SIPRI02Findlay

THE USE OF
FORCE IN
UN PEACE
OPERATIONS

TREVOR FINDLAY

One of the most vexing issues to have
faced the international community since
the end of the cold war is the use of force
by United Nations peacekeeping forces.
UN intervention in civil wars—as in Somalia,
Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Rwanda—
has thrown into stark relief the difficulty
of peacekeepers operating in situations
where consent to their presence and activi-
ties is fragile and where there is little peace
to keep. Complex questions arise in these
circumstances. When and how should
peacekeepers use force to protect them-
selves, to protect their mission and, most
troublingly, to ensure recalcitrant parties’
compliance with peace accords? Is a peace
enforcement role for peacekeepers possible
or is this simply war by another name? How
is it to be distinguished, doctrinally, from
traditional and expanded peacekeeping?
Trevor Findlay records for the first time
the history of the use of force by UN
peacekeepers, from Sinai in the 1950s
to East Timor in 2001. He traces the
origins of peacekeeping norms, notably
the constraints on the use of force except in
self-defence, and how these have evolved
both in practice and as reflected in mission
mandates, use of force guidelines and rules
of engagement. Drawing on these insights
Dr Findlay examines how the use of force
by UN peace operations might in future be
managed and executed, including by the
development of a credible UN peace
operations doctrine.

Dr Trevor Findlay (Australia) is Executive
Director of the Verification Research,
Training and Information Centre (VERTIC)
in London. From 1993 to 1997 he was
Leader of the SIPRI Project on Peace-
keeping and Regional Security. He is
a former Australian diplomat and has a
PhD in International Relations from the
Australian National University.

His other publications for SIPRI include
Cambodia: The Legacy and Lessons
of UNTAC (SIPRI Research Report
no. 9, 1995) and Challenges for the
New Peacekeepers (SIPRI Research
Report no. 12, 1996).

Recent and forthcoming SIPRI books from Oxford University Press

SIPRI Yearbook 2002: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security

The Security of the Caspian Sea Region
Edited by Gennady Chufrin
hardback

The Regulation of Arms and Dual-Use Exports: Germany, Sweden
and the UK
Ian Davis
hardback

Executive Policing: Enforcing the Law in Peace Operations
Edited by Renata Dwan
SIPRI Research Report no. 16
paperback and hardback

CSBMs and Regional Arms Control in the New Europe
Zdzislaw Lachowski
SIPRI Research Report no. 17
paperback and hardback

Military Expenditure of African States: A Survey
Wuyi Omitoogun
SIPRI Research Report no. 18
paperback and hardback

The Evolution of Biological Disarmament
Nicholas A. Sims
SIPRI Chemical & Biological Warfare Studies no. 19
paperback

1 ISBN 0-19-829282-1

9 780198 292821

The Use of Force in UN Peace
Operations

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
SIPRI is an independent international institute for research into
problems of peace and conflict, especially those of arms control and
disarmament. It was established in 1966 to commemorate Sweden’s
150 years of unbroken peace.
The Institute is financed mainly by the Swedish Parliament. The staff
and the Governing Board are international. The Institute also has an
Advisory Committee as an international consultative body.
The Governing Board is not responsible for the views expressed in the
publications of the Institute.

Governing Board
Ambassador Rolf Ekéus, Chairman (Sweden)
Dr Catherine M. Kelleher, Vice-Chairman (United States)
Dr Alexei G. Arbatov (Russia)
Dr Willem F. van Eekelen (Netherlands)
Dr Nabil Elaraby (Egypt)
Sir Marrack Goulding (United Kingdom)
Professor Helga Haftendorn (Germany)
Professor Ronald G. Sutherland (Canada)
The Director

Director
Alyson J. K. Bailes (United Kingdom)

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Signalistgatan 9, SE-169 70 Solna, Sweden
Cable: SIPRI
Telephone: 46 8/655 97 00
Telefax: 46 8/655 97 33
Email: [email protected]
Internet URL: http://www.sipri.org

