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300 THE US E OF F OR C E IN UN P EAC E OP ER ATIONS

things happened, [the rebel attacks] must have been reasonably well coord-
inated. We should have had a sense of what was going on’.128 George Tenet,
Director of the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), had warned the US
Congress (but apparently not the UN) in February 2000 that the RUF was
‘poised to break a tenuous cease-fire and resume a campaign of terror’.129

On 2 May the situation deteriorated sharply when the RUF tried to forcibly
disarm Kenyan troops at Magburaka. This time they resisted and exchanges of
fire continued throughout the day, the RUF using small arms, rocket-propelled
grenades and mortars, and wounding three Kenyans. The RUF also attacked
Kenyan troops at Makeni, wounding two in one location, and attacking and
overrunning a 60-strong Kenyan unit at the disarmament, demobilization and
reintegration camp. Thereafter, as the UN force displayed little effective oppo-
sition, mass detentions of UNAMSIL troops took place, often, it appears,
without any resistance. Almost 500 UN troops, as well as elements of the
Kenyan sector headquarters, fell into RUF hands, some being relocated to the
RUF stronghold in Kono. UNAMSIL headquarters seemed unable to obtain
accurate information on the total number or their exact status.130 Poor com-
munications not only left the force unsure of the true situation, but led to more
peacekeepers being taken hostage as endangered units could not call for
reinforcements and troops sent to find those missing could not communicate
with them and were captured as well.131

Meanwhile, a Zambian battalion, instructed to move from Lungi to Makeni to
reinforce the town, was stopped at a ‘strong roadblock’ and ‘presumably
ambushed and detained by a large group of RUF fighters’ (the fact that the
Secretary-General apparently still did not know what had happened more than
two weeks later is symptomatic of the confused situation).132 Jetley later con-
ceded that some of the obstacles placed in the way of his troops by the RUF had
been militarily insignificant, although ‘others were strong, involving a lot of
firepower’.133 President Kabbah said on national radio that he was ‘dis-
appointed’ by the way some UN troops had capitulated to the RUF.134

With RUF units advancing on Freetown and refugees streaming into it, panic
began to grip the city. The UN prepared to evacuate its civilian and non-
essential personnel, mistakenly announcing on 7 May that the rebels were
poised to attack.135 UN spokesman Fred Eckhard declared that: ‘We’ll do what

128 ‘With US loath to send troops, UN seeks peacekeeping change’, International Herald Tribune,
12 May 2000, p. 1.

129 Quoted in ‘In Sierra Leone, UN forces robbed of guns’ (note 126).
130 The total number of UNAMSIL personnel ‘presumed’ to be in the hands of the RUF on 19 May was
352 (297 Zambians, 29 Kenyans, 23 Indians and 3 military observers). Fourth report of the Secretary-
General (note 125), para. 69.
131 ‘Old problems, and split in command, hamper UN in Sierra Leone’, International Herald Tribune,
12 June 2000, p. 6.
132 Fourth report of the Secretary-General (note 125), para. 62. The Zambians were later released as a
result of the negotiating efforts of Liberian President Charles Taylor.
133 ‘Interview: Maj.-Gen. Vijay Kumar Jetley, Commander United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone’,
Jane’s Defence Weekly, 12 July 2000, p. 32.
134 ‘Sierra Leone in grip of panic and chaos’, The Times, 8 May 2000, p. 15.
135 ‘Sierra Leone in grip of panic and chaos’ (note 134).

