marriage with Socrates on the ground of the latter‘s
psychological incapacity. On July 18, 2003, the RTC of Muntinlupa, Branch 256, rendered an
Amended Decision declaring the marriage of respondent with Socrates null and void. On May 14,
2004, petitioner Merlinda Cipriano Montañez, Silverio‘s daughter from the first marriage, filed with
the Municipal Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna, a Complaint for Bigamy against respondent.

On July 24, 2007 and before her arraignment, respondent, through counsel, filed a Motion to
Quash Information (and Dismissal of the Criminal Complaint) alleging that her marriage with
Socrates had already been declared void ab initio in 2003, thus, there was no more marriage to speak
of prior to her marriage to Silverio on January 24, 1983; that the basic element of the crime of
bigamy, i.e., two valid marriages, is therefore wanting. She also claimed that since the second
marriage was held in 1983, the crime of bigamy had already prescribed.

On September 24, 2007, the RTC issued its assailed Order dismissing the case. Dissatisfied, a
Motion for Reconsideration was filed by the prosecution, but opposed by respondent. In a
Resolution dated January 2, 2008, the RTC denied the same ruling, among others, that the judicial
declaration of nullity of respondent's marriage is tantamount to a mere declaration or confirmation
that said marriage never existed at all, and for this reason, her act in contracting a second marriage
cannot be considered criminal.

Issue:
Whether or not the RTC erred in quashing the Information for bigamy filed against

respondent.

Ruling:
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code defines and penalizes bigamy. The elements of the

crime of bigamy are: (a) the offender has been legally married; (b) the marriage has not been legally
dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead
according to the Civil Code; (c) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and (d) the
second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity. The felony is
consummated on the celebration of the second marriage or subsequent marriage.It is essential in the
prosecution for bigamy that the alleged second marriage, having all the essential requirements, would

be valid were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage.

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In this case, it appears that when respondent contracted a second marriage with Silverio in
1983, her first marriage with Socrates celebrated in 1976 was still subsisting as the same had not yet
been annulled or declared void by a competent authority. Thus, all the elements of bigamy were
alleged in the Information. Here, at the time respondent contracted the second marriage, the first
marriage was still subsisting as it had not yet been legally dissolved. As ruled in the above-mentioned
jurisprudence, the subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage would not change
the fact that she contracted the second marriage during the subsistence of the first marriage. Thus,
respondent was properly charged of the crime of bigamy, since the essential elements of the offense
charged were sufficiently alleged.

Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the
same must be submitted to the judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of the
marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the
presumption is that the marriage exists.Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the
judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.

The petition is granted.

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VALID BIGAMOUS MARRIAGES

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GREGORIO NOLASCO
G.R. No. 94053 March 17, 1993

Facts:
Nolasco testified that he was a seaman and that he had first met Janet Monica Parker, a

British subject, in a bar in England during one of his ship's port calls. From that chance meeting
onwards, Janet Monica Parker lived with respondent Nolasco on his ship for six (6) months until
they returned to respondent's hometown of San Jose, Antique on 19 November 1980 after his
seaman's contract expired. On 15 January 1982, respondent married Janet Monica Parker in San
Jose, Antique, in Catholic rites officiated by Fr. Henry van Tilborg in the Cathedral of San Jose.
Respondent Nolasco further testified that after the marriage celebration, he obtained another
employment contract as a seaman and left his wife with his parents in San Jose, Antique. Sometime
in January 1983, while working overseas, respondent received a letter from his mother informing
him that Janet Monica had given birth to his son. The same letter informed him that Janet Monica
had left Antique. Respondent claimed he then immediately asked permission to leave his ship to
return home. He arrived in Antique in November 1983.

Respondent further testified that his efforts to look for her himself whenever his ship
docked in England proved fruitless. He also stated that all the letters he had sent to his missing
spouse at No. 38 Ravena Road, Allerton, Liverpool, England, the address of the bar where he and
Janet Monica first met, were all returned to him. He also claimed that he inquired from among
friends but they too had no news of Janet Monica.

