would be beyond the means of the party involved.
Ma. Darlene Dimayuga-Laurena vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 159220,
September 22, 2008
Republic of the Phil. vs. Lynnette Cabantug-Baguio, G.R. No. 171042, June 30, 2008
Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112019, January 4, 1995
Psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code must be
characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. Thus, the
incapacity "must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of
carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history
of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge
only after marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure
would be beyond the means of the party involved." In this connection, the burden of
proving psychological incapacity is on the petitioner, pursuant to Republic v. Court of
Appeals, or the Molina case.
Matudan v. Republic, G.R. No. 203284, November 14, 2016, citing Santos v. Court of
Appeals, 10 Phil. 21 (1995) and Republic v. Court of Appeals, 335 Phil. 664, 676 (1997)
Guideline No. 2 requires testimony of psychiatrist or medical doctor to prove
psychological incapacity.
The wife failed to comply with guideline No. 2 which requires that the root
cause of psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically identified and
sufficiently proven by experts, since no psychiatrist or medical doctor testified as to
the alleged psychological incapacity of her husband.
Republic of the Phil. vs. Erlinda Matias Dagdag, G.R. No. 109975, February 9, 2001
In the task of ascertaining the presence of psychological incapacity as a ground for
the nullity of marriage, the courts, which are concededly not endowed with expertise
in the field of psychology, must of necessity rely on the opinions of experts in order to
inform themselves on the matter, and thus enable themselves to arrive at an intelligent
and judicious judgment. Indeed, the conditions for the malady of being grave,
antecedent and incurable demand the in-depth diagnosis by experts.
Kalaw v. Fernandez, G.R. No. 166357, January 14, 2015
Examination by physician or psychologist is not a prerequisite for declaration of
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psychological incapacity.
Psychological incapacity, as a ground for declaring the nullity of a marriage,
may be established by the totality of evidence presented. There is no requirement,
however, that the respondent should be examined by a physician or a psychologist as a
conditio sine qua non for such declaration.
Brenda B. Marcos vs. Wilson G. Marcos, G.R. No. 136490, October 19, 2000
Kalaw v. Fernandez, G.R. No. 166357, January 14, 2015
Verily, the totality of the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between
the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself. If
other evidence showing that a certain condition could possibly result from an assumed
state of facts existed in the record, the expert opinion should be admissible and be
weighed as an aid for the court in interpreting such other evidence on the causation.
Kalaw v. Fernandez, G.R. No. 166357, January 14, 2015
Indeed, an expert opinion on psychological incapacity should be considered as
conjectural or speculative and without any probative value only in the absence of
other evidence to establish causation. The expert's findings under such circumstances
would not constitute hearsay that would justify their exclusion as evidence. This is so,
considering that any ruling that brands the scientific and technical procedure adopted
by Dr. Gates as weakened by bias should be eschewed if it was clear that her
psychiatric evaluation had been based on the parties' upbringing and psychodynamics.
Kalaw v. Fernandez, G.R. No. 166357, January 14, 2015
[E]ven if the expert opinions of psychologists are not conditions sine qua non in the
granting of petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage, the actual medical
examination of [the husband] was to be dispensed with only if the totality of evidence
presented was enough to support a finding of his psychological incapacity. This did
not mean that the presentation of any form of medical or psychological evidence to
show the psychological incapacity would have automatically ensured the granting of
the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. What was essential, we should
emphasize herein, was the "presence of evidence that can adequately establish the
party's psychological condition," as the Court said in Marcos. But where, like here, the
parties had the full opportunity to present the professional and expert opinions of
psychiatrists tracing the root cause, gravity and incurability of the alleged
psychological incapacity, then the opinions should be presented and be weighed by the
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trial courts in order to determine and decide whether or not to declare the nullity of the
marriages. It bears repeating that the trial courts, as in all the other cases they try, must
always base their judgments not solely on the expert opinions presented by the parties
but on the totality of evidence adduced in the course of their proceedings.
Arabelle J. Mendoza vs. Republic of the Phil., et al., G.R. No. 157649, November 12,
2012
The presentation of any form of medical or psychological evidence to show the
psychological incapacity, however, did not mean that the same would have
automatically ensured the granting of the petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage. It bears repeating that the trial courts, as in all the other cases they try, must
always base their judgments not solely on the expert opinions presented by the parties
but on the totality of evidence adduced in the course of their proceedings.
Castillo v. Republic, G.R. No. 214064, February 6, 2017
Guidelines in evaluating the testimonies of psychologists and psychiatrists
Rumbaua provides some guidelines on how the courts should evaluate the
testimonies of psychologists or psychiatrists in petitions for the declaration of nullity
of marriage, viz.:
We cannot help but note that Dr. Tayag's conclusions about the respondent's
psychological incapacity were based on the information fed to her by only one side —
the petitioner — whose bias in favor of her cause cannot be doubted. . . . To make
conclusions and generalizations on the respondent's psychological condition based on
the information fed by only one side is, to our mind, not different from admitting
hearsay evidence as proof of the truthfulness of the content of such evidence.
xxx xxx xxx
First, what she medically described was not related or linked to the
respondent's exact condition except in a very general way. In short, her testimony and
report were rich in generalities but disastrously short on particulars. . .
Second, her testimony was short on factual basis for her diagnosis because it
was wholly based on what the petitioner related to her. . . . If a psychological disorder
can be proven by independent means, no reason exists why such independent proof
cannot be admitted and given credit. No such independent evidence, however, appears
on record to have been gathered in this case, particularly about the respondent's early
life and associations, and about events on or about the time of the marriage and
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immediately thereafter. Thus, the testimony and report appear to us to be no more
than a diagnosis that revolves around the one-sided and meagre facts that the
petitioner related, and were all slanted to support the conclusion that a ground exists
to justify the nullification of the marriage. We say this because only the baser
qualities of the respondent's life were examined and given focus; none of these
qualities were weighed and balanced with the better qualities. . . The evidence fails to
mention also what character and qualities the petitioner brought into her marriage . . .
To be sure, these are important because not a few marriages have failed, not because
of psychological incapacity of either or both of the spouses, but because of basic
incompatibilities and marital developments that do not amount to psychological
incapacity.
Viñas v. Parel-Viñas, G.R. No. 208790, January 21, 2015, citing 612 Phil. 1061 (2009)
An expert witness would have strengthened the claim of psychological incapacity.
[I]n order that the allegation of psychological incapacity may not be considered a
mere fabrication, evidence other than [the wife's] lone testimony should have been
adduced. While an actual medical, psychiatric or psychological examination is not a
conditio sine qua non to a finding of psychological incapacity, an expert witness
would have strengthened [the wife's] claim of [the husband's] alleged psychological
incapacity. [Her] omission to present one is fatal to her position. There can be no
conclusion of psychological incapacity where there is absolutely no showing that the
"defects" were already present at the inception of the marriage or that they are
incurable.
Republic of the Phil. vs. Norma Cuison-Melgar, et al., G.R. No. 139676, March 31, 2006
It is already settled that the courts must accord weight to expert testimony on the
psychological and mental state of the parties in cases for the declaration of the nullity
of marriages, for by the very nature of Article 36 of the Family Code the courts,
"despite having the primary task and burden of decision-making, must not discount
but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on the
psychological and mental temperaments of the parties."
Kalaw v. Fernandez, G.R. No. 166357, January 14, 2015, citing Ngo Te v. Yu-Te, G.R.
No. 161793, February 13, 2009
The presentation of expert proof in cases for declaration of nullity of marriage
based on psychological incapacity presupposes a thorough and an in-depth assessment
of the parties by the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave,
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severe and incurable presence of psychological incapacity. The probative force of the
testimony of an expert does not lie in a mere statement of her theory or opinion, but
rather in the assistance that she can render to the courts in showing the facts that serve
as a basis for her criterion and the reasons upon which the logic of her conclusion is
founded.
Castillo v. Republic, G.R. No. 214064, February 6, 2017
Petition need not allege root cause of psychological incapacity.
Procedural rules apply to actions pending and unresolved at the time of their
passage. The obvious effect of the new Rules providing that "expert opinion need not
be alleged" in the petition is that there is also no need to allege the root cause of the
psychological incapacity. Only experts in the fields of neurological and behavioral
sciences are competent to determine the root cause of psychological incapacity. Since
the new Rules do not require the petition to allege expert opinion on the psychological
incapacity, it follows that there is also no need to allege in the petition the root cause
of the psychological incapacity.
Diana M. Barcelona vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 130087, September 24, 2003
Petition alleging physical manifestations indicative of psychological incapacity
complies with the requirement of the new Rules.
Science continues to explore, examine and explain how our brains work,
respond to and control the human body. Scientists still do not understand everything
there is to know about the root causes of psychological disorders. The root causes of
many psychological disorders are still unknown to science even as their outward,
physical manifestations are evident. Hence, what the new Rules require the petition to
allege are the physical manifestations indicative of psychological incapacity.
Diana M. Barcelona vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 130087, September 24, 2003
Psychological incapacity refers to a mental, not physical, incapacity.
Correlated with existing precepts in our law on marriage, "psychological
incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a
party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which include their mutual
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obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and
support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine
the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning
and significance to the marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time
the marriage is celebrated. The law does not evidently envision, upon the other hand,
an inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This conclusion is
implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which considers children conceived prior
to the judicial declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be "legitimate." plpecdtai
Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112019, January 4, 1995
We have time and again held that psychological incapacity should refer to no less
than a mental, not physical, incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the
basic marital covenants that must concomitantly be assumed and discharged by the
parties to the marriage that, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include
their mutual obligations to live together, to observe love, respect and fidelity, and to
render help and support. We have also held that the intendment of the law has been to
confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage. To qualify as psychological incapacity as a
ground for nullification of marriage, a person's psychological affliction must be grave
and serious as to indicate an utter incapacity to comprehend and comply with the
essential objects of marriage, including the rights and obligations between husband
and wife. The affliction must be shown to exist at the time of marriage, and must be
incurable.
Arabelle J. Mendoza vs. Republic of the Phil., et al., G.R. No. 157649, November 12,
2012
"Psychological incapacity," as a ground to nullify a marriage under Article 36 of
the Family Code, should refer to no less than a mental — not merely physical —
incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants
that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage
which, as so expressed in Article 68 of the Family Code, among others, include their
mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help
and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to
confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability
to give meaning and significance to the marriage.
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Republic v. De Gracia, G.R. No. 171557, February 12, 2014
The courts are justified in declaring a marriage null and void under Article 36 of
the Family Code regardless of whether it is the petitioner or the respondent who
imputes the psychological incapacity to the other as long as the imputation is fully
substantiated with proof. Indeed, psychological incapacity may exist in one party
alone or in both of them, and if psychological incapacity of either or both is
established, the marriage has to be deemed null and void.
