Ooi-Malaysia-and-the-Cold-War-Era

66  Ooi Keat Gin

resumed in earnest in the post-war period spurred by positive developments
of the CCP and the subsequent establishment of the PRC. The bulk of the
teachers were born, bred and trained on the mainland and many had long
been partial to the CCP. Encouraged by left-wing Chinese intelligentsia and
activists, teachers and middle school students became enthusiastic, fervent
supporters and sympathizers of the SCO.

Leftist influence and infiltration in Chinese vernacular schools became
apparent when student strike actions were undertaken in the 1950s. Owing to
pedagogical issues, students took to strikes at the CHMS in Kuching on 29
October 1951.164 A 103-day school-wide strike action was an unprecedented
phenomenon against a traditional background of well-behaved, respectful
and dutiful of Chinese vernacular students. But it was the hand of the SCO
that had successfully instigated and emboldened the students to stage a
protracted strike, which dragged on until 9 February 1952. But a tactical
misstep on the part of the student strikers revealed not only the clandestine
involvement of the SCO, but also contributed to their failure. Initially fight-
ing on a platform of righteousness in demanding for the replacement of a
principal and teachers for alleged incompetence, the righteousness call was
replaced with a political stance of anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism,
striking at the heart of the British colonial government. Expelled students,
who feared potential arrest by the colonial authorities, took flight across the
border to West Kalimantan.

The second strike action (47 day, March–April 1955) of the Kuching
CHMS was an unqualified triumph. Again, pedagogical issue posed as
a bone of contention between students and faculty leading to the former
executing a boycott of the school. An enquiry meeting chaired by Stephen
Yong Kuet Tze and Ong Kee Hui, attended by 13 Chinese associations
called for the resignation of the school principal in absentia. This decision
was celebrated by the student body and the strike/boycott was lifted.

From the SCO perspective, the strike actions by students were merely a
pretext; the real intention and/or agenda was the radicalization of the youth,
steering them to the Communist cause – the long-term objective was the
setting up of a communist state modelled on the PRC. The student leaders
of the strikes, such as Bong Kee Chok, Yap Choon Ho and others, were to
play prominent roles in the SCO in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Bong
Kee Chok, for instance headed NKPA-PARAKU whereas Yap Choon Ho
was one of the field commanders of the formidable 3rd Company Pasukan
Gerilya Rakyat Sarawak (PGRS, Sarawak People’s Guerrilla Force [SPGF]).

The Sarawak United People’s Party (SUPP), established in 1959 as the
first political party with moderates Ong Kee Hui and Stephen Yong Kuet
Tze as inaugural president and secretary-general respectively, was the target
for implementing the SCO’s ‘united front’ tactic. Apart from the Ong-Yong
top leadership portfolios, SCO members infiltrated every level of the SUPP
hierarchy, some even holding influential positions. For instance, the case
of Wen Ming Chyuan, who later became chairman of NKCP, was SUPP’s

Chinese politics in Malaysia, 1920s–1990s  67

Central Assistant Secretary-General (Publicity). Bong Kee Chok, another
senior SCO cadre and later founder leader of PGRS, assumed the office of
Central Assistant Secretary-General (Organization). Yang Chu Chung and
Yap Choon Ho, both field commanders of 3rd Company PGRS, were mem-
bers of the SUPP Central Committee, the policymaking body.

The litmus test that SUPP had been infiltrated by SCO cadres was the for-
mer’s vociferous opposition to the ‘Conversion Plan’. In pursuing a national
education system, the British colonial government of Sarawak envisaged
the creation of multi-ethnic secondary schools with the English language
as a common medium of instruction. In other words, implementation of
the Conversion Plan (vernacular to English language) literally spelt the de-
mise of ethnic-based schools, specifically the Chinese vernacular middle
schools. The latter, as pointed out, served as nurseries for the SCO of influ-
encing and recruiting youth to its cause. In its ideological propagation, the
SCO appealed to ethnic affinity and patriotism to the Chinese fatherland,
the PRC in the 1950s and 1960s that could raise passionate and spirited
support among students of Chinese vernacular schools, especially those in
and/or from the Middle schools. Owing to the sociocultural and language
barrier, the native (Malay and other indigenes) and English-medium mis-
sion and government schools were impermeable to SCO appeal and influ-
ence. The SCO, therefore, vehemently opposed the colonial government’s
Conversion Plan.

In arguing against the Conversion Plan, the often well-worn thesis of the
defence and upholding of Chinese culture, heritage and language was uti-
lized by SCO activists albeit covertly and SUPP overtly. Any threat, real or
perceived, in removing the teaching of the Chinese language was regarded
as an affront to denying ethnic Chinese’s their birth right in acquiring their
5,000-year history and sociocultural traditions. Pulling on the emotional
strings of ethnic identity, sociocultural history and heritage were particu-
larly appealing to Chinese youths as well as adults against the backdrop of
an emerging PRC that had successfully thrown off ‘a century of humilia-
tion’. Therefore, at all costs, the anti-Conversion Plan activists argued, the
Sarawak Chinese must defend and uphold the Chinese vernacular schools
as vehicles in nurturing, through Guo-yi, the younger generation in the rich
sociocultural heritage and traditions of the fatherland.

The Sarawak colonial government on its part utilized financial aid as
bait in pursuit of the Conversion Plan. Failure to abide by the 15 April 1961
deadline meant the cessation of colonial government financing effective
from 1 April 1962. Unsurprisingly, there was no objection from Christian
mission-managed secondary schools or government Malay junior second-
ary schools to this changeover to English as the sole medium of instruction.
Only the 16 independent Chinese vernacular middle schools that were at the
crossroad: acquiesce or maintain the status quo.

In countering claims that the Conversion Plan might compromise the
teaching and learning of Chinese language and literature, the colonial

68  Ooi Keat Gin

government fought back citing examples from Penang’s Chung Ling High
School and Hong Kong’s Anglo-Chinese secondary schools where the
quality of achievement in Chinese studies (language and literature) was
comparatively ‘as high as those reached in the ordinary middle schools’.165

‘Outline of the Summary Report in the Struggle against the 10-Year
Conversion Plan’ a captured SCO document that explicitly revealed its com-
plicity and agenda, is most damning evidence:

The Conversion Plan seriously conflicts with the racial concepts of
the Chinese people. Correct leadership [of the SCO] provides us with
favourable terms to control and make use of the anti-conversion
struggle. By convincing and winning the support of the [Chinese] school
management boards who fought shoulder to shoulder with us despite
pressure by the British Imperialists, only 3 out of 16 middle schools
agreed with the [P]lan.166

In reality, the majority, 11 out of 16, of the independent Chinese vernacular
middle schools abided the colonial government’s Conversion Plan.167 Not
so much being unpatriotic (to the fatherland), and/or discarding their iden-
tity and sociocultural heritage, or eager for financial support, the boards of
management of the Chinese vernacular middle schools acted to accept the
language changeover on grounds of practical reality. Hitherto, as earlier
mentioned, a Chinese middle school certificate was not recognized by the
colonial government likewise the private sector whereby English was the
undisputed lingua franca. In other words, pragmatism prevailed.

The ‘Malaysia Proposal’, mooted in 1961, again saw opposition by SUPP
that appeared to be in line with SCO intentions. The Tunku’s speech on 27
May 1961 publicly discussed the concept of a wider federation, ‘Malaysia’,
at the Conference of Foreign Journalists’ Association of Southeast Asia at
the Adelphi Hotel, Singapore. What the Tunku proposed was that inde-
pendent Malaya together with the three crown colonies (Singapore, Sar-
awak and North Borneo) and a protectorate (Brunei) of Britain formed a
wider federation, namely the ‘Federation of Malaysia’. In one single stroke,
Britain’s decolonization plan in Southeast Asia would be accomplished
without compromising and endangering its former colonies and protector-
ate falling into non-agreeable hands (read: communist). Mandarins at the
Colonial Office and Foreign Office (FO) in London were concerned with
the increasingly spate of strike actions by workers and students in Singa-
pore and Sarawak in the past decade (1950s) that undoubtedly were insti-
gated, provoked or even directly orchestrated by leftist elements. Singapore,
Sarawak and North Borneo and Brunei appeared vulnerable: a worst case
scenario might see Singapore and Sarawak falling into communist hands
whereas North Borneo and Brunei being annexed by Sukarno’s Indonesia.
The latter seemed to be increasingly leaning towards the left, the Partai Ko-
munis Indonesia (PKI, Indonesian Communist Party). Therefore, Tunku’s

Chinese politics in Malaysia, 1920s–1990s  69

‘Malaysia’ was an appealing possibility, a bulwark to the then prevailing
leftist wave in the region.

In Singapore, left-wing members of the ruling People’s Action Party
(PAP) were against ‘Malaysia’. They saw the proposed wider federation
as a means of eliminating the left. Translating their intentions in action,
they abandoned PAP candidates in the Hong Lim (April) and Anson (July)
by-elections in 1961 resulting in defeat of the ruling party.

The Hong Lim and Anson by-elections in 1961 were but the tipping point
in the rupture within the PAP. Displeased with the PAP government’s re-
fusal to abolish the Internal Security Council (ISC), refusal to back down
the merger plan (with independent Malaya) and refusal to release the re-
maining political detainees, the PAP left-wingers abandoned support for
their own candidates in favour of opposition figures such as Ong Eng Guan
(in Hong Lim) and David Marshall (in Anson), which resulted in the PAP’s
defeat in the two by-elections. In a move to regain support, Prime Minister
Lee Kuan Yew moved a motion of confidence in his own government on
20 July 1961, five days after the Anson electoral defeat. Although the gov-
ernment carried the motion, 13 PAP left-wingers either abstained or voted
against the motion of confidence. It was political mutiny. Consequently, the
13 were expelled from the PAP.

The 13 and their followers formed the Barisan Sosialis (Socialist Front)
with Dr Lee Siew Choh as chairman, and Lim Chin Siong as secretary-
general.168 Formally registered on 17 September 1962, Barisan Sosialis
posed as the opposition to the PAP, and thwarted the ruling party on every
opportunity and/or issue including ‘Malaysia’.

Meanwhile in Sarawak, the SCO, through the guise and façade of the
bona fide SUPP, staged an opposition front against ‘Malaysia. The SCO
rejected ‘Malaysia’ as it would mean not only more formidable obstacles
to address but also it might lead to its own obliteration by the many anti-
communist forces, notably the Tunku himself, and Singapore’s Lee Kuan
Yew. In the context of Malaysia, the SCO had to contend not only with
Kuching but the Malay-dominated federal government in Kuala Lumpur
headed by the anti-communist aristocrat, the Tunku. Having managed to
end the 12-year Emergency, the Tunku and his colleagues in the Alliance
Party were not going to compromise or tolerate another communist organ-
ization, the SCO.

Alternatively, the SCO advocated a stance whereby Sarawak should strive
to attain independence from Britain, and thereafter, to consider ‘Malay-
sia’ as an option. SCO’s push for ‘independence-from-Britain-first’ agenda
would enable it to seize power, either through constitutional means of the
ballot box or through more radical means if circumstances necessitated.
Not surprisingly, the SUPP leadership too advocated the ‘independence-
from-Britain-first’ strategy and accordingly rejected ‘Malaysia’.

Although SUPP professed to be a multi-ethnic party, the bulk of its mem-
bership, including the top echelon, was predominantly Chinese. The latter,

70  Ooi Keat Gin

to be more specific, were Chinese youth, graduates of Chinese middle
schools. In fact, the parents and grandparents of these youngsters were
uncomfortable, uneasy with SUPP’s radical stance on issues despite the
Ong-Yong moderate leadership. A sprinkling of natives, mainly Ibans, were
members of SUPP branches in rural areas. From the colonial government’s
perspective, SUPP was a proxy in articulating the voice and concerns of the
various Chinese communities (traditionally divided along dialect lines) in
Sarawak. Therefore, it seemed, to the colonial government, that the Chinese
were not keen on ‘Malaysia’.

But SUPP, more accurately, was the overt mouthpiece of the SCO and
inadvertently perceived by the colonial authorities to speak on behalf of
the Chinese communities. The wider Chinese society in Sarawak, in fact,
especially the entrepreneurial towkay class, was enthusiastic about the pro-
posed wider federation. Sarawak Chinese businesses, since the last quarter
of the nineteenth century, had utilized Singapore as the conduit in tapping
the international capitalist market for its products, notably pepper, rubber
and jungle products. Besides Singapore, the opening of the Malaya market
in the context of ‘Malaysia’ was undoubtedly a welcome proposition to the
Chinese business sector. In reality, the Chinese in Sarawak generally were
partial to ‘Malaysia’, but as the proverbial ‘silent majority’, they were over-
shadowed by the loud and vociferous opposition publicly voiced by SUPP.

But what finally decided the issue of the ‘Malaysia Proposal’ in the context
of the SUPP, the SCO and the Chinese in Sarawak was an event from with-
out that exploded on the scene on 8 December 1962, the Brunei Rebellion.

Meanwhile in Brunei, Tunku’s ‘Malaysia Proposal’ received non-committal
response from the istana (palace). Being diplomatic, Sultan Omar Ali
Saifuddien III (r. 1950–1967) was reluctant to commit either way. Instead, a
high-level committee headed by the Chief Minister was set up tasked to gar-
ner the views of his rakyat (people, masses). Although having unanimously
won practically all the elected seats to the Brunei Legislative Council, the Par-
tai Rakyat Brunei (PRB, Brunei People’s Party) was denied the opportunity
to exert its power simply because the meeting of the Council was continuously
being postponed.

On the question of ‘Malaysia’, PRB was adamantly against any form of
federation, union or other similar concepts besides what was propounded by
its founder-president, the charismatic Sheikh Azahari bin Sheikh Mahmud
(1928–202) or A. M. Azahari, of a return to the sultanate’s glorious heyday.
Azahari conceived a Negarabagian Kesatuan Kalimantan Utara (NKKU,
Unitary State of North Kalimantan) whereby Brunei oversee neighbouring
Sarawak and North Borneo returning to its fold as its rightful territories of
a unitary state. PRB, therefore, opposed ‘Malaysia’.

Then, when the Brunei Legislative Council finally convened on 5 Decem-
ber 1962, PRB proposed three motions, viz:

(1) a motion rejecting the concepts of the Federation of Malaysia;
(2)  a  motion asking the British Government to restore the sovereignty

Chinese politics in Malaysia, 1920s–1990s  71

of the Sultanate of Brunei over the former territories of Sarawak and
North Borneo; and (3) a motion urging the British Government to fed-
erate the three territories of Sarawak, Brunei and North Borneo under
the Unitary State of Kalimantan Utara with Sultan Omar Ali Saifud-
din III as its constitutional and parliamentary Head of State and the
granting of complete and absolute Independence to this new State not
later than 1963.169

All three motions were dismissed by the Speaker, who claimed that it was
beyond the jurisdiction of the Council. Three days later, the PRB responded.

For whatever intentions or agenda, an uprising was staged by the Tentera
Negara Kalimantan Utara (TNKU, Army of the State of North Kaliman-
tan), the armed wing of the PRB, against the Brunei government. Invoking
the freshly renewed Anglo-Brunei Treaty (1959), the Brunei monarch sought
British assistance. British military units from Singapore were airlifted to
the sultanate where they met with colonial police from the North Borneo
constabulary who had earlier rushed across the border to secure the palace
and Brunei Town itself. Within a week, the suppression was completed, and
the sultanate was secured in the monarch’s hands under British protection.

