Ooi-Malaysia-and-the-Cold-War-Era

166  Azmi Arifin

Nonetheless, the British response that was forceful and drastic vis-à-vis
the MCP’s unpreparedness to address it and the crisis that it was facing,
viz. the Lai Teck treachery and the PMFTU ban, was something that was
actually not expected. It was received in a surprising situation.103 The re-
sult was that the decision to act in an ‘underground’ manner was taken
immediately by the MCP in rushed and chaotic circumstance.104 The
unpreparedness and inability of the MCP to face the Emergency and an
open war against the British was admitted by Malcolm MacDonald. He
even believed that if the operation against the MCP was conducted in an
open manner, the MCP would be able to be defeated within a duration of
six weeks.105

The Emergency – a British plot?

British intelligence revealed that there was no clear evidence that could con-
nect the violence in Malaya in the 1940s with the MCP plan to rebel against
the British. The question then, if it was true that the violence was not com-
mitted by the MCP, then who was responsible?

The probability of violence breaking out in Malaya in the late 1940s
caused by the action of subversive elements other than the MCP cannot be
pushed aside. For example, according to Cheah, there were a few groups
that could be associated with such violence. First, members of trade unions,
consisting of Indians and Chinese, who felt the adverse economic impact
and hardship after the Japanese Occupation. These were the radical groups
that often resorted to violence especially in estates owned by Europeans.
Some of them might have been involved as members or supporters of the
MCP, but they did not get any directive, neither were they directly controlled
by the MCP.106

Second, the existence of triads and thugs; although some of them were
created by the MCP, they too could not be controlled or followed MCP
directive.107 Such groups were found to have been involved in criminal
activities such as robberies and fights and were responsible for violence after
the Japanese Occupation to the extent that the MCP’s name was dragged
in with violence. According to Cheah, crimes and violence committed by
triads and thugs had smeared the good name of the MCP, likewise that
of the KMT.108 In fact, the murders in Sungai Siput were believed to have
been committed by these groups. Deery clarified that: ‘The murders of the
three European planters at Sungai Siput on 16 June were not authorised or
sanctioned by MCP leaders but carried out instead by a local Communist
guerrilla unit acting on its own initiative.’109 Stubbs stated that ‘lower level
cadres’ took matters ‘into their own hands’.110 Chin Peng also admitted to
the involvement of MCP supporters in the murders. However, he stressed
that they were not done at his directive or that of the CEC. In fact, he re-
garded the murders as ‘a blunder’.

From Malayan Union to Malayan Emergency  167

Nonetheless, it was not refuted as to the role played by the British that de-
liberately caused provocations and exploited the violence to justify its action
in declaring the ‘Emergency’. Hence, the Emergency, or to be precise, the
colonial war, was part of the British plan not only to quell the MCP threat,
but also, and more importantly, the threat from the left-leaning Malay na-
tionalist and religious movements that demanded independence, that the
British feared would be influenced or capitalized by the MCP. In this con-
text, scholars should examine how this British plot or conspiracy emerged
as it was apparent that the British manipulated the situation whereby the
nationalist groups that had adopted a moderate stance became its main tar-
get during the Emergency.

The threat from the anti-colonial and nationalist groups that demanded
independence for Malaya became increasingly obvious after 1946. The
emergence of left-leaning Malay nationalist movements and Malay religious
groupings such as PKMM, Angkatan Pemuda Insaf (API, Awakening Youth
Force), Angkatan Wanita Sedar (AWAS, Conscious Women’s Front), MATA,
and Hizbul Muslimin, was believed to have the capacity to pose a threat
because they were not only anti-British but also were alleged to have been
influenced by elements of radical Communists and ‘Indonesia’. Thus, the
British began to smear their nationalist struggle to deny Malay support as
well as to justify the violent response towards them. The method used by the
British was in portraying the impression that the communists were terrorists
who perpetrated violent activities in Malaya. Similarly, Malay nationalist
movements that were linked to the MCP were accused of being involved in
violent activities as well even though such accusations were baseless and
unjustifiable. Some historians believed that the violence of the late 1940s
that prompted the Emergency was not the MCP’s doing, the British, how-
ever, linked them to the MCP as the ‘scapegoat’ for the purpose of declaring
the Emergency. The real target of the British during the Emergency was not
the MCP per se, but instead the left-leaning Malay nationalists and Malay
religious movements that struggled for independence. Their struggle threat-
ened not only the British, but also threatened UMNO, which was supported
by the British. The British attempt to link the left-leaning Malay national-
ist struggle with MCP’s communism was a British two-pronged strategy to
smear and villify all anti-colonial movements, cast away Malay support and
quash all enemies in one single stroke.

From this perspective, the Emergency was the British response and plan
and not caused by the MCP revolt, although it cannot be denied that some
of the chaos and violence that occurred did involve the MCP directly or
indirectly. The failure of historians, such as Stockwell, Furedi and others,
to understand the existence of conspiracy and British strategy came about
from this approach that only linked the Emergency to the MCP, while the
motive of the British can only be seen if viewed from the perspective of its
original objective, that is, the threat from the left-leaning Malay nationalists.

168  Azmi Arifin

The real target of the 1948 Emergency? Communism
or nationalism?

There existed confusion and differences of opinion and regarding who was
actually responsible for the declaration of Emergency, and who became the
target and victims, whether the communists, or the nationalists. The de-
pendence of historians on British official sources and intelligence materials
that contained full of allegations that left-leaning Malay nationalists who
championed independence were part of MCP elements and communist
‘terrorists’,111 made them partial to British claims. Many historians believed
that the left-leaning Malay nationalist and religious movements in Malaya
that had emerged in the 1940s, were part of the communist element or had
been infiltrated and completely controlled by the MCP. In their interpreta-
tion, the communist struggle with the nationalist struggle was intermixed
even though the two forms of struggle were separate from one another and
even in conflict with each other. Owing to this interpretation, or misinter-
pretation, all anti-colonial movements were equated with the communist
movement. It formed the foundation of Furedi’s view, who opined that
communist guerrillas were a ‘nationalist force’, who actually had struggled
against the British and demanded independence.112 In the same vein, Stock-
well emphasized that Communism in Malaya was a nationalist movement
and independence proponent, and the MCP was ‘the only party committed
to the liberation of the Malayan people’.113

