for recognition and support may create an unwholesome atmosphere or may be an
irritant in the family or lives of the parties, so that it must be issued only if paternity or
filiation is established by clear and convincing evidence.
Francisco L. Jison vs. Court of Appeals and Monina Jison, G.R. No. 124853. February
24, 1998
What constitutes “open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate
child”.
To establish "the open and continuous possession of the status of an
illegitimate child," it is necessary to comply with certain jurisprudential requirements.
"Continuous" does not mean that the concession of status shall continue forever but
only that it shall not be of an intermittent character while it continues. The possession
of such status means that the father has treated the child as his own, directly and not
through others, spontaneously and without concealment though without publicity
(since the relation is illegitimate). There must be a showing of the permanent intention
of the supposed father to consider the child as his own, by continuous and clear
manifestation of paternal affection and care.
Casimiro Mendoza vs. Court of Appeals and Teopista Toring Tuñacao, G.R. No. 86302,
September 24, 1991
“Authentic writing” for purposes of voluntary recognition, defined.
"Authentic writing," so as to be an authentic writing for purposes of voluntary
recognition, simply as being a genuine or indubitable writing of the father. The term
would include a public instrument (one duly acknowledged before a notary public or
other competent official) or a private writing admitted by the father to be his.
Maria Jeanette C. Tecson vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 161434, March 3, 2004
The acknowledgment or recognition of illegitimate children is increasingly
liberalized.
The growing trend to liberalize the acknowledgment or recognition of
illegitimate children is an attempt to break away from the traditional idea of keeping
well apart legitimate and non-legitimate relationships within the family in favor of the
greater interest and welfare of the child. The provisions are intended to merely govern
the private and personal affairs of the family. There is little, if any, to indicate that the
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legitimate or illegitimate civil status of the individual would also affect his political
rights or, in general, his relationship to the State. While, indeed, provisions on
"citizenship" could be found in the Civil Code, such provisions must be taken in the
context or private relations, the domain of civil law
Maria Jeanette C. Tecson vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 161434, March 3, 2004
How filiation of illegitimate children is established.
The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is established by
(1) the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2) an
admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence thereof, filiation shall
be proved by (1) the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate
child; or (2) any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
Jinkie Christie A. de Jesus vs. The Estate of Decedent Juan Gamboa Dizon, G.R. No.
142877, October 2, 2001
The legitimate filiation of a child may be established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be
proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
These requirements likewise apply to establish the filiation of illegitimate
children.
Zoleta-San Agustin v. Sales, G.R. No. 189289, August 31, 2016
When judicial action within the applicable statute of limitations is essential in
order to establish the child's acknowledgment.
The due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a
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statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a
consummated act of acknowledgment of the child, and no further court action is
required. In fact, any authentic writing is treated not just a ground for compulsory
recognition; it is in itself a voluntary recognition that does not require a separate
action for judicial approval. Where, instead, a claim for recognition is predicated on
other evidence merely tending to prove paternity, i.e., outside of a record of birth, a
will, a statement before a court of record or an authentic writing, judicial action within
the applicable statute of limitations is essential in order to establish the child's
acknowledgment.
Jinkie Christie A. de Jesus vs. The Estate of Decedent Juan Gamboa Dizon, G.R. No.
142877, October 2, 2001
Judicially approved compromise agreement by parents may constitute a statement
by which a child may be voluntarily acknowledged.
A compromise agreement entered into by parents acknowledging their five (5)
natural children and providing for their support approved by the court, constitutes a
statement before a court of record by which a child may be voluntarily acknowledged.
Yao Kee vs. Aida Sy-Gonzales, G.R. No. L-55960, November 24, 1988
A judicial order to compel a person to submit to DNA paternity testing does not
violate his right against self-incrimination.
The proposed DNA paternity testing does not violate his right against
self-incrimination because the right applies only to testimonial compulsion. PLPE05
Rosendo Herrera vs. Rosendo Alba, et al., G.R. No. 148220, June 15, 2005
Art. 176 - Surname of illegitimate children
Illegitimate children should bear the surname of their mother.
If alleged father did not intervene in the birth certificate, inscription of his name therein is
null and void.
Changing of surname to that of stepfather's will invite confusion as to child's paternity.
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Illegitimate children should bear the surname of their mother.
Thus, as illegitimate children, Emerson and Rafael should bear the surname of
their mother, Luzviminda Celestino. Resultingly, with the correction of the entries in
their birth certificates which deleted the entry in the date and place of marriage of
parents, the corresponding correction with respect to their surname should have also
been made and changed to Celestino, their mother's surname.
Republic of the Phils. vs. Gerson R. Abadilla, G.R. No. 133054, January 28, 1999
If alleged father did not intervene in the birth certificate, inscription of his name
therein is null and void.
It is settled that a certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative
father is not competent evidence as to the issue of paternity, when there is no showing
that the putative father had a hand in the preparation of said certificates, and the Local
Civil Registrar is devoid of authority to record the paternity of an illegitimate child
upon the information of a third person. Simply put, if the alleged father did not
intervene in the birth certificate, e. g., supplying the information himself, the
inscription of his name by the mother or doctor or registrar is null and void; the mere
certificate by the registrar without the signature of the father is not proof of voluntary
acknowledgment on the latter's part.
Francisco L. Jison vs. Court of Appeals and Monina Jison, G.R. No. 124853, February
24, 1998
Changing of surname to that of stepfather's will invite confusion as to child's
paternity.
The reason alleged by Andrew Barretto (because it is the surname of his
step-father) is not compelling enough to warrant the change of name prayed for. The
surname "Barretto" is his mother's surname. He is the illegitimate child of Lucy
Barretto. But he is not a natural child of Magin V. Velez. The circumstances of his
illegitimate filiation are not known. Magin V. Velez had children of his own before he
married the applicant's mother. Magin V. Velez and Lucy Barretto also have their own
children. To warrant the change of name sought will necessary invite confusion as to
paternity, to the prejudice of Magin V. Velez, the applicant's mother, as well as their
common and separate offsprings.
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Republic of the Phils. vs. Hon. Judge of Branch III of CFI-Cebu, G.R. No. L-35605,
October 11, 1984
This provision [Art. 176 of the Family Code] was later amended on March 19,
2004 by RA 9255 which now reads:
Art. 176. — Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be
under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in
conformity with this Code. However, illegitimate children may use the
surname of their father if their filiation has been expressly recognized by
their father through the record of birth appearing in the civil register, or when
an admission in a public document or private handwritten instrument is made
by the father. Provided, the father has the right to institute an action before the
regular courts to prove non-filiation during his lifetime. The legitime of each
illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child.
Grande v. Antonio, G.R. No. 206248, February 18, 2014
[T]he general rule is that an illegitimate child shall use the surname of his or her
mother. The exception provided by RA 9255 is, in case his or her filiation is expressly
recognized by the father through the record of birth appearing in the civil register or
when an admission in a public document or private handwritten instrument is made by
the father. In such a situation, the illegitimate child may use the surname of the father.
Grande v. Antonio, G.R. No. 206248, February 18, 2014
Parental authority over minor children is lodged by Art. 176 on the mother; hence,
respondent's prayer has no legal mooring. Since parental authority is given to the
mother, then custody over the minor children also goes to the mother, unless she is
shown to be unfit.
Grande v. Antonio, G.R. No. 206248, February 18, 2014
Art. 177 - Legitimated children
Legitimation does not include children born of adulterous relations.
Legitimation is a privilege available only to natural children.
To effect legitimation, the parents should be married to each other.
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Legitimated child enjoys all rights and privileges associated with legitimacy.
Legitimation does not include children born of adulterous relations.
Legitimation is limited to natural children and cannot include those born of
adulterous relations.
Ma. Blyth B. Abadilla vs. Jose C. Tabiliran, Jr., Adm. Matter No. MTJ-92-716, October
25, 1995
Legitimation is a privilege available only to natural children.
Legitimation is not a "right" which is demandable by a child. It is a privilege,
available only to natural children proper, as defined under Art. 269. Although natural
children by legal fiction have the same rights as acknowledged natural children, it is a
quantum leap in the syllogism to conclude that, therefore, they likewise have the right
to be legitimated, which is not necessarily so, especially, as in this case, when the
legally existing marriage between the children's father and his estranged first wife
effectively barred a "subsequent marriage" between their parents.
Maria Rosario de Santos vs. Adoracion G. Angeles, G.R. No. 105619, December 12,
1995
To effect legitimation, the parents should be married to each other.
The parents should be married to each other in order to effect the legitimation
of their acknowledged natural children. And once legitimated, the child becomes
legitimate child. Since the parents marry each other, the acknowledgment of the
natural children need no judicial approval.
Alfonso Colorado vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-39948, February 28, 1985
Legitimated child enjoys all rights and privileges associated with legitimacy.
The status of a marriage determines in large part the filiation of its resultant
issue. Thus, a child born within a valid marriage is legitimate, while one born outside
of wedlock is illegitimate. If, however, the latter's parents were, at the time of the
child's conception, not legally barred from marrying each other and subsequently do
so, the child's filiation improves as he becomes legitimized and the "legitimated" child
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eventually enjoys all the privileges and rights associated with legitimacy.