Kalaw v. Fernandez, G.R. No. 166357, January 14, 2015
Senseless and protracted refusal of a spouse to fulfill marital obligation of
procreation is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is "to
procreate children based on the universal principle that procreation of children
through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage." Constant non-fulfillment of
this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the marriage. Thus,
the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the above marital
obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
Chi Ming Tsoi vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119190, January 16, 1997
Habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment do not by
themselves constitute psychological incapacity.
Habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment do not
by themselves constitute grounds for finding that he is suffering from a psychological
incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code. It must be shown that these
acts are manifestations of a disordered personality which make private respondent
completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state, and not
merely due to private respondent’s youth and self-conscious feeling of being
handsome.
Lucita Estrella Hernandez vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126010, December 8, 1999
In Sivino A. Ligeralde v. May Ascension A. Patalinghug and the Republic of the
Philippines, the Court ruled that the respondent's act of living an adulterous life
cannot automatically be equated with a psychological disorder, especially when no
specific evidence was shown that promiscuity was a trait already existing at the
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inception of marriage. The petitioner must be able to establish that the respondent's
unfaithfulness was a manifestation of a disordered personality, which made her
completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state.
Mallilin v. Jamesolamin, G.R. No. 192718, February 18, 2015, citing Ligeralde v.
Patalinghug, G.R. No. 168796, April 15, 2010
"Irreconcilable differences" and "conflicting personalities" do not constitute
psychological incapacity.
This case is of a husband who is constantly embarrassed by his wife's outbursts
and overbearing ways, who finds his wife's obsession with cleanliness and the tight
reign on his wallet "irritants" and who is wounded by her lack of support and respect
for his person and his position as a Judge. However, these inadequacies do not amount
to psychological incapacity to comply with the essential marital obligations. The
totality of the evidence shows simple case of a married couple drifting apart,
becoming strangers to each other, with the husband consequently falling out of love
and wanting a way out. An unsatisfactory marriage, however, is not a null and void
marriage. Mere showing of "irreconcilable differences" and "conflicting personalities"
in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity.
Juanita Carating-Siayngco vs. Manuel Siayngco, G.R. No. 158896, October 27, 2004
It has been held that mere showing of "irreconcilable differences" and "conflicting
personalities" does not constitute psychological incapacity nor does failure of the
parties to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons. These differences
do not rise to the level of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family
Code and are not manifestations thereof which may be a ground for declaring their
marriage void. If at all, these are difficulties that couples ordinarily deal with in the
course of their marriage.
Republic v. Pangasinan, G.R. No. 214077, August 10, 2016
The evidence merely shows that Mary Grace is outgoing, strong-willed and not
inclined to perform household chores. Further, she is employed in Dubai and is
romantically-involved with another man. She has not been maintaining lines of
communication with Glenn at the time the latter filed the petition before the RTC.
Glenn, on the other hand, is conservative, family-oriented and is the exact opposite of
Mary Grace. While Glenn and Mary Grace possess incompatible personalities, the
latter's acts and traits do not necessarily indicate psychological incapacity.
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Viñas v. Parel-Viñas, G.R. No. 208790, January 21, 2015
Irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity
and irresponsibility and the like, do not by themselves warrant a finding of
psychological incapacity under Article 36, as the same may only be due to a person's
refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage. In order for
sexual infidelity to constitute as psychological incapacity, the respondent's
unfaithfulness must be established as a manifestation of a disordered personality,
completely preventing the respondent from discharging the essential obligations of the
marital state; there must be proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor that
effectively incapacitated him from complying with the obligation to be faithful to his
spouse. It is indispensable that the evidence must show a link, medical or the like,
between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder
itself.
Castillo v. Republic, G.R. No. 214064, February 6, 2017
Sexual infidelity, per se, does not constitute psychological incapacity.
The only essential marital obligation which the husband was not able to fulfill,
if any, is the obligation of fidelity. Sexual infidelity, per se, however, does not
constitute psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code. It
must be shown that his unfaithfulness is a manifestation of a disordered personality
which makes him completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the
marital state and not merely due to his ardent wish to have a child of his own flesh and
blood.
Juanita Carating-Siayngco vs. Manuel Siayngco, G.R. No. 158896, October 27, 2004
Sexual infidelity and abandonment of the conjugal dwelling, even if true, do not
necessarily constitute psychological incapacity; these are simply grounds for legal
separation. To constitute psychological incapacity, it must be shown that the
unfaithfulness and abandonment are manifestations of a disordered personality that
completely prevented the erring spouse from discharging the essential marital
obligations.
Republic of the Phil. vs. Cesar Encelan, G.R. No. 170022, January 9, 2013
In order for sexual infidelity to constitute as psychological incapacity, the
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respondent's unfaithfulness must be established as a manifestation of a disordered
personality, completely preventing the respondent from discharging the essential
obligations of the marital state; there must be proof of a natal or supervening disabling
factor that effectively incapacitated her from complying with the obligation to be
faithful to her spouse.
Ricardo P. Toring vs. Teresita M. Toring, et al., G.R. No. 165321, August 3, 2010
Sexual infidelity is not sufficient proof of psychological incapacity.
Sexual infidelity, by itself, is not sufficient proof that petitioner is suffering from
psychological incapacity. It must be shown that the acts of unfaithfulness are
manifestations of a disordered personality which make petitioner completely unable to
discharge the essential obligations of marriage.
Jaime F. Villalon vs. Ma. Corazon N. Villalon, G.R. No. 167206, November 18, 2005
Sexual infidelity, per se, however, does not constitute psychological incapacity
within the contemplation of the Family Code. Again, petitioner must be able to
establish that respondent's unfaithfulness is a manifestation of a disordered
personality, which makes him completely unable to discharge the essential obligations
of the marital state.
Veronica Cabacungan Alcazar vs. Rey C. Alcazar, G.R. No. 174451, October 13, 2009
Emotional immaturity and irresponsibility cannot be equated with psychological
incapacity.
Emotional immaturity and irresponsibility cannot be equated with
psychological incapacity. Marriage is an inviolable social institution and the
foundation of the family that the State cherishes and protects. While the Supreme
Court commiserates with the wife in her unhappy marital relationship with her
husband, totally terminating that relationship, however, may not necessarily be the
fitting denouement to it. In these cases, the law has not quite given up, neither should
the Court.
Lorna Guillen Pesca vs. Zosimo A. Pesca, G.R. No. 136921, April 17, 2001
The medical report failed to show that [the husband's] actions indicated a
psychological affliction of such a grave or serious nature that it was medically or
clinically rooted. His alleged immaturity, deceitfulness and lack of remorse for his
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dishonesty and lack of affection did not necessarily constitute psychological
incapacity. His inability to share or to take responsibility or to feel remorse over his
misbehavior or to share his earnings with family members, albeit indicative of
immaturity, was not necessarily a medically rooted psychological affliction that was
incurable. Emotional immaturity and irresponsibility did not equate with
psychological incapacity. Nor were his supposed sexual infidelity and criminal
offenses manifestations of psychological incapacity. If at all, they would constitute a
ground only for an action for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code.
Arabelle J. Mendoza vs. Republic of the Phil., et al., G.R. No. 157649, November 12,
2012
To be tired and give up on one's situation and on one's spouse are not signs of
psychological illness.
To be tired and give up on one's situation and on one's spouse are not necessarily
signs of psychological illness; neither can falling out of love be so labeled. When
these happen, the remedy for some is to cut the marital knot to allow the parties to go
their separate ways. This simple remedy, however, is not available to us under our
laws. Ours is a limited remedy that addresses only a very specific situation — a
relationship where no marriage could have validly been concluded because the parties;
or where one of them, by reason of a grave and incurable psychological illness
existing when the marriage was celebrated, did not appreciate the obligations of
marital life and, thus, could not have validly entered into a marriage.
Renato Reyes So v. Valera, G.R. No. 150677, 5 June 2009
Veronica Cabacungan Alcazar vs. Rey C. Alcazar, G.R. No. 174451, October 13, 2009
Wife's lack of attention to children, immaturity and lack of "intention of procreative
sexuality" do not constitute psychological incapacity.
Even if taken as true, the husband's testimony basically complains about three
aspects of the wife's personality; namely, her alleged (1) lack of attention to their
children, (2) immaturity and (3) lack of an "intention of procreative sexuality." None
of these three, singly or collectively, constitutes "psychological incapacity."
Leni O. Choa vs. Alfonso C. Choa, G.R. No. 143376, November 26, 2002
Immaturity, sexual promiscuity and abandonment do not by themselves constitute
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psychological incapacity.
The wife’s sexual infidelity or perversion and abandonment do not by
themselves constitute psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family
Code. Neither could her emotional immaturity and irresponsibility be equated with
psychological incapacity. It must be shown that these acts are manifestations of a
disordered personality which make respondent completely unable to discharge the
essential obligations of the marital state, not merely due to her youth, immaturity or
sexual promiscuity. At best, the circumstances relied upon by petitioner are grounds
for legal separation.
David B. Dedel vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 151867, January 29, 2004
[The wife’s] immaturity alone did not constitute psychological incapacity. To rule
that such immaturity amounted to psychological incapacity, it must be shown that the
immature acts were manifestations of a disordered personality that made the spouse
completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state, which
inability was merely due to her youth or immaturity.
Republic of the Phil. vs. CA (Ninth Division), et al., G.R. No. 159594, November 12,
2012
The respondent's act of living an adulterous life cannot automatically be equated
with a psychological disorder, especially when no specific evidence was shown that
promiscuity was a trait already existing at the inception of marriage. The petitioner
must be able to establish that the respondent's unfaithfulness was a manifestation of a
disordered personality, which made her completely unable to discharge the essential
obligations of the marital state.
Mallilin v. Jamesolamin, G.R. No. 192718, February 18, 2015, citing Ligarde v.
Patalinghug, G.R. No. 168796, April 15, 2010
Psychological defect cannot be presumed from the mere fact of abandonment.
The husband’s act of abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible but it was
never alleged nor proven to be due to some kind of psychological illness. This could
have been done through an expert witness. Psychological defect cannot be presumed
from the mere fact that he abandoned his family immediately after the celebration of
the marriage. As ruled in Molina, it is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet
his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential that he must be shown to
be incapable of doing so due to some psychological, not physical, illness. There was
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no proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral
element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates a person from
accepting and complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
Republic of the Phil. vs. Lolita Quintero-Hamano, G.R. No. 149498, May 20, 2004
[A]bandonment [of the conjugal home to live with another man] was not one of the
grounds for the nullity of marriage under the Family Code. It did not also constitute
psychological incapacity, it being instead a ground for legal separation under Article
55 (10) of the Family Code. On the other hand, [the wife’s] sexual infidelity was not a
valid ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code,
considering that there should be a showing that such marital infidelity was a
manifestation of a disordered personality that made her completely unable to
discharge the essential obligations of marriage.