The viewpoints of Furedi and Stockwell, however, constituted a form
of confusion arising from their failure to identify the real threat that the
British were facing in Malaya in the late 1940s. Their confusion was that
they regarded the MCP, which was led by the Chinese, as proponents of
Malayan independence. The anti-colonial independence movement in the
late 1940s was, in fact, a movement that was initiated, activated and led by
a majority of Malay nationalists who were not communists, although un-
deniably some were left-leaning, socialists but not communists. The Malay
nationalists were the ones who became the real threats to the British. The
independence struggle that was spearheaded by left-leaning Malay nation-
alist and religious movements such as the PKMM, MATA and Hizbul Mus-
limin that acted moderately possessed clear independence ambition. They
were not communist supporters, let alone championing the communist ide-
ology and harbouring ambition to set up a communist state. The ambition
of Hizbul Muslimin, for instance, was to form an Islamic state that was
independent of colonialism and its involvement in the leftist movement was
intended to balance the influence between socialists and communists that
was feared to have influenced Malay thinking.114 In this context, the strug-
gle of Hizbul Muslimin was not only anti-colonial but also anti-communist.
Although admittedly there were also communists in the Malay leftist move-
ment circles, they were, however, a minority group. But the Malay leftist
group, who were not communist, could unite with those who were inclined

From Malayan Union to Malayan Emergency  169

towards Communism owing to their nationalist sentiments and not because
the leftist movement was controlled by the communists.

The threat of the left-leaning Malay nationalist and religious movements,
in fact, gained serious attention of the British. Their struggle was most
feared because of their potential to attract the support of the Malays to-
wards a radical anti-colonial struggle. Based on British intelligence sources,
the Malay leftist movement comprising various streams, either the extreme
left, which was communist and radical, or the moderates, were considered
to be more dangerous by the British compared to the MCP.

The aim of the Emergency, therefore, was to curb Malay support for the
communists:

In Malaya, one of the main motives for adopting special powers [dur-
ing Emergency] was to prevent the MCP from gaining influence among
the Malays. The fear that the anti-colonial movement would spread
from the Chinese to the Malay communities was a constant theme in
the deliberations of local administration during the first four years
of the [E]mergency. Isolating the mainly non-Malay working class from
the  Malay peasantry had always been an important undercurrent of
British colonial policy. With the growth of the MCP within the urban
and rural proletariat, the immunization of the Malay community against
the virus of radical anti-colonialism became the more important. Their
loyalty was a precondition for the survival of British rule. It is not su-
prising that during the [E]mergency British officials were particularly
sensitive to any evidence of disloyalty in the Malay community.115

Hence, the real British fear was the process of radicalization of the Ma-
lay political movement that could pose problems to the British. The threat
of the Malay left would give rise to two effects that the British wanted to
avoid. First, the leftist movement was able to compete with UMNO in
controlling Malay support transforming the indigenous people to be anti-
British and their struggle for independence could seriously weakened the
British-UMNO collusion. Second, the British were most concerned that the
widening support of the Malays towards the left would give an opportunity
for the MCP to manipulate it thereby enabling the party to gain support
from the Malays. The Malay left and the MCP, although of different ideol-
ogies, nonetheless shared a common enemy, prompting them to cooperate
despite their differences in opposing the British.

This threat was felt when the British faced unprecedented pressure dur-
ing the implementation of the Malayan Union. The Malayan Union plan
gave rise to fierce Malay opposition that could unite the left and conserva-
tives and elite that subsequently led to the creation of UMNO in 1946. The
unity of the Malay left and conservatives within UMNO was feared by the
British who believed if it were not addressed, it would cause the right wing
in UMNO, which was pro-British, to be influenced by the leftist faction.

170  Azmi Arifin

Hence, the British formed cracks within UMNO by supporting the de-
mands of the Malay elite, who were pro-British, and isolated the left-leaning
elements from the conservatives, to the extent that PKMM exited from
UMNO.116 Ever since its withdrawal from UMNO, PKMM’s position, as an
anti-British political movement, became much stronger.

The influence of left-leaning Malay nationalists became more prominent
and conspicuous in 1947–1948 when they united with the religious move-
ments, particularly those based in Gunung Semanggol, Perak. The left-
leaning Malay nationalists also challenged the British and UMNO in setting
up the Pan Malayan Council of Joint Action (PMCJA)-Pusat Tenaga Rakyat
(PUTERA, Centre of People Power) in 1947 that demanded self-governance
and proposed the People’s Constitution as an alternative to the Federation of
Malaya proposal borne of British-UMNO collusion.117 The amalgamation
of the Malay left-religious movement with the Malay-non-Malay national-
ists gained the people’s support and at the same time, threatened UMNO
when many of party members involved themselves in the leftist nationalist
activities despite a warning by President Dato’ Onn himself.118 The increas-
ing support of the Malays towards the left-leaning Malay nationalists was
reflected in the disbanding of UMNO branches including a few Persatuan
Melayu Johor (PMJ, Johor Malay Association) branches led by Dato’ Onn
himself, which eventually became PKMM branches.119

The situation c learly caused anxiety not only to Dato’ Onn’s leadership,
but also to the British. The failed attempt to weaken the left-wing nation-
alist movement and to strengthen the right-wing nationalist movement
under UMNO’s patronage was clearly felt by the British. British intelligence
report from April until May 1948 revealed that the activities of the left-wing
nationalists gained increasing support, while UMNO was said to be ‘stead-
ily losing ground to left-wing organizations’ and its leadership was very
much vulnerable to ‘attack[s] by left-wing propaganda’.120 Hence, the British
intelligence report concluded, if this situation was not arrested immediately,
UMNO would be swallowed by the Malay leftist movement.121

Therefore, when the attempt to weaken the left-wing movement and
strengthen the struggle of the right-wing movement failed, and when there
emerged an increasing fear that UMNO, which was supported by the Brit-
ish might be swallowed by the left-wing and Indonesian elements, and the
possibility that the reinforced left-wing movement would be exploited by
the MCP to gain Malay support, the British then responded with force by
banning the political branches of PKMM, API as well as arresting its leader,
Ahmad Boestamam. API was considered by the British colonial administra-
tion as ‘a subversive body of pro-Indonesian Malays, a militant youth corps
which has been engaged in drilling and military training and a good deal of
provocative blustering’.122 Furthermore, force was applied to the activities
of trade unions, such as the banning of PMFTU and the arrest of workers’
leaders who were radical, whom the British feared to have been influenced
by MCP elements. The climax of the British response was the declaration of
Emergency in June 1948 under the pretext of the murder of three European

From Malayan Union to Malayan Emergency  171

planters in Sungai Siput, Perak, that was suspected to have been committed
by elements possibly influenced by the communists.

