To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a petition for recognition of foreign
judgment would mean that the trial court and the parties should follow its provisions,
including the form and contents of the petition, the service of summons, the
investigation of the public prosecutor, the setting of pre-trial, the trial and the
judgment of the trial court. This is absurd because it will litigate the case anew. It will
defeat the purpose of recognizing foreign judgments, which is "to limit repetitive
litigation on claims and issues."
Minoru Fujiki vs. Maria Paz Galela Marinay, et al., G.R. No. 196049, June 26, 2013
Only the party who can demonstrate a "proper interest" can file an action to
declare the absolute nullity of a marriage.
The old and new Civil Codes contain no provision on who can file a petition to
declare the nullity of a marriage, and when. It is clarified, however, that the absence
of a provision in the old and new Civil Codes cannot be construed as giving a license
to just any person to bring an action to declare the absolute nullity of a marriage. The
plaintiff must still be the party who stands to be benefited by the suit, or the party
entitled to the avails of the suit, for it is basic in procedural law that every action must
be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party in interest. Thus, only the
party who can demonstrate a "proper interest" can file the action. The omission to
implead the wife and daughter was not immediately fatal to the present action,
however, considering that Section 11, Rule 3, Rules of Court, states that neither
misjoinder nor non-joinder of parties is a ground for the dismissal of an action. The
petitioner can still amend his initiatory pleading in order to implead her, for under the
same rule, such amendment to implead an indispensable party may be made "on
motion of any party or on (the trial court's) own initiative at any stage of the action
and on such terms as are just."
Isidro Ablaza vs. Republic of the Phil., G.R. No. 158298, August 11, 2010, citing Carlos
v. Sandoval, G.R. No. 179922, December 16, 2008
Art. 48 - Collusion
A grant of annulment of marriage or legal separation by default is fraught with the danger
of collusion
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The State is mandated to actively intervene in the procedure for declaration of nullity of
marriage.
Non-intervention of prosecuting attorney is not fatal where husband vehemently opposed
annulment proceedings.
Earnest efforts towards a compromise need not be looked into when the complaint for
legal separation has been withdrawn.
In a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage, the Solicitor General shall issue a
certification before a decision is handed down.
Lack of participation of the State was not cured by the lower court's dismissal of the
petition.
The Solicitor General's intervention in the proceedings for annulment or declaration of
nullity of marriages ensures that the interest of the State is represented.
A grant of annulment of marriage or legal separation by default is fraught with the
danger of collusion
The task of protecting marriage as an inviolable social institution requires
vigilant and zealous participation and not mere pro-forma compliance. The protection
of marriage as a sacred institution requires not just the defense of a true and genuine
union but the exposure of an invalid one as well. A grant of annulment of marriage or
legal separation by default is fraught with the danger of collusion. Hence, in all cases
for annulment, declaration of nullity of marriage and legal separation, the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal is ordered to appear on behalf of the State for the purpose of
preventing any collusion between the parties and to take care that their evidence is not
fabricated or suppressed. If the defendant-spouse fails to answer the complaint, the
court cannot declare him or her in default but instead, should order the prosecuting
attorney to determine if collusion exists between the parties. The prosecuting attorney
or fiscal may oppose the application for legal separation or annulment through the
presentation of his own evidence, if in his opinion, the proof adduced is dubious and
fabricated.
Marietta B. Ancheta vs. Rodolfo S. Ancheta, G.R. No. 145370, March 4, 2004
The State is mandated to actively intervene in the procedure for declaration of
nullity of marriage.
A declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code
requires the application of procedural and substantive guidelines. While compliance
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with these requirements mostly devolves upon the wife, the State is likewise mandated
to actively intervene in the procedure. Should there be non-compliance by the State
with its statutory duty, there is a need to remand the case to the lower court for proper
trial.
Florence Malcampo-Sin vs. Philipp T. Sin, G.R. No. 137590, March 26, 2001
Non-intervention of prosecuting attorney is not fatal where husband vehemently
opposed annulment proceedings.
The husband's vehement opposition to the annulment proceedings negates the
conclusion that collusion existed between the parties. Thus, the non-intervention of a
prosecuting attorney to assure lack of collusion between the contending parties is not
fatal to the validity of the proceedings in the trial court.
Emilio Tuason vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 116607, April 10, 1996
Earnest efforts towards a compromise need not be looked into when the complaint
for legal separation has been withdrawn.
The husband’s filing of notice of withdrawal of his complaint for legal
separation rendered the case moot and academic. Thus, it is not necessary to resolve
the controversial issue of whether in an action by the husband for legal separation
against the wife, it should be alleged that earnest efforts towards a compromise had
been made.
Consuelo Madrigal-Vasquez vs. Judge Corazon J. Agrava, G.R. No. L-32219, February
25, 1982
In a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage, the Solicitor General shall issue
a certification before a decision is handed down.
The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor
General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless
the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision,
briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be,
to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall
submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is
deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge
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the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.
Republic of the Phils. vs. Court of Appeals and Roridel Olaviano Molina, G.R. No.
108763, February 13, 1997
Lack of participation of the State was not cured by the lower court's dismissal of
the petition.
While the fiscal filed with the trial court a manifestation stating that he found
no collusion between the parties, he did not actively participate therein. Other than
entering his appearance at certain hearings of the case, nothing more was heard from
him. Neither did the presiding Judge take any step to encourage the fiscal to contribute
to the proceedings. It can be argued that since the lower court dismissed the petition,
the evil sought to be prevented (i.e., dissolution of the marriage) did not come about,
hence, the lack of participation of the State was cured. Not so. The task of protecting
marriage as an inviolable social institution requires vigilant and zealous participation
and not mere pro-forma compliance. The protection of marriage as a sacred institution
requires not just the defense of a true and genuine union but the exposure of an invalid
one as well.
Florence Malcampo-Sin vs. Philipp T. Sin, G.R. No. 137590, March 26, 2001
The Solicitor General's intervention in the proceedings for annulment or
declaration of nullity of marriages ensures that the interest of the State is represented.
That Article 48 does not expressly mention the Solicitor General does not bar him
or his Office from intervening in proceedings for annulment or declaration of nullity
of marriages. . . The intent of Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines is to
ensure that the interest of the State is represented and protected in proceedings for
annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages by preventing collusion between the
parties, or the fabrication or suppression of evidence; and, bearing in mind that the
Solicitor General is the principal law officer and legal defender of the land, then his
intervention in such proceedings could only serve and contribute to the realization of
such intent, rather than thwart it.
Republic of the Phil. vs. Crasus L. Iyoy, G.R. No. 152577, September 21, 2005
Failure of the RTC to require the appearance of the Public Prosecutor or Solicitor
General in proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages does
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not nullify the Compromise Agreement.
The purpose of the active participation of the Public Prosecutor or the Solicitor
General is to ensure that the interest of the State is represented and protected in
proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages by preventing
collusion between the parties, or the fabrication or suppression of evidence. While the
appearances of the Solicitor General and/or the Public Prosecutor are mandatory, the
failure of the RTC to require their appearance does not per se nullify the Compromise
Agreement.
Virgilio Maquilan vs. Dita Maquilan, G.R. No. 155409, June 8, 2007
Art. 55 - Legal separation
Drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality as grounds for legal
separation.
Petition for legal separation is independent from the counterclaim to declare nullity of
same marriage.
Death of one party to an action for legal separation causes the death of the action itself.
Action for legal separation is abated by death of the plaintiff even if property rights are
involved.
Dissolution and liquidation of property regime are necessary consequences of the final
decree of legal separation.
Allegation that earnest efforts towards a compromise had been made is deemed
unnecessary as notice of dismissal rendered the legal separation case moot and academic.
Decree of legal separation on the ground of concubinage may be issued upon proof by
preponderance of evidence.
Conviction for concubinage need not be first secured before action for legal separation can
prosper.
The RTC, designated as Family Court, has the exclusive original jurisdiction over cases
relating to marital status and property relations of couples.
Drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality as grounds for
legal separation.
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If drug addiction, habitual alcholism, lesbianism or homosexuality should
occur only during the marriage, they become mere grounds for legal separation under
Article 55 of the Family Code. These provisions of the Code, however, do not
necessarily preclude the possibility of these various circumstances being themselves,
depending on the degree and severity of the disorder, indicia of psychological
incapacity.
Leouel Santos vs. CA and Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos, G.R. No. 112019, January 4,
1995
Petition for legal separation is independent from the counterclaim to declare
nullity of same marriage.
The petition for legal separation and the counterclaim to declare the nullity of
the same marriage can stand independent and separate adjudication. They are not
inseparable nor was the action for legal separation converted into one for a declaration
of nullity by the counterclaim, for legal separation presupposes a valid marriage, while
the petition for nullity has a voidable marriage as a precondition.
Carmen Lapuz Sy vs. Eufemio S. Eufemio, G.R. No. L-30977, January 31, 1972
Death of one party to an action for legal separation causes the death of the action
itself.
An action for legal separation which involves nothing more than the
bed-and-board separation of the spouses (there being no absolute divorce in this
jurisdiction) is purely personal. The Civil Code of the Philippines recognizes this in its
Article 100, by allowing only the innocent spouse (and no one else) to claim legal
separation; and in its Article 108, by providing that the spouses can, by their
reconciliation, stop or abate the proceedings and even rescind a decree of legal
separation already rendered. Being personal in character, it follows that the death of
one party to the action causes the death of the action itself — actio personalis moritur
cum persona.
Carmen Lapuz Sy vs. Eufemio S. Eufemio, G.R. No. L-30977, January 31, 1972
Action for legal separation is abated by death of the plaintiff even if property rights
are involved.
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A further reason why an action for legal separation is abated by the death of the
plaintiff, even if property rights are involved, is that these rights are mere effects of a
decree of separation, their source being the decree itself; without the decree such
rights do not come into existence, so that before the finality of a decree, these claims
are merely rights in expectation. If death supervenes during the pendency of the
action, no decree can be forthcoming, death producing a more radical and definitive
separation; and the expected consequential rights and claims would necessarily remain
unborn.
Carmen Lapuz Sy vs. Eufemio S. Eufemio, G.R. No. L-30977, January 31, 1972
Dissolution and liquidation of property regime are necessary consequences of the
final decree of legal separation.
Article 106 of the Civil Code mandates the dissolution and liquidation of the
property regime of the spouses upon finality of the decree of legal separation. Such
dissolution and liquidation are necessary consequences of the final decree. This legal
effect of the decree of legal separation ipso facto or automatically follows, as an
inevitable incident of, the judgment decreeing legal separation — for the purpose of
determining the share of each spouse in the conjugal assets. The clear mandate of this
provision is that the decision of the trial court decreeing the legal separation between
the spouses had long become final and executory and the division of the conjugal
property in a "supplemental decision" is a mere incident of the decree of legal
separation.