For the PRB-TNKU members, their objective remained unclear; many
thought that they were getting rid of the British colonialists in the name of
their sultan, but when the latter brought in British military units to suppress
the armed uprising, many became confused. Without Azahari’s presence
(he was stranded in Manila) on the ground to provide leadership and direc-
tion, the bewildered militants simply fled while others were apprehended
and/or surrendered.170

The Brunei Rebellion was a catalyst for subsequent developments in the
region. When the colonial authorities in neighbouring North Borneo and
Sarawak launched an anti-subversive (read: leftist) sweep, the SCO switched
its hitherto united front strategy to armed revolution. The bulk of the SCO
personnel (male and female Chinese youths) crossed the border to West
Kalimantan, where they were joined by TNKU remnants and PRB mem-
bers. Both refugee dissident groups were welcomed by local members of
the PKI as well as, albeit reluctantly, the Tentera Nasional Indonesia (TNI,
National Armed Forces of Indonesia). Here, in the mountainous interior
jungles of West Kalimantan, TNI instructors trained SCO youngsters and
PRB-TNKU members in basic military exercises supplying them with weap-
onry and other military materials. The intention was that following train-
ing, both groups would cross over the border to undertake their agendas in
their respective territories.

Denuded almost to its core resulting from the anti-subversive sweep,
SUPP was exposed to be deeply infiltrated by SCO elements. Public denials
by both Ong and Yong were hollow statements exposing their political na-
ivety. Consequently, many non-Chinese members withdrew from SUPP as
they were apprehensive of the foreign ideologies (Marxism, communism)
that further weakened the party among the natives.

72  Ooi Keat Gin

Across the Java Sea, a serious salvo was fired by Indonesian Foreign
Minister Dr Soebandrio on 20 January 1963 who proclaimed the adoption
of a policy of Konfrontasi (Confrontation) towards ‘Malaysia’, in line with
President Sukarno’s hostile stance. Sensing the ‘hidden hand’ of White-
hall, Sukarno labelled ‘Malaysia’ a ‘neo-colony’ that foresaw Britain’s cov-
ert intention in the post-decolonization period to continue and sustain its
influence and control over its former territories. ‘Malaysia’, according to
Sukarno, was a threat to Republik Indonesia, directly challenging Jakarta as
the predominant power in the region. Therefore, stern measures, needed to
be taken to ensure that ‘Malaysia’ would not be realized.

In Manila, opposition to ‘Malaysia’ took a different stance. Contention
over possession of North Borneo (renamed Sabah from 1963) was the crux
of the objection of the Philippines that claimed the territory as the rightful
owner in lieu of the Sulu Sultanate that has become a part of the Republic
of the Philippines. Therefore, North Borneo should not be a part of the pro-
posed wider federation that the Tunku envisaged.

Nonetheless, militarily active anti-Malaysia elements were the SCO, rem-
nants of PRB-TNKU in West Kalimantan and TNI forces on the Sarawak-
Kalimantan border. Konfrontasi was a low-key border war, characterized by
occasional small-scale raids by TNI units across the Sarawak-Kalimantan
divide into Sarawak territory. No conventional set piece battles were fought
or planned.

Between left and right: 1960s–1990s

Sarawak communist insurgency (1962–1990)

As a result of the colonial government sweep of subversives following the
Brunei Rebellion, about 700 or 800 SCO members, mainly Chinese youth,
mainly males with a handful of females, fled across the border to West Kali-
mantan. Similarly, remnants of TNKU and members of PRB also made the
difficult journey (mountainous and thickly forested terrain) to sanctuary on
the Indonesian side of the border. SCO members, TNKU militants and PRB
stragglers were brought under the charge of TNI who trained them in jungle
warfare for the refugees intended to return to continue their respective
struggle. It was then that the SCO discarded its united front strategy (with
SUPP) and turned to armed revolution to seize Sarawak that became the
ultimate goal of the youthful SCO militants.

These SCO exiles that subsequently formed the core of NKCP guerrilla
units, namely Pasukan Gerilya Rakyat Sarawak (PGRS, Sarawak People’s
Guerrilla Force), and Pasukan Rakyat Kalimantan Utara (PARAKU, North
Kalimantan People’s Army). Both PGRS and PARAKU were directly sup-
ported and sponsored by the TNI and the Sukarno government. In fact,
Indonesian Foreign Minister Dr Soebandrio and the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs had a hand in the setting up of PGRS on 30 March 1964 at Mount

Chinese politics in Malaysia, 1920s–1990s  73

Asuansang, West Kalimantan. Yang Chu Chung headed PGRS that was
assigned the western parts of Sarawak as its area of operations. Other key
figures in PGRS were Bong Kee Chok and Wen Ming Chyuan. At its base
in Batu Hitam, the 800-strong PGRS was bolstered by 120 Indonesian in-
telligence personnel and a small cadre unit trained in then Communist
China. At the same time, the PKI had a small contingent headed by its West
Kalimantan branch leader, Said Achmad Sofyan, a revolutionary of mixed
Arab-Madurese descent. TNI, on its part, kept PGRS at arm’s length ever
suspicious of its leftist leanings and rapport with PKI.

With PKI support and assistance, PARAKU was constituted on 26 Octo-
ber 1965 by founder-leader, Bong Kee Chok in the area of the Melawi River,
West Kalimantan. Initially command of PARAKU was entrusted to Lam
Wah Kwai who operated in eastern Sarawak. Bong Kee Chok subsequently
assumed leadership.

The Konfrontasi period (1963–1965) was a preparatory time for the com-
munist guerrilla units to engage in small-scale cross-border skirmishes; a
time for honing their military and adaptive skills in operating in a jungle
environment. It was undoubtedly a difficult and trying time for the Chinese
youths, not only surviving armed clashes with security forces of Malaysia
that had assistance from military units of Commonwealth forces, but also
acclimatizing in jungle living (shelter, foods, eschewing dangers, etc.).

But the safe havens along the Sarawak-Kalimantan border that had pro-
vided convenient cross-border offensive became untenable and dangerous
following the end of Konfrontasi. President Sukarno’s fall from grace in
the aftermath of the GESTAPU Affair (Gerakan September Tiga Puluh,
30 September Movement) (1965) and the ascendancy of General Suharto
witnessed the resumption of diplomatic relations between Indonesia and
Malaysia in 1967.171 The TNI, once the trainers of the Sarawak Chinese
militants, were under Jakarta’s directive to hunt down leftists and subver-
sives. Kuala Lumpur was determined to eliminate leftist elements along its
border with Indonesian Kalimantan, hence the pressure on the Suharto
regime. With little choice, most units of PGRS and PARAKU decamped
and crossed back into Sarawak.

Not unlike the circumstances in the peninsula during the Malayan Emer-
gency (1948–1960), SCO members too tapped into Chinese rural communi-
ties for foods, medicine, recruits and in eliciting intelligence. Intimidation
and strong-arm tactics were applied by the SCO jungle guerrillas in forcing
compliance and cooperation of the settlers.172 Terrorist activities of PRGS
and PARAKU comprised sabotaging communication lines, destroying
public properties, equipment, infrastructure, disrupting development pro-
jects (arson, disabling machinery) and attempts at destroying the economy
thereby facilitating the seizure of political power amid social chaos. Threats
and creating a climate of fear among the populace were deliberate acts of
SCO agents operating in towns, kampung, longhouses and settlements on
the jungle fringes. But undeniably, Chinese rural farming communities in

74  Ooi Keat Gin

general were sympathetic and supportive of the SCO, apparently owing
more towards ethnicity rather than ideological affinity.

The Malaysian government applied counter-insurgency measures, some
drawn from the Malayan Emergency. Similar to the successful and cele-
brated Briggs Plan, the Goodsir Plan, after David Goodsir, the British act-
ing commissioner of police in Sarawak, was implemented albeit on a lesser
scale. Operation Hammer (6–8 July 1965) witnessed the enforced resettle-
ment of 7,500 of mainly Chinese farmers into five ‘temporary settlements’
on the Kuching-Serian road in the First and Third Divisions.173 Similar to
the peninsula’s New Villages, the ‘temporary settlements’ were enclosed by
protective barbwire fences and provided with essential amenities and util-
ities, viz. piped water and electricity, housing and other basic necessities.
Such a resettlement strategy managed to a great extent in severing the SCO
jungle guerrillas’ supply lines of foodstuff, medicines, recruits and infor-
mation beyond the jungle. By the close of 1965, permanent settlements were
erected at Siburan, Beratok and Tapah to accommodate the inmates of the
‘temporary settlements’.

Next on the agenda, was Operasi Harapan (Hope Operation), launched
in July 1966, whereby amnesty and safe-conduct passes were offered by the
government to the jungle guerrillas. Disappointingly, only 41 guerrillas ac-
quiesced to this olive branch; more than an estimated 700 guerrillas with
some 2,000 sympathisers remained steadfast in their armed struggle.174 It
appeared that a protracted insurrection was underway.

The conclusion of Konfrontasi saw joint military operations (1967–1968)
between Malaysian security forces and TNI against SCO guerrillas on the
Sarawak-Kalimantan border areas. The latter, it was reported, suffered
heavy losses. Within Sarawak itself, a concerted state-wide sweep of leftist
remnants was undertaken in 1968–1969 period; SUPP was almost denuded
of members, again revealing the extent the political party was being infil-
trated and utilized by the SCO for its own ends.

Meanwhile, the TNI too scored significant success. At Songkong, West
Kalimantan, on 25 March 1969, Indonesian forces wiped out PGRS’s Third
Branch, its largest militant force.175 It was, indeed, a devastating setback
for the SCO and demonstrated the commitment of the staunchly anti-
communist Suharto regime. Kuala Lumpur was undoubtedly pleased.

Shortly after the collapse of the PGRS’s Third Branch, remnants were
forced to cross over into Sarawak. There they regrouped at Nonok on the
Sadong River in Sarawak’s First Division to form the Pasukan Gerilya Rak-
yat Kalimantan Utara (PGRK, North Kalimantan People’s Guerrilla Force)
headed by Wen Ming Chyuan.

A year later, on 30 March 1970, in order to garner international recogni-
tion and support, it necessitated the creation of a formal communist party
or organization. In this connection, Wen Ming Chyuan orchestrated the
formation of the North Kalimantan Communist Party (NKCP).176 Beijing
rendered support for Wen and the NKCP. With renewed spirit, Bong Kee

Chinese politics in Malaysia, 1920s–1990s  75

Chok’s PARAKU was particularly active in its area of operations, viz. the
triangular area of Kanowit, Sibu and Sarikei.

In response, on 25 March1972, the Malaysian government declared Sar-
awak’s Third Division as a ‘special security area’. The next day witnessed
the establishment of the Rajang Area Security Command (RASCOM)
based at Sibu primarily to ensure public security and safety.177 Sarawak’s
Chief Minister Tun Datu Patinggi Abdul Rahman Yakub (t. 1970–1981)
stood as director of operations with executive power over all military, police
and civil authorities thereby facilitating coordination to better address the
ongoing insurgency. All government sectors and departments were involved
and directly engaged with grassroots’ personnel including ketua kampung
(village head) and tuai rumah (head of longhouse), DOs and ADOs and
(division) residents. RASCOM’s modus operandi in combining military,
police and civilian departments under a single command (director of oper-
ations) was replicating the successful practice utilized during the Malayan
Emergency in the peninsula.

Meanwhile, feelers were extended to NKCP to lay down their arms. Play-
ing behind-the-scene in cloak-and-dagger fashion, SUPP Secretary-General
Stephen Yong was able to convince PARAKU’s leader Bong Kee Chok to
give up the struggle. Accordingly, Bong’s letter to Rahman Yakub, dated
10 October 1973, indicated his willingness to end the struggle. Operation
Sri Aman witnessed formal negotiations on 20 October and the following
day at the Government Rest House in Simanggang, Chief Minister Rah-
man Yakub signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with Director
and Political Commissar of PARAKU Bong Kee Chok. A total of 302 com-
munist guerrillas laid down their arms and were welcomed back to society
following ‘debriefing’ by the police. Marking this historic event of a break-
through in the protracted insurgency, Simanggang was renamed Bandar Sri
Aman (Town of Peace).

Nonetheless, Bong Kee Hiu, military commander of the First Division
Bureau Military Unit, and Hung Chu Ting, deputy director of PARAKU
and leader of the Second Bureau Third Division continued the armed strug-
gle with 120 guerrillas. The insurgency continued for another decade and
a half and the ‘battlefield’ was largely within the delta area of the Rajang
River. Both sides suffered heavy losses and many civilians caught in the
crossfire became ‘collateral damage’, a military euphemism of victims of
so-called friendly fire.

Events in Europe in the late 1980s and early 1990s subsequently led to the
collapse of the Soviet Union on 26 December 1991. The disintegration of the
USSR had set in from the mid-1980s that saw domino-like series of scenes
of national unrest in defiance to Moscow by its satellite states in Eastern
Europe. Taking cue from developments in Europe that indicated the fail-
ure and inevitable demise of the communist totalitarian state, the USSR in
particular, Chin Peng and his comrades in the MCP decided to hold peace
negotiation with their longstanding adversary, the Malaysian government.

76  Ooi Keat Gin

Then on 2 December 1989, the Malaysian government and the MCP signed
a Peace Accord in Haadyai, Thailand that finally ended the 21-year Second
Malayan Emergency (1968–1989).

It was then that Wen Ming Chyuan, head of NKCP, by now residing in
Beijing, instructed his comrades in Sarawak to commence negotiation with
the Malaysian government. Between July and October 1990, peace talks
were held between the NKCP and the Sarawak state government in Bintulu.
On 17 October, a peace agreement was penned by both parties in Kuching
that finally concluded the Sarawak Communist Insurgency.

Second Malayan Emergency (1968–1989)

When the Tunku proclaimed the end of the Malayan Emergency on 12 July
1960, 12 years after it had begun, most inhabitants of the then independent
Malaya gave a sigh of relief. But it was a short-lived respite from the threat
of a communist takeover. In less than a decade, eight years precisely, the
MCP led by Secretary-General Chin Peng relaunched its armed struggle
with the same ultimate goal of setting up a communist republic. In typical
fashion, on 17 June 196, an ambush that resulted in the death of 17 members
of Malaysian security forces in the Kroh-Betong area in northern Perak and
across the Thai border signalled the start of the Second Malayan Emergency.

Owing to successes on the part of the British colonial government and
thereafter the government of independent Malaya and, from 1963, Malay-
sia, in the military sphere, in ‘winning hearts and minds’ psychological
warfare, establishment of New Villages and the concerted efforts of the
military, police and civil authorities, the MCP jungle guerrillas were forced
to retreat further inland where they finally were able to take refuge and to
regroup at the Thai-Malaysian border. The border area – mountainous and
thickly forested – not only offered safe sanctuaries, but also when Malayan/
Malaysian security forces pressed forward, the MCP guerrillas could flee
across the divide and hide on the Thai side. Kuala Lumpur would not allow
its troops to cross the border in pursuit lest create an international incident
displeasing Bangkok. Capitalizing on this sensitivity, Chin Peng and his
comrades managed to survive.

By 1968, MCP possessed of between 500 and 600 well-trained guerrillas
with an additional 1,000 in reserve in its armed wing, MNLA.178 Moreover,
they had also learnt as well as developed new techniques of guerrilla warfare
that had been adopted from the ongoing conflict in Vietnam, but adapted
to local conditions.

Efforts to attract Malays to the MCP bore fruits. The task befell Abdullah
CD (Cik Dat bin Anjang Abdullah; 1923–present) then the MCP chairman,
and Rashid Maidin (1917–2006), a prominent leader of the 10th Regiment.
Abdullah, the founder-leader of the 10th Regiment, a Malay unit in Temer-
loh, Pahang (established in mid-1949), utilized the lull period at the border
region to win over youths. He established several Sekolah Revolusi Rakyat

Chinese politics in Malaysia, 1920s–1990s  77

(Masses Revolutionary School) sought to disseminate Maoist ideas among
Thai Malays and Malays in Kelantan. In addition, the MCP-founded Parti
Persaudaraan Islam (PAPERI; Islamic Brotherhood Party) was aimed at
winning over Malay support and recruits. PAPERI tried to spread the notion
that there was no inherent contradiction between Islam and communism.