Republic of the Phil. vs. CA (Ninth Division), et al., G.R. No. 159594, November 12,
2012
Article 36 is not to be equated with legal separation and divorce
Neither is Article 36 to be equated with legal separation, in which the grounds
need not be rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral
pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism,
sexual infidelity, abandonment and the like.
Brenda B. Marcos vs. Wilson G. Marcos, G.R. No. 136490, October 19, 2000
Republic of the Phil. vs. Lynnette Cabantug-Baguio, G.R. No. 171042, June 30, 2008
Article 36 should not be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at
the time the causes therefor manifest themselves, nor with legal separation in which
the grounds need not be rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical violence,
moral pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual
alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment, and the like.
Republic of the Phil. vs. Lynnette Cabantug-Baguio, G.R. No. 171042, June 30, 2008
Norms for determining psychological incapacity should apply to any person
regardless of nationality.
In proving psychological incapacity, we find no distinction between an alien
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spouse and a Filipino spouse. We cannot be lenient in the application of the rules
merely because the spouse alleged to be psychologically incapacitated happens to be a
foreign national. The medical and clinical rules to determine psychological incapacity
were formulated on the basis of studies of human behavior in general. Hence, the
norms used for determining psychological incapacity should apply to any person
regardless of nationality.
Republic of the Phil. vs. Lolita Quintero-Hamano, G.R. No. 149498, May 20, 2004
Psychological incapacity justifies judicial declaration freeing the parties from
consequences stemming from the marriage.
The inviolability of marriage depends on whether the marriage exists and is
valid. If it is void ab initio, the "permanence" of the union becomes irrelevant, and the
Court can step in to declare it so. Article 36 of the Family Code is the justification.
Where it applies and is duly proven, a judicial declaration can free the parties from the
rights, obligations, burdens and consequences stemming from their marriage.
Florence Malcampo-Sin vs. Philipp T. Sin, G.R. No. 137590, March 26, 2001
An inveterate pathological liar is unable to commit to the basic tenets of
relationship between spouses.
Respondent is evidently unable to comply with the essential marital obligations as
embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code. Article 68, in particular, enjoins
the spouses to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render
mutual help and support. [I]t is difficult to see how an inveterate pathological liar
would be able to commit to the basic tenets of relationship between spouses based on
love, trust and respect.
Leonilo Antonio vs. Marie Ivonne F. Reyes, G.R. No. 155800, March 10, 2006
Psychological conditions that hamper performance of marital obligations do not
mean that the husband and wife suffer from psychological incapacity.
We cannot see how their personality disorder would render the husband and wife
unaware of the essential marital obligations or to be incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to a
marriage. The fact that these psychological conditions will hamper their performance
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of their marital obligations does not mean that they suffer from psychological
incapacity as contemplated under Article 36 of the Family Code. Mere difficulty is not
synonymous to incapacity.
Rodolfo A. Aspillaga vs. Aurora A. Aspillaga, G.R. No. 170925, October 26, 2009
Psychological incapacity is confined to the most serious cases of personality
disorders.
Psychological incapacity must be more than just a "difficulty", "refusal" or
"neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations. The intention of the law is
to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage.
Rodolfo A. Aspillaga vs. Aurora A. Aspillaga, G.R. No. 170925, October 26, 2009
[T]he expert evidence presented in cases of declaration of nullity of marriage based
on psychological incapacity presupposes a thorough and in-depth assessment of the
parties by the psychologist or expert to make a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe
and incurable presence of psychological incapacity.
Republic of the Phil. vs. CA (Ninth Division), et al., G.R. No. 159594, November 12,
2012
To the Court's mind, [the wife's] refusal to live with [her husband] and to assume
her duties as wife and mother as well as her emotional immaturity, irresponsibility and
infidelity do not rise to the level of psychological incapacity that would justify the
nullification of the parties' marriage. Indeed, to be declared clinically or medically
incurable is one thing; to refuse or be reluctant to perform one's duties is another. . . .
[P]sychological incapacity refers only to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning
and significance to the marriage.
Republic v. De Gracia, G.R. No. 171557, February 12, 2014
Disagreements on money matters is not a ground to declare a marriage null and
void.
While disagreements on money matters would, no doubt, affect the other aspects of
one's marriage as to make the wedlock unsatisfactory, this is not a ground to declare a
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marriage null and void. In fact, the Court takes judicial notice of the fact that
disagreements regarding money matters is a common, and even normal, occurrence
between husbands and wives.
Rodolfo A. Aspillaga vs. Aurora A. Aspillaga, G.R. No. 170925, October 26, 2009
Article 36 is not to be confused with a divorce law.
Article 36 of the Family Code is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the
marital bond at the time the causes thereof manifest themselves. Article 36 refers to a
serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the
marriage. The malady must be so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to
assume.
Rodolfo A. Aspillaga vs. Aurora A. Aspillaga, G.R. No. 170925, October 26, 2009
It must be reiterated, however, that the remedy [for a failed marriage] is not always
to have it declared void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity. Article 36
of the Family Code must not be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond
at the time the grounds for divorce manifest themselves; rather, it must be limited to
cases where there is a downright incapacity or inability to assume and fulfill the basic
marital obligations, not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the
part of the errant spouse.
Republic v. Romero II, G.R. Nos. 209180 & 209253, February 24, 2016, citing Republic
v. Albios, G.R. No. 198780, October 16, 2013
"Psychological incapacity" is not meant to comprehend all possible cases of
psychoses.
"Psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Family Code is not meant to
comprehend all possible cases of psychoses. It should refer, rather, to no less than a
mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic
marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties
to the marriage. Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b)
juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability
Veronica Cabacungan Alcazar vs. Rey C. Alcazar, G.R. No. 174451, October 13, 2009
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Art. 36 does not contemplate mere refusal, neglect, difficulty or ill will on the part
of the errant spouse.
The remedy for a marriage that has failed and appears to be without hope of
reconciliation, is not always to have it declared void ab initio on the ground of
psychological incapacity. We stress that Article 36 of the Family Code contemplates
downright incapacity or inability to assume and fulfill the basic marital obligations,
not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the part of the errant
spouse. It is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the
time the grounds for divorce manifest themselves. The State, fortunately or
unfortunately, has not seen it fit to decree that divorce should be available in this
country. Neither should an Article 36 declaration of nullity be equated with legal
separation, in which the grounds need not be rooted in psychological incapacity but on
physical violence, moral pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction,
sexual infidelity, abandonment, and the like. Unless the evidence presented clearly
reveals a situation where the parties or one of them, by reason of a grave and
incurable psychological illness existing at the time the marriage was celebrated, was
incapacitated to fulfill the obligations of marital life (and thus could not then have
validly entered into a marriage), then we are compelled to uphold the indissolubility of
the marital tie.
Enrique A. Agraviador vs. Erlinda Amparo-Agraviador, et al., G.R. No. 170729,
December 8, 2010
An unsatisfactory marriage is not a null and void marriage.
Psychological incapacity must be more than just a "difficulty," a "refusal," or a
"neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations. An unsatisfactory marriage
is not a null and void marriage.
Noel B. Baccay vs. Maribel C. Baccay, et al., G.R. No. 173138, December 1, 2010
Manifestations of psychological incapacity.
The husband's pattern of behavior manifests an inability, nay, a psychological
incapacity to perform the essential marital obligations as shown by his: (1) sporadic
financial support; (2) extra-marital affairs; (3) substance abuse; (4) failed business
attempts; (5) unpaid money obligations; (6) inability to keep a job that is not
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connected with the family businesses; and (7) criminal charges of estafa.
Ma. Socorro Camacho-Reyes vs. Ramon Reyes-Reyes, G.R. No. 185286, August 18,
2010
Mismanagement of family finances does not constitute psychological incapacity.
Irresponsibility in managing the family's finances does not rise to the level of a
psychological incapacity required under Article 36 of the Family Code. At most, the
wife's mismanagement of the family's finances merely constituted difficulty, refusal or
neglect, during the marriage, in the handling of funds intended for the family's
financial support.
Ricardo P. Toring, G.R. No. 165321, August 3, 2010
Annulments of the Catholic church are not controlling or decisive
To consider church annulments as additional grounds for annulment under Article
36 would be legislating from the bench. . . . [I]nterpretations given by the NAMT
[National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal] of the Catholic Church in the Philippines
are given great respect by our courts, but they are not controlling or decisive.
Mallilin v. Jamesolamin, G.R. No. 192718, February 18, 2015, citing Republic v. Court
of Appeals and Molina, 335 Phil. 664, 676-678 (1997)
Findings of the RTC on existence or non-existence of psychological incapacity is
final and binding; A marriage that is null and void ab initio is not accorded
protection
The findings of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) on the existence or non-existence
of a party's psychological incapacity should be final and binding for as long as such
findings and evaluation of the testimonies of witnesses and other evidence are not
shown to be clearly and manifestly erroneous. In every situation where the findings of
the trial court are sufficiently supported by the facts and evidence presented during
trial, the appellate court should restrain itself from substituting its own judgment. It is
not enough reason to ignore the findings and evaluation by the trial court and
substitute our own as an appellate tribunal only because the Constitution and the
Family Code regard marriage as an inviolable social institution. We have to stress that
the fulfilment of the constitutional mandate for the State to protect marriage as an
inviolable social institution only relates to a valid marriage. No protection can be
accorded to a marriage that is null and void ab initio, because such a marriage has no
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legal existence.
Kalaw v. Fernandez, G.R. No. 166357, January 14, 2015
Definition of "psychological incapacity."
Psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of
the Family Code refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even prior
to the celebration of the marriage that is permanent as to deprive the party of the
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she was
about to assume. Although the Family Code has not defined the term psychological
incapacity, the Court has usually looked up its meaning by reviewing the deliberations
of the sessions of the Family Code Revision Committee that had drafted the Family
Code in order to gain an insight on the provision. It appeared that the members of the
Family Code Revision Committee were not unanimous on the meaning, and in the end
they decided to adopt the provision "with less specificity than expected" in order to
have the law "allow some resiliency in its application." Illustrative of the "less
specificity than expected" has been the omission by the Family Code Revision
Committee to give any examples of psychological incapacity that would have limited
the applicability of the provision conformably with the principle of ejusdem generis,
because the Committee desired that the courts should interpret the provision on a
case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in
psychological disciplines, and the decisions of church tribunals that had persuasive
effect by virtue of the provision itself having been taken from the Canon Law.
