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C ONC LUS IONS 363

As Brahimi noted, many new and updated versions of peacekeeping guidelines
and handbooks ‘now sit half finished in a dozen offices all around DPKO,
because their authors are busy meeting other needs’.9

Proper planning also needs to be done for particular tasks in peace operations,
especially those that run the risk of the use of force. They include: the enforced
or protected delivery of humanitarian assistance; the protection of civilians at
risk; and the disarmament, cantonment and demobilization of armed forces. In
the case of humanitarian assistance, the experiences of Somalia and Bosnia
should be drawn on to produce SOP and model strategies for different circum-
stances. In the case of civilian protection, strategies for establishing, main-
taining and defending safe areas, safe havens and enclaves should be developed
and the advantages and disadvantages of each elucidated for future reference.

For disarmament, cantonment and demobilization, model schemata should be
developed for each type of undertaking, including the role of force in imple-
menting and protecting them, drawing on the UN’s rich and varied experience.
The DPKO announced in December 2001 its intention to include ‘compre-
hensive disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes’ in the
planning for future peace operations, as appropriate.10 Such plans should take as
a given that successful disarmament does not require the removal of every
single weapon (there are permanently millions of firearms in private hands in
many countries, including the USA), but rather that sufficient disarmament
must be achieved and sustained in order for confidence to be built and a peace
process facilitated, unburdened by the threat of the use of force by armed fac-
tions. This has been the practice followed in Bosnia, Kosovo and Macedonia.

More capable and rapidly deployable UN forces

Implementation of the Brahimi Report’s recommendations and Kofi Annan’s
follow-on proposals for meeting its 30- and 90-day deployment goals would
vastly improve the quality, availability and deployability of contingents for UN
peace operations. The most important reforms in this regard include: improve-
ments to UNSAS, including the addition of brigade-size forces; an essential
equipment stockpile at the UN Logistics Base; rapid dispatch of field assess-
ment teams to the mission area, implementing the Canadian vanguard concept
for the rapid deployment of mission headquarters;11 standby arrangements for
civilian and civilian police deployments; and greater selectivity in the choice of
contingents for UN missions, plus training and equipment improvements.

‘Hostage incident card’; ‘Provisional guidelines for public information components in UN peacekeeping
and other field missions’; the ‘UN military symbols handbook’; and ‘Security awareness: an aide-
mémoire’.

9 Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (note 5), para. 192.
10 United Nations, Implementation of the recommendations of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping
Operations and the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations: report of the Secretary-General, UN
document A/56/732, 21 Dec. 2001, p. 14.
11 Government of Canada, Towards a Rapid Reaction Capability for the United Nations (Government
of Canada: Ottawa, Sep. 1995).

364 THE US E OF F OR C E IN UN P EAC E OP ER ATIONS

Ultimately, it is to be hoped that improvements in the management and opera-
tion of UN missions will increase the confidence of all member states, including
the most militarily capable, that they can entrust their forces to the UN and that
they will be properly commanded and protected. This should increase the
willingness of member states to contribute forces to more difficult missions.
However, much more will be required before the UN is able to deploy rapidly.

There have been various proposals over the years for the UN to have, on call,
its own standing rapid reaction capability. Currently, the political, organiza-
tional and financial obstacles to such a development remain insuperable.
Exhaustive studies have been done of both the idea of the UN having its own
force and the alternative of making available such a capability to the UN on
call.12 Perhaps the most important step in this direction would be for the states
which contribute to the Stand-by High-Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG) to
permit it to be available for inclusion in peace enforcement missions.13 Norway
has supported the idea, but has noted that the decision would have to be taken
by the brigade’s members on a case-by-case basis with due account being taken
of the proposed mandates and ROE, as well as the overall political and military
situation.14 Alternatively, SHIRBRIG could be used as an in-theatre or offshore
rapid reaction force to act as a deterrent and in case quick reinforcement is
needed, like UNPROFOR’s RRF and the marine forces stationed off Somalia
and East Timor by the USA. This may become possible if the brigade achieves
success in the less challenging missions in which it is currently being tested.