NEW M IS S IONS , OLD DILEM M AS 301

we have to do to defend ourselves and the government. We hope it won’t come
to a pitched battle, but we are preparing for one’.136 Jetley attempted to redeploy
his forces to protect the capital, as well as Port Loko and Masiaka.137 The
Jordanians, however, refused to remain at the ‘front line’, even in defensive
positions, and retreated towards Freetown. A Jordanian officer was quoted as
saying: ‘No Jordanians should die here. This is a British problem. It was their
colony’.138 The Guineans were rumoured to have said the same.139

British reinforcements arrive

Kofi Annan appealed to militarily capable states to quickly provide a rapid
reaction force to UNAMSIL for ‘deterrent purposes’. Alarmed by the deterior-
ating situation in its former colony, the UK was alone in rapidly deploying. A
so-called Joint Force, involving troops, aircraft and a substantial naval pres-
ence, started arriving on 9 May. It consisted of 1st Parachute Group, an Amphi-
bious Readiness Group comprising 42 Commando Royal Marines, a combat air
group of 13 Harrier jump-jets, two frigate gunships with a logistic support
group of three Royal Fleet Auxiliaries, and support helicopters. It was
reportedly given ‘robust’ ROE to act in self-defence, but not offensively.140

While ostensibly having as its objective the safe evacuation of British and
other foreign nationals, the force was soon involved in helping organize and
train UN troops, establishing fortified positions, manning roadblocks, securing
Freetown and its airport, conducting joint patrols with UNAMSIL, and coming
under fire and returning it robustly in self-defence.141 This enabled UNAMSIL
to redeploy much-needed troops to threatened areas east of Freetown. Although
not under UN command and control, the British forces worked in close coop-
eration with UNAMSIL and attended UN planning meetings.142 Their Harriers,
based on an aircraft carrier off the coast, were used to collect invaluable
intelligence information on rebel troop movements to pass to the UN force.143

The British presence proved crucial in steeling the UN’s nerve. According to
Annan, it was ‘a pivotal factor in restoring stability’ and ‘boosted the con-
fidence of the Sierra Leoneans’.144 Jetley stated: ‘They helped very effectively
to stiffen my defences’.145 According to Lieutenant-Colonel Philip Wilkinson:

136 ‘UN troops prepare to defend Freetown’, International Herald Tribune, 11 May 2000, p. 1.
137 Fourth report of the Secretary-General (note 125), para. 62.
138 ‘Battle-hardened troops stiffen UN morale in Sierra Leone’, Independent on Sunday, 4 June 2000,
p. 21.
139 ‘Interview: Maj.-Gen. Vijay Kumar Jetley’ (note 133).
140 ‘Paratroops dig in to secure key peninsula’, The Times, 12 May 2000, p. 18.
141 ‘Paras put rebels to flight after brief battle’, The Times, 18 May 2000, p. 16.
142 ‘Hoodwinked by rebel leader: UN’s misreading of Sankoh hastened Sierra Leone fiasco’,
International Herald Tribune, 15 May 2000, p. 11.
143 ‘Jets track Sierra Leone’s rebels’, The Times, 30 May 2000, p. 18. The first combat involving British
troops came on 17 May after a joint patrol with Nigerian UN troops was attacked by RUF rebels north of
Freetown’s airport.
144 Fourth report of the Secretary-General (note 125), para. 69.
145 ‘Interview: Maj.-Gen. Vijay Kumar Jetley ’ (note 133).

302 THE US E OF F OR C E IN UN P EAC E OP ER ATIONS

‘The deployment of UK forces arguably rescued the UN mission and certainly
played a significant part in averting a full-scale humanitarian catastrophe’.146

The threat averted

As the British were deploying, counter-attacks by UNAMSIL troops (mainly
the Nigerian contingent), government forces and revived pro-government
militia (including the Kamajors and the so-called West Side Boyz147) succeeded
in staving off the rebel assault on Freetown.148 On 9 May the Indian quick-
reaction company and a Kenyan company, which had been surrounded at
Magburaka, successfully broke through RUF lines (whether by using force or
not is unclear), as did Kenyan troops detained at Makeni. Praising their military
courage and determination, Annan noted that: ‘Before their breakout, these
units stood their ground and did not surrender in spite of continuing threats and
attacks by [the] RUF, which had encircled their positions’.149 On the same day,
however, UNAMSIL troops withdrew from the strategic crossroads town of
Masiaka, a UN spokesman admitted, after running out of ammunition following
exchanges of fire with the RUF.150 In an hour-long battle on 11 May, govern-
ment helicopter gunships pounded rebel forces at Waterloo, 33 km south-east of
Freetown, while Nigerian troops used anti-aircraft guns, rocket-propelled
grenade launchers and automatic weapons to capture territory from the RUF.151