Maria Rosario de Santos vs. Hon. Adoracion G. Angeles, G.R. No. 105619, December
12, 1995
Art. 179 - Rights of legitimated children
Legitimated child enjoys all rights and privileges associated with legitimacy.
The status of a marriage determines in large part the filiation of its resultant
issue. Thus, a child born within a valid marriage is legitimate, while one born outside
of wedlock is illegitimate. If, however, the latter's parents were, at the time of the
child's conception, not legally barred from marrying each other and subsequently do
so, the child's filiation improves as he becomes legitimized and the "legitimated" child
eventually enjoys all the privileges and rights associated with legitimacy.
Maria Rosario de Santos vs. Hon. Adoracion G. Angeles, G.R. No. 105619, December
12, 1995
One who voluntarily but falsely acknowledges his spouse's child as his own is
bound by the effects of legitimation.
BBB is not CCC's biological father. Such being the case, it was improper to
have CCC legitimated after the celebration of BBB and AAA's marriage. Clearly then,
the legal process of legitimation was trifled with. BBB voluntarily but falsely
acknowledged CCC as his son. . . the principle of estoppel finds application and it
now bars BBB from making an assertion contrary to his previous representations. He
should not be allowed to evade a responsibility arising from his own
misrepresentations. He is bound by the effects of the legitimation process. CCC
remains to be BBB's son, and pursuant to Article 179 of the Family Code, the former
is entitled to the same rights as those of a legitimate child, including the receipt of his
father's support.
BBB v. AAA, G.R. No. 193225, February 9, 2015
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Art. 183 - Who may adopt
Adoption creates a status closely assimilated to legitimate paternity and filiation.
The issue of abandonment by the oppositor natural parent is a preliminary issue that an
adoption court must first confront.
Adopted child has sole right to sever legal ties created by adoption.
The interests and welfare of the child are of primary and paramount consideration in
determining whether or not to set aside a decree of adoption.
Adoption laws should be construed so as to give all the chances for human life to exist.
Written consent of the natural parent is indispensable for the validity of the decree of
adoption.
However, written consent of natural parent can be dispensed with if said parent has
abandoned the child.
Deprivation of parental authority is one of the effects of an adoption decree.
Adoption creates a status closely assimilated to legitimate paternity and filiation.
Adoption creates a status that is closely assimilated to legitimate paternity and
filiation with corresponding rights and duties that necessarily flow from adoption,
such as, but not necessarily confined to, the exercise of parental authority, use of
surname of the adopter by the adopted, as well as support and successional rights.
Republic of the Phils. vs. Court of Appeals and Sps. James Anthony and Lenita
Hughes, G.R. No. 100835, October 26, 1993
The issue of abandonment by the oppositor natural parent is a preliminary issue
that an adoption court must first confront.
The allegations of abandonment in the petition for adoption, even absent the
written consent of the father, sufficiently vested the lower court with jurisdiction since
abandonment of the child by his natural parents is one of the circumstances under
which our statutes and jurisprudence dispense with the requirement of written consent
to the adoption of their minor children. However, in cases where the father opposes
the adoption primarily because his consent thereto was not sought, the matter of
whether he had abandoned his child becomes a proper issue for determination. The
issue of abandonment by the oppositor natural parent is a preliminary issue that an
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adoption court must first confront. Only upon failure of the oppositor natural father to
prove to the satisfaction of the court that he did not abandon his child may the petition
for adoption be considered on its merits.
Herbert Cang vs. Court of Appeals and Sps. Ronald and Ma. Clara Clavano, G.R. No.
105308, September 25, 1998
Adopted child has sole right to sever legal ties created by adoption.
R.A. No. 8552 (Domestic Adoption Act of 1998) affirmed the legitimate status
of the adopted child, not only in his new family but also in the society as well. The
new law withdrew the right of an adopter to rescind the adoption decree and gave to
the adopted child the sole right to sever the legal ties created by adoption. It is still
noteworthy, however, that an adopter, while barred from severing the legal ties of
adoption, can always for valid reasons cause the forfeiture of certain benefits
otherwise accruing to an undeserving child.
Isabelita S. Lahom vs. Jose Melvin Sibulo, G.R. No. 143989, July 14, 2003
The interests and welfare of the child are of primary and paramount consideration
in determining whether or not to set aside a decree of adoption.
a) The welfare of a child is of paramount consideration in proceedings
involving its custody and the propriety of its adoption by another, and the courts to
which the application for adoption is made is charged with the duty of protecting the
child and its interests and, to bring those interests fully before it, it has authority to
make rules to accomplish that end. Ordinarily, the approval of the adoption rests in the
sound discretion of the court. This discretion should be exercised in accordance with
the best interests of the child, as long as the natural rights of the parents over the child
are not disregarded.
Rep. of the Phils. vs. Court of Appeals and Zenaida C. Bobiles, G.R. No. 92326,
January 24, 1992
b) Adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, hold the interest and
welfare of the child to be of paramount consideration and are designed to provide
homes, parental care and education for unfortunate, needy or orphaned children and
give them the protection of society and family in the person of the adopter as well as
to allow childless couples or persons to experience the joys of parenthood and give
them legally a child in the person of the adopted for the manifestation of their natural
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parental instincts. Every reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote and
fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of the law.
In re: Frederick William Malkinson vs. Corazon Juliano Agrava, G.R. No. L-36309,
November 26, 1973
c) The philosophy behind adoption statutes is to promote the welfare of the
child. Accordingly, the modern trend is to encourage adoption and every reasonable
intendment should be sustained to promote that objective.
Paulina Santos vs. Gregoria Aranzanso, G.R. No. L-23828, February 28, 1966
Adoption laws should be construed so as to give all the chances for human life to
exist.
The rule of "dura lex sed lex" should be softened so as to apply the law with
less severity and with compassion and humane understanding, for adoption is more for
the benefit of unfortunate children, particularly those born out of wedlock — than for
those born with a silver spoon in their mouths. All efforts or acts designed to provide
homes, love, and care and education for unfortunate children should be given the
widest latitude of sympathy, encouragement and assistance. The law is not, and should
not be made an instrument to impede the achievement of a salutary humane policy. As
often as is legally and lawfully possible, their texts and intendments should be
construed so as to give all the chances for human life to exist.
Robin Francis Radley Duncan and Maria Lucy Christensen vs. CFI of Rizal, G.R. No.
L-30576, February 10, 1976
Slobodan Bobanovic and Dianne Elizabeth Cunningham Bobanovic vs. Hon. Sylvia P.
Montes, G.R. No. 71370, July 7, 1986
Written consent of the natural parent is indispensable for the validity of the decree
of adoption.
Notwithstanding the amendments introduced by the Family Code to the Child
and Youth Welfare Code on adoption, the written consent of the natural parent to the
adoption has remained a requisite for its validity.
Herbert Cang vs. Court of Appeals and Sps. Ronald and Ma. Clara Clavano, G.R. No.
105308, September 25, 1998
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However, written consent of natural parent can be dispensed with if said parent
has abandoned the child.
Nevertheless, the requirement of written consent can be dispensed with if the
parent has abandoned the child or that such parent is "insane or hopelessly
intemperate." The court may acquire jurisdiction over the case even without the
written consent of the parents or one of the parents provided that the petition for
adoption alleges facts sufficient to warrant exemption from compliance therewith.
This is in consonance with the liberality with which this Court treats the procedural
aspect of adoption.
Herbert Cang vs. Court of Appeals and Sps. Ronald and Ma. Clara Clavano, G.R. No.
105308, September 25, 1998
Deprivation of parental authority is one of the effects of an adoption decree.
Deprivation of parental authority is one of the effects of a decree of adoption.
But there cannot be a valid decree of adoption when the findings of the trial court on
the issue of the husband's abandonment of his family was based on a misappreciation
that was tantamount to non-appreciation, of facts on record.
Herbert Cang vs. Court of Appeals and Sps. Ronald and Ma. Clara Clavano, G.R. No.
105308, September 25, 1998
Art. 190 - Rules on legal or intestate succession to estate of the adopted
Moreover, this ruling finds support on the fact that even though parental authority
is severed by virtue of adoption, the ties between the adoptee and the biological
parents are not entirely eliminated. To demonstrate, the biological parents, in some
instances, are able to inherit from the adopted, as can be gleaned from Art. 190 of the
Family Code. . .
Bartolome v. SSS, G.R. No. 192531, November 12, 2014
We are guided by the catena of cases and the state policies behind RA 8552
wherein the paramount consideration is the best interest of the child, which We invoke
to justify this disposition. It is, after all, for the best interest of the child that someone
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will remain charged for his welfare and upbringing should his or her adopter fail or is
rendered incapacitated to perform his duties as a parent at a time the adoptee is still in
his formative years, and, to Our mind, in the absence or, as in this case, death of the
adopter, no one else could reasonably be expected to perform the role of a parent other
than the adoptee's biological one.
Bartolome v. SSS, G.R. No. 192531, November 12, 2014
[E]ven though parental authority is severed by virtue of adoption, the ties between
the adoptee and the biological parents are not entirely eliminated. To demonstrate, the
biological parents, in some instances, are able to inherit from the adopted, as can be
gleaned from Art. 190 of the Family Code. . .
