The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia

The Elements of Politics 139

Revolution. Most of them had played "solidarity maker" roles during

the Revolution. A number had been involved in Tan Malaka's abortive

attempt on July 3, 1946, to unseat the Sjahrir cabinet by coup. Sub-
sequently the group had left the Masjumi because of their opposition
to the leaders then dominant, particularly the Natsir group. Since the
split the PSII had consistently failed to co-operate with the Masjumi,
despite the frequent statements of leaders of both parties that the
differences between the two were minor. The party was not distin-
guished by a particular position on religious issues or by a particular
view of current policy problems. Although it obtained the loyalty of
local religious groups in certain of the areas where its prewar fore-
runner had been strong, its national strength was not comparable to
that of the Masjumi.

The Indonesian Nationalist Party

The PNI, the second largest party in the country according to the
common estimates of 1950, stands in strong contrast to the Masjumi
in a number of respects. It was predominantly a city party in its power
base as the Masjumi was predominantly a party of the towns and
rural areas. Its leaders had arisen from the vestigial aristocracies, and
particularly the aristocracy of Java. Few of them came from a com-
mercial background. Unlike the Masjumi, it was a party strong in
the civil service. Such links as it had with entrepreneurship were
with the new businesses established as an outcrop of political and
bureaucratic leadership. It was in fact the principal organization rep-
resenting the "Javanese-aristocratic political culture" as the Masjumi
was the principal representative of the "Islamic-entrepreneurial politi-

cal culture."

But there were also considerable similarities between these two
major parties. The PNI too was a loosely organized body. It lacked
effective party discipline. It was handicapped by serious internal
divisions. Like the Masjumi it was bound together by a set of ideo-
logical orientations whose cohesive power was inadequate in the face

of clique fission.

PNI ideology was centered in the Revolution. It was the formulation
par excellence of the mood of nationalist political messianism char-
acteristic of the old revolutionary fighters. This formulation, which
had yet to be given its final official form, was "Marhaenism" (usually
translated "proletarian nationalism") or "Socionationalist Democ-

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140 Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia

racy." 46 It was a political creed stressing national unity and national
culture and socialist or collectivist economics. It affirmed the impor-
tance of democratic rights and opposed dictatorship, but condemned
liberalism and individualism, declaring them to be offshoots of capi-
talism. Based on an eclectic selection of ideas from Western and Asian
nationalists, Western socialists, and traditional Indonesian social
thought, Marhaenism reflected both the PNI's attachment to the sym-
bols of the nationalist Revolution and the difficulties which the party
faced in establishing a highest common factor of ideological orienta-
tions. As a party for which nationalism itself was central to value
orientations, it was particularly difficult for the PNI to adapt itself to
the postrevolutionary situation, which seemed to many of its members
to call for new issues, new goals, and new patterns of political percep-

tion. 47

In cultural and religious outlook the PNI represented "Javanism."
Most of its leaders were Javanese and members of the social group of
the prijafi, the Javanese aristocracy which had in large part remained
little affected by Islam.48 Combining a nominal adherence to Islam
with contempt for Islamic orthodoxy, these Javanese aristocrats held
syncretistic mystical beliefs which owe more to Hinduism than to any
branch of Islam. Proud of traditional Javanese culture, they saw this
as the basis for a new Indonesian civilization and looked to it to pro-
vide an alternative to cosmopolitan culture.49 Hence, although opposed
to Islamic influence in the state, they did not hold a secularist view of

politics.

In the period immediately after the transfer of sovereignty, the PNI
was the most strongly nationalistic of the major parties. As mentioned
earlier, it played a major role in the movement for a unitary state. It
strongly urged the quick withdrawal of all Dutch troops remaining
in Indonesia. More than any other large party it took the side of the
men from Jogjakarta as they came to take over and be fitted into the

"See Kementerian Penerangan, Kepartaian di Indonesia ("Political Parties in
Indonesia"; Djakarta: Kementerian Penerangan, 1950), pp. 78-80, and also Party
Council of the Partai Nasional Indonesia, Manifesto of Marhaenism (Djakarta,
1954 [?])•

4T For a stimulating discussion see Josef A. Mestenhauser, op. cit., pp. 217 ff.

a On the prijaji see Geertz, The Religion of Java, pp. 227 ff.; Selosoemardjan,

Social Changes in Jogjakarta, pp. 118-121; and D. H. Burger, Structural Changes
in Javanese Society: The Supra-VtUage Sphere (Cornell Modern Indonesia Project,
Translation Series; Ithaca, N.Y., 1957) •

49 See, for instance, S. Mangunsarkoro, The Sociological and Cultural Funda-
mentals for the Educational Sijstem in Indonesia (Djakarta: [no publisher,] 1945).

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The Elements of Politics 141

former Dutch administrative structure. More than any other, it em-
phasized the importance of the national claim to West Irian. At the
same time, however, it succeeded in attracting to itself large numbers
of political leaders from the Dutch-built states.

