Ooi-Malaysia-and-the-Cold-War-Era

16  Ooi Keat Gin

were subsequently trained as cadres. Pro-KMT teaching personnel like-
wise swayed middle school pupils to their cause of republicanism on the
mainland. As pointed out, most huaqiao harboured deep attachment to the
fatherland and most of the youth on graduation were anxious to return to
serve the ancestral homeland. Whether pro-KMT or pro-communist, Chi-
nese middle school students to a large extent looked to the mainland for
moral and ideological inspiration and as the destination of their future.

Colonial authorities were more partial to the nationalist/KMT rather
than the anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist CCP/MCP/SCO elements.
Consequently, measures were devised to contain the influence of the latter
lest their subversive influences were translated into real anti-British/Brooke
rhetoric and insurrectionary activities. Here, the Cold War phenomenon of
‘taking sides’, ‘identifying with particular camps’, was apparent, the dichot-
omy was clear as to the stance of the British colonial government of Malaya
and the Brooke regime of Sarawak. The colonialists (British and Brooke)
expressed preference for the republican KMT and, conversely, opposed and
rejected the communists (CCP/MCP/SCO).

Constructive steps including legislation were implemented to contain the
leftist threat and menace such as the closer monitoring of labour organ-
izations, greater scrutiny of the Chinese vernacular schools (curriculum,
textbooks, teachers, etc.), Chinese societies and Chinese communities in
general increasingly received attention from colonial intelligence agencies
(viz.  Kuala Lumpur’s Special Branch, and Kuching’s Constabulary). The
latter were tasked to deter ‘undesirables’ and such individuals were de-
ported to China.

From the 1930s following Imperial Japan’s invasion of northern China in
1937, which sparked the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945),27 that led,
in turn, to the second KMT-CCP united front, the colonial authorities in
Malaya and Northern Borneo were wary of the anti-Japanese propaganda
campaign of the Chinese lest the movement veered to anti-imperialism and
anti-colonialism agenda targeting the British, Brooke and Company re-
gimes as well. Overall, there was a closer surveillance of Chinese activities
by the colonial administration in their respective territories.

Adopting the longue durée approach with the 1920s as the point of de-
parture and stretching to the early 1990s, the present volume has nine
chapters focusing on various historical themes and covering several parts
within Malaysia, viz. the peninsula, Sarawak and Sabah. It opens with this
present introductory chapter, which sets the stage and background for the
entire volume in presenting an interplay between events and situations from
within Malaya/Malaysia (‘small’ picture) and global and regional devel-
opments from without (‘big’ picture). Against this backdrop, the narrative
moves from the pre-war KMT-CCP rivalry for Chinese support (Chapter 2),
into the Pacific War (1941–1945) period of KMT-British special forces
relations (Chapter 3), anti-Japanese movements and the Malayan Commu-
nist Party (MCP) (Chapter 4), the immediate post-war political landscapes

An introductory essay  17

(Chapter 5), the ‘twist and turns’ of Malaysia’s foreign relations vis-à-vis the
Cold War era and beyond (Chapter 6), Manila’s ‘Sabah claim’ (Chapter 7),
the watershed ‘May 13’ tragedy and subsequent Malaysian socioeconomic
restructuring (Chapter 8), and a final piece whereby a longue durée approach
assesses the Cold War era in the context of Malaya/Malaysia that was seen
not only as a post-war phenomenon but also traces of its influences can be
discerned as early as the 1920s and 1930s (Chapter 9). In utilizing the longue
durée approach that is not only a paradigm shift in examination, evaluation
and interpretation, but also widens the scope and perspective of the Cold
War’s influences and impacts.

Chapter 2 argues for a longer trajectory of the Cold War phenomenon
beyond the conventional period of 1947–1990, impacting on the Malayan/
Malaysian context dating back to the 1920s. During the early decades of
the twentieth century, the majority of immigrant Chinese communities
in British Malaya and British Borneo continued to be sojourners with
strong and close familial ties with the mainland with comings and goings
with scant restrictions at both entry and departure points. Accompanying
this free flow of people and goods came thoughts and ideologies. In 1910
Sun Yat-Sen came to the British Crown Colony of Penang to garner sup-
port and aid for his anti-Qing revolutionary movement. It was then that
his political organization, Tong Meng Hui, was headquartered in George
Town. Although the British colonial government was not unduly concerned
then, it became increasingly apprehensive from the late 1920s when leftist
literature (including Chinese vernacular school curriculum and textbooks)
and activists (schoolteachers from the mainland were especially influen-
tial in and outside the classroom) ever more entered the Straits Settlements
(Penang, Melaka and Singapore) and the western peninsular Malay States.
Communist-style anti-imperialist, anti-colonialist subversive propaganda
coupled with seditious activities roused the attention of the British colo-
nial authorities in Malaya and the Brooke administration in Sarawak that
spurred both governments to implement legislation on Chinese vernac-
ular schools hitherto unregulated that were nurseries for nurturing leftist
thoughts and recruitment of supporters and sympathizers. Their partiality
towards the Nationalist Kuomintang (KMT, Guomindang) notwithstand-
ing, both the Malayan British colonial administration and the Brooke re-
gime in Sarawak were concerned about the KMT-CCP rivalry for support
of the overseas Chinese during the 1930s. Such anxiousness was justifiable
as the MCP was constituted in 1930 by Vietnamese Communist revolution-
ary leader Ho Chi Minh and Chinese Communist propagandist Fu Daqing
(alias Fu Dajing). The MCP from the outset had support from international
communism, in particular the CCP. Not surprisingly, MCP membership
was predominantly Chinese including its leadership. Although in occupied
Malaya (1941–1945), British special forces Force 136 worked hand in hand
with the MCP-founded Malayan People’s Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA)
behind Japanese lines (see Chapter 3), the post-war scenario saw the British

18  Ooi Keat Gin

colonial government declaring an ‘Emergency’ (1948–1960) against the
MCP. It was during this struggle for winning the ‘hearts and minds’ largely
of the Chinese communities in Malaya, that the British orchestrated the
formation in 1949 of the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA), initially a
welfare organization that became an alternative political force to the MCP.
Unsurprisingly, MCA’s top echelon featured some KMT elements.

Relationship between the KMT and the pre-war colonial British govern-
ment in Malaya is here examined in Chapter 3. Wu Tiecheng (1888–1953),
one of the senior statesmen of the Kuomintang (KMT) and Republican
China, was a pragmatic politician skilful in political networking and
eloquence. He served as Secretary-General of the KMT Central Executive
Committee (CEC) in 1941–1948. Wu in this capacity also served as ex officio,
the man behind KMT intelligence agency, the Bureau of Investigation and
Statistics of the CEC of KMT China or Zhongtong. In 1941, he was elected
as President for both Nanyang Overseas Chinese Association and Chinese
People’s Foreign Relations Association which strengthened his ties with
those abroad, especially the Overseas Chinese. Force 136 was a specialized
military unit set up in 1942 and disbanded shortly after the Second World
War. It was borne of collaboration between Britain’s Special Operations Ex-
ecutive (SOE) and China through Zhongtong. Force 136, with its Chinese
recruits drawn mainly from Singapore-Malaya, infiltrated into occupied
Malaya to undertake underground activities behind Japanese enemy lines.
The present study focuses on Wu Tiecheng and Force 136, notably his role
in the establishment and development of Force 136 and his relationship with
troop members including Lim Bo Seng and Tan Chong Tee. At the same
time, it draws attention to Wu’s relationship with the British and his early
connections with Overseas Chinese in Singapore-Malaya during his visit to
the Nanyang (1940–1941) to convey Chiang Kai-shek’s gratitude to Overseas
Chinese and Overseas KMT members. His relationship with each quarter
had been incorporated into his Overseas Chinese network that was benefi-
cial not only to him but also to the KMT and the Nationalist Government.
Force 136 undoubtedly was established as a counterweight to the leftist-
created Malayan People’s Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA). It was apparent
that the British colonial government in Malaya was supportive of the KMT
and Chiang’s Nationalist Government on the mainland even before the on-
set of the Cold War (1947–1990). Later when the British-initiated Malayan/
Malaysian Chinese Association was established in 1949, initially as a wel-
fare organization and later took on a political role, the leadership comprised
KMT elements.

Against the background of the Cold War era, Chapter 4 examines the role
and the involvement of woman in the planning of party strategies and execu-
tion thereafter, from the formation of the anti-Japanese movement following
the Japanese invasion of China in 1937, the MPAJA, during the Malayan
Emergency to the CPM relocation to southern Thailand. The formation of
the MCP in 1930, the anti-Japanese movement of the late 1930s, the formation

An introductory essay  19

of the Malayan People’s Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA) in January 1942 and
the Emergency declaration in June 1948 are crucial episodes in Malaysia’s
historical development. The 41-year animosity between the CPM and the
Malaysian government ended only with the Haadyai Peace Accord (1989).
Behind this long history of struggle, however, the involvement of women
in the CPM has garnered but marginal attention in the literature. Female
members were indispensable whether in terms of party rejuvenation or in
the negotiation process that subsequently led to the 1989 peace accord. It
shall be argued that women members did not play insubstantial and/or mere
supportive roles in the survival and relevancy of the CPM; on the contrary,
their role was both pivotal and significant.

Chapter 5 discusses the anti-colonial resistance and the British reaction
and response between 1946 and 1948, a critical period, from the incep-
tion of the Malayan Union (1946–1948) to the onset of the Malayan Emer-
gency (1948–1960). The primary aim is to elucidate in detail the position
and actions of Malay nationalists in response to the various British recol-
onization policies during the immediate post-war period and the counter-
measures executed by the colonial authorities to eliminate their resistance
and overall weakened Malay nationalism. The present study demonstrates
how the British manipulated the ideological dichotomy inherent in the var-
ious nationalist movements and accentuated the bipolarity between Malay/
non-Malay, elite/non-elite, right/left, nationalist/communist groups to
create wide chasms and in the process, weaken their pursuit for merdeka
(independence). Moreover, the British utilized biased historical interpre-
tations and political propaganda to fabricate a negative image of these
groups. It was apparent that global Cold War politics had a hand in Brit-
ish policy and subsequent action. Communist aggression, for instance, was
used widely to justify the highhandedness of British actions, including the
declaration of the Malayan Emergency as a means to pressurize and elimi-
nate nationalist movements in Malaya.

Chapter 6 puts forth the thesis of the triumph of pragmatism over ideo-
logical and/or traditional considerations as the clear guiding principle of
Malaysia’s positioning vis-à-vis within the region and on the global arena in
the Cold War era as well as in the post-Cold War scenario. Cambridge-trained
solicitor Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra Al-Haj proved his leadership capa-
bilities in leading a multi-ethnic Malaya in the 1955 general elections of
members to the Federal Legislative Council whereby his Alliance Party won
all but one seat. Tunku’s Alliance Party that comprised the United Malays
National Organization (UMNO), Malayan Chinese Association (MCA) and
the Malayan Indian Congress (MIC), literally representative of all the major
ethnic communities of Malaya then, proved beyond doubt to the British
government that independence of Malaya could be entrusted to him. Sub-
sequently Tunku was able to triumphantly proclaimed Malaya’s merdeka on
31 August 1957. Newly independent Malaya was in the midst of battling a
communist insurgency (Malayan Emergency) since 1948 that saw military

20  Ooi Keat Gin

assistance from Britain and its Commonwealth, viz. Australia, New Zealand
and Fiji in the form of ground combat troops and equipment. British and
Commonwealth military contribution continued in the post-merdeka pe-
riod. Understandably Tunku remained partisan and loyal to Britain and
the Western democracies eschewing communism, whether from Moscow or
from Beijing. When Tunku proposed ‘Malaysia’ in 1961, for a wider federa-
tion to co-join British Borneo to independent Malaya, it was apparent that
an anti-communist design was in the agenda. Having only a year ago (1960)
declared an end to the Malayan Emergency, Tunku was confident that com-
munism could be ‘contained’ and ‘arrested’. The geopolitical situation in
the region, Vietnam in particular, was most troubling. Following the French
withdrawal from Indochina after Dien Bien Phu (1954), the US stepped in
with increasing commitment to ensure that the communist North Vietnam
did not swallow the non-communist South Vietnam. Without doubt, US
President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s (t. 1953–1961) ‘falling domino’ principle
was applicable in the idea of ‘Malaysia’ as a bulwark to the communist
wind. British-trained lawyer Tun Abdul Razak, Tunku’s successor as the
second Prime Minister of Malaysia (t. 1970–1976) was a pragmatist. Razak
subscribed to the concept of non-alignment in the bipolar Cold War world
hence Malaysia’s participation in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) Con-
ference at Lusaka, Zambia 8–10 September 1970. Within the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) where Malaysia was a founder-member,
Razak pushed for the adoption of ZOPFAN (Zone of Peace, Freedom and
Neutrality) intending the region not to be drawn in the raging conflict on
the Indochina front.

Furthermore, in 1974, in an unprecedented initiative, Razak led a
Malaysian delegation to Beijing to normalize relations with the People’s Re-
public of China (PRC). Malaysia then was in the midst of suppressing the
Second Malayan Emergency (1968–1989). Despite Kuala Lumpur-Beijing
normalization of relations, MCP-CCP continued unabated with moral and
material aid. Third Prime Minister Tun Hussein Onn (t. 1976–1981) was
committed to NAM and ASEAN-ZOPFAN. Dr Mahathir Mohamad, the
fourth premier (t. 1981–2003) was radical in positioning Malaysia’s foreign
relations. He turned away from the West including a ‘Buy Britain Last’ cam-
paign to literally ‘Look East’, to Japan in particular, and South Korea and
Taiwan for trade and markets, technology transfer, work ethics and man-
agement model. Meanwhile, his diatribe against the rich and powerful of the
First World, US, UK and Western Europe earned him respect and adoration
among Third World nations in Africa and Asia. Consequently, Mahathir
energized South–South dialogue and cooperation (Langkawi Dialogue).
Mahathir’s Malaysia emerged as the model of a moderate Islamic country
to emulate, actively playing pivotal roles within the Organization of Islamic
Conference/Cooperation (OIC). While Tun Abdullah Badawi continued to
be active within the OIC during his premiership (t. 2003–2009), Najib Razak,
son of Razak, as the fifth Prime Minister (from 2009–present), reaped mile-
age from the more than three decades of Malaysia-PRC relations.

An introductory essay  21

The Philippines claim over Sabah (North Borneo until 1963) began with
the creation of the wider federation of Malaysia on 16 September 1963. This
territorial claim is intertwined to the fact that the Sulu Sultanate in 1878
ceded the territory to Baron Gustavus von Overbeck, formerly the Aus-
trian Consul (t.  1864–1867) and Alfred Dent (1844–1927), a London-based
British colonial merchant and entrepreneur. Chapter 7 evaluates the issue of
the Philippines claim over Sabah since 1963 and how it impacted on Kuala
Lumpur–Manila relations against the background of the regional and inter-
national Cold War political arena. Moreover, focus is on the significant role
played by prominent Cold War players the US and Great Britain, in particu-
lar, both their influence on Kuala Lumpur and Manila. Both the US and,
to a lesser extent, Great Britain were perceived as super power nations in
the post-war bipolar world. Britain–Malaysia and US –Philippines relations
were determinant influences in political relations between the two Southeast
Asian nations. The support of both the US and Great Britain lent weight to
the creation of Malaysia and therein explains the dissimilarities in interrela-
tions between Malaysia–Indonesia and Malaysia–Philippines.

Turning inwards from within Malaysia itself, Chapter 8 scrutinizes
ethnic-based policies. One development that took shape in Malaysia in the
1970s was the implementation of a racial ideology in capitalist and social de-
velopment, a policy that previously largely characterized the United States
during the pre-Second World War period. During the Cold War, there was
a sort of ideological revitalization in the US to remedy its own institutional
racism to legitimize its geopolitical ascendancy and role in international
capitalism when the disenfranchisement of the African Americans was used
as propaganda by Soviets against the Western bloc. By contrast, Malaysia
regressed in that sense as there began to emerge significant federal inter-
est to articulate and implement a preference in national socioeconomic de-
velopment for the ethnic Malays, the dominant group of the country. The
starting point for this was the 13 May 1969 Sino-Malay sectarian violence in
Kuala Lumpur, which happened under the administration of Tunku Abdul
Rahman, and which was subsequently used as a justification to implement
the government policy of favouring the Malays in the socioeconomic re-
structuring program called the New Economic Policy (NEP). This chapter
considers in what ways the 13 May incident led to the systematization of
Malay preference, or in other words, to examine the rise of bumiputeraism in
the 1970s and 1980s. Moreover, it evaluates the regressive aspects of the pol-
icy in a mixed capitalistic economy that Malaysia was keen to adopt during
the Cold War and the extent to which the poorer non-Malay population, es-
pecially the Indian minority, who held a meagre 1 percent stake in national
wealth, was marginalized under the NEP.