The Use of Force in UN Peace
Operations

Trevor Findlay

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
2002

OXFORD

UNIVERSITY PRESS

Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP
Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford.
It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship,

and education by publishing worldwide in
Oxford New York

Auckland Bangkok Buenos Aires Cape Town Chennai
Dar es Salaam Delhi Hong Kong Istanbul Karachi Kolkata
Kuala Lumpur Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Mumbai Nairobi

São Paulo Shanghai Taipei Tokyo Toronto

Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press
in the UK and certain other countries
Published in the United States

by Oxford University Press Inc., New York

© SIPRI 2002

First published 2002
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced,
stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means,
without the prior permission in writing of SIPRI or as expressly permitted by law,
or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprographics rights organizations.
Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to

SIPRI, Signalistgatan 9, SE-169 70 Solna, Sweden
You must not circulate this book in any other binding or cover

and you must impose the same condition on any acquirer

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
Data available

Library of Congress Cataloguing-in-Publication Data
Data available

ISBN 0-19-829282-1

Typeset and originated by Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Printed in Great Britain on acid-free paper by
Biddles Ltd., Guildford and King’s Lynn

Contents

Preface viii
Acknowledgements ix
Acronyms and abbreviations x

1. Introduction 1
I. Peace operations: a typology 3
II. Mandating the use of force by UN peace operations 7
9
III. Command and control of the use of force 13
IV. Regulating the use of force 14
V. The origins of the self-defence norm 16
VI. Myths, puzzles and paradoxes about the UN’s use of force

2. The emergence of the self-defence norm: UNEF I 20
I. Genesis and mandate 20
II. Use-of-force rules 23
26
III. Application and evolution of the use-of-force rules 44
IV. UNEF’s experience of the use of force 46
V. Codification of the UNEF I experience 49
VI. Conclusions

3. Breaking the rules: peace enforcement in the Congo 51
I. Genesis, mandate and deployment 51
II. Policy and directives on the use of force 55
62
III. The use of force in practice and the evolution of policy 71
IV. The use of force in Katanga: a lapse into peace enforcement 81
V. Conclusions: lessons of the Congo 74
Figure 3.1. Summary of Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld’s

instructions to ONUC, 7 or 8 September 1961

4. The Congo to Lebanon: from self-defence to ‘defence of the mission’ 87

I. The impact of the Congo on the UN’s use-of-force norms 87

and rules

II. The UN Force in Cyprus (1964 to the present) 89

III. The UN Emergency Force II (1973–79) 99

IV. The UN Interim Force in Lebanon (1978 to the present) 103

V. UN doctrine on the use of force by the 1980s 121

Table 4.1. The Nordic UN Tactical Manual situation schedule for the 122

use of force

vi THE US E OF F OR C E IN UN P EAC E OP ER ATIONS

5. After the cold war: use-of-force dilemmas resurface 124
I. The immediate post-cold war missions and the use of force 124
II. Use-of-force norms under strain 148
154
III. The peace enforcement debate 160
IV. The UN reconsiders the use-of-force issue

6. Somalia: crossing the Mogadishu Line 166
I. The United Task Force (1993–94) 166
II. The second UN Operation in Somalia (1993–95) 184
204
III. Somalia and the use-of-force issue

7. Bosnia: from white-painted tanks to air strikes 219
I. The use of force by UNPROFOR 219
II. The use of force by NATO on behalf of UNPROFOR 231
252
III. The use of force by UNPROFOR and NATO for peace
enforcement 262
271
IV. The lessons of the use of force in Bosnia
V. Conclusions

8. From Haiti to Rwanda to Sierra Leone: new missions, old 273
dilemmas
273
I. The UN Mission in Haiti (1993–96) 276
II. The UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (1993–94) 284
III. New missions in the Balkans 287
IV. The East Timor operations 296
V. The UN Mission in Sierra Leone (1999 to the present)

9. Retreat, resurgence and reform: rethinking the use of force by the 315
United Nations
315
I. Back to basics? 320
II. The UN struggles to learn lessons 326
III. The Annan era 332
IV. The Brahimi Report 337
V. Beyond Brahimi 341
Table 9.1. Mission support requirements for effective deployment 340
Figure 9.1. Rapid deployment