On 5 August 1988, respondent Gregorio Nolasco filed before the Regional Trial Court of
Antique, Branch 10, a petition for the declaration of presumptive death of his wife Janet Monica
Parker, invoking Article 41 of the Family Code. The petition prayed that respondent's wife be
declared presumptively dead or, in the alternative, that the marriage be declared null and void.The
trial court granted Nolasco's petition.The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision,
holding that respondent had sufficiently established a basis to form a belief that his absent spouse
had already died.

Issue:
Whether or not Nolasco has a well-founded belief that his wife is already dead.

Ruling:
The present case was filed before the trial court pursuant to Article 41 of the Family Code

which provides that:
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage
shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior
spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief

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that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death
under the circumstances set forth in the provision of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an
absence of only two years shall be sufficient.

The Family Code prescribes as "well founded belief" that the absentee is already dead before a petition
for declaration of presumptive death can be granted. As pointed out by the Solicitor-General, there
are four (4) requisites for the declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code:

1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or two consecutive
years if the disappearance occurred where there is danger of death under the circumstances
laid down in Article 391, Civil Code;
2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;
3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and
4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive
death of the absentee.

The Court believes that respondent Nolasco failed to conduct a search for his missing wife
with such diligence as to give rise to a "well-founded belief" that she is dead.In the case at bar, the
Court considers that the investigation allegedly conducted by respondent in his attempt to ascertain
Janet Monica Parker's whereabouts is too sketchy to form the basis of a reasonable or well-founded
belief that she was already dead. The Court also views respondent's claim that Janet Monica declined
to give any information as to her personal background even after she had married respondent too
convenient an excuse to justify his failure to locate her. The same can be said of the loss of the
alleged letters respondent had sent to his wife which respondent claims were all returned to him.
Respondent said he had lost these returned letters, under unspecified circumstances.
Neither can this Court give much credence to respondent's bare assertion that he had inquired from
their friends of her whereabouts, considering that respondent did not identify those friends in his
testimony. The Court of Appeals ruled that since the prosecutor failed to rebut this evidence during
trial, it is good evidence. But this kind of evidence cannot, by its nature, be rebutted. In any case,
admissibility is not synonymous with credibility

Since respondent failed to satisfy the clear requirements of the law, his petition for a judicial
declaration of presumptive death must be denied. The law does not view marriage like an ordinary
contract. In fine, respondent failed to establish that he had the well-founded belief required by law
that his absent wife was already dead that would sustain the issuance of a court order declaring Janet
Monica Parker presumptively dead.

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Persons and Family Relation

VALID BIGAMOUS MARRIAGES

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 159614 December 9, 2005

Facts:
On March 29, 2001, Alan B. Alegro filed a petition in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of

Catbalogan, Samar, Branch 27, for the declaration of presumptive death of his wife, Rosalia (Lea) A.
Julaton. On May 28, 2001, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), filed a Motion to Dismissthe petition, which was, however, denied by the court.
At the hearing, Alan adduced evidence that he and Lea were married on January 20, 1995 in
Catbalogan, Samar.He testified that, on February 6, 1995, Lea arrived home late in the evening and
he berated her for being always out of their house. Alan narrated that, when he reported for work
the following day, Lea was still in the house, but when he arrived home later in the day, Lea was
nowhere to be found.However, Lea did not return to their house anymore.Sometime in June 1995,
he decided to go to Manila to look for Lea, but his mother asked him to leave after the town fiesta
of Catbalogan, hoping that Lea may come home for the fiesta. He failed to find out Lea‘s

whereabouts despite his repeated talks with Janeth. Alan decided to work as a part-time taxi driver.
On June 20, 2001, Alan reported Lea‘s disappearance to the local police station.
After Alan rested his case, neither the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor nor the Solicitor General
adduced evidence in opposition to the petition. On January 8, 2002, the court rendered judgment
granting the petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in granting the petition.

Ruling:
The petition is meritorious. The spouse present is, thus, burdened to prove that his spouse

has been absent and that he has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead before
the present spouse may contract a subsequent marriage. The law does not define what is meant by a
well-grounded belief. Belief is a state of the mind or condition prompting the doing of an overt act.
It may be proved by direct evidence or circumstantial evidence which may tend, even in a slight
degree, to elucidate the inquiry or assist to a determination probably founded in truth. Any fact or
circumstance relating to the character, habits, conditions, attachments, prosperity and objects of life
which usually control the conduct of men, and are the motives of their actions, was, so far as it tends
to explain or characterize their disappearance or throw light on their intentions, competence
evidence on the ultimate question of his death.