Antonio Macadangdang vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-38287, October 23, 1981
Allegation that earnest efforts towards a compromise had been made is deemed
unnecessary as notice of dismissal rendered the legal separation case moot and
academic.
Notice of dismissal of complaint rendered the legal separation case moot and
academic and that it is not necessary to resolve the controversial issue of whether in
an action by the husband for legal separation against the wife, it should be alleged that
earnest efforts towards a compromise had been made, as supposedly required in
Article 222 of the Civil Code and Section 1 (j), Rule 16 of the Rules of Court.
Because of that notice of dismissal, the wife obtained the relief which she had sought
by means of her motion to dismiss.
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Consuelo Madrigal-Vasquez vs. Judge Corazon J. Agrava, G.R. No. L-32219, February
25, 1982
Decree of legal separation on the ground of concubinage may be issued upon proof
by preponderance of evidence.
A decree of legal separation, on the ground of concubinage, may be issued
upon proof by preponderance of evidence in the action for legal separation. No
criminal proceeding or conviction is necessary. To this end, the doctrine in Francisco
vs. Tayao has been modified, as that case was decided under Act. No. 2710, when
absolute divorce was then allowed and had for its grounds the same grounds for legal
separation under the New Civil Code, with the requirement, under such former law,
that the guilt of defendant spouses had to be established by final judgment in a
criminal action. That requirement has not been reproduced or adopted by the framers
of the present Civil Code, and the omission has been uniformly accepted as a
modification of the stringent rule in Francisco v. Tayao.
Froilan C. Gandionco vs. Hon. Senen C. Peñaranda, G.R. No. 79284, November 27,
1987
Conviction for concubinage need not be first secured before action for legal
separation can prosper.
A decree of legal separation, on the ground of concubinage, may be issued
upon proof by preponderance of evidence in the action for legal separation.No
criminal proceeding or conviction is necessary.
Froilan C. Gandionco vs. Hon. Senen C. Peñaranda, G.R. No. 79284, November 27,
1987
The RTC, designated as Family Court, has the exclusive original jurisdiction over
cases relating to marital status and property relations of couples.
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8369 confers upon an RTC, designated as the Family
Court of a city, the exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide, among others,
complaints or petitions relating to marital status and property relations of the husband
and wife or those living together. The Rule on Legal Separation provides that "the
petition [for legal separation] shall be filed in the Family Court of the province or city
where the petitioner or the respondent has been residing for at least six months prior
to the date of filing or in the case of a non-resident respondent, where he may be
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found in the Philippines, at the election of the petitioner."
Brigido B. Quiao vs. Rita C. Quiao, et al., G.R. No. 176556, July 4, 2012
Art. 55 (10) - Abandonment
Meaning of "abandon".
Meaning of "abandonment".
Physical separation of parties and husband's refusal to give support sufficed to constitute
abandonment.
Physical separation, without financial and moral desertion, is not abandonment.
Meaning of 'abandon".
The word "abandon", in its ordinary sense, means to forsake entirely; to forsake
or renounce utterly. The dictionaries trace this word to the root idea of "putting under
a ban." The emphasis is on the finality and the publicity with which some thing or
body is thus put in the control of another, and hence the meaning of giving up
absolutely, with intent never again to resume or claim one's rights or interests. When
referring to desertion of a wife by a husband, the word has been defined as "the act of
a husband in voluntarily leaving his wife with intention to forsake her entirely, never
to return to her, and never to resume his marital duties towards her, or to claim his
marital rights; such neglect as either leaves the wife destitute of the common
necessaries of life, or would leave her destitute but for the charity of others."
Estrella de la Cruz vs. Severino de la Cruz, G.R. No. L-19565, January 30, 1968
Meaning of "abandonment".
a) Abandonment implies a departure by one spouse with the avowed intent
never to return, followed by prolonged absence without just cause, and without in the
meantime providing in the least for one's family although able to do so. There must be
absolute cessation of marital relations, duties and rights, with the intention of
perpetual separation. This idea is clearly expressed in the provision, which states that
"a spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other when he or she has left the conjugal
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dwelling without any intention of returning."
Prima Partosa-Jo vs. Court of Appeals and Ho Hang, G.R. No. 82606, December 18,
1992
b) The word "abandonment," when referring to the act of one consort of
leaving the other, is "the act of the husband or the wife who leaves his or her consort
willfully, and with an intention of causing perpetual separation." Thus, to constitute
abandonment of the wife by the husband, there must be absolute cessation of marital
relations and duties and rights, with the intention of perpetual separation.
Estrella de la Cruz vs. Severino de la Cruz, G.R. No. L-19565, January 30, 1968
Physical separation of parties and husband's refusal to give support sufficed to
constitute abandonment.
The physical separation of the parties, coupled with the refusal by the husband
to give support to the wife, sufficed to constitute abandonment as a ground for the
judicial separation of their conjugal property.
Prima Partosa-Jo vs. Court of Appeals and Ho Hang, G.R. No. 82606, December 18,
1992
Physical separation, without financial and moral desertion, is not abandonment.
To entitle the wife to any of the extraordinary remedies as a result of
abandonment, the abandonment must not only be physical estrangement but also
amount to financial and moral desertion. Although an all-embracing definition of the
term "abandonment" is yet to be spelled out in explicit words, its meaning can be
determined from the context of the law well as from its ordinary usage. The concept
of abandonment may be established in relation to the alternative remedies granted to
the wife when she has been abandoned by the husband, namely, receivership,
administration by her, or separation of property, all of which are designed to protect
the conjugal assets from waste and dissipation rendered imminent by the husband's
continued absence from the conjugal abode, and to assure the wife of a ready and
steady source of support. Therefore, physical separation alone is not the full meaning
of the term "abandonment", if the husband, despite his voluntary departure from the
society of his spouse, neither neglects the management of the conjugal partnership nor
ceases to give support to his wife.
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Estrella de la Cruz vs. Severino de la Cruz, G.R. No. L-19565, January 30, 1968
Art. 56 (1) - Condonation
Condonation, defined.
A single voluntary marital intercourse is sufficient to constitute condonation.
Husband's failure to search for his wife does not constitute condonation.
When condonation of wife’s offense does not entitle her to a divorce.
Condonation, defined.
Condonation is the forgiveness of a marital offense constituting a ground for
legal separation or, the conditional forgiveness or remission, by a husband or wife of a
matrimonial offense which the latter has committed.
Benjamin Bugayong vs. Leonila Ginez, G.R. No. L-10033, December 28, 1956
A single voluntary marital intercourse is sufficient to constitute condonation.
Any cohabitation with the guilty party, after the commission of the offense, and
with the knowledge or belief on the part of the injured party of its commission, will
amount to conclusive evidence of condonation; but this presumption may be rebutted
by evidence. Single voluntary act of marital intercourse between the parties ordinarily
is sufficient to constitute condonation, and where the parties live in the same house, it
is presumed that they live on terms of matrimonial cohabitation.
Benjamin Bugayong vs. Leonila Ginez, G.R. No. L-10033, December 28, 1956
Husband's failure to search for his wife does not constitute condonation.
The husband's failure actively to search for his wife and take her home after the
latter had left him does not constitute condonation or consent to her adulterous
relations. She "left" him after having sinned and after he had discovered her dates
with other men. Consequently, it was not his duty to search for her to bring her home.
Hers was the obligation to return.
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Jose de Ocampo vs. Serafina Florenciano, G.R. No. L-13553, February 23, 1960
When condonation of wife’s offense does not entitle her to a divorce.
The wife can defeat the husband's suit for a divorce by proof that he has
pardoned her, but the effect of such condonation of the wife's offense is not to entitle
her to a divorce from her husband by reason of adultery committed by him,
notwithstanding her own condoned act of adultery.
Agueda Benedicto vs. Esteban de la Rama, G.R. No. 1056, December 8, 1903
Art. 56 (2) - Consent
Failure of husband to file case for adultery is not proof of his consent.
The mere fact that the injured husband allowed seven months to pass without
instituting criminal proceedings against his wife and her paramour is not sufficient
proof of his consent.
Francisco Gali vs. Faustino Sahagun, G.R. No. 1229, August 19, 1903
Adriano Mortiga vs. Vicente Serra and Maria Obleno, G.R. No. 2045, September 20,
1905
Art. 56 (5) - Collusion
Collusion, defined.
Rationale for state intervention in uncontested proceedings for legal separation or
annulment of marriage.
Collusion, defined.
a) Collusion in divorce or legal separation means the agreement between
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husband and wife for one of them to commit, or to appear to commit, or to be
represented in court as having committed, a matrimonial offense, or to suppress
evidence of a valid defense, for the purpose of enabling the other to obtain a divorce.
This agreement, if not express, may be implied from the acts of the parties. It is a
ground for denying the divorce. There would be collusion if the parties had arranged
to make it appear that a matrimonial offense had been committed although it was not,
or if the parties had connived to bring about a legal separation even in the absence of
grounds therefor.
Jose de Ocampo vs. Serafina Florenciano, G.R. No. L-13553, February 23, 1960
b) Collusion in matrimonial cases is "the act of married persons in procuring
a divorce by mutual consent, whether by preconcerted commission by one of a
matrimonial offense, or by failure, in pursuance of agreement to defend divorce
proceedings"
William H. Brown vs. Juanita Yambao, G.R. No. L-10699, October 18, 1957
Rationale for state intervention in uncontested proceedings for legal separation or
annulment of marriage.
a) The policy calling for the intervention of the state attorneys in case of
uncontested proceedings for legal separation (and of annulment of marriages), is to
emphasize that marriage is more than a mere contract; that it is a social institution in
which the state is vitally interested, so that its continuation or interruption can not be
made to depend upon the parties themselves .It is consonant with this policy that the
inquiry by the Fiscal should be allowed to focus upon any relevant matter that may
indicate whether the proceedings for separation or annulment are fully justified or not.
William H. Brown vs. Juanita Yambao, G.R. No. L-10699, October 18, 1957
b) The prohibition expressed in the laws and rules is predicated on the fact
that the institutions of marriage and of the family are sacred and therefore are as much
the concern of the State as of the spouses; because the State and the public have vital
interest in the maintenance and preservation of these social institutions against
desecration by collusion between the parties or by fabricated evidence. The
prohibition against annulling a marriage based on the stipulation of facts or by
confession of judgment or by non-appearance of the defendant stresses the fact that
marriage is more than a mere contract between the parties; and for this reason, when
the defendant fails to appear, the law enjoins the court to direct the prosecuting officer
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to intervene for the State in order to preserve the integrity and sanctity of the marital
bonds.