Del Socorro v. Van Wilsem, G.R. No. 193707, December 10, 2014
Art. 194 - Support
Characteristics of legal support.
Mere act of marriage creates an obligation on the part of husband to support his wife.
An unborn child has a right to support from its progenitors.
Rationale for entitling illegitimate children to support and successional rights.
Right to support presupposes existence of a justifiable cause on the part of the claimant
spouse.
Adultery on the part of the wife is a valid defense against an action for support
The wife is not entitled to support if she establishes her residence apart from the husband.
Husband's repeated illicit relations with women justify separate maintenance for the wife.
A claim for future support cannot be subject of a valid compromise.
Characteristics of legal support.
Legal support has the following characteristics: (1) It is personal, based on family
ties which bind the obligor and the obligee; (2) It is intransmissible; (3) It cannot be
renounced; (4) It cannot be compromised; (5) It is free from attachment or execution;
(6) It is reciprocal; (7) It is variable in amount.
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Perla G. Patricio vs. Marcelino G. Dario III, et al., G.R. No. 170829, November 20, 2006
Mere act of marriage creates an obligation on the part of husband to support his
wife.
The mere act of marriage creates an obligation on the part of the husband to
support his wife. This obligation is founded not so much on the express or implied
terms of the contract of marriage as on the natural and legal duty of the husband; an
obligation, the enforcement of which is of such vital concern to the state itself that the
law will not permit him to terminate it by his own wrongful acts in driving his wife to
seek protection in the parental home.
Eloisa Goitia y de la Camara vs. Jose Campos Rueda, G.R. No. 11263, November 2,
1916
An unborn child has a right to support from its progenitors.
A conceived child, although as yet unborn, is given by law a provisional
personality of its own for all purposes favorable to it. The unborn child, therefore, has
a right to support from its progenitors, even if the said child is only "en ventre de sa
mere;" just as a conceived child, even if as yet unborn, may receive donations as
prescribed by law.
Carmen Quimiguing vs. Felix Icao, G.R. No. L-26795, July 31, 1970
Rationale for entitling illegitimate children to support and successional rights.
Illegitimate children are entitled to support and successional rights because the
transgressions of social conventions committed by the parents should not be visited
upon them. They were born with a social handicap and the law should help them to
surmount the disadvantages facing them through the misdeeds of their parents.
Artemio G. Ilano vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 104376, February 23, 1994
Right to support presupposes existence of a justifiable cause on the part of the
claimant spouse.
The right to separate support or maintenance, even from the conjugal
partnership property, presupposes the existence of a justifiable cause for the spouse
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claiming such right to live separately. A petition in bad faith, such as that filed by one
who is himself or herself guilty of an act which constitutes a ground for legal
separation at the instance of the other spouse, cannot be considered as within the
intendment of the law granting separate support.
Teodoro E. Lerma vs. Court of Appeals and Concepcion Diaz, G.R. No. L-33352,
December 20, 1974
Adultery on the part of the wife is a valid defense against an action for support
Adultery on the part of the wife is a valid defense against an action for support.
Consequently, as to the child, it is also a defense that it is the fruit of such adulterous
relations, for in that case, it would not be the child of the husband; hence, would not
be entitled to support as such.
Feliciano Sanchez vs. Francisco Zulueta, G.R. No. 45616, May 16, 1939
Maria Quintana vs. Gelasio Lerma, G.R. No. 7426, February 5, 1913
The wife is not entitled to support if she establishes her residence apart from the
husband.
Although the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual
respect and fidelity and render mutual help and assistance and that the wife is entitled
to be supported, our laws contain no provision compelling the wife to live with her
husband where even without legal justification she establishes her residence apart
from that provided for by the former. In such event, there is no plausible reason why
she should be allowed any support from the husband.
Pilar Atilano vs. Chua Ching Beng, G.R. No. L-11086, March 29, 1958
Husband's repeated illicit relations with women justify separate maintenance for
the wife.
In order to entitle a wife to maintain a separate home and to require separate
maintenance from her husband, it is not necessary that the husband should bring a
concubine into the marital domicile. Repeated illicit relations with women outside of
the marital establishment are enough. The law is not so unreasonable as to require a
wife to live in marital relations with a husband whose propensity towards other
women makes common habitation with him unbearable.
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Aurelia Dadivas de Villanueva vs. Rafael Villanueva, G.R. No. 29959, December 3,
1929
A claim for future support cannot be subject of a valid compromise.
No valid compromise is possible on the issue of future support. Hence, a
showing of previous efforts to compromise required under Art. 222 of the Civil Code
would be superfluous.
Cecilio Mendoza vs. Court of Appeals and Luisa de la Rosa Mendoza, G.R. No.
L-23102, April 24, 1967
Since filiation is beyond question, support follows as a matter of obligation; a
parent is obliged to support his child, whether legitimate or illegitimate. Support
consists of everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical
attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the
family. Thus, the amount of support is variable and, for this reason, no final judgment
on the amount of support is made as the amount shall be in proportion to the resources
or means of the giver and the necessities of the recipient. It may be reduced or
increased proportionately according to the reduction or increase of the necessities of
the recipient and the resources or means of the person obliged to support.
Charles Gotardo vs. Divina Buling, G.R. No. 165166, August 15, 2012
Art. 195 (3) - Who are obliged to support each other: Parents and their
legitimate children
[P]etitioner cannot rely on Article 195 of the [Family] Code in demanding support
from respondent, who is a foreign citizen, since Article 15 of the New Civil Code
stresses the principle of nationality. In other words, insofar as Philippine laws are
concerned, specifically the provisions of the Family Code on support, the same only
applies to Filipino citizens. By analogy, the same principle applies to foreigners such
that they are governed by their national law with respect to family rights and duties. . .
. This does not, however, mean that respondent is not obliged to support
petitioner's son altogether.
In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute
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or case has the burden of proving the foreign law. . . . It is incumbent upon respondent
to plead and prove that the national law of the Netherlands does not impose upon the
parents the obligation to support their child (either before, during or after the issuance
of a divorce decree) . . . . In view of respondent's failure to prove the national law of
the Netherlands in his favor, the doctrine of processual presumption shall govern.
Under this doctrine, if the foreign law involved is not properly pleaded and proved,
our courts will presume that the foreign law is the same as our local or domestic or
internal law. Thus, since the law of the Netherlands as regards the obligation to
support has not been properly pleaded and proved in the instant case, it is presumed to
be the same with Philippine law, which enforces the obligation of parents to support
their children and penalizing the non-compliance therewith.
Del Socorro v. Van Wilsem, G.R. No. 193707, December 10, 2014
Art. 195 (4) - Who are obliged to support each other
[Respondent]'s demand for support, being based on her claim of filiation to
petitioner as his illegitimate daughter, falls under Article 195 (4). As such, her
entitlement to support from petitioner is dependent on the determination of her
filiation.
Ben-Hur Nepomuceno vs. Arhbencel Ann Lopez, G.R. No. 181258, March 18, 2010
Filiation must be duly proved before illegitimate children are entitled to support.
To be entitled to legal support, petitioner must, in proper action, first establish the
filiation of the child, if the same is not admitted or acknowledged. Since petitioner's
demand for support for her son is based on her claim that he is respondent's
illegitimate child, the latter is not entitled to such support if he had not acknowledged
him, until petitioner shall have proved his relation to him. The child's remedy is to file
through her mother a judicial action against respondent for compulsory recognition. If
filiation is beyond question, support follows as matter of obligation. In short,
illegitimate children are entitled to support and successional rights but their filiation
must be duly proved.
Cherryl B. Dolina vs. Glenn D. Vallecera, G.R. No. 182367, December 15, 2010
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Art. 199 - Order of support
Article 305 of the Civil Code, in relation to what is now Article 199 of the Family
Code, specifies the persons who have the right and duty to make funeral arrangements
for the deceased.
Valino v. Adriano, G.R. No. 182894, April 22, 2014
From the aforecited provisions [Articles 305 and 308 of the Civil Code, Art. 199 of
the Family Code, Sec. 1103 of the Revised Administrative Code], it is undeniable that
the law simply confines the right and duty to make funeral arrangements to the
members of the family to the exclusion of one's common law partner.
Valino v. Adriano, G.R. No. 182894, April 22, 2014
[I]t is undeniable that the law simply confines the right and duty to make funeral
arrangements to the members of the family to the exclusion of one's common law
partner.
Valino v. Adriano, G.R. No. 182894, April 22, 2014
[I]t is clear that the law gives the right and duty to make funeral arrangements to
Rosario, she being the surviving legal wife of Atty. Adriano. The fact that she was
living separately from her husband and was in the United States when he died has no
controlling significance. To say that Rosario had, in effect, waived or renounced,
expressly or impliedly, her right and duty to make arrangements for the funeral of her
deceased husband is baseless. The right and duty to make funeral arrangements, like
any other right, will not be considered as having been waived or renounced, except
upon clear and satisfactory proof of conduct indicative of a free and voluntary
intent to that end. While there was disaffection between Atty. Adriano and Rosario
and their children when he was still alive, the Court also recognizes that human
compassion, more often than not, opens the door to mercy and forgiveness once a
family member joins his Creator.
