The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia

220 Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia

Assembly meeting of 1951 whereas the Natsir cabinet had sent a dele-
gation of five. It showed particular concern for civil servants, giving
them Lebaran bonuses and allocations of rice. And the system of
working with provisional budgets was continued, with a high degree
of ad hoc improvisation in the whole financial structure of the govern-
ment.

The Sukiman cabinet was able to register some important achieve-
ments in the field of labor. Following upon its repressive action against
the Communists in August 1951, it introduced a new emergency law
on labor disputes in September. This law, which replaced the Febru-
ary 1951 decree banning strikes in "vital industries," established a
system of government labor mediation, with compulsory arbitration
of disputes by the Labor Ministry where mediation efforts had failed
and with a three-week "cooling off period" required before any strike
action could be taken in any industry. 78 This more flexible series of
provisions, in conjunction with the fact that Communist influence in
labor unions was significantly set back by the mass arrests of August,
resulted in a marked decline in the level of strike activity. As 1951 was
a year when fewer working days were lost through strikes than in 1950,
so 1952 was to show a further improvement over 1951.80

In the area of foreign policy the cabinet was initially successful. It
carried on an active foreign policy, and for a time it appeared to be
effective both in achieving the goals of its anti-Communist leaders and
in raising Indonesia's prestige overseas. But finally it was foreign policy
which precipitated the governments downfall, and thus most of its
foreign policy achievements came to nothing.

The Sukiman cabinet, like the cabinets of Hatta and Natsir, was
remarkably successful in its policies for the advancement of education
and training. Dutch colonial policies had left Indonesia with only tiny
numbers of persons with the skills required for the operation of a
modern state,81 and there was a strongly felt need for rapid increases
in the number of such persons. Moreover, the Revolution had created
a powerful drive for expanded opportunity, in both the rural and the

n For a discussion of the emergency law by the man chiefly responsible for its
enactment and initial implementation see L Tedjasukmana, The Political Character
of the Indonesian Trade Union Movement (Cornell Modern Indonesia Project,
Monograph Series; Ithaca, N.Y., 1959), pp. 113-114.

"Bank Indonesia, Report for the Year 1954-1955 (Djakarta, 1955), P- ISO*
M On the very small numbers of Indonesians given higher education in the pre-
war period see George McT. Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia

(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1952), pp. 31-36.

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The Sukiman Cabinet 221

urban population, and education was a principal ladder to occupational

and thus social advancement. Finally, educational facilities served in

many cases to absorb former revolutionaries for whom no other accept-

able forms of civilian rehabilitation could be found

Thus the first years after December 1949 were a period of very rapid

educational expansion. One set of statistics has it that 5,609,485 chil-

dren were attending primary schools in 1951-1952, as compared with

-^4>977»3<>4 in igS0 1 arjd 2,021,990 in 1939-1940.82 Other statistics

give a somewhat different picture,83 but it is clear that primary school

attendance was rising by an annual 10 per cent or so for several years

of this early postrevolutionary period, with secondary school numbers

rising at the rate of 15 to 20 per cent per year and university numbers

even more rapidly.

At the same time numerous training programs were started for those

already employed. Every government agency developed training fa-

cilities for its personnel. Every large firm, foreign as well as Indonesian,

was obliged to train Indonesians in technical and managerial skills.

Great numbers of men and women were given training overseas, either

at Indonesian government expense or under one or another of the

overseas fellowship programs sponsored by the United States, the

United Nations, or the Colombo Plan.

The existence of this wide range of educational opportunities helped

considerably to buttress the stability of the postrevolutionary regime.

At the same time it contributed to the sustaining of hope that the just

and prosperous society for which the Revolution had been fought was

indeed in the process of realization.

In other ways, however, this hope had been dwindling for some

time. Indeed, the Sukiman cabinet period was one in which feelings of

disillusionment with the fruits of independence, feelings which had

been widely prevalent since 1950, were expressed with great fre-
quency. For some in the newspaper-reading public the focus of criticism
was lack of achievement with regard to problem-solving policy. These

persons deplored the failure of cabinets to make rapid progress with

their self-set policies of re-establishing security, stabilizing the ad-

ministration, and reorganizing the economy with a view to expansion

"Statistik Pendidikan dan Pengadjaran tahun i953-*954 ("Educational Statis-
tics, 1953-1954; Djakarta: Kementerian P.P. dan K., 1954), p. 7.

M Biro Pusat Statistik ( Central Bureau of Statistics ) , Statistical Pocketbook of
Indonesia, 1957 (Djakarta: Biro Pusat Statistik, 1957), pp. 20-26; also Appendix
to Presidential Message, in Hope and Facts (Djakarta: Ministry of Information,

1952), p. 25-

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222 Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia

and development. They decried the continued chaos in many areas of
rebel and bandit activity, the persistence of confusion and in-

efficiency in the government service, the facts of inflation, repeated
strikes, and bottlenecks of distribution. In general, they were inclined
to blame these shortcomings on "politics." Their criticisms reflect the
discrepancy which existed between the situation as they saw it and

their own "administrator" view of the tasks of government. These same
criticisms were occasionally echoed by persons who were themselves
prominent in the leadership of the cabinets. Thus Sjafruddin Prawi-
ranegara in his pamphlet of June 1951 ended a discussion of various
aspects of administration and economic management by declaring that
the country was in "a process of decline in all fields, which is only
temporarily hidden by the pseudo-welfare of high export prices." 84