Even though officially the British often stated that the step taken during
the Emergency was to focus on the endeavour to quell violence of the Chi-
nese in the MCP, the reality was that the main focus of the British was to
quash the influence of Malay left-religious movement and to curb Malay sup-
port for anti-colonial activities. Hence, during the Emergency, left-leaning
Malay nationalist and religious movements and their supporters, apart
from communist elements, became the real targets of the British forceful
response. Besides banning Malay political organizations such as PKMM,
API, the entire left-wing nationalist movement also received immense pres-
sure when all its principal leaders were arrested and jailed on the pretext of
them getting involved in violent and militant elements. The moderate Malay
left-religious movement that adhered to democratic tenets became victims
of the Emergency, not because of their ‘militant’ response or communist
designs, but because their independence struggle was deemed threatening to
the British. This compelled members of the Malay nationalist left and reli-
gious movement to make a difficult decision during the Emergency, either to
flee to Indonesia or join UMNO in order to avoid pressure from the British
security forces. Without much choice on hand, a few of the spirited nation-
alists chose to remain in the struggle against the British and entered the jun-
gle, subsequently emerging in the 10th Regiment of the MCP. However, the
majority of the Malay left-religious nationalists who did not feel comforta-
ble with the communists joined UMNO and struggled to gain independence
within UMNO to the extent of inducing UMNO to change its party slogan,
from Hidup Melayu (Long Live Malays), to Merdeka (Independence).

During the implementation of the Emergency, the Malays who were in-
volved in resisting the British in the 10th Regiment of the MCP were most
feared, and became the main targets of the British. ‘A dead Malay terror-
ist’, British army officer Major-General Sir Charles Boucher claimed, ‘was
worth seven or eight Chinese.’123 Aggressive campaigns were launched by
the British against Malay villages that had become the main hideouts of
Malay guerrillas from the 10th Regiment. Villages in Temerloh, Pahang, for
instance, received a collective punishment of the British because they were
believed to have supported the anti-colonial struggle.124 Although receiving
immense pressure from the British, what was interesting was that the MCP
was not banned soon after the Emergency was declared, on 16 June 1948.
The MCP was only banned a month after the declaration, that is, on 23 July
1948. This British action raised reasonable doubts whether the MCP was
really their main target before and during the ‘1948 colonial war’.

Conclusion

Historians often link the factors of the Malayan Emergency declaration to
the action of the MCP and the British. Orthodox researchers claimed that
the Emergency emerged from the MCP’s revolt plan that received a directive

172  Azmi Arifin

from the Soviet Union. That opinion, however, was too weak if measured
against the inability and unpreparedness of the MCP. At the same time, his-
torians could not offer concrete evidence to show the existence of the MCP’s
uprising plan as well as the directive from external communists, namely the
Soviets.

Revisionist and neo-orthodox researchers, by way of contrast, attempted
to link the Emergency to the overly provocative action of the British. They
considered the Emergency was deliberately declared by the British in or-
der to quell the threat of anti-colonial movement that was spearheaded by
the MCP. Their argument was based, inter alia, on an intelligence report
that the British did not possess any evidence of violence perpetrated by the
MCP. They were also of the opinion that the time when the Emergency was
declared was not suitable compared to conditions before 1948, the chaos in
Malaya was becoming increasingly less and the pressure from radical trade
unions was weak. Hence, they felt that the Emergency was declared not be-
cause there was an international communist ‘conspiracy’ that directed the
MCP to revolt, but because there existed a ‘British conspiracy’ that wanted
to ban and obliterate the MCP threat. To Furedi, the action of the British to
declare the Emergency, or what was really considered as a ‘colonial war’ was
a step deliberately taken by the British to quell all anti-colonial movements
that demanded for independence.

Although it cannot be denied that the MCP was involved in activities that
threatened colonial interests in Malaya between 1945 and 1948, to what ex-
tent the British regarded the MCP as the main threat to its colonial rule
remains doubtful. In fact, at the early stage the British only perceived the
MCP threat as minor. They were considered as ‘bandit’ that was not seen as
having the capability of endangering the British. This explains why the Brit-
ish were not eager to take drastic action in banning the MCP on the pretext
of their not having clear evidence. Nonetheless, when the Emergency was
eventually declared without clear evidence, it was not the MCP that became
the main target of the British, instead Malay political organizations such as
API, AWAS, PKMM and Hizbul Muslimin that hitherto operated moder-
ately and did not have direct link to the MCP.Contrariwise, the MCP con-
tinued to exist as a legal organization and was only banned a month after
the declaration of Emergency. The British action raised questions regarding
who was the real target of the Emergency, nationalists or communists?

In the hope of a reassessment so as to replace the position of the nationalist
movement in the historical interpretation that is accurate and balanced, this
chapter proposed that the main target and victims of the British, apart from
the MCP, are the left-leaning Malay nationalist and religious movements
that struggled for independence. This movement became very influential
after the Pacific War and towards the end of the 1940s and it became prom-
inent in political organizations such as PKMM, API, AWAS, MATA and
Hizbul Muslimin that operated actively to gain support and carried out
campaigns to achieve independence. The British intelligence report shows

From Malayan Union to Malayan Emergency  173
that they were potentially a threat to the British because they were able to
influence Malay support and weakened UMNO. The British were worried
if this movement, which was ready to cooperate with the MCP, would be
controlled by the MCP that was eager to garner Malay support.