Kalaw v. Fernandez, G.R. No. 166357, January 14, 2015
[A]s the Court has observed in Santos v. Court of Appeals, the deliberations of the
Family Code Revision Committee and the relevant materials on psychological
incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage have rendered it obvious that the
term psychological incapacity as used in Article 36 of the Family Code "has not been
meant to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned by
some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like
circumstances," and could not be taken and construed independently of "but must
stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage."
Kalaw v. Fernandez, G.R. No. 166357, January 14, 2015, citing Santos v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 112019, January 4, 1995
Interpretations of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
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Church
Although it is true that in the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina, the
Court stated that interpretations given by the NAMT (National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal) of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive,
should be given great respect by our courts, still it is subject to the law on evidence.
Thus: Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to
harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that
to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to decisions
of such appellate tribunal. Ideally — subject to our law on evidence — what is
decreed as [canonically] invalid should be decreed civilly void . . . .
Mallilin v. Jamesolamin, G.R. No. 192718, February 18, 2015, citing Republic v. Court
of Appeals and Molina, 335 Phil. 664, 676-678 (1997)
Granting that it was offered and admitted, it must be pointed out that the basis of
the declaration of nullity of marriage by the NAMT (National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines) was not the third paragraph of
Canon 1095 which mentions causes of a psychological nature similar to Article 36 of
the Family Code, but the second paragraph of Canon 1095 which refers to those who
suffer from grave lack of discretion of judgment concerning essential matrimonial
rights and obligations to be mutually given and accepted.
Mallilin v. Jamesolamin, G.R. No. 192718, February 18, 2015
In Santos v. Santos, the Court referred to the deliberations during the sessions of
the Family Code Revision Committee, which drafted the Code, to provide an insight
on the import of Article 36 of the Family Code. It went out to state that a part of the
provision is similar to the third paragraph of Canon 1095 of the Code of Canon Law .
..
Mallilin v. Jamesolamin, G.R. No. 192718, February 18, 2015, citing Santos v. Santos,
310 Phil. 21, 37 (1995)
In Najera v. Najera, the Court was also confronted with a similar issue of whether
to consider an annulment by the NAMT as also covering psychological incapacity, the
only ground recognized in our law. In the said case, the NAMT decision was also
based on the second paragraph of Canon 1095. The Court ruled that it was not similar
to, and only annulments under the third paragraph of, Canon 1095 should be
considered. . .
To repeat, the decision of the NAMT was based on the second paragraph of
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Canon 1095 which refers to those who suffer from a grave lack of discretion of
judgment concerning essential matrimonial rights and obligations to be mutually
given and accepted, a cause not of psychological nature under Article 36 of the
Family Code.
Mallilin v. Jamesolamin, G.R. No. 192718, February 18, 2015, citing Najera v. Najera,
609 Phil. 316, 336 (2009)
To consider church annulments as additional grounds for annulment under Article
36 would be legislating from the bench. As stated in Republic v. Court of Appeals and
Molina, interpretations given by the NAMT of the Catholic Church in the Philippines
are given great respect by our courts, but they are not controlling or decisive.
Mallilin v. Jamesolamin, G.R. No. 192718, February 18, 2015, citing Republic v. Court
of Appeals and Molina, 335 Phil. 664, 676-678 (1997)
Marriages entered into for considerations other than love, are equally valid
That he married [his wife] not out of love, but out of reverence for the latter's
parents, does not mean that [the husband] is psychologically incapacitated in the
context of Article 36 of the Family Code. In Republic v. Albios, the Court held that:
Motives for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The State
does not and cannot dictate on the kind of life that a couple chooses to lead.
Any attempt to regulate their lifestyle would go into the realm of their right to
privacy and would raise serious constitutional questions. The right to marital
privacy allows married couples to structure their marriages in almost any way
they see fit, to live together or live apart, to have children or no children, to
love one another or not, and so on. Thus, marriages entered into for other
purposes, limited or otherwise, such as convenience, companionship,
money, status, and title, provided that they comply with all the legal
requisites, are equally valid. Love, though the ideal consideration in a
marriage contract, is not the only valid cause for marriage. Other
considerations, not precluded by law, may validly support a marriage.
Republic v. Romero II, G.R. Nos. 209180 & 209253, February 24, 2016, citing Republic
v. Albios, G.R. No. 198780, October 16, 2013
Article 36 of the Family Code must not be confused with a divorce law
It must be reiterated, however, that the remedy [for a failed marriage] is not always
to have it declared void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity. Article 36
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of the Family Code must not be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond
at the time the grounds for divorce manifest themselves; rather, it must be limited to
cases where there is a downright incapacity or inability to assume and fulfill the basic
marital obligations, not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the
part of the errant spouse.
Republic v. Romero II, G.R. Nos. 209180 & 209253, February 24, 2016, citing Republic
v. Albios, G.R. No. 198780, October 16, 2013
Art. 40 - Absolute nullity of a previous marriage
Article 40 applies to remarriages after effectivity of Family Code regardless of the date of
first marriage.
Declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is necessary for purposes of remarriage.
However, no judicial decree of nullity is needed when marriage took place and all children
were born before Wiegel vs. Sempio-Diy and before effectivity of Family Code.
No judicial declaration of absolute nullity is necessary for purposes other than remarriage.
Issuance of marriage license after marriage ceremony gives rise to the conclusion that the
marriage was contracted without a license.
Pendency of case for declaration of nullity is not a prejudicial question to concubinage
case.
Only competent courts, not parties themselves, are authorized to judge nullity of marriage.
Parties to marriage are not permitted to judge for themselves its nullity.
No matter how obvious the absence of an element, intervention of courts must be resorted
to.
Legality of marriage is a matter of law and every person is presumed to know the law.
Pendency of annulment case does not give rise to a prejudicial question.
No declaration of nullity of marriage is necessary for purposes other than remarriage.
Declaration of nullity of previous marriage does not validate second marriage.
When crime of bigamy had been consummated, declaration of nullity of second marriage
on ground of psychological incapacity is of no moment.
Without a judicial declaration of nullity of void marriage, one may be convicted of
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bigamy.
Outcome of annulment case had no bearing upon the criminal case for bigamy.
Among legal consequences of void marriages is incurring criminal liability for bigamy.
Subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of first marriage is immaterial if bigamy had
been consummated.
No judicial declaration of nullity is needed when parties merely signed a marriage contract
on their own.
Re: Complaint of Mrs. Corazon S. Salvador Against Spouses Noel and Amelia Serafico,
A.M. No. 2008-20-SC, March 15, 2010
Article 40 applies to remarriages after effectivity of Family Code regardless of the
date of first marriage.
Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the effectivity of the
Family Code on August 3, 1988 regardless of the date of the first marriage. Besides,
under Article 256 of the Family Code, said Article is given "retroactive effect insofar
as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the
Civil Code or other laws." This is particularly true with Article 40, which is a rule of
procedure.
Lupo Almodiel Atienza vs. Judge Francisco F. Brillantes, Jr., Adm. Matter No.
MTJ-92706, March 29, 1995
Maria Apiag vs. Esmeraldo G. Cantero, Adm. Matter No. MTJ-95-1070, February 12,
1997
[A]rticle 40, which is a rule of procedure, should be applied retroactively because
Article 256 of the Family Code itself provides that said "Code shall have retroactive
effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights." . . . The fact
that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants' rights may not preclude
their retroactive application to pending actions. The retroactive application of
procedural laws is not violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is
adversely affected. The reason is that as a general rule, no vested right may attach to,
nor arise from, procedural laws.
Merlinda Cipriano Montañez vs. Lourdes Tajolosa Cipriano, G.R. No. 181089, October
22, 2012 citing Jarillo vs. People, G.R. No. 164435, June 29, 2010
Declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is necessary for purposes of
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remarriage.
The Family Code settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on
whether or not a judicial declaration of a void marriage is necessary for purposes of
remarriage. A declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is now explicitly required
either as a cause of action or a ground for defense. Where the absolute nullity of a
previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second
marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for said projected marriage to be free from
legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void.
Roberto Domingo vs. Court of Appeals and Delia Soledad Avera, G.R. No. 104818,
September 17, 1993
The requirement of securing a judicial declaration of nullity of marriage prior to
contracting a subsequent marriage is found in Article 40 of the Family Code . . . The
reason for the provision was aptly discussed in Teves v. People:
. . . The Family Code has settled once and for all the conflicting
jurisprudence on the matter. A declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage
is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground for defense.
Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for
purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for
said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment
declaring the previous marriage void.
The Family Law Revision Committee and the Civil Code Revision
Committee which drafted what is now the Family Code of the Philippines
took the position that parties to a marriage should not be allowed to assume
that their marriage is void even if such be the fact but must first secure a
judicial declaration of the nullity of their marriage before they can be allowed
to marry again.
In fact, the requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a
marriage is also for the protection of the spouse who, believing that his or her
marriage is illegal and void, marries again. With the judicial declaration of the
nullity of his or her marriage, the person who marries again cannot be charged
with bigamy.
In numerous cases, this Court has consistently held that a judicial
declaration of nullity is required before a valid subsequent marriage can be
contracted; or else, what transpires is a bigamous marriage, reprehensible and
immoral.
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If petitioner's contention would be allowed, a person who commits
bigamy can simply evade prosecution by immediately filing a petition for the
declaration of nullity of his earlier marriage and hope that a favorable decision
is rendered therein before anyone institutes a complaint against him. We note
that in petitioner's case the complaint was filed before the first marriage was
declared a nullity. It was only the filing of the Information that was overtaken
by the declaration of nullity of his first marriage. Following petitioner's
argument, even assuming that a complaint has been instituted, such as in this
case, the offender can still escape liability provided that a decision nullifying
his earlier marriage precedes the filing of the Information in court. Such
cannot be allowed. To do so would make the crime of bigamy dependent upon
the ability or inability of the Office of the Public Prosecutor to immediately
act on complaints and eventually file Informations in court. Plainly,
petitioner's strained reading of the law is against its simple letter.
Lasanas v. People, G.R. No. 159031, June 23, 2014, citing Teves v. People, G.R. No.
188775, August 24, 2011
Persons intending to contract a second marriage must first secure a judicial
declaration of nullity of their first marriage. If they proceed with the second marriage
without the judicial declaration, they are guilty of bigamy regardless of evidence of
the nullity of the first marriage.
Vitangcol v. People, G.R. No. 207406, January 13, 2016
However, no judicial decree of nullity is needed when marriage took place and all
children were born before Wiegel vs. Sempio-Diy and before effectivity of Family
Code.
A marriage though void still needs a judicial declaration of such fact before
any party thereto can marry again; otherwise, the second marriage will also be void.
