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F R OM S ELF - DEF ENC E TO ‘ DEF ENC E OF THE M IS S ION’ 111

120-mm mortars. The battalion halted and an uneasy stand-off developed.
Meanwhile, Erskine alerted UN Headquarters in New York.

The deadlock ended when the UN offered to search for the guerrillas whom
the Israeli troops had been intending to look for in nearby houses. When the UN
search revealed that Israeli intelligence had been mistaken, the Israeli troops
withdrew. Erskine later commented that: ‘A show of force, depending on how
one plays it, can be an effective means of self-defence’.105 On other occasions,
however, Israeli forces crashed through UN roadblocks unperturbed. Fijian
Colonel Isikia Savua noted that: ‘We had to put up a semblance of resistance by
placing barricades in the roads, and the Israelis would plow over them with
trucks. Then the only thing we could do was stand back and watch. This was an
observer mission, not an enforcement action’.106

The May 1979 incident led to establishment of a permanent Force Mobile
Reserve (FMR) for UNIFIL,107 a composite mechanized company drawn from
all six infantry battalions and equipped with APCs. It was deployed quickly to
areas of tension and given other special tasks when required. The Lebanese
ambassador to the United Nations, Ghassan Tueni, claims that UNIFIL’s prob-
lems were caused by the fact that it was given a ‘dynamic mission’ but
essentially ‘static means’ to do the job.108 The FMR was designed to address
this problem. Some of the incidents in which it was subsequently involved are
described below.

The At-Tiri Incident, April 1980

One of the most infamous violent incidents between the UN and the DFF
occurred in the strategically situated village of At-Tiri in the Irish sector on
6 April 1980. Tension began to build when a DFF tank and two jeeps arrived at
the main intersection controlling movements into and out of At-Tiri, which was
guarded by an Irish post. The tank pushed an Irish personnel carrier out of the
way to allow the jeeps to enter the village. Irish troops immediately surrounded
the DFF men and began negotiations to evict them. After an investigation by
UNIFIL’s troubleshooting ‘Team Zulu’, the FMR was deployed in and around
the village. Melodramatically, and quite inaccurately given UNIFIL’s mandate
and ROE, Erskine declares that: ‘UNIFIL was at war’.109 On 7 April a heavy
exchange of small arms fire took place, initiated by the DFF, to which UNIFIL
responded.

During the fighting nine Irish soldiers were taken prisoner by Haddad’s
forces. In negotiations Haddad attempted to trade their freedom for establish-
ment of a command post in At-Tiri. UNIFIL’s negotiator, Norwegian Brigadier
Ole Nielsen, refused and demanded the men’s unconditional release. He warned

105 Erskine (note 84), p. 121.
106 Greenberg (note 65), p. 43.
107 Erskine (note 84), p. 120.
108 Tueni, G., Une guerre pour les autres [A war for others] (Jean-Claude Lattes: Paris, 1985), p. 203,
cited in Skogmo (note 69), p. 90.
109 Erskine (note 84), p. 71.

112 THE US E OF F OR C E IN UN P EAC E OP ER ATIONS

Haddad that if the DFF did not withdraw by the following morning, 8 April, at
1100 hours, UNIFIL would seal off the area, thereby preventing supplies
getting through to his men. If armed confrontation ensued, UNIFIL would
respond with ‘full force’. Erskine notes that: ‘Security Council Resolution 425
had to be defended whatever happened, and in any case the loss of At-Tiri
would have meant a serious encroachment which, on top of the encroachments
we had already suffered, would harm the credibility of UNIFIL operations. Our
stand on At-Tiri was non-negotiable’.110

Waldheim was informed and Urquhart commended Erskine for his handling
of the crisis. The Secretary-General urgently requested Israel to call off its allies
and the USA was informed. Although three of the Irish captives were released
early on 8 April, the Irish battalion in the area was attacked. The Irish com-
mander ordered his force to open controlled fire on the DFF attackers. A local
ceasefire was arranged but subsequently broke down. Further incidents
occurred on 10 and 11 April, resulting in the death of a Fijian soldier. This
provoked the Dutch troops into using their TOW anti-tank missiles in a battle
against DFF tanks.