10. Conclusions 351
I. The use of force and the UN: a reckoning 351
II. Improving the ability of UN peace operations to use (and 360
avoid using) force
374
III. Peace enforcement and the UN 384
IV. Towards a UN peace operations doctrine? 389
V. Conclusions

C ONTENTS vii

Appendix 1. National peace operations doctrines 391
I. The USA 391
II. The UK 399
404
III. France 406
IV. Australia 407
V. Canada 409
VI. Russia 394
Table A1. Operational variables in US Army Field Manual FM 100-23 400
Figure A.1. The British Army’s conceptual model of peace support

operations

Appendix 2. Rules of engagement 411
1. Selected ONUC operations directives 411
2. Use-of-force instructions for UNEF-II 416
3. Rules of engagement for UNPROFOR 417
4. Rules of engagement for UNITAF: ROE card for Operation Restore 422

Hope 423
5. Rules of engagement for UNOSOM II

Appendix 3. The UN master list of numbered rules of engagement 425

Appendix 4. The Charter of the United Nations 428
1. Chapter VI. Pacific settlement of disputes 428
2. Chapter VII. Action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches 429

of the peace, and acts of aggression

Bibliography 431

Index 469

Preface

This book is a product of SIPRI’s Project on Peacekeeping and Regional
Security, which was led from its inception in 1993 to 1997 by Dr Trevor
Findlay, the author. The aim of the study is to examine the use of force in all its
forms—in self-defence, in defence of the mission and as a tool of peace
enforcement.

One of the most troubling issues that faced the international community in the
closing decade of the 20th century was the use of force by the United Nations
peace operations in situations where the ultimate goal was the alleviation or
ending of armed conflict. Such missions were dubbed ‘peace enforcement’. The
difficulty is that they were carried out by peacekeepers—UN forces designed
for the relatively benign function of monitoring borders between states after
conflict has ended. Complex civil wars in Somalia, Bosnia and Rwanda, in
which UN peacekeeping missions were deployed with disastrous results, raised
several stark questions. When and how should UN peacekeepers use force to
protect themselves or protect their mission, or, most troublingly, to ensure the
compliance of recalcitrant parties with peace accords? Is a ‘peace enforcement’
role for peacekeepers impossible? Is there a middle ground between peace-
keeping and enforcement or is there a stark ‘Mogadishu Line’ across which
peacekeeping should never stray? More recent UN operations in East Timor and
Sierra Leone have kept such issues at the forefront of international concern.

This project was made possible by the funding received from various sources.
We are indebted to all the external funders involved for supporting this study.
The Australian Government funded a conference organized by SIPRI on the
subject in Stockholm in April 1995 which was attended by senior academics,
former UN force commanders, and UN and government officials. The then
Australian Foreign Minister, Senator Gareth Evans, opened and participated in
that meeting. Funding for subsequent research was provided by the US Institute
of Peace in Washington, DC, and by an Evans-Grawemeyer Travel Award to
Dr Findlay by the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade.

We would like to thank Dr Findlay for the invaluable work he has done to
bring this project to completion. In publishing this book he makes a significant
contribution to both the theory and the practice of the use of force in peace
operations.