This was expressly provided under Article 40 of the Family Code. However, if the
marriage took place and all the children were born before the promulgation of Wiegel
vs. Sempio-Diy (August 19, 1986) and before the effectivity of the Family Code, the
doctrine in Odayat vs. Amante (June 2, 1977), that no judicial decree is necessary to
establish the invalidity of void marriages, applies.
Maria Apiag vs. Esmeraldo G. Cantero, Adm. Matter No. MTJ-95-1070, February 12,
1997
No judicial declaration of absolute nullity is necessary for purposes other than
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remarriage.
Other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare
a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to
determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate,
dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass
upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same
so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is without prejudice to
any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final judgment of
declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The
clause "on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void" in
Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that such final judgment need not be obtained
only for purpose of remarriage.
Engrace Niñal vs. Norma Bayadog, G.R. No. 133778, March 14, 2000
Issuance of marriage license after marriage ceremony gives rise to the conclusion
that the marriage was contracted without a license.
Petitioner did not expressly state in her petition before the trial court that there
was incongruity between the date of the actual celebration of their marriage and the
date of the issuance of their marriage license. From the documents she presented, the
marriage license was issued on September 17, 1974, almost one year after the
ceremony took place on November 15, 1973. The ineluctable conclusion is that the
marriage was indeed contracted without a marriage license.
Filipina Y. Sy vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127263, April 12, 2000
Pendency of case for declaration of nullity is not a prejudicial question to
concubinage case.
The pendency of the case for declaration of nullity of petitioner's marriage is
not a prejudicial question to the concubinage case. For a civil case to be considered
prejudicial to a criminal action as to cause the suspension of the latter pending the
final determination of the civil case, it must appear not only that the said civil case
involves the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution would be based, but also
that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the aforesaid civil action, the guilt
or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined.
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Meynardo L. Beltran vs. People of the Phils., G.R. No. 137567, June 20, 2000
Only competent courts, not parties themselves, are authorized to judge nullity of
marriage.
Parties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity,
only competent courts having such authority. Prior to such declaration of nullity, the
validity of the first marriage is beyond question. A party who contracts a second
marriage then assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.
Rolando Landicho vs. Hon. Lorenzo Relova, G.R. No. L-22579, Feb. 23, 1968
Parties to marriage are not permitted to judge for themselves its nullity.
Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its
nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of the competent courts and
only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long
as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists for all
intents and purposes. Therefore, he who cohabits with a woman not his wife before
the judicial declaration of nullity of the marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted
for concubinage.
Meynardo L. Beltran vs. People of the Phils., G.R. No. 137567, June 20, 2000
Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity,
for the same must be submitted to the judgment of competent courts and only when
the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is
no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore, he who
contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first
marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.
Merlinda Cipriano Montañez vs. Lourdes Tajolosa Cipriano, G.R. No. 181089, October
22, 2012
No matter how obvious the absence of an element, intervention of courts must be
resorted to.
Article 40 of the Family Code requires a prior judicial declaration of nullity of
a previous marriage before a party may remarry. The clear implication of this is that it
is not for the parties to determine the validity or invalidity of the marriage. Whether or
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not the first marriage was void for lack of a license is a matter of defense because
there is still no judicial declaration of its nullity at the time the second marriage was
contracted. No matter how obvious, manifest or patent the absence of an element is,
the intervention of the courts must always be resorted to. That is why Article 40 of the
Family Code requires a "final judgment," which only the courts can render.
Imelda Marbella-Bobis vs. Isagani D. Bobis, G.R. No. 138509, July 31, 2000
Legality of marriage is a matter of law and every person is presumed to know the
law.
Ignorance of the existence of Article 40 of the Family Code cannot even be
successfully invoked as an excuse. The contracting of a marriage knowing that the
requirements of the law have not been complied with or that the marriage is in
disregard of a legal impediment is an act penalized by the Revised Penal Code. The
legality of a marriage is a matter of law and every person is presumed to know the
law.
Imelda Marbella-Bobis vs. Isagani D. Bobis, G.R. No. 138509, July 31, 2000
Pendency of annulment case does not give rise to a prejudicial question.
Parties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity,
for this must be submitted to the judgment of competent courts and only when the
nullity of a marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no
such declaration the presumption of marriage exists. The pendency of the civil case
for annulment did not give rise to a prejudicial question which warranted the
suspension of the proceedings in the criminal case for bigamy since at the time of the
alleged commission of the crime, the marriage was, under the law, still valid and
subsisting.
Arthur Te vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126746, November 29, 2000
No declaration of nullity of marriage is necessary for purposes other than
remarriage.
However, for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to
declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to
the determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of
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estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may
pass upon the validity of marriage even after the death of the parties thereto, and even
in a suit not directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is
essential to the determination of the case. In such instances, evidence must be
adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering
such a previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be limited solely to an
earlier final judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage void.
Engrace Niñal vs. Norma Bayadog, G.R. No. 133778, March 14, 2000
Declaration of nullity of previous marriage does not validate second marriage.
It does not follow that since the marriage of petitioner and the deceased is
declared void ab initio, the "death benefits" would now be awarded to respondent
Susan Yee. To reiterate, under Article 40 of the Family Code, for purposes of
remarriage, there must first be a prior judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous
marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage, otherwise, the
second marriage would also be void. Accordingly, the declaration in the instant case
of nullity of the previous marriage of the deceased and petitioner Susan Nicdao does
not validate the second marriage of the deceased with respondent Susan Yee. The fact
remains that their marriage was solemnized without first obtaining a judicial decree
declaring the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased void. Hence, the
marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is, likewise, void ab initio.
Susan Nicdao Cariño vs. Susan Yee Cariño, G.R. No. 132529, February 2, 2001
When crime of bigamy had been consummated, declaration of nullity of second
marriage on ground of psychological incapacity is of no moment.
A declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity is of absolutely no moment insofar as the State's penal laws
are concerned. Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code penalizes the mere act of
contracting a second or a subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid
marriage. Thus, as soon as the second marriage was celebrated during the subsistence
of the valid first marriage, the crime of bigamy had already been consummated. There
is no cogent reason for distinguishing between a subsequent marriage that is null and
void purely because it is a second or subsequent marriage, and a subsequent marriage
that is null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity, at least insofar as
criminal liability for bigamy is concerned. The State's penal laws protecting the
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institution of marriage are in recognition of the sacrosanct character of this special
contract between spouses, and punish an individual's deliberate disregard of the
permanent character of the special bond between spouses.
Veronico Tenebro vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 150758, February 18, 2004
Without a judicial declaration of nullity of void marriage, one may be convicted of
bigamy.
A judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage is now necessary before one
can contract a second marriage. Absent that declaration, one may be charged with, and
convicted of, bigamy.
Vincent Paul G. Mercado vs. Consuelo Tan, G.R. No. 137110, August 1, 2000
As early as 1968, this court held in Landicho v. Relova, et al. that
parties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, only
competent courts having such authority. Prior to such declaration of nullity, the validity of the
first marriage is beyond question. A party who contracts a second marriage then assumes the
risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.
The commission that drafted the Family Code considered the Landicho ruling
in wording Article 40 of the Family Code.
Vitangcol v. People, G.R. No. 207406, January 13, 2016, citing Landicho v. Relova, 130
Phil. 745 (1968)
This Court has consistently held that a judicial declaration of nullity is required
before a valid subsequent marriage can be contracted; or else, what transpires is a
bigamous marriage, which is void from the beginning as provided in Article 35 (4) of
the Family Code of the Philippines.
Iwasawa v. Gangan, G.R. No. 204169, September 11, 2013
[R]espondent's clear intent is to obtain a judicial declaration of nullity of his first
marriage and thereafter to invoke that very same judgment to prevent his prosecution
for bigamy. He cannot have his cake and eat it too. Otherwise, all that an adventurous
bigamist has to do is disregard Article 40 of the Family Code, contract a subsequent
marriage and escape a bigamy charge by simply claiming that the first marriage is
void and that the subsequent marriage is equally void for lack of a prior judicial
declaration of nullity of the first. A party may even enter into a marriage aware of the
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absence of a requisite — usually the marriage license — and thereafter contract a
subsequent marriage without obtaining a declaration of nullity of the first on the
assumption that the first marriage is void. Such scenario would render nugatory the
provision on bigamy.
Merlinda Cipriano Montañez vs. Lourdes Tajolosa Cipriano, G.R. No. 181089, October
22, 2012 citing Jarillo vs. People, G.R. No. 164435, June 29, 2010
Outcome of annulment case had no bearing upon the criminal case for bigamy.
The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner's marriage to private
respondent had no bearing upon the determination of petitioner's innocence or guilt in
the criminal case for bigamy, because all that is required for the charge of bigamy to
prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is
contracted. Under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be
deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding.
Arthur Te vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126746, November 29, 2000
Among legal consequences of void marriages is incurring criminal liability for
bigamy.
Although the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar
as the vinculum between the spouses is concerned, it is significant to note that said
marriage is not without legal effects. Among these effects is that children conceived
or born before the judgment of absolute nullity of the marriage shall be considered
legitimate. There is therefore a recognition written into the law itself that such a
marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce legal consequences. Among these
legal consequences is incurring criminal liability for bigamy. To hold otherwise would
render the State's penal laws on bigamy completely nugatory, and allow individuals to
deliberately ensure that each marital contract be flawed in some manner, and to thus
escape the consequences of contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of
hapless women with the promise of futurity and commitment.
Veronico Tenebro vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 150758, February 18, 2004
Subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of first marriage is immaterial if
bigamy had been consummated.
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Under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed
valid until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding. Thus, even if the husband
eventually obtained a declaration that his first marriage was void ab initio, the point
is, both the first and the second marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was
annulled. The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was
immaterial because prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime had already been
consummated. Moreover, the husband’s assertion would only delay the prosecution of
bigamy cases considering that an accused could simply file a petition to declare his
previous marriage void and invoke the pendency of that action as a prejudicial
question in the criminal case. The outcome of the civil case for annulment of
petitioner’s marriage to his first wife had no bearing upon the determination of his
innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy, because all that is required for the
charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the
second marriage is contracted.
Salvador S. Abunado vs. People of the Phils., G.R. No. 159218, March 30, 2004
No judicial declaration of nullity is needed when parties merely signed a marriage
contract on their own.
The mere private act of signing a marriage contract, without a marriage
ceremony performed by a duly authorized solemnizing officer, bears no semblance to
a valid marriage. Thus, it needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Such act alone,
without more, cannot be deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for which
petitioner might be held liable for bigamy unless he first secures a judicial declaration
of nullity before he contracts a subsequent marriage.
Lucio C. Morigo vs. People of the Phils., G.R. No. 145226, February 6, 2004
Art. 41 - Subsequent marriage of absentee's spouse
Remarriage of abandoned spouse, not of deserting spouse, is contemplated under Art. 83
(a) of Civil Code.