The belief of the present spouse must be the result of proper and honest to goodness
inquiries and efforts to ascertain the whereabouts of the absent spouse and whether the absent
spouse is still alive or is already dead. Whether or not the spouse present acted on a well-founded

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belief of death of the absent spouse depends upon the inquiries to be drawn from a great many
circumstances occurring before and after the disappearance of the absent spouse and the nature and
extent of the inquiries made by present spouse.In sum, the Court finds and so holds that the
respondent failed to prove that he had a well-founded belief, before he filed his petition in the RTC,
that his spouse Rosalia (Lea) Julaton was already dead.

VALID BIGAMOUS MARRIAGES

NENITA BIENVENIDO vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, LUISITA CAMACHO and
LUIS FAUSTINO C. CAMACHO

G.R. No. 111717 October 24, 1994

Facts:
Aurelio P. Camacho married Consejo Velasco in Manila on October 3, 1942. On February 6,

1962, without his marriage to Consejo Velasco being dissolved, Aurelio P. Camacho contracted
another marriage with respondent Luisita C. Camacho (Luisita) with whom he had been living since
1953 and by whom he begot a child, respondent Aurelio Luis Faustino C. Camacho (Chito) born on
May 22, 1961. The marriage was solemnized in Tokyo, Japan where Aurelio and Luisita had been
living since 1958.

There were instances during Luisita and Aurelio's marriage when, because of their quarrels,
one or the other left the dwelling place for long periods of time. In her case Luisita stayed on those
occasions at various times in Davao City, Hongkong or Japan.In 1967 Aurelio met petitioner Nenita
T. Bienvenido, who had been estranged from her husband, Luis Rivera. Aurelio courted her and
apparently won her heart because from June 1968 until Aurelio's death on May 28, 1988, he lived
with her, the last time in a duplex apartment on 84 Scout Delgado Street, Quezon City. Petitioner's
daughter, Nanette, stayed with them as did Aurelio's son, Chito, who lived with them for about a
year in 1976.

On April 30, 1982, Aurelio bought the house and the lot on Delgado Street in which they
were staying from the owners, Paz Lorenzo Infante and Suzette Infante-Moñozca. In the deed of
sale and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 288350 of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City, issued in
his name, Aurelio was described as single.On November 26, 1984, Aurelio executed a deed of sale of
the property in favor of petitioner Nenita in consideration of the sum of P250,000.00, by virtue of
which Transfer Certificate of Title No. 326681 was issued in petitioner's name on January 11, 1985.
Between 1985 and 1987 Nenita and Luisita came to know each other. On May 28, 1988, Aurelio
died. Petitioner, using her Loyola Life Plan and Aurelio's account in the PCI Bank, took care of the
funeral arrangements. Respondent Luisita was then in the United States with respondent Chito,
having gone there, according to her, at the instance of Aurelio in order to look for a house in San
Francisco so that Aurelio could follow and rejoin them. Upon learning of the death of Aurelio she
and her son Chito came home on May 30, 1988. She had the remains of Aurelio transferred from
the Loyola Memorial Chapels, first to the St. Ignatius Church and later to the Arlington Memorial
Chapels. Luisita paid for the funeral services.

Respondent Luisita was granted dealt benefits by the Armed Forces of the Philippines as the
surviving spouse of Aurelio. Soon she also claimed ownership of the house and lot on Scout

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Delgado Street in which Nenita had been living. The two met at a barangay conciliation meeting but
efforts to settle their dispute failed.

On September 7, 1988, Luisita and her son Chito brought this case in the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, seeking the annullment of the sale of the property to petitioner and the
payment to them of damages. Luisita alleged that the deed of sale was a forgery and that in any event
it was

On August 29, 1989, the trial court rendered a decision upholding the sale of the property to
petitioner and dismissing the complaint of Luisita. It found the deed of sale in favor of petitioner to
be genuine and respondents Luisita and Chito to be in estoppel in not claiming the property until
1988 despite knowledge of the sale by the late Aurelio who had represented himself to be single.
Respondents moved for a reconsideration but the trial court denied their motion. On appeal the
respondents prevailed. On June 4, 1993, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court
and declared respondents to be the owners of the house and lot in dispute.