Valino v. Adriano, G.R. No. 182894, April 22, 2014
The right and duty to make funeral arrangements, like any other right, will not be
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considered as having been waived or renounced, except upon clear and
satisfactory proof of conduct indicative of a free and voluntary intent to that end.
While there was disaffection between Atty. Adriano and Rosario and their children
when he was still alive, the Court also recognizes that human compassion, more often
than not, opens the door to mercy and forgiveness once a family member joins his
Creator.
Valino v. Adriano, G.R. No. 182894, April 22, 2014
Verily, in the same vein that the right and duty to make funeral arrangements will
not be considered as having been waived or renounced, the right to deprive a
legitimate spouse of her legal right to bury the remains of her deceased husband
should not be readily presumed to have been exercised, except upon clear and
satisfactory proof of conduct indicative of a free and voluntary intent of the deceased
to that end. Should there be any doubt as to the true intent of the deceased, the
law favors the legitimate family.
Valino v. Adriano, G.R. No. 182894, April 22, 2014
From its terms, it is apparent that Article 307 simply seeks to prescribe the "form of
the funeral rites" that should govern in the burial of the deceased. As thoroughly
explained earlier, the right and duty to make funeral arrangements reside in the
persons specified in Article 305 in relation to Article 199 of the Family Code. Even if
Article 307 were to be interpreted to include the place of burial among those on which
the wishes of the deceased shall be followed, Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino (Dr. Tolentino),
an eminent authority on civil law, commented that it is generally recognized that
any inferences as to the wishes of the deceased should be established by some
form of testamentary disposition. As Article 307 itself provides, the wishes of the
deceased must be expressly provided. It cannot be inferred lightly . . .
Valino v. Adriano, G.R. No. 182894, April 22, 2014
[T]he wishes of the decedent with respect to his funeral are not absolute. As Dr.
Tolentino further wrote:
The dispositions or wishes of the deceased in relation to his funeral,
must not be contrary to law. They must not violate the legal and
reglementary provisions concerning funerals and the disposition of the
remains, whether as regards the time and manner of disposition, or the place
of burial, or the ceremony to be observed.
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In this case, the wishes of the deceased with respect to his funeral are limited by
Article 305 of the Civil Code in relation to Article 199 of the Family Code, and
subject the same to those charged with the right and duty to make the proper
arrangements to bury the remains of their loved-one.
Valino v. Adriano, G.R. No. 182894, April 22, 2014
It is generally recognized that the corpse of an individual is outside the commerce
of man. However, the law recognizes that a certain right of possession over the corpse
exists, for the purpose of a decent burial, and for the exclusion of the intrusion by
third persons who have no legitimate interest in it. This quasi-property right, arising
out of the duty of those obligated by law to bury their dead, also authorizes them to
take possession of the dead body for purposes of burial to have it remain in its final
resting place, or to even transfer it to a proper place where the memory of the dead
may receive the respect of the living. This is a family right. There can be no doubt
that persons having this right may recover the corpse from third persons.
Valino v. Adriano, G.R. No. 182894, April 22, 2014
Art. 201 - Amount of support
The capacity or resources of both parents and the child's monthly expenses must be proved
to justify award of support.
The allowance for support is provisional.
Judgment for support is never final.
The capacity or resources of both parents and the child's monthly expenses must be
proved to justify award of support.
It is incumbent upon the trial court to base its award of support on the evidence
presented before it. The evidence must prove the capacity or resources of both parents
who are jointly obliged to support their children as provided for under Article 195 of
the Family Code; and the monthly expenses incurred for the sustenance, dwelling,
clothing, medical attendance, education and transportation of the child.
Jose Lam vs. Adriana Chua, G.R. No. 131286, March 18, 2004
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The allowance for support is provisional.
Judgment for support does not become final. The right to support is of such
nature that its allowance is essentially provisional; for during the entire period that a
needy party is entitled to support, his or her alimony may be modified or altered, in
accordance with his increased or decreased needs, and with the means of the giver. It
cannot be regarded as subject to final determination.
Manuela Advincula vs. Manuel Advincula, G.R. No. L-19065, January 31, 1964
Judgment for support is never final.
Under Article 195 (4) of the Family Code, a parent is obliged to support his
illegitimate child. The amount is variable. There is no final judgment thereof as it
shall be in proportion to the resources or means of the giver and the necessities of the
recipient. It may be reduced or increased proportionately according to the reduction or
increase of the necessities of the recipient and the resources or means of the person
obliged to support. Support comprises everything indispensable for sustenance,
dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with
the financial capacity of the family. Under the premises, the award of P5,000 monthly
support to Laurence is reasonable, and not excessive nor exorbitant.
Dolores Montefalcon, et al. vs. Ronnie S. Vasquez, G.R. No. 165016, June 17, 2008
A judgment for support is never final in the sense that not only can its amount
be subject to increase or decrease but its demandability may also be suspended or
re-enforced when appropriate circumstances exist.
Bernarda S. Canonizado vs. Judge Regina G. Ordonez Benitez, G.R. Nos. L-49315 and
60966, February 20, 1984
Art. 203, par. 2 - Support pendente lite
Support pendente lite can be availed of in an action for legal separation.
Court order fixing the amount of support pendente lite is not final.
Complaint may be filed in court without passing the Lupon Tagapayapa where the issues
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of support pendente lite and delivery of personal properties are essentially involved.
Support pendente lite can be availed of in an action for legal separation.
Support pendente lite, as a remedy, can be availed of in an action for legal
separation, and granted at the discretion of the judge. If the amount of support
pendente lite ordered is found to be too onerous, a motion to modify or reduce the
same can always be filed.
Froilan C. Gandionco vs. Hon. Senen C. Peñaranda, G.R. No. 79284, November 27,
1987
Court order fixing the amount of support pendente lite is not final.
The order fixing the amount of support pendente lite is not final in character in
the sense that it can be the subject of modification, depending on the changing
conditions affecting the ability of the obligor to pay the amount fixed for support.
Buenaventura San Juan vs. Hon. Manuel E. Valenzuela, G.R. No. L-59906, October 23,
1982
Complaint may be filed in court without passing the Lupon Tagapayapa where the
issues of support pendente lite and delivery of personal properties are essentially
involved.
A complaint may be filed directly in a competent court without passing the
Lupon Tagapayapa in actions coupled with provisional remedies such as support
pendente lite. The issues of support pendente lite and delivery of personal properties
belonging to the conjugal partnership, although not ‘coupled’ in the strict sense of the
word with the Petition for Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership, are essentially
involved in this petition because of the minority of the daughter, and because the
resolution or decision of this court on the pending petition would be incomplete
without a clear-cut disposition on the partition of the personal and real properties of
the conjugal partnership and consequent delivery thereof to the proper parties.
Mauro Blardony, Jr. vs. Hon. Jose L. Coscolluela, Jr., G.R. No. 70261, February 28,
1990
Provisional remedies are writs and processes available during the pendency of the
action which may be resorted to by a litigant to preserve and protect certain rights and
interests therein pending rendition, and for purposes of the ultimate effects, of a final
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judgment in the case. They are provisional because they constitute temporary
measures availed of during the pendency of the action, and they are ancillary because
they are mere incidents in and are dependent upon the result of the main action. The
subject orders on the matter of support pendente lite are but an incident to the main
action for declaration of nullity of marriage.
Ma. Carminia C. Calderon vs. Jose Antonio F. Roxas, et al., G.R. No. 185595, January
9, 2013
Art. 207 - Parental support
A quasi-contract exists between the person obliged to give support and the third person
who furnished support.
[C]ontextually, the resulting juridical relationship between the [the person obliged
to give support] and [the third person who furnished support] is a quasi-contract, an
equitable principle enjoining one from unjustly enriching himself at the expense of
another.
Edward V. Lacson vs. Maowee Daban Lacson et al., G.R. No. 150644, August 28, 2006
Art. 209 - Parental authority
A mother bringing her children to mahjong sessions reveals her disregard for their moral
and mental development.
Definition of “parental authority”.
Joint parental authority is vested by law on the father and mother.
As far as joint parental authority is concerned, there is no more distinction between
legitimate or adopted children and acknowledged illegitimate children.
Inability to provide material comfort is not sufficient to deprive a personal of parental
authority.
A “bad” husband does not necessarily make a “bad” father.
Parental authority may not be transferred or renounced.
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Parental authority may be waived or be subject to a compromise.
“Best interest” rule should not be implemented in derogation of the primary right of the
parents to exercise parental authority.
Definition of “parental authority”.
Parental authority or patria potestas in Roman Law is the juridical institution
whereby parents rightfully assume control and protection of their unemancipated
children to the extent required by the latter's needs. It is a mass of rights and
obligations which the law grants to parents for the purpose of the children's physical
preservation and development, as well as the cultivation of their intellect and the
education of their heart and senses. As regards parental authority, "there is no power,
but a task; no complex of rights, but a sum of duties; no sovereignty but a sacred trust
for the welfare of the minor."
Leouel Santos, Sr. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 113054, March 16, 1995
Joint parental authority is vested by law on the father and mother.