Declaration of presumptive death is necessary for validity of subsequent marriage.
Judicial declaration of absence is not necessary when prescribed period of absence is met.
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Conditions before a subsequent bigamous marriage may be deemed valid.
Belief of the present spouse must be the result of proper and honest-to-goodness inquiries
and efforts.
A judgment of the presumptive death of the absent spouse is required for the benefit of the
spouse present and of the State.
Only with a declaration by a competent court of the presumptive death of an absent spouse
can marriage be treated as so dissolved as to permit second marriages.
Remarriage of abandoned spouse, not of deserting spouse, is contemplated under
Art. 83 (a) of Civil Code.
The first exception (when the absent spouse has not been heard from for seven
consecutive years and the present spouse has no news that he/she is alive) under Art.
83 of the Civil Code on illegality of subsequent marriages, refers to the subsequent
marriage of the abandoned spouse and not the remarriage of the deserting spouse,
after the period of seven years has lapsed.
Nenita Bienvenido vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 111717, October 24, 1994
Declaration of presumptive death is necessary for validity of subsequent marriage.
Even if the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was
already dead, a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death is
necessary in order to contract a subsequent marriage, a mandatory requirement which
has been precisely incorporated into the Family Code to discourage subsequent
marriages where it is not proven that the previous marriage has been dissolved or a
missing spouse is factually or presumptively dead, in accordance with pertinent
provisions of law.
Rodolfo G. Navarro vs. Hernando C. Domagtoy, Adm. Matter No. MTJ-96-1088, July
19, 1996
Republic of the Phil. vs. Robert P. Narceda, G.R. No. 182760, April 10, 2013
Judicial declaration of absence is not necessary when prescribed period of absence
is met.
A judicial declaration of absence of the absentee spouse is not necessary as
long as the prescribed period of absence is met. It is equally noteworthy that the
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marriage in these exceptional cases are, by the explicit mandate of Article 83 of the
Civil Code, to be deemed valid "until declared null and void by a competent court."
Antonia Armas vs. Marietta Calisterio, G.R. No. 136467, April 6, 2000
Conditions before a subsequent bigamous marriage may be deemed valid.
Under the 1988 Family Code, in order that a subsequent bigamous marriage
may exceptionally be considered valid, the following conditions must concur; viz.: (a)
The prior spouse of the contracting party must have been absent for four consecutive
years, or two years where there is danger of death under the circumstances stated in
Article 391 of the Civil Code at the time of disappearance; (b) the spouse present has
a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead; and (c) there is, unlike
the old rule, a judicial declaration of presumptive death of the absentee for which
purpose the spouse present can institute a summary proceeding in court to ask for that
declaration. The last condition is consistent and in consonance with the requirement of
judicial intervention in subsequent marriages as so provided in Article 41, in relation
to Article 40, of the Family Code.
Antonia Armas vs. Marietta Calisterio, G.R. No. 136467, April 6, 2000
Before a judicial declaration of presumptive death can be obtained, it must be
shown that the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the present
spouse had a well-founded belief that the prior spouse was already dead. Under Article
41 of the Family Code of the Philippines (Family Code), there are four (4) essential
requisites for the declaration of presumptive death: (1) that the absent spouse has been
missing for four (4) consecutive years, or two (2) consecutive years if the
disappearance occurred where there is danger of death under the circumstances laid
down in Article 391 of the Civil Code; (2) that the present spouse wishes to remarry;
(3) that the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and (4)
that the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive
death of the absentee.
Republic v. Tampus, G.R. No. 214243, March 16, 2016
Belief of the present spouse must be the result of proper and honest-to-goodness
inquiries and efforts.
The belief of the present spouse must be the result of proper and honest to
goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain the whereabouts of the absent spouse and
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whether the absent spouse is still alive or is already dead. Whether or not the spouse
present acted on a well-founded belief of death of the absent spouse depends upon the
inquiries to be drawn from a great many circumstances occurring before and after the
disappearance of the absent spouse and the nature and extent of the inquiries made by
present spouse.
Republic of the Phil. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 159614, December 9, 2005
Republic v. Granada, G.R. No. 187512, June 13, 2012
Republic v. Tampus, G.R. No. 214243, March 16, 2016
The well-founded belief in the absentee's death requires the present spouse to prove
that his/her belief was the result of diligent and reasonable efforts to locate the absent
spouse and that based on these efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that under the
circumstances, the absent spouse is already dead. It necessitates exertion of active
effort (not a mere passive one). Mere absence of the spouse (even beyond the period
required by law), lack of any news that the absentee spouse is still alive, mere failure
to communicate, or general presumption of absence under the Civil Code would not
suffice. The premise is that Article 41 of the Family Code places upon the present
spouse the burden of complying with the stringent requirement of "well-founded
belief" which can only be discharged upon a showing of proper and
honest-to-goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain not only the absent spouse's
whereabouts but, more importantly, whether the absent spouse is still alive or is
already dead. This strict standard approach ensures that a petition for declaration of
presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code is not used as a tool to
conveniently circumvent the laws in light of the State's policy to protect and
strengthen the institution of marriage. Courts should never allow procedural shortcuts
but instead should see to it that the stricter standard required by the Family Code is
met.
Republic v. Orcelino-Villanueva, G.R. No. 210929, July 29, 2015
Republic v. Tampus, G.R. No. 214243, March 16, 2016
In Nolasco . . . [t]he Court held that the present spouse's methods of investigation
were too sketchy to form a basis that his wife was already dead. It stated that the
pieces of evidence only proved that his wife had chosen not to communicate with their
common acquaintances, and not that she was dead.
Republic v. Orcelino-Villanueva, G.R. No. 210929, July 29, 2015, citing Republic v.
Nolasco, G.R. No. 94053, March 17, 1993
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Recently, in Republic v. Cantor, the Court considered the present spouse's efforts to
have fallen short of the "stringent standard" and lacked the degree of diligence
required by jurisprudence . . . In the Court's view, the wife merely engaged in a
"passive search" where she relied on uncorroborated inquiries from her in-laws,
neighbors and friends. She, thus, failed to conduct a diligent search. Her claimed
efforts were insufficient to form a well-founded belief that her husband was already
dead.
Republic v. Orcelino-Villanueva, G.R. No. 210929, July 29, 2015, citing Republic v.
Cantor, G.R. No. 184621, December 10, 2013
A judgment of the presumptive death of the absent spouse is required for the benefit
of the spouse present and of the State.
The requirement for a judgment of the presumptive death of the absent spouse is
for the benefit of the spouse present, as protection from the pains and the
consequences of a second marriage, precisely because he/she could be charged and
convicted of bigamy if the defense of good faith based on mere testimony is found
incredible. The requirement of judicial declaration is also for the benefit of the State.
Under Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution, the "State shall protect and strengthen
the family as a basic autonomous social institution." Marriage is a social institution of
the highest importance. Public policy, good morals and the interest of society require
that the marital relation should be surrounded with every safeguard and its severance
only in the manner prescribed and the causes specified by law. The laws regulating
civil marriages are necessary to serve the interest, safety, good order, comfort or
general welfare of the community and the parties can waive nothing essential to the
validity of the proceedings. A civil marriage anchors an ordered society by
encouraging stable relationships over transient ones; it enhances the welfare of the
community.
Eduardo P. Manuel vs. People of the Phil., G.R. No. 165842, November 29, 2005
Only with a declaration by a competent court of the presumptive death of an absent
spouse can marriage be treated as so dissolved as to permit second marriages.
The consequences of an invalid marriage to the parties, to innocent parties and to
society, are so serious that the law may well take means calculated to ensure the
procurement of the most positive evidence of death of the first spouse or of the
presumptive death of the absent spouse after the lapse of the period provided for
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under the law. One such means is the requirement of the declaration by a competent
court of the presumptive death of an absent spouse as proof that the present spouse
contracts a subsequent marriage on a well-grounded belief of the death of the first
spouse. Indeed, "men readily believe what they wish to be true," is a maxim of the old
jurists. To sustain a second marriage and to vacate a first because one of the parties
believed the other to be dead would make the existence of the marital relation
determinable, not by certain extrinsic facts, easily capable of forensic ascertainment
and proof, but by the subjective condition of individuals. Only with such proof can
marriage be treated as so dissolved as to permit second marriages.
Eduardo P. Manuel vs. People of the Phil., G.R. No. 165842, November 29, 2005
[A] petition for declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse for the
purpose of contracting a subsequent marriage under Article 41 of the Family Code is a
summary proceeding "as provided for" under the Family Code. . . . Taken together,
Articles 41, 238, 247 and 253 of the Family Code provide that since a petition for
declaration of presumptive death is a summary proceeding, the judgment of the court
therein shall be immediately final and executory. . . . In sum, under Article 41 of the
Family Code, the losing party in a summary proceeding for the declaration of
presumptive death may file a petition for certiorari with the CA on the ground that, in
rendering judgment thereon, the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction. From the decision of the CA, the aggrieved party
may elevate the matter to this Court via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court.
Republic of the Phil. vs. Yolanda Cadacio Granada, G.R. No. 187512, June 13, 2012
The Family Code provides that it is the proof of absence of a spouse for four
consecutive years, coupled with a well-founded belief by the present spouse that the
absent spouse is already dead, that constitutes a justification for a second marriage
during the subsistence of another marriage.
Santos v. Santos, G.R. No. 187061, October 8, 2014
A second marriage is bigamous while the first subsists. However, a bigamous
subsequent marriage may be considered valid when the following are present:
1) The prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years;
2) The spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent
spouse was already dead;
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3) There must be a summary proceeding for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absent spouse; and
4) There is a court declaration of presumptive death of the absent
spouse.
Santos v. Santos, G.R. No. 187061, October 8, 2014
A subsequent marriage contracted in bad faith, even if it was contracted after a
court declaration of presumptive death, lacks the requirement of a well-founded belief
that the spouse is already dead. The first marriage will not be considered as validly
terminated. Marriages contracted prior to the valid termination of a subsisting
marriage are generally considered bigamous and void. Only a subsequent marriage
contracted in good faith is protected by law. Therefore, the party who contracted the
subsequent marriage in bad faith is also not immune from an action to declare his
subsequent marriage void for being bigamous. The prohibition against marriage
during the subsistence of another marriage still applies.
Santos v. Santos, G.R. No. 187061, October 8, 2014
If . . . [the husband] was in bad faith when he filed his petition to declare her
presumptively dead and when he contracted the subsequent marriage, such marriage
would be considered void for being bigamous under Article 35 (4) of the Family
Code. This is because the circumstances lack the element of "well-founded belief"
under Article 41 of the Family Code, which is essential for the exception to the rule
against bigamous marriages to apply.
