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B OS NIA: F R OM WHITE- P AINTED TANKS TO AIR S TR IKES 237

Defence of UNPROFOR through close air support

Close air support was seen as the easiest and most likely use of NATO air
power in Bosnia, but it was also viewed as a potentially powerful deterrent to
attacks on UNPROFOR, whether force was actually used or not. Indeed, in the
early stages, overflights and shows of force were enough to end particular
attacks on peacekeepers, stop localized fighting between the parties or halt the
advance of one party or another. On 18 August 1993 NATO aircraft engaged in
a show of force to threaten Bosnian Serb forces attacking Bosnian Government
forces on Mount Igman. The attacks stopped and French UNPROFOR troops
deployed to the area, intermingling with Serb units. (The proximity of French
forces had the unfortunate consequence of forestalling future air strikes against
the Serbs.80) It was the first time the UN had seriously threatened the use of
NATO air power for such purposes and it had worked.

Indeed, initially, every time NATO seriously threatened to use air power the
Bosnian Serbs backed down. It helped induce them, for instance, to sign a
temporary ceasefire agreement in January 1994 and to comply with NATO’s
ultimata to establish exclusion zones around Sarajevo and Gorazde in February
and April 1994. The utility of threats declined, however, the longer NATO
waited to actually attack. As NATO and UNPROFOR showed continuing
reluctance to use the weapons with which the aircraft were armed, even when
UNPROFOR was directly under fire, the factions became emboldened. After a
year of operating under constantly buzzing Western jets which failed to use
force, the Bosnian Serbs became blasé about the devastating potential of air
power.81 Overflights and shows of force were increasingly ignored.

Suspicion about the responsibility for this situation fell increasingly, and
unfairly, on Akashi and Boutros-Ghali, both of whom were accused of vetoing
each proposed use of air power. Boutros-Ghali tried to absolve himself: ‘I want
it to be clear that so far I have never received a request to use the air force. The
day I receive such a request and that I have the support of those respon-
sible . . . I will be the first to support its use’.82 Boutros-Ghali later, dis-
ingenuously, denied that he had refused the use of air strikes in Bosnia. He told
a press conference in December 1995 that: ‘The discussion of bombing or not
bombing was undertaken by the people on the ground. I am not a military
specialist. My decision, or the decision of my Special Representative, was taken
according to the point of view of the military people on the ground. The
military people on the ground were saying, “Don’t bomb, because this will rep-
resent a risk for our soldiers”, or “Bomb, because we are ready to take that
risk”’.83

In July 1995 Akashi made up a list for reporters entitled ‘SRSG approval of
employment of air power’ which showed that he had approved 11 air operations

80 Durch and Schear (note 18), p. 237.
81 Durch and Schear (note 18), p. 242.
82 Quoted in Leurdijk (note 73), p. 41, fn. 49.
83 United Nations, Press Conference, UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, UN Headquarters,
18 Dec. 1995, UN document SG/SM/95/331, 18 Dec. 1995, p. 8.

238 THE US E OF F OR C E IN UN P EAC E OP ER ATIONS

since being assigned to Bosnia, agreeing to virtually every request made by
field commanders.84 Per-Erik Solli estimates that 98 per cent of requests for air
strikes were turned down by the military, not by UN civilians.85

Part of the problem was the scepticism of UNPROFOR’s military personnel,
both at headquarters and in the field, about the efficacy of air power.
UNPROFOR spokesman Commander Barry Frewer cautioned in July 1993 that
air strikes were a last resort to be considered ‘very, very carefully. We hope
[they] will never have to be used’.86 Briquemont declared that: ‘To make threats
is easy, to carry them out is more difficult. Those who want to carry out air
strikes should come to Sarajevo and study the map with me’.87

Such statements tended to undermine the deterrent effect of NATO air power
even before it was used, but they reflected a genuine concern that the use of air
power could endanger UNPROFOR forces on the ground, risked escalating
conflict between the UN and the local belligerents, and would jeopardize the
UN’s attempt to remain impartial.