The volume concludes with Chapter 9, which offers a wider and deeper
comprehension of external influences and impacts on local, internal devel-
opments. In taking the viewpoint that in the context of Malaya/Malaysia,
the Cold War was not only a post-war spectacle but also could be traced
back to the 1920s and 1930s and beyond the 1990s, presents a refreshing look

22  Ooi Keat Gin

on this global phenomenon. Malaya/Malaysia as a case study of stretching
the conventional Cold War period of between 1947 and 1990 on either end of
the timeline might set the agenda for other nation-states and/or regions to
follow suit hence further enriching our understanding of the influence and
impact of this global phenomenon.

Throughout this volume, we intend to determine and ascertain to
what extent the MCP and the NKCP were autonomous and independent
local players and local-based entities with policies and actions spurred
by local situations and developments from within, or were puppets on a
string, handled by puppet master(s) from afar and with non-local agen-
das. Malaysia, until 1990, endured three protracted leftist-led insurgencies,
two on peninsular or West Malaysia, and the third in the East Malaysian
state of Sarawak. Historically, the former occurred in two stages, the initial
phase from 1948 to 1960 commonly referred to as the Malayan Emergency,
and the subsequent stage between 1968 and 1989, known as the Second
Malayan Emergency. Denoted as the Sarawak Communist Insurgency,
this revolt engaged government security forces and their foreign allies for
nearly three decades, from 1962 to 1990. While the MCP perpetrated the
armed insurrections on the peninsula, the NKCP executed an armed strug-
gle in Sarawak. Both the MCP and the NKCP sought the overthrow of
the government of the day, on the peninsula initially the British colonial
government followed by the independent Malayan government from 1957,
and from 1963, the Malaysian government, whereas in Sarawak, the British
colonial administration and from 1963 thereafter, the Malaysian govern-
ment. The ultimate goal was the establishment of a communist republic
through force of arms and revolutionary means. Finally, in 1989 and 1990,
the MCP and the NKCP respectively through negotiations, agreed to lay
down their arms thus concluding their armed insurrections. The death toll
collectively from all quarters ranged between 10,000 and 13,000, including
civilian casualties. All three insurgencies occurred during the post-war
Cold War era, hence the influence and impact of this global phenomenon
appeared apparent.

Notes

1 Its full title was British Malaya: The Magazine of the Association of British
Malaya.

2 See Ooi Keat Gin, Historical Dictionary of Malaysia, 2nd ed. (Lanham, MD:
Rowman & Littlefield, 2018), p. 345.

3 Britain granted independence to Malaya in 1957. While Penang and Malacca
were incorporated into Malaya then, Singapore was excluded and remained a
British Crown Colony.

4 It was only in 1984 that Brunei attained independence from Britain.
5 For instance, see Matthew Jones, Conflict and Confrontation in South East Asia,

1961–1965: Britain, the United States, Indonesia and the Creation of Malaysia
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Tai Yong Tan, Creating ‘Greater
Malaysia’: Decolonization and the Politics of Merger (Singapore: Institute of

An introductory essay  23
Southeast Asian Studies, 2008); Lela Garner Noble, Philippine Policy toward Sa-
bah: A Claim to Independence (Tucson, AZ: University of Arizona Press for the
Association for Asian Studies, 1977).
6 The EEIC and the French East India Company struggled for hegemony over the
sub-continent. The Carnatic Wars (1740s–1760s) included naval engagements in
the Bay of Bengal. Even after the conclusion of open warfare, the EEIC contin-
ued to be wary of future threats and sought ways and means to strengthen and
consolidate its power in India and the waters in the Bay of Bengal region.
7 The East Indies referred to present-day island Southeast Asia, in general, and
Indonesia, in particular. During the colonial period, Indonesia was referred to
as the Netherlands East Indies.
8 A Hokkien term denoting an entrepreneur, proprietor of property (shop, mine,
plantation, etc.), generally attributed to a person of standing, economically and
socially. Often used as an honorific of respect, hence Towkay Lim Lean Teng, a
Penang-based businessman and philanthropist.
9 Wong Lin Ken, The Malayan Tin Industry to 1914 (Tucson, AZ: University of
Arizona Press for the Association for Asian Studies, 1964); Yip Yat Hoong, The
Development of the Tin Mining Industry of Malaya (Kuala Lumpur and Singa-
pore: University of Malaya Press, 1969).
10 Ignorant of the Chinese language and of the various Chinese dialects as well as
of Chinese sociocultural traditions, the British in general regarded any organi-
zation of the Chinese to be a ‘secret society’ and used this term freely without
qualification. The term hui, which denotes an association or a society, covers a
whole spectrum of social organizations, viz. home village/district associations,
political groupings, associations that support schools, societies that cover funeral
expenses, welfare for the destitute, etc. Hui also denotes sworn brotherhoods,
societies specifically set up to subvert the dynasty-of-the-day and they were the
real secret societies that sprang up during the Yuan/Mongol dynasty (1271–1368),
and again, when the Qing/Manchu dynasty (1644–1911) reigned. Hence, the term
‘syndicate’ is preferred as those Chinese organizations involved in the tin indus-
try were nothing more than profit-making businesses, from labour trafficking to
opium smoking dens to brothels. See David Ownby and Mary Somers Heidhues,
eds., Secret Societies Reconsidered: Perspectives on the Social History of Early
Modern South China and Southeast Asia (Armonk, NY and Newark, NJ: M. E.
Sharpe, 1993); Yen Ching-hwang, A Social History of the Chinese in Singapore and
Malaya, 1800–1911 (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1986).
11 ‘Pangkor Treaty – January 20, 1874’, Document Archive (SMSA); http://www.
fas.nus.edu.sg/hist/eia/documents_archive/pangkor-treaty.php (accessed 22
February 2019).
12 Often referred by its initials, or simply, the Company.
13 In order to preserve the territorial integrity of the Sultanate of Brunei, Britain
granted protectorate status to Sarawak, North Borneo and Brunei in 1888.
Henceforth the three territories on northern Borneo came to be referred as Brit-
ish Borneo, differentiating from the eastern and southern portion of the island
then under Dutch colonial rule, thus Dutch Borneo.
14 ‘Southeast Asia’ was derived from South-East Asia Command (SEAC), an
Allied-designated theatre of military operation entrusted to Britain. Headquar-
tered in Kandy, Ceylon (Sri Lanka), Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten headed
SEAC that was responsible for the reoccupation of all territories in mainland
and island Southeast Asia then under Imperial Japan. See Peter Dennis, Trou-
bled Days of Peace: Mountbatten and South-East Asia Command, 1945–46
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1987).
15 On 24 June 1939, Siam was renamed Thailand. Then, briefly between 1946
and 1948, the name Siam was reinstated, but thereafter, the name reverted to

24  Ooi Keat Gin
Thailand until contemporary times. On 12 June 1940, Thailand and Imperial
Japan signed a treaty whereby they became ‘allies’, mutually respecting their
territorial integrity. See E. Bruce Reynolds, Thailand and Japan’s Southern
Advance, 1940–1945 (Basingstoke and London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1994).

16 Also referred to as the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM), particularly during
the Second Malayan Emergency (1968–1989).

17 For convenience of usage and to deter confusion, SCO is here used to refer to
leftist/communist elements in Sarawak.

18 According to the Julian calendar then in use in Russia, the Bolsheviks seized
power on 24–25 October 1917, hence the October Revolution. According to
the Gregorian calendar, which was adopted by most countries from the eight-
eenth century until contemporary times, 24–25 October was equivalent to 6–7
November.

19 Its full designation was Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR) but often
shortened to Soviet Union.

2 0 For Leninism, see Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, Essential Works of Lenin: ‘What Is
to Be Done?’ and Other Writings (Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 1987; un-
abridged and unaltered republication of the work first published by Bantam
Books, New York in 1966 under the title Essential Works of Lenin).

21 When he arrived at Petrograd’s Finland Station on 3 April 1917, Lenin famously
declared: ‘All power to the soviets’, a statement that subsequently led to the col-
lapse of Aleksandr Kerensky’s provisional government. See Catherine Merrid-
ale, Lenin on the Train (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2017).

22 Emile Burns, ed., A Handbook of Marxism: Scientific Socialism as Stated and
Interpreted by Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin (Scotts Valley, CA: CreateSpace Inde-
pendent Publishing Platform, 2018), pp. 13–45.

23 See V. I. Lenin, What is Leninism? (Scotts Valley, CA: CreateSpace Independent
Publishing Platform, 2018), pp. 7–45.

24 Harold Henry Fisher, The Communist Revolution: An Outline of Strategy and
Tactics (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1955), p. 13. Also, see Burns,
A Handbook of Marxism, pp. 754–816; Lenin, ‘Terms of Admission into Com-
munist International’, July 1920; http://ciml.250x.com/archive/comintern/
termsadm.html (accessed 27 February 2019).

25 Tony Saich, “The Chinese Communist Party during the era of the COMINTERN
(1919–1943)”, p. 2; https://sites.hks.harvard.edu/fs/asaich/chinese-communisty-
party-during-comintern.pdf (emphasis added) (accessed 27 February 2019).

26 Ibid., p. 6 (emphasis added).
27 Scholars of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) discarded this reference,

instead utilized, Japan’s War of Aggression against China.

2 Between left and right

Chinese politics in
Malaya/Malaysia, 1920s–1990s

Ooi Keat Gin

During the early decades of the twentieth century, the majority of immi-
grant Chinese communities in British Malaya and British Borneo continued
to be sojourners with strong and close familial ties with the Chinese main-
land with comings and goings taking advantage of the scant restrictions at
both entry and departure points. Accompanying this free flow of goods and
people also came thoughts and ideologies. In 1910, Sun Yat-Sen (1866–1925)
sojourned at the British Crown Colony of Penang to garner support and aid
for his anti-Qing revolutionary movement. It was then that his political or-
ganization, the clandestine Tong Meng Hui, was headquartered in George
Town. Although the British colonial government was not unduly concerned
then, it became increasingly apprehensive from the late 1920s when leftist lit-
erature (including Chinese vernacular school curriculum and textbooks) and
activists (schoolteachers from the mainland were especially influential in and
outside the classroom) ever more entered the Straits Settlements (Penang,
Malacca [Melaka] and Singapore) and the western peninsular Malay states.
Communist-style anti-imperialist, anti-colonialist subversive propaganda
coupled with seditious activities roused the attention specifically of the Brit-
ish colonial authorities in Malaya and the Brooke administration in Sar-
awak, both territories having sizeable Chinese communities, which spurred
the respective governments to implement legislation on Chinese vernacular
schools hitherto unregulated that were prime nurseries for nurturing leftist
thoughts and recruitment of adherents, supporters, and sympathizers. Their
partiality towards the Nationalist Kuomintang (KMT, Guomindang) not-
withstanding, both the British colonial administration in Malaya and the
Brooke regime in Sarawak were concerned of the KMT-CCP (Chinese Com-
munist Party) rivalry for support of the overseas Chinese during the 1930s.
Such anxiousness was justifiable as the Malayan Communist Party (MCP)1
was constituted in 1930 by Vietnamese Communist revolutionary leader Ho
Chi Minh (1890–1969) and Chinese Communist propagandist Fu Daqing
(alias Fu Dajing). From the outset, the MCP had support from international
communism, in particular, the CCP. Not surprisingly, MCP membership
was predominantly Chinese, including its top echelons. Although in wartime
Malaya (1941–1945), British special unit, Force 136, worked hand in hand with
the MCP-created Malayan People’s Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA) behind

26  Ooi Keat Gin

enemy lines,2 the post-war scenario saw the British colonial government de-
claring an all-out war, the Malayan Emergency.3 It was during this struggle
in winning the ‘hearts and minds’ largely of the Chinese communities in
Malaya, that the British encouraged the formation of the Malayan Chinese
Association (MCA) in 1949, initially a welfare organization that later became
an alternative political force to the MCP. Unsurprisingly, MCA’s top ranks
featured several KMT elements to whom the British were partial.

This chapter argues for a longer trajectory of the Cold War phenomenon
stretching back to the 1920s beyond the conventional starting point of the
mid-1940s, one that had impacted on the Malayan/Malaysian context. In the
1920s, the British colonial government in Malaya and the Brooke regime in
Sarawak, two territories of primary focus owing to their significant Chinese
presence, had demonstrated their anti-leftist temper (see Table 2.1). Both
authorities showed partiality to non-communist parties and/or individuals.
Chinese migration in the nineteenth century to Malaya and Sarawak offers a
background setting. The appeal of Dr Sun Yat-Sen and the Tong Meng Hui
pushed the huaqiao (overseas Chinese) in Malaya to take sides, in support of
the revolutionary cause or upholding the reigning Qing dynasty. The chapter’s
running theme of choosing between the left and the right is presented in four
periodic phases, 1920s–1930s, 1941–1945, 1940s–1960s and 1960s–1990s.

Table 2.1 Population by ethnicity in Sarawak, Brunei and North Borneo,
1939–1960

Year Indigenous Chinese Others Total

Sarawak 1939 † 361,585 123,626 5,283 490,585
North Borneo 1947 (74%)# (25%) (1%) 546,385
Brunei 1960 * 395,417 145,158 5,810 744,529
1931 (73%) (26%) (1%) 277,476
1951 507,252 229,154 8,123 334,141
1960 (68%) (31%) (1%) 454,421
1931 205,218 50,056 22,202 30,135
1947 ◊ (74%) (18%) (8%) 40,657
1960 243,009 74,374 16,758 83,877
(73%) (22%) (5%)
306,498 104,542 43,381
(67%) (23%) (10%)
26,746 2,683 706
(89%) (9%) (2%)
31,161 8,300 1,196
(77%) (20%) (3%)
59,203 21,795 2,879
(71%) (26%) (3%)

† Head count conducted by the Food Control Department
# Figures in parentheses denote percentage of total population
* 1960 census was undertaken by a pan-British Borneo Census Department
◊ Part of the census of Sarawak
Source: After L. W. Jones, The Population of Borneo: A Study of the Peoples of Sarawak,
Sabah and Brunei (London: University of London, Athlone Press, 1966), p. 63.

Chinese politics in Malaysia, 1920s–1990s  27

Sojourners to settlers

Chinese presence in what is present-day Southeast Asia predated fifteenth-
century Malacca, then the foremost entrepôt of the region. Chinese traders
carried on commerce with the mainland territories as well as the archipe-
lagic expense undertaking brisk business in luxury items of China, notably
tea, silk, porcelain (chinaware) in exchange for the wide varieties of spices,
jungle products such as bird’s nests, bezoar stones and sea produce like
trepang, holothuroidea (sea cucumber), a culinary delight. The port-city of
Malacca had its share of Chinese merchants and traders to the extent that
the Malay ruler appointed a kapitan China (lit. Chinese captain; communal
head) among their numbers to oversee the welfare and interests of the so-
journing trading community, peacekeeping, security and orderly living. The
mercantile community expanded when Ming China recognized Malacca as
a tributary state in the hierarchy of state relations in the Chinese concentric
world order.

The occupation of Malacca by the Catholic Portuguese (1511–1644) wit-
nessed a contraction of the Chinese mercantile community, like their fellow
traders, shifted to other less exacting ports of call such as Acheh and Bru-
nei. During the sixteenth century, a Chinese junk trade that exploited the
jungle and sea products of the Bornean environment flourished at Brunei
and northeast Borneo (present-day Sabah).4 In search of the exotic pricey
products of the island, regular Chinese trading presence in the interior lent
their namesake to a major waterway, the 560-kilometre Kinabatangan, or
literally, Chinese river.

When Francis Light established a trading outpost on the island of Penang
for the English East India Company (EEIC) in 1786, one of the first arrivals
was a group of Chinese who presented him with fishing nets. Stamford Raf-
fles’ Singapore (1819), the exchange of Bencoolen for Malacca in the Treaty
of London (1824) and the creation of the Straits Settlements in 1826 brought
more Chinese traders to the periphery of the Malay Peninsula. But it was
the China trade in luxuries (tea, porcelain, silk) that the EEIC and the Chi-
nese were prioritizing then. Undoubtedly, there were some entrepreneurs
making inroads into the west coast Malay states in proximity to the Straits
Settlements for possible economic opportunities such as in minerals and/or
commercial agriculture.

Meanwhile, the Chinese mainland was undergoing of what retrospec-
tively became known, from the Chinese perspective, as ‘a century of
humiliation’, from the mid-nineteenth century to the mid-twentieth century.
China suffered scorn and humiliation consequent of foreign intervention
and pseudo-colonialism translated into foreign concessions and spheres of
influence from European imperialist powers and Imperial Japan that sub-
sequently ended with the proclamation of the PRC. Anti-Qing rebellions
and uprisings within the country brought adversities and sufferings likewise
natural calamities (floods, earthquakes) devastated crops that resulted in
widespread famines.5

28  Ooi Keat Gin

Conflicts and natural disasters made emigration as a channel out in
seeking survival and fortunes in distant lands. Following the Opium Wars,
Britain, to some extent, brought to a close to Qing isolation policy, in that
Beijing was requested to allow the export of Chinese labour abroad. There-
fore, from the mid-nineteenth century, there begun the coolie traffic, an
exodus of Chinese labour to various corners of the world, in particular to
British colonial territories in Southeast Asia (Malaya), Australia, South
Africa, as well as to other parts of the world including North America
(California).6 Chinese labour was needed especially in the mining sector,
and also, in commercial agriculture. The nineteenth-century Chinese
migration to Malaya and northern Borneo was part of this general outflow
from the mainland.7

The deluge of Chinese immigration in tens of thousands into the Malay
Peninsula, specifically the west coast Malay states, occurred from the late
1840s in response to the call for coolies in the tin mining industry. Initially,
in the Larut Hills, then the auriferous Kinta Valley and Klang Valley, and
also Sungai Ujong, rich alluvial tin fields were being exploited on a major
scale that necessitated the importation of labour in the thousands. Malay
chieftains who nominally oversaw these tin fields leased them to the Chinese
who undertook the mining, invested the capital, recruited the labour and
bore all the risk of the enterprise.