Then in July 1961, Chin Peng met Deng Xiaoping (1904–1997) in Beijing.
The latter, was a significant personality wielding enormous power holding
the post of deputy premier of the PRC, head of the Chinese Communist
Party (CCP) Organization Department, and member of the Central Military
Commission. According to Chin Peng, Deng proposed to the MCP to launch
a second armed struggle, pledging financial support of US$100,000.179

The trying circumstances besetting it notwithstanding, the Federation
of Malaysia was realized on 16 September 1963. Malaysian Prime Minis-
ter Tunku Abdul Rahman remained steadfastly uncompromising towards
leftist elements. The MCP, on its part, regarded both Malaya (1957) and
Malaysia (1963) as a hollow independence, hence it was justified to continue
to strive for the establishment of a communist state.

The year 1968 saw escalation in tense inter-ethnic relations, specifically
Sino-Malay ties. Despite the ruling Alliance Party in showcasing inter-
ethnic political cooperation between the three ethnic communities namely
UMNO (Malay), MCA (Chinese) and MIC (Indian), at the grassroots there
was loathing brewing between the Malays and the Chinese. Instigation from
opposition political parties such as the Democratic Action Party (DAP),180
Parti Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia (Gerakan, Malaysian People’s Move-
ment Party)181 further accentuated the prickly issues over Malay ‘special
rights’ and ‘privileges’, status and position of the Malay rulers, non-Malay
citizenships, resurfacing of the concept of ‘Malaysian Malaysia’. The last
mentioned was the clarion call of Lee Kuan Yew’s PAP and since Singa-
pore’s secession in 1965, it was taken up by the DAP, successor to the PAP.
‘Malaysian Malaysia’ calls for equality of all citizens regardless of ethnicity
and demanded that ‘special rights’ and ‘privileges’ of Malays be abrogated
from the Federal Constitution. Malaysia’s general elections were scheduled
for May the following year (1969). Both the DAP and Gerakan regarded the
MCA’s closeness to UMNO as a sell-out to the Chinese; both opposition
parties worked hard to swing the Chinese electorate to their side.

Meanwhile, on the Indochinese mainland, the scenario in the ongoing
Vietnam War appeared to be shifting in favour of the communist. The
Tet Offensive (31 January 1968) shocked the US for the VC (Vietnamese
communist) offensive managed to directly threatened the American Em-
bassy itself in Saigon and formidable military incursions across South
Vietnam.182 Although the US military and the Army of the Republic of
Vietnam (ARVN) managed to push back the VC, the incident proved to be
a turning point. It was then that Washington realized that the much harped
on ‘victory by Christmas’ was nothing more than an illusion and pouring
in more Marines was not the solution. An honourable withdrawal settled

78  Ooi Keat Gin

across the negotiation table appeared to be the best, if not, the most viable,
option for the US.183

Back on the peninsula, Malaysia held its general elections on 10 May 1969
without incident. But the electoral results triggered alarm: the incumbent
Alliance Party had won less than half of the popular vote signalling a major
political setback. Although it managed to retain a majority of seats in
parliament, it was with a significantly reduced majority. The MCA lost half
the number of seats contested implying a clear repudiation of the Chinese
electorate for the Alliance. At state level, it was amply clear that the Alliance
had lost Kelantan to PAS, and Penang to Gerakan. What was then (11–12
May) unclear was the fate of Selangor where the Federal capital Kuala
Lumpur was located. (The Alliance did retain Selangor.)

The ‘13 May 1969 Tragedy’ was brought about by the post-election ‘victory’
parades and processions by political parties where provocative taunting
subsequently led to Sino-Malay riots in Kuala Lumpur. Small-scale riots
too occurred in other towns such as George Town, Malacca and Ipoh. A
nationwide state of emergency was declared, nationwide curfew imposed
on Peninsular Malaysia, parliament was suspended and a National Opera-
tions Council (NOC) was established on 16 May chaired by Deputy Prime
Minister Tun Abdul Razak (t. 1963–1970). With parliament suspended, the
NOC became the supreme decision-making body of the country. State and
District Operations Councils were convened to take over state governments.
Primarily the NOC implemented security measures to restore law and order.
Within 18 months, by February 1971, full parliamentary rule was restored.

The years prior to the 1969 general election saw an increasingly vocal
stance for ‘Malaysian Malaysia’ by opposition Chinese-dominated politi-
cal parties, namely DAP and Gerakan. The assertiveness of the opposition
vis-à-vis the ruling Alliance Party demonstrated the ‘possibilities’ of an elec-
toral defeat for the latter and, subsequently, the championing of non-Malay
interests. Undoubtedly UMNO in particular, and the Malays in general,
were gravely concerned of such an eventuality. It was only in recent memory
that witnessed the UMNO-PAP spat that finally concluded with the expul-
sion of Singapore in August 1965.

The electoral outcome of 1969 saw a rejection of the MCA as the hitherto
‘voice of the Chinese’ from within the ruling coalition. Such a ‘voice’ from
within apparently proved ineffective from the perspective of the wider Chinese
community. Consequently, they turned to alternatives, viz. DAP and/or Ger-
akan. The latter was able to be triumphant in Penang, a Chinese-majority
state, and the perception that Selangor too might be lost to the opposition.
The tragic events in the aftermath of the elections notwithstanding, the Chi-
nese electorate, to a great extent, withdrew support for the MCA.184

One of the principal root causes of the ’13 May 1969 Tragedy’ was the
inter-ethnic socioeconomic cleavage, the most conspicuous between
Malays and Chinese and Indians. Comparatively, the poverty level among
Malays and Indians was high, although undeniably there were Chinese in

Chinese politics in Malaysia, 1920s–1990s  79

dire circumstances as well. As a result, the Alliance Party-led government
launched a pro-Malay affirmative action programme under the New Eco-
nomic Policy (NEP; 1971–1990). But an ethnic-based affirmative policy
(for the eradication of poverty) would create disaffection among the non-
prioritized communities that might be exploited by subversive quarters.
Rightly, the MCP activists seized on dissatisfied and victimized Chinese
youth (in educational opportunities, government scholarships, employ-
ment, etc.) to sway and win them over. Suara Revolusi Rakyat (Voice of the
People’s Revolution), a radio station operating from Hunan on the Chinese
mainland, broadcasted Maoist propaganda from 1969. Consequently, some
Chinese youth were recruited directly into the MRLA, while others became
staunch sympathizers. On university campuses in Malaysia as well as in
Singapore, undergraduates were politicized, many of the Chinese students
appeared partial to the left. Benefitting from these propaganda activities,
the MRLA gained 600 to its ranks, half came from peninsular Malaysia and
the other half from southern Thailand.

The Second Malayan Emergency, like its predecessor, was confined to
Peninsular Malaysia and was characterized by CTs embarking on stealth
activities such as sabotage targeting telecommunication facilities, trans-
port, destruction to equipment and machinery, disrupting public infrastruc-
ture projects, threatening workers and employers, etc. Besides propagation
of leftist literature with focus on Chinese youth and students in particular,
and the public in general, the physical hoisting of the MCP flag on public
buildings during significant occasions such as the anniversary of the estab-
lishment of the PRC, Mao’s birthday. Radio broadcast was increasingly
utilized to reach a wider audience in spreading leftist propaganda; typically,
achievements of the PRC were harped on about, and conversely, the Malay-
sian government was criticized, ridiculed and condemned. It was common
practice for radio broadcasters to incite resentment and stir hatred towards
the pro-Malay Malaysian government.

Communist propaganda appeared to only appeal to vernacular-educated
Chinese youth that looked to the Chinese mainland for hope and salvation.
Owing to their ignorance of the Chinese language, and vague or non-existing
familial ties with the Chinese mainland, the English-educated Chinese were
less susceptible to leftist propaganda and/or appeals. Malays, who were
Muslims, found incompatibility with the atheist communist ideology, hence
the majority were unmoved by leftist propaganda. Overall, Indians, Hindu
and Muslim alike, rejected communism.

The Second Malayan Emergency was, in fact, a misnomer, as unlike its
predecessor, no declaration of an ‘emergency’ was ever broadcast. Prime
Minister Tun Abdul Razak bin Hussein (t.1970–1976) in facing the reality
of a Chinese-dominated MCP thought that in declaring an ‘emergency’,
it might connote an incorrect stance of a Malay-dominated government
declaring ‘war’ against a Chinese-dominated MCP, inevitably perceived as
a Sino-Malay struggle against the hitherto tense inter-ethnic situation.

80  Ooi Keat Gin

Instead, taking cue from the previous insurgency where ‘winning hearts
and minds’ appeared to be a winning formula for success, the Razak
government launched Program Keselamatan dan Pembangunan (KESBAN,
Security and Development Programme). The two-pronged strategy of com-
bining ‘security’ with ‘development’ was an unqualified successful formula
in ‘winning hearts and minds’ of the multi-ethnic populace. Military and
police protection of the people, whether in urban or rural settings, that
at the same time, the initiation of development projects (infrastructure,
housing, commercial agriculture, manufacturing industries, service sector,
etc.), delivered concrete benefits in improved and expanded social services
(education and public health) and spurred economic development with its
concomitant generation of wealth.

At all levels – village, district, state and federal – KESBAN was insti-
tutionalized thereby facilitating interaction between government agencies
and the rakyat in development projects from the conceptualization stage
through to the phases of implementation and completion. In particular,
and undertaken in earnest, were development schemes in rural areas that
focused on alleviating poverty. Improved living conditions, reducing pov-
erty in rural settings were able to counter and nullify MCP propaganda that
alleged government neglect, discrimination.

Meanwhile, the military arm in countering the MCP threat was further
strengthened with the incorporation of the Orang Asli Senoi Praaq Regiment
into the Royal Malaysian Police stationed in Kroh, Perak. Moreover, a
Senoi Praaq Battalion was set up at Bidor, Perak. Drawing support from the
Orang Asli communities in the fight against the MCP meant the jungle guer-
rillas had to withdraw further inland, thereby increasingly less threatening
the general population. The CTs supply line where they relied on Orang Asli
assistance too were severed. Hitherto much neglected and/or overlooked by
the government during the colonial period, and/or of the post-independent
era, Orang Asli communities too benefitted from government development
programmes, for instance, supplying electricity and piped water.

By the 1980s, KESBAN showed progress and successes, likewise the
NEP. Rural poverty had been much alleviated and the local populace en-
joyed a better standard of living amid improved infrastructure facilities.
MCP propaganda held little appeal under such circumstances and CTs
had but little choice then but to withdraw further and more deeply into the
jungle vastness. Security forces complemented by Orang Asli police and
military personnel had collectively contributed in making survival of CTs
precarious, difficult and overall unsustainability. Malaysia’s Special Branch
(Intelligence) had successfully infiltrated the MCP creating dissensions,
suspicions and animosity among members. Secretary-General Chin
Peng claimed that internal investigation undertaken by the MCP Central
Committee-appointed counterintelligence agents believed that almost all
(90 percent) of the Thai Chinese recruited from 1960 were planted govern-
ment spies.185 Death was the penalty for traitors. Hence, the aforesaid reve-
lations resulted in accusations and counter-accusations:

Chinese politics in Malaysia, 1920s–1990s  81

The jungle trial conducted by the MCP Central Committee found a
large number of guerrillas from headquarters and Betong East Camp
were enemy agents. But in complete defiance, the Sadao and West
Betong Group refused to hold such trials. Instead, these two factions
hurled accusations that the MCP Central Committee itself was being
manipulated and controlled by government agents.186

Schism within the MCP was unavoidable under such dire circumstances
that saw two splinter groups, namely the Communist Party of Malaya–
Marxist-Leninist (CPM-ML), and the Communist Party of Malaya–
Revolutionary Faction (CPM-RF).187 The original MCP was stationed with
the East Betong Group, CPM-ML associated with the West Betong Group,
and CPM-RF based at Sadao. A complete split was made when CPM-RF
styled itself MCP Revolutionary Faction (RF). Similarly, CPM-ML moved
out to be an independent entity known as MCP ‘Marxist–Leninist’ (M-L)
with a military arm, the Malayan People’s Liberation Army (MPLA).
Undoubtedly, such adverse developments from within the MCP with splits
and breakaways subsequently sapped their strength.

The situation from without too worked against the MCP. In an unprec-
edented move, Razak journeyed to Beijing in 1974 to establish diplomatic
relations. The historic portrait of Mao receiving Razak, and of the duo
shaking hands, signalled the symbolic ‘termination’ of PRC support for the
MCP. Moreover, schism within the latter adversely impacted CCP support.
A decade forward, the 1980s witnessed the questionable sustainability of the
Soviet Union where many satellite states in Eastern Europe were increasing
demands for disengagement. The demise of the ‘union’ finally came on 26
December 1991.

Within Malaysia itself, the premiership of Dr Mahathir bin Mohamad
(t. 1981–2003) saw the country’s economy accelerated by leaps and bounds
enjoying double-digit growth rates during the early 1970s and late 1980s.188
Poverty rate was drastically reduced and the rakyat enjoyed prosperity.189

Therefore, against the background from within and from without, the
armed revolutionary struggle of the MCP to establish a communist repub-
lic became increasingly untenable, anachronistic with scant appeal to any
quarter. Finally, as earlier mentioned, the two longstanding adversaries,
the Malaysian government and the MCP, penned a Peace Accord on 2 De-
cember 1989, in Haadyai, Thailand, brokered by Bangkok. A diplomatic
face-saving clause in the peace agreement did not call for the MCP to sur-
render but to end all militant activities and hostilities. They all agreed to
demobilize their military units and destroy all weaponry. MCP members
on the active list then totalled 1,188.190 They were offered two options: ei-
ther to return home to Malaysia or to choose to settle in Thailand in so-
called ‘Peace Villages’. For the former, it was mandatory that they formally
pledged loyalty to the Yang Di-Pertuan Agong (king of Malaysia). Alto-
gether the collective death toll was 367, comprising 155 government security
forces personnel and 212 CTs.191

82  Ooi Keat Gin

The successes of KESBAN that complemented the NEP, the sustained
economic prosperity (1970s–1990s), the collapse of the Soviet Union that
brought forth the conclusion of the Cold War, all contributed to the irrele-
vancy of the MCP’s armed struggle. Malaysia’s rapprochement with the PRC
had also undermined the MCP’s struggle and cause. Only a knot of hard-
core MCP stalwarts remained steadfast in the pursuit of the revolutionary
end of establishing a communist state. With economic upturn, unemploy-
ment rates fell and there were less dissatisfied and/or disaffected groups
among the Chinese that had long been sympathetic towards the MCP cause.
But, as pointed out, apart from a minority ideologically committed core of
individuals that sacrificed everything for the party and its cause, the ma-
jority who supported, sympathized and assisted the jungle guerrillas did
so because of ethnic affinity rather than on ideological grounds. Moreover,
without doubt there were many, Chinese or Orang Asli, who rendered as-
sistance to the jungle guerrillas under duress and threats to themselves and
their families.

Concluding remarks

Analyzing the political proclivities of the Chinese in Malaya/Malaysia in the
twentieth century has brought into perspective the fact that the trajectory of
the Cold War dates back to the 1920s. By the 1920s, the colonial authorities
(British colonial administration, Brooke regime) had already a clear-cut, if
not informal policy, of taking an anti-communist stance. Both the British
colonial administration in Malaya and the Brooke Raj in Sarawak, likewise
the Company administration in North Borneo, took measures to eliminate
leftist influence in their respective territories since the 1920s and through-
out the 1930s. The colonial authorities had been weary and suspicious of
the MCP in Malaya and the SCO in Sarawak, which utilized the cloak of
Chinese patriotism and nationalism in anti-Japanese movements of the late
1930s to disguise their (communist) intentions, namely, the mobilization of
the masses (students, workers, peasants) gearing them to their (communist)
cause. Such distrust of the colonial authorities of the Chinese communists
persisted to the eve of Singapore’s fall; when DALFORCE was finally con-
stituted, it was ‘too little, too late’. But the wartime situation in occupied
Malaya forced the British Force 136 to cooperate with the MCP-MPAJA.