Romulo Tolentino vs. Helen Villanueva, G.R. No. L-23264, March 15, 1974
Art. 63 (2) - Forfeiture of the share of the offending spouse in the net profits
[S]ince it was already established by the trial court that the spouses have no
separate properties, there is nothing to return to any of them. The listed properties . . .
are considered part of the conjugal partnership. Thus, ordinarily, what remains in the .
. . listed properties should be divided equally between the spouses and/or their
respective heirs. However, since the trial court found the petitioner the guilty party,
his share from the net profits of the conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor of the
common children, pursuant to Article 63 (2) of the Family Code. Again, lest we be
confused, like in the absolute community regime, nothing will be returned to the
guilty party in the conjugal partnership regime, because there is no separate property
which may be accounted for in the guilty party's favor.
Brigido B. Quiao vs. Rita C. Quiao, et al., G.R. No. 176556, July 4, 2012 citing Abalos
vs. Macatangay, Jr., 482 Phil. 877-894 (2004)
Art. 68 - Duties of husband and wife
Duty to live together can only be fulfilled if the husband and wife are physically together
Right of parties to cohabitation is sanctioned by mutual affection, not court order
The wife is not entitled to support if she establishes her residence apart from the husband
Wife may acquire residence separate from her husband if the latter has given cause for
divorce
Courts cannot compel the restitution of the purely personal right of consortium
Procreation is one of the essential marital obligations
Marital Rape
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Duty to live together can only be fulfilled if the husband and wife are physically
together
The duty to live together can only be fulfilled if the husband and wife are
physically together. This takes into account the situations where the couple has many
residences. If the husband has to stay in or transfer to any one of their residences, the
wife should necessarily be with him in order that they may "live together."
Imelda Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 119976, September 18, 1995
It is true that the Family Code, obligates the spouses to love one another but this
rule sanctions affection and sexual intimacy, as expressions of love, that are both
spontaneous and mutual and not the kind which is unilaterally exacted by force or
coercion.
Further, the delicate and reverent nature of sexual intimacy between a husband and
wife excludes cruelty and coercion. Sexual intimacy brings spouses wholeness and
oneness. It is a gift and a participation in the mystery of creation. It is a deep sense of
spiritual communion. It is a function which enlivens the hope of procreation and
ensures the continuation of family relations. It is an expressive interest in each other's
feelings at a time it is needed by the other and it can go a long way in deepening
marital relationship. When it is egoistically utilized to despoil marital union in order to
advance a felonious urge for coitus by force, violence or intimidation, the Court will
step in to protect its lofty purpose, vindicate justice and protect our laws and State
policies. Besides, a husband who feels aggrieved by his indifferent or uninterested
wife's absolute refusal to engage in sexual intimacy may legally seek the court's
intervention to declare her psychologically incapacitated to fulfill an essential marital
obligation. But he cannot and should not demand sexual intimacy from her coercively
or violently.
People v. Jumawan, G.R. No. 187495, April 21, 2014
Right of parties to cohabitation is sanctioned by mutual affection, not court order.
It would be unrealistic for the courts to compel or urge married couples to live
together when they are speaking of impossibility of cohabitation. For while marriage
entitles both parties to cohabitation or consortium, the sanction therefor is the
spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and wife and not any legal mandate
or court order. This is due to the inherent characteristic and nature of marriage in this
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jurisdiction.
Lourdes Ramirez-Cuaderno vs. Angel Cuaderno, G.R. No. L-20043, November 28,
1964
The wife is not entitled to support if she establishes her residence apart from the
husband.
Although the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual
respect and fidelity and render mutual help and assistance and that the wife is entitled
to be supported, our laws contain no provision compelling the wife to live with her
husband where even without legal justification she establishes her residence apart
from that provided for by the former. In such event, there is no plausible reason why
she should be allowed any support from the husband.
Pilar Atilano vs. Chua Ching Beng, G.R. No. L-11086, March 29, 1958
Wife may acquire residence separate from her husband if the latter has given cause
for divorce.
If the wife can acquire a separate residence when her husband consents or
acquiesces, there is no reason why the law will not allow her to do so when the
husband unlawfully ejects her from the conjugal home in order that he may freely
indulge in his illicit relations with another woman. Under no other circumstance could
a wife be more justified in establishing a separate residence from that of her husband.
For her to continue living with him, even if he had permitted it, would have been a
condonation of his flagrant breach of fidelity and marital duty. Furthermore, in this
case no longer was there an "identity of persons and of interest between the husband
and the wife." It is clear, therefore, that a married woman may acquire a residence or
domicile separate from that of her husband, during the existence of the marriage,
where the husband has given cause for divorce.
Diego de la Viña vs. Antonio Villareal, G.R. No. 13982, July 31, 1920
Courts cannot compel the restitution of the purely personal right of consortium
It is not within the province of the courts of this country to attempt to compel
one of the spouses to cohabit with, and render conjugal rights to, the other. Of course
where the property-rights of one of the pair are invaded, an action for restitution of
such rights can be maintained. But the Court disinclined to sanction the doctrine that
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an order, enforceable by process of contempt, may be entered to compel the restitution
of the purely personal right of consortium. At best such an order can be effective for
no other purpose than to compel the spouses to live under the same roof.
Mariano B. Arroyo vs. Dolores C. Vazquez de Arroyo, G.R. No. 17014, August 11, 1921
Alfonso Lacson vs. Carmen San Jose-Lacson and the CA, G.R. No. L-23482, August
30, 1968
Procreation is one of the essential marital obligations.
One of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is "To procreate
children based on the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual
cooperation is the basic end of marriage." Constant non-fulfillment of this obligation
will finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the marriage. While the law provides
that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love respect
and fidelity the sanction therefor is actually the "spontaneous, mutual affection
between husband and wife and not any legal mandate of court order" Love is useless
unless it is shared with another. Indeed, no man is an island, the cruelest act of a
partner in marriage is to say "I could not have cared less." This is so because an
ungiven self is an unfulfilled self. The egoist has nothing but himself. In the natural
order, it is sexual intimacy which brings spouses wholeness and oneness. Sexual
intimacy is a gift and a participation in the mystery of creation. It is a function which
enlivens the hope of procreation and ensures the continuation of family relations.
Chi Ming Tsoi vs. CA and Gina Lao-Tsoi, G.R. No. 119190, January 16, 1997
Marital Rape
It is true that the Family Code obligates the spouses to love one another but this
rule sanctions affection and sexual intimacy as expressions of love that are both
spontaneous and mutual and not the kind which is unilaterally exacted by force or
coercion.
Further, the delicate and reverent nature of sexual intimacy between a husband and
wife excludes cruelty and coercion. Sexual intimacy brings spouses wholeness and
oneness. It is a gift and a participation in the mystery of creation. It is a deep sense of
spiritual communion. It is a function which enlivens the hope of procreation and
ensures the continuation of family relations. It is an expressive interest in each other's
feelings at a time it is needed by the other and it can go a long way in deepening
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marital relationship. When it is egoistically utilized to despoil marital union in order to
advance a felonious urge for coitus by force, violence or intimidation, the Court will
step in to protect its lofty purpose, vindicate justice and protect our laws and State
policies. Besides, a husband who feels aggrieved by his indifferent or uninterested
wife's absolute refusal to engage in sexual intimacy may legally seek the court's
intervention to declare her psychologically incapacitated to fulfill an essential marital
obligation. But he cannot and should not demand sexual intimacy from her coercively
or violently.
Moreover, to treat marital rape cases differently from non-marital rape cases in
terms of the elements that constitute the crime and in the rules for their proof,
infringes on the equal protection clause. The Constitutional right to equal protection
of the laws ordains that similar subjects should not be treated differently, so as to give
undue favor to some and unjustly discriminate against others; no person or class of
persons shall be denied the same protection of laws, which is enjoyed, by other
persons or other classes in like circumstances.
People v. Jumawan, G.R. No. 187495, April 21, 2014
Husbands are once again reminded that marriage is not a license to forcibly rape
their wives. A husband does not own his wife's body by reason of marriage. By
marrying, she does not divest herself of the human right to an exclusive autonomy
over her own body and thus, she can lawfully opt to give or withhold her consent to
marital coitus. A husband aggrieved by his wife's unremitting refusal to engage in
sexual intercourse cannot resort to felonious force or coercion to make her yield. He
can seek succor before the Family Courts that can determine whether her refusal
constitutes psychological incapacity justifying an annulment of the marriage.
People v. Jumawan, G.R. No. 187495, April 21, 2014
Sexual intimacy is an integral part of marriage because it is the spiritual and
biological communion that achieves the marital purpose of procreation. It entails
mutual love and self-giving and as such it contemplates only mutual sexual
cooperation and never sexual coercion or imposition.
People v. Jumawan, G.R. No. 187495, April 21, 2014
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Art. 73 - Either spouse may exercise legitimate profession and business
Wife who enters into contract is solely liable for damages awarded.
Under Article 117 of the Civil Code (now Article 73 of the Family Code), the
wife may exercise any profession, occupation or engage in business without the
consent of the husband. Thus, since it was only the wife who entered into the contract,
she is solely liable for the damages awarded, pursuant to the principle that contracts
produce effect only as between the parties who execute them.
Nancy Go, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 114791, May 29, 1997
Under R.A. No. 9262, the provision of spousal and child support specifically
address one form of violence committed against women — economic abuse.
D. "Economic abuse" refers to acts that make or attempt to make a
woman financially dependent which includes, but is not limited to the
following:
1. Withdrawal of financial support or preventing the victim from
engaging in any legitimate profession, occupation, business or activity, except
in cases wherein the other spouse/partner objects on valid, serious and moral
grounds as defined in Article 73 of the Family Code; . . .
Republic v. Yahon, G.R. No. 201043, June 16, 2014
Art. 74 - Property relations between husband and wife
As a general rule, any modification in the marriage settlements must be made
before the celebration of marriage. An exception to this rule is allowed provided that
the modification is judicially approved and refers only to the instances provided in
Articles 66, 67, 128, 135 and 136 of the Family Code.
Noveras v. Noveras, G.R. No. 188289, August 20, 2014
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Art. 76 - Modifications in the marriage settlement
The Family Code itself provides in Article 76 that marriage settlements cannot be
modified except prior to marriage. . . . Post-marriage modification of such settlements
can take place only where: (a) the absolute community or conjugal partnership was
dissolved and liquidated upon a decree of legal separation; (b) the spouses who were
legally separated reconciled and agreed to revive their former property regime; (c)
judicial separation of property had been had on the ground that a spouse abandons the
other without just cause or fails to comply with his obligations to the family; (d) there
was judicial separation of property under Article 135; (e) the spouses jointly filed a
petition for the voluntary dissolution of their absolute community or conjugal
partnership of gains.