Chinese immigrants entered Perak, Selangor and Sungai Ujong (later
Negeri Sembilan) through the Straits Settlements.8 The China trade in
luxuries had expanded Penang and Singapore in particular, and Malacca,
into major port-cities. Investment in the tin industry further enhanced the
importance of the Straits ports. Recruiting agents in the Straits undertook the
task of transporting coolies in concert with mainland counterparts whereby
Hong Kong, Macao, Amoy (Xiamen) as major departure points and land-
ings in Penang and Singapore. From the last, the sin-kheh (lit. guests, new
arrivals) were transported overland to the tin fields. Recruiting agents trans-
acted the new coolie, initially with the captain of the ship or junk, whereby
the agent paid the cost of the sea passage to the captain. Temporarily, the
coolie was the ‘property’ of the agent and was housed at the port-city. Then,
when there was a demand for labour, the coolie was transported overland to
the tin fields. There, the agent handed over the coolie to the tin mine towkay
who took on the cost of the sea passage. The sin-kheh becomes an inden-
tured labourer on a three-year contract, namely the period within which he
pays back the cost of his sea passage from China to the mine owner. Owing
to the numbers transacted, the trafficking of labour in the tin industry came
to be known in derogatory terms as the pig trade, i.e. not unlike the buying
and selling of pigs.

Mine workers, from the technical, specialized individuals that initiated
the search and mining, to the unskilled coolie who took on the heavy and
dirtiest parts of the job, were under the watchful eye of the towkay with
his cohort of ‘bullyboys’ to enforce discipline, ensure no runaways and

Chinese politics in Malaysia, 1920s–1990s  29

overall order and peace among the labouring force. The mine owner pro-
vided recreation for the hundreds of his workforce, viz. opium dens, gam-
bling outlets, brothels, arrack (locally distilled liquor) stalls and pawnshops.
Consequent of the partaking of the various vice outlets, the majority of the
workers were indebted and only a minority of steadfast characters managed
to work off the three-year indenture and leave the mine as ‘free men’. Some
of the ‘free men’ decided in partnership to initiate mines of their own and
assumed the role of towkay. The tin fields were rich with ore during the 1850s
through 1870s, the early period, hence opening new mining enterprises were
pregnant with ample opportunities for success. Others, however, decided to
leave mining and ventured into commercial agriculture or trading.

Besides the coolie traffic, other Chinese who emigrated on their own ex-
penses involved themselves in non-mining enterprises such as petty trading,
import-and-export businesses (mainly of foodstuffs from China), artisans
(carpenters, furniture makers, brick layers, iron smiths and metal workers,
etc.) in towns, market gardening (vegetables, poultry, pigs, freshwater fish)
on the outskirts of urban areas and commercial agriculture (sugar cane,
tapioca, pepper, gambier, coffee, rubber) in rural districts.9 While Chinese
sugar cane growers thrived in the southern districts of Province Wellesley,
pepper and gambier growers prospered in Johor in securing land stakes in
river valleys granted by the Malay ruler under the kangchu (lit. ‘head/leader
of river’) system. In the hinterland of Malacca town, there were Chinese
tapioca cultivators. Coffee, too, was cultivated in medium-sized holdings,
later followed by rubber at the turn of the twentieth century.

Keen to develop commercial agriculture in Sarawak, Rajah Charles
Brooke encouraged Chinese peasant farmers with generous land grants
and other incentives to undertake pepper and gambier in the First Division
(present-day Kuching Division) and rice cultivation in the Lower Rajang.10
In the 1870s Hakka farmers successfully established pepper and gambier
gardens on the outskirts of Kuching. But Fuzhou (Foochow) peasant im-
migrants who arrived in 1900–1901 failed in rice cultivation in and around
Sibu. Subsequently, rubber as an alternative commercial enterprise turned
out to be a boom industry.

Most of the Chinese in Malaya and northern Borneo migrated from the
southern provinces of Fujian and Guangdong. An exception, however, was
a community of northern Chinese from Hebei and Shandong provinces
emigrating from the port of Tianjin, who settled in the western parts of
North Borneo. Besides the Tianjin ren, as those from northern China were
collectively designated, the bulk of the Chinese of southern stock comprised
Hokkien, Teochew, Cantonese, Hakka, Fuzhou (Foochow), Henghua, Hain-
anese (Hailam).11 Traditionally, Hokkien predominated in the northern
Malay states like Kedah and Perlis owing to proximity to George Town,
Penang, where the Hokkien community spoke, and still does, the predom-
inant dialect with clusters of Hakka, Hainanese and Cantonese. Teochew
bastion was among the sugar cane growers of southern Province Wellesley.

30  Ooi Keat Gin

Cantonese, who formed the bulk of the coolie traffic of the nineteenth cen-
tury, were the main community in Perak, Selangor and Negri Sembilan with
pockets of Hokkien and Hakka. Johor possessed significant Hokkien and
Teochew that replicated across to Singapore. Malacca had unique eclectic
Baba Nyonya, a Sino-Malay Peranakan heritage when Hokkien traders in-
termarried with local women in the fifteenth century. George Town too had
its northern version of the Baba Nyonya.12 Hokkien and Teochew were the
main dialect groups in Kuching and Miri whereas Fuzhou dominated Sibu
and the Lower Rajang area.

Not only were the various dialects unintelligible to one another, inter-
dialect rivalry and outright antagonism were the norm rather than the ex-
ception. The Larut Wars (1861–1874), for instance, pitted the Hai San against
the Ghee Hin.13 The Ghee Hin society, which originated in Singapore, was
initially Cantonese, but Hokkien became the majority by 1860. Established
in George Town, the Hai San society commenced as a Cantonese-based
organization, but by mid-1850s, an influx of Hakka dominated it, and there-
after became increasingly anti-Ghee Hin. To non-Chinese observers, the
Chinese appeared to be a single ethnic community but on closer scrutiny,
they were divisive along dialect lines, clannish and belligerent from within
the various groups.

By the 1920s, the heyday of British Malaya, the Chinese community was
second only to the indigenous Malays in quantifiable terms. In Sarawak,
the Chinese comprised the largest non-native group, in fact, the territory
accommodated the largest Chinese community on the island. Chinese com-
munities more often established their own enclaves in the urban areas, the
so-called ‘Chinatown’. Likewise, in North Borneo, pockets of Chinese were
found in the towns and sparingly dotting the interior. Initially, the majority
of the Chinese immigrants appeared to be sojourners, from traders to coo-
lies, but by the early decades of the twentieth century, some had decided to
be settlers in their host country. For example, the Hokkian and Teochew,
and the Baba Nyonya of George Town, had long regarded Penang as their
homeland, likewise their counterparts, the Hokkian and the Baba Nyonya
of Malacca and Hokkien and Teochew of Kuching and Miri. Others, how-
ever, physically in Ipoh, Kuala Lumpur or Sandakan, but mentally and
emotionally remained with the ancestral village in Guangdong or Fujian
on the Chinese mainland. It was this affinity and ties with the mainland
that made the huaqiao in Malaya and Sarawak remain susceptible and
sympathetic to influences from the fatherland, affecting both sojourners
and settlers.

Aware of the blood ties, sympathy and support of the huaqiao in Malaya,
Taiping rebels who escaped capture by the Qing government and the inev-
itable beheading, fled to the Nanyang (South Seas, namely Southeast Asia)
preferably to Penang. Being Hakka, the fugitives sought refuge with their
brethren in George Town, and also in Balik Pulau, a rural settlement in the
island’s southwest where there existed a Hakka Catholic enclave.

Chinese politics in Malaysia, 1920s–1990s 31

Similarly, when the Hundred Days’ Reforms14 failed, its initiator the re-
formist Kang Youwei (1858–1927) fled to Penang where he sojourned for
more than five months evading Qing officials. In George Town, Penang,
August 1900 to December 1901, Kang promoted his concept of constitu-
tional monarchy as an alternative to the absolute emperorship of the Qing.
At the same time, he competed with the revolutionary leader Dr Sun Yat-sen
(1866–1925) for funds and recruits among the overseas Chinese.

In aid of a revolution

During the second half of 1910, a much forlorn Dr Sun Yat-Sen also came
to George Town for refuge and, at the same time, sought support for his
revolutionary cause. By then, Dr Sun was almost a broken man. Numer-
ous attempts to topple the Qing had been abortive and support for his rev-
olutionary cause had increasingly declined, particularly in the US, which
hitherto had been his main sponsor, likewise in Singapore. His move to
Penang was almost a desperate last attempt at resuscitating his revolution-
ary cause.15 But the Chinese of George Town did not disappoint him:

In the five months in Penang [mid-July to mid-Nov 1910] … Dr Sun
gathered his key [local] supporters [Wu Shirong (Goh Say Eng) and
Huang Jingqing (Ng Kim Kheng)] together, including his brother Sun
Mei, Huang Xin, Hu Hanming and Wang Jingwei, to raise funds for
his revolutionary work, change the Tongmenhui [Tong Meng Hui] con-
stitution and also founded the oldest Chinese newspaper overseas, the
Kwong Wah Yit Poh.16

The Tong Meng Hui’s Nanyang or overseas headquarters shifted from Sin-
gapore to Penang as the British colonial authorities, partly from pressure
exerted by the Qing government, and partly from the local towkay elite, pro-
scribed the organization. The Chinese mercantile elite in Singapore were
then weary of Dr Sun, even questioning his declared aim of overthrowing
the Qing and thought it prudent to shift support to the latter rather than to
the uncertain revolutionary ideals. But their counterparts in Penang sus-
tained their faith in Dr Sun’s ability, leadership and revolutionary cause and
continued to lend their support. Wu Shirong, of patrician background as
scion of a Straits Chinese mercantile family and founding chairman of the
Penang branch of the Tong Meng Hui, wholeheartedly supported Dr Sun’s
mission. Wu initiated the establishment of the Penang Philomathic Union
on Macalister Road,17 officially registered as a Chinese reading club but
its real purpose was in acting as a front for the Tong Meng Hui. Moreover,
Wu contributed funds to the revolutionary cause, to the extent of selling off
family properties to furnish funds for the revolutionary cause. The Kwong
Wah Yit Poh, in turn, acted as the mouthpiece in garnering support for Dr
Sun’s revolutionary agenda.

32  Ooi Keat Gin

On Sunday, 12 November 1910, coincidentally on his birthday, Dr Sun con-
vened the Penang Conference at number 404 Dato Keramat Road.18 It was
at this gathering that the groundwork planning of the Second Guangzhou
Huang Hua Uprising aimed at toppling the Qing regime was undertaken.

Five months later, in April 1911, Qing forces suppressed the Second
Guangzhou Huang Hua Uprising and many were captured and summarily
executed including four from Penang. Despite the failure, it appeared to
have inspired the 10 October (Double Tenth) Wu Chang Rebellion that sub-
sequently led to the collapse of the Qing dynasty and ushered in the birth of
Republican China. Dr Sun became the first president of Republican China
on 29 December 1911.

Between left and right: 1920s–1930s

Developments on the Chinese mainland

The huaqiao community in Malaya and northern Borneo, like their compa-
triots in the region, were anxious of developments on the fatherland. Thanks
to improvements in literacy rates, the vernacular press and regular contacts
with kinfolk on the mainland through correspondence, the Chinese com-
munity from Penang, Singapore to Kuching, Sibu, Jesselton and Sandakan
kept abreast of happenings. Political developments, in particular, were the
key concerns of the huaqiao community.19 Hence, they took in the news of
the collapse of Qing and the triumph of Dr Sun Yat-Sen, developments of the
Republican Era that witnessed birth of the Nationalist Party (Guomindang,
KMT)20 on 25 August 1912 in Beijing, the experiment with parliamentarian
democracy, and the ascendancy of General Yuan Shikai (1859–1916), who
reinstated the monarchy, himself as the Hongxian Emperor (12 December
1915 to 22 March 1916), and thereafter, as president of the Republic of
China until his demise on 6 June 1916. While in power, Yuan reorganized
the provincial governments placing each province under a military governor
who held all authority including maintaining own (private) army. Conse-
quently, such a move – appointments of military governors with personal
army – sowed the seeds of warlordism that plagued the country for more
than two decades and that brought forth conflicts, strife, massive devasta-
tions and untold sufferings for the population.

From afar in Malaya, Sarawak and North Borneo, the Chinese witnessed
the establishment of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 1921 in Shang-
hai, and two years thereafter, the involvement of the Communist Interna-
tional (COMINTERN), a Moscow-based international organization that
advocated and propagated world communism, in the reorganization of the
Guomindang after the fashion of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
(CPSU). It was the COMINTERN that urged a KMT-CCP (first) united
front.21 But the emergence of Chiang Kai-shek (1887–1975, Jiang Jieshi) as
leader of the KMT, saw a deterioration in relations with the CCP that subse-
quently led to the ‘White Terror’ or the Shanghai massacre of 12 April 1927

Chinese politics in Malaysia, 1920s–1990s  33

(April 12th Incident), which saw the annihilation of the CCP in Shanghai,
also suppression in Guangzhou and Changsha. It marked the end of the
KMT-CCP united front, likewise the KMT-COMINTERN alliance.

Both the KMT Northern Expedition (1926–1928) and the CCP Long
March (1934–1935) were known to the Chinese in Malaya and northern
Borneo. Similarly, the invasion and seizure of Manchuria, renamed Man-
chuko, by Imperial Japan in 1932, and the formation of the Second KMT-
CCP United Front (1937–1945)22 in facing the Second Sino-Japanese War
(1937–1945)23 were detailed in the vernacular broadsheets that were read and
discussed from Penang to Sandakan. In kopitiam (coffee shops) to roadside
food stalls to homes, the literate related news of such momentous develop-
ments on the mainland to their non-literate brethren.

Chinese vernacular schools: nurseries for influence and recruitment

Owing to the nonchalant attitude of the colonial administration (British
and Brooke) towards education and schools for the Chinese, the commu-
nity itself took on the responsibility. Traditional Chinese social hierarchy
elevated the scholar to the apex, hence, every Chinese village would ensure
that a schoolhouse be built, a teacher engaged and books and writing mate-
rials be available for the education of the young. The community genuinely
hoped that from within the ranks of the younger generation there would
emerge a scholar who would excel in the Imperial Civil Service Examina-
tions and become a scholar-bureaucrat thereby bringing fame to the com-
munity. Therefore, even abroad, outside the ancestral homeland, Chinese
communities emphasized and prioritized schools and education for the
young. Through philanthropy of towkay, and/or through communal effort,
schools were erected and both teachers and textbooks were brought from
the mainland. Affluent households would engage a personal tutor for their
son’s home schooling.

Chinese vernacular schools abounded in rural areas as well as in urban
settings. Typically, the nomenclature educational levels comprised: a six-
year elementary school (seven- to 12-year-olds); a three-year junior middle
school (13- to 15-year-olds); and, a three-year senior middle school (16- to
17-year-olds). The elementary and junior middle schools were common-
place, but senior middle schools were available only in major cities such as
George Town and Singapore.

The undeniable fact that both teachers and textbooks were from the
mainland emphasized the dominant influence of the fatherland on the im-
pressionable young generation of the huaqiao community in Malaya and
northern Borneo.24 The mainland’s school curriculum was also wholly
adopted, meaning that, to all intents and purposes, a child studying in Jes-
selton or Taiping was no different from his counterpart in Soochow (Suzhou)
or in Chengdu. The child’s emotional affinity and worldview were all China-
oriented thanks to the combination of the wholesale import of teachers,
curricular and textbooks. Initially, dialects were used by the vernacular

34  Ooi Keat Gin

Chinese schools as reflected in the name such as Hokkien Girls’ School
(Fukien Girls’ School) in George Town, Hokkien Free School in Kuching.
But following the May Fourth Movement (1919), dialect schools gave way
to Guo-yu or vernacular Mandarin, the Chinese national language, as the
medium of instruction. Through this single medium, in contrast to the mul-
titude of dialects, the propagation and spread of ideologies and other prop-
aganda was rendered easier and convenient. Only in Sarawak did dialect
schools survived into the post-war period.