Thus, in their attempt to weaken the nationalist movement and isolate its
Malay support, the British colonial administration in Malaya carried out
campaigns to smear the left-wing movement by accusing it to be associated
with communist elements and, at the same time, widening their support for
UMNO’s struggle that was pro-British. However, owing to the immense
independence sentiments and the failure of UMNO to champion for inde-
pendence, the Malays had given their solid support to the leftist struggle.
For example, many UMNO members had declared leaving the party and,
in fact, disbanded UMNO branches that were transformed into PKMM
ones. This was why British intelligence and the UMNO leadership issued
warning to Whitehall that if they failed to take immediate action, there is
a high possibility that UMNO would be swallowed by the Malay left and
‘Indonesian’ influence. The failure of the British to curb the threat of the
Malay left-religious movement through political pressure and laws, eventu-
ally compelled the British to use the pretext of the occurrence of violence in
Malaya in mid-1948 to declare the Emergency and subsequently took action
to smash the entire anti-colonial movement.

Notes



­

174  Azmi Arifin
persons and vehicles.’ ‘The Situation in Malaya: Memorandum by the Secretary
of State for the Colonies’, 1 July 1948. CAB 129/28, CP (48) 171 (NAUK).

8 K. Hack, ‘The Origins of the Asian Cold War: Malaya 1948’, Journal of South-
east Asian Studies, 40 (3) (2009): 472.

9 R. Clutterbuck, Riot and Revolution in Singapore and Malaya (London: Faber &
Faber Ltd., 1973), p. 169.

10 Ibid.
11 Political Intelligence Journal, 1946–48. MSS Ind. Ocn. S251 (RHL). For some

background on the Journal, see Leon Comber, Malaya’s Secret Police: The Role
of the Special Branch in the Malayan Emergency (Singapore: Institute of South-
east Asian Studies (ISEAS), 2008).
12 P. Deery, ‘The Terminology of Terrorism: Malaya 1948–52’, Journal of South-
east Asian Studies, 34 (2) (2003), p. 229 (emphasis added).
13 Stockwell published a number of impressive writings particularly in 1993 which
discussed the reasons for the declaration of independence. He also compiled
three important books which included official British documents released by
The National Archives, especially those that were related to British policies
after the Pacific War. See A. J. Stockwell, Malaya, Part 1: The Malayan Union
Experiment, 1942–48; Malaya, Part 2: The Communist Insurrection 1948–53;
and, Malaya, Part 3: The Alliance Route to Independence, 1953–57, London: Her
Majesty’s Stationery Office (HSMO), 1995.
14 A. J. Stockwell, ‘”A widespread and long-concocted plot to overthrow govern-
ment in Malaya”? The Origins of Malayan Emergency’, Journal of Imperial and
Commonwealth History, 21 (3) (1993): 74–80.
15 Hack claimed that he represented the neo-orthodox stream, or the neo-
revisionists, in his interpretation of the history of the Malayan Emergency. See
Hack, ‘The Origins of the Asian Cold War: Malaya 1948’.
16 C. C. Chin, ‘Re-Examining the 1948 Revolt of the Malayan Communist Party
in Malaya’, Kajian Malaysia [Journal of Malaysian Studies] 27 (1 & 2) (2009):
11–36.
17 Chin, ‘Re-Examining the 1948 Revolt’, p. 17.
18 O’Ballance, Malaya: The Communist Insurgent War, pp. 14–15, 19, 76.
19 Pye, Guerilla Communism in Malaya, pp. 86–87.
20 Sir Henry Gurney, Communist Banditry in Malaya: The Emergency with a Chro-
nology of Important Events, June 1948–June 1951 (Department of Information,
Kuala Lumpur: The Standard Engraves & Art Printers, 1951). Also, see Politi-
cal Intelligence Journal, 1948. MSS Ind. Ocn. S251 (RHL).
21 Political Intelligence Journal, 1948. MSS Ind. Ocn. S251 (RHL).
22 H. Miller, Menace in Malaya (London: George G. Harrap & Co., 1954), p. 74.
23 They were Arthur Walker, Manager of Elphil Estate, Sungai Siput; John
Allison, Manager of Phin Soon Estate, Sungai Siput, and his assistant, Ian
D. Christian. Ibid., p. 82; Pye, Guerilla Communism in Malaya, p. 89; O’Bal-
lance, Malaya: The Communist Insurgent War, p. 82.
24 Gurney, Communist Banditry in Malaya, p. 2. According to Furedi: ‘In the case
of Malaya, the shooting of three European planters at Sungei Siput on 16 June
1948 is often seen as the incident which forced the hand of the imperial power.’
F. Furedi, Colonial Wars and the Politics of Third World Nationalism (London:
I. B. Tauris, 1994), p. 60. According to Rob Holland, it was ‘this event which
led the colonial government to declare an emergency two days later’. Holland
as cited by Furedi, ibid., p. 160. Among the organizations under the influence of
the MCP that were outlawed during the Emergency were the New Democratic
Youth League, Indian New Democratic Youth League and the Malayan Peo-
ple’s Anti-Japanese Army Servicemen’s Association.

From Malayan Union to Malayan Emergency  175

176  Azmi Arifin

From Malayan Union to Malayan Emergency  177

178  Azmi Arifin

From Malayan Union to Malayan Emergency  179
1 01 Ibid., p. 478.
1 02 Mohamad Amin and Malcolm Caldwell, Malaya: The Making of a Neo-Colony,

p. 220.
103 Nicholas Tarling, Britain, Southeast Asia and the Onset of the Cold War

1945–1950 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 311.
1 04 According to Deery: ‘The ruthlessness of the British response – first in