The law vests on the father and mother joint parental authority over the persons
of their common children. In case of absence or death of either parent, the parent
present shall continue exercising parental authority. Only in case of the parents' death,
absence or unsuitability may substitute parental authority be exercised by the
surviving grandparent.
Leouel Santos, Sr. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 113054, March 16, 1995
As far as joint parental authority is concerned, there is no more distinction between
legitimate or adopted children and acknowledged illegitimate children.
The new Family Code erases any distinction between legitimate or adopted
children on one hand and acknowledged illegitimate children on the other, insofar as
joint parental authority is concerned. Article 211 of the Family Code merely
formalizes into statute the practice on parental authority.
Christina Marie Dempsey vs. RTC Branch LXXV, Olongapo City and Joel Dempsey,
G.R. Nos. 77737-38, August 15, 1988
Inability to provide material comfort is not sufficient to deprive a personal of
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parental authority.
Indeed, it would be against the spirit of the law if financial consideration were
to be the paramount consideration in deciding whether to deprive a person of parental
authority over his children. There should be a holistic approach to the matter, taking
into account the physical, emotional, psychological, mental, social and spiritual needs
of the child. The conclusion that the husband abandoned his family needs more
evidentiary support other than his inability to provide them the material comfort that
his admittedly affluent in-laws could provide. There should be proof that he had so
emotionally abandoned them that his children would not miss his guidance and
counsel if they were given to adopting parents.
Herbert Cang vs. Court of Appeals and Sps. Ronald and Ma. Clara Clavano, G.R. No.
105308, September 25, 1998
A “bad” husband does not necessarily make a “bad” father.
The actuality that the father carried on an affair with a paramour cannot be
taken as sufficient basis for the conclusion that he was necessarily an unfit father.
Conventional wisdom and common human experience show that a "bad" husband
does not necessarily make a "bad" father. That a husband is not exactly an upright
man is not, strictly speaking, a sufficient ground to deprive him as a father of his
inherent right to parental authority over the children.
Herbert Cang vs. Court of Appeals and Sps. Ronald and Ma. Clara Clavano, G.R. No.
105308, September 25, 1998
Parental authority may not be transferred or renounced.
Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and may not be transferred
or renounced except in cases authorized by law. The right attached to parental
authority, being purely personal, the law allows a waiver of parental authority only in
cases of adoption, guardianship and surrender to a children's home or an orphan
institution. When a parent entrusts the custody of a minor to another, such as a friend
or godfather, even in a document, what is given is merely temporary custody and it
does not constitute a renunciation of parental authority. Even if a definite renunciation
is manifest, the law still disallows the same.
Leouel Santos, Sr. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 113054, March 16, 1995
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Parental authority may be waived or be subject to a compromise.
The husband may not be deemed as having been completely deprived of
parental authority, notwithstanding the award of custody to his wife in the legal
separation case. To reiterate, that award was arrived at by the lower court on the basis
of the agreement of the spouses. While parental authority may be waived, as in law it
may be subject to a compromise, there was no factual finding in the legal separation
case that the husband was such an irresponsible person that he should be deprived of
custody of his children or that there are grounds under the law that could deprive him
of parental authority.
Herbert Cang vs. Court of Appeals and Sps. Ronald and Ma. Clara Clavano, G.R. No.
105308, September 25, 1998
“Best interest” rule should not be implemented in derogation of the primary right
of the parents to exercise parental authority.
Underlying the policies and precepts in international conventions and the
domestic statutes with respect to children is the overriding principle that all actuations
should be in the best interests of the child. This is not, however, to be implemented in
derogation of the primary right of the parent or parents to exercise parental authority
over him. The rights of parents vis-a-vis that of their children are not antithetical to
each other, as in fact, they must be respected and harmonized to the fullest extent
possible.
Herbert Cang vs. Court of Appeals and Sps. Ronald and Ma. Clara Clavano, G.R. No.
105308, September 25, 1998
Equally deplorable is the debarment of parental consent in cases where the minor,
who will be undergoing a procedure, is already a parent or has had a miscarriage. . . .
There can be no other interpretation of this provision [Section 7 of the RH law] except
that when a minor is already a parent or has had a miscarriage, the parents are
excluded from the decision-making process of the minor with regard to family
planning. Even if she is not yet emancipated, the parental authority is already cut off
just because there is a need to tame population growth.
It is precisely in such situations when a minor parent needs the comfort, care,
advice, and guidance of her own parents. The State cannot replace her natural mother
and father when it comes to providing her needs and comfort. To say that their
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consent is no longer relevant is clearly anti-family. It does not promote unity in the
family. It is an affront to the constitutional mandate to protect and strengthen the
family as an inviolable social institution.
Spouses Imbong v. Ochoa, Jr., G.R. Nos. 204819, 204934, etc., April 8, 2014
To insist on a rule that interferes with the right of parents to exercise parental
control over their minor child or the right of the spouses to mutually decide on matters
which very well affect the very purpose of marriage, that is, the establishment of
conjugal and family life, would result in the violation of one's privacy with respect to
his family. It would be dismissive of the unique and strongly-held Filipino tradition of
maintaining close family ties and violative of the recognition that the State affords
couples entering into the special contract of marriage to as one unit in forming the
foundation of the family and society.
Spouses Imbong v. Ochoa, Jr., G.R. Nos. 204819, 204934, etc., April 8, 2014
The State cannot, without a compelling state interest, take over the role of parents
in the care and custody of a minor child, whether or not the latter is already a parent or
has had a miscarriage. Only a compelling state interest can justify a state substitution
of their parental authority.
Spouses Imbong v. Ochoa, Jr., G.R. Nos. 204819, 204934, etc., April 8, 2014
A mother bringing her children to mahjong sessions reveals her disregard for their
moral and mental development
The fact that the respondent brought her children with her to her mahjong sessions
did not only point to her neglect of parental duties, but also manifested her tendency
to expose them to a culture of gambling. Her willfully exposing her children to the
culture of gambling on every occasion of her mahjong sessions was a very grave and
serious act of subordinating their needs for parenting to the gratification of her own
personal and escapist desires. . . . The respondent revealed her wanton disregard for
her children's moral and mental development. This disregard violated her duty as a
parent to safeguard and protect her children, as expressly defined under Article 209
and Article 220 of the Family Code. . .
Kalaw v. Fernandez, G.R. No. 166357, January 14, 2015
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Art. 213 - Custody of children
Article 213 does not disallow a father from seeing or visiting his child under seven years
of age.
The "tender-age presumption" may be overcome only by compelling evidence of the
mother's unfitness.
The sole and foremost consideration in controversies regarding custody of minors is the
physical, education, social and moral welfare of the child.
In custody cases, the foremost consideration is always the welfare and best interest of the
child.
Right of parents to custody of minor children is a constitutional and natural right.
Right of parents to custody of their children is but ancillary to the proper discharge of
parental duties.
Even if estranged, mother and father may be granted joint custody of common children.
If child is under seven years of age, law presumes that the mother is the best custodian.
If child is over seven, his choice is paramount.
However, the court may find the chosen parent unfit.
The right of the child to choose the parent he wishes to live with may be invoked only if
the parents are married to each other but are separated.
Moral dereliction is not a ground to deprive mother of custody of child below 7 years old.
Lesbianism is not a ground to deprive mother of custody pendente lite of her child who is
less than 7 years old.
The mother has sole parental authority over an illegitimate child.
Recognition of an illegitimate child by the father is not a ground for awarding him custody
of said child.
Parental authority is inalienable and may not be transferred or renounced.
Custody of child may be awarded to the father to free her from her mother's immoral
influence.
A parent’s love outweighs that of the grandparents’.
Grounds for depriving a mother of custody and parental authority.
Adopting parents have the right to custody of the adopted child.
Decisions on the custody of minor children are always open to adjustment.
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“Best interest” rule should not be implemented in derogation of the primary right of the
parents to exercise parental authority.
Family Code determines fitness of a mother, who is no longer a Muslim, to take custody
of her children.
Father’s use of trickery to take his son away from in-laws is not a ground to deprive him
of custody.
The welfare of the child, not the suffering, pride, and other feelings of either parent, is the
paramount consideration.
Contending parents stand on equal footing in custody cases of minor children.
Every child's rights should not be dependent solely on the whims and caprices of his
parents.
Article 213 does not disallow a father from seeing or visiting his child under seven
years of age.
Article 213 of the Family Code deals with the judicial adjudication of custody and
serves as a guideline for the proper award of custody by the court. [The mother] can
raise it as a counter argument for [the father's] petition for custody. But it is not a
basis for preventing the father to see his own child. Nothing in the said provision
disallows a father from seeing or visiting his child under seven years of age.
Marie Antonette Abigail C. Salientes, et al. vs. Loran S.D. Abanilla, et al., G.R. No.
162734, August 29, 2006
The "tender-age presumption" may be overcome only by compelling evidence of the
mother's unfitness.
The so-called "tender-age presumption" under Article 213 of the Family Code may
be overcome only by compelling evidence of the mother's unfitness. The mother is
declared unsuitable to have custody of her children in one or more of the following
instances: neglect, abandonment, unemployment, immorality, habitual drunkenness,
drug addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity, or affliction with a communicable
disease.