Issue:
Whether or not Aurelio‘s marriage to respondent Luisita is valid.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court findsthe petition to be meritorious. This Court finds that the

presumption of the validity of the marriage between Aurelio and Luisita has not been successfully
assailed by appellee. Art. 83 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first
spouse of such person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void
from its performance, unless:
(1) the first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or
(2) the first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second
marriage without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or if the
absentee, though he has been absent for less than seven years, is generally considered as
dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent
marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead according to articles 390 and 391. The
marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases until declared null and void by
a competent court.

In the case at bar, the burden of proof was on respondents to show that Luisita and
Aurelio's marriage falls under any of these exceptions in order to be considered valid. They failed to
discharge this burden. Instead the contrary appears. What applies in this case, therefore, is the
general rule, i.e., since Aurelio had a valid, subsisting marriage to Consejo Velaso, his subsequent
marriage to respondent Luisita was void for being bigamous.Consequently, there is no basis for
holding that the property in question was property of the conjugal partnership of Luisita and the late
Aurelio because there was no such partnership in the first place. In the second place, until otherwise
shown in an appropriate action, the sale to petitioner must be presumed. Petitioner's ownership is
evidenced by a deed of absolute saleexecuted with all the solemnity of a public document and by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 326681 issued in due course in her name.Petitioner is in possession

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of the property. It was error for the Court of Appeals to annul petitioner's title at the instance of one
whose marriage to the seller is void.

Indeed, the property in question was acquired by Aurelio during a long period of
cohabitation with petitioner which lasted for twenty years (1968-1988). While petitioner knew
respondent Chito to be Aurelio's son way back in 1976, there is nothing to show that she knew
Aurelio to be married to Luisita. To the contrary, Aurelio represented himself to be single. As far as
petitioner was concerned, Chito could have been Aurelio's child by a woman not his wife. There
was, therefore, no basis for the Court of Appeals' ruling that Nenita was not a buyer in good faith of
the property because she ought to have known that Aurelio was married to Luisita.

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VALID BIGAMOUS MARRIAGES

EDUARDO P. MANUEL vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 165842 November 29, 2005

Facts:
On July 28, 1975, Eduardo was married to Rubylus Gaña before Msgr. Feliciano Santos in

Makati, which was then still a municipality of the Province of Rizal.He met the private complainant
Tina B. Gandalera in Dagupan City sometime in January 1996. She stayed in Bonuan, Dagupan City
for two days looking for a friend. Tina was then 21 years old, a Computer Secretarial student, while
Eduardo was 39. Afterwards, Eduardo went to Baguio City to visit her. Eventually, as one thing led
to another, they went to a motel where, despite Tina‘s resistance, Eduardo succeeded in having his
way with her. Eduardo proposed marriage on several occasions, assuring her that he was single.

Eduardo even brought his parents to Baguio City to meet Tina‘s parents, and was assured by them
that their son was still single.Tina finally agreed to marry Eduardo sometime in the first week of
March 1996. They were married on April 22, 1996 before Judge Antonio C. Reyes, the Presiding
Judge of the RTC of Baguio City, Branch 61. It appeared in their marriage contract that Eduardo
was "single."

The couple was happy during the first three years of their married life. Through their joint
efforts, they were able to build their home in Cypress Point, Irisan, Baguio City. However, starting
1999, Manuel started making himself scarce and went to their house only twice or thrice a year. Tina
was jobless, and whenever she asked money from Eduardo, he would slap her.Sometime in January
2001, Eduardo took all his clothes, left, and did not return. Worse, he stopped giving financial
support.

Sometime in August 2001, Tina became curious and made inquiries from the National
Statistics Office (NSO) in Manila where she learned that Eduardo had been previously married. She
secured an NSO-certified copy of the marriage contract.She was so embarrassed and humiliated
when she learned that Eduardo was in fact already married when they exchanged their own vows.

After trial, the court rendered judgment on July 2, 2002 finding Eduardo guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of bigamy. On June 18, 2004, the CA rendered judgment affirming the decision of
the RTC with modification as to the penalty of the accused.

