property and incomes from their work or industry in the common fund. . . . This
means that they continue under such property regime to enjoy rights of ownership
over their separate properties. Consequently, to automatically change the marriage
settlements of couples who got married under the Civil Code into absolute community
of property in 1988 when the Family Code took effect would be to impair their
acquired or vested rights to such separate properties.
Efren Pana vs. Heirs of Jose Juanite, Sr., et al., G.R. No. 164201, December 10, 2012
Art. 143 - Separation of property in marriage settlements
Voluntary separation of property is subject to the rights of creditors of the conjugal
partnership of gains.
Under Article 143 of the Family Code, separation of property may be effected
voluntarily or for sufficient cause, subject to judicial approval. . . However, the Court
must stress that this voluntary separation of property is subject to the rights of all
creditors of the conjugal partnership of gains and other persons with pecuniary interest
pursuant to Article 136 of the Family Code.
Virgilio Maquilan vs. Dita Maquilan, G.R. No. 155409, June 8, 2007
Art. 147 - Co-ownership in unions without marriage
Requisites for co-ownership under Article 147
When no legal impediment to marry exists between common-law spouses, co-ownership
applies.
When a legal impediment to marry exists, only actual contributions shall be owned in
common.
Art. 147 or 148 govern property relations of parties in a void marriage.
A constructive trust is deemed created when property is titled in the name of common-law
wife during subsistence of a pre-existing marriage.
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Paramour named in certificate of title is not deemed owner where lawful heirs stand to be
deprived.
Even if it is only the man who works, the property acquired during the man-and-wife
relationship belongs to the two of them through a fifty-fifty sharing.
Common-law wife must show that she really contributed to the acquisition of the property
during cohabitation.
A woman's "real contribution" refers to her contribution to the family’s material and
spiritual goods.
The woman traditionally holds the family purse even if she does not contribute to filling
that purse with funds.
There must be evidence that the woman actually contributed to the acquisition of property.
Common-law couple with legal impediment to marry, own proportionately the property
acquired by them in common.
Wives in marriages celebrated subsequent to a valid marriage are not precluded from
proving that property acquired during their cohabitation with their Muslim husband, is
their exclusive property, respectively.
Requisites for co-ownership under Article 147
For Article 147 to operate, the man and the woman: (1) must be capacitated to
marry each other; (2) live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and (3)
their union is without the benefit of marriage or their marriage is void. Articles 50 and
51 of the Family Code relate only to voidable marriages and exceptionally to void
marriages under Article 40 of the Family Code.
Elna Mercado-Fehr vs. Bruno Fehr, G.R. No. 152716, October 23, 2003
When no legal impediment to marry exists between common-law spouses,
co-ownership applies.
This peculiar kind of co-ownership applies when a man and a woman,
suffering no legal impediment to marry each other, so exclusively live together as
husband and wife under a void marriage or without the benefit of marriage. The term
"capacitated" refers to the legal capacity of a party to contract marriage, i.e., any
"male or female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of the
impediments mentioned in Articles 37 and 38 of the Family Code.
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Antonio A.S. Valdes vs. RTC, Branch 102, QC, G.R. No. 122749, July 31, 1996
As there is no showing that Luis and Severina were incapacitated to marry each
other at the time of their cohabitation and considering that their marriage is void from
the beginning for lack of a valid marriage license, Article 144 of the Civil Code, in
relation to Article 147 of the Family Code, are the pertinent provisions of law
governing their property relations. Article 147 of the Family Code "applies to union of
parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract
marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void for other reasons, like absence of a
marriage license." "Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses
through their work and industry shall be governed by the rules on equal
co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to
have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the
acquisition of the property shall still be considered as having contributed thereto
jointly if said party's 'efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family
household.'"
Diaz-Salgado v. Anson, G.R. No. 204494, July 27, 2016
The provision states that properties acquired during cohabitation are presumed
co-owned unless there is proof to the contrary.
Uy v. Spouses Lacsamana, G.R. No. 206220, August 19, 2015
When a legal impediment to marry exists, only actual contributions shall be owned
in common.
When the common-law spouses suffer from a legal impediment to marry or
when they do not live exclusively with each other (as husband and wife), only the
property acquired by both of them through their actual joint contribution of money,
property or industry shall be owned in common and in proportion to their respective
contributions.
Antonio A.S. Valdes vs. RTC, Branch 102, QC, G.R. No. 122749, July 31, 1996
Indeed, Philippine Law does not recognize common law marriages. A man and
woman not legally married who cohabit for many years as husband and wife, who
represent themselves to the public as husband and wife, and who are reputed to be
husband and wife in the community where they live may be considered legally
married in common law jurisdictions but not in the Philippines.
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While it is true that our laws do not just brush aside the fact that such
relationships are present in our society, and that they produce a community of
properties and interests which is governed by law, authority exists in case law to the
effect that such form of co-ownership requires that the man and woman living
together must not in any way be incapacitated to contract marriage.
Banguis-Tambuyat v. Balcom-Tambuyat, G.R. No. 202805, March 23, 2015, citing
Valino v. Adriano, G.R. No. 182894, April 22, 2014
Art. 147 or 148 govern property relations of parties in a void marriage.
In a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations of the
parties during the period of cohabitation is governed by the provisions of Article 147
or Article 148, such as the case may be, of the Family Code. Article 147 is a remake
of Article 144 of the Civil Code as interpreted and so applied in previous cases.
Antonio A.S. Valdes vs. RTC, Branch 102, QC, G.R. No. 122749, July 31, 1996
Article 147 of the Family Code applies to the union of parties who are legally
capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose
marriage is nonetheless declared void under Article 36 of the Family Code. . . . Under
this property regime, property acquired during the marriage is prima facie presumed to
have been obtained through the couple's joint efforts and governed by the rules on
co-ownership.
Salas, Jr. v. Aguila, G.R. No. 202370, September 23, 2013
A constructive trust is deemed created when property is titled in the name of
common-law wife during subsistence of a pre-existing marriage.
Property acquired by a man while living with a common-law wife during the
subsistence of his marriage is conjugal property, even when the property was titled in
the name of the common-law wife. In such cases, a constructive trust is deemed to
have been created by operation of Article 1456 of the Civil Code over the property
which lawfully pertains to the conjugal partnership of the subsisting marriage. It was
at the time that the adjudication of ownership was made following the husband's
demise (not when he merely allowed the property to be titled in his paramour's name)
that a constructive trust was deemed to have been created.
Josephine B. Belcodero vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 89667, October 20, 1993
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Paramour named in certificate of title is not deemed owner where lawful heirs
stand to be deprived.
The paramour cannot be deemed owner to half of the property just because its
title was registered in her name and that of the husband because the heirs of the lawful
pre-existing marriage stand to be deprived. A certificate of title under the Torrens
system is aimed to protect dominion, and should certainly not be turned into an
instrument for deprivation of ownership.
Marino Adriano vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124118, March 27, 2000
Even if it is only the man who works, the property acquired during the
man-and-wife relationship belongs to the two of them through a fifty-fifty sharing.
The formation of an informal civil partnership between a man and wife not
legally married and their corresponding right to an equal share in properties acquired
through their joint efforts and industry during cohabitation was recognized through
decisions of the Supreme Court. With the enactment of the new Civil Code, Article
144 codified the law established through judicial precedents but with the modification
that the property governed by the rules on co-ownership may be acquired by either or
both of them through their work or industry. Even if it is only the man who works, the
property acquired during the man-and-wife relationship belongs through a fifty-fifty
sharing to the two of them. This provision recognizes that it would be unjust and
abnormal if a woman who is a wife in all aspects of the relationship except for the
requirement of a valid marriage must abandon her home and children, neglect her
traditional household duties, and go out to earn a living or engage in business before
the rules on co-ownership would apply.
Margaret Maxey vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-45870, May 11, 1984
Common-law wife must show that she really contributed to the acquisition of the
property during cohabitation.
The creation of the civil relationship envisaged in Article 144 is circumscribed
by conditions, the existence of which must first be shown before rights provided
thereunder may be deemed to accrue. One such condition is that there must be a clear
showing that the common-law wife had, during cohabitation, really contributed to the
acquisition of the property involved.
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Teresita C. Yaptinchay vs. Hon. Guillermo E. Torres, G.R. No. L-26462, June 9, 1969
A woman’s “real contribution” refers to her contribution to the family’s material
and spiritual goods.
"Real contribution" to the acquisition of property must include not only the
earnings of a woman from a profession, occupation, or business but also her
contribution to the family's material and spiritual goods through caring for the
children, administering the household, husbanding scarce resources, freeing her
husband from household tasks, and otherwise performing the traditional duties of a
housewife.
Margaret Maxey vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-45870, May 11, 1984
The woman traditionally holds the family purse even if she does not contribute to
filling that purse with funds.
The provisions of the Civil Code are premised on the traditional and existing,
the normal and customary gender roles of Filipino men and women. No matter how
large the income of a working wife compared to that of her husband, the major, if not
the full responsibility of running the household remains with the woman. She is the
administrator of the household. Even if the couple was not legally married, such fact
does not change the nature of their respective roles. It is the woman who traditionally
holds the family purse even if she does not contribute to filling that purse with funds.
Margaret Maxey vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-45870, May 11, 1984
There must be evidence that the woman actually contributed to the acquisition of
property.
Although in cases of common-law relations where an impediment to marry
exists, equity would dictate that property acquired by the man and woman through
their joint endeavor should be allocated to each of them in proportion to their
respective efforts, there must be evidence that the woman actually contributed to the
acquisition of the property in question.
Marino Adriano vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124118, March 27, 2000
Common-law couple with legal impediment to marry, own proportionately the
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property acquired by them in common.
When a common-law couple have a legal impediment to marriage, only the
property acquired by them — through their actual joint contribution of money,
property or industry — shall be owned by them in common and in proportion to their
respective contributions.
Milagros Joaquino vs. Lourdes Reyes, G.R. No. 154645, July 13, 2004
Wives in marriages celebrated subsequent to a valid marriage are not precluded
from proving that property acquired during their cohabitation with their Muslim
husband, is their exclusive property, respectively.
Co-ownership provided in Article 144 of the Civil Code requires that the man
and woman living together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or
under a void marriage must not in any way be incapacitated to marry. Therefore, the
co-ownership contemplated in this provision cannot apply to Hadji Abdula's marriages
celebrated subsequent to a valid and legally existing marriage, since from the point of
view of the Civil Code Hadji Abdula is not capacitated to marry. However, the wives
in such marriages are not precluded from proving that property acquired during their
cohabitation with Hadji Abdula is their exclusive property, respectively. Absent such
proof, however, the presumption is that property acquired during the subsistence of a
valid marriage — and in the Civil Code, there can only be one validly-existing
marriage at any given time — is conjugal property of such subsisting marriage.