outlawing the all-important PMFTU, then in introducing the draconian State
of Emergency regulations – was unexpected. The timing of the State of Emer-
gency clearly took the MCP by suprise. Consequently, the party’s decision to
go underground was ad hoc; its retreat to the jungle was made in panic; and its
switch from urban to rural revolt was confused. These moves left the MCP’s
“front” organizations off balance, leaderless and isolated. In this sense, the deci-
sion to mobilize for guerrilla warfare was accelerated by, and partly in response
to, the severity of government action in May-June 1948. The notion that the
MCP was following a carefully planned strategy – a strategy coordinated by a
highly centralized party structure – is fallacious.’ Deery, ‘The Terminology of
Terrorism’, p. 51.
105 Ibid.
106 Cheah, Red Star over Malaya, p. 244.
107 Ibid., p. 242.
108 Ibid., pp. 80–81.
109 Deery, “The Terminology of Terrorism”, p. 51.
110 R. Stubbs, Hearts and Minds in Guerilla Warfare: The Malayan Emergency,
1948–1960 (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 61.
111 But according to Furedi: ‘During this period of High Cold War, terms like
communist and nationalist would [often] be used interchangeably.’ Furedi,
‘Colonial Wars’, p. 3.
1 12 Ibid., p. 214.
113 Stockwell, ‘“A widespread and long-concocted plot to overthrow government
in Malaya”?’, p. 69.
114 For instance, see Nabir Haji Abdullah, Maahad Il Ihya Assyariff Gunung Se-
manggol 1934–1959.
115 Furedi, ‘Colonial Wars’, p. 196.
116 HQ Malaya Command: Weekly Intelligence Review No. 34: General review of
the internal situation in Malaya, July 1946. CO 537/1528 (NAUK). PKMM and
its youth wing API left UMNO mainly ‘because of its [UMNO] undemocratic
structure (the Malay Nationalist Party, for example, though the most numer-
ically powerful of the affliated organizations had a voting strength no greater
than that of the small local associations with a fraction of the membership of
the Malay Nationalist Party); because of the dictatorial methods of the aristo-
cratic leaders of the UMNO; and, more importantly, because they felt that the
policy of the UMNO, formulated in this undemocratic and dictatorial manner,
was contrary to the true interests of the Malay people. The result of this with-
drawal was that the UMNO became, and still remains, solely the organization
of the Malay aristocracy.’ See Reactions to Constitutional Proposal: Malaya
People’s Constitutional Proposal: Part 1: Constitutional and Political Develop-
ments from September 1945 to September 1947. CO 537/2148 (NAUK).
117 Malayan Union Policy: Reactions to Constitutional Proposals: Counter Pro-
posals by PUTERA-AMCJA, 1947. CO 537/2148 (NAUK). PMCJA then
changed its name to All-Malayan Council of Joint Action (AMCJA).
118 Dato’ Onn cautioned UMNO members about being too close to the Il Ihya:
‘I am not prohibiting, but I am not also willing (UMNO members to go to
the Gunung Semanggol Conference) … the danger from up the mountain is
there and now we have an even more threatening (Hizbul Muslimin) which can

180  Azmi Arifin
bring the downfall of the Malays.’ Nabir Haji Abdullah, Maahad Il Ihya Ass-
yariff Gunung Semanggol 1934–1959, p. 197. In his presidential speech at the
UMNO Tenth General Assembly on 23 April 1948 in Francis Light School on
Perak Road in Penang, Dato’ Onn warned: ‘Since the Federation of Malaya was
inaugurated the political atmosphere in Malaya has become more and more
complex, and the Malays must be aware of the dangers. One and half years
ago I reminded the Malays of the dangers coming from the forest and from the
mountain. I may as well add new that these dangers are still in existence. Addi-
tionally there is a menace amidst us, which has just sprung from the ground. Its
object is to bring about the downfall of the Malays. … In regard to the Gunong
Semanggol Congress, I do not support it because I can see the danger it implies.
Empty promises were made to the people there.’ Political Intelligence Journal,
30 April 1948. MSS Ind. Ocn. S251 (RHL).

1 19 Political Intelligence Journal, 1948. MSS Ind. Ocn. S251; Azmi Arifin, ‘Local
Historians and the Historiography of Malay Nationalism 1945–57: The British,
the United Malays National Organization (UMNO) and the Malay Left’, Kajian
Malaysia, 32, 1 (2004): 19–20.

1 20 Political Intelligence Journal, 15 April 1948. MSS Ind. Ocn. S251 (RHL).
1 21 Political Intelligence Journal, 1948. MSS Ind. Ocn. S251 (RHL); Azmi, ‘Local

Historians and the Historiography of Malay Nationalism 1945–57’, pp. 19–20.
1 22 Malayan Union Policy: Angkatan Pemuda Insaf: Minute from Morris to

Russell, 5 September 1947. CO 537/2151 (NAUK).
123 Short, The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 1948–1960, pp. 208–209;

Mohamad Amin and Malcolm Caldwell, Malaya: The Making of a Neo-Colony,
p. 225; Furedi, ‘Colonial Wars’, p. 197.
124 See Mohamed Salleh Lamry, Gerakan Kiri Melayu dalam Perjuangan Kemerde-
kaan [Malay Leftist Movement in the Independence Struggle] (Bangi: Universiti
Kebangsaan Malaysia Publishers, 2006).

6 Malaysia, the Cold War
and beyond

Ooi Keat Gin

Cambridge-trained Tunku Abdul Rahman (1903–1990) proved his leader-
ship capabilities in leading a multi-ethnic Malaya in the 1955 general elec-
tions of members to the Federal Legislative Council whereby his Alliance
Party won all but one seat. Tunku’s Alliance Party, which comprised the
United Malays National Organization (UMNO), Malayan Chinese Associ-
ation (MCA) and the Malayan Indian Congress (MIC), literally represent-
ative of all the major ethnic communities of Malaya then, proved beyond
doubt to the British government that the independence of Malaya could
be entrusted to him. Subsequently, Tunku was able to triumphantly pro-
claimed Malaya’s merdeka (independence) on 31 August 1957. Newly in-
dependent Malaya was in the midst of battling a communist insurgency
(Malayan Emergency) since 1948 that saw military assistance from Britain
and its Commonwealth, viz. Australia, New Zealand, and Fiji in the form of
ground combat troops and military equipment. British and Commonwealth
military contribution continued in the post-merdeka era. Understandably,
the Tunku remained partisan and loyal to Britain and the Western democ-
racies eschewing communism, whether from Moscow or Beijing.

When Tunku proposed ‘Malaysia’ in 1961, for a wider federation to co-
join Singapore and British Borneo to independent Malaya, it was apparent
that an anti-communist design was in the agenda. Having only a year earlier
(1960) declared an end to the Malayan Emergency, Tunku was confident that
communism could be ‘contained’ and ‘arrested’.

The geopolitical situation in Southeast Asia, and in Vietnam in par-
ticular, was most troubling. Following the French withdrawal from In-
dochina after Dien Bien Phu (1954), the US stepped in with increasing
commitment to ensure that communist North Vietnam did not engulf the
non-communist South Vietnam. Undoubtedly, US President Dwight D.
Eisenhower’s (t. 1953–1961) ‘falling domino’ principle was applicable in the
idea of ‘Malaysia’ as a bulwark to the communist wind then prevailing over
the region. Adverse circumstances notwithstanding, ‘Malaysia’ was inaugu-
rated on 16 September 1963.

