The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia

The Second Alt Cabinet 463

cities and towns they saw large numbers of new schools and of new
buildings of every kind and an extraordinary increase in motor and
bicycle traffic. The national, modern style of life which was theirs
and which they hoped would become general for society as a whole
the white-shirt style of life of the government official and the student

—was gaining adherents very rapidly throughout society. Foreigners

were more and more losing the positions of leadership they had held,
and Indonesians were fitting with increasing poise and sense of ease
into what were once foreign roles.

But the members of the political public saw much which disap-
pointed and shamed them. They saw a snobbish aloofness in the
ranks of the elite, an immoral ostentation among the newly rich,
laziness and corruption among government servants, and everywhere

—self-seeking and conflict the conspicuous absence of a sense of na-

tional unity and national purpose. At the same time they saw a lack
of advance in the tackling of particular problems. Large parts of the
country were still insecure; there were beggars in the cities and large
numbers of unemployed and underemployed. Many government plans
for economic progress were being implemented at a snails pace or

not at all.

How were these serious shortcomings to be explained? How could

they be squared with the fact that this was now the period of inde-
pendence of which so much had been expected? Many found consola-
tion in the frequently expressed idea that "we are still a young state,"

that "these are children's diseases," and that "this is still the period of
transition." But this was only part of the explanation for most. Only
those with a low degree of personal involvement in the revolutionary
cause (as well as a small group who imposed intellectual detachment
upon themselves) were inclined to tell themselves that the expecta-
tions had been too high. Other explanations were required.

For many the principal explanation lay in the continuing hold of
imperialism over the country. Indonesia was not really free, it was
believed, so long as Dutch and Chinese capital continued to dominate
the country, so long as huge profits flowed out of the country, and
so long as West Irian was still under Dutch domination. Some linked
this with the new cultural imperialism of Hollywood films, Cadillacs,
and Coca-Cola. Some linked it with the continuing hold of Dutch
thinking over a large part of those who had had higher education.

Another broad line of explanation of existing shortcomings was in
terms of a failure of leadership. The Indonesian leaders had failed to

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464 Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia

rise to their tasks, it was said. Or as Hatta frequently put it, quoting

Schiller:

Eine grosse Epoche hat das Jahrhundert geboren,
Aber der grosse Moment findet ein kleines Geschlecht.
(The century has given birth to a time of greatness,
But the great moment finds man small.)

The failure was attributed variously to Soekarno, to Soekarno and
Hatta, to "the ruling clique," to "the older generation," to "those who
were trained by the Dutch," to "the half-intellectuals," to "those whose
only education has been in political tactics," to "those who came to
power by the grace of the Round Table Conference," to "those who
have grown rich through 'national business/" In every case the as-
sumption was that the tasks were essentially capable of being tackled
satisfactorily and this would require only a change in top personnel.

But there was yet another line of explanation, which had extremely
wide currency and usually served to buttress all others. This focused on
politics and the weakness of the political system. The basic cause of
the existing difficulties, it was said, lay in the fact that there were too
many parties. This led to weak and short-lived coalition governments,
and hence to the lack of achievement in the making of policy. In addi-
tion, it resulted in the creation of political bottlenecks in the admin-
istrative machinery by which decisions were being implemented. More-
over, it was producing an exacerbation of all conflict in society and a
politicization of all social life. (The word usually employed, the Dutch
verpolitiseering, has strong negative connotations.) To make matters
worse, most of this conflict was not about principles at all but was part
of a selfish scramble for jobs and favors.

For those who saw the party system as the central cause of the
shortcomings of independence, elections assumed very great impor-
tance. There were indeed those who felt from the beginning that
elections would not get to the root of the trouble. Some believed that
that could be achieved only by the complete abolition of parties or by
a return to the single-party system which had been formally estab-
lished in the first two weeks after the proclamation of independence.
Others thought that only a "strong man" or a military dictatorship
would solve the problems which had come to a head in the party sys-
tem. But there were many who hesitated before such radical solutions,

whether for reasons of democratic principle or because of a stake in
the status quo of civilian, party, parliamentary, and cabinet govern-

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The Second Ah Cabinet 465

—ment and for them elections provided the answer. Elections would

reduce the number of parties, eliminating the small ones which were

the most opportunistic of all. They would tap new leadership talents.