Neng "Kagui Kadiguia" Malang vs. Corocoy Moson, G.R. No. 119064, August 22, 2000
Although Article 129 provides for the procedure in case of dissolution of the
conjugal partnership regime, Article 147 specifically covers the effects of void
marriages on the spouses' property relations.
Barrido v. Nonato, G.R. No. 176492, October 20, 2014
The applicable law . . . in so far as the liquidation of the conjugal partnership assets
and liability is concerned, is Article 129 of the Family Code in relation to Article 147
of the Family Code.
Ocampo v. Ocampo, G.R. No. 198908, August 3, 2015
The Court held that in a void marriage, as in those declared void under Article 36
of the Family Code, the property relations of the parties during the period of
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cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code.
Article 147 of the Family Code applies to union of parties who are legally capacitated
and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is
nonetheless void, as in this case.
Ocampo v. Ocampo, G.R. No. 198908, August 3, 2015
This particular kind of co-ownership applies when a man and a woman, suffering
no illegal impediment to marry each other, exclusively live together as husband and
wife under a void marriage or without the benefit of marriage. It is clear, therefore,
that for Article 147 to operate, the man and the woman: (1) must be capacitated to
marry each other; (2) live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and (3)
their union is without the benefit of marriage or their marriage is void. . . . The term
"capacitated" in the first paragraph of the provision pertains to the legal capacity of a
party to contract marriage.
Barrido v. Nonato, G.R. No. 176492, October 20, 2014
Ocampo v. Ocampo, G.R. No. 198908, August 3, 2015
Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through their work
and industry shall be governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any property
acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their
joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall be
considered as having contributed to the same jointly if said party's efforts consisted in
the care and maintenance of the family household. Efforts in the care and maintenance
of the family and household are regarded as contributions to the acquisition of
common property by one who has no salary or income or work or industry.
Barrido v. Nonato, G.R. No. 176492, October 20, 2014
Ocampo v. Ocampo, G.R. No. 198908, August 3, 2015
The rules which are set up to govern the liquidation of either the absolute
community or the conjugal partnership of gains, the property regimes recognized for
valid and voidable marriages, are irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-ownership that
exists between common-law spouses or spouses of void marriages.
Barrido v. Nonato, G.R. No. 176492, October 20, 2014
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Art. 148 - Cohabitation
Cohabitation means more than sexual intercourse.
Art. 148 applies to cohabitation amounting to adultery or concubinage.
Administration of property during cohabitation does not amount to contribution in its
acquisition.
Co-ownership exists even if the couple are not capacitated to marry each other.
However, a foreigner cannot recover real properties purchased in the name of his Filipina
partner.
Wages and contributions in the form of care of the home and children are excluded in this
regime.
No co-ownership exists if actual contribution of a party is not proved.
Co-ownership is up to the extent of the proven actual contribution of money, property or
industry.
Art. 148 governs even if cohabitation or acquisition of property occurred before effectivity
of Family Code.
Cohabitation, no matter how long, does not sever the tie of a subsisting previous marriage.
Paramour is deemed to hold property in trust for the legal spouse and compulsory heirs.
Cohabitation means more than sexual intercourse.
The term "cohabitation" or "living together as husband and wife" means not
only residing under one roof, but also having repeated sexual intercourse.
Cohabitation, of course, means more than sexual intercourse, especially when one of
the parties is already old and may no longer be interested in sex. At the very least,
cohabitation is the public assumption by a man and a woman of the marital relation,
and dwelling together as man and wife, thereby holding themselves out to the public
as such. Secret meetings or nights clandestinely spent together, even if often repeated,
do not constitute such kind of cohabitation; they are merely meretricious. In this
jurisdiction, this Court has considered as sufficient proof of common-law relationship
the stipulations between the parties, a conviction of concubinage, or the existence of
illegitimate children.
Cirila Arcaba vs. Erlinda Tabancura vda. de Batocael, G.R. No. 146683, November 22,
2001
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Art. 148 applies to cohabitation amounting to adultery or concubinage.
The Family Code has filled the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code by
expressly regulating in its Article 148 the property relations of couples living in a state
of adultery or concubinage.
Guillerma Tumlos vs. Mario Fernandez, G.R. No. 137650, April 12, 2000
Administration of property during cohabitation does not amount to contribution in
its acquisition.
Nothing in Article 148 of the Family Code provides that the administration of
the property amounts to a contribution in its acquisition.
Guillerma Tumlos vs. Mario Fernandez, G.R. No. 137650, April 12, 2000
Co-ownership exists even if the couple are not capacitated to marry each other.
It was error for the trial court to rule that, because the parties in this case were
not capacitated to marry each other at the time that they were alleged to have been
living together, they could not have owned properties in common. The Family Code,
in addition to providing that a co-ownership exists between a man and a woman who
live together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, likewise provides
that, if the parties are incapacitated to marry each other, properties acquired by them
through their joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by them
in common in proportion to their contributions which, in the absence of proof to the
contrary, is presumed to be equal. There is thus co-ownership even though the couple
are not capacitated to marry each other.
Eustaquio Mallilin vs. Ma. Elvira Castillo, G.R. No. 136803, June 16, 2000
Article 148 of the Family Code refers to the property regime of bigamous
marriages, adulterous relationships, relationships in a state of concubinage,
relationships where both man and woman are married to other persons and to
multiple alliances of the same married man.
Susan Nicdao Cariño vs. Susan Yee Cariño, G.R. No. 132529, February 2, 2001
However, a foreigner cannot recover real properties purchased in the name of his
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Filipina partner.
Even if it is assumed gratia arguendi that the respondent and the petitioner
were capacitated to marry, the petitioner, a German citizen, is still disqualified to own
the properties in tandem with the respondent. The sale of parcels of land in favor of a
foreigner is illegal per se. The transactions are void ab initio because they were
entered into in violation of the Constitution. Thus, to allow the petitioner to recover
the properties or the money used in the purchase of the parcels of land would be
subversive of public policy.
Alfred Fritz Frenzel vs. Ederlina P. Catito, G.R. No. 143958, July 11, 2003
Wages and contributions in the form of care of the home and children are excluded
in this regime.
In this property regime, the properties acquired by the parties through their
actual joint contribution shall belong to the co-ownership. Wages and salaries earned
by each party belong to him or her exclusively. Then too, contributions in the form of
care of the home, children and household, or spiritual or moral inspiration, are
excluded in this regime. plpecdtai
Susan Nicdao Cariño vs. Susan Yee Cariño, G.R. No. 132529, February 2, 2001
No co-ownership exists if actual contribution of a party is not proved.
a) Actual contribution is required by this provision, in contrast to Article 147
which states that efforts in the care and maintenance of the family and household are
regarded as contributions to the acquisition of common property by one who has no
salary or income or work or industry. If the actual contribution of the party is not
proved, there will be no co-ownership and no presumption of equal shares.
Erlinda A. Agapay vs. Carlina V. Palang, G.R. No. 116668, July 28, 1997
b) A reading of Article 148 readily shows that there must be proof of "actual
joint contribution" by both the live-in partners before the property becomes co-owned
by them in proportion to their contribution. The presumption of equality of
contribution arises only in the absence of proof of their proportionate contributions,
subject to the condition that actual joint contribution is proven first. Simply put, proof
of actual contribution by both parties is required, otherwise there is no co-ownership
and no presumption of equal sharing.
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Procopio Villanueva vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 143286, April 14, 2004
Co-ownership is up to the extent of the proven actual contribution of money,
property or industry.
a) The regime of limited co-ownership of property governing the union of
parties who are not legally capacitated to marry each other, but who nonetheless live
together as husband and wife, applies to properties acquired during said cohabitation
in proportion to their respective contributions. Co-ownership will only be up to the
extent of the proven actual contribution of money, property or industry. Absent proof
of the extent thereof, their contributions and corresponding shares shall be presumed
to be equal.
Jacinto Saguid vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 150611, June 10, 2003
b) When a common-law couple have a legal impediment to marriage, only
the property acquired by them — through their actual joint contribution of money,
property or industry — shall be owned by them in common and in proportion to their
respective contributions.
Milagros Joaquino vs. Lourdes Reyes, G.R. No. 154645, July 13, 2004
Art. 148 governs even if cohabitation or acquisition of property occurred before
effectivity of Family Code.
Although the adulterous cohabitation of the parties commenced in 1987, which
is before the date of the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1998, Article 148
thereof applies because this provision was intended precisely to fill up the hiatus in
Article 144 of the Civil Code. Before Article 148 of the Family Code was enacted,
there was no provision governing property relations of couples living in a state of
adultery or concubinage. Hence, even if the cohabitation or the acquisition of the
property occurred before the Family Code took effect, Article 148 governs.
Jacinto Saguid vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 150611, June 10, 2003
Lupo Atienza vs. Yolanda de Castro, G.R. No. 169698, November 29, 2006
Cohabitation, no matter how long, does not sever the tie of a subsisting previous
marriage.
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The cohabitation of a spouse with another person, even for a long period, does
not sever the tie of a subsisting previous marriage; otherwise, the law would be giving
a stamp of approval to an act that is both illegal and immoral.. Hence, all property
acquired from the date of the previous marriage, until the date of the other spouse’s
death, are still presumed conjugal.
Procopio Villanueva vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 143286, April 14, 2004
Paramour is deemed to hold property in trust for the legal spouse and compulsory
heirs.
The registration of the property in paramour's name was clearly designed to
deprive the husband's legal spouse and compulsory heirs of ownership. By operation
of law, the paramour is deemed to hold the property in trust for them. Therefore, she
cannot rely on the registration in repudiation of the trust, for this case is a well-known
exception to the principle of conclusiveness of a certificate of title.
Milagros Joaquino vs. Lourdes Reyes, G.R. No. 154645, July 13, 2004
Art. 151 - Suit between family members
When a stranger becomes a party to the suit, the law law no longer requires earnest efforts
towards a compromise.
Conditions precedent may be generally averred in the pleadings.
A barangay certification complies with the condition precedent established in Art. 151.
Trial court should order amendment of complaint if there is failure to comply with
condition precedent.
Barangay conciliation is not required where there is deprivation of liberty.
When a stranger becomes a party to the suit, the law law no longer requires
earnest efforts towards a compromise.
[O]nce a stranger becomes a party to a suit involving members of the same family,
the law no longer makes it a condition precedent that earnest efforts be made towards
a compromise before the action can prosper.
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Hiyas Savings and Loan Bank, Inc. vs. Edmundo T. cuña, et al., G.R. No. 154132,
August 31, 2006
Conditions precedent may be generally averred in the pleadings.
