The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia

544 Constitutional Deinocracy in Indonesia

the PRN, the Baperki organization of Indonesian citizens of Chinese
origin, and the Police Employees' Association. Beyond that there was
no group which supported the President. Only the Masjumi and the
Catholic Party gave him directly negative answers, but all the vague,
ambiguous, noncommittal, or conditionally positive answers given by
the NU, PSII, Parkindo, IPKI, and PSI were tantamount to rejec-
tions. 158 Of particular importance was the fact that the Nahdatul
Ulama, highly influential because of its balance position, had stuck
by the position it had announced earlier of opposing the inclusion of
the PKI in a cabinet. Thus not only had Soekarno failed to receive a
consensus in favor of his formula; he had failed to obtain even ma-
jority support. And this was despite the use of such new techniques as
government-ordered radio listening and capital-city goon squads.

After hearing the various parties' views, the President stated that
he thought it only natural that there should be differences of opinion

on his konsepsi. He added that he would think about the whole matter

further and "boil up" the various views together, that he would travel
to Surabaja for several days, and that on March 4 he would announce
what additional steps he would take. Meanwhile there continued to
be a great amount of pro-konsepsi activity. There were more mass

meetings and more delegations arriving in Djakarta. On March 1 a
group of top leaders of the Masjumi, NU, PSII, Parkindo, and the

Catholic Party visited the chief public prosecutor to complain of
intimidation of party leaders.

On March 2 came the countermove. In Makassar at seven that morn-

ing, a proclamation was read by Lieutenant Colonel H. N. V. Sumual,
the territorial commander in East Indonesia. Sumual, a Minahasan,
declared before a gathering of 51 top military, government, and po-
litical leaders of many ethnic groups in Makassar that the whole of the

area under his command would thenceforth be under a State of War

and Siege. At the same time he announced the names of four military
governors who would exercise authority on his behalf in the different
areas of East Indonesia. In the case of North Sulawesi, Nusa Tenggara
(the Lesser Sunda Islands), and the Moluccas and West Irian prov-
ince, he named the local regimental commander as military governor.
In the case of South Sulawesi, where the situation was complicated

by the existence of a Battle Area Command with nine battalions of
East Java troops (under the former East Java territorial commander
Colonel Sudirman), he named the Governor of all Sulawesi, Andi

1M For a statement of the views of each of these parties, see ibid.

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The Second Ali Cabinet 545

Pangerang Petta Rani, as military governor. 150 He also immediately

blocked transfers out of the East Indonesia area of cash sums larger

than Rp. 5,000.
At the same time, Sumual's Chief of Staff, Lieutenant Colonel Saleh

Lahade, from South Sulawesi, read out the text of a lengthy Piagam

Perdjuangan Permesta (Charter of Common Struggle) of the East
Indonesian military command. This charter, which gave the name

"Permesta" to the East Indonesian regionalist movement, was a re-
markable document, following the lines of regionalist declarations in
Sumatra, but going further to make more specific demands. It called
for each province to have a five-year plan of its own, for "surplus areas"
to be allowed to keep 70 per cent of their own earnings and "minus
areas" 100 per cent of theirs with additional subsidies. It asked that

East Indonesia be given a set quota of all scholarships for study in
and outside the country. It requested that the various regions should
obtain allocations of foreign exchange, domestic and overseas credits,
and Japanese reparation commodities, on a basis proportionate to sur-
face area and not population. It contained various requests for benefits
for veterans, and it asked that the 70:30 barter system should imme-
diately be extended to East Indonesia. 160

More important still, however, were the directly political clauses
of the charter. One of these called for 70 per cent of the members of
the National Council of the Soekarno konsepsi to be representative of
province-status regions, "in order that the Council might ultimately
obtain the status of a Senate." Another said that the gotong rojong
cabinet must be presidential in character and be given a minimum life
span of five years by parliament. Finally, the charter said that both
the National Council and the cabinet would have to be led by Soekarno
and Hatta. The formulation was a masterpiece of political semantics,
for, while using the language of Soekarno, it succeeded in conveying all
the principal demands of Hatta. If it was true, as soon became appar-

,B* The Battle Area Command had been established in July 1956 shortly before
Col. Warouw had transferred his authority as East Indonesian territorial com-
mander to Lieut. Col. Sumual. Its commander, whose status was that of panglima,

thus equivalent to that of one of the seven territorial commanders, exercised mili-
tary authority over seven regencies of South and Southeast Sulawesi, where
security was disturbed by Kahar Muzakar's forces and other rebel-bandit groups

(Indonesia Raya, July 17, 1956).
1,0 This was a system of export inducements introduced for several Sumatran

ports, notably Kutaradja in Atjeh and Pakan Baru and Rengat in Riau, in Oct.
1956. Under it, exporters were allowed to keep 30 per cent of their foreign ex-
change earnings for overseas purchases.