One difficulty with SHIRBRIG is the opposition of the non-aligned countries
to its extended use. Speaking on behalf of the non-aligned, Jordan bluntly, if
absurdly, told the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations in February
2002 that: ‘The Movement continued to harbour serious reservations over the
multinational initiative because, by referring to a “brigade”, the authors of the
scheme appropriated for themselves the authority of the Secretary-General to
decide the composition of part of or—depending on its size—the entire United
Nations peacekeeping force’.15

12 Studies include: Dennehy, E. J. (Capt.) et al., ‘A Blue Helmet combat force’, Policy Analysis Paper
no. 93-01, National Security Program, Harvard University, 1993; Conetta, C. and Knight, C., Vital Force:
A Proposal for the Overhaul of the UN Peace Operations System and for the Creation of a UN Legion,
Project on Defense Alternatives Research Monograph no. 4 (Commonwealth Institute: Cambridge, Mass.,
Sep. 1995); Cox, D. and Legault, A. (eds), Lester B. Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping
Training Centre, UN Rapid Reaction Capabilities: Requirements and Prospects (Canadian Peacekeeping
Press: Clementsport, 1995); Kaysen, C. and Rathjens, G. W., ‘Send in the troops: a UN foreign legion’,
Washington Quarterly, vol. 20, no. 1 (1996); US Congressional Research Service (CRS), ‘A UN Rapid
Reaction Force? Considerations for US Policymakers, CRS Report for Congress (Library of Congress,
Congressional Research Service: Washington, DC, 29 June 1995); and Haynes, L. and Stanley, T. W., ‘To
create a United Nations fire brigade’, Comparative Strategy, vol. 14, no. 1 (Jan./Mar. 1995).

13 SHIRBRIG, set up to provide the United Nations with a high-readiness peacekeeping force, was
declared available to the UN in Jan. 2000. The participating countries at the time of writing are Argentina,
Austria, Canada, Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania and Sweden.

14 United Nations, ‘Under-Secretary-General for Peace-keeping Operations tells Special Committee
operations must deploy credibly, rapidly to succeed’, Press release GA/PK/174, 11 Feb. 2002, p. 8.

15 ‘Under-Secretary-General for Peace-keeping Operations tells Special Committee operations must
deploy credibly, rapidly to succeed’ (note 14), p. 5.

C ONC LUS IONS 365

However SHIRBRIG develops, the UN, when deploying a mission to a
dangerous environment, should investigate the possibility of asking a group of
states or single state to provide an offshore rapid reaction force to reinforce a
UN mission in difficulty or to assist in evacuation, as the UK was willing to do
in Sierra Leone. Such an arrangement has the advantage of not overburdening
the mission in theatre while at the same time providing deterrence to belli-
gerents and reassurance to troop contributors. At the very least the UN should
hone its rather rudimentary existing plans for evacuation and withdrawal and
establish contingency plans prior to each mission’s deployment.

The practice of deploying a multinational ‘coalition of the willing’ force
when the UN itself is unable to raise a force quickly enough to deal with an
emergency—to be succeeded by a UN follow-on force when ready—has
evolved more as a pragmatic response to particular cases than as a considered
strategy. It is clearly preferable to doing nothing and in most cases has worked
well. The Security Council and UN member states could, however, be more
creative and less rigid in imagining how UN peace operations might better take
advantage of such ‘willing’ partners. Instead of ‘subcontracting out’ an entire
mission and having it only loosely tethered to UN oversight (to date this has
mostly been simply by means of a requirement to report periodically), the
Security Council could request a lead nation to provide the force commander,
key command personnel and a sizeable troop contribution to create a nucleus of
coherence and military capability, but subject all elements to the usual UN
command and control structure. ‘Coalitions of the willing’ would then be left to
cases where the Security Council could not agree to deploy a UN mission, or
when the potential lead nation was not prepared to accept UN command and
control, rather than because the mission was deemed to be beyond UN
capabilities.

Given that such mechanisms are likely to be needed for some time to come, it
would be useful for the UN to better identify the requirements for smooth trans-
itions from coalition to UN operations: as previous chapters have shown, this is
when such undertakings are likely to fall apart under challenge from local
‘spoilers’. Transitional planning modules would be a worthwhile innovation.