This was followed by a major DFF attack on UNIFIL headquarters at
Naqoura the following day, 12 April, including the use of mortars, artillery,
tanks, heavy machine guns and small arms. For more than four-and-a-half hours
the headquarters and most of the adjacent supporting elements were subjected
to continuous and indiscriminate firing. UNIFIL fought back fiercely. The
Ghanaian battalion and French logistics battalion used every weapon at their
disposal except the 120-mm mortars, which it was feared would cause civilian
casualties. Extensive damage was done to the headquarters and equipment.
Luckily, the UN incurred no deaths and only one peacekeeper was wounded.
The attack on Naqoura led the UN to establish a permanent headquarters
defence unit, initially comprising a French detachment.

Security Council Resolution 467 was adopted in April 1980 after further
serious incidents which culminated in the abduction and murder of two Irish
UNIFIL soldiers. It included a paragraph that called ‘attention to the provisions
in the mandate that would allow the force to use its rights of self-defence’.111
Although this was nothing more than a restatement of the obvious, it was,
according to Skogmo, ‘meant as a reminder that the mandate and guidelines of
UNIFIL did not exclude more forceful action’.112 In response to the attacks on
its troops the Irish Government convened an unprecedented summit of UNIFIL
troop contributors in Dublin in May 1980.113 While this gave UNIFIL additional
political support and served notice on Israel and Haddad, it did not lead to any
change in the use-of-force rules or military reinforcements.

Erskine later claimed that the At-Tiri incident illustrated some important
peacekeeping principles. First, UNIFIL’s determination to hold At-Tiri demon-

110 Erskine (note 84), p. 73.
111 UN Security Council Resolution 467, 24 Apr. 1980.
112 Skogmo (note 69), p. 86.
113 Erskine (note 84), p. 87.

F R OM S ELF - DEF ENC E TO ‘ DEF ENC E OF THE M IS S ION’ 113

strated the principle of firmness, undoubtedly facilitated by the importance of
the village ‘both strategically and for ensuring that UNIFIL’s credibility did not
suffer’, which was ‘well understood’ by both sides. Second, he commended the
unswerving support of the UN Secretary-General, the Under Secretary-General
and troop contributors. Third, he pointed to the importance of an integrated
command. Fourth, he praised the parallel negotiating ‘track’ in New York to
resolve the issue while UNIFIL’s defensive operations were continuing. Fifth,
he claimed, the incident demonstrated that a UN peacekeeping force ‘is able to
fight in defence of its mandate and of its troops and equipment whenever that
becomes absolutely necessary. When the case is right, the full support of the
Secretary-General and the contributing countries can be assured’. He concluded
that: ‘The fighting at At-Tiri presented a practical demonstration, as well as
definition, of the use of force in self-defence in UN peacekeeping operation
operations’.114 This, of course, begs the question when the conditions can be
judged to be right. Much presumably depends on the fine judgements of the
force commander as to the appropriateness of using force at any particular
juncture.

Attempts to ‘refine’ the use-of-force rules

In his June 1980 report to the Security Council on UNIFIL, the Secretary-
General commented on the use of force, giving as clear a view as any of the
attitude of UN officials to its increased use:

Measures are . . . being considered to enable the contingents of UNIFIL to react firmly
and consistently to threats or actions designed to interfere with the discharge of the
duties of the Force. . . [H]owever . . . the use of force in self-defence will not by itself
achieve significant progress in the implementation of the UNIFIL mandate. A peace-
keeping operation must achieve its major objectives through means other than the use
of force, and this consideration certainly applies to UNIFIL. While consolidating
UNIFIL and taking the necessary steps to render its position as strong as possible, I
believe that the main road to full implementation of the UNIFIL mandate lies in pol-
itical and diplomatic efforts. These efforts must secure genuine co-operation with the
Force and implant the conviction that such co-operation represents, in the long run, the
best guarantee of security and normality for all concerned.115

The new measures were informally discussed with Security Council members
and troop contributors in mid-1980. They included changing the standing orders
to allow UNIFIL to open fire in specified situations—for instance, when other
forces shot at them to kill or tried to infiltrate the UNIFIL area to set up new
positions, or when UNIFIL posts were denied necessary provisions. Reactions
among troop-contributing countries were negative. The USA, which did not
have troops in UNIFIL but feared that such steps would lead to increased con-
frontations between UNIFIL and the Israeli forces, was also less than enthusi-

114 Erskine (note 84), pp. 78–79.
115 United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon,
for the period from 11 December 1979 to 12 June 1980, UN document S/13994, 12 June 1980.