Adam Daniel Rotfeld
Director of SIPRI
to June 2002

Alyson J. K. Bailes
Director of SIPRI
August 2002

Acknowledgements

I am indebted to a many individuals for their support and inspiration and
material contribution to this project over seven years. They include: Datuk
Jelani Asmawi, Abdul Razak Abdulla Baginda, Mike Bailey, Meli
Bainimarama, Maurice Baril, Mats Berdal, Runo Bergstrom, Anneli Berntson,
Billie Bielckus, Wolfgang Biermann, Christine-Charlotte Bodell, Gerard van
Bohemen, Hugh Borrowman, Göran Bäckstrand, Soon Lian Cheng, Jarat
Chopra, Christopher Coleman, R. R. Crabbe, Sarah Croco, Robert Dalsjö, Don
Daniel, Murray Denyer, Charles Dobbie, Rick Dobbie, William Durch, Renata
Dwan, Douglas Dyer, Gareth Evans, Marie Fagerström, Steve Feller,
Genevieve Forde, Trond Furuhuvde, Joshua Gabriel, Thierry Germond,
Marrack Goulding, Percurt Green, Andrew Greene, Kelly Groll, Tui Gucake,
Marilla Guptil, Olga Hardardottír, Chesley Harris, Mohamed Jawhar Hassan,
Brad Hayes, Damien Healy, John Hillen, Kristina Hinds, Jonathan Howe,
Trevor Hughes, Robert Hunter, Joachim Hütter, Peni Jikoiono, Eve Johansson,
Leonard Kapunga, Jaana Karhilo, Mike Kelly, Bill Kirk, Kathryn Klebacha,
Guy Lavender, Mark Lavender, Peter Leentjes, Milton Leitenberg, Sasha
Lezhnev, Elisabeth Lindenmeyer, Joan Link, Mohamed Yunus Bin Long,
Andrea Lupo, David McBrien, Andrew Mack, John Mackinlay, John
McKinnon, Laila Manji, Isaac Mattiakabara, Vicky Melton, Robert Merrillees,
Rosanne Milano, Tony Miles, Christopher Moore, Alex Morrison, Bernard
Myet, Fred Naceba, Andrew Natsios, Matthew Neuhaus, Peter Noble, Mak
Joon Num, Michael O’Brien, Bo Pellnäs, Dave Phillips, Mirak Raheem,
Christopher Reberger, Andrew Renton-Green, Indar Jit Rikhye, Michael Rose,
Adam Daniel Rotfeld, John Russell, John Sanderson, Erwin Schmidl, Taylor
Seybolt, Apahr Sidhu, Bjørn Skogmo, Hugh Smith, Rupert Smith, Takao
Takahra, Filipo Tarakinikini, Shashi Tharoor, Shinichi Tsurada, Brian
Urquhart, Matt Vaccaro, James Vaile, Jonas Waern, Connie Wall, Philip
Wilkinson, Luke Williams, Michael Williams, David Wimhurst and Susan
Woodward.

Trevor Findlay
June 2002

Acronyms and abbreviations

ACDA Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (USA)
ADL Armistice Demarcation Line (Egypt–Israel)
ANC Armée Nationale Congolaise
APC Armoured personnel carrier
ASEAN Association of South-East Asian Nations
BHC Bosnia and Herzegovina Command
CENTCOM US Central Command
CINCSOUTH Commander-in-Chief South (NATO)
CIS Commonwealth of Independent States
CivPol Civilian police
DFF De Facto Forces (Lebanon)
DPKO Department of Peace-keeping Operations (UN)
DRC Democratic Republic of the Congo
ECOMOG ECOWAS Military Observer Group
ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States
EISAS Executive Committee on Peace and Security (ECPS)
Information and Strategic Analysis Secretariat (UN)
FALINTIL Forças Armadas de Libertação Nacional de Timor Leste
(Armed Forces of Liberation of East Timor)
ICJ International Court of Justice
ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross
IDF Israeli Defence Forces
IFOR Implementation Force (Bosnia)
INTERFET International Force for East Timor
IPA International Peace Academy
JNA Yugoslav National Army
JTF Joint Task Force (Somalia)
KFOR Kosovo Force
KR Khmer Rouge
MMWG Mixed Military Working Group
MNF Multi-National Force (in Beirut)
MNF Multi-national Force (in Haiti)
MONUC UN Observer Force in the Democratic Republic of Congo
NAC North Atlantic Council
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NGO AC R ONYM S AND AB B R EVIATIONS xi
Nordbat
ONUC Non-governmental organization
OOTW Nordic Battalion
OP UN Operation in the Congo
PDD Operations other than war
PE Observation post
PK Presidential Decision Directive
PLO Peace enforcement
PsyOps Peacekeeping
QRF Palestine Liberation Organization
ROE Psychological operations
RPF Quick Reaction Force (Somalia)
RRF Rules of engagement
RUF Rwanda Patriotic Front
SAM Rapid Reaction Force (UNPROFOR)
SDS Revolutionary United Front
SFOR Surface-to-air missile
SHIRBRIG Strategic Deployment Stock
SNA Stabilization Force
SOC Stand-by High Readiness Brigade
SOFA Somali National Alliance
SOP State of Cambodia
SRSG Status of forces agreement
SWAPO Standing (or standard) operating procedures
UAR Special representative of the secretary-general
UNAMET South West African Peoples’ Organization
UNAMIR United Arab Republic
UNAMSIL UN Mission in East Timor
UNCRO UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda
UNDOF UN Mission in Sierra Leone
UNDP UN Confidence Restoration Operation (Croatia)
UNEF UN Disengagement Force
UNF United Nations Development Programme
UNFICYP UN Emergency Force
UNHCR UN Force (Congo)
UNIDIR UN Force in Cyprus
UNIFIL UN High Commissioner for Refugees
UNITAF United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research
UN Force in Lebanon
United Task Force (Somalia)