Issue:

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Whether or not the petitioner‘s wife cannot be legally presumed dead under Article 390 of
the Civil Code as there was no judicial declaration of presumptive death as provided under Article
41 of the Family Code.

Ruling:
The petition is denied for lack of merit.The reason why bigamy is considered a felony is to

preserve and ensure the juridical tie of marriage established by law.The phrase "or before the absent
spouse had been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper
proceedings" was incorporated in the Revised Penal Code because the drafters of the law were of
the impression that "in consonance with the civil law which provides for the presumption of death
after an absence of a number of years, the judicial declaration of presumed death like annulment of
marriage should be a justification for bigamy."

For the accused to be held guilty of bigamy, the prosecution is burdened to prove the felony:
(a) he/she has been legally married; and (b) he/she contracts a subsequent marriage without the
former marriage having been lawfully dissolved. The felony is consummated on the celebration of
the second marriage or subsequent marriage.It is essential in the prosecution for bigamy that the
alleged second marriage, having all the essential requirements, would be valid were it not for the
subsistence of the first marriage.

The requirement for a judgment of the presumptive death of the absent spouse is for the
benefit of the spouse present, as protection from the pains and the consequences of a second
marriage, precisely because he/she could be charged and convicted of bigamy if the defense of good
faith based on mere testimony is found incredible.The requirement of judicial declaration is also for
the benefit of the State. Under Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution, the "State shall protect and
strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution." Marriage is a social institution of the
highest importance. Public policy, good morals and the interest of society require that the marital
relation should be surrounded with every safeguard and its severance only in the manner prescribed
and the causes specified by law.The laws regulating civil marriages are necessary to serve the interest,
safety, good order, comfort or general welfare of the community and the parties can waive nothing
essential to the validity of the proceedings. A civil marriage anchors an ordered society by
encouraging stable relationships over transient ones; it enhances the welfare of the community.
In a real sense, there are three parties to every civil marriage; two willing spouses and an approving
State. On marriage, the parties assume new relations to each other and the State touching nearly on
every aspect of life and death. The consequences of an invalid marriage to the parties, to innocent
parties and to society, are so serious that the law may well take means calculated to ensure the
procurement of the most positive evidence of death of the first spouse or of the presumptive death
of the absent spouseafter the lapse of the period provided for under the law. One such means is the
requirement of the declaration by a competent court of the presumptive death of an absent spouse
as proof that the present spouse contracts a subsequent marriage on a well-grounded belief of the
death of the first spouse.

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VALID BIGAMOUS MARRIAGES

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GLORIA BERMUDEZ-LORINO

G.R. No. 160258 January 19, 2005

Facts:
Respondent Gloria Bermudez-Lorino and her husband were married on June 12, 1987.

Because of her husband‘s violent character, Gloria found it safer to leave him behind and decided to
go back to her parents together with her three (3) children. In order to support the children, Gloria
was compelled to work abroad. From the time of her physical separation from her husband in 1991,
Gloria has not heard of him at all. She had absolutely no communications with him, or with any of
his relatives. On August 14, 2000, nine (9) years after she left her husband, Gloria filed a verified
petition with the Regional Trial Court (RTC).

In a decision dated November 7, 2001, the RTC, finding merit in the summary petition,
rendered judgment granting the same. In a decision dated September 23, 2003, the Court of
Appeals, treating the case as an ordinary appealed case under Rule 41 of the Revised Rules on Civil
Procedure, denied the Republic‘s appeal and accordingly affirmed the appealed RTC decision.

Issues:
a) Whether or not the Court of Appeals duly acquired jurisdiction over the appeal on a final
and executory judgment of the Regional Trial Court
b) Whether or not the factual and legal bases for a judicial declaration of presumptive death
under Article 41 of the Family Code were established in this case.

Ruling:
The Court rules against petitioner Republic. Article 238 of the Family Code, under Title XI:

SUMMARY JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS IN THE FAMILY LAW, sets the tenor for cases
covered by these rules. In Summary Judicial Proceedings under the Family Code, there is no
reglementary period within which to perfect an appeal, precisely because judgments rendered
thereunder, by express provision of Section 247, Family Code, supra, are "immediately final and
executory". It was erroneous, therefore, on the part of the RTC to give due course to the Republic‘s
appeal and order the transmittal of the entire records of the case to the Court of Appeals.

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