The struggles on the mainland between the nationalists and the com-
munists undoubtedly overflowed into the populace where supporters and
sympathizers took sides. Both the KMT and the CCP vied for recruits
and supporters from the wider society from within as well as from with-
out, namely huaqiao communities in foreign lands. No different from Kang
Youwei or Dr Sun Yat-Sen in previous decades who sought support from
the huaqiao communities, KMT and CCP activists and agitators undertook
their proselytizing mission in spreading their ‘-isms’ and garnering support-
ers and recruits. Chinese communities throughout Southeast Asia were tar-
geted in a way that was no different from communities in North America,
South Africa or elsewhere.

Consequently, China-born teachers who advocated the KMT or the CCP
agenda took their commitments to the classroom. Whether for the ‘right’ or
the ‘left’ of the Chinese political spectrum that Chinese vernacular schools
and their students in Malaya and northern Borneo chose to seek solace; the
colonial authorities in Malaya like their Sarawak counterparts were forced
to take sides.

Owing to the fact that the KMT championed republicanism based on
Dr Sun’s political philosophy of the ‘Three Principles of the People’, viz.
nationalism, democracy and people’s welfare and/or livelihood, the British
colonial authorities in Malaya, the Brooke regime and the Company ad-
ministration were less troubled by the KMT agenda. The CCP, however,
promoted anti-imperialism, anti-colonialism and in its striving to attain its
end of establishing a communist state was undoubtedly antithetical to the
government of the aforesaid colonial territories. Acting on this premise,
the British, the Brooke, and the Company took measures to arrest and/or
curtail the activities of CCP advocates in their respective territories.

In Sarawak, for instance:

He [Rajah Charles Vyner Brooke] was sorry to find in certain Chinese
[vernacular] schools the opportunity had been taken by unscrupulous
teachers to preach revolutionary propaganda … the Sarawak Govern-
ment would not tolerate for a moment teaching in any form, which was
likely to disturb the peace of Sarawak or stir up discontent.25

Consequently, in order to curb such ‘subversive’ activities, the Brooke ad-
ministration issued ‘regulations in 1924 that briefly prohibited the teaching

Chinese politics in Malaysia, 1920s–1990s  35

of Mandarin [Kuo-yu] and required the registration of all [Chinese vernac-
ular] schools and teachers, the supervision of registered schools, and the
censorship of [imported] textbooks’.26 As mentioned, the used of Mandarin
as the medium of instruction also facilitated the propagation of (subver-
sive) ideologies, hence its usage was prohibited. Similar measures were also
undertaken in Malaya and in North Borneo. The situation appeared to be
contained in the pre-war period. The post-war era, however, proved less ef-
fective in suppressing such subversive activities.

Likewise, in Malaya, until 1920, the colonial government had wholly
neglected or failed to take cognizance of Chinese education and vernacular
schools. But the May Fourth Movement had awoken the colonial government.
In1919, that May day witnessed anti-Japanese student demonstrations in Bei-
jing against the terms of the Treaty of Versailles, which sanctioned Imperial
Japan to assume German possessions in Shandong. The radical action of the
students prompted a nationwide protest, and in turn, spurred a reinvigorat-
ing surge of Chinese nationalism. As a result, there emerged what came to be
referred to as the May Fourth Movement, which forged an anti-imperialist
agenda, prioritizing politics over cultural concerns, and increasingly assuming
proportions of a mass movement rather than being led by an intellectual, elitist
clique.27 The latter too also appeared to move further to the ‘left’ and became
more radical, losing faith in Western-style liberal democracy.

In total support of their mainland counterparts, teachers and students
of Chinese vernacular schools in Penang, Kuala Lumpur and Singapore
stepped out of their classroom en masse, taking on the streets in June 1919
in support of the Beijing event. This show of support was so strong in its
manifestation that the British colonial authorities declared martial law in
Penang and Singapore.28

Consequently, developments in mid-1919 spurred the British colonial
government to take stern measures to curb the Chinese vernacular schools.
The registration of all schools and teachers was made mandatory in the
Straits Settlements to ensure that the schools were conducted whereby it
was not ‘against the interest of the government of the Colony’.29 Any vio-
lation meant that the colonial government could order the closure of such
recalcitrant schools. Although the regulations encompassed a whole range
of requirements including building facilities to sanitation, political control
(over curriculum, textbooks and teachers) was prioritized and specifically
targeted at Chinese vernacular schools where the seeds of subversion were
being sown and nurtured.30

Although describing the situation in the 1930s, it was easily applicable in
the previous decade with regards to the attitude and stance of the British
colonial government in Malaya:

Throughout the 1930s, colonial officials continued to be more con-
cerned with the problem of teachers and students participating in
China-centred political issues. These fluctuated between years of

36  Ooi Keat Gin

relative quiet, for example between 1932 and 1935, and intense activities
during the dramatic climaxing of huaqiao nationalism after 1937 when
the Japanese invasion of China began. The colonial government’s atti-
tude towards such activities was ad hoc and ambivalent. It vacillated
between alarm when these had an anti-colonial and anti-British tone
and tolerance when British interests were not threatened.31

Control and influence of labour organization and workers

Labour and labour organizations had been the vanguard of the commu-
nist revolution. Soviet Russia’s example in successfully infiltrating and con-
trolling labour, its organizations and movements had been replicated in the
satellites in Eastern Europe. Hence, as early as December 1922, the Malayan
Political Bulletin of Political Intelligence (MBPI),32 the then almost year-old
British colonial outfit, reported of communist doctrines in Malaya, namely
the manifesto of the ‘Congress of the labouring masses of the Far East’, and
in Singapore, a cache of 10 copies of the ‘Pioneer’, a communist publication,
sent from Shanghai that included a ‘Manifesto issued by the First Conven-
tion of the Communist and Racial Revolutionary Organisations of the var-
ious countries of the Far East’. The sender of the latter requested that the
Singapore addressee, apparently a schoolgoing teenager, ‘to distribute these
copies to “other school colleagues”’.33

In reporting on workers’ strikes and threat of a strike in later part of 1925,
colonial British intelligence cautioned of the ‘hidden hand’ of communist
activists:

Although there has been no trace of direct Communist instigation of the
strikes hitherto, there is no doubt that labour in Malaya is beginning
to realise the value of unity and the power of direct action, and the ad-
vice of persons with Communist leanings is being listened to in many
instances.34

The next decade, the 1930s, witnessed a confluence of various factors that
brought forth ‘a more coherent and concerted labour movement’ whereby
strikes were planned and executed that subsequently created dangerous
socio-political scenarios.35 The resurrected decentralization issue (from
1930) – the devolution of political and administrative powers from the Kuala
Lumpur-based federal government to the Federated Malay States (FMS),
and increasingly more articulated Malays voicing their social, economic and
political quandaries vis-à-vis the immigrant peoples (namely Chinese and
Indians), the formation of the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) apparently
on 30 April 1930,36 and the conspicuous reawakening of patriotism and na-
tionalism within the Chinese community in Malaya towards the unfolding
of critical developments on the mainland from the 1930s – would culminate
in Imperial Japan’s invasion of China on 7 July 1937.

Chinese politics in Malaysia, 1920s–1990s  37

Contemporary political developments in the Indian subcontinent were
equally significant, as they had repercussions in the diaspora in Malaya. The
charismatic Indian activist Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi (1869–1948)
proved a formidable influence in the struggle for Indian independence from
the British Raj. Gandhi pioneered satyagraha (lit. ‘holding onto truth’) with
a strict adherence to principles of ahimsa (non-violence), and civil disobedi-
ence in his independence struggle. Through Gandhi’s exemplary leadership,
the common people too begun to be involved in the non-violent independ-
ence movement. Moreover, in adhering strictly to democratic principles,
religious equality, eschewing social status (in contrast to the caste hierar-
chy) and brotherhood of all, Gandhi succeeded in bringing together people,
literally from all walks of life united in one single purpose: independence.
The 1930s witnessed a surge in membership, in tens of thousands, in the In-
dian National Congress, undoubtedly the major political party.37 Although
many had committed to residence in Malaya, inspiration and influence
from the subcontinent remained strong. However, drawing from Gandhi’s
movement, Indians in Malaya became increasingly conscious of their social
and political position vis-à-vis the indigenous Malays and the immigrant
Chinese.

Both the MCP and the Indian associations seized on the heightening of
ethnic, socio-political consciousness among the Chinese and Indian com-
munities, respectively. Aggravating the aforesaid was the onset of the De-
pression (1929–1931), which added fuel to the fire including issues of wage
deductions in lieu of layoffs, unemployment and its array of concomitant
consequences, issues of repatriation. The Depression brought forth the liq-
uidation of many capitalist enterprises including closure of tin mines and
rubber plantations where the bulk of the labour force gravitated. A combi-
nation of the above mentioned issues and factors created fertile ground for
left-wing political subversive activities, the crux of the black propaganda
campaign was that the British colonial government was to be blamed for all
the hardships, miseries consequent of the Depression. The inherent weak-
nesses and flaws of the capitalist system itself, it was highlighted in leftist
propaganda that these had brought forth the Depression, hence the alterna-
tive, socialism and communism must be the panacea.

The MCP, working through its front organization, the Malayan Gen-
eral Labour Union (MGLU), seized the opportunity to extend its political
influence within the working class and recruitment of labour to the leftist
cause. MGLU oversaw and coordinated the various labour unions through-
out Malaya including Singapore. As the labour arm of the MCP, despite
its intention to be multi-ethnic, MGLU was Hainanese dominated and
non-Chinese members were inconsequential.38 In fact, MGLU branches
largely consisted of members drawn from typical Chinese guilds of the var-
ious trades such as shoemakers, tailors, goldsmiths, construction workers,
shop assistants, waiters and cooks, mechanics, painters, domestic servants.
The various Chinese guilds were admonished by MCP through MGLU of

38  Ooi Keat Gin

being passive, possessing incompetent leaders, pro-employer, clannish be-
sides adhering to traditional and customary constraints.39

Non-Chinese sectors were equally important to the MCP, namely the
Malay peasantry and Indian labourers.40 But whether among the urban
Chinese workers, Malay peasantry or Indian workers, the MCP did not
make much headway mainly due to its own weaknesses from within and dis-
tractions from without. The former was its overall perception and in reality
of the MCP as a Chinese-based and dominated organization41 and the latter
was the labour and focus of most members orientated towards the struggle
of the CCP on the mainland.42

Ironically, when the economy started to recover from the mid-1930s, MCP
penetration into labour circles, namely transport workers, mechanics and
construction labourers and influencing the establishment of overt bona fide
registered unions were increasingly successful.43 The colonial police was un-
doubtedly concerned. Moreover, a greater concern was the MCP extending
its tentacles into the mainland, the Malay states.

Labour troubles became increasingly apparent from the later part of 1935
and throughout the following year. The workers’ strike and takeover of Batu
Arang mine was most telling.44 A coalmine in Gombak district, Selangor,
Batu Arang was a colliery that was a major supplier of coal for the FMS
railway as well as fuel for electric power stations. The action of the strikers,
numbering some 5,000, in setting up a so-called ‘soviet government’ with
its administrative body and law courts, had the tell-tale signs of a commu-
nist hand prompting developments. A surprise night assault by a 300-strong
colonial police force retook the colliery following a brief armed clash.

The gravity of the MCP challenge at Batu Arang was spelt out in the fol-
lowing fashion:

The Federated Malay States [FMS] has passed through the most serious
crisis of its history. It was within an ace of dissolving into temporary
chaos as a result of Communist intrigue. The evidence is now clear
that Batu Arang was to be a trial of strength between the [Malayan]
Communist Party and the Government. Had the organization [‘soviet
government’] there not been crushed and crushed quickly it is almost
certain that there would not only have been a general strike but that this
country … would have been in very serious danger of being overrun by
angry and desperate Chinese mobs.45

The year 1936 witnessed even more labour unrest, in fact, it was regarded
as the ‘high tide in party labour work’.46 A 24-hour work stoppage involv-
ing 30,000 labourers in the pineapple canning and the building industries
was an unprecedented phenomenon. The strikers staged demonstrations,
surrounded public buildings and challenged the colonial police. When the
police arrested various strike leaders, the MCP appealed for the support
of other workers, viz. rubber tappers, tin miners, fishermen, mechanics to
down tools and stage a ‘sympathy walk-out’ in support of their co-workers.

Chinese politics in Malaysia, 1920s–1990s  39

British colonial government sources had clear evidence of the direct in-
volvement of the MCP in the various strike actions.47 Apparently in Sep-
tember 1936, a MCP conference was held to launch the workers’ united
front strategy. Senior cadres were fanned out across the peninsula: Selangor
housed the party’s ‘Northern central’ branch with ‘eastern’ and ‘western’
sections. It was the Hainanese Chen Han, the chairman of the ‘western’
section that organized the colliery strike at Batu Arang.48 His counterpart,
head of the ‘eastern’ section, Chu Tong, a Cantonese cadre, organized the
rubber labourers’ union in Selangor. In Klang, Phang Seow Lin, a Teo-
chew cadre was reputed to have set up the Pineapple Cutters Benevolent
Association.49

From the aforesaid developments in organizing workers and establishing
occupational unions, the MCP succeeded in two fronts. First, it demon-
strated the party’s ability to mobilize workers on a large scale, for instance
having the capability to influence 30,000 labourers in the pineapple canning
and the building industries to undertake strike action. Second, success in
garnering support from female workers as witnessed during the rubber es-
tate workers’ strike of March 1937 whereby women strikers exhibited unex-
pected militancy towards colonial authorities, both Chinese Protectorate
personnel and police.50

The MCP’s ‘golden opportunity’ arose out of the emotional repercussion
of the Chinese diaspora in Malaya and Singapore following the outbreak
of the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945).51 The MCP literally piggy-
backed on the overseas Chinese anti-Japanese movement for the national
salvation of China, the fatherland. Consequent of the Xi’an Incident (1936),
the Second United Front of KMT-CCP (1936–1945) was formed in order to
counter the threat of Imperial Japan that subsequently launched an invasion
of China proper in early July 1937. Chinese communities, regardless of di-
alect affiliations, formed relief fund committees to collect donations (mon-
ies, jewellery, gold, etc.) for the Nationalist Government in its war against
Imperial Japan. Others organized concerted boycotts of ‘Made in Japan’
goods including foodstuffs. Chinese workers, in both rural and urban set-
tings, were in the forefront of the national salvation movement in convening
relief fund committees and organizing events to raise funds for the father-
land.52 Exhibiting patriotic fervour, workers drawn from various trades and
industries collaborated and cooperated in relief fund committees. Although
initially such committees tasked in collecting funds for the war effort on the
Chinese mainland, these committees subsequently developed into mutual
aid societies and/or associations established along traditional lines of trade
guilds. These ‘new’ societies and associations transcended dialect particu-
larism as well as being more inclusive of all workers, from master craftsmen
to coolies.

The MCP seized the ‘moment’ of rising patriotic fervour among Chinese
communities throughout Malaya, from Penang to Singapore and the west-
ern Malay states, in particular, Perak, Selangor and Negeri Sembilan. Ingen-
iously, the communists married their labour strategy to national salvation

40  Ooi Keat Gin

aimed at mobilizing mass support with the setting up of the Anti-Enemy
Backing-Up Society (AEBUS) with each of its branches representing a par-
ticular trade.53 AEBUS was, to all intents and purposes, the vehicle that
the MCP intended to use to create a ‘united front’ with all quarters that
opposed Imperial Japan’s aggressive policy towards Nationalist China.

Meanwhile, the MCP even contemplated a possible ‘united front’ with the
British colonial government in Malaya in the fight against Imperial Japan,
particularly when the Second World War (1939–1945) broke out in Europe.54
A besieged London might be agreeable to a ‘united front’ with the MCP
against fascist Tokyo. Nothing, however, materialized then. By 1939, mem-
bership of AEBUS had reached 30,000, a sizeable number of which com-
prised the Chinese labouring class.55 In other words, the MCP had to a large
extent accomplished its labour goals in fortuitously riding on the rising wave
of Chinese patriotic zeal.

In the wider Chinese community, whether in Malaya, Singapore or Sar-
awak and North Borneo, only the proletariat and peasantry lent support
to the left. Other social classes such as the towkay elite, who had thrived
on capitalist enterprises, in trade and commerce, and the emerging middle
class of kerani (clerk) and the handful of professionals, drawn particularly
from the English-educated urban-based Baba Nyonya, remained supportive
of the British colonial government and the Brooke Raj.

Furthermore, leftist propaganda, whether emphasizing the oppressed
labouring class or entreaty to the salvation of mainland China, had scant
appeal to the Anglicized Baba and other local-born Chinese, who in large
measure might not even comprehend the Guo-yu (vernacular Mandarin)
ideographic script used in propaganda materials (pamphlets, notes, sheets,
etc.), and as the medium of instruction in the hitherto dialect-based vernac-
ular Chinese schools. The majority of the Straits-born Chinese including
the Baba Nyonya had little or vague familial ties with the mainland; conse-
quently, many did not possess much emotional affinity vis-à-vis the China
born, who understandably, still maintained close contact with kith and kin
back in the fatherland. The China-born and vernacular-educated Chinese
comprised the bulk of the labouring and peasant class who were, in general,
partial to leftist influence.