xii THE US E OF F OR C E IN UN P EAC E OP ER ATIONS

UNMEE UN Mission in Eritrea and Ethiopia
UNMIH UN Mission in Haiti
UNOSOM UN Operation in Somalia
UNPA UN protected area
UNPF UN Peace Forces
UNPREDEP UN Preventive Deployment Force (Former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia)
UNPROFOR UN Protection Force (former Yugoslavia)
UNRWA UN Relief and Works Agency
UNSAS UN Standby Forces Arrangements System
UNSCOM UN Special Commission on Iraq
UNTAC UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia
UNTAES UN Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia,
Baranja and Western Sirmium
UNTAET UN Transitional Administration in East Timor
UNTAG UN Transitional Assistance Group (Namibia)
UNTSO UN Truce Supervision Organization
USC United Somali Congress
WFP World Food Programme

1. Introduction

Traditionally, the United Nations has shied away from allowing the military
forces under its command to use force. The whole bias of the UN Charter is,
quite rightly, towards the peaceful resolution of disputes. The effect of this was
magnified by the cold war, which dramatically reduced the options (beyond
negotiation and mediation) that might otherwise have been open to the UN for
maintaining international peace and security. The result was the invention of
peacekeeping. Dag Hammarskjöld, the UN Secretary-General who oversaw its
advent and was by personal inclination conflict-averse, saw in peacekeeping a
role for the UN which was quasi-military but avoided the use of force.

While UN peacekeepers have always had the right to use force in self-
defence,1 it has been used sparingly, even in extreme life-and-death circum-
stances where it would be universally perceived as legitimate and warranted.
The chief concern of commanders at all levels has been to avoid exacerbating a
situation and damaging the consent of the parties to the UN’s presence, both at
the tactical and, more dangerously, at the strategic level. Overall, the use of
force has been marked more by its absence than by its presence. However, it
has been a central issue and a source of abiding controversy in UN peace
operations. While principles and practices have evolved, they have been subject
to the vicissitudes of time and place as various missions across almost half a
century have struggled to fulfil the mandate of a Security Council that often
seemed oblivious to the facts of the situation in the field.

The three peace operations in which the UN’s disinclination to use force was
overcome on a significant scale—in the Congo in 1960–64, in Bosnia and
Herzegovina in 1992–95 and in Somalia in 1993–95—were traumatic exper-
iences for the UN. During the cold war era, even though the UN operated in a
number of intra-state environments, only the Congo mission triggered sig-
nificant debate about the use of force by peacekeepers. With the end of the cold
war, the sheer number, level of ambition and complexity of UN missions
occasioned public and often passionate debate. Argument centred not just on
how and when the UN should use force, but on whether and how various types
of mission might be categorized in terms of the degree of force they used.
Controversy about the non-use of force by particular missions, as in Rwanda
and Bosnia,2 was often as heated as the controversy surrounding missions, such
as that in Somalia, which were generally felt to have used too much force.

This book examines the use of force by UN peacekeepers, from the first
armed mission under UN command to the present. It investigates every mission
in which substantial force has been used and the major incidents which affected

1 See section V below.
2 Although the official name of the country is the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the term
‘Bosnia’ is used hereafter in this volume for the sake of brevity.