The attempt to compromise as well as its failure or inability to succeed is a
condition precedent to the filing of a suit between members of the same family. Rule
8, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that conditions precedent
may be generally averred in the pleadings. While it is true that the lead sentence which
reads "Earnest efforts towards have been made but the same have failed" may be
incomplete or even grammatically incorrect as there might be a missing word or
phrase, a lacking word like "compromise" could be supplied by the rest of the
paragraph.
Sps. Manuel and Rosemarie Wee vs. Rosario D. Galvez, G.R. No. 147394, August 11,
2004
A barangay certification complies with the condition precedent established in Art.
151.
Although the petition for habeas corpus failed to allege that compromise
proceedings were resorted to, the attachment of a Barangay Certification effectively
established that the parties tried to compromise but were unsuccessful in their efforts.
Evidently, the condition precedent under Article 151 of the Family Code has been
complied with. A dismissal under Section 1(j) of Rule 16 is warranted only if there is
a failure to comply with a condition precedent. Given that the alleged defect is a mere
failure to allege compliance with a condition precedent, the proper solution is not an
outright dismissal of the action, but an amendment under Section 1 of Rule 10 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Edwin N. Tribiana vs. Lourdes M. Tribiana, G.R. No. 137359, September 13, 2004
Trial court should order amendment of complaint if there is failure to comply with
condition precedent.
Failure of a party to comply with a condition precedent is not a jurisdictional
defect. Such defect does not place the controversy beyond the court’s power to
resolve. If a party fails to raise such defect in a motion to dismiss, such defect is
deemed waived. Such defect is curable by amendment as a matter of right without
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leave of court, if made before the filing of a responsive pleading. A motion to dismiss
is not a responsive pleading. More importantly, an amendment alleging compliance
with a condition precedent is not a jurisdictional matter. Neither does it alter the cause
of action of a petition for habeas corpus. We have held that in cases where the defect
consists of the failure to state compliance with a condition precedent, the trial court
should order the amendment of the complaint. Courts should be liberal in allowing
amendments to pleadings to avoid multiplicity of suits and to present the real
controversies between the parties.
Edwin N. Tribiana vs. Lourdes M. Tribiana, G.R. No. 137359, September 13, 2004
Barangay conciliation is not required where there is deprivation of liberty.
The barangay conciliation requirement in Section 412 of the Local Government
Code does not apply to habeas corpus proceedings where a person is "deprived of
personal liberty." In such a case, Section 412 expressly authorizes the parties "to go
directly to court" without need of any conciliation proceedings. There is deprivation
of personal liberty warranting a petition for habeas corpus where the "rightful custody
of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto."
Edwin N. Tribiana vs. Lourdes M. Tribiana, G.R. No. 137359, September 13, 2004
[A] failure to allege earnest but failed efforts at a compromise in a complaint
among members of the same family, is not a jurisdictional defect but merely a defect
in the statement of a cause of action.
Heirs of Favis, Sr. v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 185922, January 15, 2014
Indeed, even if we go by the reason behind Article 151 of the Family Code, which
provision as then Article 222 of the New Civil Code was described as "having been
given more teeth" by Section 1 (j), Rule 16 of the Rule of Court, it is safe to say that
the purpose of making sure that there is no longer any possibility of a compromise,
has been served. As cited in commentaries on Article 151 of the Family Code —
This rule is introduced because it is difficult to imagine a sudden and
more tragic spectacle than a litigation between members of the same family. It
is necessary that every effort should be made towards a compromise before a
litigation is allowed to breed hate and passion in the family. It is known that a
lawsuit between close relatives generates deeper bitterness than between
strangers.
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Heirs of Favis, Sr. v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 185922, January 15, 2014
Art. 152 - Family home
Reason for exemption from execution of the family home.
Provisions on "family home" remain effective regardless of couple's property regime.
There is no more need to constitute a family home judicially or extrajudicially.
However, Article 152 of the Family Code has no retroactive effect
When family home not exempt from execution of money judgment.
"Actual" occupancy by owner or beneficiaries excludes maids and overseer.
Reason for exemption from execution of the family home.
It has been said that the family home is a real right that is gratuitous,
inalienable and free from attachment. The great controlling purpose and policy of the
Constitution is the protection or the preservation of the homestead — the dwelling
place. A houseless, homeless population is a burden upon the energy, industry, and
morals of the community to which it belongs. No greater calamity, not tainted with
crime, can befall a family than to be expelled from the roof under which it has been
gathered and sheltered. The family home cannot be seized by creditors except in
special cases. The nature and character of the property that debtors may claim to be
exempt, however, are determined by the exemption statute. The exemption is limited
to the particular kind of property or the specific articles prescribed by the statute; the
exemption cannot exceed the statutory limit.
Eulogio v. Bell, Sr., G.R. No. 186322, July 8, 2015
Provisions on "family home" remain effective regardless of couple's property
regime.
The provisions of the Family Code on the "family home," i.e., the provisions
found in Title V, Chapter 2, of the Family Code, remain in force and effect regardless
of the property regime of the spouses.
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Antonio A.S. Valdes vs. RTC, Br. 102, Quezon City, G.R. No. 122749, July 31, 1996
There is no more need to constitute a family home judicially or extrajudicially.
Under the Family Code, a family home is deemed constituted on a house and
lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence. There is no need to constitute
the same judicially or extrajudicially as required in the Civil Code. In the present case,
the residential house and lot of petitioner was not constituted as a family home
whether judicially or extrajudicially under the Civil Code. It became a family home by
operation of law only under Article 153 of the Family Code. It is deemed constituted
as a family home upon the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 not
August 4, one year after its publication in the Manila Chronicle on August 4, 1987
(1988 being a leap year)
Jose Modequillo vs. Hon. Augusto V. Breva, G.R. No. 86355, May 31, 1990
Two sets of rules are applicable for family homes to be exempted from execution.
For the family home to be exempt from execution, distinction must be made as to
what law applies based on when it was constituted and what requirements must be
complied with by the judgment debtor or his successors claiming such privilege.
Hence, two sets of rules are applicable.
If the family home was constructed before the effectivity of the Family Code or
before August 3, 1988, then it must have been constituted either judicially or
extra-judicially as provided under Articles 225, 229-231 and 233 of the Civil
Code. Judicial constitution of the family home requires the filing of a verified petition
before the courts and the registration of the court's order with the Registry of Deeds of
the area where the property is located. Meanwhile, extrajudicial constitution is
governed by Articles 240 to 242 of the Civil Code and involves the execution of a
public instrument which must also be registered with the Registry of Property. Failure
to comply with either one of these two modes of constitution will bar a judgment
debtor from availing of the privilege.
For family homes constructed after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3,
1988, there is no need to constitute extrajudicially or judicially, and the exemption
is effective from the time it was constituted and lasts as long as any of its beneficiaries
under Art. 154 actually resides therein. Moreover, the family home should belong to
the absolute community or conjugal partnership, or if exclusively by one spouse, its
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constitution must have been with consent of the other, and its value must not exceed
certain amounts depending upon the area where it is located. Further, the debts
incurred for which the exemption does not apply as provided under Art. 155 for which
the family home is made answerable must have been incurred after August 3, 1988.
And in both cases, whether under the Civil Code or the Family Code, it is not
sufficient that the person claiming exemption merely alleges that such property is a
family home. This claim for exemption must be set up and proved.
Juanita Trinidad Ramos, et al. vs. Danilo Pangilinan, et al., G.R. No. 185920, July 20,
2010
The . . . rules on constitution of family homes, for purposes of exemption from
execution, could be summarized as follows:
First, family residences constructed before the effectivity of the Family Code or
before August 3, 1988 must be constituted as a family home either judicially or
extrajudicially in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code in order to be
exempt from execution;
Second, family residences constructed after the effectivity of the Family Code on
August 3, 1988 are automatically deemed to be family homes and thus exempt from
execution from the time it was constituted and lasts as long as any of its beneficiaries
actually resides therein;
Third, family residences which were not judicially or extrajudicially constituted as
a family home prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, but were existing thereafter,
are considered as family homes by operation of law and are prospectively entitled to
the benefits accorded to a family home under the Family Code.
Sps. Ernesto and Araceli de Mesa vs. Sps. Claudio, Jr. and Ma. Rufina Acero, et al.,
G.R. No. 185064, January 16, 2012
However, Article 152 of the Family Code has no retroactive effect
A family residence cannot be considered a family home from the time it was
occupied in 1969. Article 162 of the Family Code does not mean that Articles 152 and
153 of said Code have a retroactive effect such that all existing family residences are
deemed to have been constituted as family homes at the time of their occupation prior
to the effectivity of the Family Code and are exempt from execution for the payment
of obligations incurred before the effectivity of the Family Code. Article 162 simply
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means that all existing family residences at the time of the effectivity of the Family
Code, are considered family homes and are prospectively entitled to the benefits
accorded to a family home under the Family Code. Article 162 does not state that the
provisions of Chapter 2, Title V have a retroactive effect
Jose Modequillo vs. Hon. Augusto V. Breva, G.R. No. 86355, May 31, 1990
Florante F. Manacop vs. Court of Appeals and E & L Mercantile, Inc., G.R. No. 97898.
August 11, 1997
Pablito Taneo, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals and Abdon Gilig, G.R. No. 108532, March 9,
1999
When family home not exempt from execution of money judgment.
A family home is not exempt from execution of money judgment where the
debt or liability which was the basis of the judgment arose or was incurred, and the
money judgment arising therefrom, preceded the effectivity of the Family Code on
August 3, 1988. This case does not fall under the exemptions from execution provided
in the Family Code.
Jose Modequillo vs. Hon. Augusto V. Breva, G.R. No. 86355, May 31, 1990
Florante F. Manacop vs. Court of Appeals & F.F. Cruz & Co., Inc., G.R. No. 104875,
November 13, 1992
"Actual" occupancy by owner or beneficiaries excludes maids and overseers.
The law explicitly provides that occupancy of the family home either by the
owner thereof or by "any of its beneficiaries" must be actual. That which is "actual" is
something real, or actually existing, as opposed to something merely possible, or to
something which is presumptive or constructible. Actual occupancy, however, need
not be by the owner of the house specifically. Rather, the property may be occupied by
the beneficiaries" enumerated by Article 154 of the Family Code. This enumeration
may include the in-laws where the family home is constituted jointly by the husband
and wife. But the law definitely excludes maids and overseers. They are not the
beneficiaries contemplated by the Code.
Florante F. Manacop vs. Court of Appeals and E & L Mercantile, Inc., G.R. No. 97898.
August 11, 1997
Perla G. Patricio vs. Marcelino G. Dario III, et al., G.R. No. 170829, November 20, 2006
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Art. 153 - Advantages of family home
Claim for exemption from execution or forced sale must be set up and proved to the
Sheriff before public auction sale.