Far more important, however, was the criticism of those who ex-

pected government and politics to be inspiring, to be able to create the
same moral tension and sense of purpose which had existed for them
during the struggle for independence and which had transformed the
material sufferings of that struggle into badges of heroism. For per-
sons like these the dominant features of political life in the Indonesia
of 1951-1952 were lassitude, self-seeking, and division. In the govern-
ment service they saw laziness, corruption, and clique infighting and,
if they were themselves civil servants, a lack of meaningful work. In
the political elite they saw more cliques and factions and in addition
luxury, social climbing, and cocktail-party affectation. In the economy
and social life they saw the continued prominence of the large Dutch
firms and their personnel. And to many of them it appeared that the
leaders of the Indonesian Revolution were adapting themselves to terms
of economic and social existence set by these foreign firms rather than
forcing the firms to accept the fact of Indonesian sovereignty in whole-
hearted fashion. Everywhere they saw a growing gulf between the
leaders who had been raised to prominence in the Revolution and their
followers, whose devotion and active support had made possible the

success of the Revolution, but who were now neglected and forgotten.
Wherever they turned they saw honor and position being distributed
in ways which did not accord with the values of the Revolution. As
Colonel Nasution put it, "Patriots and traitors are mixing about with

one another." 85

1

81 Indonesia Dipersimpangan Djalan, p. 31.
""Semangat 17 Agustus" ("The Spirit of August 17"), Mimbar Indonesia,
Aug. 17, 1951.

The Sukiman Cabinet 223

Resentments of this kind had exceedingly wide currency. They
were most characteristic of those sections of the political public whose
members participated in politics expressively, having no firm basis for
personal values outside politics. But they were by no means limited to
these sections. In fact, they found expression everywhere, in the daily
press, in weeklies and student monthlies, and at conferences of in-
tellectuals and cultural leaders. 88 Everywhere the complaint was about

the decline in the spirit of the Revolution, the spirit of Jogjakarta, the
spirit of the days of the guerrilla struggle against the Dutch. Often it

was accompanied by expressions of cynicism and disgust about the
existing situation. Sometimes the sense of grievance was focused on a
particular target—"the politicians" and their newly acquired business
interests, the President and the pomp at his palace, or the "leaders
who governed by grace of the Round Table Conference Agreement."
Often too it had no particular focus.

The upsetting aspect of this seemingly omnipresent decline in revo-
lutionary elan was its affect on personal integration. "On all sides,"
said President Soekarno, "we see our people drifting, rudderless, suf-
fering from confusion and dullness of the spirit." 87 Those whose per-
sonal values and sense of identity had found their source and center
in participation in the nationalist Revolution were now compelled ( un-
less they found a similar source in partisan political ideologies) to
make painful psychological adjustments. When they complained of
lassitude and a decline in revolutionary spirit in the society as a whole,
they were often describing their own inner anguish.

Normlessness and "moral crisis" were constantly spoken of in urban

society.88 On the one hand, moral demands of many different and

mutually contradictory kinds were being made, as a result of the great

" See, for instance, Abadi, Dec. 31, 1951, and Mimbar Indonesia, Dec. 8, 15,
1951, and 1951-1952 passim (articles by Sugardo) and March 15, 1952 (articles
by Pramoedya Ananta Toer). See also Gadjah Mada (Jogjakarta students'
monthly), 1951-1952 passim and especially the brilliant cartoons of Soebantardjo.
For some views of artists see Indonesia, Madjallah Kebudajaan ("Indonesia, a

Cultural Periodical"), Jan.-Feb. 1952 (issue on Second Cultural Congress). See
too Symposion tentang Kesulitan-Kestditan Zaman Peralihan Sekarang ("A Sym-
posium on the Difficulties of the Present Period of Transition"; Djakarta: Balai

Pustaka, 1953). especially the remarks of Sjahrir (pp. 13 ff.) and Mohammad Said

(pp. 103 ff.).
President Soekarno's Message ... on the Sixth Anniversary of Indonesian In-

dependence, p. 15.

"Indeed, the words "moral crisis" (krisis achlak) were used so much that one
cartoonist depicted an applicant for a radio announcer's position in the pose of
merely repeating this phrase! See Pedoman Radio ("Radio Guide"), May 4, 1952.

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224 Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia
speed of political and social change in the previous decade. On the
other hand, there was something of a hiatus in sanctions for morality:
the revolutionary morality was losing its relevance, and there were as
yet few firmly established new social institutions to provide sanctions

for the regulation of behavior.

Clearly, then, this was a period when political leaders were expected
to provide new integrative equivalents of the revolutionary struggle.
Inspiring leadership was in demand, and one central question of
politics was whether consolidation-and-routinization-minded cabinets
like that of Sukiman (or of Natsir) could provide it. What appeared
to be necessary was a government which had long-range vision, an
ability to fashion meaningful symbols, and authority based on the
values of the Revolution and which at the same time was able to link

its symbols of the greatness of the future to the practical, complicated,
and divisive tasks of the present.

In these respects the Sukiman cabinet was largely unsuccessful.

Bom in an atmosphere of particularly bitter factional infighting, con-

taining among its membership relatively few men of high prestige,
showing the marks of internal division early in its period of office, and

demonstrating no herolike intensity of concern for the achievements
of its goals, it was not perceived as affording leadership that inspired.
Nor did it champion long-range policies capable of firing the imagina-
tion of the political public. These shortcomings were only partly com-
pensated by the cabinet's ability to work in close co-operation with
President Soekarno.

I

i

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