The post-war scenario of the late 1940s saw the Chinese in the peninsula
having little choice but the MCP, particularly for the labouring class (urban)
and peasantry (rural). The emergence of the MCA (1949) was a respite, as
an alternative political avenue was available for the Chinese populace. In
championing and securing citizenship status for thousands of immigrant
Chinese, and welfare work among the inmates of New Villages, raised
the stature of the MCA in the eyes of the Chinese. From the mid-1950s,
Chinese support for the MCA vis-à-vis the MCP was increasingly gaining
momentum. In partnering UMNO and the MIC in the inter-ethnic tripartite

Chinese politics in Malaysia, 1920s–1990s  83

Alliance Party, the MCA was a rising star. It was the Alliance Party that
attained merdeka, not the MCP, who hitherto claimed was struggling for
Malaya’s independence.

In the context of Sarawak, the vernacular-educated Chinese were the
most susceptible to SCO propaganda, in the pre-war years and even more
conspicuous in the post-war period. They were the disaffected and disfran-
chised group, rejected by the Brooke bureaucracy and Western enterprises
for employment, likewise by the towkay entrepreneurs that favoured dialect
and clan particularism over middle school certificates. Cast aside, many of
these Chinese youth found solace with leftist ideology and willingly com-
mitted themselves to the SCO. The achievements of Mao and the proclama-
tion of the PRC (1949) ushered the emergence of a ‘New China’ resonated
with the disfranchised Sarawak Chinese youth, such as the likes of Wen
Ming Chyuan, Bong Kee Chok, Yang Chu Chung and Yap Choon Ho.

The mid-1960s in Peninsula Malaysia saw the PAP challenging the MCA
in pursuit of the ‘Malaysian Malaysia’ principle. Following the expulsion
of Singapore (1965), the DAP (1966) continued the ‘Malaysian Malaysia’
principle albeit with greater restraint. While the MCP retreated to the
Thai-Malaysian border, the Chinese community in the peninsula possessed
ample political choices, viz. MCA, DAP and Gerakan (1968). Although a
latecomer, Gerakan proved its appeal among the English-educated Chi-
nese middle class in its electoral triumph over Penang in the 1969 general
elections.

By the 1970s and 1980s, consequent of economic prosperity of Malaysia,
the MCP’s second outing – Second Malayan Emergency – faced insurmount-
able challenges in making relevant its revolutionary struggle. The ‘hollow
independence’ thesis propagated by the MCP as the decades progressed be-
came increasingly ‘hollow’ itself. The MCA and by then Gerakan were in
the ruling Barisan Nasional (BN, National Front) (1973), allowing a Chinese
‘voice’ from within the government. By the 1980s, the MCP has become an
anachronism not unlike communism itself in the European context.

The Sarawak Communist Insurgency (1962–1990) was militarily un-
sustainable. During Konfrontasi, SCO jungle guerrillas fought alongside
the TNI staging incursions into Sarawak from West Kalimantan. When
Konfrontasi ended, and Malaysia–Indonesia diplomatic relations were
reinstated (1967), joint military operations between the TNI and Malay-
sian security forces almost annihilated the PGRS and PARAKU in the
Sarawak-Kalimantan border area. Then in 1969, TNI, on the Indonesian
side of the border, destroyed the PGRS’s Third Branch, viz. its largest
militant force.

Following various anti-leftist sweeps by the Malaysian government, SUPP
was cleansed off SCO infiltration and influence. Convinced that working
from within the government rather as an opposition from without, SUPP
became a partner (1970) in Sarawak’s ruling coalition. SUPP managed to
win back the Chinese electorate, hence denying the SCO.

84  Ooi Keat Gin

Then in 1974, Bong Kee Chok and his PARAKU comrades, altogether
302 in number, decided to lay down their arms and return to society. Half
that number, however, remained in the jungle to continue the armed strug-
gle. Economic prosperity from the 1970s and 1980s rendered the SCO armed
struggle redundant. The effectiveness of RASCOM from within, and the
changing geopolitical situation in Europe that witnessed the deterioration
and subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union (1991) from without, prompted
the remainder SCO jungle guerrillas to secure a peace agreement (1990).

The Chinese labouring class and peasantry in Malaya/Malaysia and
Sarawak were the most susceptible to leftist propaganda, some participated
directly becoming jungle guerrillas, while others as sympathizers played sup-
porting roles. But the majority were involved owing more to ethnic affinity
rather than ideological commitment. Undeniably, a hard-core minority
were ideologically converted to Marxism, Communism and Maoism, fully
convinced that leftist ideologies were better options for Malaya/Malaysia
and Sarawak vis-à-vis Westminster-style parliamentary democracy. But it
was this last style of political setup supported by the majority within the
Chinese community carried the day. Fortuitously, there were alternative
political voices for the Chinese apart from leftist-based parties (MCP in the
peninsula and SCO in Sarawak), initially the MCA, then the PAP (short
lived, 1963–1965), DAP and Gerakan and SUPP.

Circumstances had pushed some Chinese to the left of the political spec-
trum, but overall, the majority within the community turned to the right.
Their choice for the latter was consistent with the other ethnic communities
(Malays, Indians and other indigenes) in Malaysia that had long eschewed
and distant themselves from leftist/communist ideologies.

Notes

1 Also referred as the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM).
2 See Chapter 3.




5 For instance, see Zheng Wang, Never Forget National Humiliation: Historical
Memory in Chinese Politics and Foreign Relations (New York: Columbia Uni-
versity Press, 2014).



7 See W. L. Blythe, Historical Sketch of Chinese Labour in Malaya (Singapore:
Government Printing Press); Ooi Keat Gin, Of Free Trade and Native Inter-
ests: The Brookes and the Economic Development of Sarawak, 1841–1941 (Kuala
Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1997).

Chinese politics in Malaysia, 1920s–1990s  85

86  Ooi Keat Gin

Chinese politics in Malaysia, 1920s–1990s  87

88  Ooi Keat Gin
mainland historians backdated this war to Imperial Japan’s invasion of Man-
churia following the Mukden Incident (18 September 1931).

52 See Yoji Akashi, The Nanyang Chinese National Salvation Movement, 1937–1941
(Lawrence, KS: Center for East Asian Studies, University of Kansas, 1970); and
Stephen Leong. ‘The Kuomintang-Communist United Front in Malaya during
the National Salvation Period, 1937–1941’, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies,
8, 1 (Mar 1977): 31–47.

53 M. R. Stenson, Industrial Conflict in Malaya (London: Oxford University
Press, 1970), p. 22.

54 ‘The Boycott and Activities of Patriotic Societies’, Monthly Report of Chinese
Affairs, Aug 1939, CO 273/654 (NAUK).

55 Annual Report of the State of Crime and the Administration of the Police
Force, FMS (Kuala Lumpur: Police Department, 1939), p. 14.

56 Richard L. DiNardo, Germany and the Axis Powers: From Coalition to Collapse
(Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2005), pp. 78–95.

57 Steven D. Mercatante, Why Germany Nearly Won: A New History of the Second
World War in Europe (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2012); Max Hastings,
Inferno: The World at War, 1939–1945. New York: Vintage, 2012).

58 Sir Richard Clarke, Anglo-American Economic Collaboration in War and Peace,
1942–1949 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982).

59 Report No. 3780, ‘The Role of the Communists in Malaya’, the Division of Re-
search for Far East, Office of Intelligence Research (OIR), Department of State,
March 16, 1947 (US National Archives, Washington, DC), in Cheah, From PKI
to the COMINTERN, p. 93.

60 See Bryan C. Cooper, Decade of Change; Malaya and the Straits Settlements 1936–
1945 (Singapore: Graham Brash, 2001), pp. 434–435; and, Indrajaya Abdullah,
Ringkasan Sejarah Tentera Anti-Jepun Rakyat Malaya [Summary of the History
of the Malayan People’s Anti-Japanese Army] (Petaling Jaya, Malaysia: Strategic
Information and Research Development Centre (SIRD), 2014), p. 1. Indrajaya
Abdullah, who undertook the translation and adaptation of the writings (orig-
inally in Chinese) of the volume’s 16 contributors, all ex-MPAJA, was a former
member of the MCP’s 10th Regiment, the only non-Chinese unit.

61 Chin Peng, Alias Chin Peng: My Side of History (Singapore: Media Masters,
2003), p. 60; ‘Memorandum on the Force 136: Organisation in Malaya’, by Lt.
Col. D.G. Gill-Davies R.E in D.C.C.A.O. 227/42. Resistance Force, Force 136,
p. 1, para 5, CO 574/88-90 (NAUK).

62 The verdict of British wartime Prime Minister Winston Churchill in his mas-
terpiece, The Second World War, Vol. IV: The Hinge of Fate (Boston, MA:
Houghton Mifflin, 1950), p. 81.

63 Cheah Boon-Kheng, ‘Malayan People’s Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA)’, South-
east Asia: A Historical Encyclopedia, from Angkor Wat to East Timor, edited by
Ooi Keat Gin (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-Clio, 2004), II: 837.

64 Tie Yi, and Zhong Cheng, ‘An Account of the Anti-Japanese War Fought Jointly
by the British Government and MPAJA’, The Price of Peace: True Accounts
of the Japanese Occupation, compiled and edited by Foong Choon Hon, and
translated by Clara Show (Singapore: Asiapac Books for Singapore Chamber
of Commerce & Industry, 1997), pp. 46–47.

65 Ibid., p. 47.
66 Ibid. Another source maintained that 7,000 MPAJA members handed over

their arms. Victor Purcell, The Chinese in Malaya (London: Oxford University
Press, 1949), p, 262.
67 Tie and Zhong, ‘An Account of the Anti-Japanese War’, p. 47.
68 Cheah Boon Kheng, Red Star Over Malaya. Resistance and Social Conflict
during and after the Japanese Occupation of Malaya, 1941–1946 (Singapore:
Singapore University Press, National University of Singapore, 1983), p. 73.

Chinese politics in Malaysia, 1920s–1990s  89

90  Ooi Keat Gin
100,000.’ Hara Fujio, ‘Sook ching: A “Cleansing” Exercise’, Southeast Asia: A
Historical Encyclopedia, from Angkor Wat to East Timor, edited by Ooi Keat
Gin (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-Clio, 2004), III: 1230. In addition, a monetary
demand of Malayan dollar $50 million was imposed on the Chinese for their
pre-war anti-Japanese activities. See ‘Principles Governing the Implementation
of Measures Relative to [the] Chinese, 25th Army Group’, April 1942, Japa-
nese Military Administration in Indonesia: Selected Documents, edited by Harry
Benda (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1965), pp. 178–181. Also see Tan,
Y. S., History of the Formation of the Oversea Chinese Association and the Extor-
tion by J.M.A. of $50,000,000 Military Contribution from the Chinese in Malaya
(Singapore: Nanyang Book Co., 1947).

90 The IJA appropriated the shu-jin accordingly to economic standing: Kuch-
ing (S$900,000); Sibu (S$700,000); Miri (S$300,000); Jesselton (West Coast)
(S$600,000); and, Sandakan (East Coast) (S$500,000). See Ooi Keat Gin, The
Japanese Occupation of Borneo, 1941–1945 (London: Routledge, 2011), p. 66.

91 Ibid., pp. 35–37.
92 A twist of fate saw the remnants of the 2/15th Punjab being brought back from

Pontianak to their barracks in Kuching that had been transformed into the
Batu Lintang Prisoners of War and Internment Camp. Ibid., p. 37.
93 Ibid., pp. 98–99.
94 For a detailed recent treatment, see Danny Wong Tze Ken, One Crowded
Moment of Glory. The Kinabalu Guerrillas and the 1943 Jesselton Uprising
(Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya Press, 2019).
95 Ibid., pp. 146–153.
96 Ibid., pp. 153–154. Also, see Maxwell J. Hall, Kinabalu Guerrillas (Kuching:
Borneo Literature Bureau, 1949), pp. 146–147. Prior to Wong’s (2019), Hall’s
volume was the only account of this gory episode.
97 Being ignorant of the Chinese mother tongue, English-educated Chinese such
as the Straits-born Chinese and the eclectic Baba Nyonya were generally re-
garded with awe and envy by the Chinese-educated. Due to wider opportunities
in the colonial setting for the English educated, even holding clerical positions
allowed reasonable comfortable middle class livelihood, and those who became
professionals (doctors, lawyers, etc.), a handful, enjoyed luxurious living. The
majority of the vernacular educated could barely go beyond their proletarian
and peasantry roots.
98 Lennox A. Mills, Malaya: A Political and Economic Appraisal (Minneapolis,
MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1958), p. 45.
99 For Lai Teck’s betrayal, see Cheah, Red Star Over Malaya, pp. 78–100.
1 00 Ibid., p. 97.
1 01 Ibid.
1 02 Ibid., p. 90.
1 03 ‘Statement of the Selangor State Committee, The Communist Party of Malaya’,
27 August 1945’, as Appendix D; Ibid., p. 309 (emphasis added).
1 04 Van Der Kroef, Communism in Malaysia and Singapore, pp. 23–24.
105 For a detailed account of this period, see Cheah, Red Star Over Malaya,
pp. 127–240.
1 06 ‘Telegram giving the Terms of Agreement’, Rear SACSEA [Supreme Allied
Commander South-East Asia] to War Office, 6 November 1945, WO 172/1790
(NAUK).
107 For the complexity of British Malaya, see Ooi Keat Gin, Historical Dictionary
of Malaysia, 2nd ed. (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2018), pp. 160–161,
421–422, 442–443.
1 08 J. De V. Allen, A. J. Stockwell and L. R. Wright, A Collection of Treaties and
Other Documents Affecting the States of Malaysia, 1761–1963 (London: Oce-
ania Publications, 1981), vol. I, p. 390 (Emphasis added.

Chinese politics in Malaysia, 1920s–1990s  91
1 09 For the Malayan Union, see Albert Lau, The Malayan Union Controversy,

1942–1948 (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1991).
1 10 ‘Formation of The Federation of Malaya’, 01-02-1948 (ANM); http://hids.

a r k i b.g ov. my/e n / p e r i s t i w a /- /a s s e t _ p u b l i s h e r/ WA h qb C Y R 9 w w 2 /c o nt e nt /
p e r s ek ut u a n-t a n a h-m el ay u d it ubu h k a n /p op_ up?_101_ I NSTA NCE _WA hqb
CYR9ww2_viewMode=print (accessed 27 July 2019).
111 In fact, it was this Anglo-Malay Working Committee Report that became the
final draft of the Constitution of the Federation of Malaya.
112 Oong Hak Ching, Chinese Politics in Malaya, 1942–55: The Dynamics of British
Policy (Bangi, Malaysia: Penerbit Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, 2000),
p. 109.
1 13 Tan Cheng Lock, Malayan Problems from a Chinese Point of View (Singapore:
Tannsco, 1947), p. 135.
114 Yeo Kim Wah, Political Development in Singapore, 1945–1955 (Singapore:
Singapore University Press, 1973), p. 22.
115 See Yeo Kim Wah, ‘The Anti-Federation Movement in Malaya, 1946–48’,
Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 4, 1 (March 1973): 31–51.
116 AMCJA was the name adopted in August 1947, almost nine months after the
organization was initially convened. It begun with the Singapore-established
Council for Joint Action (CJA), and thereafter, with the inclusion of component
parties from Malaya, a name change to Pan Malayan Council for Joint Action
(PMCJA).
117 Hereinafter referred to as MNP.
118 Initially, an umbrella organization for labour unions that subsequently split
into the Singapore Federation of Trade Unions (SFTU), and the Pan Malayan
Federation of Trade Unions (PMFTU), both highly influenced and infiltrated
by leftist elements.
119 Yeo, Political Development in Singapore, p. 320.
120 Later from December 1946, Gerald de Cruz, also from MDU, became
secretary-general.
1 21 Yeo, Political Development in Singapore, p. 320. Tan Cheng Lock expounded
these three basic principles in his public address in Kuala Lumpur on 26 Janu-
ary 1947. See Tan, Malayan Problems, p. 139.
122 Malayan Union, Working Committee on the Constitutional Proposals, Sum-
mary of the Report of the Working Committee appointed by a Conference of His
Excellency the Governor of the Malayan Union, Their Highnesses the rulers of
the Malay States and the representatives of the United Malays National Organ-
isation. Revised to the 19th of December, 1946 (Kuala Lumpur: Printed at the
Malayan Union Govt. Press, 1946).
123 Paul H. Kratoska, ed., South East Asia. Colonial History, Vol. V: Peaceful Tran-
sition to Independence (1945–1963) (London and New York: Routledge, 2001),
pp. 165–166 (emphasis added).
1 24 Also referred to as the Malayan Races Liberation Army (MRLA), or, from
1949, the Malayan People’s Liberation Army (MPLA). Hereinafter, MNLA is
solely used.
125 The Rajah had three daughters (Leonara, Elizabeth and Valerie), thus no male
heir. His brother, Bertram, the Tuan Besar, had two daughters (Anne and Jean),
and a son (Anthony). See R. H. W. Reece, The Name of Brooke: The End of
White Rajah Rule in Sarawak (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1982),
pp. 191–194.
126 See Sarawak Government Gazette, 24 September 1941.
1 27 See Ooi Keat Gin, ‘The Man who would be King: The Tribulations of An-
thoni Walter Dayrell Brooke (1912–2011) of Sarawak’, 3rd Nicholas Tarling
Conference on Southeast Asia Studies, Exalted Heroes, Demonized Villains,
and Losers: Altering Perceptions and Memories of Leaders and Leadership in

92  Ooi Keat Gin
Southeast Asia, c. 1800– c. 2000, University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, 12–13
November 2013.