By 15 May the threat to Freetown had receded significantly. Government
forces and pro-government militia retook Masiaka and pressed on to Makeni.
Adeniji, bizarrely, proposed a ceasefire, apparently fearing that continued
fighting would jeopardize the safety of the remaining UN hostages.152 By late
May government and pro-government forces had slowly pushed the RUF out of
other important towns. The situation was also helped by the capture and gaoling
of Foday Sankoh by government security forces on 17 May.153

On 5 June, urged on by the British and helped by their involvement in opera-
tions planning, Jetley sent two companies of battle-hardened Indian troops,
newly arrived from Kashmir, to retake by force a strategic crossroads at
Rogberi Junction, approximately 60 km north-east of Freetown. (The Nigerians,
in what has been described as ‘direct insubordination’, had refused Jetley’s
order to do so.154) The Indians broke through RUF roadblocks and, although

146 Wilkinson, P. R. (Lt-Col), ‘Peace support under fire: lessons from Sierra Leone’, International
Security Information Service (ISIS) Briefing Paper on Humanitarian Intervention no. 2, London, June
2000, p. 8.

147 Some of their members had previously committed atrocities and later turned their weapons on
government forces.

148 ‘In panic, thousands flee to Freetown’, International Herald Tribune, 12 May 2000, p. 1.
149 Fourth report of the Secretary-General (note 125), para. 64.
150 ‘Annan struggling on Sierra Leone aid’, International Herald Tribune, 10 May 2000, p. 1. See also
Fourth report of the Secretary-General (note 125), para. 62.
151 International Herald Tribune, 12 May 2000, p. 5.
152 ‘157 UN peacekeepers freed in Sierra Leone’, International Herald Tribune, 16 May 2000, p. 4.
153 ‘How Scorpion captured the ruthless lion’, The Times, 18 May 2000, p. 16.
154 ‘Battle-hardened troops stiffen UN morale in Sierra Leone’ (note 138), p. 21; and ‘Old problems,
and split in command’ (note 131), p. 6.

NEW M IS S IONS , OLD DILEM M AS 303

encountering little opposition, responded robustly to machine-gun fire.155 An
Indian helicopter gunship was also involved in a brief exchange of fire. The
operation, despite its military insignificance, was widely seen as a sea change in
UNAMSIL’s approach.

UNAMSIL was now reported to be planning ‘daily aggressive patrols’ on a
key route from Freetown to Lunsar and on to Lungi Airport. However, on
30 June RUF fighters ambushed a unit escorting the Jordanian contingent, kill-
ing one peacekeeper and wounding four others. Most of the attackers were
killed in the ‘robust response’ by UNAMSIL troops.156 The RUF also staged a
series of attacks on the Jordanian company deployed at Rokel Bridge as well as
on the Nigerian positions at Port Loko. On 4 July, a day after RUF forces
attempted to seize Masiaka from pro-government forces, UNAMSIL swiftly
dislodged them after a brief exchange of fire. On 16 July a Nigerian soldier was
killed in an ambush on his patrol. On 22 July a group of West Side Boyz
ambushed an UNAMSIL convoy, injuring a Guinean peacekeeper.

On 15 July, in cooperation with British troops, UNAMSIL partly redeemed
its reputation by successfully mounting an operation, planned for months, to
rescue the remaining hostages held by the RUF at Kailahun. As British com-
mandos rescued several British and other hostages in a daring helicopter raid,
without shots being fired,157 UNAMSIL troops freed 222 Indian peace-
keepers.158 One thousand mostly Indian but also Ghanaian and Nigerian UN
troops in APCs, backed by helicopter gunships and commanded by Jetley
himself, carried out the operation. While the force met no initial resistance, a
convoy carrying the soldiers and observers to freedom was later ambushed,
leaving six UN soldiers wounded and one dead, and many RUF casualties. In
what sounded like a throwback to the Congo, the UN described the operation as
follows: ‘Since intensive diplomatic and political efforts, at all levels, to seek a
solution by peaceful means were unsuccessful, UNAMSIL decided to launch a
robust military operation to ensure the security of United Nations personnel and
to restore their freedom of movement, in accordance with its mandate and rules
of engagement’.159 It was reported, however, that Jetley had originally opposed
a forcible rescue, arguing that negotiations were preferable.160 He apparently
only agreed when the hostages appeared to be running short of food.