And perhaps in this way the parties would return to their real task

of working for the establishment of political principles.

Elections were thus seen as a way of saving democracy and as an im-
portant step toward the broader goals for which the Revolution had
been fought. They seemed a panacea. They permitted nationalists of
the political public to maintain most of the same high, inchoate ex-
pectations of independence which they had held in the period of the
Revolution and still be able to explain why these expectations had as

yet remained unrealized.

Nor was it only within the political public that these perceptions

existed. As the campaign progressed, the party leaders, in speaking to
all sorts of audiences, made much of the regenerative powers of elec-

tions. In offering reassurance to rural leaders concerned about the so-

cially divisive effects of campaigning, they made extensive promises
of political and socioeconomic improvements which would follow
from the elections. Similarly, when government functionaries, at the
central or the local level, were presented with grievances with which

they felt incapable of coping, one of their most frequent answers was:

"Just wait till after the elections. It will be possible to settle these

various things then."

Now the elections had come and gone. The actual experience of elec-

tion day, especially the day of the first election of September 29, was
memorable. Millions had had a sense of participation in a national
celebration of great scope. But what now? What of all the promised
amelioration? It was not thought that there had been significant im-
provements in the five months between the September elections and
the Burhanuddin cabinet's resignation; these had been months of
politicking very much in the old style. Now, however, there would
be a new parliament and a new cabinet responsible to it. Surely things
would be better now? These expectations were usually inchoate. Those
who attempted to give them specific political formulations averred
that this would probably be a longer-lived cabinet than those which

had gone before it, that co-operation between the parties composing
it would probably be more harmonious, and that the state's authority
would be restored. But inchoate or formulated, the expectations were

high.

This was one aspect of the context in which the postelection cabinet

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466 Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia

was formed. But another aspect was the bitterness and extreme
polarization of forces which characterized politics in the last months
of the Burhanuddin Harahap cabinet's term of office. In much of the

countryside, it is true, the acuteness of party antagonisms declined
rather rapidly after the elections. But in the urban centers tensions

remained high. Large parts of the bureaucracy, particularly such
ministries as Information and Foreign Affairs, which had been PNI-

ized and de-PNI-ized in turn, were rent with party conflict. And
virtually every newspaper in the country was fully on either the
Masjumi or the PNI side. Moreover, hostility between Soekarno and
Hatta was more manifest than at any previous time in our period.
These circumstances promised to make it extremely difficult to establish
a cabinet with enough cohesion and capacity for resolute action to

meet existing expectations even in a minimally satisfactory way.
This, however, is what Mr. Ali Sastroamidjojo set himself to do

when President Soekarno on March 8, 1956, named him as formateur.1
When Ali began his work, the biggest decision had already been made
for him by the PNI: the cabinet was to be based on a PNI-Masjumi-NU
coalition—rather than a PNI-NU combination supported by the Com-
munist Party. Although there were PNI leaders who were against any
cabinet co-operation with the Masjumi and others who thought the
PNI-Masjumi breach too sharp to make a cabinet partnership prac-
ticable, the more widely held view was that healing this breach was
both possible and necessary, particularly in view of the PKI threat, of
which regional PNI leaders spoke ever more frequently. At least the
attempt had to be made. The PNI party executive made it particularly
clear that this was its view by instructing Wilopo to assist Ali in the

tasks of cabinet formation.

It was apparent from the beginning of Ali's formateur-shiip that he

NUwould succeed. The PNI and had worked out a basis of co-

operation in the previous weeks. The Masjumi very definitely wanted

to be included in the cabinet and recognized that its bargaining power

was (therefore) not great. As to all the other parties, they would

have to take what they could get. The formateur had little need to

include them since a coalition of the three largest parties provided

him with a sizable parliamentary majority. Thus it was possible to

x The President had decided soon after the Burhanuddin cabinet's resignation
on March 3 not to ask for the formation of a caretaker cabinet, as had been
suggested by the sponsors of the Sutardjo Kartohadikusumo motion. Instead Ali
was asked to form a cabinet which would be able to take office at the same time
that the new parliament was installed on March 26.

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