114 THE US E OF F OR C E IN UN P EAC E OP ER ATIONS

astic. The Security Council and troop contributors reiterated their strong support
for the existing use-of-force policy outlined in the Secretary-General’s original
report.116 Ironically, all the new measures proposed were perfectly possible
within the existing mandate and the March 1978 guidelines.

In 1982, again under Lebanese pressure, the Security Council, as well as
increasing UNIFIL’s strength to 7000 troops, in its Resolution 501 quoted ver-
batim the relevant paragraphs of the Secretary-General’s original report on the
use of force.117 According to Skogmo, even if no new elements were intro-
duced, this elevated the use-of-force guidelines to a slightly higher status, since
they were quoted in a resolution and not simply in a report.118 However, they
were useless in preventing Israeli incursions.

The second Israeli invasion of Lebanon, 1982

In June 1982 UNIFIL Force Commander Lieutenant-General William
Callaghan of Ireland was informed by the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) Chief of
Staff, General Rafael Eitan, that Israel intended to launch its second invasion of
Lebanon within half an hour. Eitan intimated that Israeli forces would pass
through or near UNIFIL positions and he expected UNIFIL to ‘raise no physical
difficulty’ for his advancing troops. Callaghan protested strongly and ordered
all UNIFIL troops to block the advancing IDF, adopt defensive measures and
remain in position unless their safety was ‘seriously imperilled’.119

In accordance with these instructions UNIFIL troops took various measures
to stop or at least delay the Israeli advance. On the coastal road to Tyre, Dutch
soldiers planted obstacles before an advancing Israeli tank column and damaged
one tank. During the encounter Israeli tank barrels were trained on the Dutch
soldiers while Israeli troops pushed the obstacles aside. Other UNIFIL batt-
alions also put up various obstacles which were forcibly removed or bulldozed.
A small Nepalese position guarding the Khardala bridge stood its ground
despite continued harassment and threats. Only after two days were the Israeli
tanks able to cross the bridge after partially destroying the Nepalese post.

Despite these efforts, the UN officially records: ‘UNIFIL soldiers with their
light defensive weapons could not withstand the massive Israeli invading
forces, and the UNIFIL positions in the line of the invasion were bypassed or
overrun within 24 hours’.120 One Norwegian soldier was killed by shrapnel on
6 June. In commenting on the invasion in his report of 14 June 1982 to the
Security Council, the Secretary-General stated that UNIFIL, like all UN peace-
keeping operations, was based on certain fundamental principles, foremost of
which was the non-use of force, except in self-defence: ‘The Force was not
meant to engage in combat to attain its goals; it had a strictly limited strength,

116 Skogmo (note 69), p. 88.
117 UN Security Council Resolution 501, 25 Feb. 1982.
118 Skogmo (note 69), p. 87.
119 The Blue Helmets, 3rd edn (note 11), p. 101.
120 The Blue Helmets, 3rd edn (note 11), p. 101.

F R OM S ELF - DEF ENC E TO ‘ DEF ENC E OF THE M IS S ION’ 115

armed only with light defensive weapons . . . Once the Israeli action com-
menced, it was evident that UNIFIL troops could, at best, maintain their posi-
tions and take defensive measures, seeking to impede and protest the
advance’.121 Erskine pleads that: ‘Perhaps UNIFIL could have offered more
resistance, taken some casualties and made a few more “martyrs”, thus con-
soling some critics who have accused it of doing nothing to stop the IDF.
Whether such casualties, in a show of force designed for political convenience,
are justifiable is a highly debatable issue’.122

Once the IDF had occupied the area, UNIFIL troops could do little to affect
the situation. They were instructed not to block IDF movements but only
observe and report. They generally followed Israeli troops wherever they went.
When the latter went beyond what UNIFIL considered allowable in their deal-
ings with Lebanese civilians, UNIFIL often tried to intervene, at times by
placing themselves between the IDF troops and the civilians to prevent violence
and to permit mediation to commence.123 In some cases UNIFIL personnel
interposed themselves physically to prevent the IDF demolishing the houses of
suspected anti-Israeli guerrillas, leading to heated arguments and sometimes
direct confrontation.124 In mid-February 1985, in the village of Burj Rahhal,
French UNIFIL soldiers engaged in fisticuffs with IDF soldiers in an attempt to
stop such demolitions.125

Intensified civil war, 1986

As the conflict between Lebanese resistance groups, on the one hand, and the
IDF and South Lebanon Army (SLA) forces, on the other, intensified in 1986,
UNIFIL personnel were subjected to increasing attacks from both sides. In
August two men, one of them a local Amal leader, were shot by a French sentry
in a confrontation at a UNIFIL checkpoint.126 In the following days UNIFIL
positions came under fire, particularly in the French sector, but also in the
Fijian, Finnish, Irish and Nepalese contingent areas. In September four French
soldiers were killed by remote-controlled bombs, several more were wounded
and the French contingent continued to be harassed. Hezbollah militia were
suspected of involvement.