Efren Pana vs. Heirs of Jose Juanite, Sr., et al., G.R. No. 164201, December 10, 2012
Art. 87 - Donations between husband and wife
Prohibition against donations between spouses likewise applies to donations
between persons living together in illicit relations.
The purchase and subsequent registration of the realty in the paramour's name
was tantamount to a donation by the husband to her. Such donation was void, because
it was "made between persons who were guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time
of the donation." The prohibition against donations between spouses must likewise
apply to donations between persons living together in illicit relations; otherwise, the
latter would be better situated than the former.
Milagros Joaquino vs. Lourdes Reyes, G.R. No. 154645, July 13, 2004
Erlinda A. Agapay vs. Carlina V. Palang, G.R. No. 116668, July 28, 1997
Cirila Arcaba vs. Erlinda Tabancura vda. de Batocael, G.R. No. 146683, November 22,
2001
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Art. 91 - What constitutes community property
When a couple enters into a regime of absolute community, the husband and the
wife becomes joint owners of all the properties of the marriage. Whatever property
each spouse brings into the marriage, and those acquired during the marriage (except
those excluded under Article 92 of the Family Code) form the common mass of the
couple's properties. And when the couple's marriage or community is dissolved, that
common mass is divided between the spouses, or their respective heirs, equally or in
the proportion the parties have established, irrespective of the value each one may
have originally owned.
Brigido B. Quiao vs. Rita C. Quiao, et al., G.R. No. 176556, July 4, 2012 citing Abalos v.
Macatangay, Jr., 482 Phil. 877-894 (2004)
Nobleza v. Nuega, G.R. No. 193038, March 11, 2015
Actual contribution is not relevant in determining whether a piece of property is
community property for the law itself defines what constitutes community property.
Nobleza v. Nuega, G.R. No. 193038, March 11, 2015
The only exceptions from the above rule are: (1) those excluded from the absolute
community by the Family Code; and (2) those excluded by the marriage settlement.
Under the first exception are properties enumerated in Article 92 of the Family Code. .
.
Nobleza v. Nuega, G.R. No. 193038, March 11, 2015
Since the subject property does not fall under any of the exclusions provided in
Article 92, it therefore forms part of the absolute community property of Shirley and
Rogelio. Regardless of their respective contribution to its acquisition before their
marriage, and despite the fact that only Rogelio's name appears in the TCT as owner,
the property is owned jointly by the spouses Shirley and Rogelio.
Nobleza v. Nuega, G.R. No. 193038, March 11, 2015
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Art. 94 - Liabilities of absolute community of property
Lilibeth Sunga-Chan, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 164401, June 25, 2008
Finally, consistent with our ruling that Rogelio solely entered into the contract of
sale with petitioner and acknowledged receiving the entire consideration of the
contract under the Deed of Absolute Sale, Shirley could not be held accountable to
petitioner for the reimbursement of her payment for the purchase of the subject
property. Under Article 94 of the Family Code, the absolute community of property
shall only be "liable for . . . [d]ebts and obligations contracted by either spouse
without the consent of the other to the extent that the family may have been benefited .
. . ." As correctly stated by the appellate court, there being no evidence on record that
the amount received by Rogelio redounded to the benefit of the family, respondent
cannot be made to reimburse any amount to petitioner.
Nobleza v. Nuega, G.R. No. 193038, March 11, 2015
Art. 96 - Administration of community property
Husband's management of conjugal property is a mere privilege given him by law.
The husband's management of the conjugal estate is not a natural right like his
right to do as he pleases with his private affairs. It is a mere privilege or preference
given him by law on the assumption that he is better able to handle the administration.
It results that when his supposed superiority over the woman in this regard; when
indeed, as in this case, his ability as manager totally disappears, the raison d' etre of
the privilege vanishes, and it is only just and proper that his co-partner should take
control.
Robert C. Peyer vs. Felix Martinez, G.R. No. L-3500, January 12, 1951
Article 124 of the Family Code which applies to conjugal partnership property, is a
reproduction of Article 96 of the Family Code which applies to community property.
Both Article 96 and Article 127 of the Family Code provide that the powers do not
include disposition or encumbrance without the written consent of the other spouse.
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Any disposition or encumbrance without the written consent shall be void. However,
both provisions also state that "the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer
on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a
binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse . . . before the offer is
withdrawn by either or both offerors." . . . The execution of the SPA is the acceptance
by the other spouse that perfected the continuing offer as a binding contract between
the parties, making the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage a valid contract.
Arturo Sarte Flores vs. Sps. Enrico, Jr. and Edna Lindo, G.R. No. 183984, April 13,
2011
"[A]ssuming arguendo that the signature of plaintiff-appellee Paz on the Kasulatan
ng Bilihan ng Lupa was not forged, her signature alone would still not bind the
subject property, it being already established that the said transaction was made
without the consent of her husband plaintiff appellee Alfredo."
Cotoner-Zacarias v. Spouses Revilla, G.R. No. 190901, November 12, 2014
Respondent and Rogelio were married on September 1, 1990. Rogelio, on his own
and without the consent of herein respondent as his spouse, sold the subject property
via a Deed of Absolute Sale dated December 29, 1992 — or during the subsistence of
a valid contract of marriage. Under Article 96 of Executive Order No. 209, otherwise
known as The Family Code of the Philippines, the said disposition of a communal
property is void . . . It is clear under the foregoing provision of the Family Code that
Rogelio could not sell the subject property without the written consent of respondent
or the authority of the court. Without such consent or authority, the entire sale is void.
Nobleza v. Nuega, G.R. No. 193038, March 11, 2015
Art. 99 - Termination of absolute community regime
The grant of the judicial separation of the absolute community property
automatically dissolves the absolute community regime, as stated in the 4th paragraph
of Article 99 of the Family Code. . .
Noveras v. Noveras, G.R. No. 188289, August 20, 2014
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Art. 102 - Dissolution of the absolute community regime
Article 129 of the Family Code applies as to the property relations of the parties. In
other words, the computation and the succession of events will follow the provisions
under Article 129 of the said Code. Moreover, as to the definition of "net profits," we
cannot but refer to Article 102 (4) of the Family Code, since it expressly provides that
for purposes of computing the net profits subject to forfeiture under Article 43, No.
(2) and Article 63, No. (2), Article 102 (4) applies. In this provision, net profits "shall
be the increase in value between the market value of the community property at the
time of the celebration of the marriage and the market value at the time of its
dissolution." Thus, without any iota of doubt, Article 102 (4) applies to both the
dissolution of the absolute community regime under Article 102 of the Family Code,
and to the dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime under Article 129 of the
Family Code. Where lies the difference? . . . [T]he difference lies in the processes
used under the dissolution of the absolute community regime under Article 102 of the
Family Code, and in the processes used under the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership regime under Article 129 of the Family Code.
Brigido B. Quiao vs. Rita C. Quiao, et al., G.R. No. 176556, July 4, 2012 citing Abalos
vs. Macatangay, Jr., 482 Phil. 877-894 (2004)
Under Article 102 of the Family Code, upon dissolution of marriage, an inventory
is prepared, listing separately all the properties of the absolute community and the
exclusive properties of each; then the debts and obligations of the absolute community
are paid out of the absolute community's assets and if the community's properties are
insufficient, the separate properties of each of the couple will be solidarily liable for
the unpaid balance. Whatever is left of the separate properties will be delivered to
each of them. The net remainder of the absolute community is its net assets, which
shall be divided between the husband and the wife; and for purposes of computing the
net profits subject to forfeiture, said profits shall be the increase in value between the
market value of the community property at the time of the celebration of the marriage
and the market value at the time of its dissolution.
Applying Article 102 of the Family Code, the "net profits" requires that we first
find the market value of the properties at the time of the community's dissolution.
From the totality of the market value of all the properties, we subtract the debts and
obligations of the absolute community and this result to the net assets or net remainder
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of the properties of the absolute community, from which we deduct the market value
of the properties at the time of marriage, which then results to the net profits.
Brigido B. Quiao vs. Rita C. Quiao, et al., G.R. No. 176556, July 4, 2012 citing Abalos
vs. Macatangay, Jr., 482 Phil. 877-894 (2004)
Art. 102 (4) - Dissolution of the absolute community regime: Computation of
net profits
[A]mong the effects of the decree of legal separation is that the conjugal
partnership is dissolved and liquidated and the offending spouse would have no right
to any share of the net profits earned by the conjugal partnership. It is only [the
father]'s share in the net profits which is forfeited in favor of [the child]. Article 102
(4) of the Family Code provides that "[f]or purposes of computing the net profits
subject to forfeiture in accordance with Article 43, No. (2) and 63, No. (2), the said
profits shall be the increase in value between the market value of the community
property at the time of the celebration of the marriage and the market value at the time
of its dissolution." Clearly, what is forfeited in favor of [the child]is not [the father]'s
share in the conjugal partnership property but merely in the net profits of the conjugal
partnership property.
Mario Siochi vs. Alfredo Gozon, et al., G.R. Nos. 169900 & 169977, March 18, 2010
Article 130 is to be read in consonance with Article 105 of the Family Code. . . . It
is clear that conjugal partnership of gains established before and after the effectivity
of the Family Code are governed by the rules found in Chapter 4 (Conjugal
Partnership of Gains) of Title IV (Property Relations Between Husband and Wife) of
the Family Code. Hence, any disposition of the conjugal property after the dissolution
of the conjugal partnership must be made only after the liquidation; otherwise, the
disposition is void.
Heirs of Sps. Protacio, Sr. and Marta Go vs. Ester L. Servacio, et al., G.R. No. 157537,
September 7, 2011
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Art. 105 - Conjugal partnership of gains: General provisions
Article 130 is to be read in consonance with Article 105 of the Family Code. . . . It
is clear that conjugal partnership of gains established before and after the effectivity
of the Family Code are governed by the rules found in Chapter 4 (Conjugal
Partnership of Gains) of Title IV (Property Relations Between Husband and Wife) of
the Family Code. Hence, any disposition of the conjugal property after the dissolution
of the conjugal partnership must be made only after the liquidation; otherwise, the
disposition is void.
Heirs of Sps. Protacio, Sr. and Marta Go vs. Ester L. Servacio, et al., G.R. No. 157537,
September 7, 2011
Article 105 of the Family Code explicitly mandates that the Family Code shall
apply to conjugal partnerships established before the Family Code without prejudice
to vested rights already acquired under the Civil Code or other laws. Thus, under the
Family Code, if the properties are acquired during the marriage, the presumption is
that they are conjugal. Hence, the burden of proof is on the party claiming that they
are not conjugal. This is counter-balanced by the requirement that the properties must
first be proven to have been acquired during the marriage before they are presumed
conjugal.