British-trained lawyer Tun Abdul Razak (1922–1976), Tunku’s successor
as the second Prime Minister of Malaysia (t. 1970–-1976), was a pragmatist.

182  Ooi Keat Gin

Razak subscribed to the concept of non-alignment in the bipolar Cold
War world, hence Malaysia’s participation in the Non-Aligned Movement
(NAM) Conference at Lusaka, Zambia on 8–10 September 1970. Within the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) (1967) where Malaysia
was a founder member, Razak pushed for the adoption of ZOPFAN (Zone
of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality) intending that the region not be drawn
into the raging conflict on the Indochina peninsula. Furthermore, in 1974,
in an unprecedented initiative, Razak led a delegation to Beijing to normal-
ize relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Malaysia then was
in the midst of suppressing the Second Malayan Emergency (1968–1989).
Despite Kuala Lumpur-Beijing normalization of relations, party-to-party
relations, namely Malayan Communist Party (MCP)-Chinese Communist
Party (CCP), continued unabated with moral support and material aid.
Malaysian third Prime Minister, Tun Hussein Onn (t. 1976–1981), favoured
continuity and was committed to NAM and ASEAN-ZOPFAN. The latter,
however, was thwarted by conflicts on the Indochinese mainland.

Dr Mahathir Mohamad, the fourth premier (t. 1981–2003) was radical in
repositioning Malaysia’s foreign relations. He turned away from the West,
including a ‘Buy Britain Last’ campaign, to instead literally ‘Look East’,
to Japan in particular, and South Korea and Taiwan for trade and mar-
kets, technology transfer, work ethics and organizational and management
model. Meanwhile, his diatribe against the rich and powerful of the First
World, US, UK and Western Europe earned him respect and adoration
among Third World nations in Africa and Asia. Consequently, Mahathir
energized South–South dialogue and cooperation (Langkawi Dialogue).
Mahathir’s Malaysia emerged as the model of a moderate Islamic country
to emulate, actively playing pivotal roles within the Organization of Islamic
Cooperation (OIC).1

While Abdullah Badawi continued to be active within the OIC during his
premiership (t. 2003–2009), Najib Razak, son of Razak, as the sixth Prime
Minister (t. 2009–2018), reaped mileage from the more than four decades of
Malaysia-PRC relations.

The underlying thesis of this chapter is in arguing the primacy of pragma-
tism over ideological and/or traditional considerations as the main guiding
principle of Malaysia’s positioning vis-à-vis within the region and on the
global arena in the Cold War era, as well as in the post-Cold War scenario.

Western democracies and the so-called ‘free world’

Within a short (two-year) interlude of the end of the devastating and disas-
trous Second World War (1939–1945) with the unconditional surrender of
Imperial Japan on 15 August 1945, the world again entered in an environ-
ment of animosity between nations. Known as the Cold War (1947–1990),
nations took sides rallying between two centres of power, the US and the

Malaysia, the Cold War and beyond  183

USSR. Washington claimed to represent the Western democracies, advo-
cate of capitalism and the free market with the likes of the UK, its domin-
ions and Commonwealth and Western Europe aligned to it as the acclaimed
leader of the so-called ‘free world’. In direct opposition was Moscow, the
centre to which the USSR gravitated, comprising a huge part of Eastern
Europe. The Soviet Union was a totalitarian communist state, where central
planning dictated all spheres of administration and development, moreover,
the state was the sole arbiter of morals, values, livelihood and lifestyle.

It was dubbed a Cold War as neither protagonist, the US nor the USSR,
ever came to a face-to-face military clash. Both the US and the Soviet Un-
ion, however, were involved in proxy wars, but did not themselves meet in
the battlefield. Ironically, the former wartime Allies after the end of the war
were initiating the start of another, albeit a ‘cold’, and not a ‘hot’ war. But,
for more than four decades, Washington and Moscow almost came close to
a real clash of arms. And considering the enormous possession of nuclear
arsenal each boasted of, a Third World War was in the making that might
spell the end of our human species. Fortuitously, this Third World War did
not materialize.

Meanwhile, besides the arms race between them, both protagonists were
eager to win over nations to their side, effecting a crossover to their camp.
The newly independent nations of Asia and Africa were wooed by both
Washington and Moscow and, after 1949, by Beijing. When it first emerged,
the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was in Moscow’s turf, not surpris-
ingly as they shared ideological foundations of Marxism-Leninism. But as
Beijing increasingly moved towards home-grown Maoism, a Sino-Soviet
split (1956–1966) appeared inevitable owing to differing interpretations and
practical applications of communist doctrines. Therefore, from the mid-
1960s, another major Cold War protagonist entered the stage – Mao Zedong
and the PRC (or Red China). Beijing was to play a more influential role in
the context of Malaya/Malaysia and within Southeast Asia.

Against this global geopolitical backdrop, we shall examine the trajectory
of external relations of Malaya/Malaysia in navigating its survival, devel-
opment, and sustainability as a nation-state. Choices made and directions
adopted are the foci of attention of Malayan/Malaysian leaders in the posi-
tioning of this multi-ethnic comparatively small nation.

The Tunku, merdeka (1957) and ‘Malaysia’ (1963)

The post-war British Labour government was keen on disengagement, in
the dismantling of the empire, that to a certain extent, in acquiescing the
Wilsonian doctrine of self-determination of nation-states. Except for two
interludes – Churchill (t. 1951–1955) and Eden (t. 1955–1957) – that sought
to ‘resurrect’ and ‘strengthen’ the colonial empire, Britain was determined
to execute the decolonization process as smoothly as possible without

184  Ooi Keat Gin

trauma and/or undue rancour. British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan
(t. 1957–1963) delivered his ‘Wind of Change’ speech at a luncheon meeting
of the Parliament of South Africa on 3 February 1960 in Cape Town:

In the twentieth century, and especially since the end of the war, the
processes which gave birth to the nation states of Europe have been re-
peated all over the world. We have seen the awakening of national con-
sciousness in peoples who have for centuries lived in dependence upon
some other power. Fifteen years ago this movement spread through
Asia. Many countries there, of different races and civilisations, pressed
their claim to an independent national life. Today the same thing is hap-
pening in Africa, and the most striking of all the impressions that I have
formed since I left London a month ago is of the strength of this African
national consciousness. In different places it takes different forms, but
it is happening everywhere. The wind of change is blowing through this
continent and whether we like it or not, this growth of national conscious-
ness is a political fact. And we must all accept it as a fact, and our national
policies must take account of it.2

Against this backdrop, Malaya’s independence was conceived and subse-
quently granted on 31 August 1957. The ‘wind of change’ notwithstand-
ing, Whitehall with the Colonial Office (CO) and Foreign Office (FO) were
concerned that any handover should be smooth, but more importantly, the
aftermath, referring to the post-independence era, should not be fraught
with ‘troubles’ leading to strife or even civil war.

