The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia

382 Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia

Ulama was still pressing the demands of its Political Note of July. And
on October 14 the PSII had called for the resignation of the Ministers
of Economic Affairs, Finance, and the Interior.

On October 22 the three PIR ministers resigned from the cabinet.

Hazairin declared he was complying with the decision of the October
17 meeting. Wongsonegoro and Roosseno, who supported the cabinet s
continued functioning, said they were resigning "in order to clear the
air until a definite viewpoint is expressed by the new PIR party council
and in order to give the government-supporting parties an oppor-
tunity to review the cabinet's composition." 102

Reshuffling portfolios to keep the coalition in existence was no easy
task. The numerous conflicts between government parties led many
opposition members to believe that it could not be accomplished and
that a cabinet resignation was in sight. As in most previous situations
where a cabinet's position had become shaky, there were a number of
opposition calls for a presidential (in this case read Hatta-led) cab-
inet. 103 But eventually Prime Minister Ali succeeded in bringing
about a reshuffle with which the respective parties of the cabinet
were satisfied. 104 The reshuffled cabinet was not strong in parliamen-

tary support, but it managed to weather the crisis. On December 14

it succeeded in defeating by 115 to 92 the motion of no confidence
in the cabinet moved by Jusuf Wibisono. It was the first time in the
history of the Indonesian parliament that an outright no-confidence
motion had been moved against the whole cabinet. The government's

—margin of survival was not great opposition critics made much of

the point that it could not have obtained its majority if PKI members

—and sympathizers had been instructed to abstain on the ballot but

the fact was that it had survived.
This success was due in the first place to the PNI's willingness to

have Mr. Iskaq step down. The public image of the cabinet became
more favorable as a result of the early actions of Iskaq's successor,

Professor Roosseno, particularly certain reforms in the foreign trade

Feb. and Aug. 1954. Two of them were cabinet nominees and all but seven were

supporters of the cabinet. See Kementerian Penerangan, Kepartaian dan Parlemen-
taria di Indonesia ("Political Parties and Parliamentary Affairs in Indonesia";
Djakarta: Kementerian Penerangan, 1954), pp. 670-673.

ie*Pedoman, Oct. 23, 1954-

"See the statement of the Gerakan Pemuda Indonesia Angkatan-Proklamasi
(Indonesian Youth Movement of the Generation of the Proclamation of Inde-

pendence), Abadi, Oct. 22, 1954, and also the editorial in Indonesia Raya, Oct
29, 1954-

104 For the changes made see p. 338, note 25.

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Asector. 103 second important factor in the cabinet's survival was the

active support of President Soekarno. This operated partly through
public declarations, most notably the Palembang speech of early
November in which the President alleged that opposition leaders were
involved in a foreign plot to overthrow the cabinet. It was also

related to fear of the President's power to dissolve parliament. Many
in the government parties who considered supporting the cabinet's
resignation as an alternative to a reshuffle edged away from this

course because they thought that the President might act as Sartono,
the chairman of parliament, had warned in the previous December
and join with the Prime Minister to dissolve parliament, maintaining
the cabinet on an extraparliamentary basis until elections were held.

Most important perhaps, the coalition partners had worked out
minimally satisfactory ways of co-operating with one another. The
leaders of the more important parties in the cabinet shared certain
values, holding a common hostility to Masjumi Islamic modernism on
the one hand and the "administrator** view of government and politics
on the other. And all of them had benefited from the cabinet's gen-
erous apportioning of patronage. Thus there was a general feeling
among them that their grievances against one another should be
settled by the intra muros method of reshuffling. None of them could
feel certain that the alternative power arrangements which would
grow out of a cabinet resignation would serve their interests as well.

After the cabinet had survived its test vote of December 14, 1954,
it had a number of months of relative political calm. From January
1955 much attention was given to the Asian-African Conference, now
due to be held in Bandung in April. Moreover, elections were prom-
ised for August 1955. It seemed increasingly likely that the Ali cabinet
would stay in power until the elections were over.

But the first six months of 1955 were a time of extraordinarily fast
price rises, with speculation becoming more rife than ever in our

period. A new Plymouth or Dodge would often sell for Rp. 400,000

($35,o88 at the official rate or approximately $10,000 at current black-

market rates). The number of newly imported luxury cars was large,

108 Thus on Dec. 6 Roosseno ordered a new screening of the bank accounts of
importers, with the declared aim of reducing the number of national importers
by half (Sutter, op. cit., p. 1027). He did not in fact complete the rescreening
before the Ali cabinet fell more than seven months later, but he was responsible
for a number of measures which went some way toward tightening government
controls over national importers and national banks. See Schmitt, op. cit., pp. 176-
177, and Amstutz, op. cit, pp. 65-68.

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384 Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia

and the much-read wags of the opposition dailies' gossip columns
coined epithets like "Kabinet Mercedes-Benz" and "Kabinet Opel/'
Still more important, textile prices were rising particularly fast, a fact
which was to make itself felt especially in April and May, with the
approach of the Lebaran holidays when it is customary to buy new
clothes. In Djakarta the textile price index for April 1955 was 103.5
per cent higher than it had been a year earlier. 106

Thus the cabinet was again under political pressure for its eco-

nomic policies. In May the PSI-oriented trade union federation KBSI

(Kesatuan Buruh Seluruh Indonesia, All-Indonesian Unity of Labor)
held a one-day demonstration strike against high prices. In June the
PNI executive took the unusual step of issuing a statement which

—implied criticism of the cabinet's economic policies apparently in an

effort to disclaim responsibility for the inflation in the face of the

impending elections. 107 At the same time the opposition press made
much of scandals and corruption, especially of the "Hong Kong barter
scandal" in which it was discovered that the system of allowing se-
lected exporters to retain foreign exchange had opened the way to
gross corruption. This was the context in which the cabinet had to

fight its last battles. Before a discussion of these, however, the cabi-
net's actions in the field of foreign relations must be considered.