Agnes Gamboa-Hirsch vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 174485, July 11, 2007
The sole and foremost consideration in controversies regarding custody of minors
is the physical, education, social and moral welfare of the child.
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In all cases involving the custody, care, education and property of children, the
latter's welfare is paramount. The foremost consideration is the moral, physical and
social welfare of the child concerned, taking into account the resources and moral as
well as social standing of the contending parents. Never has this Court deviated from
this criterion.
In re: Angelie Anne C. Cervantes vs. Gina Carreon Fajardo, G.R. No. 79955, Jan. 27,
1989
In custody cases, the foremost consideration is always the welfare and best interest
of the child.
It has long been settled that in custody cases, the foremost consideration is
always the welfare and best interest of the child. In fact, no less than an international
instrument, the Convention on the Rights of the Child provides: "In all actions
concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare
institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best
interests of the child shall be a primary consideration."
Nerissa Z. Perez vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118870, March 29, 1996
In disputes concerning post-separation custody over a minor, the well-settled rule
is that no child under seven (7) years of age shall be separated from the mother, unless
the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise. And if already over 7 years of
age, the child's choice as to which of his parents he prefers to be under custody shall
be respected, unless the parent chosen proves to be unfit. Finally, in Perez v. Court of
Appeals [G.R. No. 118870, March 29, 1996], We held that in custody cases, the
foremost consideration is always the welfare and best interest of the child, as reflected
in no less than the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child which provides that
"[i]n all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social
welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the
best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration."
Geoffrey Beckett vs. Olegario R. Sarmiento, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-12-2326, January 30,
2013
Right of parents to custody of minor children is a constitutional and natural right.
The right of parents to the custody of their minor children is one of the natural
rights incident to parenthood, a right supported by law and sound public policy. The
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right is an inherent one, which is not created by the estate of decisions of the courts,
but derives from the nature of the parent relationship.
Teresita Sagala-Eslao vs. CA and Maria Paz Cordero-Ouye, G.R. No. 116773, January
16, 1997
Right of parents to custody of their children is but ancillary to the proper discharge
of parental duties.
While our law recognizes the right of a parent to the custody of her child,
courts must not lose sight of the basic principle that "in all questions of the care,
custody, education and property of children, the latter's welfare shall be paramount",
and that for compelling reasons, even a child under seven may be ordered separated
from the mother. This is as it should be, for in the continual evolution of legal
institutions, the patria potestas has been transformed from the jus vitae ac necis (right
of life and death) of the Roman law, under which the offspring was virtually a chattel
of his parents, into a radically different institution, due to the influence of Christian
faith and doctrines. The obligational aspect is now supreme. As pointed out by Puig
Peña, now "there is no power, but a task; no complex of rights (of parents) but a sum
of duties; no sovereignty, but a sacred trust for the welfare of the minor." As a result,
the right of parents to the company and custody of their children is but ancillary to the
proper discharge of parental duties to provide the children with adequate support,
education, moral, intellectual and civic training and development.
Zenaida Medina vs. Dra. Venancia L. Makabali, G.R. No. L-26953, March 28, 1969
Even if estranged, mother and father may be granted joint custody of common
children.
a) Parents have the natural right, as well as the moral and legal duty, to care
for their children, see to their upbringing and safeguard their best interest and welfare.
This authority and responsibility may not be unduly denied the parents; neither may it
be renounced by them. Even when the parents are estranged and their affection for
each other is lost, the attachment and feeling for their offspring invariably remain
unchanged. Neither the law nor the courts allow this affinity to suffer absent, of
course, any real, grave and imminent threat to the well-being of the child.
Carlitos E. Silva vs. CA and Suzanne T. Gonzales, G.R. No. 114742, July 17, 1997
b) The visitorial right of an illegitimate father over his children is sustained
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in view of the constitutionally protected inherent and natural right of parents over
their children. Even when the parents are estranged and their affection for each other
is lost, their attachment to and feeling for their offspring remain unchanged. Neither
the law nor the courts allow this affinity to suffer, absent any real, grave or imminent
threat to the well-being of the child.
Sabrina Artadi Bondagjy vs. Fouzi Ali Bondagjy, G.R. No. 140817, December 7, 2001
If child is under seven years of age, law presumes that the mother is the best
custodian.
In ascertaining the welfare and best interests of the child, courts are mandated
by the Family Code to take into account all relevant considerations. If a child is under
seven years of age, the law presumes that the mother is the best custodian. The
presumption is strong but it is not conclusive: It can be overcome by "compelling
reasons".
Reynaldo Espiritu vs. CA, G.R. No. 115640, March 15, 1995
[U]pon separation of the spouses, the mother takes sole custody under the law if the
child is below seven years old and any agreement to the contrary is void. Thus, the
law suspends the joint custody regime for (1) children under seven of (2) separated or
divorced spouses. Simply put, for a child within this age bracket (and for
commonsensical reasons), the law decides for the separated or divorced parents how
best to take care of the child and that is to give custody to the separated mother.
Indeed, the separated parents cannot contract away the provision in the Family Code
on the maternal custody of children below seven years anymore than they can
privately agree that a mother who is unemployed, immoral, habitually drunk, drug
addict, insane or afflicted with a communicable disease will have sole custody of a
child under seven as these are reasons deemed compelling to preclude the application
of the exclusive maternal custody regime under the second paragraph of Article 213.
Herald Black Dacasin vs. Sharon Del Mundo Dacasin, G.R. No. 168785, February 5,
2010
It will not do to argue that the second paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code
applies only to judicial custodial agreements based on its text that "No child under
seven years of age shall be separated from the mother, unless the court finds
compelling reasons to order otherwise." To limit this provision's enforceability to
court-sanctioned agreements while placing private agreements beyond its reach is to
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sanction a double standard in custody regulation of children under seven years old of
separated parents. This effectively empowers separated parents, by the simple
expedient of avoiding the courts, to subvert a legislative policy vesting to the
separated mother sole custody of her children under seven years of age "to avoid a
tragedy where a mother has seen her baby torn away from her." This ignores the
legislative basis that "[n]o man can sound the deep sorrows of a mother who is
deprived of her child of tender age."
Herald Black Dacasin vs. Sharon Del Mundo Dacasin, G.R. No. 168785, February 5,
2010
It could very well be that Article 213's bias favoring one separated parent (mother)
over the other (father) encourages paternal neglect, presumes incapacity for joint
parental custody, robs the parents of custodial options, or hijacks decision-making
between the separated parents. However, these are objections which question the law's
wisdom not its validity or uniform enforceability. The forum to air and remedy these
grievances is the legislature, not this Court. At any rate, the rule's seeming harshness
or undesirability is tempered by ancillary agreements the separated parents may wish
to enter such as granting the father visitation and other privileges. These arrangements
are not inconsistent with the regime of sole maternal custody under the second
paragraph of Article 213 which merely grants to the mother final authority on the care
and custody of the minor under seven years of age, in case of disagreements.
Herald Black Dacasin vs. Sharon Del Mundo Dacasin, G.R. No. 168785, February 5,
2010
Further, the imposed custodial regime under the second paragraph of Article 213 is
limited in duration, lasting only until the child's seventh year. From the eighth year
until the child's emancipation, the law gives the separated parents freedom, subject to
the usual contractual limitations, to agree on custody regimes they see fit to adopt.
Lastly, even supposing that petitioner and respondent are not barred from entering into
the Agreement for the joint custody of [the child], respondent repudiated the
Agreement by asserting sole custody over [her]. Respondent's act effectively brought
the parties back to ambit of the default custodial regime in the second paragraph of
Article 213 of the Family Code vesting on respondent sole custody of [the child].
Herald Black Dacasin vs. Sharon Del Mundo Dacasin, G.R. No. 168785, February 5,
2010
If child is over seven, his choice is paramount.
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The mother and her children may not be enjoying a life of affluence that the
father promises if the child lives with him. It is enough, however, that she is earning a
decent living and is able to support her children according to her means. Even now
that the child is over seven years of age the mother's custody over him will have to be
upheld because the child categorically expressed preference to live with his mother.
Daisie T. David vs. CA and Ramon R. Villar, G.R. No. 111180, November 16, 1995
However, the court may find the chosen parent unfit.
If a child is over seven, the law allows him to make a choice. Once the choice
has been made, the burden lies on the court to investigate if the parent thus chosen is
unfit to assume parental authority and custodial responsibility. The child’s choice is
paramount but the court is not bound by that choice. In its discretion, the court may
find the chosen parent unfit and award custody to the other parent, or even to a third
party as it deems fit under the circumstances.
Reynaldo Espiritu vs. CA, G.R. No. 115640, March 15, 1995
The right of the child to choose the parent he wishes to live with may be invoked
only if the parents are married to each other but are separated.
Section 6 of Rule 99 of the Rules of Court contemplates a situation in which
the parents of the minor are married to each other, but are separated either by virtue of
a decree of legal separation or because they are living separately de facto.
Joey D. Briones vs. Maricel P. Miguel, G.R. No. 156343, October 18, 2004
Moral dereliction is not a ground to deprive mother of custody of child below 7
years old.
