The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia

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i Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia

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Dutch would depart, and at last Indonesians, they themselves, would
have opportunities. The welcome which the people of Djakarta gave
to President Soekarno when he arrived back there from Jogjakarta on
December 28 was one of triumph in the highest degree.

In the world outside the creation of the new state was welcomed
with pleasure and a measure of relief. Indeed, Indonesia's prestige was
high. It came into existence as a nation which had earned its right to
nationhood. In Asia there was rejoicing because of the Indonesian
victory over colonialism. Asia had been watching the Indonesian strug-
gle for years, with both admiration and concern. The plight of the Indo-
nesian Republic after the second Dutch attack had led Nehru to call a
conference of free Asian governments, the New Delhi Asian Relations

Conference, of January 1949.

In the West opinion was more divided. Some feared a repetition of
the insecurity which had followed the achievement of independence
in Burma. But the feeling was widespread that the Indonesian na-
tionalists had demonstrated high qualities of leadership, arousing the
full support of their people and yet holding their ardor in check while
negotiations were held. In every country the memory of the two Dutch
attacks on the Republic was still fresh. The cause of the Republic had
long drawn a warm response from those whose hearts went out to the
underdog. More recently it had won the sympathy also of all whose
hopes were pinned on the United Nations as a conciliator and pre-
venter of aggression. In a sense Indonesia was, as India's Sir Bcnegal
Rau was to say a little later, a "child of the United Nations." 16 Only
in the Soviet bloc was there hostility toward the new state. In general,
the Indonesian representatives who assumed diplomatic posts over-
seas in early 1950 were welcomed with sympathy and respect. 17

THE DEMISE OF THE FEDERAL STATES

The peculiar set of circumstances which had brought about the

Round Table Conference was of decisive importance for the role of the

Hatta cabinet and gave it a dual character. On the one hand, the

cabinet saw as its chief task the ordering of the complex administra-

tive and military changes of the transition in such a way as to preserve

and strengthen public security and legal norms. On the other hand, it

m Alastair M. Taylor, Indonesian Independence and the United Nations ( Ithaca,

N.Y.: Cornell University Press, i960), p. 265. Sir Benegal was proposing Indo-

UNnesia's admission to membership, Sept. 28, 1950.

"See Mohammad Roem, Politik Indonefiia, 1952 (Djakarta and Bukittinggi:

Penjiaran Ilmu, 1952), pp. 10-11.

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The Hatta Cabinet 59

was itself an arm of a successful revolutionary movement which
strove with all determination to extend its power to areas where it had
theretofore been repressed. Within a few weeks of its assumption of
power the Hatta cabinet came to face most of the problems inherent

in this duality of roles.

In political substance RUSI represented a victory for Indonesian
nationalism, but in legal form the Dutch had succeeded in imposing
their will. One effect of this discrepancy was an enormous administra-

tive confusion in the period immediately after the transfer of sov-

ereignty.

In the BFO areas legal and administrative arrangements were char-

acterized by an amazing variety of forms. Each and every one of the
fifteen Dutch-established constitutional entities had its own peculiari-
ties of structure and organization and its own particular basis for rela-
tions with Djakarta. The entities of highest constitutional status were
the six "states"—East Indonesia, Pasundan (West Java), East Java,
Madura, South Sumatra, and East Sumatra. The nine other units,
which the RUSI constitution termed merely "separate constitutional
entities" (satuan kenegaraan jang tegak sendiri) and which were
usually referred to as territories (daerahs), were lower in status and
were, on the earlier Dutch projection, at various stages of develop-
ment to becoming "states" or parts of "states." They were the "special
territory" (daerah istimewa) of West Kalimantan, the "territory"
(dacrah) of Bandjar, the four "neolands" Dajak Besar, Bangka, Billi-
ton, and Riau, the two "federations" East Kalimantan and Southeast
Kalimantan, and the "political entity" Central Java. In addition, there
existed other quasi-autonomous units which had not participated in

the BFO or the Round Table Conference. And then again there were

subordinate units in some of these constitutional entities (notably in
the state of East Indonesia), which had a degree of autonomy and

direct access to Djakarta. 18

What had hitherto given this whole ramshackle edifice cohesion
was the presence of Dutch administrators, who had controlled both the

(still predominantly powerful) central government in Djakarta and
the lines of communication linking this government with the regional

entities. But now these men were no longer in control. On administra-

tive grounds alone it appeared that a major overhaul of governmental

" This legal structure is described with meticulous care ( and a marvelous un-
concern for political reality) in A. Arthur Schiller, The Formation of Federal Indo-
nesia (The Hague: van Hoeve, 1955)- See especially pp. 80-197.