While it is true that the family home is constituted on a house and lot from the time
it is occupied as a family residence and is exempt from execution or forced sale under
Article 153 of the Family Code, such claim for exemption should be set up and proved
to the Sheriff before the sale of the property at public auction. Failure to do so would
estop the party from later claiming the exemption.
Jose E. Honrado vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 166333, November 25, 2005
Indeed, the family home is a sacred symbol of family love and is the repository of
cherished memories that last during one's lifetime. It is likewise without dispute that
the family home, from the time of its constitution and so long as any of its
beneficiaries actually resides therein, is generally exempt from execution, forced sale
or attachment. The family home is a real right, which is gratuitous, inalienable and
free from attachment. It cannot be seized by creditors except in certain special cases.
However, this right can be waived or be barred by laches by the failure to set up and
prove the status of the property as a family home at the time of the levy or a
reasonable time thereafter.
Sps. Ernesto and Araceli de Mesa vs. Sps. Claudio, Jr. and Ma. Rufina Acero, et al.,
G.R. No. 185064, January 16, 2012
While it is true that the family home is constituted on a house and lot from the time
it is occupied as a family residence and is exempt from execution or forced sale under
Article 153 of the Family Code, such claim for exemption should be set up and proved
to the Sheriff before the sale of the property at public auction. Failure to do so would
estop the party from later claiming the exemption.
Sps. Charlie and Ofelia Fortaleza vs. Sps. Raul and Rona Lapitan, G.R. No. 178288,
August 15, 2012 citing Honrado vs. Court of Appeals, 512 Phil. 657 (2005)
The settled rule is that the right to exemption or forced sale under Article 153 of
the Family Code is a personal privilege granted to the judgment debtor and as such, it
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must be claimed not by the sheriff, but by the debtor himself before the sale of the
property at public auction. It is not sufficient that the person claiming exemption
merely alleges that such property is a family home. This claim for exemption must be
set up and proved to the Sheriff. . .
Sps. Ernesto and Araceli de Mesa vs. Sps. Claudio, Jr. and Ma. Rufina Acero, et al.,
G.R. No. 185064, January 16, 2012 citing Spouses Versola vs. Court of Appeals, 529
Phil. 377 (2006)
Art. 154 - Beneficiaries of family home
Three requisites must concur to be a beneficiary of the family home.
To be a beneficiary of the family home, three requisites must concur: (1) they must
be among the relationships enumerated in Art. 154 of the Family Code; (2) they live in
the family home; and (3) they are dependent for legal support upon the head of the
family.
Perla G. Patricio vs. Marcelino G. Dario III, et al., G.R. No. 170829, November 20, 2006
Art. 155 - Liabilities of family home
Family home answers for debts incurred prior to its constitution.
Under Article 155 of the Family Code, the family home shall be exempt from
execution, forced sale, or attachment except for, among other things, debts incurred
prior to the constitution of the family home. In the case at bar, the house and lot of
was not constituted as a family home, whether judicially or extrajudicially, at the time
the debts were incurred. Under prevailing jurisprudence, it is deemed constituted as
such only upon the effectivity of the Family Code on 03 August 1988, thus, the debts
were incurred before the constitution of the family home.
Mary Josephine Gomez, et al. vs. Roel Sta. Ines, et al., G.R. No. 132537, October 14,
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2005
Rules have been laid down relative to the levy on execution over the family home.
Kelley, Jr. v. Planters Products, Inc. lays down the rules relative to the levy on
execution over the family home, viz.:
No doubt, a family home is generally exempt from execution provided it was duly
constituted as such. There must be proof that the alleged family home was constituted
jointly by the husband and wife or by an unmarried head of a family. It must be the
house where they and their family actually reside and the lot on which it is situated.
The family home must be part of the properties of the absolute community or the
conjugal partnership, or of the exclusive properties of either spouse with the latter's
consent, or on the property of the unmarried head of the family. The actual value of
the family home shall not exceed, at the time of its constitution, the amount of
P300,000 in urban areas and P200,000 in rural areas.
Under the Family Code, there is no need to constitute the family home judicially or
extrajudicially. All family homes constructed after the effectivity of the Family Code
(August 3, 1988) are constituted as such by operation of law. All existing family
residences as of August 3, 1988 are considered family homes and are prospectively
entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under the Family Code.
The exemption is effective from the time of the constitution of the family home as
such and lasts as long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein. Moreover,
the debts for which the family home is made answerable must have been incurred
after August 3, 1988. Otherwise (that is, if it was incurred prior to August 3, 1988),
the alleged family home must be shown to have been constituted either judicially or
extrajudicially pursuant to the Civil Code.
Juanita Trinidad Ramos, et al. vs. Danilo Pangilinan, et al., G.R. No. 185920, July 20,
2010, citing Kelley, Jr. v. Planters Products, Inc., G.R. No. 172263, July 9, 2008
As a rule, the family home is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment.
However, Article 155 (3) of the Family Code explicitly allows the forced sale of a
family home "for debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such
constitution." . . . While it is true that the family home is constituted on a house and
lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence and is exempt from execution or
forced sale under Article 153 of the Family Code, such claim for exemption should be
set up and proved to the Sheriff before the sale of the property at public auction.
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Failure to do so would estop the party from later claiming the exemption.
Sps. Charlie and Ofelia Fortaleza vs. Sps. Raul and Rona Lapitan, G.R. No. 178288,
August 15, 2012 citing Honrado vs. Court of Appeals, 512 Phil. 657 (2005)
Even though petitioner's property has been constituted as a family home, it is not
exempt from execution. Article 155 of the Family Code explicitly provides that debts
secured by mortgages are exempted from the rule against execution, forced sale, or
attachment of family home. . . Since petitioner's property was voluntarily used by him
as security for a loan he obtained from respondent, it may be subject to execution and
attachment.
Vitug v. Abuda, G.R. No. 201264, January 11, 2016
To summarize, the exemption of the family home from execution, forced sale or
attachment is limited to P300,000 in urban areas and P200,000 in rural areas, unless
those maximum values are adjusted by law. If it is shown, though, that those amounts
do not match the present value of the peso because of currency fluctuations, the
amount of exemption shall be based on the value that is most favorable to the
constitution of a family home. Any amount in excess of those limits can be applied to
the payment of any of the obligations specified in Articles 155 and 160.
Eulogio v. Bell, Sr., G.R. No. 186322, July 8, 2015
Any subsequent improvement or enlargement of the family home by the persons
constituting it, its owners, or any of its beneficiaries will still be exempt from
execution, forced sale or attachment provided the following conditions obtain: (a) the
actual value of the property at the time of its constitution has been determined to fall
below the statutory limit; and (b) the improvement or enlargement does not result in
an increase in its value exceeding the statutory limit. Otherwise, the family home can
be the subject of a forced sale, and any amount above the statutory limit is applicable
to the obligations under Articles 155 and 160. Certainly, the humane considerations
for which the law surrounds the family home with immunities from levy do not
include the intent to enable debtors to thwart the just claims of their creditors.
Eulogio v. Bell, Sr., G.R. No. 186322, July 8, 2015
Art. 159 - Minor beneficiaries of family home
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Three requisites must concur before a minor becomes beneficiary of family home.
Three requisites must concur before a minor beneficiary is entitled to the benefits
of Art. 159: (1) the relationship enumerated in Art. 154 of the Family Code; (2) they
live in the family home, and (3) they are dependent for legal support upon the head of
the family.
Perla G. Patricio vs. Marcelino G. Dario III, et al., G.R. No. 170829, November 20, 2006
Purpose of provision
The purpose of Article 159 is to avert the disintegration of the family unit
following the death of its head. To this end, it preserves the family home as the
physical symbol of family love, security and unity by imposing the following
restrictions on its partition: first, that the heirs cannot extra-judicially partition it for a
period of 10 years from the death of one or both spouses or of the unmarried head of
the family, or for a longer period, if there is still a minor beneficiary residing therein;
and second, that the heirs cannot judicially partition it during the aforesaid periods
unless the court finds compelling reasons therefor. No compelling reason has been
alleged by the parties; nor has the RTC found any compelling reason to order the
partition of the family home, either by physical segregation or assignment to any of
the heirs or through auction sale as suggested by the parties.
More importantly, Article 159 imposes the proscription against the immediate
partition of the family home regardless of its ownership. This signifies that even if the
family home has passed by succession to the co-ownership of the heirs, or has been
willed to any one of them, this fact alone cannot transform the family home into an
ordinary property, much less dispel the protection cast upon it by the law. The rights
of the individual co-owner or owner of the family home cannot subjugate the rights
granted under Article 159 to the beneficiaries of the family home.
Vilma G. Arriola, et al. vs. John Nabor C. Arriola, G.R. No. 177703, January 28, 2008
Art. 160 - Value of the family home
To summarize, the exemption of the family home from execution, forced sale or
attachment is limited to P300,000 in urban areas and P200,000 in rural areas, unless
those maximum values are adjusted by law. If it is shown, though, that those amounts
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do not match the present value of the peso because of currency fluctuations, the
amount of exemption shall be based on the value that is most favorable to the
constitution of a family home. Any amount in excess of those limits can be applied to
the payment of any of the obligations specified in Articles 155 and 160.
Eulogio v. Bell, Sr., G.R. No. 186322, July 8, 2015
Any subsequent improvement or enlargement of the family home by the persons
constituting it, its owners, or any of its beneficiaries will still be exempt from
execution, forced sale or attachment provided the following conditions obtain: (a) the
actual value of the property at the time of its constitution has been determined to fall
below the statutory limit; and (b) the improvement or enlargement does not result in
an increase in its value exceeding the statutory limit. Otherwise, the family home can
be the subject of a forced sale, and any amount above the statutory limit is applicable
to the obligations under Articles 155 and 160. Certainly, the humane considerations
for which the law surrounds the family home with immunities from levy do not
include the intent to enable debtors to thwart the just claims of their creditors.
Eulogio v. Bell, Sr., G.R. No. 186322, July 8, 2015
To warrant the execution sale of respondents' family home under Article 160,
petitioners needed to establish these facts: (1) there was an increase in its actual value;
(2) the increase resulted from voluntary improvements on the property introduced by
the persons constituting the family home, its owners or any of its beneficiaries; and (3)
the increased actual value exceeded the maximum allowed under Article 157.
Eulogio v. Bell, Sr., G.R. No. 186322, July 8, 2015
Art. 164 - Presumption of legitimacy of child
Presumption of legitimacy may be refuted only by evidence of physical
impossibility of access between husband and wife during conception.