On 22 July, having learned of plans for an attack on its troops, UNAMSIL
launched a pre-emptive operation to remove illegal checkpoints and clear the
Occra Hills area of the by now anti-government West Side Boyz. This was
achieved without UNAMSIL casualties and led effectively to the demise of this

155 United Nations, Daily press briefing of the Office of the Spokesman for the Secretary-General, UN,
New York, 5 June 2000.

156 United Nations, Fifth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra
Leone, UN document S/2000/455, 31 July 2000, p. 4.

157 The Times, 17 July 2000, p. 6.
158 ‘Peacekeepers are freed in Sierra Leone by UN force’, International Herald Tribune, 17 July 2000,
p. 6.
159 Fifth report of the Secretary-General (note 156), p. 5.
160 The Times, 17 July 2000, p. 6.

304 THE US E OF F OR C E IN UN P EAC E OP ER ATIONS

militia group. The crisis cost the lives of nine UN peacekeepers, seven from
Nigeria, one from India and one from Jordan.161 The number of RUF casualties
was unknown, although there were indications that it was high. Some of the UN
troops who had been abducted were later found dead, while others escaped or
were released after negotiations. The whole episode was deeply disturbing to
those who had been attempting to reform UN peacekeeping and who had
envisaged a peace enforcement role for the UN in post-civil war situations.

Efforts to strengthen and improve UNAMSIL’s performance

Both during and after the May 2000 crisis efforts were made by the Secretary-
General to strengthen UNAMSIL and improve its performance, particularly
with regard to the use of force. New Security Council resolutions authorized an
increase in its size and a heightening of its military posture, several investiga-
tions conducted into the mission recommended sweeping changes, and
UNAMSIL became the guinea pig for several recommendations of the Brahimi
Report on peacekeeping reform.162 The impact of all these initiatives was slow
and in many instances negligible.

Emergency measures

Immediate attempts to reinforce UNAMSIL militarily during the crisis, except
for the British deployment, came to nought. At a meeting of the Security Coun-
cil on 11 May, as the crisis was unfolding, many members, especially Nigeria
on behalf of the African countries, advocated giving UNAMSIL a strong
Chapter VII peace enforcement mandate. Annan responded that, while he was
not opposed in principle, UNAMSIL had to obtain the necessary resources from
member states with ‘ready capacity’. He warned that, unless the international
community demonstrated the necessary resolve to impose peace on Sierra
Leone, any effort to strengthen UNAMSIL’s mandate would ‘unduly raise
expectations, increase the risk of loss of life, and undermine the credibility of
the Organization’.163

On 19 May the Security Council approved the immediate reinforcement of
UNAMSIL to a strength of 13 000 to enhance its capability to defend its
positions at Lungi Airport, on the Freetown Peninsula and at other strategic
locations in the western and southern parts of the country.164 Because it was
possible that the RUF would adopt ‘guerrilla tactics’, it would be necessary,
Annan said, to deploy with ‘due care and preparation, in sufficient numbers and
backed up by adequate military means to deter attacks and, if necessary,
respond decisively to any hostile action or intent’.165

161 Fifth report of the Secretary-General (note 156), p. 12.
162 United Nations, Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, UN document A/55/305,
S/2000/809, 21 Aug. 2000. On the Brahimi Report see also chapter 9, section IV, in this volume.
163 Fourth report of the Secretary-General (note 125), para. 100.
164 UN Security Council Resolution 1299, 19 May 2000.
165 Fourth report of the Secretary-General (note 125), para. 85.