In his report to the Security Council, the Secretary-General spoke of the
‘major crisis’ facing UNIFIL and presented a list of immediate measures pro-
posed by the force commander, including regroupment of UNIFIL positions
and contingents, a crash programme for additional reinforced shelters and
increased reliance on APCs.127 The Council authorized the Secretary-General to
proceed. There was also discussion about reassessing aspects of the SOP, one

121 The Blue Helmets, 3rd edn (note 11), pp. 101–102.
122 Erskine (note 84), p. 112.
123 United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General, UN document S/17093, 11 Apr. 1985.
124 Skogmo (note 69), p. 35.
125 Skogmo (note 69), p. 35.
126 Skogmo (note 69), p. 53.
127 United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General, UN document S/18348, 18 Sep. 1986.

116 THE US E OF F OR C E IN UN P EAC E OP ER ATIONS

suggestion being to acquire heavy weapons. In the opinion of Force Com-
mander Major-General Gustav Hägglund of Finland, UNIFIL should not
acquire such weapons, given its need for the cooperation and consent of the
local population. He believed instead that UNIFIL’s strategy should be to avoid
violence by being able to deploy superior force quickly when needed.128

The measures introduced in late 1986 and early 1987 to enhance UNIFIL’s
effectiveness and improve its security included: (a) a major redeployment in
late 1986 as a result of the withdrawal of the French contingent from its
sector;129 (b) a revision of the SOP to ensure that the tasks assigned to indi-
vidual units were realistic and practicable in the prevailing circumstances of
southern Lebanon; and (c) steps to ensure that these procedures were carried out
consistently by all units of the force.130 When the cold war ended in 1989
UNIFIL was still in place, effectively overshadowed by the emergence of new
missions with even more difficult use-of-force issues to confront.

Conclusions on UNIFIL’s use of force

UNIFIL used force, where necessary, to defend itself and its mission. Most of
its fatalities were incurred at its own roadblocks, designed to check the entry of
weapons, ammunition and armed personnel into its area of operation.131 In some
cases force was not used where it might have been, even according to a con-
servative interpretation of the self-defence rule. Skogmo reports that there were
cases where UNIFIL units were ‘not sufficiently firm to establish respect’.132
There were also several reports of incidents in which UNIFIL contingents, in
response to repeated provocation, used more force than UN and UNIFIL head-
quarters realized. By June 1990 UNIFIL had incurred 130 fatalities through
hostile action, the highest toll of any UN mission at that time.133

Sound political judgement and military professionalism on the part of
UNIFIL officers were two equally important requirements in handling incidents
involving the use of force. Also crucial in performing its preventive duties
without the use of force was early warning of the build-up of Israeli or militia
forces prior to an incursion. When successful, this resulted in UNIFIL being
able to boost its presence in the area under threat, including through the use of

128 Report of the Secretary-General (note 127).
129 Skogmo (note 69), pp. 89–90.
130 None of this helped UNIFIL in Feb. 1992 when Israel launched another large-scale incursion.
Lewis, P., ‘A short history of United Nations peacekeeping’, Soldiers for Peace, Supplement to Military
History Quarterly, vol. 5, no. 1 (autumn 1992), p. 20. UNIFIL was humiliated when an Israeli armoured
column broke through its roadblocks on its way to punish Hezbollah guerrilla groups. Israeli attacks on
UNIFIL troops occurred periodically thereafter, some apparently deliberate. In Apr. 1996 an Israeli
artillery barrage against the Fijian battalion’s headquarters at Qana killed 100 refugees and injured several
peacekeepers. A report by the Secretary-General’s Military Advisor, Major-Gen. Franklin van Kappen,
expressed doubt that the attack had been as accidental as Israel claimed. United Nations, Annex to Letter
dated 7 May 1996 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council, UN
document S/1996/337, 7 May 1996.
131 Erskine (note 84), p. 107.
132 Skogmo (note 69), p. 88.
133 The Blue Helmets, 2nd edn (note 74), p. 427.