The special requirements of humanitarian emergencies, where armed conflict
might threaten the delivery of urgently needed aid, also need to be considered.
Tom Weiss argues that, because political and military enforcement are incon-
sistent with fundamental humanitarian principles, UN agencies are compro-
mised by association with Chapter VII peace enforcement operations.16 He pro-
poses a Humanitarian Protection Force (HUMPROFOR), to be established by
the Security Council in much the same way as the UN Special Commission on
Iraq (UNSCOM), comprising experts and resources siphoned off from existing
UN humanitarian agencies, plus troops seconded from national forces experi-
enced in humanitarian operations. In cases where consent was not obtainable or

16 Weiss, T., ‘Overcoming the Somalia syndrome: Operation Rekindle Hope?’, Global Governance,
vol. 1, no. 3 (May/Aug. 1995), p. 175.

366 THE US E OF F OR C E IN UN P EAC E OP ER ATIONS

was shaky, the military forces could, for instance, ‘carve out defensible areas
within which they could take command without constant friction from com-
batants and local factions’. The models are Operation Provide Comfort in north-
ern Iraq and Opération Turquoise in Rwanda rather than UNITAF, UNOSOM
or UNPROFOR.

Civilian police

The more rapid deployment of more capable UN CivPols, either to monitor the
activities of local police or to assume police functions in cases where the local
police have dissolved or are incapable of operating effectively, could help avoid
the use of force in UN peace operations by tackling law-and-order problems at
an appropriate level. Saul Mendlovitz and John Fousek propose a global con-
stabulary 10 000–15 000 strong comprising volunteers directly recruited and
paid for by the UN.17 It would be the police arm of the International Criminal
Court and be mandated to act in a preventive role. If prevention failed it would
be authorized to use force to protect threatened groups and apprehend war crim-
inals. The virtue of such a constabulary would be that it was truly international
and readily deployable. Its most controversial aspect would be that authority to
deploy it would be vested in the Secretary-General. Moreover, if it landed in
difficulties it would have to be rescued by a military operation.

Current efforts to improve the management of CivPol deployments (including
the separation of the Civilian Police Division from the Military Division in the
DPKO in 2001, in part to avoid CivPol operations being swamped by military
considerations), should continue. Continuing efforts to improve ‘quality con-
trol’ processes for selecting CivPols and enhanced training are also necessary.18

Command and control

The importance of tight command and control increases exponentially when-
ever the use of force is envisaged, threatens or eventuates. Two major problems
must be avoided. First, allied military forces should not operate outside the UN
command structure. If a separate national force is present in the same theatre of
operations it must either be brought quickly under UN command or withdraw.
Second, forces within the command structure must obey UN command, or they
should also withdraw. The authority of the SRSG, acting on the orders of the
UN Secretary-General, must be paramount.

Again, many of the Brahimi and follow-up recommendations, if imple-
mented, would strengthen command and control by producing better-selected,

17 Mendlovitz, S. and Fousek, J., ‘A UN constabulary to enforce the law on genocide and crimes
against humanity’, ed. N. Riemer, Protection Against Genocide: Mission Impossible? (Praeger: Westport,
Ct., 1999), cited in Wheeler, N. J., ‘Review article: humanitarian intervention after Kosovo: emergent
norm, moral duty or the coming anarchy?’, International Affairs, vol. 77, no. 1 (Jan. 2001), pp. 124–25.

18 The DPKO has recently announced the preparation of a model CivPol headquarters, the first time this
has ever happened, to enhance rapid deployment of CivPols. Implementation of the recommendations
(note 10), p. 7.

C ONC LUS IONS 367

-briefed and -prepared SRSGs and force commanders. The UK’s proposal for a
UN Staff College to prepare senior officers for leadership roles in UN opera-
tions would be an excellent innovation in this respect.

Efforts to involve troop-contributing countries more in discussions on man-
dates, concepts of operation, ROE and any changes after deployment would
help to avoid the problem of national contingents second-guessing instructions
from UN forces by seeking high-level authorization from their national capitals.
An institutional innovation at the UN which could help further alleviate, if not
end, the problem would be the establishment for each mission of an equivalent
of Hammarskjöld’s Congo Advisory Committee, comprising representatives of
troop-contributing countries and senior UN Secretariat officials involved in
planning and managing the mission. Presumably, as the staff of the DPKO
grows, it will become increasingly feasible to service such committees. John
Ruggie also proposes that senior officers of the larger troop-contributing coun-
tries be made part of the field headquarters staff of a mission, performing
liaison and advisory functions outside the operational chain of command.19