Ocampo v. Ocampo, G.R. No. 198908, August 3, 2015
While Virginia and Deogracio tied the marital knot on January 16, 1978, it is still
the Family Code provisions on conjugal partnerships, however, which will govern the
property relations between Deogracio and Virginia even if they were married before
the effectivity of the Family Code.
Ocampo v. Ocampo, G.R. No. 198908, August 3, 2015
Conjugal partnership of gains established before and after the effectivity of the
Family Code are governed by the rules found in Chapter 4 (Conjugal Partnership of
Gains) of Title IV (Property Relations Between Husband and Wife) of the Family
Code. This is clear from Article 105 of the Family Code.
Domingo v. Spouses Molina, G.R. No. 200274, April 20, 2016
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Art. 109 - Exclusive property of each spouse
Character of paraphernal property cannot be changed by subsequent declarations.
Paraphernal property of the wife may not be attached or levied upon for the obligation of
her husband.
Cadastral court's finding prevails over presumption that properties acquired during
marriage are conjugal.
Property acquired by the spouses during the marriage is presumed to belong to the
conjugal partnership of gains, regardless of in whose name the same is registered.
The phrase “married to” is merely descriptive of wife’s civil status and not construed to
mean that her husband is also a registered owner.
Property whose title is in the name of the wife alone is paraphernal.
Paraphernal property cannot be attached by reason of a debt contracted by the husband.
Husband cannot lawfully dispose of wife's paraphernal property.
Offspring of animals which are paraphernal property are considered community property.
Increase in value of paraphernal property due to nature and time is not partnership
property.
Husband is not authorized to alienate property belonging exclusively to his wife.
Damages awarded for personal injury suffered by one of the spouses is exclusive property.
Character of paraphernal property cannot be changed by subsequent declarations.
Where the husband has been a party to an act of purchase of immovable
property in the name of his wife which recited that the purchase was made with
paraphernal funds, and that the property was to be and remain paraphernal property,
neither he nor his heirs can be permitted to go behind the deed and contest the wife's
title to the property by claiming that it is conjugal. Since the property is the
paraphernal property of the wife, the same having been acquired by her prior to her
marriage and having been purchased with her exclusive or private funds, any
declaration to the contrary made by her, as well as that of her child, cannot prevail nor
change the character of the property in question.
Pacifico C. del Mundo vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-25788, April 30, 1980
Paraphernal property of the wife may not be attached or levied upon for the
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obligation of her husband.
The levy by the sheriff on property by virtue of a writ of execution may be
considered as made under authority of the court only when the property levied upon
unquestionably belongs to the judgment debtor. If he should attach any property other
than those of said debtor, he acts beyond the limits of his authority. Stated otherwise,
the court issuing a writ of execution is supposed to enforce its authority only over
properties of the judgment debtor, and should a third party appear to claim the
property levied upon by the sheriff, the procedure laid down by the rules is that such
claim should be the subject of a separate and independent action. A money judgment
is enforceable only against property unquestionably belonging to the judgment debtor.
One man's goods shall not be sold for another man's debts.
Sps. Julian and Rosa Sy vs. Hon. Jaime D. Discaya, G.R. No. 86301, January 23, 1990
Novernia P. Naguit vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 137675, December 5, 2000
Cadastral court's finding prevails over presumption that properties acquired
during marriage are conjugal.
Properties acquired during the marriage are presumed to be conjugal. However,
this prima facie presumption cannot prevail over the cadastral court's specific finding,
reached in adversarial proceedings, that the property was inherited by the wife from
her mother.
Jessie V. Pisueña vs. Heirs of Petra Unating and Aquilino Villar, G.R. No. 132803,
August 31, 1999
Property acquired by the spouses during the marriage is presumed to belong to the
conjugal partnership of gains, regardless of in whose name the same is registered.
As a general rule, all property acquired by the spouses, regardless of in whose
name the same is registered, during the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership of gains, unless it is proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to
the wife. The fact that the grant was solely in the name of the wife did not make the
property paraphernal property. What was material was the time the fishpond lease
right was acquired by the grantee, and that was during the lawful existence of the
marriage.
Olimpia Diancin vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119991, November 20, 2000
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The phrase “married to” is merely descriptive of wife’s civil status and not
construed to mean that her husband is also a registered owner.
Title is registered in the name of the wife alone because the phrase "married to
Rogelio Ruiz" is merely descriptive of her civil status and should not be construed to
mean that her husband is also a registered owner. Furthermore, registration of the
property in the name of "Corazon G. Ruiz, of legal age, married to Rogelio Ruiz" is
not proof that such property was acquired during the marriage, and thus, is presumed
to be conjugal. The property could have been acquired by the wife while she was still
single, and registered only after her marriage. Acquisition of title and registration
thereof are two different acts.
Corazon G. Ruiz vs. Court of Appeals and Consuelo Torres, G.R. No. 146942, April 22,
2003
Property whose title is in the name of the wife alone is paraphernal.
Proof of acquisition during the marriage is a condition sine qua non for the
operation of the presumption in favor of conjugal ownership. On the basis alone of the
certificate of title, it cannot be presumed that said property was acquired during the
marriage and that it is conjugal property. Since there is no showing as to when the
property in question was acquired, the fact that the title is in the name of the wife
alone is determinative of its nature as paraphernal, i.e., belonging exclusively to said
spouse.
Corazon G. Ruiz vs. Court of Appeals and Consuelo Torres, G.R. No. 146942, April 22,
2003
Paraphernal property cannot be attached by reason of a debt contracted by the
husband.
An estate partaking of the nature of paraphernal property belonging to the wife
can not be attached by reason of a debt contracted by the husband, at the request of a
creditor of the latter, nor sold and adjudged to him there being no legal reason
whereby the wife should be bound to make any payment or loan to the said creditor;
therefore, the proceedings by virtue of which the woman who owned the estate was
deprived of the property for the payment of a debt for which she was in no way
responsible, are entirely null and void.
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Marcela Alvaran vs. Bernardo Marquez, G.R. No. 4465, September 10, 1908
Husband cannot lawfully dispose of wife's paraphernal property.
Whatever may have been agreed in a conciliatory action between a third person
and the husband of the lawful owner of a property can not deprive the latter, as a wife,
of her interest in said property to which such third person pretends to have acquired
certain rights without the intervention of the wife and without her consent to such
action; the husband could not lawfully dispose of said estate which is paraphernal
property, nor could he assign the same to a third person to the prejudice of his wife
who was the owner.
Ildefonsa Vargas vs. Agatona Egamino, G.R. No. 2994, November 18, 1908
Offspring of animals which are paraphernal property are considered community
property.
The marriage having lasted for more than thirty years, and some of the
carabaos being the offspring of others which were purchased during the marriage,
such animals are not paraphernal property of the widow for even such offspring is
considered as community property nor were they the private property of the deceased
husband.
Narciso Marigsa vs. Ildefonsa Macabuntoc, G.R. No. L-4883, September 27, 1910
Increase in value of paraphernal property due to nature and time is not partnership
property.
The sum representing the difference between the original assessed value of the
paraphernal property and before the improvements thereon and the assessed value of
the same with the improvements thereon, at the time of the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership, cannot be considered partnership property because such improvements
were not due to industry and labor of the surviving spouse. Furthermore, the land as
well as the coconut trees are, by nature and time, susceptible to increase in value: the
land, through the development of the town, of commerce and of industry; the coconut
groves, through the growth of the coconut trees from the time they are planted until
they bear, and also through the development of commerce and of the coconut oil
industry. This increase in value due to nature and time is not considered partnership
property under the law on the ground that it is neither produced with funds from the
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conjugal partnership nor with the work or industry of any of the spouse.
Sinforoso Ona vs. Serapia De Gala, G.R. No. 37756, November 28, 1933
Husband is not authorized to alienate property belonging exclusively to his wife.
If the property acquired during the marriage with money belonging exclusively
to the wife is considered as her own, it is unquestionable that it does not belong to the
class of community property. Therefore the husband is not authorized to alienate,
encumber, or make contracts in regard thereto, without the knowledge and consent of
its lawful owner, and a sale or conveyance thereof by the husband, who is not its
owner, is null and void.
Asuncion Gefes vs. Silvestre Salvio, G.R. No. 11387, February 7, 1917
Damages awarded for personal injury suffered by one of the spouses is exclusive
property.
Damages awarded for personal injury suffered by the wife is considered
paraphernal property.
Aleko E. Lilius vs. Manila Railroad Company, G.R. No. 42551, September 4, 1935
Art. 116 - Conjugal partnership
All property of the marriage is presumed conjugal.
Property whose title is in the name of the wife alone is paraphernal.
A phrase in the title descriptive of the civil status of one spouse should not be construed to
mean that the other spouse is also a registered owner.
Constructive trust is deemed created when conjugal property is titled in the name of
common-law wife.
Proof of acquisition during the marriage is a condition sine qua non for the operation of
the presumption in favor of conjugal ownership.
Alienation or encumbrance of conjugal property without wife's consent before effectivity
of Family Code is voidable.
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Survivorship pension of spouse who contracted marriage to a GSIS member within 3
years before the latter’s retirement or death is no longer automatically forfeited.
Consent of both spouses needed in the sale of conjugal property.
All property of the marriage is presumed conjugal.
All property of the marriage is presumed to be conjugal. However, for this
presumption to apply, the party who invokes it must first prove that the property was
acquired during the marriage. Proof of acquisition during the coverture is a condition
sine qua non to the operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership.
Thus, the time when the property was acquired is material.
Evangeline D. Imani vs. Metrobank, G.R. No. 187023, November 17, 2010
The certificates of titles and tax declarations are not sufficient proof to overcome
the presumption under Article 116 of the Family Code. All properties acquired by the
spouses during the marriage, regardless in whose name the properties are registered,
are presumed conjugal unless proved otherwise. The presumption is not rebutted by
the mere fact that the certificate of title of the property or the tax declaration is in the
name of one of the spouses only. Article 116 expressly provides that the presumption
remains even if the property is "registered in the name of one or both of the spouses."
Ocampo v. Ocampo, G.R. No. 198908, August 3, 2015
Property whose title is in the name of the wife alone is paraphernal.
[O]n the basis alone of the certificate of title, it cannot be presumed that said
property was acquired during the marriage and that it is conjugal property. Since there
is no showing as to when the property in question was acquired, the fact that the title
is in the name of the wife alone is determinative of its nature as paraphernal, i.e.,
belonging exclusively to said spouse. The only import of the title is that Corazon is the
owner of said property, the same having been registered in her name alone, and that
she is married to Rogelio Ruiz.
Corazon G. Ruiz vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 146942, April 22, 2003
A phrase in the title descriptive of the civil status of one spouse should not be
construed to mean that the other spouse is also a registered owner.
The property subject of the mortgage is registered in the name of "Corazon G.