1 28 Official Minutes Council Negri Debates, reproduced in Sarawak Gazette, 2
September 1946.

1 29 On 6 February 1946, the Rajah announced cession to the peoples of Sarawak,
while the British parliament was similarly informed by public statement.
Cession was formally approved by Council Negri (14 May), and the Supreme
Council (20 May), and finally, the House of Commons (22 May).

1 30 Iban concerns were expressed by Robert Jitam, SDA treasurer. See Robert
Jitam to Anne Bryant, 10 August 1946, Brooke Papers, Box 11/1 (RHL).

1 31 Reece, The Name of Brooke, p. 249.
132 For instance, see Mohd Nor to Anthony Brooke, n.d., Brooke Papers, Box 22

(RHL).
133 Ooi Keat Gin, Post-war Borneo, 1945–1950: Nationalism, Empire, and

State-building (London: Routledge, 2013), p. 88.
1 34 For Chinese views towards cession, see Sarawak Tribune, 15 February and 22

February 1946.
135 Ooi, Post-war Borneo, p. 88.
1 36 See Sanib Said, Malay Politics in Sarawak, 1946–1966: The Search for Unity

and Political Ascendancy (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1985), p. 59.
137 See Gerry Van Tonder, Malayan Emergency: Triumph of the Running Dogs,

1848–1960 (London: Pen and Sword Military, 2017); Donald MacKay, The
Malayan Emergency 1948– 60: The Domino That Stood (Lincoln, NE: Potomac
Books Inc., 1997); Richard Stubbs, Hearts and Minds in Guerrilla Warfare: The
Malayan Emergency 1948–1960 (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1990);
Roger C. Arditti, Counterinsurgency Intelligence and the Emergency in Malaya
(London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019); Souchou Yao, The Malayan Emergency:
Essays on a Small, Distant War (Copenhagen: Nordic Institute of Asian Studies
(NIAS), 2016); Noel Barber, The War of the Running Dogs: How Malaya de-
feated the Communist Guerrillas, 1948– 60 (London: Cassell, 1971); John Leary,
Violence & the Dream People: The Orang Asli in the Malayan Emergency 1948–
1960 (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1995); Leon Comber, Malaya’s Secret
Police 1945– 60: The Role of the Special Branch in the Malayan Emergency
(Clayton, VIC: Monash University Publishing, 2008); Kumar Ramakrishna,
Emergency Propaganda: The Winning of Malayan Hearts and Minds 1948–1958
(Richmond, Surrey: Curzon Press, 2002).
1 38 Breakdown of death toll: 6,711 (insurgents), 1,346 (police), 519 (military),
3,283 (civilians). Insurgents who were captured or surrendered totalled 3,993.
John Coates, Suppressing Insurgency: An Analysis of the Malayan Emergency,
1948–1954 (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1992), p. 202.
1 39 Eight years later, the MCP resurrected its armed struggle for a Malaya/
Malaysia Democratic Republic, that would witness another protracted two
decades of jungle warfare until 1989. See Ong Weichong, Malaysia’s Defeat of
Armed Communism: The Second Emergency, 1968–1989 (London: Routledge,
2015).
1 40 Prominent Malays in the MCP include Abdullah C D (b. 1923), Rashid Maidin
(1917–2006), Shamsiah Fakeh (1924–2008), Abu Samah Mohd Kassim (b. 1909),
Wahi Annuar, Mat Indera (1920–1953). R. G. Balan and P. Veerasenan were the
notable Indians related to the MCP.
1 41 See his memoirs, Chin Peng, Alias Chin Peng - My Side of History (Singapore:
Media Masters, 2003).
142 MCP- MNLA jungle guerrillas were referred to in colonial official circles, in-
itially as ‘bandits’, but later ‘communist terrorists’ or CTs. The reference to
‘bandits’ was reminiscent of Mao Zedong’s Red Army guerrillas in the Chinese

Chinese politics in Malaysia, 1920s–1990s  93
Civil War, hence might be offensive to the PRC which Britain, the first major
Western power, to have recognized in 1950.
1 43 Young Chinese females were especially desired as ‘comfort women’, a euphe-
mism for prostitutes to serve in ‘comfort stations’ (military brothels) of the IJA.
For instance, see Yoshiaki Yoshimi, Comfort Women, rev. ed., trans. Suzanne
O’Brien (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002); George Hicks, The
Comfort Women: Japan’s Brutal Regime of Enforced Prostitution in the Second
World War (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1995).
144 Stubbs, Hearts and Minds in Guerrilla Warfare, pp. 169, 262; Coates, Suppress-
ing Insurgency, p. 104.
145 Through conducting public lotteries, the MCA was able to rely on a sustainable
fund for its activities in New Villages.
1 46 Abdul Rahman Haji Ismail, ‘Malayan Chinese Association (MCA) (1949)’,
Southeast Asia: A Historical Encyclopedia, from Angkor Wat to East Timor,
edited by Ooi Keat Gin (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-Clio, 2004), II: 831.
147 Ibid.
148 See Oong, Chinese Politics in Malaya, pp. 143–150.
149 See ‘Recovered Documents of the Malayan Communist Party. Secret.
01/01/1951 - 31/12/1953. CO1022/46 (NAUK)
1 50 William Blum, Killing Hope: U.S. Military and CIA Interventions Since World
War II (London: Zed Books, 2004), p. 23.
1 51 Chin Peng was awarded the OBE (Order of the British Empire) in 1945 for his
wartime contribution in fighting the IJA.
1 52 A Malay socialist party that grew out of the MNP’s youth wing (of the same
name). Ahmad Boestamam (1920–1983) together with Dr Burhanuddin Al
Helmi (1911–1969) were its founding leaders.
1 53 API was the MNP’s women’s wing. Prominent leaders included Aishah Ghani,
Sakinah Junid and Shamsiah Fakeh.
1 54 An Islamic offshoot of MNP was the Pan-Malayan Supreme Islamic Council
(MATA) formed in 1947. MATA, in turn, established Hizbul Muslimin (Islamic
Party) in the following year that professed its intention of setting up an Islamic
state. Hizbul Muslimin was the precursor of the contemporary Parti Islam
Se-Malaysia (PAS, Malaysian Islamic Party).
1 55 The Alliance Party, however, was only officially registered as a political party
on 30 October 1957, two months after having attained independence for Malaya.
1 56 See Record of Baling talks in December 1955 between Tunku Abdul Rahman,
Chief Minister of Malaya, David Marshall, Chief Minister of Singapore and
Dato Su [Sir] Cheng Lock Tan and Communist principals Chin Peng, Chen
Tian and Abdul Rashid Mahiden to discuss amnesty. CO 1030/29, NAB 1563
(NAUK)
1 57 Singapore attained partial internal self-rule after the 2 April 1955 Legislative
Assembly election where a coalition government led by the Labour Party
emerged. David Marshall, who headed the Labour Party, was appointed chief
minister.
1 58 Jeyakumar Devaraj, ‘Who Is to Blame for our Soldiers’ Deaths? Baling Peace
Talks revisited’, Aliran Newsletter, 29 September 2013; https://aliran.com/
web-specials/who-is-to-blame-for-our-soldiers-deaths-baling-peace-talks-
revisited/ (accessed 4 August 2019). For the Tunku’s duplicity, see Said Zahari,
Dark Clouds at Dawn: A Political Memoir (Kuala Lumpur: Institute of Social
Analysis (INSAN), 2001), p. 282; Khong Kim Hoong, Merdeka! British Rule
and the Struggle for Independence in Malaya, 1945–1957 (Kuala Lumpur: Insti-
tute of Social Analysis, 1984), p. 198.
159 ‘Malayan Emergency’, National Army Museum, Chelsea, London; https://
www.nam.ac.uk/explore/malayan-emergency (accessed 16 August 2019).

94  Ooi Keat Gin
1 60 Hereinafter, SCO is preferred.
161 E. W. Woodhead, Report upon Financing of Education and Conditions of Service

in the Teaching Profession in Sarawak (Kuching: Sarawak Government Printing
Press, 1955), pp. 43, 47.
1 62 Ibid., p. 7.
163 Ooi, World beyond the Rivers, p. 162.
164 See Ooi Keat Gin, Borneo in the Cold War, 1950–1990 (London: Routledge,
2019), especially Chapter IV.
1 65 D. McLellan, Report on Secondary Education (Kuching: Government Printing
Office, 1960), p. 6.
1 66 The Danger Within, p. 24.
1 67 Sarawak Administration Report 1962 (Kuching: Government Printing Office,
1963), p. 151.
1 68 In support of Dr Lee Siew Choh and Lim Chin Siong, 35 branch committees
out of 51 and 19 of 23 paid organizing secretaries of the PAP, transplanted their
loyalty to Barisan Sosialis.
1 69 Haji Zaini Haji Ahmad, ed., Partai Rakyat Brunei/The People’s Party of Brunei:
Selected Documents/Dokumen Terpilih (Petaling Jaya: INSAN [Institute of So-
cial Analysis], n.d.), p. 198.
170 As far as can ascertained, incarceration was brief neither were any charges
brought against any detainee. The entire episode was rather ambivalent and
even in contemporary times (2020s), Bruneians politely disengaged themselves
from discussing the matter.
1 71 See Tarzie Vittachi, The Fall of Sukarno (New York: Frederick A. Praeger,
1967); US Central Intelligence Agency, Indonesia, 1965: The Coup that Back-
fired (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 1968).
172 See Ooi, Borneo in the Cold War, Chapter VIII.
173 Vernon L. Porritt, The Rise and Fall of Communism in Sarawak 1940–1990
(Clayton, VIC: Monash Asia Institute, 2004), p. 141.
174 Sarawak Tribune, 23 July 1966.
175 See Hara Fujio, ‘The North Kalimantan Communist Party and China’, Sec-
ond International Conference in Research and Documentation of the Chinese
Oversea, Chinese University of Hong Kong, 13–15 March 2003, Hong Kong,
pp. 201–202.
176 See Hon-Kah Fong, ‘Vernon L. Porritt, “The Rise and Fall of Communism in
Sarawak 1940–1990”’, Book Review, Taiwan Journal of Southeast Asian Studies,
2 (1) (2005): 187–188;

https://web.archive.org/web/20131224123919/http://www.cseas.ncnu.edu.tw/
journal/v02_no1/5.pp183–192書評new.pdf (accessed 20 November 2018).
177 See Ooi, Historical Dictionary of Malaysia, pp. 397–398.
1 78 Chin Peng, My Side of History, pp. 434–435.
1 79 Ibid., pp. 428–430.
1 80 Registered in March 1966, some seven months following Singapore’s expulsion,
the DAP, seen as the successor to the PAP, championed the latter’s ‘Malaysian
Malaysia’ principle. See Ooi, Historical Dictionary of Malaysia, pp. 131–132.
181 Remnants of the then dissolved United Democratic Party (UDP) and the La-
bour Party regrouped to form Gerakan in 1968. A Penang-based party, Ger-
akan had long had a membership comprising the English-educated Chinese
middle class, and the intelligentsia (regardless of ethnicity). See Ooi, Historical
Dictionary of Malaysia, p. 173.
182 Edwin Moise, The Myths of Tet: The Most Misunderstood Event of the Viet-
nam War (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2017), pp. 134–155; James
Willbanks, The Tet Offensive: A Concise History (New York: Columbia Univer-
sity Press, 2007), pp. 8–14, 26–42.

Chinese politics in Malaysia, 1920s–1990s  95
1 83 See Nguyen Phu Duc, The Viet Nam Peace Negotiations: Saigon’s Side of the

Story, ed. Arthur J. Dommen (Christianburg, VA: Dalley Book Service, 2005).
1 84 For instance, see Ooi Keat Gin, ‘Eclipse of the Yellow Sun? The Malaysian

Chinese Association (MCA) and Resurgence of Chinese Politics in Malaysia’,
Malaysia and the World: Cross-Regional Perspectives on Race, Religion, and
Ethnic Identity, Ohio University, Athens, Ohio, 24–26 March 2017.
1 85 Chin Peng, My Side of History, pp. 465–466.
1 86 Ooi, Historical Dictionary of Malaysia, p. 272.
187 Ibid.
188 See The Global Economy.com. ‘Malaysia: Economic Growth; source: The
World Bank’; https://www.theglobaleconomy.com/Malaysia/Economic_growth/
(accessed 20 August 2019)
1 89 The overall household poverty rate dropped from 42.2 percent in 1976 to 19.1
percent in 1990; rural poverty rate plummeted from 50.9 percent in 1976 to 21.8
percent in 1990. Ooi, Historical Dictionary of Malaysia, p. 318.
190 Chin Peng, My Side of History, p. 491.
191 Nazar Bin Talib, ‘Malaysia’s Experience in War Against Communist Insur-
gency and its Relevance to The Present Situation in Iraq’, MA thesis, United
States Marine Corps, Command and Staff College, Marine Corps Combat De-
velopment, Marine Corps University, Quantico, VA, 2005, p. 22.

3 Kuomintang man behind
special force

Wu Tiecheng and Force 136,
1942–1945

Tan Chee Seng

Wu Tiecheng (or Wu Te-chen 吴铁城 1888–1953), one of the senior statesmen
of the Kuomintang (KMT, Guomindang 国民党 or Nationalist Party) and
Republican China, was a pragmatic politician skilful in political networking
and eloquence. He served as Secretary-General of the KMT Central Execu-
tive Committee (CEC) in 1941–1948. In this capacity, he also served as ex of-
ficio, the man behind KMT intelligence agency, the Bureau of Investigation
and Statistics of the CEC of KMT China or Zhongtong (中统). In 1941, he was
elected as President for both the Nanyang Overseas Chinese Association (Nan-
yang Huaqiao Xiehui 南洋华侨协会) and the Chinese People’s Foreign Rela-
tions Association (Zhongguo Guomin Waijiao Xiehui 中国国民外交协会), which
strengthened his ties with those abroad, especially the Overseas Chinese. Wu
was also one of the KMT key figures with a firm anti-communist stance.