Clearly, though, the UN needs to avoid micromanagement of its missions by
troop contributors, lest its operations become even more unwieldy. During the
troop-contributor consultations for the Sierra Leone deployment, it was agreed
that, while these consultations were ‘indispensable’, they should not lead to
‘delays in the execution of tasks or prevent the Mission from retaining the
necessary operational flexibility’.20

At the strategic level, one issue of command and control that was not con-
sidered by Brahimi or any of the subsequent reports is the role of the Secretary-
General as the supreme commander of UN forces. There have been suggestions,
notably by Giandomenico Pico,21 that the Secretary-General should be relieved
of this role lest his command of peace enforcement or more robust missions
compromise his impartiality and ability to mediate international disputes.
However, the four secretaries-general who have had the closest involvement in
commanding UN operations that involved peace enforcement—Hammarskjöld,
U Thant, Boutros-Ghali and Annan—seem not to have been so encumbered.
Indeed, it could be argued that giving the UN a more powerful military deploy-
ment capability might give the Secretary-General more negotiating power. He
would have more options available than simply good offices, monitoring and
peacekeeping. In any event negotiating theory does not require that effective
negotiators are unalloyedly neutral: the pro-Israel bias of the US has never
stopped it being an effective negotiator in the Middle East. Finally, it is hard to
see who else in the UN system could be entrusted with being UN supreme force
commander. The Security Council presidency rotates every month, while the
Military Staff Committee remains a dead letter.

19 Ruggie, J. G., ‘The UN and the collective use of force: whither or whether?’, ed. M. Pugh, The UN,
Peace and Force (Frank Cass: London, 1997), p. 16.

20 United Nations, Sixth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone,
UN document S/2000/832, 24 Aug. 2000, p. 7.

21 Pico, G., ‘The UN and the use of force’, Foreign Affairs, vol. 73, no. 5 (Sep./Oct. 1994), p. 15.

368 THE US E OF F OR C E IN UN P EAC E OP ER ATIONS

On balance, it is probably better to leave the current structure for strategic
command and control of UN forces as it is. A better-informed Security Council
and the provision of more substantial and long-range military advice than the
current military adviser and various DPKO offices can provide can be expected
to help improve the UN command and control structure overall.

Intelligence

One of the great gaps in the UN’s peace operations capability is the acquisition,
analysis and effective use of timely intelligence information. Proper intelligence
information is essential for the effective and judicious use of force, as the
Rwanda case indicated, and vital if ill-judged plans to use force are to be
avoided, as the attempted seizure of Aideed demonstrated. Again, the impor-
tance of intelligence information rises exponentially once the use of force is
contemplated or occurs.

Concerned about the hypersensitivity of some if its members to the issue, the
UN has traditionally shied away from openly acknowledging the utility of
gathering and using intelligence information. In practice, however, from the
very beginning, UN operations have, out of military necessity, unofficially
gathered and used such information, albeit at a relatively basic level. UN
missions have also cooperated with certain participating countries in obtaining
higher-level intelligence information when deemed necessary.

There have been several attempts to establish at UN Headquarters a capacity
for intelligence-gathering and analysis, but all have met with opposition from
key developing countries. Perhaps experience with the modest EISAS that will
now be established as a result of the Brahimi Report will convince the sceptics
that such activity does not pose a threat to either their sovereignty or the UN’s
independence. In any event, the same communications revolution that is making
it increasingly difficult for states to keep information from crossing borders will
also make it increasingly easy for the UN to obtain access to information pre-
viously undreamed of. This will come not from a dedicated intelligence unit in
the Secretariat, but from the Internet and via rapid communications with UN
global offices, missions and networks. Member states could assist by sharing
information derived from what is known in the arms control community as
national technical means, most spectacularly satellite photographs (which the
USA, for instance, provided to UNSCOM with respect to Iraq, and to the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) with respect to North Korea).

Rules of engagement

While UN operations have always used rules of engagement to regulate the use
of force by their troops, they have not always been called ROE and knowledge
of them was largely confined to the military. Since the end of the cold war,
largely as a result of US and British participation in Somalia and Bosnia, res-
pectively, ROE have become the subject of intense interest and scrutiny by the