Notwithstanding these considerations, Rose was ‘determined to engineer a
situation in which I could legitimately employ NATO air strikes in order to
demonstrate a more robust UN approach to peacekeeping’.88 He decided soon
after arriving in January 1994 to confront Bosnian Croat forces who had been
firing on Canadian convoys resupplying a hospital for mentally handicapped
children by sending in British Coldstream Guards to lead the next convoy. The
troops would be accompanied by a NATO forward air controller, who could
call in air power if necessary. Rose wanted to target the local command struc-
ture, not just their firing trenches, to send a tough message to all the factions
that UNPROFOR was not to be toyed with. He says that he chose the Bosnian
Croats rather than the Bosnian Serbs in order to demonstrate his even-handed
‘peacekeeping’ approach. UNPROFOR headquarters opposed the mission on
the grounds that carefully nurtured relationships with the Croats would be
destroyed. As it turned out, with four A10 ‘tank-busting’ aircraft flying over-
head, the convoy was not fired on, nor was it ever fired on again. Rose was
disappointed: ‘Although a tactical advantage had been gained by opening up the
route, the overall strategic impact of carrying out an early air strike was lost’.89
The plan, to spring a trap as a means of signalling resolve, was an unusual
departure from the normal peacekeeping ethos from someone who professed to
be adhering to it.

Thereafter, successive incidents illustrated the difficulties involved in
attempting close air support in defence of peacekeepers in a volatile environ-
ment. On 22 February 1994, after five of their number were wounded in a mor-
tar attack on a Nordbat convoy near Tuzla, Swedish troops called for air cover.
While two Harrier jets flew over, neither the troops nor the jets could identify a

84 Boutros-Ghali (note 46), p. 241.
85 Personal conversation with the author.
86 Sydney Morning Herald, 31 July 1993.
87 ‘Sarajevo’s besiegers sneer at international disarray’, Sunday Times, 8 Aug. 1993, p. 13.
88 Rose (note 13), p. 36.
89 Rose (note 13), p. 37.

B OS NIA: F R OM WHITE- P AINTED TANKS TO AIR S TR IKES 239

target. Nor was it clear whether the Serbs or Bosnian Government forces had
carried out the attack. An official at UNPROFOR headquarters was reported as
claiming: ‘We came very, very close to using air power’.90 Rose had supported
the request, but Cot was opposed, ‘only because there was no absolute means of
determining the origin of the shell’.91

On 13 March 1994, when two tank shells were fired at a UN observation post
and the French base at Bihac came under heavy machine-gun and anti-aircraft
fire, the French forces requested close air support. Akashi approved the request
but bad weather prevented NATO jets from taking off immediately. By the time
they arrived, the offending tank had withdrawn. According to a French officer
in Bihac: ‘It was a joke; the planes took five hours to turn up. If the UN wants
us to carry out this mission, we have to be able to strike back. We’re all very
angry with our chiefs’.92

In mid-May 1994 the Nordbat commander at Tuzla Airport asked, for the
fifth time, for close air support. The source of shelling—Serb tanks—had this
time been clearly identified. Akashi refused authorization.93 An UNPROFOR
spokesperson explained that by the time headquarters learned of the 20-minute
tank attack the firing had stopped, adding that: ‘The procedure is very clear—
the attack has to be in progress for us to strike’.94 The following day another
spokesperson added: ‘Close air support from NATO is a last resort for UN
troops under attack and when loss of life is at stake. This request did not meet
those standards’.95 Clearly, as regards close air support, troops in the field and
their commanders had different views of the ROE.

In June 1994 British troops being attacked by Serb artillery in Bugojno in
Central Bosnia requested close air support. Akashi and de Lapresle approved it
and passed the request to NATO, but the attack was cancelled when the shelling
stopped.96

The use of air power in respect of the safe areas

NATO’s most challenging and complex involvement in the use of force in
Bosnia came in connection with the safe areas. Resolution 836 of 4 June 1993,
which mandated UNPROFOR to act in self-defence to deter attacks on these
areas, also authorized NATO, ‘with all necessary measures, through the use of
air power’ and in ‘close coordination with the Secretary-General and
UNPROFOR’, to support UNPROFOR in carrying out its mandate. What this
meant in practice was left unspecified, although it was generally interpreted as
meaning that NATO was not mandated to protect the safe areas or their popula-

90 International Herald Tribune, 23 Feb. 1994, p. 1.
91 The Independent, 23 Feb. 1994, p. 1.
92 ‘Weather thwarts UN air strikes’, The Independent, 14 Mar. 1994, p. 8.
93 Zucconi, M., ‘The former Yugoslavia: lessons of war and diplomacy’, SIPRI Yearbook 1995:
Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1995), p. 226.
94 International Herald Tribune, 18 May 1994.
95 International Herald Tribune, 18 May 1994.
96 Recounted in Leurdijk (note 73), p. 53.