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Ruiz, of legal age, married to Rogelio Ruiz, Filipinos." Thus, title is registered in the
name of Corazon alone because the phrase "married to Rogelio Ruiz" is merely
descriptive of the civil status of Corazon and should not be construed to mean that her
husband is also a registered owner. Furthermore, registration of the property in the
name of "Corazon G. Ruiz, of legal age, married to Rogelio Ruiz" is not proof that
such property was acquired during the marriage, and thus, is presumed to be conjugal.
The property could have been acquired by Corazon while she was still single, and
registered only after her marriage to Rogelio Ruiz. Acquisition of title and registration
thereof are two different acts.
Corazon G. Ruiz vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 146942, April 22, 2003
The statement in the title that the property is "registered in accordance with the
provisions of Section 103 of the Property Registration Decree in the name of JOSE B.
TAN, of legal age, married to Eliza Go Tan" does not prove or indicate that the
property is conjugal.
Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company, et al. vs. Sps. Jose B. Tan, et al., G.R. No.
163712, November 30, 2006
Constructive trust is deemed created when conjugal property is titled in the name
of common-law wife.
Property acquired by a man while living with a common-law wife during the
subsistence of his marriage is conjugal property, even when the property was titled in
the name of the common-law wife. In such cases, a constructive trust is deemed to
have been created by operation of Article 1456 of the Civil Code over the property
which lawfully pertains to the conjugal partnership of the subsisting marriage. It was
at the time that the adjudication of ownership was made following the husband's
demise (not when he merely allowed the property to be titled in his paramour's name)
that a constructive trust was deemed to have been created.
Josephine B. Belcodero vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 89667, October 20, 1993
Marino Adriano vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124118, March 27, 2000
Proof of acquisition during the marriage is a condition sine qua non for the
operation of the presumption in favor of conjugal ownership.
Before [the presumption under Article 116 of the Family Code that properties
acquired during the marriage are presumed to be conjugal] can apply, it must first be
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established that the property was in fact acquired during the marriage. In other words,
proof of acquisition during the marriage is a condition sine qua non for the operation
of the presumption in favor of conjugal ownership.
Corazon G. Ruiz vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 146942, April 22, 2003
Alienation or encumbrance of conjugal property without wife's consent before
effectivity of Family Code is voidable.
Without the wife's consent, the husband's alienation or encumbrance of
conjugal property prior to the effectivity of the Family Code is not void, but merely
voidable.
Vicente G. Villaranda vs. Sps. Honorio and Ana Maria Y. Villaranda, G.R. No. 153447,
February 23, 2004
Survivorship pension of spouse who contracted marriage to a GSIS member within
3 years before the latter's retirement or death is no longer automatically forfeited.
The present GSIS law (R.A. No. 8291) does not presume that marriages
contracted within three years before retirement or death of a member are sham
marriages contracted to avail of survivorship benefits. It does not automatically forfeit
the survivorship pension of the surviving spouse who contracted marriage to a GSIS
member within three years before the member's retirement or death. The law
acknowledges that whether the surviving spouse contracted the marriage mainly to
receive survivorship benefits is a matter of evidence. The law no longer prescribes a
sweeping classification that unduly prejudices the legitimate surviving spouse and
defeats the purpose for which Congress enacted the social legislation.
GSIS vs. Milagros O. Montesclaros, G.R. No. 146494, July 14, 2004
Consent of both spouses needed in the sale of conjugal property.
Since the property was undoubtedly part of the conjugal partnership, the sale to
[petitioner] required the consent of both spouses. Article 165 of the Civil Code
expressly provides that "the husband is the administrator of the conjugal partnership".
Likewise, Article 172 of the Civil Code ordains that "(t)he wife cannot bind the
conjugal partnership without the husband's consent, except in cases provided by law".
Titan Construction Corp. vs. Manuel A. David, Sr., et al., G.R. No. 169548, March 15,
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2010
All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership,
unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.
Registration in the name of the husband or the wife alone does not destroy this
presumption. The separation-in-fact between the husband and the wife without
judicial approval shall not affect the conjugal partnership. The lot retains its conjugal
nature. Moreover, the presumption of conjugal ownership applies even when the
manner in which the property was acquired does not appear. The use of the conjugal
funds is not an essential requirement for the presumption to arise.
Elenita M. Dewara vs. Sps. Ronnie and Gina Lamela, et al., G.R. No. 179010, April 11,
2011
Art. 120 - Ownership of improvements made on separate property of a spouse
Article 120 of the Family Code, which supersedes Article 158 of the Civil Code,
provides the solution in determining the ownership of the improvements that are made
on the separate property of the spouses, at the expense of the partnership or through
the acts or efforts of either or both spouses. Under this provision, when the cost of the
improvement and any resulting increase in value are more than the value of the
property at the time of the improvement, the entire property of one of the spouses shall
belong to the conjugal partnership, subject to reimbursement of the value of the
property of the owner-spouse at the time of the improvement; otherwise, said property
shall be retained in ownership by the owner-spouse, likewise subject to
reimbursement of the cost of the improvement.
Francisco Muñoz, Jr. vs. Erlinda Ramirez, et al., G.R. No. 156125, August 25, 2010
Art. 121 - Liabilities of conjugal partnership
How Article 21 should be applied.
Obligations contracted by husband on behalf of family business are presumed to redound
to the benefit of conjugal partnership
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Contract of surety or accommodation agreement entered into by husband requires proof to
establish benefit redounding to the conjugal partnership
Property registered in the name of the wife is deemed paraphernal property in the absence
of proof that the same was acquired during the marriage
Proof of acquisition during the marriage is a condition sine qua non for the operation of
the presumption in favor of conjugal ownership
All property acquired by the spouses during the marriage, regardless in whose name the
property is registered, is presumed conjugal unless proved otherwise
Conjugal partnership bears the indebtedness and losses incurred by husband in the
legitimate pursuit of his career or profession
Property acquired with salaries of husband belong to conjugal partnership even if
registered in paramour's name
Conjugal property is determined by law and not by will of one of the spouses.
Without the wife's consent, the husband's alienation or encumbrance of conjugal property
prior to the effectivity of the Family Code is not void, but merely voidable.
Obligations contracted by husband on behalf of the family business is presumed to
redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership
Spouses are solidarily liable with each other if conjugal properties are not enough to
answer for liabilities enumerated in Art. 121
How Article 21 should be applied.
Ayala Investment & Development Corp. v. Court of Appeals has explained how
Article 121 should be applied:
(A) If the husband himself is the principal obligor in the contract, i.e., he
directly received the money and services to be used in or for his own business or his
own profession, that contract falls within the term ". . . obligations for the benefit of
the conjugal partnership." Here, no actual benefit may be proved. It is enough that the
benefit to the family is apparent at the time of the signing of the contract. From the
very nature of the contract of loan or services, the family stands to benefit from the
loan facility or services to be rendered to the business or profession of the husband. It
is immaterial, if in the end, his business or profession fails or does not succeed.
Simply stated, where the husband contracts obligations on behalf of the family
business, the law presumes, and rightly so, that such obligation will redound to the
benefit of the conjugal partnership.
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(B) On the other hand, if the money or services are given to another person or
entity, and the husband acted only as a surety or guarantor, that contract cannot, by
itself, alone be categorized as falling within the context of "obligations for the benefit
of the conjugal partnership." The contract of loan or services is clearly for the benefit
of the principal debtor and not for the surety or his family. No presumption can be
inferred that, when a husband enters into a contract of surety or accommodation
agreement, it is "for the benefit of the conjugal partnership." Proof must be presented
to establish benefit redounding to the conjugal partnership.
Philippine National Bank v. Reyes, Jr., G.R. No. 212483, October 5, 2016, citing Ayala
Investment & Development Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 349 Phil. 942 (1998)
Obligations contracted by husband on behalf of family business are presumed to
redound to the benefit of conjugal partnership
If the husband himself is the principal obligor in the contract, i.e., he directly
received the money and services to be used in or for his own business or his own
profession, that contract falls within the term ". . . obligations for the benefit of the
conjugal partnership." No actual benefit may be proved. It is enough that the benefit to
the family is apparent at the time of the signing of the contract. From the very nature
of the contract of loan or services, the family stands to benefit from the loan facility or
services to be rendered to the business or profession of the husband. It is immaterial,
if in the end, his business or profession fails or does not succeed.
Ayala Investment & Devt. Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118305, February 12,
1998
There are two scenarios considered: one is when the husband, or in this case,
the wife, contracts a loan to be used for the family business and the other is when she
acts as a surety or guarantor. If she is a mere surety or guarantor, evidence that the
family benefited from the loan need to be presented before the conjugal partnership
can be held liable. On the other hand, if the loan was taken out to be used for the
family business, there is no need to prove actual benefit. The law presumes the family
benefited from the loan and the conjugal partnership is held liable.
Philippine National Bank v. Reyes, Jr., G.R. No. 212483, October 5, 2016
Contract of surety or accommodation agreement entered into by husband requires
proof to establish benefit redounding to the conjugal partnership
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If the money or services are given to another person or entity, and the husband
acted only as a surety or guarantor, that contract cannot, by itself, alone be categorized
as falling within the context of "obligations for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership." The contract of loan or services is clearly for the benefit of the principal
debtor and not for the surety or his family. No presumption can be inferred that, when
a husband enters into a contract of surety or accommodation agreement, it is "for the
benefit of the conjugal partnership." Proof must be presented to establish benefit
redounding to the conjugal partnership.
Ayala Investment & Devt. Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118305, February 12,
1998
That the shares of stocks of the petitioner-husband and his family would
appreciate if the PBMCI could be rehabilitated through the loans obtained and that the
petitioner-husband's career would be enhanced should PBMCI survive because of the
infusion of fresh capital cannot be argued because these are not the benefits
contemplated by Article 161 of the New Civil Code. The benefits must be those
directly resulting from the loan. They cannot merely be a by-product or a spin-off of
the loan itself.
Alfredo Ching vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124642, February 23, 2004
Property registered in the name of the wife is deemed paraphernal property in the
absence of proof that the same was acquired during the marriage
The property subject of the mortgage is registered in the name of "Corazon G.
Ruiz, of legal age, married to Rogelio Ruiz, Filipinos." Thus, title is registered in the
name of Corazon alone because the phrase "married to Rogelio Ruiz" is merely
descriptive of the civil status of Corazon and should not be construed to mean that her
husband is also a registered owner. Since there is no showing as to when the property
in question was acquired, the fact that the title is in the name of the wife alone is
determinative of its nature as paraphernal, i.e., belonging exclusively to said spouse.
The only import of the title is that Corazon is the owner of said property, the same
having been registered in her name alone, and that she is married to Rogelio Ruiz.