Sarawak was a maverick in terms of the adoption of Guo-yu. In fact, the
various dialects continued to be used as the medium of instruction until
the 1950s. Nonetheless, the more ‘progressive’ (read: pro-China, pro-left)
youth tended to master Guo-yu, hence were in a better position to absorb
and propagate leftist literature among their numbers. Post-war develop-
ments witnessed the radicalization of the Chinese youth in Kuching, Sibu
and other parts of Sarawak. In the wider Chinese society, however, appeal
to the fatherland was less strong, on the one hand, and appeal and suscepti-
bility to leftist propaganda that utilized Guo-yu, on the other hand, had less
impact due to the language barrier.

Chinese politics in Malaysia, 1920s–1990s  41

Between left and right: 1941–1945

Power play in Europe

Prior to the outbreak of the Second World War, diplomatic shuffling be-
tween Berlin and Rome from the mid-1930s culminated in a treaty in Oc-
tober 1936 between the two foremost European fascist powers, Hitler’s
Germany and Mussolini’s Italy. Almost paralleling this alliance was an
anti-Communist pact between Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan on 25
November 1936 aimed at countering and overcoming the subversive activ-
ities of the COMINTERN. Italy joined this Anti-Comintern Pact in 1937.
It was a harbinger to the creation of the ‘Axis Powers’. Penned on 22 May
1939, the Pact of Friendship and Alliance (aka Pact of Steel) between Ger-
many and Italy, was a military and political alliance. The Pact was initially
planned for a tripartite military alliance between Japan, Italy and Ger-
many.56 Disagreements, however, disrupted Imperial Japan’s participation.
Always suspicious and perceived as a threat, Tokyo was insistent that the
Pact be directed against the Soviet Union. Instead, geopolitical concerns on
the continent prioritized Britain and its empire and France as far as Ger-
many and Italy were concerned. Then, on 27 September 1940, the Tripartite
Pact or Berlin Pact, brought together Germany, Italy and Imperial Japan in
a defensive military alliance against the US.

Pitted against the Axis Powers, as Germany, Italy and Imperial Japan
came to be known, were the Allies.57 When war broke out in September 1939,
the Allies comprised the UK, France, and Poland. Shortly thereafter, they
were joined by Dominions of the British Commonwealth, namely Canada,
Australia, New Zealand and South Africa. Later, the Netherlands, Belgium,
Greece and Yugoslavia joined the Allies. At the outbreak of war, Stalin’s
Soviet Union, in spite of assisting Nazi Germany’s Blitzkrieg in overrunning
Poland, resisted joining either the Axis or the Allies. But the onset of Oper-
ation Barbarossa (June–December 1941), the invasion of the Soviet Union
by Germany, Stalin turned to the Allies (June 1941). Meanwhile, the US was
supplying war materials to the Allies, the UK in particular.58 The stealth as-
sault on its Pacific fleet base at Hawai’i’s Pearl Harbor by the Imperial Japa-
nese Navy (IJN) on 7 December 1941, forced Washington’s hand in formally
declaring war on the side of the Allies against the Axis Powers. Nationalist
China too, from 1941, aligned itself with the Allies. The Allies’ ‘Big Four’,
referred to the UK, US, Soviet Union and China, whereby the US appeared
to be increasingly the predominant power as the war progressed.

Changed geopolitical scenario

Against the backdrop of developments in Europe, particularly with regards
to the Soviet Union, the MCP had to make strategic decisions and choices
in the Singapore and Malaya context. When Hitler launched his invasion of

42  Ooi Keat Gin

the Soviet Union in June 1941, Stalin’s options were literally closed – with
the exception of crossing over to the Allies. A report from the US Office of
Intelligence Research (OIR) detailed the MCP’s chronological development:

1939 At the Sixth Central Expansion Council, an extremely anti-
British ten-point directive … was issued. Strikes increased in numbers.

It is believed that top-level direction came through the Chinese 8th
Route Army and the Southern Bureau of the Chinese Communist Party
in Hong [K]ong.

1940 The Malayan Communist Party pursued a more extreme anti-
British program and was vigorously suppressed by British authorities.

1941 Malayan Communist policy of semi-cooperation with the
British began in June, when Germany attacked the USSR. Full coop-
eration was offered in December, and many communists were then
released from jail.59

Within a year – 1940 to 1941 – the geopolitical situation had drastically
changed. The MCP, which had ideological relations with the Soviet Union as
well as with the CCP, had to take another look at its stance. From mid-1941,
Moscow had turned to the Allies in the face of the Nazi invasion. National-
ist China had since the outbreak of war with Imperial Japan from 1937 had
been supported by the Allies with supplies and war materials. The Second
United Front of the KMT-CCP was aimed at defeating and ejecting the Im-
perial Japanese Army (IJA) from the mainland. It appeared that the Hong
Kong branch of the CCP had instructed the MCP to realign with the British
in Malaya against Imperial Japan.60 It was therefore understandable that the
MCP had to reoriente its anti-imperialist, anti-colonial stance against the
British in Malaya.61 The MCP viewed Imperial Japan as the greater threat
and, by mid-1941, the threat of war was increasingly imminent. The MCP’s
initial gestures (July 1941), however, were rejected by the British colonial gov-
ernment in Malaya that maintained suspicion of communists’ intentions.

The IJA landings at Kota Bahru on 8 December 1941, and the swift two-
pronged advance southwards down the peninsula, struck a chord with the
British High Command in Singapore. Ten days later, the British colonial
authorities finally agreed to a clandestine meeting with MCP Secretary-
General Lai Teck. The British agreed to train and equip resistance fight-
ers at the 101 Special Training School (STS) in Singapore under instructors
from the Special Operations Executive (SOE).

Meanwhile, the Overseas Chinese Anti-Japanese Mobilisation Feder-
ation (OCAJMF) comprising a diverse assembly of anti-Japanese groups
and organizations was constituted on 19 December 1941. Under the aus-
pices of OCAJMF, volunteers were recruited that subsequently constituted
the Singapore Overseas Chinese Anti-Japanese Volunteer Army. Although
there were both KMT and MCP personnel in this Volunteer Army, the
latter predominantly as recruits. The Chinese volunteers were trained by

Chinese politics in Malaysia, 1920s–1990s  43

Lieutenant Colonel John Dalley of the Federated Malay States (FMS)
Police Force, hence the unit’s name of DALFORCE, after its chief instruc-
tor and commanding officer. This 4,000-strong DALFORCE was a unit of
irregulars/guerrillas within the British Straits Settlements Volunteer Force
that fought alongside the Australian 22nd Brigade and 1st Malaya Infantry
Brigade in the Battle of Singapore (25 December 1941 to 13 February 1942).
DALFORCE appeared to be a desperate attempt that was simply, ‘too little,
too late’.

Described as ‘the worst disaster and largest capitulation in British
history’,62 Singapore surrendered to the IJA on 15 February 1942.
DALFORCE too ceased to exist thereafter. But the MCP seized on the
momentum in regrouping the various anti-Japanese elements, literally
stranded behind enemy lines, to work out a new strategy again under the
‘new’ changing circumstances, in Occupied Malaya.

MCP, MPAJA and Force 136

Remnants of DALFORCE regrouped in March 1942 to constitute the 1st
Independent Force of the Malayan People’s Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA).
To all intents and purposes, the MPAJA was the armed guerrilla force of the
MCP. Most telling was the ‘Three Stars’ in yellow against a red background
flag that was the MCP’s as well as the MPAJA’s standard bearer. In addition
to the three yellow stars grouped on the top left corner, the MPAJA 1st
Independent Army Flag had three rows of Chinese characters. Indigenous
Malays referred to the MPAJA as Bintang Tiga (Three Stars) that appeared
on the flag (in yellow) as well as on the green cloth five-cornered service
cap (in red) of its guerrilla fighters. The MCP claimed that symbolically the
‘Three Stars’ represent the three main ethnic groups in Malaya, viz. Malay,
Chinese and Indian. In reality, however, the MPAJA, like its mother organi-
zation the MCP, was overwhelmingly Chinese in both rank and file.

Undoubtedly, not all members of the MPAJA were communist, but a sub-
stantial number of the guerrillas were card-carrying members of the MCP.
The overall MPAJA commandant was Liu Yau, chairman of the MCP’s Mil-
itary Committee.63 Between March 1942 and June/July 1944, MCP-MPAJA
operated on their own in the vast, thick tropical jungles of the peninsula.
Guerrilla tactics and strategy of the MPAJA were modelled on the CCP’s
Red Army, literally mirroring the anti-Japanese guerrilla war that Mao
Zedong waged on the Chinese mainland. Mao’s use of women, in various
roles, such as couriers, medics in the field (frontline medical care) and even
guerrilla fighters alongside male counterparts, was replicated in the MPAJA.

The MPAJA had eight independent regiments spread across the penin-
sula: 1st (Selangor); 2nd (Negeri Sembilan); 3rd (Johor – north); 4th (Johor –
south); 5th (Perak); 6th (Pahang – west and Terengganu); 7th (Pahang – east);
and, 8th (Kedah and Perlis).64 The Central Military Committee of the
MCP was the MPAJA’s ‘High Command’ wherein emanated all orders and

44  Ooi Keat Gin

instructions, policies and directions.65 Like an octopus with its tentacles,
each regiment possessed several intermediate and subteams spread across
the region (state) that it oversaw. By the close of the war, all the aforesaid
eight independent regiments remained intact, and as many as 67 intermedi-
ate teams, collectively numbering 9,000 guerrillas.66 Moreover:

[E]ach independent regiment and intermediate team had a British officer
or Chinese liaison officer assigned by the Allied Forces [Force 136] to
assist mainly in training its members in the use of advance weaponry.67

Since bidding farewell to their charges at 101 STS in Singapore on comple-
tion of their hurried training, SOE’s personnel such as Jim Gavin, Spencer
Chapman and others had lost all contact with the guerrillas in the Malayan
jungle. Then, from late May 1943, Britain’s wartime South-East Asia
Command (SEAC) headed by Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten based in
Colombo, Ceylon (Sri Lanka) was finally able to send personnel (known
as Force 136) via submarine to Malaya’s west coast. Members of Force
136, a covert unit of SOE, was armed with a mission to act as a conduit
in supplying resistance movements behind enemy lines. Besides supplying
resistance fighters with modern equipment and weaponry, Force 136 officers
themselves launched clandestine sabotage operations. Accompanying Force
136 British officers to Malaya were Major Lim Bo Seng, a Malayan KMT
member and representative of the Nationalist Government then (1943)
based at Chungking (Chongqing). Major Lim brought his staff of wireless
operators and intelligence specialists. One scholar opined:

It appears that Force 136 was attempting to set up its own intelligence
service by using KMT agents. This is evident because only after the
KMT agents had been established in cover jobs in Ipoh was contact
made on 30 September [1943] with Chin Peng, representative of the
Perak MPAJA headquarters.68

It was apparent that the pre-war distrust of the MCP was again translated
to the wartime MPAJA. Nevertheless, on 1 January 1944, an agreement
was made between Force 136 and MPAJA at Bukit Bidor, Perak, whereby
both parties would cooperate and collaborate in the fight against the IJA
in Occupied Malaya.69 SEAC agreed to supply arms, monies, training and
supplies to the MPAJA in return for its cooperation. Moreover, the British
would contribute £3,000 per month to the MPAJA coffers and instructed
that all arms be returned following the defeat of Imperial Japan.70

By 1944, MPAJA strength stood between 3,000 and 4,000 guerrillas.71
Major F. Spencer Chapman of Force 136, who had earlier trained the core
members of MPAJA, managed to join some of his charges in the jungle to
wage guerrilla war against the IJA.72 Prior to the joint operations with Force
136, the MPAJA were in fact in dire straits. A plethora of challenges faced

Chinese politics in Malaysia, 1920s–1990s  45

the guerrillas: ill trained for jungle warfare; shortage of arms and ammuni-
tion; lack of food, medicine; inexperienced and unfamiliarity with the jungle
led to illnesses and fatalities; and, eventually, a leadership vacuum. The last
mentioned was a crucial factor for the MPAJA that greatly compromised its
effectiveness in the field against the enemy.

The betrayal of MCP Secretary-General Lai Teck of his comrades to
the IJA at Batu Caves, outside Kuala Lumpur in late August 1942, saw ‘29
party officials, including four MPAJA “Political Commissars” and their
bodyguards were dead, 15 were arrested, and only a handful managed to
escape’.73 Due to this loss and accentuated by all the other inadequacies, the
strategy generally adopted by MPAJA against the IJA were limited to sim-
ply ‘hit-and-run’, ‘cat-and-mouse’ and sabotage work (disruption of trans-
port and communications). Good relations with civilian communities on
the fringes of the jungle sustained a supply of food, clothes, funds, recruits
and intelligence for the MPAJA. The peninsula’s various tribal Orang Asli
(indigenous, aboriginal peoples) in the interior, too, lent support for the
MPAJA guerrillas.

As the MPAJA gradually gained strength in numbers as well as in con-
fidence, raids were undertaken on small town police stations primarily to
access the weaponry therein. From February 1945, owing to inputs from
Force 136, caches of arms, military equipment, supplies, medicines and
other basic necessities were parachuted into the depths of the tropical jungle.

Additionally, working through the Malayan People’s Anti-Japanese
Union (MPAJU) that recruited anti-Japanese elements irrespective of
political ideology (including KMT), ethnicity (a handful of Indians and
Malays, besides Chinese) or social class (towkay to coolies), MPAJA man-
aged to increase its manpower and network of support (food, medicines,
intelligence etc.) in the wider society that immensely contributed greatly
towards its sustainability.74 Moreover, the MPAJA maintained a ‘reserve’
force based in rural villages, and when circumstances necessitated, this
backup force could be called on. Known as Ho Pi Tui (reserves), volun-
teers were given a two-month training as jungle guerrillas; thereafter,
they returned to their homes in villages and towns in readiness for any
eventuality.75 Collectively, support from without MPAJA numbered some
300,000 civilian volunteers.76

‘Open’ units were MPAJA units that had liaised with Force 136, while
‘secret’ units were formed comprising ‘veterans’, meaning key leaders
and long-tested members of the MCP.77 Armed with modern weaponry
airdropped by SEAC, the ‘secret’ army was to maintain itself in the jungle
vastness, keep a low profile and assumed a ‘wait-and-see’ stance. While
MPAJA ‘open’ units were to be engaged in Operation Zipper, the reoccupa-
tion of Malaya, ‘secret’ units were in readiness to launch an armed seizure
of power from the British colonialist in the event that the MCP’s ultimate
goal of the setting up of a Democratic Republic of Malaya failed to materi-
alize. Meanwhile, while lying low, the ‘secret’ units were tasked to amass as

46  Ooi Keat Gin

much weaponry as possible from SEAC drops, concealed them deep in the
jungle for future access.78

Evidence for the aforesaid thesis – having a clandestine well-armed force
in readiness to face the British colonialist in the post-war period – was
apparent from the post-war handover of weapons from MPAJA members.
British sources79 not only maintained that only 7,000 MPAJA personnel
handed over their arms, but also most of the weapons were those seized
from the IJA, namely, largely Arisaka Type 38 and Type 44 6.5mm Car-
bines. It was estimated that SEAC dropped at least 2,000 modern arms (such
as BREN guns, Sten SMGs, US-made.45 Caliber Thompson SMGs, M1
Carbines) and other military supplies worth £1.5 million.

Another source, however, opined differently:

5,497 weapons were handed in by the 6,800 guerrillas who came forward
for demobilisation at ceremonial parades at various MPAJA headquar-
ters in the country. This was more than the 4,765 weapons originally is-
sued by the British. According to Force 136 records most of the weapons
that had been air-dropped into [jungle] the were eventually returned,
but this did into account the thousands of weapons and ammunition
discarded during the British retreat in 1941–2, or the weapons secured
by the guerrillas when police armouries and troop positions were aban-
doned and overrun.80

Adherence to such a covert strategy demonstrated how faithfully the MCP-
MPAJA followed Mao’s tactics in the execution of the Second United Front
of KMT-CCP whereby the Communists conserved their strength (men,
equipment, resources) in avoiding direct confrontation with the IJA; in
preparation to face the ‘real’ enemy, Chiang’s KMT. Likewise, the MCP-
MPAJA prepared for the post-war showdown against the ‘real’ enemy, the
British colonialist.