The presumption that the child is the legitimate son of the couple becomes
conclusive in the absence of proof that there was physical impossibility of access
between the spouses in the first 120 days of the 300 which preceded the birth of the
child. This presumption is actually quasi-conclusive and may be rebutted or refuted by
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only one evidence — the physical impossibility of access between husband and wife
within the first 120 days of the 300 which preceded the birth of the child. This
presumption of legitimacy is based on the assumption that there is sexual union in
marriage, particularly during the period of conception. Hence, proof of the physical
impossibility of such sexual union prevents the application of the presumption.
Antonio Macadangdang vs. Court of Appeals and Elizabeth Mejias, G.R. No. L-49542,
September 12, 1980
Children born in wedlock are presumed legitimate.
There is perhaps no presumption of the law more firmly established and founded on
sounder morality and more convincing reason than the presumption that children born
in wedlock are legitimate. This presumption indeed becomes conclusive in the
absence of proof that there is physical impossibility of access between the spouses
during the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately precedes the birth of the
child due to (a) the physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual intercourse with
his wife; (b) the fact that the husband and wife are living separately in such way that
sexual intercourse is not possible; or (c) serious illness of the husband, which
absolutely prevents sexual intercourse. Quite remarkably, upon the expiration of the
periods set forth in Article 170, and in proper cases Article 171, of the Family Code
(which took effect on 03 August 1988), the action to impugn the legitimacy of the
child would no longer be legally feasible and the status conferred by the presumption
becomes fixed and unassailable.
Jinkie Christie A. De Jesus, et al. vs. Estate of Decedent Juan Gamboa Dizon, G.R. No.
142877, October 2, 2001
A legitimate child implies a valid marriage.
The term legitimate merely addresses the dependent child's status in relation to
his/her parents. In Angeles v. Maglaya, (G.R. No. 153798, 2 September 2005) we
have expounded on who is a legitimate child, viz.:
A legitimate child is a product of, and, therefore, implies a valid and lawful
marriage. Remove the element of lawful union and there is strictly no legitimate
filiation between parents and child. Article 164 of the Family Code cannot be more
emphatic on the matter: "Children conceived or born during the marriage of the
parents are legitimate".
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Continental Steel Mfg. Corp. vs. Allan S. Montaño, et al., G.R. No. 182836, October 13,
2009
Art. 166 - Grounds for impugning legitimacy of child
Sexual intercourse is presumed where personal access is not disproved.
There must be physical impossibility of access by the husband to the wife to defeat the
presumption of legitimacy.
Impotency is not synonymous with sterility
Advanced tuberculosis does not prevent carnal intercourse.
Person who never became the husband of the child's mother never acquired any right to
impugn the child's legitimacy.
Presumption of legitimacy may be overthrown by proof that there was no access that could
have enabled the husband to father the child.
Presumption of legitimacy is grounded on the policy to protect the innocent offspring from
the odium of illegitimacy.
Sexual intercourse is presumed where personal access is not disproved.
The modern rule is that, in order to overthrow the presumption of legitimacy, it
must be shown beyond reasonable doubt that there was no access as could have
enabled the husband to be the father of the child. Sexual intercourse is to be presumed
where personal access is not disproved, unless such presumption is rebutted by
evidence to the contrary; where sexual intercourse is presumed or proved, the husband
must be taken be the father of the child.
Antonio Macadangdang vs. Court of Appeals and Elizabeth Mejias, G.R. No. L-49542,
September 12, 1980
There must be physical impossibility of access by the husband to the wife to defeat
the presumption of legitimacy.
To defeat the presumption of legitimacy, therefore, there must be physical
impossibility of access by the husband to the wife during the period of conception.
The law expressly refers to physical impossibility. Hence, a circumstance which
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makes sexual relations improbable, cannot defeat the presumption of legitimacy; but it
may be proved as a circumstance to corroborate proof of physical impossibility of
access.
Antonio Macadangdang vs. Court of Appeals and Elizabeth Mejias, G.R. No. L-49542,
September 12, 1980
Impotency is not synonymous with sterility
Impotency being an abnormal condition should not be presumed. The fact that
the deceased was able to produce a specimen of his semen by means of a rubber sac,
commonly called "condom" and a woman, shows conclusively that he was potent.
Impotency is not synonymous with sterility. Impotency is the physical inability to have
sexual intercourse; it is different from sterility. However, even considering the
evidence as to sterility, according to medical jurisprudence, a man may not have
spermatozoa at a certain time, but may have had it previously or may have it
subsequently to the examination.
Probate of the will of the late Faustino Neri San Jose, G.R. No. L-1967, May 28, 1951
Advanced tuberculosis does not prevent carnal intercourse.
Although the husband was already suffering from tuberculosis and his
condition then was so serious that he could hardly move and get up from his bed, his
feet were swollen and his voice hoarse, yet that is no evidence of impotency, nor does
it prevent carnal intercourse. There are cases where persons suffering from this
sickness can do the carnal act even in the most crucial stage because they are more
inclined to sexual intercourse. As an author has said, "the reputation of the
tuberculous towards eroticism (sexual propensity) is probably dependent more upon
confinement to bed than the consequences of the disease."
Mariano Andal vs. Eduvigis Macaraig, G.R. No. L-2474, May 30, 1951
Person who never became the husband of the child's mother never acquired any
right to impugn the child's legitimacy.
Impugning the legitimacy of a child is a strictly personal right of the husband or, in
exceptional cases, his heirs. Since the marriage of petitioner and private respondent
was void from the very beginning, he never became her husband and thus never
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acquired any right to impugn the legitimacy of her child.
Gerardo B. Concepcion vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 123450, August 31, 2005
Presumption of legitimacy may be overthrown by proof that there was no access
that could have enabled the husband to father the child.
The presumption of legitimacy proceeds from the sexual union in marriage,
particularly during the period of conception. To overthrow this presumption on the
basis of Article 166 (1)(b) of the Family Code, it must be shown beyond reasonable
doubt that there was no access that could have enabled the husband to father the child.
Sexual intercourse is to be presumed where personal access is not disproved, unless
such presumption is rebutted by evidence to the contrary. The presumption is
quasi-conclusive and may be refuted only by the evidence of physical impossibility of
coitus between husband and wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days which
immediately preceded the birth of the child. To rebut the presumption, the separation
between the spouses must be such as to make marital intimacy impossible. This may
take place, for instance, when they reside in different countries or provinces and they
were never together during the period of conception. Or, the husband was in prison
during the period of conception, unless it appears that sexual union took place through
the violation of prison regulations.
Gerardo B. Concepcion vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 123450, August 31, 2005
Presumption of legitimacy is grounded on the policy to protect the innocent
offspring from the odium of illegitimacy.
The presumption of legitimacy does not only flow out of a declaration in the statute
but is based on the broad principles of natural justice and the supposed virtue of the
mother. It is grounded on the policy to protect the innocent offspring from the odium
of illegitimacy.
Camelo Cabatania vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 124814, October 21, 2004
In Herrera v. Alba, (499 Phil. 185, 191 (2005)) we stressed that there are four
significant procedural aspects of a traditional paternity action that parties have to face:
a prima facie case, affirmative defenses, presumption of legitimacy, and physical
resemblance between the putative father and the child. We explained that a prima
facie case exists if a woman declares — supported by corroborative proof — that she
had sexual relations with the putative father; at this point, the burden of evidence
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shifts to the putative father. We explained further that the two affirmative defenses
available to the putative father are: (1) incapability of sexual relations with the mother
due to either physical absence or impotency, or (2) that the mother had sexual
relations with other men at the time of conception.
Charles Gotardo vs. Divina Buling, G.R. No. 165166, August 15, 2012
Articles 166 and 170 of the Family Code . . . do not contemplate a situation . . .
where a child is alleged not to be the child of nature or biological child of a
certain couple. Rather, these articles govern a situation where a husband (or his heirs)
denies as his own a child of his wife.
Geronimo v. Santos, G.R. No. 197099, September 28, 2015, citing Benitez-Badua v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 105625, January 24, 1994
Art. 167 - Declaration of mother against child's legitimacy
Reasons for presumption of legitimacy of child despite mother's declaration against
legitimacy.
The law which provides that the child is presumed legitimate although the
mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an
adulteress has been adopted for two solid reasons. First, in a fit of anger or to arouse
jealousy in the husband, the wife may have made this declaration. Second, the article
is established as a guaranty in favor of the children whose condition should not be
under the mercy of the passions of their parents. The husband whose honor if
offended, that is, being aware of his wife's adultery, may obtain from the guilty spouse
by means of coercion, a confession against the legitimacy of the child which may
really be only a confession of her guilt. Or the wife, out of vengeance and spite, may
declare the child as not her husband's although the statement be false. But there is
another reason which is more powerful, demanding the exclusion of proof of
confession or adultery, and it is, that at the moment of conception, it cannot be
determined when a woman cohabits during the same period with two men, by whom
the child was begotten, it being possible that it be the husband himself.
Antonio Macadangdang vs. Court of Appeals and Elizabeth Mejias, G.R. No. L-49542,
September 12, 1980
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It is stressed that Felicidad's declaration against the legitimate status of Teofilo II is
the very act that is proscribed by Article 167 of the Family Code. The language of the
law is unmistakable. An assertion by the mother against the legitimacy of her child
cannot affect the legitimacy of a child born or conceived within a valid marriage.
Juan De Dios Carlos vs. Felicidad Sandoval, et al., G.R. No. 179922, December 16,
2008
Art. 170 - Period to impugn legitimacy of child
Article 263 [now Art. 170 of the Family Code] refers to an action to impugn the
legitimacy of a child, to assert and prove that a person is not a man's child by his wife.
However, the present case is not one impugning petitioner's legitimacy. Respondents
are asserting not merely that petitioner is not a legitimate child of Jose, but that she is
not a child of Jose at all.
Aguilar v. Siasat, G.R. No. 200169, January 28, 2015, citing Labagala v. Santiago, 422
Phil. 699, 708 (2001)
Articles 166 and 170 of the Family Code . . . do not contemplate a situation . . .
where a child is alleged not to be the child of nature or biological child of a
certain couple. Rather, these articles govern a situation where a husband (or his heirs)
denies as his own a child of his wife.
Geronimo v. Santos, G.R. No. 197099, September 28, 2015, citing Benitez-Badua v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 105625, January 24, 1994
Art. 171 - Heirs of husband may impugn legitimacy of child
Art. 171 applies where a husband denies as his own, a child of his wife.
Art. 171 applies only when the child is the undisputed offspring of the mother.
Legitimacy of a child can be impugned only in a direct action.
There is no presumption of legitimacy in favor of children born out of husband's
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cohabitation with another woman.
Sexual intercourse is presumed where personal access is not disproved.
There must be physical impossibility of access by the husband to the wife to defeat the
presumption of legitimacy.