The rationale for awarding the custody of children younger than seven years of
age to their mother was explained by the Code Commission: "The general rule is
recommended in order to avoid many a tragedy where a mother has seen her baby torn
away from her. No man can sound the deep sorrows of a mother who is deprived of
her child of tender age. The exception allowed by the rule has to be for 'compelling
reasons' for the good of the child; those cases must indeed be rare, if the mother's
heart is not to be unduly hurt. If she has erred, as in cases of adultery, the penalty of
imprisonment and the divorce decree (relative divorce) will ordinarily be sufficient
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punishment for her. Moreover, moral dereliction will not have any effect upon the
baby who is as yet unable to understand her situation." PLPE05
Nerissa Z. Perez vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118870, March 29, 1996
Lesbianism is not a ground to deprive mother of custody pendente lite of her child
who is less than 7 years old.
It is not enough for the husband to show merely that the wife was a lesbian. He
must also demonstrate that she carried on her purported relationship with a person of
the same sex in the presence of their son or under circumstances not conducive to the
child's proper moral development. PLPE05
Joycelyn Pablo-Gualberto vs. Crisanto Rafaelito Gualberto V, G.R. No. 154994, June
28, 2005
The mother has sole parental authority over an illegitimate child.
An illegitimate child is under the sole parental authority of the mother. In the
exercise of that authority, she is entitled to keep the child in her company. The Court
will not deprive her of custody, absent any imperative cause showing her unfitness to
exercise such authority and care.
Joey D. Briones vs. Maricel P. Miguel, G.R. No. 156343, October 18, 2004
Recognition of an illegitimate child by the father is not a ground for awarding him
custody of said child.
Recognition of an illegitimate child by the father could be a ground for
ordering the latter to give support to, but not custody of, the child. The law explicitly
confers to the mother sole parental authority over an illegitimate child. It is only if she
defaults can the father assume custody and authority over the minor.
Daisie T. David vs. CA and Ramon R. Villar, G.R. No. 111180, November 16, 1995
Parental authority is inalienable and may not be transferred or renounced.
a) Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and may not be
transferred or renounced except in cases authorized by law. The right attached to
parental authority, being purely personal, the law allows a waiver of parental authority
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only in cases of adoption, guardianship and surrender to a children's home or an
orphan institution. When a parent entrusts the custody of a minor to another, such as a
friend or godfather, even in a document, what is given is merely temporary custody
and it does not constitute a renunciation of parental authority. Even if a definite
renunciation is manifest, the law still disallows the same.
Leouel Santos, Sr. vs. CA, G.R. No. 113054, March 16, 1995
b) When the mother entrusted the custody of her minor child to the latter’s
paternal grandmother, what she gave to the latter was merely temporary custody and it
did not constitute abandonment or renunciation of parental authority. For the right
attached to parental authority, being purely personal, the law allows a waiver of
parental authority only in cases of adoption, guardianship and surrender to a children's
home or an orphan institution
Teresita Sagala-Eslao vs. CA and Maria Paz Cordero-Ouye, G.R. No. 116773, January
16, 1997
Custody of child may be awarded to the father to free her from her mother's
immoral influence.
It is in the best interest of the child to be freed from the obviously
unwholesome, not to say immoral, influence that the situation in which the mother has
placed herself, might create in the moral and social outlook of her daughter who is
now in her formative and most impressionable stage in her life. The fact that the
father might have been tolerant about her stay with her mother in the past when she
was still too young to distinguish between right and wrong and have her own correct
impressions or notions about the unusual and peculiar relationship of her mother with
her own uncle-in-law, the husband of her sister's mother, is hardly of any consequence
now that she has reached a perilous stage in her life. In all controversies regarding the
custody of minors, the sole and foremost consideration is the physical, education,
social and moral welfare of the child concerned, taking into account the respective
resources and social and moral situations of the contending parents.
Miguel R. Unson III vs. Hon. Pedro C. Navarro and Edita N. Araneta, G.R. No. L-52242,
November 17, 1980
A parent’s love outweighs that of the grandparents’.
The law considers the natural love of a parent to outweigh that of the
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grandparents, such that only when the parent present is shown to be unfit or unsuitable
may the grandparents exercise substitute parental authority.
Leouel Santos, Sr. vs. CA, G.R. No. 113054, March 16, 1995
Grounds for depriving a mother of custody and parental authority.
Only the most compelling of reasons, such as the mother's unfitness to exercise
sole parental authority, shall justify her deprivation of parental authority and the
award of custody to someone else. In the past, the following grounds have been
considered ample justification to deprive a mother of custody and parental authority:
neglect or abandonment, unemployment, immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug
addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity, and affliction with a communicable
disease.
Joey D. Briones vs. Maricel P. Miguel, G.R. No. 156343, October 18, 2004
Dinah B. Tonog vs. CA and Edgar V. Daguimol, G.R. No. 122906, February 7, 2002
Adopting parents have the right to custody of the adopted child.
The minor has been legally adopted by petitioners with the full knowledge and
consent of respondents. A decree of adoption has the effect, among others, of
dissolving the authority vested in natural parents over the adopted child, except where
the adopting parent is the spouse of the natural parent of the adopted, in which case,
parental authority over the adopted shall be exercised jointly by both spouses. The
adopting parents have the right to the care and custody of the adopted child and
exercise parental authority and responsibility over him.
In re: Angelie Anne C. Cervantes vs. Gina Carreon Fajardo, G.R. No. 79955, Jan. 27,
1989
Decisions on the custody of minor children are always open to adjustment.
Decisions even of the Supreme Court on the custody of minor children are
always open to adjustment as the circumstances relevant to the matter may demand in
the light of the inflexible criterion
Miguel R. Unson III vs. Hon. Pedro C. Navarro and Edita N. Araneta, G.R. No. L-52242,
November 17, 1980
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“Best interest” rule should not be implemented in derogation of the primary right
of the parents to exercise parental authority.
Underlying the policies and precepts in international conventions and the
domestic statutes with respect to children is the overriding principle that all actuations
should be in the best interests of the child. This is not, however, to be implemented in
derogation of the primary right of the parent or parents to exercise parental authority
over him. The rights of parents vis-a-vis that of their children are not antithetical to
each other, as in fact, they must be respected and harmonized to the fullest extent
possible.
Herbert Cang vs. CA and Sps. Ronald and Ma. Clara Clavano, G.R. No. 105308,
September 25, 1998
Family Code determines fitness of a mother, who is no longer a Muslim, to take
custody of her children.
The standard in the determination of sufficiency of proof is not restricted to
Muslim laws. The Family Code shall be taken into consideration in deciding whether
a non-Muslim woman is worthy to have custody of her children. What determines her
capacity is the standard laid down by the Family Code now that she is not a Muslim.
Indeed, what determines the fitness of any parent is the ability to see to the physical,
educational, social and moral welfare of the children, and the ability to give them a
healthy environment as well as physical and financial support taking into
consideration the respective resources and social and moral situations of the parents.
Sabrina Artadi Bondagjy vs. Fouzi Ali Bondagjy, G.R. No. 140817, December 7, 2001
Father’s use of trickery to take his son away from in-laws is not a ground to
deprive him of custody.
The father’s employment of trickery in spiriting away his boy from his in-laws,
though unjustifiable, is not a ground to wrest custody from him.
Leouel Santos, Sr. vs. CA, G.R. No. 113054, March 16, 1995
The welfare of the child, not the suffering, pride, and other feelings of either
parent, is the paramount consideration.
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The law or jurisprudence does not intend to downplay a father's sense of loss
when he is separated from his child: While the bonds between a mother and her small
child are special in nature, either parent, whether father or mother, is bound to suffer
agony and pain if deprived of custody. One cannot say that his or her suffering is
greater than that of the other parent. It is not so much the suffering, pride, and other
feelings of either parent but the welfare of the child which is the paramount
consideration.
Dinah B. Tonog vs. CA and Edgar V. Daguimol, G.R. No. 122906, February 7, 2002
Contending parents stand on equal footing in custody cases of minor children.
In controversies involving the care, custody and control of their minor children,
the contending parents stand on equal footing before the court who shall make the
selection according to the best interest of the child. The child if over seven years of
age may be permitted to choose which parent he/she prefers to live with, but the court
is not bound by such choice if the parent so chosen is unfit. In all cases, the sole and
foremost consideration is the physical, educational, social and moral welfare of the
child concerned, taking into account the respective resources as well as social and
moral situations of the opposing parents.
Reymond B. Laxamana vs. Ma. Lourdes D. Laxamana, G.R. No. 144763, September 3,
2002
Every child's rights should not be dependent solely on the whims and caprices of
his parents.
Legal provisions grant to every child rights which are not and should not be
dependent solely on the wishes, much less the whims and caprices, of his parents. His
welfare should not be subject to the parents' say-so or mutual agreement alone. Where
the parents are already separated in fact, the courts must step in to determine in whose
custody the child can better be assured the rights granted to him by law.
Alfonso Lacson vs. Carmen San Jose-Lacson and CA, G.R. No. L-23482, August 30,
1968
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Art. 220 - Rights and duties of persons exercising parental authority
Right of parents to the custody of their children is but ancillary to the proper discharge of
parental duties.