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60 Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia

relationships was necessary. And indeed this was foreseen in the
RUSI constitution, which gave the federal authorities of RUSI wide

powers to legislate concerning the area, the internal constitutional
provisions, and the very existence of the member states and territories. 19

Within the areas of the Republic of Indonesia the situation was
more stable, and a considerable degree of governmental continuity
prevailed. There was, however, a source of confusion in the fact that
the Republic's legal area of competency as a member state of the
federation was small compared with its actual power and prestige.
Thus its officials tended to look to the RI government in Jogjakarta for
instructions in areas of governmental activity which were formally
the province of the RUSI government in Djakarta.

The chaos was greatest in those areas of Java and Sumatra where

BFO areas bordered on territory of the Republic. Here the state

boundaries—originally laid down in the 1948 Renville Agreement-
were often irrelevant to the actual conduct of administration. In some

formally Republican areas, areas occupied in the second "police ac-
tion" of December 1948, Dutch officers continued to operate military
government. In other areas, formally part of the state of Pasundan or
the state of East Java, the Republic had long had "shadow" administra-
tions. Frequently a condition of double administration prevailed, with

no clear delineation of spheres of influence. Some of the confusion was
alleviated by the fact that martial law prevailed throughout Java ( not
Madura) and Sumatra, placing ultimate governmental authority in
the hands of RUSI army officers whose commands often extended
across state boundaries. And certainly the administrative picture was
simpler for the fact that the constitution was highly centralistic in its
federal-state division of powers, giving the federal authorities com-
petency not only in such matters as defense, foreign relations, and for-
eign trade, but also as regards police regulation and the appropriation
of state-levied taxation. Nevertheless the new cabinet faced enormous

problems of administrative regularization.
However, the most difficult problems before it were not administra-

tive but political, and before long also military. With the transfer of
sovereignty completed, large numbers of Republican guerrilla fighters

19 See Articles 42 to 50. The constitution was published in Kementerian Peneran-

gan Republik Indonesia, Perdjuangan di Konperensi Medja Bundar ("The Struggle

at the Round Table Conference"; Jogjakarta: Kementerian Penerangan, 1949), pp.

270-333. An English translation of the constitution may be found in United Nations
Commission for Indonesia, Special Report to the Security Council on the Round

UNTable Conference, Security Council Document S/1417, Nov. 10, 1949, vol. II.

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The Hatta Cabinet 61

came down from the mountains in triumph, ready to take an active

BFOpart in the politics of the urban centers, most of them situated in

territory. They joined an important group of Republican political
prisoners emerging from Dutch jails either before December 27 or
soon afterward. 20 Welcoming them, often with particular vociferous-
ness, was a third group important for an understanding of the new
political situation, the group of those whose nationalist record had
blotches to be erased.

At the same time, RUSI army units composed of old Republican

soldiers moved in large numbers into the old BFO states. Here there

continued to be a great many soldiers under Dutch command, 80,000
of the Royal Army (KL) and 65,000 of the Royal Netherlands Indies

Army (KNIL).21 Plans were in hand for die repatriation of the KL

troops, but there had been only limited progress in the weeks before

December 27 on the question of the terms on which KNIL troops
would enter the RUSI armed forces. Most of the 65,000 therefore
remained under Dutch command for some time.