Santos v. Santos, G.R. No. 187061, October 8, 2014
Using the parameters outlined in Article 41 of the Family Code, Edna, without
doubt, failed to establish that there was no impediment or that the impediment was
already removed at the time of the celebration of her marriage to Edgardo. Settled is
the rule that "whoever claims entitlement to the benefits provided by law should
establish his or her right thereto by substantial evidence." . . . Edna cannot be
considered as the legal spouse of Edgardo as their marriage took place during the
existence of a previously contracted marriage. . . . It is of no moment that the first
wife, Rosemarie, did not participate or oppose Edna's claim. Rosemarie's
non-participation or her subsequent death . . . did not cure or legitimize the status of
Edna.
Social Security Commission v. Azote, G.R. No. 209741, April 15, 2015
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A petition for certiorari pursuant to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the proper
remedy to challenge a trial court's declaration of presumptive death under Article 41
of The Family Code of the Philippines.
Republic v. Sareñogon, Jr., G.R. No. 199194, February 10, 2016
Before a judicial declaration of presumptive death can be obtained, it must be
shown that the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the present
spouse had a well-founded belief that the prior spouse was already dead. Under
Article 41 of the Family Code, there are four essential requisites for the declaration of
presumptive death:
1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive
years, or two consecutive years if the disappearance occurred where there is
danger of death under the circumstances laid down in Article 391 of the Civil
Code;
2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;
3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the
absentee is dead; and,
4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the
declaration of presumptive death of the absentee. (Underscoring supplied)
Republic v. Sareñogon, Jr., G.R. No. 199194, February 10, 2016, citing Republic v.
Cantor, G.R. No. 184621, December 10, 2013
With respect to the third element (which seems to be the element that in this case
invites extended discussion), the holding is that the —
mere absence of the spouse (even for such period required by the law), or lack
of news that such absentee is still alive, failure to communicate [by the
absentee spouse or invocation of the] general presumption on absence under
the Civil Code [would] not suffice. This conclusion proceeds from the
premise that Article 41 of the Family Code places upon the present spouse the
burden of proving the additional and more stringent requirement of
"well-founded belief" which can only be discharged upon a due showing of
proper and honest-to-goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain not only the
absent spouse's whereabouts but, more importantly, that the absent spouse is
[either] still alive or is already dead.
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xxx xxx xxx
The law did not define what is meant by "well-founded belief." It depends
upon the circumstances of each particular case. Its determination, so to speak,
remains on a case-to-case basis. To be able to comply with this requirement,
the present spouse must prove that his/her belief was the result of diligent and
reasonable efforts and inquiries to locate the absent spouse and that based on
these efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that under the circumstances, the
absent spouse is already dead. It requires exertion of active effort (not a mere
passive one).
Republic v. Sareñogon, Jr., G.R. No. 199194, February 10, 2016, citing Republic v.
Cantor, G.R. No. 184621, December 10, 2013
The present spouse merely conducted a "passive search" because she simply made
unsubstantiated inquiries from her in-laws, from neighbors and friends. For that
reason, this Court stressed that the degree of diligence and reasonable search required
by law is not met (1) when there is failure to present the persons from whom the
present spouse allegedly made inquiries especially the absent spouse's relatives,
neighbors, and friends, (2) when there is failure to report the missing spouse's
purported disappearance or death to the police or mass media, and (3) when the
present spouse's evidence might or would only show that the absent spouse chose not
to communicate, but not necessarily that the latter was indeed dead. The rationale for
this palpably stringent or rigorous requirement has been marked out thus:
. . . [T]he Court, fully aware of the possible collusion of spouses in nullifying
their marriage, has consistently applied the "strict standard" approach. This is
to ensure that a petition for declaration of presumptive death under Article 41
of the Family Code is not used as a tool to conveniently circumvent the laws.
Courts should never allow procedural shortcuts and should ensure that the
stricter standard required by the Family Code is met. . . .
The application of this stricter standard becomes even more imperative
if we consider the State's policy to protect and strengthen the institution of
marriage. Since marriage serves as the family's foundation and since it is the
state's policy to protect and strengthen the family as a basic social institution,
marriage should not be permitted to be dissolved at the whim of the parties. . .
.
. . . [I]t has not escaped this Court's attention that the strict standard required
in petitions for declaration of presumptive death has not been fully observed
by the lower courts. We need only to cite the instances when this Court, on
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review, has consistently ruled on the sanctity of marriage and reiterated that
anything less than the use of the strict standard necessitates a denial. To rectify
this situation, lower courts are now expressly put on notice of the strict
standard this Court requires in cases under Article 41 of the Family Code."
(Citations omitted)
Republic v. Sareñogon, Jr., G.R. No. 199194, February 10, 2016, citing Republic v.
Cantor, G.R. No. 184621, December 10, 2013
Art. 42 - Subsequent marriage
The termination of the subsequent marriage by affidavit provided by [Article 42] of
the Family Code does not preclude the filing of an action in court to prove the
reappearance of the absentee and obtain a declaration of dissolution or termination of
the subsequent marriage.
SSS vs. Teresita Jarque Vda. de Bailon, G.R. No. 165545, March 24, 2006
The Family Code also provides that the second marriage is in danger of being
terminated by the presumptively dead spouse when he or she reappears. . . . In other
words, the Family Code provides the presumptively dead spouse with the remedy of
terminating the subsequent marriage by mere reappearance. The filing of an affidavit
of reappearance is an admission on the part of the first spouse that his or her marriage
to the present spouse was terminated when he or she was declared absent or
presumptively dead.
Santos v. Santos, G.R. No. 187061, October 8, 2014
[A] close reading of the entire Article 42 reveals that the termination of the
subsequent marriage by reappearance is subject to several conditions: (1) the
non-existence of a judgment annulling the previous marriage or declaring it void ab
initio; (2) recording in the civil registry of the residence of the parties to the
subsequent marriage of the sworn statement of fact and circumstances of
reappearance; (3) due notice to the spouses of the subsequent marriage of the fact of
reappearance; and (4) the fact of reappearance must either be undisputed or judicially
determined.
The existence of these conditions means that reappearance does not always
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immediately cause the subsequent marriage's termination. Reappearance of the absent
or presumptively dead spouse will cause the termination of the subsequent marriage
only when all the conditions enumerated in the Family Code are present.
Santos v. Santos, G.R. No. 187061, October 8, 2014
Hence, the subsequent marriage may still subsist despite the absent or
presumptively dead spouse's reappearance (1) if the first marriage has already been
annulled or has been declared a nullity; (2) if the sworn statement of the reappearance
is not recorded in the civil registry of the subsequent spouses' residence; (3) if there is
no notice to the subsequent spouses; or (4) if the fact of reappearance is disputed in
the proper courts of law, and no judgment is yet rendered confirming such fact of
reappearance.
Santos v. Santos, G.R. No. 187061, October 8, 2014
When subsequent marriages are contracted after a judicial declaration of
presumptive death, a presumption arises that the first spouse is already dead and that
the second marriage is legal. This presumption should prevail over the continuance of
the marital relations with the first spouse. The second marriage, as with all marriages,
is presumed valid. The burden of proof to show that the first marriage was not
properly dissolved rests on the person assailing the validity of the second marriage.
Santos v. Santos, G.R. No. 187061, October 8, 2014
[M]ere reappearance will not terminate the subsequent marriage even if the parties
to the subsequent marriage were notified if there was "no step . . . taken to terminate
the subsequent marriage, either by [filing an] affidavit [of reappearance] or by court
action[.]" "Since the second marriage has been contracted because of a presumption
that the former spouse is dead, such presumption continues inspite of the spouse's
physical reappearance, and by fiction of law, he or she must still be regarded as
legally an absentee until the subsequent marriage is terminated as provided by law."
Santos v. Santos, G.R. No. 187061, October 8, 2014, citing Social Security System v.
Vda. de Bailon, 520 Phil. 249 (2006)
The provision on reappearance in the Family Code as a remedy to effect the
termination of the subsequent marriage does not preclude the spouse who was
declared presumptively dead from availing other remedies existing in law. This court
had, in fact, recognized that a subsequent marriage may also be terminated by filing
"an action in court to prove the reappearance of the absentee and obtain a declaration
Copyright 2017 CD Technologies Asia, Inc. and Accesslaw, Inc. Philippine Law Encyclopedia (2017.1) 92
of dissolution or termination of the subsequent marriage."
Santos v. Santos, G.R. No. 187061, October 8, 2014
Since an undisturbed subsequent marriage under Article 42 of the Family Code is
valid until terminated, the "children of such marriage shall be considered legitimate,
and the property relations of the spouse[s] in such marriage will be the same as in
valid marriages." If it is terminated by mere reappearance, the children of the
subsequent marriage conceived before the termination shall still be considered
legitimate. Moreover, a judgment declaring presumptive death is a defense against
prosecution for bigamy.
Santos v. Santos, G.R. No. 187061, October 8, 2014
It is true that in most cases, an action to declare the nullity of the subsequent
marriage may nullify the effects of the subsequent marriage, specifically, in relation to
the status of children and the prospect of prosecuting a respondent for bigamy.
However, "a Petition for Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages may be
filed solely by the husband or wife." This means that even if [the absent spouse] is a
real party in interest who stands to be benefited or injured by the outcome of an action
to nullify the second marriage, this remedy is not available to her. Therefore, for the
purpose of not only terminating the subsequent marriage but also of nullifying the
effects of the declaration of presumptive death and the subsequent marriage, mere
filing of an affidavit of reappearance would not suffice. [The absent spouse]'s choice
to file an action for annulment of judgment will, therefore, lie.
Santos v. Santos, G.R. No. 187061, October 8, 2014
Art. 45 - Annulment of marriage
Distinction between "annul' and "null and void".
Annulment of marriage cannot destroy its juridical consequences.
Lawyer's act of advertising himself as "Annulment of Marriage Specialist" erodes sanctity
of marriage
Non-disclosure of premarital relationship is not one of grounds for annulment.
Concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was pregnant (4
months) by a man other than her husband constitutes fraud and is ground for annulment of
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marriage.
There is no fraud when the wife was already in the 7th month of pregnancy at the time of
marriage.
A voidable marriage cannot be assailed collaterally.
Distinction between "annul" and "null and void".
The terms "annul" and "null and void" have different legal connotations and
implications. Annul means to reduce to nothing; annihilate; obliterate; to make void or
of no effect; to nullify; to abolish; to do away with, whereas null and void is
something that does not exist from the beginning. A marriage that is annulled
presupposes that it subsists but later ceases to have legal effect when it is terminated
through a court action. But in nullifying a marriage, the court simply declares a status
or condition which already exists from the very beginning.