Adoption creates a status closely assimilated to legitimate paternity and filiation with
corresponding rights and duties.
Right of parents to custody of minor children is an inherent one.
Parents’ right to impose discipline on their children does not authorize them to invade the
latter's honor.
Right of parents to the custody of their children is but ancillary to the proper
discharge of parental duties.
In the continual evolution of legal institutions, the patria potestas has been
transformed from the jus vitae ac necis (right of life and death) of the Roman law,
under which the offspring was virtually a chattel of his parent, into a radically
different institution, due to the influence of Christian faith and doctrines. The
obligational aspect is now supreme. As pointed out by Puig Pena, now "there is no
power, but a task; no complex of rights (of parents) but a sum of duties; no
sovereignty, but a sacred trust for the welfare of the minor." As a result, the right of
parents to the company and custody of their children is but ancillary to the proper
discharge of parental duties to provide the children with adequate support. education,
moral, intellectual and civic training and development
Reynaldo Espiritu vs. CA, G.R. No. 115640, March 15, 1995
Zenaida Medina vs. Dra. Venancia L. Makabali, G.R. No. L-26953, March 28, 1969
Adoption creates a status closely assimilated to legitimate paternity and filiation
with corresponding rights and duties.
Adoption creates a status that is closely assimilated to legitimate paternity and
filiation with corresponding rights and duties that necessarily flow from adoption,
such as, but not necessarily confined to, the exercise of parental authority, use of
surname of the adopter by the adopted, as well as support and successional rights.
Republic of the Phil. vs. CA and Sps. James Anthony and Lenita Hughes, G.R. No.
100835, October 26, 1993
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Right of parents to custody of minor children is an inherent one.
The right of parents to the custody of their minor children is one of the natural
rights incident to parenthood, a right supported by law and sound public policy. The
right is an inherent one, which is not created by the state or decisions of the courts, but
derives from the nature of the parental relationship.
Teresita Sagala-Eslao vs. CA and Maria Paz Cordero-Ouye, G.R. No. 116773, January
16, 1997
Parents’ right to impose discipline on their children does not authorize them to
invade the latter's honor.
Although the Family Code recognizes the parents' rights and duties to "impose
discipline" on their unemancipated children; "supervise their activities, recreation and
association with others . . .; and prevent them from acquiring habits detrimental to
their . . . morals", it does not authorize them to force their offspring to copulate with
them under the mask of discipline, or invade their honor and violate their dignity nor
does it give them the license to ravish the product of their marital union.
People of the Phils. vs. David Silvano, G.R. No. 127356, June 29, 1999
Art. 229 (3) - Abandonment of child
Abandonment, defined.
Physical absence, without financial and moral desertion, is not tantamount to
abandonment.
Inability to provide material comfort is not sufficient to deprive a personal of parental
authority.
Abandonment, defined.
In its ordinary sense, the word "abandon" means to forsake entirely, to forsake
or renounce utterly. The dictionaries trace this word to the root idea of "putting under
a ban." The emphasis is on the finality and publicity with which a thing or body is thus
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put in the control of another, hence, the meaning of giving up absolutely, with intent
never to resume or claim one's rights or interests. In reference to abandonment of a
child by his parent, the act of abandonment imports "any conduct of the parent which
evinces a settled purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental
claims to the child." It means "neglect or refusal to perform the natural and legal
obligations of care and support which parents owe their children."
Herbert Cang vs. CA and Sps. Ronald and Ma. Clara Clavano, G.R. No. 105308,
September 25, 1998
Physical absence, without financial and moral desertion, is not tantamount to
abandonment.
Physical estrangement alone, without financial and moral desertion, is not
tantamount to abandonment. While admittedly, the father was physically absent as he
was then in the United States, he was not remiss in his natural and legal obligations of
love, care and support for his children. His conduct did not manifest a settled purpose
to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims over his children as to
constitute abandonment.
Herbert Cang vs. CA and Sps. Ronald and Ma. Clara Clavano, G.R. No. 105308,
September 25, 1998
Inability to provide material comfort is not sufficient to deprive a personal of
parental authority.
Indeed, it would be against the spirit of the law if financial consideration were
to be the paramount consideration in deciding whether to deprive a person of parental
authority over his children. There should be a holistic approach to the matter, taking
into account the physical, emotional, psychological, mental, social and spiritual needs
of the child. The conclusion that the husband abandoned his family needs more
evidentiary support other than his inability to provide them the material comfort that
his admittedly affluent in-laws could provide. There should be proof that he had so
emotionally abandoned them that his children would not miss his guidance and
counsel if they were given to adopting parents.
Herbert Cang vs. CA and Sps. Ronald and Ma. Clara Clavano, G.R. No. 105308,
September 25, 1998
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Art. 247 - Judgment of the court
No right to appeal is granted to any party, including the State, in judgments
rendered in summary judicial proceedings.
An appellate court acquires no jurisdiction to review a judgment which, by
express provision of law, is immediately final and executory. As had been ruled, the
right to appeal is not a natural right nor is it a part of due process, for it is merely a
statutory privilege. Since, by express mandate of Article 247 of the Family Code, all
judgments rendered in summary judicial proceedings in Family Law are "immediately
final and executory", the right to appeal was not granted to any of the parties therein.
The Republic of the Philippines, as oppositor in the petition for declaration of
presumptive death, should not be treated differently. It had no right to appeal the RTC
decision. PLPE05
Republic of the Phil. vs. Gloria Bermudez-Lorino, G.R. No. 160258, January 19, 2005
Republic of the Phil. vs. Robert P. Narceda, G.R. No. 182760, April 10, 2013
In Summary Judicial Proceedings under the Family Code, there is no reglementary
period within which to perfect an appeal, precisely because judgments rendered
thereunder, by express provision of Section 247, Family Code, supra, are
"immediately final and executory." It was erroneous, therefore, on the part of the RTC
to give due course to the Republic's appeal and order the transmittal of the entire
records of the case to the Court of Appeals.
Republic of the Phil. vs. Gloria Bermudez-Lorino, G.R. No. 160258, January 19, 2005
Republic of the Phil. vs. Robert P. Narceda, G.R. No. 182760, April 10, 2013
Art. 256 - Retroactive effect
While it is true that the personal stakes of each spouse in their conjugal assets are
inchoate or unclear prior to the liquidation of the conjugal partnership of gains and,
therefore, none of them can be said to have acquired vested rights in specific assets, it
is evident that Article 256 of the Family Code does not intend to reach back and
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automatically convert into absolute community of property relation all conjugal
partnerships of gains that existed before 1988 excepting only those with prenuptial
agreements.
Efren Pana vs. Heirs of Jose Juanite, Sr., et al., G.R. No. 164201, December 10, 2012
[T]he petitioner's claim of vested right [by virtue of Article 256 of the Family Code
which prohibits retroactive application of the Family Code when it will prejudice a
person's vested right] is not one which is written on stone. A vested right is one whose
existence, effectivity and extent do not depend upon events foreign to the will of the
holder, or to the exercise of which no obstacle exists, and which is immediate and
perfect in itself and not dependent upon a contingency. The term "vested right"
expresses the concept of present fixed interest which, in right reason and natural
justice, should be protected against arbitrary State action, or an innately just and
imperative right which enlightened free society, sensitive to inherent and irrefragable
individual rights, cannot deny. To be vested, a right must have become a title — legal
or equitable — to the present or future enjoyment of property. The concept of "vested
right" is a consequence of the constitutional guaranty of due process that expresses a
present fixed interest which in right reason and natural justice is protected against
arbitrary state action; it includes not only legal or equitable title to the enforcement of
a demand but also exemptions from new obligations created after the right has
become vested. Rights are considered vested when the right to enjoyment is a present
interest, absolute, unconditional, and perfect or fixed and irrefutable.
Brigido B. Quiao vs. Rita C. Quiao, et al., G.R. No. 176556, July 4, 2012 citing Go, Jr. v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 172027, July 29, 2010
[W]hile one may not be deprived of his "vested right," he may lose the same if
there is due process and such deprivation is founded in law and jurisprudence. . . .
[T]he alleged deprivation of the petitioner's "vested right" is one founded, not only in
the provisions of the Family Code, but in Article 176 of the Civil Code. This
provision is like Articles 63 and 129 of the Family Code on the forfeiture of the guilty
spouse's share in the conjugal partnership profits. . . . [T]he petitioner's claim of a
vested right has no basis considering that even under Article 176 of the Civil Code,
his share of the conjugal partnership profits may be forfeited if he is the guilty party in
a legal separation case. Thus, after trial and after the petitioner was given the chance
to present his evidence, the petitioner's vested right claim may in fact be set aside
under the Civil Code since the trial court found him the guilty party.
Brigido B. Quiao vs. Rita C. Quiao, et al., G.R. No. 176556, July 4, 2012 citing
ABAKADA Guro Party List Officer Samson S. Alcantara, et al. vs. The Hon. Executive
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Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita, G.R. No. 168056, October 18, 2005
Copyright 2017 CD Technologies Asia, Inc. and Accesslaw, Inc. Philippine Law Encyclopedia (2017.1) 244
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