Occupied Malaya had at least four groups of anti-Japanese guerrillas. Be-
sides the MPAJA, the armed guerrilla force of the MCP, Force 136 and KMT
personnel, there were the Overseas Chinese Anti-Japanese Army (OCAJA)
and Malay guerrillas. Although referred to as ‘KMT guerrillas’ by Force
136, ironically the OCAJA in fact had no formal relations with the KMT,
although swearing allegiance to Chiang’s exiled government at Chungking:

These [OCAJA] guerrillas had assumed a connection with the KMT
more as a fiery cross than for ideological reasons. They had not been
formed by the KMT party in Malaya or by the KMT government in
[Chungking] China; nor did they have connections with KMT members
in Force 136.81

Numbering some 400 and spread across the region of the Thai-Kelantan
border, Thai-Perak border, and along the east coast railroad between Krai

Chinese politics in Malaysia, 1920s–1990s  47

and Merapoh in Kelantan, OCAJA guerrillas comprised Kwanghsi, natives
of Guangxi (Kwangsi) province in southeast China, led by Lee Fong Sam
who was staunchly anti-communist.82 Force 136 too did not arm or train
OCAJA Kwanghsi guerrillas. From a non-Chinese perspective, whether
British or Malay, ‘KMT guerrillas’ openly clashed with MPAJA.83

The emergence of Malay guerrillas was initiated by Force 136. Major P.
G. J. Dobree of 3/3rd Gurkha Rifles in India was seconded to Force 136 for
an infiltration mission, codenamed ‘Hebrides’, that was tasked to source
‘intelligence about the disposition of Japanese forces and … raised a local
guerrilla army’.84 Dobree was parachuted into northern Perak in Decem-
ber 1944, and was successful in his mission: to contact with aboriginal peo-
ples (Sakai) to assist in intelligence gathering about the disposition of IJA,
and to train and arm a small unit of Malays known as Askar Melayu Setia
(AMS, Loyal Malay Soldiers).85 His counterpart in Pahang was Major J. D.
Richardson, who, through former Kuala Lipis ADO Yeop Mahidin bin Mo-
hamed Shariff (1918–1999), set up the covert Tentera Wataniah (Homeland
Force). Tentera Wataniah comprised some 254 men mainly from Pahang86
including later notable personalities of Malaya/Malaysia such as Captain
Abdul Razak and Lieutenant Ghazali Shafie.87

Overall the anti-Japanese groups in the peninsula were at odds with one
another, often openly clashing with resultant heavy casualties.88 It appeared
that the common denominator, namely ‘anti-Japanese’, was impotent to
their ideological differences and/or racial mistrust that remained pivotal. To
a certain extent, Force 136 acted as the arbiter between the various groups,
but its influence was limited. The OCAJA, in particular, was beyond Force
136’s influence as it practically relied on its own resources and local sup-
port in its anti-Japanese struggle. Although out of expediency, the British
not only armed, trained, and supplied the MCP-MPAJA forces, there was
apparent partiality and trusting towards the KMT personnel within Force
136. Britain, even in its hour of darkness, still steadfast as to ‘who’ was its
‘real’ enemy, namely the communists, even taking no account of the uni-
form they wore.

The Pacific War (1941–1945) and the Bornean territories

Compared to its small Chinese population vis-à-vis Malaya and Singa-
pore, Sarawak did not possess anti-Japanese forces. At the same time,
IJA-controlled Sarawak, Brunei and North Borneo appeared to be rather
benign. Instead of the horrendous sook ching that claimed many Chinese
lives in Singapore and various parts of the peninsula,89 the Borneo
territories only faced a shu-jin, a monetary demand of a collective total
of Straits dollar S$3 million.90 The amount to be paid in pre-war cur-
rency was as an appeasement for the ‘sins against Imperial Japan’, namely
in supporting the nationalist government against the IJA on the Chinese
mainland.

48  Ooi Keat Gin

Interestingly to note was the fact that leftist and KMT elements were ‘in-
visible’ in wartime IJA-occupied Sarawak. Unlike the situation in Malaya,
there were no appeals from the Chinese to form stay-behind guerrilla
groups. On the eve of the outbreak of war, the only British military pres-
ence was the 1,050-member 2nd Battalion,15th Punjab Regiment (2nd/15th
Punjab Regiment), an Indian infantry unit headed by Major C. M. Lane.
Arriving in April–May 1941, Lane’s mission was the defence of the Bukit
Stabar landing ground, south of Kuching. But primarily the regiment’s
pivotal task was in undertaking scorched-earth tactics in disabling the
oil installations at Miri and Lutong and the neighbouring Seria oil fields
in Brunei. Bukit Stabar was to be held as long as possible as it was an
asset essential in the defence of British Singapore and Dutch Batavia on
Java. The capture of Kuching’s landing ground would enable the enemy to
launch bombing raids on the last two prime targets, hence its defence was
stressed.

Besides this small unit to Sarawak and the despatch of the Royal Navy’s
battleship HMS Prince of Wales and battlecruiser HMS Repulse to Singa-
pore, there was little in practical terms that Britain could realistically do for
British Malaya or British Borneo. In mid-1940, Britain stood alone against
the might of Nazi Germany. The Battle of Britain (10 July–31 October 1940)
saw the fate of the UK being decided in the aerial battle between the Royal
Air Force (RAF) and the Luftwaffe. It was literally a touch-and-go scenario
for London. Understandably, faraway colonial possessions and Empire
were secondary by then.

The IJA literally walked into Miri, Brunei Town, also Jesselton and on
Christmas Eve 1941, the Hinomaru fluttered over Fort Margherita, Kuch-
ing.91 The 2nd/15th Punjab successfully executed its mission in northern
Sarawak and Brunei and, following disabling Bukit Stabar, retreated to-
wards Pontianak across the border into Dutch Borneo. But the fall of Java
in March 1942 saw members of the Indian battalion being brought back
to Kuching to be incarcerated at the Batu Lintang Prisoners of War and
Internment Camp.92

The situation in North Borneo, however, took a different twist in the later
part of the occupation, with dire consequences. On the night of 9 October
and 10 October 1943, an uprising against the IJA broke out:

Having sacked the police stations at Tuaran and Menggata, a group of
100 Chinese headed south towards Api [Jesselton] (present-day Kota
Kinabalu) … where they attacked the administration offices of the
Gunseibu [military government], police stations, and other facilities …
Meanwhile a group of 200 natives from the offshore islands landed
wharf and torched at the Api the warehouses. … The rebels ‘ruled’ Api
and its surroundings for about a day (10 October) before regrouping
at their base in Mansiang, near Menggatal. Thereafter the rebels dis-
persed into hideouts in the mountainous interior.93

Chinese politics in Malaysia, 1920s–1990s  49

Known as the Kinabalu Uprising, the aim of the rebels was unclear. Led
by a Teochew tsin-sieh (physician) Guo Heng Nan (Albert Kwok), this
Sino-native force which was poorly armed (many only carried parang), and
a rebellion that was apparently not well planned, suffered dearly for its reck-
lessness.94 By mid-December, all rebels including Guo (who voluntarily sur-
rendered) were apprehended. Guo and 175 of his comrades were beheaded
at Petagas in late January 1944. Others were imprisoned, 131 in Labuan, and
96 at the Batu Tiga prison; fewer than 10 survived.95 The offshore islanders
were slaughtered and their homes burnt.96

Between left and right: 1940s–1960s

Cleavages became more apparent in the post-war period within the Chinese
communities in Malaya and Singapore as well as in Sarawak. In general,
the labouring class and the peasant farmers lent support to the MCP and
the Sarawak Communist Organization (SCO) in Malaya and Sarawak, re-
spectively. Opposing the left, were capitalists towkay and the small middle
class (professionals, clerical personnel). Owing to the plural school system
in both Malaya and Sarawak, working-class Chinese families preferred the
vernacular schools, whereas the middle class in particular, and some afflu-
ent families, favoured English-medium education (government, Christian
missions). Therefore, due to the school preferences, the vernacular schooled
were partial to the left while the English-educated stood with the right, the
British colonialist. This left–right divide dissected the Chinese community
in Malaya and Sarawak into two opposing halves, each possessing low opin-
ion, even derogatory attitude, towards one another.97

The post-war period would see the various Chinese groups torn over
political developments, at odds with one another, or in direct opposition.
The MCP played into the constitutional developments to the best of its ad-
vantage, but outcomes seemed not to be in its favour.

From Malayan Union (1946) to Federation of Malaya (1948)

The post-war Labour government in the UK stood strongly for organized
labour, to the extent of regardless ‘whether the [labour] organizers were
Communists or not’.98 The MCP, undoubtedly, seized the opportunity
in dominating the Pan-Malayan Federation of Trade Unions (PMFTU)
and its counterpart, the Singapore Federation of Trade Unions (SFTU);
subsequently, there followed a series of outbreaks of strikes, but these were
mainly inconsequential.

The MCP itself faced internal issues, namely the sudden disappearance
of Secretary-General Lai Teck in March 1947 absconding with party funds,
and questions over strategic ‘mistakes’ committed by the party. Lai Teck,
with his many aliases – Chang Hong, Wong Kim Geok, Wong Show Tong,
Wright, etc. – was finally exposed as not only a Kempeitai agent but also

50  Ooi Keat Gin

a British agent.99 The Batu Caves betrayal to the IJA in late August 1942
impacted heavily on the party’s top echelon of leaders. Equally adverse was
Lai Teck’s influence that the MCP adopt a ‘moderate policy’, a ‘constitu-
tional mode’, rather than a revolutionary line. Hence, on 27 August 1945,
shortly after the IJA administration had confirmed Imperial Japan’s uncon-
ditional surrender, the MCP Central Executive Committee (CEC) publicly
declared that it would cooperate with the returning British colonial govern-
ment in accordance with the international situation and internal develop-
ments in Malaya with the end of the war:

[…] a moderate policy was, in fact, in the party’s own best interests and
correct reading of the Comintern line of the ‘Popular Front’. … As the
Soviet Union was an ally of Britain, America, and China, this was still
acceptable. As a wartime ally of the British, the MCP could benefit from
postwar constitutional measures which the British might be expected to
introduce in Malaya on their return.100

At the same time, in following a line of cooperation with the British
colonialist:

[…] British intentions could be tested, and if they were willing to bring
about self-government and allow the MCP to operate unhindered,
developments would then help the party to move in the direction of
achieving power.101

Hawkish quarters within the MCP that advocated revolution and immedi-
ate seizure of power argued against this moderate, constitutional strategy
as a betrayal of the party’s aim (of February 1943) of setting up the Demo-
cratic Republic of Malaya, a communist state.102 Lai Teck’s and the CEC’s
counter-argument was that the ‘Eight Principles’ (hereinafter, 27 August
1945 MCP Statement) did not altogether abandon the intention of establish-
ing a Democratic Republic, instead, to the contrary: ‘These Eight Principles
are to realize the preliminary steps of the Democratic Republic because they
are part of the requirements of the Democratic Republic.’103

Consequent of Lai Teck’s betrayal, the MCP lost a ‘golden opportunity’
to forcefully seize power and set up the Democratic Republic of Malaya
during this immediate post-surrender interregnum. As one scholar clearly
pointed out:

Yet, perhaps at no time in its history was the MCP to have such an
opportunity to influence the future course of events: (1) British colonial
authority lay in ruins, leaving a vacuum which the haphazard Japanese
occupation government only filled in part, (2) even non-Communist
elements, out of necessity, had to gravitate toward the MCP-MPAJA
complex as the only significant local resistance movement, particularly

Chinese politics in Malaysia, 1920s–1990s  51

after the Allies regularly began to supply it, and (3) inchoate nationalist
aspirations, even among the Malays, seemed ready to be directed in this
period of crisis around a single rallying point.104

When Chin Peng replaced Lai Teck as MCP Secretary-General, the ‘Eight
Principles’ (27 August 1945) were criticized and repudiated. Nonetheless, the
‘golden opportunity’ had been missed. On hindsight, it was indeed a ‘golden
opportunity’ as the interregnum period – from the formal announcement
of Imperial Japan’s unconditional surrender to the time when Allied troops
landed in Malaya and the commencement of the British Military Adminis-
tration (BMA) – a two- to three-week window, when there was a power vac-
uum when lawlessness reigned. The IJA military administration collapsed
and all troops were ordered to remain in their barracks, armed, to await
further instructions. The MCP-MPAJA were the largest in numbers and
the most well-armed group on the peninsula then. Besides, there was the
behind-the-scene 300,000 civilian volunteers that could literally be called on
for logistical support and assistance.

But instead of seizing power and proceeding to establish its Democratic
Republic, the MCP-MPAJA turned towards retribution of wartime collab-
orators. A reign of terror ensued during the interregnum.105 Despite SEAC
and Whitehall’s welcoming of the 27 August 1945 MCP Statement, BMA
field commanders were cautious of the MCP-MPAJA that might pose a
military challenge to the reinstatement of British colonial authority over
Malaya. Hence, the British Army ordered that all MPAJA units (intact and
armed) to gather in designated centres, and to abide by its command. Force
136 officers were to continue their ever important role as liaison officers, the
go-between. 12 September 1945 marked the formal commencement of BMA
rule (until 1 April 1946), thus thereafter from that date, MPAJA ceased to
be operational.

Then on 1 December 1945, the MPAJA was formally disbanded and de-
mobilized. At demobilization ceremonies, each MPAJA member handed
over his weapon, received a gratuity sum of Malayan dollar M$350 and
given the career option of either taking up civilian employment or entering
the police force, volunteer force or the Malay Regiment.106 As mentioned
earlier, there appeared to be discrepancies between number of handover
weapons from the MPAJA personnel and those that were sent (airdropped)
by SEAC during the war, both in terms of quantity and of quality of arms.
At the same time, not all MPAJA members emerged from the jungle to re-
join mainstream society; ‘secret’ units remained behind.

Undoubtedly the MCP, prior to the war, already had an inkling of the
political reality in the peninsula and island Singapore, notably the multi-
ethnic populace divided along ethnic, religious and, to some extent, educa-
tional background (in particular, the English educated vis-à-vis vernacular
educated). Political developments in the post-war era accentuated this
multi-ethnic reality where opinions, support, influence run on conspicuous

52  Ooi Keat Gin

ethnic lines. In this context, the MCP found itself wanting, in not only be-
ing perceived, and in reality, a wholly Chinese-dominated organization,
from rank to file. Moreover, the MCP was identified and resonated with
the vernacular-educated Chinese mainly drawn from the labouring masses,
whether of the urban proletariat or rural peasant farming stock. Close as-
sociation with the Chinese mainland, the CCP in particular, out of sheer
ethnic affiliation, patriotic pride rather than ideological orientation per
se, differentiated pro-MCP Chinese and their brethren within the Chinese
community in Malaya and Singapore.

The immediate post-war constitutional development of the British-
designed Malayan Union (1946–1948) demonstrated the political power and
inherent influence, of the ethnic Malays. Similarly, thereafter, the Federa-
tion of Malaya (1948–1957), again witnessed consideration and prioritiza-
tion by the British colonialist of the ethnic factor, a partiality towards the
indigenous Malays, and an accommodative attitude for the immigrant com-
munities, namely Chinese and Indians.

Theoretically, what was referred to as British Malaya did not really exist,
instead it was a conglomeration of various territories each under a different
form of British colonial governance.107 Chronologically, the component ter-
ritories of the Straits Settlements (SS), viz. Penang, Malacca and Singapore
were governed as crown colonies with a Colonial Office (CO)-appointed
governor responsible for direct administration. Although basically multi-
ethnic and urban based, the population was largely Chinese, both local born
and immigrants. The local-born Straits Chinese, including the eclectic Baba
Nyonya, were, in fact, British subjects. Then, on the peninsula, were the nine
Malay states, each with its sovereign ruler (sultan). All nine sovereign Malay
states were British protectorates, meaning internal self-rule but Britain was
responsible for defence and foreign relations. An interesting and ingenious
system of British indirect rule was practised in all the nine Malay states
whereby a British officer, titled ‘resident’ or ‘adviser’, ‘whose advice must be
asked and acted on on all questions other than those touching Malay Reli-
gion and Custom’.108 Initially implemented under the terms of the Pangkor
Engagement (1874) to Perak, it was subsequently replicated and applicable
to Selangor, Negeri Sembilan and Pahang that each had a Resident whose
upkeep (remuneration, accommodation) was borne by the Malay ruler. Sim-
ilarly, the other Malay states – Perlis, Kedah, Kelantan, Terengganu, Johor
– each had an adviser. For administrative expediency, Perak, Selangor, Neg-
eri Sembilan and Pahang were federated in 1895 and known as the Federated
Malay States (FMS) headed by a Resident-General based in Kuala Lumpur.
The remaining Malay states came to be referred to as Un-Federated Malay
States (UMS). The British governor with his office in Singapore was High
Commissioner to the Malay states (FMS and UMS).

The aforesaid rather complex administrative setup – SS, FMS, UMS –
with their respective attendant drawbacks, convinced the CO mandarins
the necessity for a better administrative structure. The Malayan Union was

Chinese politics in Malaysia, 1920s–1990s  53

the immediate post-war ‘experiment’ intended in circumnavigating the hith-
erto disjointed and complicated administrative structure. This new setup of
a ‘union’ enjoined FMS-UMS-Penang-Malacca; Singapore was maintained
as a crown colony. Accompanying this revamped administrative setup, a
rather liberal citizenship designed to absorb the greater part of the immi-
grant population was adopted.