Force 136 was a specialized military unit set up in 1942, being dis-
banded shortly after the Second World War. It was borne of collaboration
between Britain’s British Special Operations Executive (SOE) and China
through Zhongtong. Force 136, with its Chinese recruits drawn mainly from
Singapore-Malaya, infiltrated into Occupied Malaya to undertake under-
ground activities behind (Japanese) enemy lines.

This chapter focuses on the connection between Wu Tiecheng and Force
136, argues notably his pivotal role in the establishment and development of
Force 136 and his relationship with important military personnel including
Lim Bo Seng (Lin Mousheng 林谋盛) and Tan Chong Tee (Chen Chongzhi 陈
崇智) (see Plate 3.1). At the same time, it draws attention to Wu’s relationship
with the British and his early connections with Overseas Chinese in Singapore-
Malaya during his visit to the Nanyang (Southeast Asia) (1940–1941) to not
only convey Chiang Kai-shek’s (Jiang Jieshi 蒋介石) gratitude to Overseas
Chinese and Overseas KMT members, but also to counter local Communist
influence. His relationship with each quarter had been incorporated into his
Overseas Chinese network that proved beneficial, not only to him, but also
to the KMT and the Nationalist Government. Force 136 was undoubtedly
established as a counterweight to the leftist-created Malayan People’s Anti-
Japanese Army (MPAJA). It was apparent that the British colonial government
in Malaya was supportive of the KMT and Chiang’s Nationalist Government
on the mainland even before the onset of the Cold War (1947–1990).

Wu Tiecheng and Force 136, 1942–1945  97

Plate 3.1 Resplendent in their revolutionary uniform in 1910, a youthful Wu
Tiecheng (left) stands next to Lin Sen (right)

Source: Huaqiao Xiehui Zonghui 华侨协会总会 Overseas Chinese Association, ‘Chuanghui
Lishizhang Wu Tiecheng Zhaopianzhan’ 创会理事长吴铁城照片展 [Photo Exhibition of the
Founding President Wu Tiecheng]); https://ocahtw.files.wordpress.com/2015/06/000-e6b091e
59c8be5898de4ba8ce5b9b4e590b3e990b5e59f8ee58f b3e4ba8ce89197e99da9e591bde69c8d
e88887e69e97e6a3aee58fb3e4b880e59088e5bdb1.jpg (accessed 18 January 2019)

Enter Wu Tiecheng1
Wu Tiecheng, a Cantonese and native of Pinghu Village (Pinghuxiang 平湖乡),
Xiangshan County (Xiangshanxian 香山县) (present-day Zhongshan County
[Zhongshanxian 中山县], and the hometown of Sun Yat-sen [Sun Yixian 孙逸
仙]), Guangdong was born at Jiujiang (九江), Jiangxi (江西), in 1888. He was
invited by Lin Sen (林森) to join the Revolutionary Alliance (Tongmenghui 同
盟会) in 1909. After the 1911 Wuchang (武昌) Uprising until the early 1930s,
Wu took up various important party and state positions at Jiujiang Military
Government, Sun Yat-sen Military Government, Xiangshan County, Canton
(Guangzhou 广州) City, Guangdong Province, Nationalist Government, KMT
and other offices. For instance, he was Military Counsellor of the Grand Mar-
shal Office (1917–1918) and then the Presidential Office (1921), and Canton Po-
lice Chief (1923–1926). Wu was not only trusted and highly regarded by Sun
Yat-sen, but followed by the demise of Sun, he also attracted the attention of
Chiang Kai-shek due to his loyal support of Chiang. He had been to Japan
and Honolulu before returning to China in 1916. In the late 1920s, Wu began
to demonstrate his abilities as a negotiator, especially in getting Zhang Xue-
liang’s (张学良) support during the Central Plains War that broke out in 1930.

98  Tan Chee Seng

From the 1930s to 1949, Wu Tiecheng’s political career and position
gradually peaked. During different periods, he took up pivotal positions
successively at city, province and central levels. On 6 January 1932, he was ap-
pointed Mayor of Shanghai (上海) and Garrison Command of Songhu (淞沪)
(1932–1937), subsequently, on 24 March 1937, he was elevated to Chairman of
Guangdong Provincial Government, head of civil administration department
and public security commander (1937–1938). After Guangdong was captured
by the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA), in the spring of 1939, Wu Tiecheng took
charge of KMT party affairs in Hong Kong and Macau. He at the same time
also guided propaganda work for the War of Resistance Against Japan in two
provinces, namely Fujian (福建) and Guangdong. On 20 November 1939, he
went to Chongqing, assuming the role of Director of KMT’s Department of
Overseas Affairs (1939–1941). Later in 1941, he served as Secretary-General
of the KMT CEC (1941–1948). In this capacity, Wu concurrently served as
ex officio, the man behind KMT intelligence agency, Zhongtong, in which
he consequently played a crucial role in the establishment and develop-
ment of Force 136. In the same year, Wu was elected as President for both
the Nanyang Overseas Chinese Association and the Chinese People’s For-
eign Relations Association. After China’s victory in the War of Resistance,
Wu reorganized the Nanyang Overseas Chinese Association into Overseas
Chinese Association (Huaqiao Xiehui Zonghui 华侨协会总会) (OCA) to serve
the Overseas Chinese throughout the world. In 1946, he was elected as dele-
gate to the National Assembly and participated in the Political Consultative
Conference (PCC). He took up the post of Vice-President of the Legislative
Yuan (1947–1948) on 20 June in the following year. He subsequently served as
Vice-Premier of the Executive Yuan and Minister of Foreign Affairs (1948–
1949) in Sun Fo’s (Sun Ke 孙科) cabinet until his resignation in March 1949.
Then, he was entrusted during this critical and difficult moment with the mis-
sion to visit Japan, South Korea, Indonesia and the Philippines. In July 1949,
he became a member of the Central Extraordinary Council in Canton. Wu
later went to Taiwan through Hong Kong to serve as Presidential Adviser and
appraisal member of the KMT’s CEC. He also restored the operation of non-
governmental organisations such as the OCA and People’s Foreign Relations
Association. Wu died in Taipei in 1953 at the age of 66.

The foregoing elucidates Wu’s active involvement and extensive connec-
tions with Overseas Chinese and in Overseas KMT party affairs and foreign
relations. Contributing to the success of such involvement and connections
were his skilfulness in political networking and eloquence, based on the
combination of his three crucial assets: guanxi (关系 relationships or con-
nections), networks and eloquence, which he had established and developed
since his formative years in Jiujiang, China.2

The early days: Wu Tiecheng, the Overseas Chinese and
the British, 1888–1939

Before commencing on details of Wu’s connection with Force 136, we should
look into his relations with the main participants related to this military

Wu Tiecheng and Force 136, 1942–1945  99

outfit, namely the Overseas Chinese and the British, especially the former,
until 1939. Questions that emerged at this stage are: When did he start his
relationships with both groups, viz. the Overseas Chinese and the British?
How was his relationship with Overseas Chinese that linked with overseas
party (KMT) affairs? What factors or events connected him with Overseas
Chinese, and did he possess Overseas Chinese relatives?

Wu’s birthplace is Xiangshan county in Guangdong. According to his
memoir, Xiangshan was close to Hong Kong-Macau and exposed to West-
ern influence. The natives there were adventurous and enterprising as most
of them travelled abroad to make a living. They scattered around Shang-
hai and along the Yangzi River (Yangzijiang 扬子江), went overseas to
North America and the Nanyang.3 Xiangshan in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth century played several roles and had influences within and
beyond China. According to Huang Hongzhao (黄鸿钊), Xiangshan had
profound supportive revolutionary masses owing to three factors: (1) early
Western influence through early connections, via Macau, with the West-
ern World; (2) Xiangshan was the cradle of Chinese students abroad with
advanced thoughts and many had joined the Revolutionary Alliance; and
(3) Xiangshan had emigrant communities (qiaoxiang 侨乡) where the Over-
seas Chinese from there possessed deep affection for their motherland and
fully supported the revolution.4 Therefore, Wu’s native place identity had
equipped him with the foundation and wherewithal to connect with Over-
seas Chinese, in particular Xiangshanese.

In addition to his Xiangshanese identity is his place of birth, Jiujiang,
which had Western influences and which formed his educational back-
ground. At the age of seven, Wu received a traditional Chinese education
in Jiujiang in a private school and later, from the age of 14, under a private
tutor. After the abolition of imperial examinations in 1905, he furthered
his education in learning English for about two years, before joining a
modern Western school, Tongwen Academy (Tongwen Shuyuan 同文书院),
established by the Methodist Church of Jiujiang.5 Through learning English
during his childhood, in his adulthood he was able to engage independently
with foreigners while concurrently expanding his networks beyond China.
Jiujiang at that time had a similarity with Xiangshan: both were trading
ports exposed to Western influence and a foreign concession area was
located within the city enabled locals’ exposure to Western cultures and
thoughts thereby widening their knowledge.6 Wu, who resided near the for-
eign concession area, recalled that during his childhood, foreign properties
and goods around him had drawn his attention.7 Wu, who was born with
two associational identifications of Xiangshanese and a Jiujiang resident,
was furnished with the background and ability to be in touch with Overseas
Chinese and Westerners like the British.

Nevertheless, it was his overseas ‘revolutionary sojourn’ at Honolulu, be-
tween 1914 and 1916, when his ties with both Overseas Chinese and over-
seas KMT party affairs really commenced. This sojourn occurred following
Wu’s failure to launch uprisings in the aftermath of the 1913 Second Revolu-
tion. He fled China in October 1913 following in the footsteps of Sun Yat-sen

100  Tan Chee Seng

and other KMT comrades in exile as a political refugee in Tokyo.8 Subse-
quently, at the end of 1914, Wu was assigned by Sun Yat-sen to handle the
United States’ party affairs at Honolulu. Hawai’i was frequently regarded
as ‘the birthplace of the Chinese revolution’. The Overseas Chinese at Hono-
lulu, with more than 60 percent from Sun Yat-sen’s native place, Xiangshan,
constituted Sun’s main revolutionary force. They formed the largest propor-
tion of Revive China Society (Xingzhonghui 兴中会) membership. In con-
trast to most of the other Xiangshanese who travelled abroad to places such
as North America to make a living, Wu was there for a revolutionary cause,
similar to that of Sun Yat-sen himself. This deployment showed that Wu was
highly regarded by Sun to conduct this task. Wu’s good command of Eng-
lish, attributed to his English educational background, had also made him
a suitable candidate to be based in the United States.9 In fact, when Wu was
in Japan, he hired a student from the Tokyo School of Foreign Studies using
English as a medium to teach him the Japanese language.10 It demonstrated
that he had a good command of English, to the extent that he used it, rather
than his native language, Chinese, as the medium through which to learn a
foreign language. Such a mission also showed Sun had acknowledged one of
Wu’s requests to be based in the US at the invitation of the local Overseas
Chinese. This indicates that Wu had established guanxi and network with
Overseas Chinese in the US prior to his arrival towards the end of 1914.11

Wu’s Honolulu sojourn that focussed on party affairs for revolutionary
cause reached a reached a climax in 1916 when he won a lawsuit initiated by
Yuan Shikai’s (袁世凯) government. More significantly, this event implies a
head start of his relationship with the Overseas Chinese. He recalled how
deeply impressed he was with the show of sympathy and support given by the
Overseas Chinese during the lawsuit and their positive orientation towards
their motherland in their generous donation to the revolutionary cause and
their open friendship with his comrades.12 Huang Chaoqin (黄朝琴) con-
sidered this as the beginning of Wu’s close rapprochement with the Over-
seas Chinese.13 It was an important milestone for Wu as regards overseas
party affairs. Li Yunhan (李云汉) had summarised Wu’s five contributions
to KMT party affairs and one of them was overseeing party affairs in Hon-
olulu and raising funds for Sun Yat-sen’s revolutionary cause.14

By the late 1910s within China, Wu also played an active role in Overseas
Chinese affairs. It was initially through a discussion organised by the Over-
seas Chinese Union (Huaqiao Lianhehui 华侨联合会) in Shanghai on 3 June
1919 to redress the predicament of the Overseas Chinese in Siam and Java
who faced harsh measures inflicted by the local authorities. He suggested
organizing a colonial association (zhimin xiehui 殖民协会) in order to study
colonial causes, which thus would lay the foundation for the development of
the nation’s colonial policy in the future.15 Wu not only hoped that the local
Chinese (in China) would play an active role in Overseas Chinese affairs, but
also in return on the side of the Overseas Chinese, they should also contrib-
ute to their motherland. On the occasion of the Assembly of the Overseas

Wu Tiecheng and Force 136, 1942–1945  101

Chinese Parents and Students Reunion (Huaqiao Kenqin Dahui 华侨恳亲大会)
organized by the Overseas Chinese Union on 12 July 1919, especially for
the Overseas Chinese students from Shanghai, the Overseas Chinese Stu-
dents Association and Ji’nan (暨南) School of Nanjing, Wu stressed that the
Overseas Chinese students should not condone the adverse and seamy side
of politics and society in China but, on the contrary, should undertake the
responsibility of reforming both.16 His sojourn and experience in Honolulu
had provided him with a good understanding of contemporary Overseas
Chinese affairs where he was able to perceive the roots of the problem and
to contribute solutions. He continued to maintain and expand his Overseas
Chinese guanxi and network in his motherland.

His efforts, guanxi and networks in Overseas Chinese and overseas party
affairs indeed had built up a solid foundation for his future involvement in
such affairs since the 1930s. During Chiang Kai-shek’s second resignation
at the end of 1931 and when the Cantonese were again leading the govern-
ment for a short period, Wu, who was himself Cantonese, was elected into
Sun Fo’s Executive Yuan (1931–1932) as Chairman of Overseas Chinese Af-
fairs Commission (Qiaowu Weiyuanzhang 侨务委员长). Executive Yuan at
that time was dominated by the Cantonese (nine out of 14 members), but
dissipated when Chiang returned to power in early 1932.17

Since the spring of 1939, Wu was heading the KMT Party and Overseas Chi-
nese affairs in Hong Kong and Macau, and continued to oversee in his capacity
as Director of KMT’s Department of Overseas Affairs and Secretary-General
of the KMT CEC. Local party affairs between 1939 and 1943 during the War
of Resistance Against Japan had become active under the auspices of Wu.18

An interesting development to be highlighted in relation brought out on
the connection of Wu and Hong Kong prior to 1939 was his involvement in
intelligence gathering during his Shanghai mayorship in the 1930s. It was
revealed in a collection of 39 confidential telegrams despatched by Wu from
13 October 1932 to 28 August 1934 that Wu had acted as messenger and mid-
dleman, passing messages to the Premier of the Executive Yuan during the
T. V. Soong (Song Ziwen 宋子文) and Wang Jingwei (汪精卫) periods. Most
of the messages that were obtained from Hong Kong telegram reports (cov-
ering nearly one year) clearly revealed Wu’s close connection with the Hong
Kong group in helping him to gather intelligence.19 When Wu supervised
the KMT Party and Overseas Chinese affairs in Hong Kong and Macau,
between 1939 and 1943, intelligence activity was one of the main tasks.20
Therefore, Wu had gained ideas and experiences in intelligence activities
and gathering before the establishment of Force 136.

As for Wu’s relationship with Westerners such as the British, it could
be traced from the latter’s positive perception of Wu in the mid-1920s. In
‘Who’s Who in China (1925–26)’, the British observed that Wu ‘is a well-
disposed and moderate man’.21 In general, Wu was skilful in utilizing his
interpersonal and communicational skills to link with foreigners, which in-
cluded the British, in foreign affairs. Zhang Zhenxi (张震西) evaluated Wu’s

102  Tan Chee Seng

foreign affairs work in accordance with the strategic post he held during
different periods of time since 1930s:

As Head of Shanghai, he was well versed in foreign relations with Japan;
as Head of Guangdong, he handled relations with the Hong Kong and
Macau colonial governments; maintained occasional friendly inter-
course with diplomatic envoys from Britain, America and other coun-
tries, and mediated when something occurred. In all these ways he was
able to assist the government in the field of foreign affairs.22

Moving into the 1940s,Wu not only took positions that were linked with
Overseas Chinese and overseas party affairs as well as with the British, but
also journeyed abroad, viz. Southeast Asia to meet up with Overseas Chi-
nese and the British in British Malaya.