FOREIGN POLICY AND THE BANDUNG CONFERENCE

With foreign policy, as with so much else, the first Ali cabinet set

off on new courses. Several of the previous cabinets had declared that

their foreign policy was not only independent, but active. In effect,

however, the international posture of all the former cabinets was pri-

marily passive. For them home policy had absolute priority over for-

eign relations. They saw Indonesia as a country still young and finding

its feet in the world, a country whose principal task was to sort out its
own pressing problems. In foreign relations their concern was to find

the most advantageous ways of channeling international pressures so

that they would be of assistance to Indonesia in its internal develop-

ment and, more important, not stand in the way of such development.

They saw themselves as necessarily limited to responding to outside,

—principally Western, initiatives. They were not concerned except

briefly and in a limited way under Foreign Minister Subardjo of the

—Sukiman cabinet with attempting to seize the diplomatic initiative.

The Ali cabinet's view of Indonesia's situation was different It saw

m "* Pedoman, June 13, 1955.
Higgins, op. cit, p. 166.

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Indonesia's internal problems as great but not oppressive, and it
looked out on the world with a sense of confidence born of faith in
Asia resurgent. It was militantly anticolonial and aspired to gain for
Indonesia a position of leadership within the anticolonialist move-
ment. Moreover, it was keenly aware of the integrative functions of an
active foreign policy and of the consequent internal political advan-
tages. Therefore the cabinet set forth, under the vigorous leadership
of its ex-diplomat Prime Minister, to make its foreign policy truly

active.

It was some time before the contrast emerged. In presenting his
program to parliament, the Prime Minister stressed that continuity
would be maintained with the foreign policy positions adopted by

previous cabinets. 108 He declared at the same time that his cabinet
would implement the Rondonuwu motion (for the establishment of
an Indonesian Embassy in Moscow by the end of 1953), but added
"after making the best possible preparations and provisions." 109 An
Indonesian Embassy was not actually established in Moscow until
March 1954.

It was in the area of Sino-American relations that the Ah cabinet
found its opportunities for an active foreign policy. The cabinet's term

of office began shortly after two important events, Stalin's death in

March 1953 and the Korean War armistice of July 27. From this time

the Chinese People's Republic began to adopt increasingly concilia-

—tory external positions, both ideologically the change from the left-

wing "join the Revolutionaries" line to the right-wing line of "Union

—with AH" and in diplomatic relations. The earlier attacks on Asian

nationalist and neutralist leaders as functionaries of imperialism were
halted, and there were signs that China sought to develop more regu-
lar relations with the states of non-Communist Asia.

To the uncommitted powers of Asia, particularly India, Burma, and
Indonesia, these seemed to be tendencies worthy of the strongest en-
couragement. Those in authority in these countries viewed Com-
munist China as a great power whose existence and internal stability
were not to be denied, and some of them sympathized with its leaders,
whom they saw as honest and dedicated men pushing ahead with
great determination toward social and economic goals which were

m Keterangan dan Dfawaban Pemerintah atas Program Kabinet .Mi Sastroamid-

fojo ( "The Government's Statement on the Program of the Ali Sastroamidjojo Cab-
inet and Its Replies to Parliamentary Criticism"; Djakarta: Kcmenterian Peneran-
gan, 1953), pp. 28-32.

"*lbid., pp. 32-33.

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386 Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia

basically similar to their own. All of them believed that the aggressive
tendencies which China had shown were due in large part to its ex-
clusion from the community of nations.

This was of course in complete contrast with the United States view
of China. The United States did not accept the Peking government
as legitimate; indeed, it was in some measure committed to its over-
throw. It regarded the C.P.R. as an inherently aggressive regime,
whose expansionist tendencies could be held in check only by the
application of superior force from outside. Thus it saw the C.P.R/s
conciliatory behavior of 1953 and 1954 as representing merely a tem-
porary change of tactics.

The position of the uncommitted states of Asia came into particu-
larly sharp conflict with the American position when the Indochina
crisis began in early 1954. At this time the Communist-led Vietminh

—was winning major military victories against the French thanks in

some part to military assistance from Peking. One hope of reaching an
over-all settlement in Indochina lay in the projected Geneva con-
ference, at which both China and the United States were to be repre-
sented. But in late March 1954, as the Geneva conference was about

to begin, France requested direct U.S. military intervention in the

area, believing this the one way to save its position, and for several
weeks there seemed a possibility that the United States might accede
to the request. At the same time the United States was both skeptical
and apprehensive about what the Geneva conference might achieve
and was concentrating its own efforts on the fashioning of a Southeast

Asian military alliance to prevent the Vietminh success from spilling
over into other countries of the area. 110

United States intervention and the possibility of a second Korea
were averted as a result of several factors. Most important probably
was British pressure to restrain the United States. But this was not a
situation in which the uncommitted states of Asia (or indeed other
Asian states which were not so uncommitted) were prepared to have
their views left out of account. The governments of the uncommitted
states in the main regarded the Vietminh with a good deal of sym-
pathy, seeing its struggle as primarily a nationalist one against an
intransigent colonialism. All of them were concerned that an effort be
made to create peace in Indochina and prevent the development of a
major Sino-American war in this part of Southeast Asia. As they saw

*

"•See Miriam Farley, The United States and Southeast Asia 19S0-S5 (New

York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1956), pp. 9-18.

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