Federico C. Suntay vs. Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay, G.R. No. 132524, December 29,
1998
Annulment of marriage cannot destroy its juridical consequences.
The annulment of the marriage by the court abolishes the legal character of the
society formed by the putative spouses, but it cannot destroy the juridical
consequences which the marital union produced during its continuance.
Sy Joc Lieng vs. Petronila Encarnacion, G.R. No. 4718, March 19, 1910
Lawyer's act of advertising himself as “Annulment of Marriage Specialist” erodes
sanctity of marriage
In advertising himself as a self-styled "Annulment of Marriage Specialist," he
erodes and undermines not only the stability but also the sanctity of an institution still
considered sacrosanct despite the contemporary climate of permissiveness in our
society. Indeed, in assuring prospective clients that an annulment may be obtained in
four to six months from the time of the filing of the case, he in fact encourages people,
who might have otherwise been disinclined and would have refrained from dissolving
their marriage bonds, to do so.
Ismael G. Khan vs. Rizalino T. Simbillo, A.C. No. 5299, August 19, 2003
Copyright 2017 CD Technologies Asia, Inc. and Accesslaw, Inc. Philippine Law Encyclopedia (2017.1) 94
Non-disclosure of premarital relationship is not one of grounds for annulment.
Non-disclosure of a husband's pre-marital relationship with another woman is
not one of the enumerated circumstances that would constitute a ground for
annulment; and it is further excluded by the last paragraph of the article, providing
that "no other misrepresentation or deceit as to . . . chastity" shall give ground for an
action to annul a marriage. While a woman may detest such non-disclosure of
premarital lewdness or feel having been thereby cheated into giving her consent to the
marriage, nevertheless the law does not assuage her grief after her consent was
solemnly given, for upon marriage she entered into an institution in which society, and
not herself alone, is interested.
Aurora A. Anaya vs. Fernando O. Palaroan, G.R. No. L-27930, November 26, 1970
Concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was
pregnant (4 months) by a man other than her husband constitutes fraud and is ground
for annulment of marriage.
The wife was alleged to be only more than four months pregnant at the time of
her marriage. According to medical authorities, even on the 5th month of pregnancy,
the enlargement of a woman's abdomen is still below the umbilicus, that is to say, the
enlargement is limited to the lower part of the abdomen so that it is hardly noticeable
and may, if noticed, be attributed only to fat formation on the lower part of the
abdomen. It is only on the 6th month of pregnancy that the enlargement of the
woman's abdomen reaches a height above the umbilicus, making the roundness of the
abdomen more general and apparent. If, as claimed by husband, the wife is "naturally
plump", he could hardly be expected to know, merely by looking, whether or not she
was pregnant at the time of their marriage, more so because she must have attempted
to conceal the true state of affairs.
Fernando Aquino vs. Conchita Delizo, G.R. No. L-15853, July 27, 1960
There is no fraud when the wife was already in the 7th month of pregnancy at the
time of marriage.
In an action for the annulment of marriage on the ground of fraud, the
husband's claim that he did not even suspect the pregnancy of the defendant was held
to be unbelievable, it having been proven that the latter was already in an advanced
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stage of pregnancy (7th month) at the time of their marriage.
Godofredo Buccat vs. Luida Mangonon de Buccat, G.R. No. 47101, April 25, 1941
A voidable marriage cannot be assailed collaterally.
[A] voidable marriage cannot be assailed collaterally except in a direct proceeding.
Consequently, such marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties
and not after the death of either, in which case the parties and their offspring will be
left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid. Upon the death of either, the marriage
cannot be impeached, and is made good ab initio.
SSS vs. Teresita Jarque Vda. de Bailon, G.R. No. 165545, March 24, 2006
Article 45 (5) of the Family Code refers to lack of power to copulate.
Article 45 (5) of the Family Code refers to lack of power to copulate. Incapacity to
consummate denotes the permanent inability on the part of the spouses to perform the
complete act of sexual intercourse. Non-consummation of a marriage may be on the
part of the husband or of the wife and may be caused by a physical or structural defect
in the anatomy of one of the parties or it may be due to chronic illness and inhibitions
or fears arising in whole or in part from psychophysical conditions. It may be caused
by psychogenic causes, where such mental block or disturbance has the result of
making the spouse physically incapable of performing the marriage act.
Veronica Cabacungan Alcazar vs. Rey C. Alcazar, G.R. No. 174451, October 13, 2009
Art. 45 (5) - Physical incapability of consummating the marriage
Lone testimony of husband that his wife is physically incapable of sexual
intercourse is insufficient.
Although the wife's refusal to be examined or failure to appear in court show
indifference on her part, yet from such attitude the presumption arising out of the
suppression of evidence could not arise or be inferred, because women of this country
are by nature coy, bashful and shy and would not submit to a physical examination
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unless compelled to by competent authority. This the court may do, without doing
violence to and infringing upon her constitutional right. A physical examination in this
case is not self-incrimination. She is not charged with any offense. She is not being
compelled to be a witness against herself. Impotency being an abnormal condition
should not be presumed. The presumption is in favor of potency. The lone testimony
of the husband that his wife is physically incapable of sexual intercourse is
insufficient to tear asunder the ties that have bound them together as husband and
wife.
Joel Jimenez vs. Remedios Cañizares, G.R. No. L-12790, August 31, 1960
Art. 46 - Voidable marriage
A voidable marriage is deemed valid until set aside by final judgment.
Other forms of psychoses merely render marriage contract voidable.
A voidable marriage may be assailed only in a direct proceeding.
Free cohabitation or prescription ratifies a voidable marriage.
A voidable marriage can be assailed only during lifetime of the parties.
A voidable marriage can be assailed only by its parties.
Conjugal partnership governs property relationship in a voidable marriage.
A voidable marriage is not a defense in a charge of bigamy.
A voidable marriage is deemed valid until set aside by final judgment.
A voidable marriage is considered valid and produces all its civil effects, until
it is set aside by final judgment of a competent court in an action for annulment.
Juridically, the annulment of a marriage dissolves the special contract as if it had
never been entered into but the law makes express provisions to prevent the effects of
the marriage from being totally wiped out.
Federico C. Suntay vs. Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay, G.R. No. 132524, December 29,
1998
Arthur Te vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126746, November 29, 2000
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Salvador S. Abunado vs. People of the Phils., G.R. No. 159218, March 30, 2004
Engrace Niñal vs. Norma Bayadog, G.R. No. 133778, March 14, 2000
Mercado vs. Tan, G.R. No. 137110, August 1, 2000
Bobis vs. Bobis, G.R. No. 138509, July 31, 2000
Wiegel vs. Sempio-Diy, G.R. No. L-53703, August 19, 1986
Other forms of psychoses merely render marriage contract voidable.
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the
state of a party being of unsound mind or concealment of drug addiction, habitual
alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders the marriage contract
voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code.
Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112019, January 4, 1995
A voidable marriage may be assailed only in a direct proceeding.
Doctrinally, a void marriage may be subjected to collateral attack, while a
voidable one may be assailed only in a direct proceeding.
Tomasa vda. de Jacob vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 135216, August 19, 1999
Engrace Niñal vs. Norma Bayadog, G.R. No. 133778, March 14, 2000
Free cohabitation or prescription ratifies a voidable marriage.
A voidable marriage can be generally ratified or confirmed by free cohabitation
or prescription.
Engrace Niñal vs. Norma Bayadog, G.R. No. 133778, March 14, 2000
A voidable marriage can be assailed only during lifetime of the parties.
Voidable marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and
not after death of either, in which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if
the marriage had been perfectly valid.
Engrace Niñal vs. Norma Bayadog, G.R. No. 133778, March 14, 2000
Copyright 2017 CD Technologies Asia, Inc. and Accesslaw, Inc. Philippine Law Encyclopedia (2017.1) 98
A voidable marriage can be assailed only by its parties.
Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it
Engrace Niñal vs. Norma Bayadog, G.R. No. 133778, March 14, 2000
Conjugal partnership governs property relationship in a voidable marriage.
The property regime governing voidable marriages is generally conjugal
partnership and the children conceived before its annulment are legitimate.
Engrace Niñal vs. Norma Bayadog, G.R. No. 133778, March 14, 2000
A voidable marriage is not a defense in a charge of bigamy.
In contrast to a voidable marriage which legally exists until judicially annulled
(and, therefore, not a defense in a bigamy charge if the second marriage were
contracted prior to the decree of annulment), the complete nullity, however, of a
previously contracted marriage, being void ab initio and legally inexistent, can
outrightly be a defense in an indictment for bigamy.
Veronico Tenebro vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 150758, February 18, 2004
Art. 47 - Persons authorized to file action for annulment
The Family Code is silent as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage.
A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the
husband or wife; Exceptions.
Only the party who can demonstrate a "proper interest" can file an action to declare the
absolute nullity of a marriage.
The Family Code is silent as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a
marriage.
Article 47 of the Family Code cannot be applied even by analogy to petitions
for declaration of nullity of marriage. The second ground for annulment of marriage
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relied upon by the trial court, which allows "the sane spouse" to file an annulment suit
"at any time before the death of either party" is inapplicable. Article 47 pertains to the
grounds, periods and persons who can file an annulment suit, not a suit for declaration
of nullity of marriage. The Code is silent as to who can file a petition to declare the
nullity of a marriage.
Engrace Niñal vs. Norma Bayadog, G.R. No. 133778, March 14, 2000
A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by
the husband or wife; Exceptions.
Section 2, paragraph (a), of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC (Rule on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages) explicitly
provides the limitation that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriage may be filed solely by the husband or wife. Such limitation demarcates a line
to distinguish between marriages covered by the Family Code and those solemnized
under the regime of the Civil Code. Specifically, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC extends only
to marriages covered by the Family Code, which took effect on August 3, 1988, but,
being a procedural rule that is prospective in application, is confined only to
proceedings commenced after March 15, 2003. The following actions for declaration
of absolute nullity of a marriage are excepted from the limitation, to wit:
1. Those commenced before March 15, 2003, the effectivity date of
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC; and
2. Those filed vis-à-vis marriages celebrated during the effectivity of
the Civil Code and, those celebrated under the regime of the
Family Code prior to March 15, 2003.
Isidro Ablaza vs. Republic of the Phil., G.R. No. 158298, August 11, 2010, citing Carlos
v. Sandoval, G.R. No. 179922, December 16, 2008
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to recognize
a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a
citizen of a foreign country. Moreover, in Juliano-Llave v. Republic (G.R. No.
169766, March 30, 2011), this Court held that the rule in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC that
only the husband or wife can file a declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage
"does not apply if the reason behind the petition is bigamy. . . .
Copyright 2017 CD Technologies Asia, Inc. and Accesslaw, Inc. Philippine Law Encyclopedia (2017.1) 100
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