Having gone through the trying years of military occupation (1941–1945)
by Imperial Japan, the multi-ethnic peoples of Malaya including the island
of Singapore were most welcoming of the reinstatement of British colonial
rule.3 Despite opposition from certain quarters, the handover of the sover-
eignty of Sarawak and North Borneo to the British Crown was also unduly
hampered.4 But Malaya in the immediate post-war years faced two major
challenges: governance of a multi-ethnic nation and a leftist threat of polit-
ical takeover.

The CO’s Malayan Union (1946–1948) scheme, primarily aimed at ‘unify-
ing’ the disparate forms of British colonial administration on the peninsula,
met with unprecedented opposition from the ethnic Malays. The so-called
pre-war ‘British Malaya’, ironically in reality, did not exist. What was then
referred to as British Malaya were three groups of administrative units, viz.
Straits Settlements (SS), Federated Malay States (FMS) and Un-federated
Malay States (UMS).5 The SS headed by a governor was governed as British
Crown Colonies comprising Penang, Malacca and Singapore, the last as the
seat of administration. FMS and UMS were British protectorates, namely
defence and foreign relations were handled by the War Office (WO) and FO
respectively, while sovereignty remained with the respective Malay sultan
who reigned but did not rule. For the FMS, that comprised the peninsular

Malaysia, the Cold War and beyond  185

Malay states of Perak Selangor, Negeri Sembilan and Pahang, the real ex-
ecutive and legislative power were in the hands of the resident, a British
administrative officer appointed to the sultan’s court (emolument and ac-
commodation provided by the royal treasury) whose main function and
preoccupation was to proffer advice, mandatorily sought and bounded, on
all state matters and affairs except on Malay customs and religion (Islam).
It was an ingenious system of British indirect rule. The major difference
between FMS and UMS was the Malay rulers in the latter possessed more
latitude and voice vis-à-vis their adviser, as the British officer was styled, in
comparison to their brother rulers in the former (with their resident).

The Malayan Union was thereby designed to overcome the hitherto rather
cumbersome administrative setup.6 Instead, setting Singapore aside as a
Crown Colony, all the peninsula Malay states shall combine with Penang
and Malacca to form a ‘union’ under a single administration. In order to
form a ‘Malayan Union’, it necessitated the signing of new Anglo-Malay
treaties with the respective Malay rulers whereby their sovereignty (daulat)
shall be transferred to the British Crown. The threat of accusation of war-
time collaboration ensured all signatures of the Malay rulers were secured.
Devoid of sovereignty and hitherto already deprived of executive and legis-
lative power, the Malay sultan on the throne (takhta) was merely a puppet
showcase. The façade of the continuity of Malay kingship was all important
in the eyes of the rakyat (people, masses): in following the dictum, Anak
Melayu pantang durhaka (Malays eschewed disloyalty), any opposition to
government policy that was issued in the name of the ruler evidenced by the
royal seal (mohor), was perceived as a show of disloyalty to the Malay sultan.

CO mandarins who conceived the Malayan Union overlooked one vital
and pivotal point, that of the Malay ruler’s daulat. Malay opposition to the
Malayan Union where street protesters and demonstrators including women
(unprecedentedly appearance in the public sphere) chanted slogans calling
for the preservation of the sovereignty of the Malay rulers. The equation viz.
daulat = negeri = bangsa Melayu, under the Malayan Union will be daulat
≠ negeri ≠ bangsa Melayu. Without daulat, there is no negeri (state), without
negeri, there are no ethnic Malays. Did not Laksamana Hang Tuah, the leg-
endary Malay admiral forewarn: Tak Melayu hilang di dunia, meaning ‘Lest
Malays are not lost (extinct) from the world’? Therefore, the crux of Malay
opposition to the Malayan Union was ethnic preservation and survival.

The misconceived Malayan Union was replaced by the Federation of
Malaya (1948) that ensured the position and status of the Malay rulers are
maintained and exalted.7 It was a triumphant achievement of UMNO under
the leadership of Onn bin Jaafar (1895–1962), who became chief minister of
Johor (t. 1947–1950). But the relationship between UMNO and its inaugural
president, Onn bin Jaafar, turned sour owing to the latter’s far-sightedness
of intending to allow non-Malay membership of the party.8 The Malays
could not conceive of such a proposal and a new president was elected, a
prince from the royal house of Kedah, Tunku Abdul Rahman.

186  Ooi Keat Gin

The Tunku (as he was known), was the ideal individual from the CO’s
point of view. An Anglophile, an alumnus of Cambridge’s St Catherine’s,
who purchased his silk socks from London, was also a suitable candidate
for leadership of not only of the Malays but also of the Chinese owing to
his close rapport with towkay and other friends within the Chinese com-
munity. Indians, too, apparently looked to the Tunku for his stewardship.
Uniting the three main communities – Malays, Chinese and Indians – was
an unenviable feat but the Tunku appeared to possess the right credentials
for achieving such a coup. This he accomplished during the 1952 Kuala
Lumpur municipal election whereby an ad hoc electoral arrangement be-
tween UMNO and the MCA clinched nine out of 12 contested seats. It was
a harbinger of interethnic political collaboration and the Tunku seized on
this electoral triumph to institutionalize this cooperative alliance, hence the
Alliance Party in that same year.9

But even more convincing and undoubtedly a greater accomplishment
was the electoral triumph at the 1955 Federal Legislative Council election.
At the 27 July elections, the Alliance Party (UMNO, MCA and the Malayan
Indian Congress, which joined in 1954) won all seats except one in the 52-
seat legislative body. The Tunku assumed the post of chief minister of a
self-government Malaya, where defence and foreign relations remained in
British hands.