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546 Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia

ent, that the military heads of the large and ethnically heterogeneous

area of East Indonesia had been able to agree on so far-reaching a set of

demands, this reflected very widespread hostility to Djakarta. And

this time there could be no doubt (for anyone trained to decode

political messages) that the challenge extended to President Soekarno

as well as the Ah cabinet.

The question immediately arose whether Sudirman's nine battalions

of Javanese troops could be used to overthrow Sumual. It was quickly

given a negative answer. By March 4 the Army General Staff in
Djakarta had sent instructions to Sudirman to take no action which

could lead to bloodshed. 161

But if there was not to be a new countercoup on the Gintings-

Macmour model, how was Djakarta to cope with the new challenge?

More particularly, how was the President to deal with it? Coming on

top of the hostility of so many parties to the President's konsepsi,

the East Indonesia coup was a very damaging blow. Hard upon it

came others. For days there were threatening declarations from mili-

tary leaders in Atjeh and Kalimantan, foreshadowing possible coup-

like actions there. Then on March 8 the regional legislative council

of South Sumatra voted no confidence in the Governor, Winarno

Danuatmodjo. On the following day Winarno left the province and

Lieutenant Colonel Barlian took over direct control. At the same time

there was a rising chorus of demands for Hatta's return to the gov-

ernment. On March 11 the Nahdatul Ulama added its voice to the

demands for a restoration of Hatta to a position in the government. 182
With the Communists and the regionalists each apparently in a mood

for toughness, the situation was tense indeed. Again the press spoke
of the possibility of civil war. 183 The cabinet continued to exist, its
member parties waiting for the moment when a resignation was

not likely to leave them too powerless. It was the President who had
to act, but what could he do? Could he now force through the

konsepsi? Would he be obliged to make a complete volte-face and

yield to the demand that Hatta return with real power? What were

the possibilities of a course midway between these two?

It was at this point that initiative came to be exercised by Major

General Nasution and his group of General Staff officers in Djakarta.

The months since the regional coups began had seen Nasution and

his associates gain considerable independence of the civil branch of

M Keng Po, March 4, 1957. im March n, 1957.
lbid.,

ia March 5, 1957.
lbid.,

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The Second Ali Cabinet 547

government, both of Prime Minister Ali, whose power was declining
throughout this period, and of President Soekarno. In the months of
August to November 1956 Nasution had been a target for great
hostility within the army and forced by the challenge of Zulkifli Lubis
to fall back heavily on the power of the cabinet and the President.
But with the Lubis challenge defeated, Nasution was able himself to
speak for an increased political role for the army, and thus internal
army hostility toward him lessened. In addition, the Chief of Staff, as a
Sumatran, was able to play something of a mediator role between the
civilian government in Djakarta and the Sumatran regionalists. In-
deed, as we have seen, he was playing this role with* considerable
independence of the Djakarta civilian authorities at the Palembang
conference in late January. Finally, Nasution was known as a man of
anti-Communist convictions from the days of the Madiun rebellion,
and his deputy and close associate, Gatot Subroto, had a similar reputa-
tion. Therefore with the Communist issue now more important as an
aspect of tension between the President and the regionalists, the Chief
of Staffs power as an arbiter was all the stronger.

In early March, Nasution and Gatot Subroto figured prominently in
most political news. Immediately after the Permesta proclamation of
March 2 they appeared to throw their weight on the side of those
working for a Hatta solution. This was the interpretation placed on
efforts they made then to persuade Soekarno to meet the former Vice-

—President although it is by no means certain that Nasution and his

deputy wanted Hatta to return to the government on the terms on
which Hatta himself was informally insisting, as a Prime Minister with
full powers. Certainly there was heavy pressure on them from inside
the army not to give way too far to the regionalists' demands. 164 In any
event their efforts failed. The President was finally not prepared to
meet Hatta.