It was in this setting that there developed the movement for aboli-
tion of the Dutch-established states. By the middle of January 1950
a crescendo of denunciations of the states and territories was coming
from political parties and other organizations in almost every part of
the country. First in one place and then in another, multiparty com-
mittees and fronts arose to urge a particular territorial entity to dis-
solve itself and merge into the Republic. In many cases this was
coupled with a demand for the quick achievement of a unitary Re-
public of Indonesia extending over the whole country. In some areas
of Java and Sumatra local heads within the administrative structure
of one or other of the states declared that they would thenceforth
be part of the Republic's administration. By the end of January various

legislative councils within the Dutch-built structure, including those of
East Java, Madura, and Central Java, had passed resolutions asking
that they be incorporated in the Republic.

This already fast rising movement grew considerably stronger in
consequence of a series of developments in West Java resulting from

30 The Dutch had released 7,862 untried persons from their jails between August

10 and December 27, 1949, and another 4,589 convicted but amnestied persons
between November 4 and December 27. Between December 27 and March 1,
1950, the RUSI cabinet amnestied and released another 4,414 convicted persons.
See the March 11, 1950, statement of Minister of Justice Supomo in Pertanjaan
Anggota dan Djawaban Pemerintah, I, 61-67.

* Taylor, op. cit., p. 413.

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62 Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia

the activities of Captain Westerling. On January 23 a Westerling force
of some 800 fully armed men attacked the West Java capital of
Bandung. Approximately 500 of them were members of Westerling's
own APRA, the rest soldiers of the KL and KNIL. After sharp fighting,
in which 79 members of the RUSI army and a sizable number of

civilians were killed, the Westerling troops captured most key points
in the city.22 There were immediate negotiations in Djakarta between
Hatta and the Dutch High Commissioner. As a result Major General

Engels, commander of the KL garrison in Bandung, persuaded the

Westerling units to leave the city. This they did on the afternoon of the
same day.

A second phase of Westerling's coup developed on the following day,

with Djakarta as its center. This time Westerling acted in close co-

ordination with Sultan Hamid, the former BFO chairman who was
then a minister without portfolio in the RUSI cabinet. On Hamid's

instructions, Westerling's men were to attack the cabinet building that
afternoon while the cabinet was in session. They were to kidnap all
cabinet members, kill the Defense Minister, Sultan Hamengku Bu-

wono, the Defense Ministry's Secretary-General Mr. Ali Budiardjo,
and the Acting Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, Colonel T. B.
Simatupang, and shoot Hamid himself in the arm or leg. In conse-
quence Hamid was to emerge as Defense Minister.23

The plot, which involved the one major assassination attempt of the
seven-and-a-half-year period of this study, was in fact never executed.
News of it reached the cabinet, which therefore stopped its meeting
early. After some skirmishes with RUSI troops the Westerling units
were driven out of the city. They became involved in several more
engagements in the following three weeks. But failure and arrests
were destroying their cohesion. On February 22 Westerling left the
country in disguise, flying to Malaya in a Netherlands military plane.

His following disintegrated quickly thereafter.

The Westerling affair was of major importance in accentuating Indo-
a See the January 24 communique of the RUSI Ministry of Defense in Kemen-

terian Penerangan, Republik Indonesia, Propinsi Djawa Barat, pp. 270-273; Min-
istry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Indonesia, Subversive Activities in Indonesia:
The Jungschlaeger and Schmidt Affair (Djakarta: Government Printing Office,
1957), pp- 13-17; and Raymond ("Turk") Westerling, Challenge to Terror (Lon-
don: Kimber, 1952).

"See Persadja (Persatuan Djaksa-Djaksa Seluruh Indonesia, All-Indonesian
Public Prosecutors' Association), Proces Peristiwa Sultan Hamid II ("The Court
Proceedings in the Case of Sultan Hamid II"; Djakarta: Fasco, 1955), passim. On
April 8, 1953, the Supreme Court gave Hamid a ten-year sentence.

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The Hatta Cabinet 63

nesian mistrust of the Dutch. Some Dutch officers were clearly im-

plicated in it, and others had shown what was regarded as an extraor-

dinary inability to keep their own soldiers under control. Subsequently

the Dutch authorities did co-operate with RUSI. But the damage

was already done. RUSI army authorities stressed that the Dutch had

done nothing about requests, repeatedly made of them in the months

before the transfer of sovereignty, for action to be taken against

Westerling.