But unanticipated Malay opposition that was spearheaded by the United
Malays National Organization (UMNO) (1 March 1946) forced the CO to
replace the Malayan Union with the Federation of Malaya.109 Overall it ap-
peared that ‘physically’, the Federation of Malaya was no different from
the previous Malayan Union; Singapore remained separated. But there were
three conspicuous differences, viz. the status of the Malay rulers and as pro-
tector of Islam, preferential and special rights of the Malays and tighter
citizenship requirements for immigrant peoples.

Malay opposition towards the Malayan Union focused on the position
of the Malay rulers. All nine sultans appended their mohor (seal) to a new
Anglo-Malay agreement (that enabled the establishment of the Malayan
Union) that transferred each Malay ruler’s sovereignty (daulat) to the British
monarch. To the Malay, identity and existence rested on the sultan’s daulat;
shorn of daulat, the sultans were literally ineffectual, no different if they
do not exist. Thus, ‘no sultan, no Malay identity, no ethnic Malay’. Did not
the traditional Malay warrior, Hang Tuah warn: Tak kan Melayu Hilang di
bumi, meaning, ‘the non-existence of Malay people’. Hence, the opposition
(UMNO) chant of Hidup Melayu against the Malayan Union was a fight for
the very survival of the ethnic Malay. Therefore, the Federation of Malaya
Agreement ensured the preservation of the Malay monarchical system, pro-
tection of the sovereignty and powers of the sultans.

Uniquely, all peninsula Malays, with scant exception, embraced Islam.
Every Malay born is a Muslim; apostasy was, and still is, not an option.
Islam is all embracing, covering all aspects of a Muslim’s existence. Hence,
all matters pertaining to Islam was in the hands of the Malay sultan as ruler
of his rakyat (people, masses). In the Malayan Union, however, in matters
relating to and on Islam, the British governor could override the sultans; un-
doubtedly, a situation that was wholly unacceptable for the Muslim faithful.
The Federation of Malaya Agreement restored the sultans as the exclusive
head of Islam in their respective states.

Second, the Malayan Union treated all citizens within the union on an
equal basis, enjoying all the rights and privileges of citizenship equally
without any particular community being given especial treatment. Ethnic
Malays argued, as indigenous peoples of the peninsula, it is their birth
right to be accorded special privileges vis-à-vis immigrant communities.
Consequently, Federation of Malaya Agreement upheld Malays as
indigenes to be accorded ‘special rights’, in terms of land ownership, busi-
ness licences, educational opportunities and scholarships and civil service
appointments.

54  Ooi Keat Gin

The third notable difference was in the accordance of citizenship, par-
ticularly to immigrant (mainly Chinese and Indians) groups. Whereas jus
soli and naturalization were the criteria for citizenship enabling eligibility
of large numbers of immigrants in the Malayan Union, in the Federation of
Malaya, both criteria were made more stringent, for instance, requiring a
period of residence of between 15 and 20 years and fluency in either Malay
or English.

With the implementation of the law, automatic citizenship was granted to
the following groups of people:

1 Citizens of the Sultan of any state in the Federation.
2 British citizens born in Penang or Malacca and had resided in the Fed-

eration continuously for 15 years.
3 British citizens born in the Federation and whose fathers were born or

lived for 15 years in the Federation.
4 Anyone born in the Federation, conversed in the Malay language and

practised Malay traditions in their daily lives.
5 Anyone born in the Federation, whose parents were born and had lived

in the Federation for 15 years continuously.

Through the naturalisation process (by application), anyone can be granted
citizenship if:

1 He/she was born in the Federation and had lived at least for eight years
out of the 12 years in the Federation of Malaya before the application
was submitted.

2 He/she had lived in the Federation for 15 years out of 20 years prior to
the application.110

But the Federation of Malaya Agreement was the consensus between the
British colonialist, UMNO and representatives of the nine Malay rulers,
an Anglo-Malay Working Committee that was convened on 25 July 1946.
It was a secretive, closed-door discussion, making decisions that completely
disregarded and excluded the vast majority of the Malays as well as non-
Malay inhabitants of Malaya.111 Understandably, there were oppositions
from those who were not privy. In fact:

As soon as the Colonial Office made known its intention to replace
the Malayan Union with a new constitution for Malaya, the Chinese
community in Melaka [Malacca] under both Tan Cheng Lock and
Goh Chee Yan, the president of the Melaka Chamber of Commerce,
made an appeal to the British government to consult all section of
Malayan opinion before arriving at a final decision on this vital
matter.112

Chinese politics in Malaysia, 1920s–1990s  55

Moreover, Tan Cheng Lock (1883–1960), who would later play pivotal roles
in Malaya’s independence (1957), warned that if presented with a fait ac-
compli, meaning a solely tripartite decision, a Gandhi-style opposition
characterized by passive resistance and non-cooperation with the colonial
government, would be launched.113

Meanwhile, as the Anglo-Malay Working Committee Report was be-
ing scrutinized by mandarins at Whitehall in November 1946, plans were
mooted to form a united front to oppose the forthcoming constitutional
proposals. Political developments were beginning to align the different eth-
nic groups against one another. The formation of UMNO, and the Brit-
ish readiness to accommodate them (UMNO) as well as the Malay rulers
in reconsidering the Malayan Union proposals that subsequently bore the
Federation of Malaya Agreement (1948), aroused Chinese concerns of their
interests vis-à-vis the Malays even before the Federation of Malaya came
into effect. The MCP had anticipated that the forthcoming constitutional
proposal (by the Anglo-Malay Working Committee) would be more restric-
tive for non-Malays than the hitherto Malayan Union scheme. In response,
the MCP organized a 20,000-strong rally at Farrer Park, Singapore in late
September, ‘to demand a self-governing Malaya in which all communities
would enjoy equal rights’.114 In organizing this rally, it appeared that the
MCP was taking the lead in galvanizing opposition towards the forthcoming
constitutional proposals to replace the Malayan Union.115

Consequently, an All-Malaya Council of Joint Action (AMCJA)116 was
convened on 14 December 1946 as a multi-ethnic united front comprising:
Malayan Democratic Union (MDU), Parti Kebangsaan Melayu Malaya
(PKMM, Malay Nationalist Party, MNP),117 Malayan Indian Congress
(MIC), General Labour Union,118 Singapore Clerical Union, Straits Chi-
nese British Association (SBCA), Singapore Indian Chamber of Commerce,
Singapore Tamil Association and Singapore Women’s Federation.119 Within
a week, others lent their support, viz. Clerical Unions of Penang, Malacca,
Selangor and Perak, the Selangor Indian Chamber of Commerce, the Sel-
angor Women’s Federation, the Malayan New Democratic Youths’ League,
the Malayan People’s Anti-Japanese Ex-Comrades Association, the Singa-
pore Chinese Association and the Peasant’s Union. Tan Cheng Lock helmed
as AMCJA chairman with Paul Eber from MDU as secretary-general.120

Indisposed during the preliminary meeting of 19 November 1946 where
attendees included Ahmad Boestamam and Musa Ahmad (MNP), Liew Yit
Fun and Chai Pek Siang (MCP), Gerald de Cruz (MDU), H. B. Talalla and
Khoo Teik Ee, both as unaffiliated individuals, Tan Cheng Lock dispatched
a telegram outlining three fundamental principles that were adopted:

1 A united Malaya including Singapore.
2 A popularly elected central government and popularly elected state

councils.

56  Ooi Keat Gin

3 A citizenship granting equal rights to all who made Malaya their per-
manent home and the object of their undivided loyalty.121

Nonetheless, on 24 December 1946, the outcome (report) of the delibera-
tion of the Anglo-Malay Working Committee was published as a govern-
ment White Paper.122 Malayan Union Governor Edward Gent appended
a note indicating that that the constitutional proposals were conditionally
accepted by Whitehall, however, ‘there can be no be no question of their
[British government] reaching any final decisions on any matters involved
until all the interested communities in Malaya have had full and free oppor-
tunity of expressing their views.’123

The non-Malay communities and left-wing Malay groups did express
‘their views’ in a collective organization popularly referred to as the
PUTERA-AMCJA. Pusat Tenaga Ra’ayat or PUTERA was convened on 22
February 1947 as a coalition of several Malay organizations that objected
to the exclusive tripartite Anglo-Malay agreement. PUTERA was steered
by the left-wing MNP. Besides the original three principles (of Tan Cheng
Lock), another seven were added and agreed on by all involved parties within
the coalition on 10 August 1947. Then, on 21 September, PUTERA-AMCJA
made public its 10 fundamental principles of constitutional proposals that
came to be referred as the ‘People’s Constitution’, although more aptly and
rightly it should be the ‘People’s Constitutional Proposals’. It is prudent to
undertake a comparison between this ‘People’s Constitutional Proposals’
and the ‘Revised Constitutional Proposals’, the latter had been accepted by
the British government (see Appendix).

Disagreements were stacked unfavourably against agreements. PUTERA-
AMCJA vis-à-vis British government: unitary state versus federation; elected
versus appointed; citizenship with equal rights versus restrictive (for non-
Malays); constitutional monarchs versus Malay rulers with powers and privi-
leges; Malay customs and religion vested with the Malay people versus vested
with the Malay rulers; foreign affairs and defence jointly by Kuala Lumpur
and London versus all portfolios remained with the colonial government and
Whitehall. On some matters, Whitehall was ‘silent’, namely a Malayan na-
tionality and a ‘Council of Races’ to ensure non-discrimination based on
ethnicity or religion. Only on four matters, at least, was there agreement
between them: affirmative action for the Malays; Malay to be the official
language; a national flag; and the formalization of a Conference of Rulers.

In order to demonstrate their opposition to Whitehall’s ‘Revised Consti-
tutional Proposals’, PUTERA-AMCJA staged an All-Malaya hartal on 20
October 1947. Hartal, a Gujarati term, drawn from the Indian independ-
ence movement, witnessed a total closure of offices, shops, markets, schools;
literally, all business activities ceased. It was more than a general labour
strike; it was an act of civil disobedience. The scheduled hartal was planned
to coincide with the tabling and debate of the Revised Constitutional Pro-
posals in the British Parliament.

Chinese politics in Malaysia, 1920s–1990s  57

Despite its success, the hartal did not impact favourably on British legisla-
tors. On 1 February 1948, the Federation of Malaya Constitution, primarily
based on the Revised Constitutional Proposals, came into force. Subse-
quently, the PUTERA-AMCJA coalition broke up.

Interestingly, AMCJA had the backing of both towkay and proletariat
elements within the Chinese community. The former was especially conspic-
uous in the support given by the influential Associated Chinese Chambers
of Commerce (ACCC) led by prominent capitalist-philanthropist, Tan Kah
Kee (1874–1961) and Lee Kong Chian (1893–1967). Undoubtedly, ACCC
was pro-KMT, and conversely anti-MCP. Nonetheless, ACCC lent support
to the AMCJA. Within the AMCJA, working-class Chinese support were
drawn from the many MCP-aligned organizations such as the various la-
bour unions, Peasant’s Union, Malayan New Democratic Youths’ League,
the Malayan People’s Anti-Japanese Ex-Comrades Association. Singapore
Clerical Union and Straits Chinese British Association (SBCA) drew their
membership and support mainly Chinese from the English-educated mid-
dle class. AMCJA, therefore, managed to attract the support from a cross-
section of the Chinese community in Malaya and Singapore, from the left,
and from the right.

The failure and subsequent dissolution of PUTERA-AMCJA showed that
constitutional means of opposition produced scant impact, basically incon-
sequential. Other radical means might be the option hence the left took the
initiative in launching a reign of terror with extra-judicial killings.

Six month later, the British colonial government declared a state of emer-
gency, the Malayan Emergency (1948–1960), enacting emergency regulations
to counter a guerrilla war launched by the Malayan National Liberation
Army (MNLA),124 the post-war military arm of the MCP.

Sarawak Chinese and cession to the Crown

While the Malays on the peninsula were galvanised by opposition to the
Malayan Union, their brethren across the South China Sea in Sarawak were
split over the cession issue. Rajah Charles Vyner Brooke, the third White
Rajah, decided to handover Sarawak to the British government. A combi-
nation of reasons, from personal (no male heir, issues with his nephew) to
pecuniary (post-war reconstruction) moved the Rajah to end a century of
Brooke rule and to entrust the future of Sarawak to Whitehall.125

But upper-class Sarawak Malays, the datu (non-royal chiefs) and pera-
bangan (sons of datu), who had enjoyed privileged positions and high status
under the Brooke Raj, strongly objected to the Rajah’s intention to cede to
the British government making Sarawak a crown colony. Meanwhile, the
Board of Directors had agreed to handover North Borneo to the CO that
administered the territory as a British Crown Colony. Accordingly, on 15
July 1946, the British Military Administration (British Borneo) (BMA [BB])
handed over North Borneo to civil administration, not to the Company but

58  Ooi Keat Gin

to the CO. Earlier in Sarawak, the BMA (BB) on 15 April passed the reins
of administration to the Rajah on his return from Australia. It was then
that the matter of cession became a controversial issue especially within the
Malay community.

The Sarawak Malays were split. The high-ranking datu and perabangan
of Kuching and their respective followers and supporters opposed cession
and, in turn, took an adamant anti-session stance, namely, insisting on sta-
tus quo, and the Rajah continued but as a constitutional monarch in line
with the 1941 Constitution126 that he presented to Sarawak on the centennial
of Brooke rule in 1941 or, if the Rajah decided to step down, his nephew,
Anthony, to be elevated as the fourth White Rajah to continue the Brooke
Raj. Anthony was the only male child of Bertram Brooke, the Tuan Besar.
Anthony, however, had a rather turbulent relationship with his uncle, the Ra-
jah.127 The anti-cession group headed by the principal Malay chief, the Datu
Patinggi Abang Haji Abdillah (1862–1946), stood in direct opposition to their
brethren under the leadership of Datu Pahlawan Abang Haji Mustapha:

The main counterargument of the pro-cessionists was that only through
Britain’s assistance and resources would the hitherto neglected areas,
namely the social services of education and public health, and the ag-
ricultural sector, see greater progress and bring benefits to the Malays
and other indigenes of Sarawak.128

On the cession issue, it seemed that the Malay community was divided be-
tween a reactionary group and a progressive sector, both uncompromising
in their respective stance. The traditionalist set up Persatuan Kebangsaan
Melayu Sarawak (PKMS, Sarawak Malay National Union) and Angkatan
Semangat Anaknegeri Sarawak (ASAS, Fervour of the Generation of Sar-
awak Natives).

For the non-Malay communities, Chinese and indigenes, the cession
question was mixed. Owing to the low literacy level among native communi-
ties, even within the largest native group, the Iban, there was literally scant
reaction. Only a handful of mission-educated Ibans in Kuching responded
to cession in establishing the Sarawak Dayak Association (SDA) on 23
February 1946, a fortnight following the public announcement.129 Initially,
although concerned about their community’s interest vis-à-vis Malays and
Chinese, the SDA adopted a neutral position. In the event of cession, ru-
mours of an influx of Chinese immigration might redraw the demographic
pattern in Sarawak. Regardless if such an eventuality was real or simply an
over-imagination and/or overreaction of the indigenous peoples, the SDA
decided to reconsider its stance.130 But it was when the PKMS declared ‘or
whatever organ of government came into being, would be on the basis of
the relative numerical strength of the Ibans and Malays’, that SDA decided
to stand alongside the anti-cession Malays.131 The more hawkish quarters
within PKMS also held similar apprehensions of a Chinese threat.132

Chinese politics in Malaysia, 1920s–1990s  59

The Sarawak Chinese community especially the towkay elite and the
English-educated group were partial to cession. Aware of developments in
Malaya and Singapore, many of the entrepreneurial class was hopeful that
the Malayan Union scheme, although it did not include Singapore, might
incorporate British territories in northern Borneo, namely Sarawak, Brunei
and North Borneo. In such an eventuality, ‘the Sarawak Chinese would ben-
efit from the Malayan Union citizenship, and would enjoy equal rights with
the native inhabitants.’133

The Chinese, even those who had long settled and thrown their lot in
with James Brooke, the first White Rajah, were never under the paternal-
istic umbrella of the Raj that prioritized native interests, especially from
being exploited and/or used by others (read: Europeans and Chinese). The
Chinese, from the perspective of the Brooke Rajahs, were necessary, par-
ticularly their contribution to the state economy, but owing to their savvy
and worldliness, need to be guarded against lest they (the Chinese) take
advantage of the natives (Malays, Ibans, Kayans, etc.). Understandably, the
Chinese in Sarawak, across all socioeconomic levels, were keen in acquiring
equal citizenship and the advantages it accrued.134 Besides, cession would
mean an expanded market for Sarawak products, boosting its trade and
commerce, which hitherto had been in Chinese hands. Moreover, from the
Chinese viewpoint, the Brooke Raj ‘had become an anachronistic anomaly
in the post-war period’.135

Hence, the Chinese supported cession, and look forward to Sarawak be-
coming a British crown colony. On 1 July 1946, the Colony of Sarawak was
inaugurated headed by a British governor.