240 THE US E OF F OR C E IN UN P EAC E OP ER ATIONS

tions directly, but only indirectly by giving UNPROFOR close air support. US
Secretary of State Warren Christopher at one stage explicitly declared that
NATO air cover would not be used to protect civilian populations under
attack.97 Boutros-Ghali seemed to have a different view, arguing that: ‘Since it
is assumed that UNPROFOR ground troops will not be sufficient to resist a
concentrated assault on any of the safe areas, particular emphasis must be
placed on the availability of a credible air-strike capability provided by Member
States’.98

The first concerted attempt to expand NATO operations to include air attacks,
as opposed to close air support to UNPROFOR, came in August 1993. On
2 August, in response to the continuing siege of Sarajevo and the seizure by the
Bosnian Serbs of two strategic positions overlooking the city, the NAC con-
vened an emergency session at the USA’s request to consider two pressing
issues—the command and control controversy, and stronger use of air power in
the form of air strikes. On the first, the USA had already been lobbying to
exclude both Boutros-Ghali and Akashi from the dual key with regard to air
strikes—although so loosely was the latter word bandied about that it is difficult
to tell whether it referred to all use of air power or only air power beyond close
air support. Christopher presented the Secretary-General with a ‘non-paper’
proposing this, but Boutros-Ghali, determined not to let NATO take over the
Bosnia operation or use the UN flag as ‘a flag of convenience’, insisted in his
own ‘non-paper’ that he retain the power to approve air strikes.99 He reached
agreement with NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner on 1 September
that the decision to call air strikes still belonged with the UN.100

On the second issue the US delegation sought an ‘extensive interpretation’ of
Resolution 836 to allow NATO, on its own initiative, to conduct air attacks on a
wide range of targets in Bosnia (and even outside it) in order to secure Serb
compliance (with what exactly was never quite clarified).101 Criticized by
Congress, the press and other observers for not adopting a ‘lift and strike’
policy (lifting sanctions and hitting the Serbs with massive air strikes), the US
administration hoped that NATO air power could not only defend the safe areas
but also punish the Bosnian Serbs for violating agreements, drive them to the
negotiating table and force them to agree a peace settlement.

Canada, France, Spain and the UK, now with thousands of troops in the field,
would not agree to a proposal for a major bombing campaign. Not only would
their forces be endangered, but they risked being drawn into a shooting war
with the Bosnian Serbs for which they were ill-equipped. They argued that
troops do not surrender to aircraft and that therefore large numbers of ground
troops would be needed if peace enforcement were to be seriously undertaken.

97 Leurdijk (note 73), p. 37, fn. 41, citing Atlantic News, no. 2534 (12 June 1993).
98 United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council, UN document S/25939,
14 June 1993.
99 Nouvelles Atlantiques, no. 2550 (3 Sep. 1993), p. 2; ‘UN commander proposes limited Bosnia air
strikes’, The Times, 5 Aug. 1993, p. 9; and Boutros-Ghali (note 46), pp. 88–90.
100 Zucconi (note 93), p. 226.
101 Leurdijk (note 73), p. 38; and ‘We must bomb now’, The Times, 8 Aug. 1993, p. 12.

B OS NIA: F R OM WHITE- P AINTED TANKS TO AIR S TR IKES 241

The USA, which had no troops in Bosnia, was unwilling to provide such forces
in the absence of a peace settlement.

The compromise, agreed on 9 August 1993, was to expand the target options
beyond ground forces directly involved in attacks on UNPROFOR to artillery
positions, ammunition storage areas, command posts and similar facilities.102
However, the ROE would still limit air strikes to proportionate retaliatory res-
ponses to attacks on UN peacekeepers. The deterrent effect was weakened by
NATO’s surreal declaration that air strikes ‘must not be interpreted as a
decision to intervene militarily in the conflict’.103

A year later, on 11 September 1994, Admiral Leighton Smith (CINCSOUTH)
wrote to de Lapresle stating that the Bosnian Serbs’ ceasefire violations were
undermining the collective credibility of NATO and the UN, and suggesting
that NATO attack significant targets within the next 48 hours.104 Rose says that
the letter provoked shock in Zagreb and Brussels given the low level of military
activity in Bosnia that summer, as well as the decision of the international
community to give peace another chance. Rose suspects that Joulwan drafted
the letter and Smith sent it against his better judgement. De Lapresle, in what
Rose calls a ‘tough reply’, restated that force should only be used in relation to
confirmed violations of the ceasefire and should be proportional to the event.