Only the husband can contest the legitimacy of a child born to his wife
The heirs of the husband may also repudiate the filiation of a child.
The husband’s heirs are allowed to contest a child’s legitimacy only in exceptional cases.
Art. 171 applies where a husband denies as his own, a child of his wife.
Articles 164, 166, 170 and 171 of the Family Code govern a situation where a
husband (or his heirs) denies as his own, a child of his wife. It is inapplicable to a case
which is not an action to impugn the legitimacy of a child, but an action to claim
inheritance as legal heirs of private respondents’ childless deceased aunt.
Marissa Benitez-Badua vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 105625, January 24, 1994
Art. 171 applies only when the child is the undisputed offspring of the mother.
Article 171 of the Family Code applies only to instances in which the father
impugns the legitimacy of his wife's child. It, however, presupposes that the child was
the undisputed offspring of the mother.
Teofista Babiera vs. Presentacion B. Catotal, G.R. No. 138493, June 15, 2000
Legitimacy of a child can be impugned only in a direct action.
It is settled that the legitimacy of the child can be impugned only in a direct
action brought for that purpose, by the proper parties and within the period limited by
law.
William Liyao, Jr. vs. Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao, G.R. No. 138961, March 7, 2002
[P]roof of legitimacy under Article 172, or illegitimacy under Article 175,
should only be raised in a direct and separate action instituted to prove the filiation of
a child. . . . . however, . . . this procedural rule is applicable only to actions where the
legitimacy — or illegitimacy — of a child is at issue.
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Geronimo v. Santos, G.R. No. 197099, September 28, 2015
When petitioner alleged that respondent is not a child of the deceased spouses .
. . jurisprudence shows that the trial court was correct in admitting and ruling on the
secondary evidence of respondent — even if such proof is similar to the evidence
admissible under the second paragraph of Article 172 and despite the instant case not
being a direct action to prove one's filiation.
Geronimo v. Santos, G.R. No. 197099, September 28, 2015
There is no presumption of legitimacy in favor of children born out of husband's
cohabitation with another woman.
Once a valid marriage is established, it is deemed to continue until proof that it
has been legally ended is presented. Thus, the mere cohabitation of the husband with
another woman will not give rise to a presumption of legitimacy in favor of the
children born of the second union, until and unless there be convincing proof that the
first marriage had been lawfully terminated; and the second, lawfully entered into.
Voltaire Arbolario vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 129163, April 22, 2003
Sexual intercourse is presumed where personal access is not disproved.
The modern rule is that, in order to overthrow the presumption of legitimacy, it
must be shown beyond reasonable doubt that there was no access as could have
enabled the husband to be the father of the child. Sexual intercourse is to be presumed
where personal access is not disproved, unless such presumption is rebutted by
evidence to the contrary; where sexual intercourse is presumed or proved, the husband
must be taken be the father of the child.
Antonio Macadangdang vs. Court of Appeals and Elizabeth Mejias, G.R. No. L-49542,
September 12, 1980
There must be physical impossibility of access by the husband to the wife to defeat
the presumption of legitimacy.
To defeat the presumption of legitimacy, therefore, there must be physical
impossibility of access by the husband to the wife during the period of conception.
The law expressly refers to physical impossibility. Hence, a circumstance which
makes sexual relations improbable, cannot defeat the presumption of legitimacy; but it
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may be proved as a circumstance to corroborate proof of physical impossibility of
access.
Antonio Macadangdang vs. Court of Appeals and Elizabeth Mejias, G.R. No. L-49542,
September 12, 1980
Only the husband can contest the legitimacy of a child born to his wife
Only the husband can contest the legitimacy of a child born to his wife. He is
the one directly confronted with the scandal and ridicule which the infidelity of his
wife produces; and he should decide whether to conceal that infidelity or expose it, in
view of the moral or economic interest involved.
Antonio Macadangdang vs. Court of Appeals and Elizabeth Mejias, G.R. No. L-49542,
September 12, 1980
The heirs of the husband may also repudiate the filiation of a child.
The right to repudiate or contest the legitimacy of a child born in wedlock
belongs only to the alleged father, who is the husband of the mother and can be
exercised only by him or his heirs, within a fixed time, and in certain cases, and only
in a direct suit brought for the purpose.
Antonio Macadangdang vs. Court of Appeals and Elizabeth Mejias, G.R. No. L-49542,
September 12, 1980
The husband’s heirs are allowed to contest a child’s legitimacy only in exceptional
cases.
Impugning the legitimacy of the child is a strictly personal right of the husband,
or in exceptional cases, his heirs for the simple reason that he is the one directly
confronted with the scandal and ridicule which the infidelity of his wife produces and
he should be the one to decide whether to conceal that infidelity or expose it in view
of the moral and economic interest involved. It is only in exceptional cases that his
heirs are allowed to contest such legitimacy. Outside of these cases, none — even his
heirs — can impugn legitimacy; that would amount to an insult to his memory.
William Liyao, Jr. vs. Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao, G.R. No. 138961, March 7, 2002
But definitely, the mere registration of a child in his or her birth certificate
as the child of the supposed parents is not a valid adoption, does not confer upon
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the child the status of an adopted child and the legal rights of such child, and even
amounts to simulation of the child's birth or falsification of his or her birth certificate,
which is a public document.
Furthermore, it is well-settled that a record of birth is merely a prima facie
evidence of the facts contained therein. It is not conclusive evidence of the
truthfulness of the statements made there by the interested parties.
Geronimo v. Santos, G.R. No. 197099, September 28, 2015, citing Rivera v. Heirs of
Romualdo Villanueva, 528 Phil. 570, 578 (2006)
Art. 172 - Proof of filiation of legitimate children
Unmistakable acts of recognition tending to prove filiation.
Illegitimate filiation may be established in the same way and on the same evidence as
legitimate children.
Filiation may be proved by other means allowed under the Rules of Court and special
laws.
Requisites to establish “open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate
child.”
An illegitimate child may establish filiation through act or declaration about pedigree.
Evidence of filiation is admissible only if presented during alleged father's lifetime.
Mere cohabitation of husband with another will not give rise to presumption of legitimacy
in favor of children born of the second union.
Courts should not hesitate to rule on admissibility of DNA evidence.
Proof of filiation to determine citizenship should be independent from proof for civil law
purposes.
Recognition of illegitimate children has been increasingly liberalized in favor of child's
greater interest and welfare.
Filiation must be settled in special proceedings, not in an action for recovery of property.
A child cannot choose his own filiation.
Legitimate filiation of a child cannot depend on the declaration of the attending physician,
midwife or mother.
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Unmistakable acts of recognition tending to prove filiation.
During his lifetime, the father acted in such a manner as to evince his intent to
recognize Ma. Theresa Alberto as his flesh and blood, first, by allowing her from birth
to use his family name; second, by giving her and her mother sums of money by way
of support and lastly, by openly introducing her to members of his family, relatives
and friends as his daughter. Supplementing such unmistakable acts of recognition
were those of his kin and gangmates manifesting open acceptance of such
relationship. Taken altogether, the claimed filiation would be hard to disprove.
Ma. Theresa R. Alberto vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 86639, June 2, 1994
Illegitimate filiation may be established in the same way and on the same evidence
as legitimate children.
Articles 276, 277, 278, 279 and 280 of the Civil Code of the Philippines were
repealed by the Family Code, which now allows the establishment of illegitimate
filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children (Art. 175).
Of interest is that Article 172 of the Family Code adopts the rule in Article 283 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines, that filiation may be proven by "any evidence or proof
that the defendant is his father."
Bienvenido Rodriguez vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 85723, June 19, 1995
Filiation may be proved by other means allowed under the Rules of Court and
special laws.
Although a baptismal certificate is indeed not a conclusive proof of filiation, it
is one of "the other means allowed under the Rules of Court and special laws" to show
pedigree. An illegitimate child is allowed to establish his claimed filiation by 'any
other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws,' according to the Civil
Code, or 'by evidence of proof in his favor that the defendant is her father,' according
to the Family Code. Such evidence may consist of his baptismal certificate, a judicial
admission, a family Bible in which his name has been entered, common reputation
respecting his pedigree, admission by silence, the testimony of witnesses, and other
kinds of proof admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
Arturio Trinidad vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118904, April 20, 1998
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Requisites to establish “open and continuous possession of the status of an
illegitimate child.”
a) To establish "the open and continuous possession of the status of an
illegitimate child," it is necessary to comply with certain jurisprudential requirements.
"Continuous" does not mean that the concession of status shall continue forever but
only that it shall not be of an intermittent character while it continues. The possession
of such status means that the father has treated the child as his own, directly and not
through others, spontaneously and without concealment though without publicity
(since the relation is illegitimate). There must be a showing of the permanent intention
of the supposed father to consider the child as his own, by continuous and clear
manifestation of paternal affection and care.
Casimiro Mendoza vs. Court of Appeals and Teopista Toring Tuñacao, G.R. No. 86302,
September 24, 1991
b) To prove open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate
child, there must be evidence of the manifestation of the permanent intention of the
supposed father to consider the child as his, by continuous and clear manifestations of
parental affection and care, which cannot be attributed to pure charity. Such acts must
be of such a nature that they reveal not only the conviction of paternity, but also the
apparent desire to have and treat the child as such in all relations in society and in life,
not accidentally, but continuously. This standard of proof is founded on the principle
that an order for recognition and support may create an unwholesome atmosphere or
may be an irritant in the family or lives of the parties, so that it must be issued only if
paternity or filiation is established by clear and convincing evidence.
Francisco L. Jison vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124853, February 24, 1998
An illegitimate child may establish filiation through act or declaration about
pedigree.
An illegitimate child is allowed to establish his claimed filiation by "any other
means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws," according to the Civil Code,
or "by evidence or proof in his favor that the defendant is her father," according to the
Family Code. In light of Rule 130, Section 39 of the Rules of Court, the following
requisites have to be complied with before the act or declaration regarding pedigree
may be admitted in evidence:
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1. The declarant is dead or unable to testify.
2. The pedigree must be in issue.
3. The declarant must be a relative of the person whose pedigree is in issue.
4. The declaration must be made before the controversy arose.
5. The relationship between the declarant and the person whose pedigree is
in question must be shown by evidence other than such declaration.
Casimiro Mendoza vs. Court of Appeals and Teopista Toring Tuñacao, G.R. No. 86302,
September 24, 1991
Evidence of filiation is admissible only if presented during alleged father's lifetime.
Private respondent can no longer be allowed at this time to introduce evidence
of his open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child or prove
his alleged filiation through any of the means allowed by the Rules of Court or special
laws. The simple reason is that the alleged father is already dead and can no longer be
heard on the claim of his alleged son's illegitimate filiation.