The PNI was a major government party during the Revolution and
was represented in each of the Hatta cabinets and also in the cabinet
of Dr. Halim. It included many "administrators'' in its leadership. But
its most important role in the first half of 1950 had been one in which
"solidarity makers" had taken the lead. Their leading position was
confirmed when the May 1950 Congress of the party elected Sidik
Djojosukarto as its chairman. This did not mean that the issue had been
sealed, however. The PNI continued to function in a great variety of

roles.

To describe internal divisions in the PNI is even more difficult
than in the case of the Masjumi, for the factions in the PNI leadership
did not correspond to constituent entities within the party. The lines
of factional cleavage were a highly personal matter within a small
group of leaders and thus more ephemeral than in the case of the
Masjumi. Nevertheless, a distinct pattern was discernible, a pattern set
as in the case of the Masjumi by the "administrator"—"solidarity maker"
delineation on the one hand and on the other hand by a division be-
tween two cliquelike segments of the "administrator" skill group.

The "solidarity makers" in the PNI leadership were mostly led by
Sidik Djojosukarto, a former "bush lawyer" and highly effective mass
orator. Sidik's following was composed principally of PNI members
without higher Western education, men who had come to political
prominence in the Japanese occupation and the Revolution, frequently
through leadership of mass organizations and guerrilla groups. The
members of the group were extreme in both their nationalist and their
socialist demands and strongly "oppositionist" in their attitude to gov-
ernments, in much the same way as the leaders of the Partai Murba.

Among the "administrators" in the PNI leadership two main groups
were distinguishable. One large group centered on the men of profes-
sional training who had been prominent in the prewar PNI founded
by Ir. Soekamo in 1927, men such as Mr. Sartono, who was later chair-
man of the RUSI House of Representatives, and R. Suwirjo, who be-
came mayor of Djakarta in 1950. The other faction or embryonic fac-
tion, considerably smaller, was led by men of similar training who were
younger and had come into prominence later. Important figures in

this group included Mr. Soejono Hadinoto, Sidik's predecessor as party

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142 Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia

chairman, and Mr. Wilopo, who was Labor Minister in the RUSI

cabinet.

Between these two groups of "administrator'' leaders there were
no clear or fixed lines. But factors of background, outlook, and per-
sonal associations established a certain pattern of division. Most mem-
bers of the older group had accepted fairly prominent positions under
the Japanese, whereas this was not the case with many of the younger
group. In the early years of the Revolution, and particularly in the pe-
riod of Sjahrir's prime ministership, the men of the older group had

been kept from political prominence. A number of them had given

their support to the Tan Malaka 1946 attempt to overthrow the Sjahrir
cabinet by coup. The younger group by contrast had no strong griev-
ance against the Sjahrir camp. Whereas the older group included many
close associates of President Soekarno, the younger stood much closer
to Vice-President Hatta. In general, the older group was more radical
in its nationalism and more concerned with the nation s prestige and
cultural identity than the younger group and less intensely concerned
with problem-solving policies in the administrative and economic
fields. Thus it was more capable of working with the Sidik group in
the party leadership and with "solidarity makers" generally. At the
same time its members had reasonably good relations with the Suki-
man group of the Masjumi (the group of older "administrators," mostly
Javanese), whereas the members of the younger group had better
relations with the Natsir faction (whose members were younger and
most frequently non-Javanese).

The main basis of PNI support lay in the lower rungs of the Indo-
nesian aristocracies. This was the group which had provided the great-
est number of pupils of Dutch secondary schools before the war and
the greatest number of civil servants. The party had considerable sup-
port at all levels of the government service, and particularly at the
lower levels. Initially it had been more attractive to the employees of
specialized departments of the government service—teachers, health
and agricultural extension workers, information officers, and so on
than to the bupatis (regents) and district and subdistrict officers of
the powerful pamong pradja corps who were frequently of higher
aristocratic origin. But by 1950 it had secured at least the passive sup-
port of a sizable section of the pamong pradja as well, not only in
Java but also in a number of other areas. In addition, it attracted a

Alarge number of white-collar workers in private employment. large

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The Elements of Politics 143

proportion of its active supporters were ex-revolutionaries of one
category or another.

To a large number of Indonesians in small towns and villages, that
is Indonesians without ties to santii Islam, the PNI was the party of
the Revolution and the nationalist movement. It therefore had the sup-
port of many of those who, while not holding clear positions on po-
litical issues, nevertheless sought to gain prestige as patriots and re-
sponsible citizens by joining a political party. It had had considerable

success in rural Indonesia in establishing itself as the heir of the pre-
war nationalist movement, in all except its specifically Islamic sections.