Wu Tiecheng’s relationship with British Malaya and
its Overseas Chinese, 1940–1941

When Wu came to Chongqing as Director of KMT’s Department of Over-
seas Affairs, a position he held between 20 November 1939 and 1941, he
demonstrated his intention and enthusiasm in expanding China’s influence
over the Overseas Chinese and overseas party affairs. Between 1940 and
1941, he was sent by Chiang Kai-shek to visit Nanyang to convey his grati-
tude to the Overseas Chinese and overseas party members. One of his trips
was to Singapore-Malaya, from 14 November 1940 to 11 January 1941.

On the eve of his departure to Nanyang, Wu had planned to promote
Overseas Chinese cultural and educational work in several Nanyang re-
gions. Teachers were assigned to teach in secondary schools in Nanyang,
besides increasing the funding and equipment for selected Overseas Chi-
nese newspapers in each region and assigning chief editors to direct edito-
rial matters. Wu was also said to have organized the Overseas Chinese to
participate in the War of Resistance Against Japan.23 Usage of newspapers
and engaging their chief editors were, in fact, utilizing the press as a medium
of propaganda to gain the support for China from among the locals. Wu’s
former subordinate, Zhuang Xinzai (庄心在) pointed out that Wu’s visit had
two main intentions: to strengthen local KMT branches and regional party
newspapers and to promote the sale of patriotism bonds.24

During Wu’s visit to Nanyang, with special reference to Singapore-Malaya,
apart from conveying Chiang’s gratitude to the Overseas Chinese, he had
several other tasks: negotiations with the British on the legalization of the
Malayan KMT, to revitalise the fundraising National Salvation Movement
among Overseas Chinese, to counter Communist influence in this movement
in order to consolidate their support for the Nationalist Government, to estab-
lish the Three People’s Principles Youth Corps (San Min Chu I Youth Corps/
Sanmin Zhuyi Qingniantuan 三民主义青年团), to create a New Overseas

Wu Tiecheng and Force 136, 1942–1945  103

Chinese Society (Xin Huaqiaoshe 新华侨社) and to promote Overseas Chinese
education.25 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives (Waijoaobu Dang’an
外交部档案) of the Nationalist Government of China stated that Wu’s trip to
Malaya was to discuss with the British colonial administration the issue of
the Malayan KMT in conducting activities publicly and to give guidance in
improving local party affairs.26 Wu’s friendship with the British when he was
in China brought positive effect to this visit. British Under-Secretary of State
for the Foreign Office, Ashley Clarke had, prior to Wu’s visit, been informed
that Wu was known personally to the Foreign Office (FO) as an official who
had been friendly towards the British authorities in Shanghai as a former
Mayor of Shanghai. Clarke had also requested the Colonial Office (CO) to
advise the Straits Settlements Governor, Sir Shenton Thomas, to find a way of
requesting the Acting Governor to receive Wu and give him ‘such reasonable
facilities as may be possible’.27 Indeed, Wu was duly and courteously received
by the British authorities in Singapore as a friendly guest. Such gesture had
greatly delighted the Malayan KMT and boosted its morale. However, no
common understanding was reached between Wu and Sir Shenton Thomas,
on both issues pertaining to the legalization of the Malayan KMT and the
development of the Three People’s Principles Youth Corps.28

Nevertheless, his visit exhibited his strenuous efforts of not only visiting
and giving letters addressed to the Singapore Malayan Overseas Chinese,
but also delivering 45 speeches to various groups in different localities, viz.
Singapore, Johore, Malacca, Negeri Sembilan, Selangor, Pahang, Perak,
Penang and Kedah. The speeches were delivered at party offices, schools,
Overseas Chinese associations, clan associations and clubs, targeting the
masses, party members and Overseas Chinese community leaders. His
speeches emphasized that his mission was to represent the government in
conveying his gratitude to Overseas Chinese, unifying them, establishing
friendship and diplomatic relations.29 Astonishingly, his visit and approach
of vigorously delivering speeches were so conspicuous that Overseas Chi-
nese in Perak published a commemorative magazine on Wu’s visit to Perak,
which compiled his letters and speeches for that area.30

Wu’s visit to Singapore-Malaya had several implications. Wu’s ap-
proach of giving speeches and letters, which covered specific groups and
to the general public at different locations, imitated a political communi-
cation style through populist approach to resonate with the public. This
enabled him to gain access, attract and exert impact on the masses in
Singapore-Malaya, and in the end, established and expanded his guanxi
and networks among them. Meanwhile, Wu’s relentless efforts through
his persistent visit to different places reflected his utilizing this mission
to build up his own reputation, personal and party networks within the
Overseas Chinese community and party members in the Southeast Asian
region. It was a dynamic process of social interaction to make guanxi
closer, aided by his populist approach in giving speeches and letters. As
a consequence, Wu’s reception was always positive and warm responses

104  Tan Chee Seng

from the locals of Singapore-Malaya through welcoming receptions and
occasional essays.

Besides the overall positive outcomes, there was a dispute between Wu
and the prominent Singapore Chinese leader, Tan Kah Kee (Chen Jiageng
陈嘉庚). b Nevertheless, Wu still strenuously tried to gain support from Tan
towards the Nationalist Government.31 Wu had gained experiences and re-
sourcefulness via this impactful visit. He had applied his networking inter-
personal skills and communicative eloquence to build up his personal and
party networks within Overseas Chinese, which in the end benefited him
and KMT when he assumed charge as the party’s Secretary-General. Ste-
phen Leong Mun Yoon even viewed Wu’s visit as a turning point within the
KMT-Communist rivalry in the Malayan Overseas Chinese National Sal-
vation Movement.32 Among Wu’s five contributions in KMT party affairs
as summarized by Li Yunhan, this visit was one of them: visited Nanyang
for fundraising for the fight against the Japanese in his capacity as Direc-
tor of KMT’s Department of Overseas Affairs.33 More importantly, one of
the significant influences was that Wu attracted local Overseas Chinese to
return and support China, some later joined Force 136. Former member
of Force 136 from Singapore, Tan Chong Tee, later recollected that he had
many close contacts with Wu especially in 1940 when Wu visited Nanyang
to convey his gratitude to the Overseas Chinese. Tan accompanied Wu and
his officers whose ‘encouragement strengthened our (Tan Chong Tee and
his friends) conviction to return to Chungking [Chongqing] for further stud-
ies’.34 Wu was highly regarded on his visit to Nanyang and on returning to
China, he came up with an official report, and later, an article: ‘Perspec-
tive and Looking Forward on the Problems of Nanyang’ (Nanyang wenti zhi
toushi yu qianzhan 南洋问题之透视与前瞻).35

Wu’s involvement in Overseas Chinese and overseas party affairs contin-
ued and elevated after he assumed the position of Secretary-General of the
KMT CEC and subsequent positions until he passed away in Taipei in 1953.
Even when Wu assumed the position of Secretary-General, it was he and not
the Director of KMT’s Department of Overseas Affairs, who took charge
of overseas party affairs at that time to write an article in 1944 dedicated to
the half-century of KMT overseas party affairs for a special magazine com-
memorating the 50th anniversary of KMT. Wu also tried to establish his
reputation in overseas party affairs by forging his roles and contributions
through two overseas experiences: sojourn at Honolulu and visit to Nan-
yang.36 Due to Wu’s active participation and contribution to Overseas Chi-
nese and overseas party affairs, Zheng Yanfen (郑彦棻) had addressed him
as the ‘Mentor of Overseas Chinese’ (Huaqiao Daoshi 华侨导师), and as the
KMT figure most concerned on both overseas affairs after Lin Sen, Chair-
man of the Nationalist Government. Chen Sanjing (陈三井) also mentioned
another title that Wu had earned: ‘Mother of Overseas Chinese’ (Huaqiao
Zhimu 华侨之母) and ‘Friend of the Overseas Chinese’ (Huaqiao Zhiyou 华
侨之友) (see Plates 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4).37

Wu Tiecheng and Force 136, 1942–1945  105

Plate 3.2 Wu Tiecheng as Secretary-General of the KMT CEC broadcasting
overseas, 30 May 1941

Source: Huaqiao Xiehui Zonghui 华侨协会总会 Overseas Chinese Association, ‘Chuanghui
Lishizhang Wu Tiecheng Zhaopianzhan’ 创会理事长吴铁城照片展 [Photo Exhibition of the
Founding President Wu Tiecheng]); https://ocahtw.files.wordpress.com/2015/06/061- e4b889
e58d81e5b9b4e4ba94e69c88e4b889e58d81e697a5-e590b3e7a798e69bb8e995b7e990b5e59f8ee
59091e59c8be5a496e5bba3e692ad.jpg (accessed 18 January 2019)

106  Tan Chee Seng

Plate 3.3 Wu Tiecheng (right) and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek (left) during a
flag inspection parade, 14 June 1943

Source: Huaqiao Xiehui Zonghui 华侨协会总会 Overseas Chinese Association, ‘Chuanghui
Lishizhang Wu Tiecheng Zhaopianzhan’ 创会理事长吴铁城照片展 [Photo Exhibition of the
Founding President Wu Tiecheng]); https://ocahtw.files.wordpress.com/2015/06/037-e4b889e
58d81e4ba8ce5b9b4e585ade69c88e58d81e59b9be697a5e894a3e4b8ade6ada3e5a794e593a1e9
95b7e59ca8e881afe59088e59c8be697a5e6aaa2.jpg (accessed 18 January 2019)

Wu Tiecheng and Force 136, 1942–1945  107

Plate 3.4 Wu Tiecheng (centre of the first row) with a group of returned overseas
Chinese who went back to China for training on 1 January 1941

Source: Huaqiao Xiehui Zonghui 华侨协会总会 Overseas Chinese Association, ‘Chuanghui
Lishizhang Wu Tiecheng Zhaopianzhan’ 创会理事长吴铁城照片展 [Photo Exhibition of the
Founding President Wu Tiecheng]); https://ocahtw.files.wordpress.com/2015/06/054-e4b889e
58d81e5b9b4e4b880e69c88e4b880e697a5e590b3e990b5e59f8ee7a595e69bb8e995b7e88887e59
b9ee59c8be58f97e8a893e6adb8e58391e59088.jpg (accessed 18 January 2019)

It could be seen that Wu had high status and vast experiences within
Overseas Chinese and overseas party affairs and simultaneously he had suc-
ceeded in building up his interpersonal relationships and networks within
and beyond China, in particular among Overseas Chinese in Singapore-
Malaya. Therefore, it was no surprise then of his involvement in the estab-
lishment of Force 136 of non-Western members of mainly Overseas Chinese
from Singapore-Malaya.
The man behind Force 136, 1942–1945
As of 2 April 1941, as Secretary-General of the KMT CEC for the pe-
riod of 1941–1948, Wu also served as ex officio, the man behind KMT
intelligence agency, Zhongtong. The reason behind Wu’s appointment
as Secretary-General as listed by Fang Ke (方可) was that Wu as one of
Chiang’s high-ranking aides (gaoji muliao 高级幕僚) and was to become
Chiang’s ‘housekeeper’ (guanjiapo 管家婆), the main purpose of which was
to utilize his special talents to coordinate internal party relationships, es-
pecially to balance factional strife within KMT party such as between CC

108  Tan Chee Seng

clique or the Chen brothers (Chen Lifu and Chen Guofu 陈果夫), who were
influential within Zhongtong, and Zhu Jiahua (朱家骅).38 It appears that
Wu’s status had been elevated in comparing Fang Ke’s description with Li
Haisheng’s (李海生) and Wanyan Shaoyuan’s (完颜绍元) that Wu was to be-
come ‘Chief Aide of the Party’ (quandang de muliaozhang 全党的幕僚长).39

In the same year (1941), Wu was also President of the Chinese People’s
Foreign Relations Association where he applied People’s Foreign Relations
approach during the period of the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945).
According to Duan Mukai (端木愷), Wu placed great stress on People’s Foreign
Relations strategy, mobilization of social forces and gaining the sympathy
and support of the Allies during that period.40 According to Shi Yuanhua
(石源华) on the People’s Foreign Relations approach, the Chinese official was
implementing special foreign policy during the Second Sino-Japanese War.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was in charge of foreign affairs with countries
that had diplomatic relations, while KMT Central Party was in charge of for-
eign affairs with countries without diplomatic relations, mainly in helping the
nationalist independence movements of neighbouring countries. Wu was the
main Chinese official in charge of People’s Foreign Relations, helping the na-
tionalist independence movements of neighbouring countries. Wu was viewed
as the ‘Friend of Independence Movements for Neighbouring Countries’ and
even equated as the Minister of Foreign Affairs.41

In such a capacity and having experiences in Overseas Chinese and over-
seas party affairs, Wu had been instructed by Chiang Kai-shek in July 1941
to oversee and preside over party affairs abroad by convening a meeting
comprising 13 committee members of senior cadres, which included him,
later renamed as Overseas Party Affairs Senior Cadres Meeting (Haiwai
Dangwu Gaoji Ganbu Huiyi 海外党务高级干部会议). In addition to the
monthly meeting, extraordinary meetings could be convened on request. It
had four main tasks, namely to decide the principles and policies of overseas
party affairs, to decide the general working plan of overseas party affairs, to
discuss and handle personnel disputes of overseas party organization and
to liaise among different parties.42 In one of these meetings, held in March
1942, it even invited Overseas Chinese leaders from Singapore to partici-
pate, viz. Lim Keng Lian (Lin Qingnian 林庆年), Ong Kiat Soo (Wang Jishi
王吉士), Lim Bo Seng, Oh Siow Yam (Hu Shaoyan 胡少炎) and Chuang
Hui Tsuan (Zhuang Huiquan 庄惠泉). In another meeting in the following
month, Lim Keng Lian participated in the preparation to initiate the estab-
lishment of Nanyang Overseas Chinese Association.43

In the aforementioned March 1942 meeting, the participation of both Lim
Bo Seng and Chuang Hui Tsuan, who would later become the key lead-
ers of Force 136, were noteworthy events. Wu, through his previous trip
to Nanyang, especially in Singapore-Malaya, had successfully built up his
networks within the Overseas Chinese and their leaders that later gained
their support when he returned to China. Owen Lattimore, who was the US

Wu Tiecheng and Force 136, 1942–1945  109

political advisor to Chiang Kai-shek in Chongqing, had noticed that Wu
was a sort of foreign secretary for maintaining contacts with the Overseas
Chinese. KMT was receiving substantial private funds from them, espe-
cially from the millionaires, and when they came to Chongqing, they stayed
with Wu.44 It justified Lim Bo Seng’s contacts with Wu and from him who
had extensive networks, Lim could tap into the circle of KMT top officials,
local Chinese and Overseas Chinese. Ian Trenowden stated that: ‘Lim Bo
Seng’s top-level Kuomintang contacts had enabled him to go straight to the
top, and arrangements had been made to recruit Malayan Chinese from
Chungking (Chongqing).’45 When Tan Chong Tee was in China, he remem-
bered Wu Tiecheng helping in handling the charity fund of the Art Exhibi-
tion in Aid of Overseas Chinese managed by Tan.46

At this juncture, how could Wu be linked with the British through Force
136? Prior to the outbreak of the Pacific War (1941–1945), the British, who
had perceived the possibilities of a Japanese offensive on Nanyang, and
in order to protect Hong Kong, through its special intelligence organiza-
tion, SOE, sought cooperation with nationalist China’s intelligence service
against Imperial Japan. Since the outbreak of the war and the rapid ad-
vancement of Japanese forces in the Pacific and Southeast Asia, the British
seriously needed intelligence in the occupied areas for defense purposes.
Thus, the Ambassador of the United Kingdom to Nationalist China, Sir
Archibald Clark Kerr, was instructed to hold discussions with Wu. Follow-
ing the discussions, Chiang Kai-shek appointed Zhongtong to have further
consultations with the SOE. The success of the IJA swiftly and fully occu-
pying Nanyang had changed the British strategy, from defence to coopera-
tion in intelligence wars against Imperial Japan through providing training
for Chinese seamen and Overseas Chinese in South China, Malaya and
India.47 Apart from discussions with Kerr, since the outbreak of the war,
Wu had played another role that earned him respect from the British. The
colonial administration in British Malaya on the eve of its retreat, on 28
January 1942, due to lack of intelligence, had requested from Singapore to
the Chinese Nationalist Government through Xu Enzeng (徐恩曾) to pro-
vide intelligence. It was Wu who coordinated and liaised with both KMT’s
Department of Overseas Affairs, and Zheng Jiemin (郑介民) who was at the
Chinese Embassy in Singapore, to direct local party members and commu-
nication agencies to provide intelligence to the British.48

Due to the outbreak of the Pacific War, Chinese seamen and Overseas
Chinese were stranded in Calcutta, India. Ma Zhendu (马振犊) estimated
those seamen numbered around 5,000 to 6,000; Shu Yun-Ts’iao and Chua
Ser-Koon estimated there were only 2,000, while KMT’s source in July 1942
recorded those registered seamen were 3,053.49 In order to solve the problem
of their livelihood, and Zhongtong sought to utilize them as a strong over-
seas troops, KMT’s Department of Overseas Affairs commissioned Lim Bo
Seng and Chuang Hui Tsuan to become Secretary and Assistant Secretary

110  Tan Chee Seng

respectively of the Wartime Work Force of the Stranded Chinese Seamen in
India.50 Prior to their departure to India with other comrades, Wu Tiecheng
had given a farewell speech on 9 June 1942 emphasizing the importance of
the mission to the KMT, cooperation with the Allies, the importance of the
technical training and discipline and, finally, the future plan to develop the
Chinese naval force.51 A party of 20 left Chongqing by air on 13 June to take
up their appointments in Calcutta.