Dorotea Uyguangco vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 76873, October 26, 1989
Mere cohabitation of husband with another will not give rise to presumption of
legitimacy in favor of children born of the second union.
Paternity or filiation, or the lack of it, is a relationship that must be judicially
established. It stands to reason that children born within wedlock are legitimate.
Failure to prove the fact or presumption of marriage between parents cannot give rise
to a presumption of legitimacy in favor of the children. Once a valid marriage is
established, it is deemed to continue until proof that it has been legally ended is
presented. Thus, the mere cohabitation of the husband with another woman will not
give rise to a presumption of legitimacy in favor of the children born of the second
union, until and unless there be convincing proof that the first marriage had been
lawfully terminated; and the second, lawfully entered into.
Voltaire Arbolario vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 129163, April 22, 2003
Courts should not hesitate to rule on admissibility of DNA evidence.
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a) Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods unless we
adopt the modern and scientific ways available. Fortunately, we have now the facility
and expertise in using DNA test for identification and parentage testing. The
University of the Philippines Natural Science Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA
Analysis Laboratory has now the capability to conduct DNA typing using short
tandem repeat (STR) analysis. The analysis is based on the fact that the DNA of a
child/person has two (2) copies, one copy from the mother and the other from the
father. The DNA from the mother, the alleged father and the child are analyzed to
establish parentage. Of course, being a novel scientific technique, the use of DNA test
as evidence is still open to challenge. Eventually, as the appropriate case comes,
courts should not hesitate to rule on the admissibility of DNA evidence. For it was
said, that courts should apply the results of science when completely obtained in aid of
situations presented, since to reject said result is to deny progress."
Edgardo and Bienvenida Tijing vs. Court of Appeals and Angelita Diamante, G.R. No.
125901, March 8, 2001
b) In case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to satisfactory
establish or would be difficult to obtain, DNA testing, which examines genetic codes
obtained from body cells of the illegitimate child and any physical residue of the long
dead parent could be resorted to. A positive match would clear up filiation or
paternity.
Maria Jeanette C. Tecson vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 161434, March 3, 2004
Proof of filiation to determine citizenship should be independent from proof for
civil law purposes.
The proof of filiation or paternity for purposes of determining citizenship status
should be deemed independent from and not inextricably tied up with that prescribed
for civil law purposes. The Civil Code or Family Code provisions on proof of filiation
or paternity, although good law, do not have preclusive effects on matters alien to
personal and family relations.
Maria Jeanette C. Tecson vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 161434, March 3, 2004
Recognition of illegitimate children has been increasingly liberalized in favor of
child's greater interest and welfare.
The growing trend to liberalize the acknowledgment or recognition of
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illegitimate children is an attempt to break away from the traditional idea of keeping
well apart legitimate and non-legitimate relationships within the family in favor of the
greater interest and welfare of the child. The provisions are intended to merely govern
the private and personal affairs of the family. There is little, if any, to indicate that the
legitimate or illegitimate civil status of the individual would also affect his political
rights or, in general, his relationship to the State. While, indeed, provisions on
"citizenship" could be found in the Civil Code, such provisions must be taken in the
context of private relations, the domain of civil law.
Maria Jeanette C. Tecson vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 161434, March 3, 2004
Filiation must be settled in special proceedings, not in an action for recovery of
property.
The filiation of the paramour's children must be settled in a probate or special
proceeding instituted for the purpose, not in an action for recovery of property.
Matters relating to the rights of filiation and heirship must be ventilated in the proper
probate court in a special proceeding instituted precisely for the purpose of
determining such rights. The status of an illegitimate child who claimed to be an heir
to a decedent's estate could not be adjudicated in an ordinary civil action which, as in
this case, was for the recovery of property.
Milagros Joaquino vs. Lourdes Reyes, G.R. No. 154645, July 13, 2004
A child cannot choose his own filiation.
The child himself cannot choose his own filiation. If the husband, presumed to
be the father does not impugn the legitimacy of the child, then the status of the child is
fixed, and the latter cannot choose to be the child of his mother's alleged paramour.
On the other hand, if the presumption of legitimacy is overthrown, the child cannot
elect the paternity of the husband who successfully defeated the presumption.
William Liyao, Jr. vs. Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao, G.R. No. 138961, March 7, 2002
Legitimate filiation of a child cannot depend on the declaration of the attending
physician, midwife or mother.
The legitimate filiation of a child is a matter fixed by law itself. It cannot be made
dependent on the declaration of the attending physician or midwife, or that of the
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mother of the newborn child. For then, an unwed mother, with or without the
participation of a doctor or midwife, could veritably invest legitimate status to her
offspring through the simple expedient of writing the putative father's name in the
appropriate space in the birth certificate.
Belen Sagad Angeles vs. Aleli "Corazon" Angeles Maglaya, G.R. No. 153798,
September 2, 2005
One can prove filiation, either legitimate or illegitimate, through the record of birth
appearing in the civil register or a final judgment, an admission of filiation in a public
document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned, or
the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate or illegitimate child,
or any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. We have held that
such other proof of one's filiation may be a "baptismal certificate, a judicial
admission, a family bible in which [his] name has been entered, common reputation
respecting [his] pedigree, admission by silence, the [testimonies] of witnesses, and
other kinds of proof [admissible] under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court."
Charles Gotardo vs. Divina Buling, G.R. No. 165166, August 15, 2012
Art. 174 - Surname of legitimate children
Children conceived before decree of annulment shall use surname of father.
To discard father's surname is to create the impression that the children are illegitimate.
Legitimate children may not adopt the surname of their mother's second husband.
Child born out of lawful wedlock cannot bear surname of mother's second husband.
The child should be the one to apply for a change of surname.
Change of surname discretionary on part of children when they reach adulthood.
Children conceived before decree of annulment shall use surname of father.
Our laws do not authorize a legitimate child to use the surname of a person
who is not his father. Article 364 of the Civil Code specifically provides that
legitimate children shall principally use the surname of their father, and Article 369 of
the same Code provides that in case of annulment of a voidable marriage the children
conceived before the annulment shall principally use the surname of the father, and
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considering by analogy the effect of a decree of divorce, it is correctly concluded that
the children who are conceived before such a decree should also be understood as
carrying the surname of the real father.
Elaine A. Moore vs. Republic of the Phils., G.R. No. L-18407, June 26, 1963
To discard father's surname is to create the impression that the children are
illegitimate.
To allow minor children, who are presumably legitimate, at their mother's
behest, to bear only their mother's surname (which they are entitled to use together
with their father's surname) and to discard altogether their father's surname, thus
removing the prima facie evidence of their paternal provenance or ancestry, is a
serious matter in which, ordinarily, the minors and their father should be consulted.
To allow the change of surname would cause confusion as to the minors' parentage
and might create the impression that the minors are illegitimate since they would carry
the maternal surname only. That would be inconsistent with their legitimate status as
indicated in their birth records
In re: Dionesio Divinagracia, Jr. and Bombi Roberto Divinagracia, G.R. No. L-55538,
March 15, 1982
Legitimate children may not adopt the surname of their mother's second husband.
Our laws do not authorize legitimate children to adopt the surname of a person
who is not their father. To allow said minors to adopt the surname of their mother's
second husband, who is not their father, could result in confusion in their paternity. It
could also create the suspicion that said minors, who were born during the coverture
of their mother with her first husband, were in fact sired by her second husband, thus
bringing their legitimate status into discredit.
In re: Dolores Gemora Padilla vs. Republic of the Phils., G.R. No. L-28274, April 30,
1982
Child born out of lawful wedlock cannot bear surname of mother's second
husband.
If a child born out of a lawful wedlock be allowed to bear the surname of the
second husband of the mother, should the first husband die or be separated by a decree
of divorce, there may result a confusion as to his real paternity. In the long run the
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change may redound to the prejudice of the child in the community. While the purpose
which may have animated petitioner, the minor's mother, is plausible and may run
along the feeling of cordiality and spiritual relationship that pervades among the
members of the family of her second husband, there is a legal barrier which cannot at
present be overlooked or brushed aside
Elaine A. Moore vs. Republic of the Phils., G.R. No. L-18407, June 26, 1963
The child should be the one to apply for a change of surname.
The child should, and in the course of time must, know of his parentage. If,
when he fully appreciates the circumstances and is capable of selecting a name for
himself, he wants to use his mother's surname only and to avoid using his father's
surname, then he should be the one to apply for a change of surname
In re: Dionesio Divinagracia, Jr. and Bombi Roberto Divinagracia, G.R. No. L-55538,
March 15, 1982
Change of surname discretionary on part of children when they reach adulthood.
The petition for change of name filed by the mother in behalf of her minor
children is premature. Indeed, the matter of change of their surname should better be
left to the judgment and discretion of the children themselves when they reach the age
of maturity. If in their adulthood they want to change their surname, then they
themselves or any of them may take such appropriate action as the law may permit.
In re: Dolores Gemora Padilla vs. Republic of the Phils., G.R. No. L-28274, April 30,
1982
Art. 174 (1) - Wife's use of husband's surname
Use of former husband’s name by a widow or divorcee is not obligatory.
Use of former husband’s name by a divorcee is not a crime.
Use of husband's surname, when not intended to mislead or deceive the public, does not
constitute material representation warranting cancellation of certificate of candidacy.
Elements of usurpation of name under Art. 377 of Civil Code.
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Woman cannot use the surname of a man to whom she has never been married.
Husband, not wife, should initiate change in spelling of his surname.
Wife shall continue using her husband's surname even after decree of legal separation.
Woman who used the name of the man she is living with to claim benefits for their son
cannot be criminally liable.
Wife cannot appropriate the initials or nickname of her husband.
Use of former husband’s name by a widow or divorcee is not obligatory.
When the marriage ties or vinculum no longer exists as in the case of death of
the husband or divorce as authorized by the Muslim Code, the widow or divorcee
need not seek judicial confirmation of the change in her civil status in order to revert
to her maiden name as the use of her former husband's name is optional and not
obligatory to her. Thus, a petition to resume the use of maiden name is a superfluity
and an unnecessary proceeding since the law requires her to do so as her former
husband is already married to another woman after obtaining a decree of divorce from
her in accordance with Muslim laws.
Hatima C. Yasin vs. Shari’a District Court, G.R. No. 94986, February 23, 1995
Use of former husband’s name by a divorcee is not a crime.
The use of a surname by a divorced wife for a purpose not criminal in nature is
certainly not a crime. The contention that every use of the husband’s surname
constitutes a new crime cannot be countenanced. The effect of divorce is more akin to
the death of the spouse where the deceased woman continues to be referred to as the
Mrs. of her husband even if the latter has remarried rather than to annulment since in
the latter case, it is as if there had been no marriage at all.