Meanwhile, opposition towards cession took various forms: public
demonstrations; en masse resignations by Malay civil servants; legal battles
in the law courts. Following the demise of the Datu Patinggi on 21 November
1946, the anti-cession movement, at best not wholly united, begin to go in
separate ways. The younger and extremist faction within PKMS, impatient
over the constitutional means hitherto adopted in opposing cession, decided
on radical means. The breakaway ‘Young Turks’ of PKMS proceeded to
set up Rukun Tigabelas (Thirteen Principles) that not only pressed for re-
instatement of Brooke rule, but also demanded beyond that, namely self-
government as provided in the 1941 Constitution. Subsequent independence
was the ultimate agenda among members of the Rukun Tigabelas. And the
way to attain their goal was through violent means. An assassination plot
was hatched to be carried out by two young members, Rosli bin Dhobie, and
Morshidi bin Sidek, both of whom were in their late teens. Their youth, it
was thought, might mitigate them from harsh punishment.

The fateful deed occurred during Governor Stewart Duncan’s visit to
Sibu on 3 December 1949 where he was distracted by Morshidi, opening
the opportunity for Rosli to stab him in the abdomen. Sarawak’s second
colonial governor succumbed to his wound a fortnight later, and died in
Singapore. Following a trial, both youngsters were found guilty of murder

60  Ooi Keat Gin

and hanged on 2 March 1950. Thereafter, the anti-cession movement came
to a quiet conclusion. The schism within the Malay community, however,
took a longer time to heal.136

Malayan Emergency (1948–1960)

Likewise, on the peninsula, the MCP switched its strategy, from constitu-
tional means through front organizations to armed revolution. Although
termed as the Malayan Emergency, it was a protracted 12-year all-out war
between the MCP and the British colonial government of Malaya and, from
1957, MCP and the independent Malayan government.137 In declaring a
state of ‘emergency’ ensured that capitalist assets (mines, plantations, com-
modities, industrial equipment, etc.) could be compensated under insurance
coverage that disqualified any claims in the event of wars. Misnomer or not,
the Malayan Emergency claimed 11,859 fatalities, of which more than half
were insurgents and one-quarter civilians.138

Although the majority of armed encounters were played out in the hot,
humid tropical rainforest of the peninsula, the real test that subsequently
led to cessation of the conflict, albeit temporarily,139 was in psychological
warfare in ‘winning hearts and minds’ of the wider population. Faced with
a concerted, coordinated strategy of military intervention paralleled with
political and constitutional progress toward independence, the MCP and
its guerrilla force were driven increasingly further to the interior regions
straddling the Thai-Malayan border. Confidently, independent Malayan
Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman proclaimed the lifting of the Emer-
gency in 1960.

The Chinese inhabitants in the peninsula played prominent roles in
and during the Emergency. Despite showcasing a sprinkling of Malays
and Indians in leadership positions and in the rank and file, the MCP, as
pointed out, was basically a Chinese-dominated political organization,
where Chinese held the all-powerful post of secretary-general to the foot
soldier-guerrilla.140 Throughout the Emergency, Chin Peng (1924–2013)141
was the MCP’s secretary-general, the pivotal arbiter of political and mili-
tary strategy and policy.

Besides the MNLA guerrilla fighters in the jungle,142 the MCP relied
heavily on the Min Yuen or Mass People’s Movement, a mass organization
chiefly among Chinese communities, in particular in small towns and rural
villages. The Min Yuen possessed an octopus-like network of support and
contacts within the general population, mainly Chinese, where supplies and
resources were obtained, from foodstuffs, medicines to equipment, source
of information and intelligence and recruits. The Min Yuen’s genesis could
be traced to the wartime MPAJU where in some areas were resurrected.

The Min Yuen network notwithstanding, MNLA guerrillas often relied
on rural Chinese communities, especially those settled on the fringes of
the jungle. During the Japanese wartime occupation, many Chinese fled

Chinese politics in Malaysia, 1920s–1990s  61

urban areas to the interior to avoid interaction with the IJA, for the men
to avoid induction into labour gangs and for young women, in particular,
recruitment into military brothels.143 Chinese peasant families eked out a
barely sustainable farming livelihood on the jungle fringes, as illegal set-
tlers (squatters) on state land. Emerging from the jungle, MNLA guerrillas
pressed demands on such farming families for food, medicines and infor-
mation. Young men from these families were recruited into the guerrilla
army. More often these Chinese peasant families rendered assistance and
support, not because they favoured the MCP and/or communism, but owing
to ethnicity, persuasive propaganda (appealing to patriotism of the father-
land), familial support or, more simply, under duress. Often, owing to this
last factor, with few options, the peasant family rendered assistance to the
armed guerrillas who descended on their isolated makeshift home of thatch
and wood in the stillness of the night or early in the morning.

Realizing the dilemma and danger posed to these Chinese peasant fam-
ilies on jungle fringes that unwillingly formed an essential source to the
guerrillas’ supply line, the British colonial government executed an ingen-
ious counter-insurgency strategic programme, namely the resettlement of
thousands of Chinese peasant farmers and settlers to ‘New Villages’. The
Briggs’ Plan, after Lieutenant General Harold Briggs, the then director of
operations, sought to cut off the jungle guerrillas’ supply line and, in turn,
to afford protection for the peasant families in New Villages that provided
accommodation with modern utilities (piped water and electricity supply)
and security. Undoubtedly, MCP propaganda was truthful without embel-
lishment that the New Villages resembled ‘concentration camps’ with its
high-walled surroundings, barbed wired parameters, guard towers, 24-hour
patrols, restrictive movement of inmates and guarded interaction with oth-
ers from without.

When the farmers leave the New Village in the mornings for work on
their fields, they were checked for contraband – additional foodstuff, items
such as batteries, wire, medicines, bandages, cigarettes, lighters, etc. – lest
they continued to supply the jungle guerrillas. The resettlement of 573,000
people, the bulk of whom were ethnic Chinese, in more than 500 New
Villages, was an unqualified success in severing the supply line of the MCP-
MNLA guerrilla force, that thereafter, increasingly retreated deeper into
the jungle.144

The mushrooming of New Villages on the west coast of the peninsula
partly spurred the creation of a social and welfare organization, notably
the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA) on 27 February 1949, which from
the outset rendered social and welfare services to residents of New Villages
facing teething problems of adjustment to the new settings.145 But more fun-
damental to the formation of the MCA is succinctly spelt out in this vein:

The formation of the Federation of Malaya (1948) and the Emergency
(1948–1960) adversely affected the Chinese community. This situation

62  Ooi Keat Gin

prompted sixteen Chinese members of the Malayan Federal Legisla-
tive and Executive Councils led by a former Kuomintang administra-
tor and general in China, Leong Yew Koh, to form a united body. The
primary objective was to find means to safeguard the interest of the
Chinese community and to cultivate the goodwill and confidence of
the [colonial] government and the Malays.146

Moreover:

[The formation of the MCA] was also to some extent a reaction to
cleanse the negative image of the Chinese produced by the terrorist acts
of the Malayan Communist Party (MCP), whose members were mainly
Chinese.147

Although established by an ex-KMT personality, the first MCA president
was Tan Cheng Lock, a prime figure of the then defunct AMCJA. Often
dubbed ‘a party of towkay’, it was no exaggeration that the founding leaders
and members of the MCA comprised mainly English-educated wealthy Chi-
nese businessmen with close rapport with the British colonial government.
In fact, the latter played a pivotal role in the conception and establishment
of the MCA.148 Under a pro-government Straits Chinese leadership with a
pan-Malaya oriented, rather than China-based, political outlook, the MCA
that transformed into a political party in 1951, was the viable alternative for
the Chinese to the then proscribed MCP.

The MCA’s groundwork in the New Villages, and subsequent champion-
ing of the interests of the ex-squatters to be given a stake in Malaya (read:
equal citizenship as indigenous Malays), not only gained support that was
translated into expanded membership (from all walks of life) but also as
means to counter MCP propaganda that speak of the anti-Chinese attitude
of the colonial government, negligence of Chinese plight, etc.149

The Chinese in Malaya were at the crossroads towards the later part of the
1940s. The Chinese Civil War witnessed the increasing military successes of
Mao’s Red Army over KMT forces despite Washington’s support (military
supplies, equipment, etc.) for the latter.150 In Malaya itself, the British co-
lonial government that had hitherto supported the wartime MCP-MPAJA
and even decorated their leaders,151 had by mid-1948, made a turnaround
in proscribing the MCP, and other left-leaning organizations including the
MNP, Angkatan Pemuda Insaf (API, Awakening Youth Force),152 Angkatan
Wanita Sedar (AWAS, Conscious Women’s Front),153 Hizbul Muslimin
(Islamic Party)154 and others. The declaration of Emergency, and imple-
mentation of emergency regulations like the draconian Internal Security
Act (ISA) that enabled indefinite detention without trial, swept the stage off
anti-colonial, anti-imperialist elements.

From the perspective of the Chinese labouring and peasant class in
Malaya, the successes enjoyed by the CCP on the mainland that subsequently

Chinese politics in Malaysia, 1920s–1990s  63

declared the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in October 1949, contrasted
with the fate of the MCP, that since mid-1948, had been proscribed and been
hunted like ‘jungle rats’ by the British colonial government then assisted
by military forces from the UK and Commonwealth countries (Fiji, Aus-
tralia, New Zealand). Many of the Chinese, among the urban working class
and rural peasantry that had lent support to the MCP, were now dissuaded
to ‘switch sides’, to support the pro-government MCA that had links with
the KMT.

By the mid-1950s, the MCP and the MCA, which had taken divergent
paths from the very beginning, were both on a different trajectory of devel-
opment. While the former was facing increasing pressure, both militarily
and politically due to government efforts, the latter was progressing favour-
ably in ethnic-based politics having embarked on a viable political coopera-
tion with the predominant Malay party of UMNO. The 1952 Kuala Lumpur
municipal election saw an ad hoc temporary electoral arrangement between
the local branches of UMNO and MCA that triumphed (won nine out of 12
contested seats). This electoral victory set the pace for inter-ethnic political
cooperation that was formalized with the formation of the Alliance Party in
that year.155 A more notable electoral triumph of this inter-ethnic political
coalition (expanded with partnership with MIC in 1954) was at the 27 July
1955 Federal Legislative Council election when the Alliance Party won 51
of the 52 seats contested. The British colonial government was impressed by
this electoral victory of the Alliance Party led by Tunku Abdul Rahman, a
prince from the ruling house of Kedah, and this accomplishment marked
the beginning of the road to merdeka (independence).

Meanwhile, Chin Peng and his colleagues in the MCP were rethinking
their next strategic move. The seven-year armed struggle appeared not to
have attained, or even got close to achieving the MCP’s goal of establishing
its Democratic Republic of Malaya. Instead, the guerrillas’ supply lines
were increasingly being severed with each New Village being set up. The
negotiating table might be an option for the MCP hence feelers were sent to
the newly inaugurated self-government of the Federation of Malaya under
Chief Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman (t. 1955–1957). On assuming the chief
ministership, the Tunku offered amnesty utilizing leaflets to announce ‘safe
areas’ where the guerrillas could come forward to hand in their weapons
and return to mainstream society. Few, however, took up this government
gesture. Instead, the MCP called for a ceasefire, and was amenable for talks.

The Tunku was agreeable, therefore a two-day meeting were held
on 28–29 December at Baling, a town in southeast Kedah near the bor-
der to Thailand.156 This four-eyed meeting witnessed Malaya Chief
Minister Tunku (1955–1957), Singapore Chief Minister David Marshall
(1955–1956)157 and MCA President Tan Cheng Lock (1949–1958) facing the
MCP Secretary-General Chin Peng, 10th Regiment Commander Rashid
Maidin and MCP Central Propaganda Department head Chen Tien (Chen
Tian). Basically, the talks were focused on the government offer of amnesty

64  Ooi Keat Gin

as a means of resolving and ending the conflict, but discussion also touched
on fundamental issues between the parties.

The talks were unsuccessful. In fact, the so-called peace talk was or-
chestrated to fail. It seemed that the Tunku had reneged on the Alliance
Party’s promise of amnesty to the members of the MCP ‘that was so loudly
canvassed in the Federal Elections of July 1955’.158 While Chin Peng refused
to surrender, the Tunku would not recognize the MCP as a political party.
The eight-hour talk spread over two days ended in each party taking a dif-
ferent route, the constitutional means in attaining independence and armed
insurrection in establishing a communist state.

Two years later, under the political leadership of the Tunku, Britain granted
independence to the Federation of Malaya on 31 August 1957. Within three
years, the Tunku confidently announced the end of the Malayan Emergency
that saw: ‘More than 500 soldiers and 1,300 police had been killed during
the conflict. Communist losses are estimated at over 6,000 killed and 1,200
captured.’159

The Tunku, who at Baling (1955) had clearly demonstrated to Whitehall
that he and his Alliance Party were steadfastly uncompromising to
Chin Peng and the MCP, thereby establishing the British government’s
confidence in him (the Tunku) in helming an independent Malaya. The
inter-ethnic political coalition of UMNO, MCA and MIC appeared to be a
successful strategy in efforts through constitutional means to finally attain
independence. Merdeka nullified MCP claims that it too was fighting to
unshackle British colonial rule. The Tunku had, in fact, politically outma-
noeuvred Chin Peng.

Chinese support for the MCA, in particular, and the Alliance Party, in
general, demonstrated its choice of subscribing to constitutional means,
ballot over bullet, in the pursuit of independence. In other words, the majority
of the Chinese inhabitants in Malaya eschewed armed revolutionary means
as advocated by the MCP in seeking political independence.

Sarawak Communist Organization (SCO)

Unlike in the peninsula where the MCP was clearly identified, communist
elements in Sarawak remained in the dark for the greater part of its ex-
istence, covertly orchestrating activities until the formal emergence of the
North Kalimantan Communist Party (NKCP) in 1971. Prior to NKCP, the
communists were variously referred by the Sarawak colonial authorities,
initially as the Clandestine Communist Organization (CCO), thereafter, the
Sarawak Communist Organization (SCO).160 Not unlike the MCP that had
its Malay-dominated 10th Regiment, the SCO too had multi-ethnic military
wings, namely the North Kalimantan People’s Army (NKPA) or Pasukan
Rakyat Kalimantan Utara (PARAKU).

Post-war SCO activities were marked by three pivotal developments-
cum-events, notably Kuching Chinese Middle School strike actions (1951

Chinese politics in Malaysia, 1920s–1990s  65

and 1955), deep infiltration of the Sarawak United People’s Party (SUPP)
(1959–1962), and launching of armed insurrection, namely the Sarawak
Communist Insurgency (1962–1990). All the aforesaid had support,
involvement, and participation of the Sarawak Chinese labouring and
peasant classes from both the towns and rural areas. With scant exceptions,
the core SCO members, including the top leadership, were graduates of
Chinese middle schools.

Consequent of the wartime interruption, the immediate post-war period
witnessed a jump in student registration for Chinese vernacular elementary
schools, from 13,416 in 1941 to 18,222 in 1946 and 28,222 in 1953.161 Con-
sequently and impressively, by 1953, Chinese vernacular secondary school
enrolment overtook Christian mission English-medium schools and Malay
government schools, a ratio of 27:10:1, respectively.162 Within the Sarawak
Chinese community, shared among the diaspora, the immediate post-war
years saw a surge in ethnic pride for the fatherland, specifically the recogni-
tion of Nationalist China (1945) as one the victorious powers alongside the
US, UK and USSR. Ethnic pride-cum-patriotism became even more ap-
parent following the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (1949).
The fatherland had again risen in witnessing Mao’s Tiananmen speech that
ushered in the PRC, a ‘New China’.

This renewed pride in the fatherland was translated into practical means
in the Sarawak context relating to the adoption, in turn, recognition of
Guo-yu. On 17 October 1945, the Chung Hwa Education Society convened
a group of 17 Chinese intellectuals drawn from all political persuasions
and dialect groups to discuss and plan for the future of Chinese vernac-
ular education in Sarawak. Consequently, after nearly three decades of
postponement, Guo-yu was adopted as the medium of instruction for all
Chung Hwa schools. The final death knell for dialect particularism was the
participants’ agreement that henceforth all Chung Hwa primary and middle
schools to be jointly managed by a Kuching Chung Hwa Schools Board of
Management that shall comprise voluntary members from all the huiguan
(clan organization).

The spurt in post-war Chinese vernacular elementary school enrolments
exerted increasing pressure in the demand for secondary education, namely
three-year junior middle standard (13- to 15-year-olds), and three-year sen-
ior middle standard (16- to 18-year-olds).163 Only in major townships such as
Kuching, Sibu and Miri were junior middle standard classes available. And
for those who intended to pursue the senior middle standard, they had to
venture abroad to Singapore, Penang or the Chinese mainland. Therefore,
when the Kuching Chung Hwa Middle School (CHMS) opened its senior
middle standard classes in 1951, pupils came from Brunei and North Borneo.

From the leftist viewpoint, the phenomenal growth in student numbers,
especially significant in the middle schools, meant a greater pool of po-
tential supporters and recruits. Undisputedly, Chinese vernacular schools
continued to be nurseries for recruitment. Hence, schoolyard recruitment