Corazon G. Ruiz vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 146942, April 22, 2003
Proof of acquisition during the marriage is a condition sine qua non for the
operation of the presumption in favor of conjugal ownership
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Registration of the property in the name of "Corazon G. Ruiz, of legal age,
married to Rogelio Ruiz" is not proof that such property was acquired during the
marriage, and thus, is presumed to be conjugal. The property could have been
acquired by Corazon while she was still single, and registered only after her marriage
to Rogelio Ruiz. Acquisition of title and registration thereof are two different acts.
The presumption under Article 116 of the Family Code that properties acquired during
the marriage are presumed to be conjugal cannot apply in the instant case. Before such
presumption can apply, it must first be established that the property was in fact
acquired during the marriage. In other words, proof of acquisition during the marriage
is a condition sine qua non for the operation of the presumption in favor of conjugal
ownership. Thus, on the basis alone of the certificate of title, it cannot be presumed
that said property was acquired during the marriage and that it is conjugal property.
Corazon G. Ruiz vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 146942, April 22, 2003
All property acquired by the spouses during the marriage, regardless in whose
name the property is registered, is presumed conjugal unless proved otherwise
Tax declarations are not sufficient proof to overcome the presumption under
Article 116 of the Family Code. All property acquired by the spouses during the
marriage, regardless in whose name the property is registered, is presumed conjugal
unless proved otherwise. The presumption is not rebutted by the mere fact that the
certificate of title of the property or the tax declaration is in the name of one of the
spouses only. Article 116 of the Family Code expressly provides that the presumption
remains even if the property is "registered in the name of one or both of the spouses."
Whether a property is conjugal or not is determined by law and not by the will of one
of the spouses. No unilateral declaration by one spouse can change the character of
conjugal property.
Procopio Villanueva vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 143286, April 14, 2004
Conjugal partnership bears the indebtedness and losses incurred by husband in the
legitimate pursuit of his career or profession
The husband is the administrator of the conjugal partnership and as long as he
believes he is doing right to his family, he should not be made to suffer and answer
alone. So that, if he incurs an indebtedness in the legitimate pursuit of his career or
profession or suffers losses in a legitimate business, the conjugal partnership must
equally bear the indebtedness and the losses, unless he deliberately acted to the
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prejudice of his family.
G-Tractors, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals and Sps. Luis and Josefina Narciso, G.R. No.
57402, February 28, 1985
Debts contracted by the husband for and in the exercise of the industry or
profession by which he contributes to the support of the family cannot be deemed to
be his exclusive and private debts.
Sps. Joe and Estrella Ros vs. PNB-Laoag Branch, G.R. No. 170166, April 6, 2011
The obligation was contracted by the husband in the purchase of leather used in
his shoe manufacturing business. It is well settled that the debts contracted by the
husband for and in the exercise of the industry or profession by which he contributes
to the support of the family cannot be deemed to be his exclusive and private debts.
Mercedes Ruth Cobb-Perez and Damaso P. Perez vs. Hon. Gregorio Lantin, G.R. No.
L-22320, May 22, 1968
Property acquired with salaries of husband belong to conjugal partnership even if
registered in paramour's name
Though registered in the paramour's name, property acquired with the salaries
and earnings of a husband belongs to his conjugal partnership with the legal spouse.
The registration of the property in petitioner's name was clearly designed to deprive
the legal spouse and compulsory heirs of ownership. By operation of law, the
paramour is deemed to hold the property in trust for them. Therefore, she cannot rely
on the registration in repudiation of the trust, for this case is a well-known exception
to the principle of conclusiveness of a certificate of title.
Milagros Joaquino vs. Lourdes Reyes, G.R. No. 154645, July 13, 2004
Conjugal property is determined by law and not by will of one of the spouses.
Whether a property is conjugal or not is determined by law and not by the will
of one of the spouses. No unilateral declaration by one spouse can change the
character of conjugal property. The clear intent of the husband in placing his status as
single is to exclude his wife from her lawful share in the conjugal property. The law
does not allow this.
Procopio Villanueva vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 143286, April 14, 2004
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Without the wife's consent, the husband's alienation or encumbrance of conjugal
property prior to the effectivity of the Family Code is not void, but merely voidable.
According to Article 166 of the Civil Code, the husband cannot alienate or
encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership without the wife's consent.
This provision, however, must be read in conjunction with Article 173 of the same
Code. The latter states that an action to annul an alienation or encumbrance may be
instituted by the wife during the marriage and within ten years from the transaction
questioned. Videlicet, the lack of consent on her part will not make the husband's
alienation or encumbrance of real property of the conjugal partnership void, but
merely voidable.
Vicente G. Villaranda vs. Sps. Honorio and Ana Maria Villaranda, G.R. No. 153447,
February 23, 2004
Obligations contracted by husband on behalf of the family business is presumed to
redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership
If the husband himself is the principal obligor in the contract, i.e., he directly
received the money and services to be used in or for his own business or his own
profession, that contract falls within the term ". . . obligations for the benefit of the
conjugal partnership." Here, no actual benefit may be proved. It is enough that the
benefit to the family is apparent at the signing of the contract. From the very nature of
the contract of loan or services, the family stands to benefit from the loan facility or
services to be rendered to the business or profession of the husband. It is immaterial,
if in the end, his business or profession fails or does not succeed. Simply stated, where
the husband contracts obligations on behalf of the family business, the law presumes,
and rightly so, that such obligation will redound to the benefit of the conjugal
partnership.
Sps. Joe and Estrella Ros vs. PNB-Laoag Branch, G.R. No. 170166, April 6, 2011,
citing Ayala Investment & Development Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118305,
February 12, 1998
The civil indemnity that the decision in the murder case imposed on [the wife] may
be enforced against their conjugal assets after the responsibilities enumerated in
Article 121 of the Family Code have been covered. . . . Article 121 . . . allows
payment of the criminal indemnities imposed on his wife . . . out of the partnership
assets even before these are liquidated. Indeed, it states that such indemnities "may be
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enforced against the partnership assets after the responsibilities enumerated in the
preceding article have been covered." No prior liquidation of those assets is required.
This is not altogether unfair since Article 122 states that "at the time of liquidation of
the partnership, such [offending] spouse shall be charged for what has been paid for
the purposes above-mentioned."
Efren Pana vs. Heirs of Jose Juanite, Sr., et al., G.R. No. 164201, December 10, 2012
Spouses are solidarily liable with each other if conjugal properties are not enough
to answer for liabilities enumerated in Art. 121
The last paragraph of Article 121 of the Family Code is instructive. . . The last
paragraph points to the "subsidiary but solidary liability of the separate properties" of
the spouses for liabilities enumerated in the Article. This Article, similar to Article 94
of the Family Code governing the Absolute Community of Property regime, explicitly
holds the spouses solidarily liable with each other if the conjugal properties are not
enough to answer for the liabilities. In this case, if the conjugal properties of the
spouses are not enough to answer for the loan, petitioner can recover the remaining
unpaid balance from the separate properties of either respondent or his wife.
Philippine National Bank v. Reyes, Jr., G.R. No. 212483, October 5, 2016
Art. 122 - Payment of a Spouse's Personal Debts
Article 122 applies to debts that were contracted by a spouse and redounded to the
benefit of the family. It applies specifically to the loan that respondent's wife Lilia
contracted, but not to the mortgage.
Philippine National Bank v. Reyes, Jr., G.R. No. 212483, October 5, 2016
Art. 124 - Administration of conjugal partnership property
A spouse's consent is indispensable for the disposition or encumbrance of conjugal
properties.
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Disposition of conjugal property by husband requires written consent of wife.
Court authorization is warranted if the spouse who does not give consent is incapacitated.
Joint management or administration does not require that the husband and wife always act
together
Rules on judicial guardianship proceedings, not summary judicial proceedings, apply
where non-consenting spouse is incapacitated or incompetent to give consent.
Husband’s management of conjugal property is a mere privilege given him by law.
Sale with assumption of mortgage executed by husband without wife's consent must be
annulled in its entirety.
Sale of conjugal property by husband without consent of his wife is voidable.
A spouse's consent is indispensable for the disposition or encumbrance of conjugal
properties.
The Family Code is clear: the written consent of the spouse who did not
encumber the property is necessary before any disposition or encumbrance of a
conjugal property can be valid.
Philippine National Bank v. Reyes, Jr., G.R. No. 212483, October 5, 2016
Disposition of conjugal property by husband requires written consent of wife.
The law requires that the disposition of a conjugal property by the husband as
administrator in appropriate cases requires the written consent of the wife, otherwise,
the disposition is void. For the contracts to sell to be effective, the consent of both
husband and wife must concur. Mere awareness of a transaction by the wife is not
consent.
Thelma A. Jader-Manalo vs. Norma Fernandez C. Camaisa, G.R. No. 147978, January
23, 2002
Hapitan v. Spouses Lagradilla, G.R. No. 170004, January 13, 2016
Court authorization is warranted if the spouse who does not give consent is
incapacitated.
If the written consent of the other spouse cannot be obtained or is being
withheld, the matter may be brought to court which will give such authority if the
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same is warranted by the circumstances. However, court authorization under Art. 124
is only resorted to in cases where the spouse who does not give consent is
incapacitated.
Thelma A. Jader-Manalo vs. Norma Fernandez C. Camaisa, G.R. No. 147978, January
23, 2002
Joint management or administration does not require that the husband and wife
always act together
The administration of the conjugal property belongs to the husband and the
wife jointly. However, unlike an act of alienation or encumbrance where the consent
of both spouses is required, joint management or administration does not require that
the husband and wife always act together. Each spouse may validly exercise full
power of management alone, subject to the intervention of the court in proper cases as
provided under Article 124 of the Family Code. Hence, the husband alone could have
filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition to contest the writs of demolition issued
against the conjugal property without being joined by his wife. The signing of the
certificate of non-forum shopping only by the husband is not a fatal defect. A rigid
application of the rules on forum shopping that would disauthorize a husband's
signing the certification in his behalf and that of his wife is too harsh and is clearly
uncalled for.
Sps. Antonio and Alfreda Docena vs. Hon. Ricardo P. Lapesura, G.R. No. 140153,
March 28, 2001
Rules on judicial guardianship proceedings, not summary judicial proceedings,
apply where non-consenting spouse is incapacitated or incompetent to give consent.
The rules on summary judicial proceedings under the Family Code govern the
proceedings under Article 124 of the Family Code. The situation contemplated is one
where the spouse is absent, or separated in fact or has abandoned the other or consent
is withheld or cannot be obtained. Such rules do not apply to cases where the
non-consenting spouse is incapacitated or incompetent to give consent. In such case,
the proper remedy is a judicial guardianship proceedings under Rule 93 of the 1964
Revised Rules of Court.
Jose Uy vs. Court of Appeals and Teodoro L. Jardeleza, G.R. No. 109557, November
29, 2000
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Husband’s management of conjugal property is a mere privilege given him by law.