Constancia C. Tolentino vs. Court of Appeals and Consuelo David, G.R. No. L-41427,
June 10, 1988
Use of husband's surname, when not intended to mislead or deceive the public,
does not constitute material representation warranting cancellation of certificate of
candidacy.
Aside from the requirement of materiality, a false representation under Sec. 78
of the Omnibus Election Code must be made with an intention to deceive the
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electorate as to one’s qualifications for public office. The use of a surname, when not
intended to mislead or deceive the public as to one’s identity is not within the scope of
the provision. The material misrepresentation contemplated by said provision refer to
qualifications for elective office. This conclusion is strengthened by the fact that the
consequences imposed upon a candidate guilty of having made a false representation
in his certificate of candidacy are grave — to prevent the candidate from running or, if
elected, from serving, or to prosecute him for violation of the election laws. It could
not have been the intention of the law to deprive a person of such a basic and
substantive political right to be voted for a public office upon just any innocuous
mistake.
Victorino Salcedo II vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 135886, August 16, 1999
Elements of usurpation of name under Art. 377 of Civil Code.
The usurpation of name under Article 377 of the Civil Code implies some
injury to the interests of the owner of the name. It consists in the possibility of
confusion of identity between the owner and the usurper, and exists when a person
designates himself by another name. The elements are as follows: (1) there is an actual
use of another’s name by the defendant; (2) the use is unauthorized; and (3) the use of
another’s name is to designate personality or identify a person.
Zenaida F. Dapar vs. Gloria Lozano Biascan, G.R. No. 141880, September 27, 2004
Constancia C. Tolentino vs. Court of Appeals and Consuelo David, G.R. No. L-41427,
June 10, 1988
Woman cannot use the surname of a man to whom she has never been married.
It is not proper for a woman to continue representing herself as the wife of a
man in view of the non-existence of the former’s marriage with him and the latter’s
actual marriage to another. Article 370 of the Civil Code of the Philippines authorizes
a married woman to use the surname of her husband; impliedly, it also excludes others
from doing likewise.
Elenita Ledesma Silva vs. Esther Peralta, G.R. No. L-13114, November 25, 1960
Husband, not wife, should initiate change in spelling of his surname.
A married woman may use her husband's surname under Art. 370 of the Civil
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Code. It is axiomatic that if she desires judicial authorization to change the spelling of
his surname, her husband should initiate the proceeding.
In re: Milagros Llerena Telmo vs. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No. L-28549,
September 23, 1976
Wife shall continue using her husband's surname even after decree of legal
separation.
The language of Article 372 of the New Civil Code is mandatory that the wife,
even after the legal separation has been decreed, shall continue using her name and
surname employed before the legal separation. This is so because her married status is
unaffected by the separation, there being no severance of the vinculum. It seems to be
the policy of the law that the wife should continue to use the name indicative of her
unchanged status for the benefit of all concerned.
Elisea Laperal vs. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No. L-18008, October 30, 1962
Woman who used the name of the man she is living with to claim benefits for their
son cannot be criminally liable .
It is not uncommon in Philippine society for a woman to represent herself as
the wife and use the name of the man she is living with despite the fact that the man is
married to another woman. The practice, to be sure, is not encouraged but neither is it
unduly frowned upon. A number of women can be identified who are living with men
prominent in political, business and social circles. The woman publicly holds herself
out as the man's wife and uses his family name blithely ignoring the fact that he is not
her husband. And yet none of the women has been charged of violating the C.A. No.
142 because ours is not a bigoted but a tolerant and understanding society. It is in the
light of our cultural environment that the law must be construed.
Corazon Legamia y Rivera vs. IAC and People of the Phils., G.R. No. L-63817, August
28, 1984
Wife cannot appropriate the initials or nickname of her husband.
Bad faith or malice on the part of a candidate was evident when, in her
certificate of candidacy and campaign materials, she appropriated the initials or
nickname of her husband, the incumbent Representative of the district in question
whom she wanted to succeed in office. Article 370 of the Civil Code, which she
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invokes, provides no relief. The article enumerates the names which a married woman
may use. One of them is "her husband's full name but prefixing a word indicating that
she is his wife, such as Mrs." If for expediency and convenience she would use the
initials of her husband, then her name, in initials would be "MRS. JTV."
Ma. Amelita C. Villarosa vs. HRET and Ricardo V. Quintos, G.R. No. 143351,
September 14, 2000
Art. 175 - Establishment of illegitimate filiation
Judicial pronouncement is unnecessary if illegitimate child is voluntarily recognized.
Change in entries in the record of birth is an audacious indirect attempt to establish
filiation.
Death of putative father bars illegitimate child from establishing filiation.
Lack or insufficiency of judicial approval is a defect available to the minor, not to the
recognizing parent.
Even if action for recognition/establishment of filiation is filed after death of putative
parent, status of illegitimate children may be confirmed.
Whether an action for establishment of illegitimate filiation is filed under the Civil Code
or the Family Code, the result will be the same.
Whether the action may be brought during the lifetime of the child or of the alleged parent
depends on the basis of the action.
Article 171 of Family Code presupposes that the child is the undisputed offspring of the
mother.
How “open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child” is proved.
What constitutes “open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child”.
“Authentic writing” for purposes of voluntary recognition, defined.
The acknowledgment or recognition of illegitimate children is increasingly liberalized.
How filiation of illegitimate children is established.
When judicial action within the applicable statute of limitations is essential in order to
establish the child's acknowledgment.
Judicially approved compromise agreement by parents may constitute a statement by
which a child may be voluntarily acknowledged.
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A judicial order to compel a person to submit to DNA paternity testing does not violate
his right against self-incrimination.
Judicial pronouncement is unnecessary if illegitimate child is voluntarily
recognized.
The illegitimate child having been voluntarily recognized by her father through
the record of birth, there was no need for any judicial pronouncement. There can be
no dispute then that the child enjoyed the open and continuous possession of the status
of an illegitimate child and that her action in defending her status is similar to an
"action to claim legitimacy" brought during her lifetime.
Juan Castro vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. L-50974-75, May 31, 1989
Change in entries in the record of birth is an audacious indirect attempt to
establish filiation.
A change in the entry from "Domingo Patawaran" to "Dominador P. Dizon",
and the alteration of the word "Unknown" after the column "Name of Father" to
"Policarpio Dizon", do not only partake of the nature of a change of name, but also
principally involve the issue of paternity and filiation. Obviously, the purpose in this
proceeding for correction of entries filed after about 65 years is an audacious indirect
attempt to establish filiation with the late putative father through the simple expedient
of changing the entries in the record of birth in the civil registry and his right to
inherit.
Republic of the Phils. vs. Hon. Fernando Bartolome, G.R. No. L-38109, September 6,
1985
Death of putative father bars illegitimate child from establishing filiation.
Under the Family Code, the illegitimate child is now also allowed to establish
his claimed filiation by "any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special
laws," like his baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family Bible in which his
name has been entered, common reputation respecting his pedigree, admission by
silence, the testimonies of witnesses, and other kinds of proof admissible under Rule
130 of the Rules of Court. However, claimant can no longer be allowed at this time to
introduce evidence of open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate
child or prove filiation through any of the means allowed by the Rules of Court or
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special laws because the alleged father is already dead and can no longer be heard on
the claim of his alleged son's illegitimate filiation.
Dorotea Uyguangco vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 76873, October 26, 1989
Lack or insufficiency of judicial approval is a defect available to the minor, not to
the recognizing parent.
The requirement of judicial approval imposed by Article 281 of the Civil Code
is clearly intended for the benefit of the minor. The lack of judicial approval cannot
impede the effectivity of the acknowledgment made. The judicial approval is for the
protection of the minor against any acknowledgment made to his prejudice. Therefore,
the lack or insufficiency of such approval is NOT a defect available to the recognizing
parent but one which the minor may raise or waive. If after reaching majority the
minor consents to the acknowledgment, the lack of judicial approval should make no
difference. Implied consent to the acknowledgment may be shown by such acts as
keeping, even after reaching the age of majority, the acknowledgment papers and the
use of the parent's surname.
Ligaya Gapusan-Chua vs. Court of Appeals and Prospero Parcon, G.R. No. 46746,
March 15, 1990
Even if action for recognition/establishment of filiation is filed after death of
putative parent, status of illegitimate children may be confirmed.
The action for recognition (or to establish filiation) is timely filed — having
been instituted after the demise of the putative parent and before the attainment of the
age of majority of the children concerned — and the ground invoked therefor having
been satisfactorily proven.
Jacoba T. Paterno vs. Beatriz Paterno, G.R. No. 63680, March 23, 1990
Whether an action for establishment of illegitimate filiation is filed under the Civil
Code or the Family Code, the result will be the same.
Under Article 283 (2) of the Civil Code, a father is obliged to recognize the
child as his natural child "when the child is in continuous possession of the status of a
child of the alleged father by the direct acts of the latter or that of his family." Under
Art. 175 in relation to Article 172 of the Family Code, illegitimate filiation shall be
proved by "the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child."
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Thus, whether the case is decided under the Civil Code or the Family Code, the result
will be the same.
Loth R. Ayco vs. Lourdes S. Fernandez, G.R. No. 84770, March 18, 1991
Whether the action may be brought during the lifetime of the child or of the alleged
parent depends on the basis of the action.
If the action is based on the record of birth of the child, a final judgment, or an
admission by the parent of the child's filiation in a public document or in a private
handwritten signed instrument, then the action may be brought during the lifetime of
the child. However, if the action is based on the open and continuous possession by
the child of the status of an illegitimate child, or on other evidence allowed by the
Rules of Court and special laws, the view has been expressed that the action must be
brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.
Corito Ocampo Tayag vs. Court of Appeals and Emilie Dayrit Cuyugan, G.R. No.
95229, June 9, 1992
Article 171 of Family Code presupposes that the child is the undisputed offspring
of the mother.
Article 171 of the Family Code applies only to instances in which the father
impugns the legitimacy of his wife's child. The provision, however, presupposes that
the child was the undisputed offspring of the mother.
Teofista Babiera vs. Presentacion B. Catotal, G.R. No. 138493, June 15, 2000
How “open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child” is
proved.
To prove open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child,
there must be evidence of the manifestation of the permanent intention of the
supposed father to consider the child as his, by continuous and clear manifestations of
parental affection and care, which cannot be attributed to pure charity. Such acts must
be of such a nature that they reveal not only the conviction of paternity, but also the
apparent desire to have and treat the child as such in all relations in society and in life,
not accidentally, but continuously. By "continuous" is meant uninterrupted and
consistent, but does not require any particular length of time. The foregoing standard
of proof required to establish one's filiation is founded on the principle that an order
Copyright 2017 CD Technologies Asia, Inc. and Accesslaw, Inc. Philippine Law Encyclopedia (2017.1) 200
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