Meanwhile, Colonel Basil G. Goodfellow, Captain John Davis and Cap-
tain R. N. Broome, all from the Malayan Branch of the British Ministry
of Economic Warfare, had retreated to India from Singapore. They had a
plan to set up a similar type of organization as in the European war thea-
tre, namely the SOE, in order to cripple the Japanese in Malaya by means
of underground activities.52 Captain Broome nevertheless pointed out that
it was impossible for Europeans to land in Malaya and infiltrate into the
jungles, and to move openly without being detected; if unable to do so, all
such attempts to infiltrate will be useless. Thus, it was vital to enlist the
cooperation of the Wartime Work Force of the Stranded Chinese Seamen
in India.53

Lim Bo Seng sought the advice of Wu on this matter. Both the govern-
ments of Nationalist China and Britain later gave their blessings to this
project and an agreement was drawn up between them. Wu signed on be-
half of the Nationalist Chinese government with Britain whereby both sides
agreed to organise Force 136. The agreement was officially signed as the
1943 Anglo-Chinese Pact. The decision also included that the Nationalist
Chinese government provide agents to India where they be trained on how
to infiltrate Malaya and conduct underground activities behind enemy lines.
Britain was responsible for the cost of the project, the training facilities and
all matters relating to assignment and transport.

Colonel Lim Bo Seng and Colonel Chuang Hui Tsuan were assigned as
the Regional Chief and Deputy Regional Chief (Chinese), respectively of
Force 136, which was based in India.54 The terms of agreement spelt out that
Force 136 was borne of the cooperation between the KMT’s Department of
Overseas Affairs and Malayan Branch of the British Ministry of Economic
Warfare. Nevertheless, when personnel of Force 136 were undergoing rigor-
ous training at their training grounds in New Delhi, Poona, Calcutta and
the naval base in Ceylon (Sri Lanka), it was Zhongtong that was responsi-
ble for the selection of candidates.55 Shu Yun-Ts’iao and Chua Ser-Koon
pointed out that this unit in the early stage was a result of the cooperation
between the Malayan Branch of the British Economic Warfare Department
and the Wartime Workforce of the Stranded Chinese Seamen in India, then
under the KMT’s Department of Overseas Affairs. This department later
transferred its responsibilities of Force 136 to Zhongtong.56 That Force 136
initially was under the KMT’s Department of Overseas Affairs notwith-
standing, Wu, who was director of this department (1939–1941) still exerted

Wu Tiecheng and Force 136, 1942–1945  111

his influence, it was he, and not the Director of KMT’s Department of
Overseas Affairs, who wrote an article 1944 dedicated to the half-century
of KMT overseas party affairs. Whether under the Department of Over-
seas Affairs, or later controlled by Zhongtong, Wu Tiecheng was indeed the
KMT man behind this special force for the Chinese government side.

Wu was duly concerned on the early development of this unit in India.
In early July 1942, Wu received feedback that most of the seamen in Cal-
cutta were not making progress and displayed unwillingness to be tied with
this unit as they thought the unit was exploited by the British government.
Moreover, many perceived that they were actually working under the Brit-
ish and not for their motherland, China. They claimed that they have been
suppressed by the British when they served in the British shipping com-
pany. Wu immediately instructed the head of Zhongtong, Xu Enzeng, that
such a perception should be rectified and be adequately explained as well as
they (seaman) should be serious in their life to show their national spirit.57
Subsequently, on 22 October 1942, apart from Chiang Kai-shek, Wu also
sent a congratulatory telegram to Calcutta on the inauguration ceremony
of this unit.58

In order to expand Zhongtong activities in Nanyang, an overseas working
personnel training class was organized at the end of 1942 at Xietaizi (歇台
子), Chongqing. Wu delivered his speech to the trainees on 14 December
1942 prior to the commencement of the class from 17 December for three
months before they were sent to Malaya, Burma and India.59 Some of them
later joined Force 136. This explains why Tan Chong Tee recalled that he
had participated in Central Overseas Chinese training class at Xietaizi,
Chongqing, and apart from consulting and discussing with the Central
Party Secretariat, he also referred to Secretary-General Wu Tiecheng on
several occasions. Then in January 1943, Wu wanted Tan to follow Lim Bo
Seng to India for further training and thereafter the mission to infiltrate
Occupied Malaya. Tan also retraced how Wu set up, planned and devoted
much of his attention to Force 136 in launching campaigns behind enemy
lines in Singapore-Malaya.60 Another Force 136 member, Lim Hong Pei
(Lin Hongpei 林宏培) who was an Overseas Chinese from Nibong Tebal of
Penang, reported to the Department of Overseas Affairs on completion of
his training in Chongqing (see Plate 3.5).61

Meanwhile in India, on 16 January 1943, Lim Bo Seng led the first batch
of 10 successful candidates to their training ground in Poona. The head-
quarters was located at Military Establishment 25 on an island adjacent
to Trincomalee in Ceylon. The training was often between six and eight
months and, on completion, they were sent to Calcutta to await orders to
infiltrate into Malaya and begin their clandestine activities.62 Personnel of
Force 136, at the initial period, were smuggled via submarines off the coast
of West Malaya and, from there, they would infiltrate the hinterland to carry
out their secret missions. The first batch of Force 136 fighters left Ceylon by

112  Tan Chee Seng

Plate 3.5 Wu Tiecheng (standing on the stage) as President of the OCA delivering
his speech at the OCA Annual General Meeting, 4 May 1952

Source: Huaqiao Xiehui Zonghui 华侨协会总会 Overseas Chinese Association, ‘Chuanghui
Lishizhang Wu Tiecheng Zhaopianzhan’ 创会理事长吴铁城照片展 [Photo Exhibition of the
Founding President Wu Tiecheng]); https://ocahtw.files.wordpress.com/2015/06/072-e59b9be
58d81e4b880e5b9b4e4ba94e69c88e59b9be697a5e88fafe58391e58d94e69c83e7b8bde69c83e
69c83e593a1e5a4a7e69c83e79086e4ba8be995b7.jpg (accessed 18 January 2019)

submarine on May 1943 and landed in the northern part of Pangkor Island
on 26 May. The last batch of fighters infiltrated Malaya on 1 December
1945, different batches used different modes for infiltration. Force 136 also
cooperated and contributed to the arsenal, technique of warfare and in-
telligence reports for the MPAJA led by the Malayan Communist Party
(MCP).63 However, Wu Tiecheng was one of the KMT key figures with a
firm anti-communist stance. His trip to Singapore-Malaya in 1940–1941 was
to counter the communist influence. The establishment of Force 136 was a
counterweight to the leftist-created MPAJA. According to Tsang Jan Man
(Zeng Zhenwen 曾振文), the Nationalist Government expected Force 136,
not only to provide war equipment and arms to the MPAJA, the former was
tasked to prevent the latter from seizing power in Malaya.64

Force 136 was disbanded shortly after the Second World War. After the
end of the war, Wu in his report to Chiang Kai-shek on 30 October 1945,
briefly furnished the history and other relevant information of Force 136, he
still envisaged of recruiting personnel for training, in order to prepare for

Wu Tiecheng and Force 136, 1942–1945  113

a counterattack in Malaya.65 However, there was no further development
as the British had indeed returned to Singapore-Malaya shortly after the
unconditional surrender of Imperial Japan.

Conclusion

Wu Tiecheng was pivotal in establishing, organizing and developing Force
136. The judicious combination of his three crucial assets – guanxi, networks
and eloquence – paved the way for his success. All three assets that had de-
veloped since his early years of his activities in China, overseas sojourn in
Honolulu, and particularly his visit to Nanyang (1940–1941), had assisted
him personally, and indirectly the KMT and the Nationalist Government, in
building up successful relationships within the Overseas Chinese, the Over-
seas KMT, and foreign affairs. Invariably, such efforts complemented his
relationship with the British colonial administration, the Singapore-Malaya
Overseas Chinese. All attributes channelled towards the establishment and
development of Force 136. Indeed, several years after the disbandment of
Force 136 and the onset of the Cold War, the British remarked positively
of Wu. In ‘Leading Personalities in China, 1948’, it was reported that: ‘He
[Wu Tiecheng] is a man of great influence in the party and is well disposed
towards Great Britain.’66

Ernest Koh Wee Song remarked that historians writing on Singapore’s
Second World War usually point to the forming of Force 136 to sabotage
the Japanese advance, besides the raising of DALFORCE to defend the is-
land.67 The legacy of Force 136 had an ‘enduring’ essence, as identified by
Wang Gungwu to mean ‘those that do affect us constantly, and actually has
some meaning for us every now and again’.68 Therefore, Wu because of his
vital role in Force 136 was a constructive force in this enduring legacy of the
history of Singapore, Malaya, and Southeast Asia.

Wu Tiecheng was indeed the KMT man behind the special force: Force 136.

Notes

114  Tan Chee Seng
传记资料 (Sources of Wu Tiecheng Biography) (Taibei: Tianyi chubanshe, 1979),
pp. 1–5; Zhang Mingkai 张明凯, ‘Wu Tiecheng zhuan’ 吴铁城传 (Wu Tiecheng’s
Biography), Guoshiguan guankan 国史馆馆刊 (Academia Historica Journal) 11,
(December 1991): 239–243; Huang Baili 黄百里, ‘Wu Tiecheng de shenping’ 吴
铁城的生平 (The Life of Wu Tiecheng), Zhongwai zazhi 中外杂志 (The Kalei-
doscope), 34:2 (198) (August 1983): 22; Chen Shicheng 陈士诚, ‘Wu Tiecheng
(1888zhi1953)’ 吴铁城 (一八八八至一九五三) (Wu Tiecheng 1888–1953), Zhong-
wai zazhi 中外杂志 (The Kaleidoscope), 59:1 (347) (January 1996): 106–107;
Jiang Yongjing 蒋永敬, ‘Zhonghuaminguo 76nian jieman bailing xianlie xian-
jin shilie-Wu Tiecheng’ 中华民国七十六年届满百龄先烈先进事略-吴铁城 (Short
Biographical Account of 100th years old Martyr and Advanced Individual on
Republic Year 76–Wu Tiecheng), Jindai Zhongguo 近代中国 (Modern China) 57,
(February 1987): 198–199; Jiang Yongjing 蒋永敬, ‘Wu Tiecheng (1888–1953)’ 吴
铁城 (1888–1953) (Wu Tiecheng 1888–1953), in Qin Xiaoyi ed. 秦孝仪, Zhongguo
xiandaishi cidian: renwu bufen 中国现代史辞典-人物部分 (Contemporary Chinese
History Dictionary: Personality) (Taibei: Jindai Zhongguo chubanshe, 1985),
pp. 162–163; Robert L. Jarman ed., China: Political Reports 1911–1960 Volume
8: 1946–1948 (Slough: Archive Editions, 2001), p. 679.

2 For details on the establishment and development of Wu’s crucial assets since
his formative years, see Tan Chee Seng, ‘Guanxi, Networks and Eloquence:
Wu Tiecheng in the 1911 Revolution in Jiujiang, China’, KEMANUSIAAN: the
Asian Journal of Humanities 23, no. 1 (2016): 65–96. It should be noted that Wu’s
activities was mainly within the China context or to be precise, the Chinese po-
litical context, in addition to his interaction with Overseas Chinese. Thus, the
term ‘relationships’ is to be deemed as appropriate and well defined as guanxi
(kuan-hsi 关系). S. A. Smith defined guanxi as the basic building block of social
relations in China, which are ties of mutual commitment and dependency. S. A.
Smith, Revolution and the People in Russia and China: A Comparative History
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 38.

3 Wu Tiecheng 吴铁城, Wu Tiecheng huiyilu, sanban 吴铁城回忆录，三版 (Wu
Tiecheng Memoir, 3rd ed.) (Taibei: Sanmin shuju, 1993), pp. 1–2.

4 Huang Hongzhao ed. 黄鸿钊编, Xinhai Geming shiqi de Xiangshan shehui 辛亥革
命时期的香山社会 (Social Change in Xiangshan During the Xinhai Revolution-
ary Period) (Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2011), pp. 1–9.

5 Wu, Wu Tiecheng huiyilu, pp. 6–7.
6 The British, through the Treaty of Tianjin (1858), had forcibly opened up Jiu-

jiang as a treaty port. A British concession was forced to be opened by British
diplomat Harry Smith Parkes in 1861; subsequently, the American and French
also had their concessions. All these brought foreign merchants and Western
Christian missionaries and Jiujiang became the collection and distribution cen-
tre for foreign goods, the setting up of Western-style hospitals and schools be-
sides churches. See Da Jian 达践, ‘Lueshu Xinhai Jiujiang qiyi’ 略述辛亥九江
起义 (A Brief Narration on the Jiujiang Uprising during the 1911 Revolution),
Jiujiang shizhuan xuebao: Zhexue shehui kexue ban 九江师专学报: 哲学社会科
学版 (Journal of Jiujiang University: Philosophy and Social Science Edition),
no.  3 (1991): 22; Xu Haiquan 许海泉, ‘Xinhai Geming zai Jiangxi’ 辛亥革命在
江西 (1911 Revolution at Jiangxi), Jiangxi shiyuan xuebao: Zhexue shehui kexue
ban 江西师院学报: 哲学社会科学版 (Journal of Jiangxi Normal University: Phi-
losophy and Social Sciences Edition), no. 4 (1981): 34–35. Chen Ronghua and He
Youliang narrated the influx of Western powers and their influences in detail;
see Chen Ronghua and He Youliang 陈荣华, 何友良, Jiujiang tongshang kouan
shilue九江通商口岸史略 (A Brief History of Jiujiang Treaty Port) (Nanchang:
Jiangxi jiaoyu chubanshe, 1985), pp. 1–46.

Wu Tiecheng and Force 136, 1942–1945  115