Even more important, the Westerling coups produced a quick in-

BFOcrease in activity directed against the states. Initially there was

no suspicion of Sultan Hamid's complicity in Westerling's activities.

But parts of the government of Pasundan fell under immediate suspi-

cion. On January 25 its Prime Minister Anwar Tjokroaminoto, its

Communications Minister Suria Kartalegawa, and a number of its

lower officials were arrested, and two days later the state's parliament

passed a vote of no confidence in its cabinet and asked that the state

should transfer its powers to RUSI. On January 30 the Pasundan

head of state, R. A. A. Wiranatakusumah, resigned, and on February

10 the Hatta cabinet appointed Sewaka, currently the Republic's

Governor for its areas of West Java, as RUSI Government Commis-

sioner in charge of government in Pasundan.

Elsewhere, too, the movement against the BFO states and terri-

tories was gaining momentum. On January 27 the Sultan of Kutai,

head of the sultanate council which was the most powerful body in

East Kalimantan, announced his support for the unitary state. Soon

thereafter the state of Madura requested and was granted a RUSI

Government Commissioner, as the state of East Java and the "politi-

cal entity" of Central Java had earlier. Similarly Djakarta acceded to

the request of the representative council of the state of South Sumatra

and placed this state under the authority of a RUSI administrator.

The clearest illustration of the political weakness of the Dutch-built
states at this time came when the RUSI parliament assembled on

February 15 and elections were held for parliamentary officers. In the

Senate, where the BFO states had 30 of the 32 seats, a BFO leader,
M. A. Pellaupessy, was elected speaker. On the other hand, in the
House of Representatives, where the BFO states had 100 seats and
the Republic of Indonesia the remaining 50, no BFO man was even

nominated for the speakership or any of the three deputy speaker-

ships or for the chairmanship of any of the parliamentary divisions

(general committees) or sections (committees for particular areas of

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64 Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia

governmental business ) 24 All these posts went to representatives from

,

—the Republic and this notwithstanding the fact that a large number

of the 100 BFO representatives had a record of pro-Republican sym-

pathies and the further fact that a majority of the group had joined

Republican-led parties.

Meanwhile rallies and demonstrations continued against most of

the states and territories. The RUSI cabinet was giving no encourage-

ment to this wave of nationalist protest, but at the same time it was

afraid to be left too far behind the predominant popular current—if

BFOonly because this might result in illegal actions against the
states. An over-all legal formula seemed to be in demand. Thus on

March 8 the cabinet enacted an emergency law sanctioning the volun-
tary union of one state or territory with another.25 The law stated that

expression of a state's will for such a union was normally to be by

plebiscite, or by the action of a specially convened session of the

representative council where such a council was in existence, but that

it could be by shorter procedures if the situation demanded this. The

emergency law was immediately discussed and approved by both

houses of parliament.

In the following three and a half weeks four states, eight territories,

and three other constitutional units were merged into the Republic.

In no case was this by plebiscite. In four instances, in the states of

Pasundan, South Sumatra, East Java, and Madura, dissolution had
been requested by an existing representative assembly, though not
in sessions specially convened for that purpose.26 In the other cases,

demonstrations, rallies, and the like were taken as sufficient indication

of popular will. In every case the RUSI House of Representatives had

passed resolutions urging the merger.

By April 4 only four separate entities continued to exist within
RUSI, the Republic of Indonesia, the states of East Indonesia and
East Sumatra, and the special territory of West Kalimantan. A point

had been reached where there were no longer any states left which

could be toppled without serious resistance. This was the point at

* See Subakir, Skets Parlementer ("Parliamentary Sketches"; Djakarta: Pena,

1950), p. 12.
35 Lembaran Negara Repuhlik Indonesia Serikat ("RUSI State Documents"),

Law no. 16, 1950. According to Articles 139 and 140 of the RUSI constitution the
government was empowered to make emergency laws which were submitted to

parliament after their enactment and continued to be valid unless rejected by

parliament.

"See F. R. Bohtlingk, "De Nieuwe Eenheidsstaat," Indonesie, IV (1950-1951),

106 fF., for a discussion of legal aspects of the dissolution.

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