Thus the local leaders not only of many of the short-lived political
' parties of the 1930 s but also of the progressive nationalist Taman

Siswa schools and of the prewar nationalist scout organizations were
drawn mainly to the PNI. In addition, the party attracted support in
Hindu Bali and in the predominantly Christian areas outside of Java
(particularly Tapanuli in North Sumatra and Minahasa in North
Sulawesi) because of its opposition to links between Islam and the

state.

The Minor Nationalist Parties

The minor nationalist parties were generally similar to the PNI in
ideological orientations, but most of them had no strong commitment
to either ideological positions or policy concerns. Lacking the sup-
port of any strong interest group and commanding only the most per-
functory organization, they were little more than cliques of parlia-
mentarians and their followers and owed their existence as parties to
the tendencies toward party fragmentation described above. But al-
though considered to have few long-term prospects, they were able

in our period to play a role of considerable importance, not only in
parliament but also in cabinets.

PIR (Partai Persatuan Indonesia Raja, Greater Indonesia Union
Party), largest of the minor nationalist parties, was somewhat un-
typical of this group in that it commanded the partial support of a
significant social group. The party had been formed in December 1948
in Jogjakarta by a combination of nonparty persons and PNI leaders
who decried their party's criticisms of Hatta's policies in negotiating
with the Dutch. 50 Led by a group of older leaders, many of them from
the higher Javanese aristocracy, it had in 1950 the support of a con-

M Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution, pp. 324-326,

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144 Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia

siderable number of pamong pradja leaders both in Java (prijajis
antagonized by the radical nationalism of the PNI) and outside Java
(persons of aristocratic connections who had worked in one of the

BFO governments). Its large parliamentary delegation was comprised
mainly of men from the BFO states. In its policy orientation PIR

stood for restoration of rural stability on a traditional basis and for
the strengthening of the pamong pradja system of administration.

Parindra (Partai Indonesia Raja, Greater Indonesia Party) was a
splinter party formed in November 1949 by R. P. Soeroso, who had
been a leader in the larger prewar party of the same name. It was
led by men of the same aristocratic background as PIR, but had no
general support. In its positions on ideology and policy it stood some- 1
where between PIR and PNI.

The PNI-Merdeka (Independent Indonesian Nationalist Party) or

PRN (Partai Rakjat Nasional, National People's Party), as it was to

rename itself in October 1950, also lacked organized support. It re-
sulted from a split in the PNI which had developed in July 1950,
partly in protest against the victory of the Sidik group at the party
congress in May.51 PNI leaders branded the new party as right wing
and capitalistic, but its own ideological pronouncements did not de-
viate from the diffuse radical nationalism of the PNI. Its subsequent
actions suggest that it was capable of adopting a variety of ideological
and policy positions as clique interests required.

SKI (Serikat Kerakjatan Indonesia, Indonesian People's Associa-
tion) had been established in South Kalimantan in 1946. Its declared
political position resembled that of the PNI, and the behavior of its
parliamentary representatives was generally "oppositionist."

The Democratic Fraction was a purely parliamentary grouping of

former BFO leaders, mainly from East Indonesia. Its orientation was

one of opposition to radic al nationalism, and it frequently co-operated
with PIR.

The Partai Buruh or Labor Party, established in December 1949 by
a group of non-Communist leaders seceding from the Communist-
dominated Partai Buruh Indonesia, was a rather more significant or-
ganization, because of a certain amount of support from organized
labor. Formally espousing Marxism, it was nevertheless primarily a
nationalist party. Within the party leadership there was conflict be-

81 For an account of the development of the split see Kementerian Penerangan,
Kepartaian di Indonesia, 1951, pp. 126-127.

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The Elements of Politics 145

tween one clique supporting "oppositionist" PNI and Murba positions
and another supporting the positions of the PSI.

The Christian Parties

The two Christian political parties, Parkindo (Indonesian Christian
Party) and Partai Katholik (Catholic Party of the Republic of In-
donesia), were minor parties of a different type. They were "per-
manent minority parties," rather than "personality parties" as the
minor'nationalist parties were.62 With a reliable basis of mass support,
much of it concentrated in particular areas such as Protestant Mina-
hasa, Ambon, and North Tapanuli and Catholic Flores, they clearly
had a more certain political future than the minor nationalist parties.
Although there were only some three million Protestants in Indonesia
and something less than one million Catholics', the influence of the
two parties was considerable. This was partly because of the dispro-
portionately large number of Christians in the civil service, the army,
business enterprise, and the universities and schools and partly be-
cause of the individual prestige of leaders such as Dr. J. Leimena and
Mr. A. M. Tambunan of Parkindo and I. Kasimo of Partai Katholik.

J.

The main policies of these parties were directed toward the mainte-
nance of the groups' sectional interests and of religious liberty. Both
parties were dominated by "administrators," men with fairly strong
policy concerns. Both were moderate in their approach to nationalism,
Parkindo standing somewhat closer to PNI ideological emphases than

the Catholic Party.

" See Duverger, op. cit., pp. ago ff.

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