The use of air power to enforce heavy weapon exclusion zones

When it became clear that simply creating safe areas and threatening retaliation
for attacks on UNPROFOR would not end the threat to the besieged cities of
Bosnia, NATO added the concept of heavy weapon exclusion zones. Estab-
lished first around Sarajevo in February 1994, they were extended in April 1994
to Gorazde and all other safe areas. The idea arose following the mortar attack
on a Sarajevo marketplace of 5 February 1994, widely assumed to be the work
of the Bosnian Serbs, which killed at least 58 civilians and wounded 142 others.
The next day Boutros-Ghali wrote to Woerner, suggesting that preparations be
made to use air strikes to ‘deter further such attacks’ and asking NATO to
prepare to launch strikes at his request against artillery or mortar positions in
and around Sarajevo which were determined by UNPROFOR to be responsible
for attacks against civilian targets.105

The mood in favour of the use of force had by now shifted somewhat, with
Belgium, France, Germany, Italy and the USA supportive. The UK remained
cautious, calling for unspecified ‘immediate and strong pressure’ by the UN to
halt attacks on Sarajevo, as well as stronger ROE, but not generalized air
strikes.106 Canada and Ukraine both opposed military intervention, fearing that

102 Atlantic News, no. 2547 (Aug. 1993); and Rader, S., ‘NATO’, ed. T. Findlay, Challenges for the
New Peacekeepers, SIPRI Research Report no. 12 (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1996), p. 149.

103 Atlantic News, no. 2547 (Aug. 1993).
104 The following account is from Rose (note 13), p. 170.
105 Boutros-Ghali (note 46), p. 144. He acted under Security Council Resolution 836 of 4 June 1993.
106 Financial Times, 9 Feb. 1994, p. 16; and ‘British troops with UN set to stay in Bosnia’, The
Guardian, 17 Feb. 1994, p. 20.

242 THE US E OF F OR C E IN UN P EAC E OP ER ATIONS

it might endanger their peacekeepers. Russia, reluctant for historical and
domestic political reasons to countenance the bombing of the Bosnian Serbs,
accused Boutros-Ghali of overstepping his mandate and strongly warned the
West that air strikes could lead to ‘all-out war’.107

NATO nonetheless accepted the Secretary-General’s request, putting approx-
imately 170 fighter aircraft, bombers and ground attack aircraft as well as
approximately 30 reconnaissance, communication and refuelling aircraft on
standby—the largest concentration of air power since the Gulf War.108 The
NAC first issued an ultimatum to the parties to establish within 10 days a
20-km heavy weapon exclusion zone around Sarajevo (and a 2-km zone around
Pale, the Bosnian Serb capital) and either withdraw such weapons or canton
them under UNPROFOR supervision. Bosnian Government forces within the
Sarajevo exclusion zone were also required to place their heavy weapons under
UNPROFOR supervision and refrain from launching attacks from the city.
Heavy weapons of either party found within the zone after 10 days (by
21 February) would be subject to NATO air strikes conducted in ‘close coord-
ination’ with the UN.

Boutros-Ghali, determined that the UN should retain the initiative in request-
ing such air strikes, responded to the NATO communiqué by declaring that:
‘We have no difficulty. All that is required is for those responsible for military,
humanitarian and political operations to ask, decide to use the air force, and we
would immediately ask NATO to use it’.109 The Secretary-General did, how-
ever, delegate to Akashi the right to approve a request from the UNPROFOR
force commander for close air support for the defence of UNPROFOR any-
where in Bosnia.110

In fact there was no use of air power at this time in response to violations of
the heavy weapon exclusion zones. Rose, fearing that they would endanger his
troops and plunge UNPROFOR into further difficulties, apparently convinced
British Defence Minister Malcolm Rifkind to resist pressure from the USA and
NATO for air strikes111 and managed to negotiate a withdrawal of the heavy
weapons from Sarajevo and surrounding areas. Russia agreed to dispatch
400 troops to help create a buffer zone separating predominantly Serb neigh-
bourhoods from the rest of the city.112 Additional reasons for avoiding air
strikes at this time included the facts that the Vance–Owen Peace Plan113 was
close to being accepted by the parties and that there was continuing uncertainty

107 The Guardian, 19 Feb. 1994, p. 1.
108 Leurdijk (note 73), pp. 42–43.
109 Quoted in Leurdijk (note 73), p. 43.
110 Zucconi (note 93), p. 226, quoting Atlantic News, no. 2597 (16 Feb. 1994), p. 3.
111 Rose (note 13), p. 46.
112 Lagunina, I., ‘Learning from Bosnia: new modes of cooperation complicate the future of peace-
keeping’, Moscow News, 18–24 Mar. 1994, p. 5. Ironically, this was the closest UNPROFOR had yet
come in Bosnia to engaging in a traditional peacekeeping activity—separating combatants along a
ceasefire line—although using the forces of a country sympathetic to one of the parties was unusual and,
in the view of some, violated classic peacekeeping norms.
113 Zucconi (note 93), p. 214.