The husband's management of the conjugal estate is not a natural right like his
right to do as he pleases with his private affairs. It is a mere privilege or preference
given him by law on the assumption that he is better able to handle the administration.
It results that when his supposed superiority over the woman in this regard; when
indeed, as in this case, his ability as manager totally disappears, the raison d' etre of
the privilege vanishes, and it is only just and proper that his co-partner should take
control.
Robert C. Peyer vs. Felix Martinez, G.R. No. L-3500, January 12, 1951
Sale with assumption of mortgage executed by husband without wife's consent must
be annulled in its entirety.
In the annulment of sale with assumption of mortgages executed by the
husband without the consent of the wife, the alienation or encumbrance must be
annulled in its entirety and not only insofar as the share of the wife in the conjugal
property is concerned. The rationale for the annulment of the whole transaction is the
same thus — the plain meaning attached to the plain language of the law is that the
contract, in its entirety, executed by the husband without the wife's consent, may be
annulled by the wife. Had Congress intended to limit such annulment in so far as the
contract shall "prejudice" the wife, such limitation should have been spelled out in the
statute. It is not the legitimate concern of this Court to recast the law.
Tomasita Bucoy vs. Reynaldo Paulino, G.R. No. L-25775, April 26, 1968
Sale of conjugal property by husband without consent of his wife is voidable.
There is no ambiguity in the wording of the law. A sale of real property of the
conjugal partnership made by the husband without the consent of his wife is voidable.
The action for annulment must be brought during the marriage and within ten years
from the questioned transaction by the wife. Where the law speaks in clear and
categorical language, there is no room for interpretation — there is room only for
application.
Heirs of Christina Ayuste vs. Court of Appeals and Viena Malabonga, G.R. No. 118784,
September 2, 1999
Heirs of Ignacia Aguilar-Reyes vs. Sps. Cipriano and Florentina Mijares, G.R. No.
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143826, August 28, 2003
The sale of a conjugal property requires the consent of both the husband and wife.
In applying Article 124 of the Family Code, this Court declared that the absence of the
consent of one renders the entire sale null and void, including the portion of the
conjugal property pertaining to the husband who contracted the sale.
Sps. Onesiforo and Rosario Alinas vs. Sps. Victor and Elena Alinas, G.R. No. 158040,
April 14, 2008
Homeowners Savings & Loan Bank vs. Miguela C. Dailo, G.R. No. 153802, March 11,
2005
Sps. Antonio and Luzviminda Guiang vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125172, June 26,
1998
Significantly, a sale or encumbrance of conjugal property concluded after the
effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, is governed by Article 124 of the
same Code that now treats such a disposition to be void if done (a) without the
consent of both the husband and the wife, or (b) in case of one spouse's inability, the
authority of the court.
Sps. Wilfredo and Patrocinia Ravina vs. Mary Ann P. Villa Abrille, et al., G.R. No.
160708, October 16, 2009
In this case, [the husband] was the sole administrator of the property because [the
wife], with whom [the husband] was separated in fact, was unable to participate in the
administration of the conjugal property. However, as sole administrator of the
property, [the husband] still cannot sell the property without the written consent of
[the wife] or the authority of the court. Without such consent or authority, the sale is
void. The absence of the consent of one of the spouse renders the entire sale void,
including the portion of the conjugal property pertaining to the spouse who contracted
the sale. Even if the other spouse actively participated in negotiating for the sale of
the property, that other spouse's written consent to the sale is still required by law for
its validity.
Mario Siochi vs. Alfredo Gozon, et al., G.R. Nos. 169900 & 169977, March 18, 2010
[A]rticle 124 of the Family Code requires that any disposition or encumbrance of
conjugal property must have the written consent of the other spouse, otherwise, such
disposition is void.
Titan Construction Corp. vs. Manuel A. David, Sr., et al., G.R. No. 169548, March 15,
2010
Copyright 2017 CD Technologies Asia, Inc. and Accesslaw, Inc. Philippine Law Encyclopedia (2017.1) 146
Article 124 of the Family Code which applies to conjugal partnership property, is a
reproduction of Article 96 of the Family Code which applies to community property.
Both Article 96 and Article 127 of the Family Code provide that the powers do not
include disposition or encumbrance without the written consent of the other spouse.
Any disposition or encumbrance without the written consent shall be void. However,
both provisions also state that "the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer
on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a
binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse . . . before the offer is
withdrawn by either or both offerors." . . . The execution of the SPA is the acceptance
by the other spouse that perfected the continuing offer as a binding contract between
the parties, making the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage a valid contract.
Arturo Sarte Flores vs. Sps. Enrico, Jr. and Edna Lindo, G.R. No. 183984, April 13,
2011
Art. 125 - Any spouse may not donate a conjugal property without the consent
of the other
[Under] Article 125 of the Family Code, a conjugal property cannot be donated by
one spouse without the consent of the other spouse.
Mario Siochi vs. Alfredo Gozon, et al., G.R. Nos. 169900 & 169977, March 18, 2010
Art. 126 - When conjugal partnership terminates
The conjugal partnership of Anastacio and Flora was dissolved when Flora died in
1968, pursuant to Article 175 (1) of the Civil Code (now Article 126 (1) of the Family
Code).
Domingo v. Spouses Molina, G.R. No. 200274, April 20, 2016
Copyright 2017 CD Technologies Asia, Inc. and Accesslaw, Inc. Philippine Law Encyclopedia (2017.1) 147
Art. 127 - The separation in fact between husband and wife shall not affect the
regime of conjugal partnership; exceptions
Article 124 of the Family Code which applies to conjugal partnership property, is a
reproduction of Article 96 of the Family Code which applies to community property.
Both Article 96 and Article 127 of the Family Code provide that the powers do not
include disposition or encumbrance without the written consent of the other spouse.
Any disposition or encumbrance without the written consent shall be void. However,
both provisions also state that "the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer
on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a
binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse . . . before the offer is
withdrawn by either or both offerors." . . . The execution of the SPA is the acceptance
by the other spouse that perfected the continuing offer as a binding contract between
the parties, making the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage a valid contract.
Arturo Sarte Flores vs. Sps. Enrico, Jr. and Edna Lindo, G.R. No. 183984, April 13,
2011
Art. 129 - Procedure for dissolution of conjugal partnership
[P]rior to the liquidation of the conjugal partnership, the interest of each spouse in
the conjugal assets is inchoate, a mere expectancy, which constitutes neither a legal
nor an equitable estate, and does not ripen into title until it appears that there are
assets in the community as a result of the liquidation and settlement. The interest of
each spouse is limited to the net remainder or "remanente liquido" (haber ganancial)
resulting from the liquidation of the affairs of the partnership after its dissolution.
Thus, the right of the husband or wife to one-half of the conjugal assets does not vest
until the dissolution and liquidation of the conjugal partnership, or after dissolution of
the marriage, when it is finally determined that, after settlement of conjugal
obligations, there are net assets left which can be divided between the spouses or their
respective heirs.
Brigido B. Quiao vs. Rita C. Quiao, et al., G.R. No. 176556, July 4, 2012 citing Abalos
vs. Macatangay, Jr., 482 Phil. 877-894 (2004)
Article 129 of the [Family] Code applies in the liquidation of the couple's
Copyright 2017 CD Technologies Asia, Inc. and Accesslaw, Inc. Philippine Law Encyclopedia (2017.1) 148
properties in the event that the conjugal partnership of gains is dissolved . . .
In the normal course of events, the following are the steps in the liquidation of the
properties of the spouses:
(a) An inventory of all the actual properties shall be made, separately listing
the couple's conjugal properties and their separate properties. . . .
(b) Ordinarily, the benefit received by a spouse from the conjugal partnership
during the marriage is returned in equal amount to the assets of the
conjugal partnership; and if the community is enriched at the expense of
the separate properties of either spouse, a restitution of the value of such
properties to their respective owners shall be made.
(c) Subsequently, the couple's conjugal partnership shall pay the debts of the
conjugal partnership; while the debts and obligation of each of the
spouses shall be paid from their respective separate properties. But if the
conjugal partnership is not sufficient to pay all its debts and obligations,
the spouses with their separate properties shall be solidarily liable.
(d) Now, what remains of the separate or exclusive properties of the husband
and of the wife shall be returned to each of them.
Brigido B. Quiao vs. Rita C. Quiao, et al., G.R. No. 176556, July 4, 2012 citing Abalos
vs. Macatangay, Jr., 482 Phil. 877-894 (2004)
Although Article 129 provides for the procedure in case of dissolution of the
conjugal partnership regime, Article 147 specifically covers the effects of void
marriages on the spouses' property relations.
Barrido v. Nonato, G.R. No. 176492, October 20, 2014
The applicable law . . . in so far as the liquidation of the conjugal partnership assets
and liability is concerned, is Article 129 of the Family Code in relation to Article 147
of the Family Code.
Ocampo v. Ocampo, G.R. No. 198908, August 3, 2015
Art. 130 - Liquidation of conjugal partnership property upon death of a
Copyright 2017 CD Technologies Asia, Inc. and Accesslaw, Inc. Philippine Law Encyclopedia (2017.1) 149
spouse
Article 130 is to be read in consonance with Article 105 of the Family Code. . . . It
is clear that conjugal partnership of gains established before and after the effectivity
of the Family Code are governed by the rules found in Chapter 4 (Conjugal
Partnership of Gains) of Title IV (Property Relations Between Husband and Wife) of
the Family Code. Hence, any disposition of the conjugal property after the dissolution
of the conjugal partnership must be made only after the liquidation; otherwise, the
disposition is void.
Heirs of Sps. Protacio, Sr. and Marta Go vs. Ester L. Servacio, et al., G.R. No. 157537,
September 7, 2011
While Article 130 of the Family Code provides that any disposition involving the
conjugal property without prior liquidation of the partnership shall be void, this rule
does not apply since the provisions of the Family Code shall be "without prejudice to
vested rights already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws."
Domingo v. Spouses Molina, G.R. No. 200274, April 20, 2016
Art. 135 - Causes for judicial separation of property
As a general rule, any modification in the marriage settlements must be made
before the celebration of marriage. An exception to this rule is allowed provided that
the modification is judicially approved and refers only to the instances provided in
Articles 66, 67, 128, 135 and 136 of the Family Code.
Noveras v. Noveras, G.R. No. 188289, August 20, 2014
Art. 142 - Transfer of administration of exclusive property by one spouse to
the other
What is more, under the conjugal partnership of gains established by Article 142 of
the Civil Code, the husband and the wife place only the fruits of their separate
Copyright 2017 CD Technologies Asia, Inc. and Accesslaw, Inc. Philippine Law Encyclopedia (2017.1) 150
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