Thereupon Nasution and Gatot Subroto turned their efforts in an-
other direction, toward what might become a genuine compromise
between Soekarno and the regionalists. They had their own formula
for this, one which would serve at the same time to strengthen their

own position. This was the proclamation of a nationwide State of War

and Siege. Such a proclamation would legalize the power of military

164 See Suluh Indonesia, March 13, 1957, for a report on the abortive attempt
by a group of staff officers in Djakarta to proclaim a Dewan Merah Putih ( Council
of the Red-and-White, the national colors) in protest against the Chief of Staff's
"lack of firmness" in the face of the Banteng Council, Simbolon, and Sumual.

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548 Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia

leaders over civilian affairs in such areas as Central and South Sumatra
and East Indonesia. At the same time it would provide a legal frame-
work and over-all face-saving formula within which the central gov-
ernment, particularly the central military leadership, could tackle the
regional problem. It wouJd give new power and status to military
leaders in other areas of the country. In effect it would help the

officers who had not risen in power and status through association with
regionalist movements to catch up with the others who had. Addi-
tionally it would strengthen the position of the central military leader-
ship by vesting it with authority to issue decrees in a wide range of

fields.

Such was the solution which finally emerged. At 10 a.m. on March 14
Ali Sastroamidjojo formally returned his cabinet's mandate to the
President. At 10:30 the President proclaimed a nationwide State of
War and Siege. The Ah cabinet came to an end with both a whimper
and a bang.

The one year of the cabinet's life had brought far-reaching changes

in the country's political constellation. When the Ali cabinet began

its work, the dominant conflict was one between political parties,
notably between the PNI and the Masjumi. The army was still outside
the main political arena, powerful but content to use its power only
sporadically. Similarly the President was still at the edge of the arena,
exercising a great deal of influence, but indirectly and subject to a
variety of restrictions of constitutional propriety. The PKI was power-
ful, but isolated. As for the regionalist movement, it existed only in
embryo.

By the time of the cabinet's resignation a completely new pattern
had emerged. Parties had lost very much of their importance, with the
crucial exception of the PKI. The Masjumi had become a subordinate
ally of the regionalist movement. The PNI had linked itself to the

President's cause, reluctantly agreeing to leave the center of the

political stage. The Nahdatul Ulama continued to be in the midway
balance position. But none of these three had retained any large
measure of initiative. They had to accommodate themselves to a situa-
tion to which they were peripheral. Four main power concentrations
had emerged to prominence, and it was with these that the political
initiative was to lie in the years which followed. The four were the
Communist Party, President Soekarno, the central leadership of the
army, and the military-civilian regionalist movement.

How could the parties' power decline so rapidly? How could they

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The Second Alt Cabinet 549

be so easily pushed from the center of the political arena just after

an elected parliament had come into existence? How could they become

so quickly an object of general hatred and disdain? And why was it that

they appeared to be so incapable of defending themselves against the

attacks to which they were subjected from all directions, being able to

say little more than Mangunsarkoro's "We will carry out a self-

correction in the party," or Natsir's "There are still some honest and

idealistic people among the party leadership," or the sad affirmation

of Sajuti Melik of the PNI that it was certainly no worse than the

other parties? 165

The answer is not one that can be given in terms of parties only.

Parties had indeed reaped widespread hatred. But what collapsed in

the twelve-month period of the second cabinet was more than the

power and prestige of parties. What collapsed, although its collapse

was by no means complete, was parliamentary democracy. Indeed, it

was more; it was constitutional government.

As far as the twelve-month period of the Ali cabinet is concerned,

the collapse was principally a collapse of a system of legitimacy.

Constitutional government was side-stepped because the particular

form of it which existed, namely, parliamentary democracy, no longer

commanded acceptance. The hectic events of this year were basically

a response to a power vacuum, to a discrepancy between claimed

authority and actual power, a discrepancy which arose because those
who claimed to exercise authority no longer had legitimacy in the

eyes of those who had power. Thus the basic question of all political

systems presented itself: "Why should I do as the man in the govern-

Whyment tells me? should I obey this politician when it is against my

interests and my moral predispositions and when I have power re-

sources of my own?" The power vacuum appeared at points all over

the political map. It appeared where the authority which the central

government claimed over a defiant region exceeded the power the

center could effectively exert over it. It appeared where the authority

which civilian political leaders claimed to exercise over the army was

greater than they could effectively exert over it. In a third sense it

appeared where the authority which the party-based cabinet claimed

over Soekarno was greater than the control it could exert over him

when the issue was joined at the level of simple power. Again, the

power vacuum appeared where a discrepancy existed between the

Suluh Indonesia, Dec. 8, 1956; Keng Po, Jan. 19, 1957; Suluh Indonesia, Dec.

8, 1956.

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