The electoral victories the Tunku accomplished were set against a back-
ground of a communist insurgency. The Chinese-dominated Malayan
Communist Party (MCP) alleged that it was in an armed struggle to un-
shackle Malaya of British colonialism.10 Staunchly anti-communist, the
Tunku was determined to demonstrate that through interethnic political
cooperation, merdeka (independence) could be achieved through the con-
stitutional process, and not, as the MCP was advocating and undertaking,
by force of arms. Both the FO mandarins and WO generals were delighted
at this Anglophile Malay prince-chief minister. With this commitment, the
Tunku met MCP Secretary-General Chin Peng in December 1955 at Baling
for talks to end the insurgency.11 The talks failed. Both parties were unwa-
vering in their respective principles: the staunchly anti-communist Tunku
refused to acknowledge the MCP as a bona fide political party in Malaya,
and Chin Peng, a hard core communist, refused to give up his ideological
commitment. Since neither refuse to compromise, the Tunku returned to
Kuala Lumpur, and Chin Peng walked back to the jungle. The insurgency
resumed for another five years.

The merdeka talks (1955–1957) went smoothly primarily working out the
details of a handover scheduled for 1957. London’s confidence in the Tunku
reached epic heights. The Baling Talks further demonstrated the Tunku’s
anti-communist credentials, but more noteworthy, was his refusal to com-
promise. The 1955 electoral triumph of the Alliance Party under the Tunku’s
leadership showed the successful workings of interethnic political coopera-
tion. The fact that that the MIC decided to join the Alliance Party hitherto

Malaysia, the Cold War and beyond  187

the UMNO-MCA partnership, proved that another community (albeit a mi-
nority) looked to the Tunku’s political leadership. Therefore, Whitehall did
not hesitate or doubt that independent Malaya under the Tunku’s premier-
ship was the best option in disengaging from the peninsula.

On gaining independence, the Federation of Malaya joined the British
Commonwealth of Nations. Likewise, Kuala Lumpur-Washington dip-
lomatic relations was established at the same time. Within three years of
independence, the Tunku confidently pronounced the end of the 12-year
Emergency. Both gestures were apparent illustrations that Malaya under
the Tunku’s stewardship remained in the Western camp in the bipolar Cold
War world, and was anti-communist to the extent of being able to defeat a
leftist-led armed insurgency.

Furthermore, regardless of whether the concept of a wider federation
named ‘Malaysia’ to encompass independent Malaya, the British Crown
Colonies of Singapore, Sarawak and North Borneo and the British protec-
torate of Brunei was the brainchild of the Tunku or the whispered suggested
proposal of CO and FO mandarins, Whitehall again was supportive.12 Sin-
gapore and Sarawak were both facing leftist threats then and developments
were increasingly favouring the left. The contemporary situation then ne-
cessitated urgent action. While Whitehall and the FO were concerned over
the leftist threat, the Tunku and UMNO were apprehensive of a ‘Chinese
deluge’ consequent with merger with Singapore. To counter this perceived
demographic ‘threat’, the northern Bornean territories (Sarawak, Brunei
and North Borneo) with their indigenous peoples were included in the wider
federation equation.

Opposition to the proposed ‘Malaysia’ came from predicted quarters.13
Leftist-backed groups, the Barisan Socialis (Socialist Front) in Singapore
and the Sarawak United People’s Party (SUPP) registered their opposition.
Similarly, the Partai Rakyat Brunei (PRB, Brunei People’s Party) rejected
‘Malaysia’, but unlike the Barisan Sosialis and the SUPP both pushing the
leftist agenda of establishing communist republics, PRB and its charismatic
leader, A. M. Azahari (1928–202),14 of a return to the sultanate’s glorious
heyday. Almost a millenarian ambition, Azahari envisaged a Negarabagian
Kesatuan Kalimantan Utara (NKKU, Unitary State of North Kalimantan)
that foresaw reuniting Sarawak and North Borneo to the Brunei fatherland,
in a unitary state setup.15

Neighbouring Indonesia, by contrast, alleged the ‘hidden hand’ of the
FO intending to maintain its influence in the aftermath of decolonization.
Labelling ‘Malaysia’ as a ‘neo-colony’ of Britain, President Sukarno’s op-
position took the form of Konfrontasi (Confrontation). President Diosdado
Macapagal of the Philippines too opposed ‘Malaysia’, but unlike accusa-
tions of clandestine meddling by colonialists, there were disputed territorial
grounds for non-acceptance, namely the claim over North Borneo. Since the
eastern half of what later (from 1881) became North Borneo was territory
belonging to the Sulu sultanate and since the latter had become a part of the

188  Ooi Keat Gin

Plate 6.1 A gathering of anti-Malaysia forces
Source: Arsip Nasional, Jakarta, Indonesia; https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:
Members_of_the_SPGF,_NKNA_and_TNI_taking_picture_together.jpg (accessed 17 January
2019)

Republic of the Philippines following independence in 1946 from the US, the
claim over North Borneo presented a legal issue. Therefore, North Borneo
should not be a part of the proposed wider federation and Manila staunchly
opposed such a move. What later became known as the ‘Sabah Claim’16
remains unresolved to the present.17

All the aforesaid oppositions notwithstanding, from within and from
without, the Federation of Malaysia was inaugurated on 16 September
1963 with the Tunku as its first Prime Minister (t. 1963–1970). Like Malaya
previously, Malaysia too, shortly after attaining independence, joined the
Commonwealth and remains to the present day. There was continuity
as Malaysia retained all the traits and characteristics favoured then by
London, viz. practised a Westminster-style of parliamentary democracy,
multi-ethnic political cooperation in the ruling Alliance Party, constitu-
tional monarchy,18 promotion and development of a capitalist free market
economy and eschewed Marxism-Leninism-Maoism and Communism as
an ideology as well as a system of governance.
Neither East, nor West
When the Asian-African Conference, also referred to as the Bandung Con-
ference (Konferensi Asia-Afrika), a meeting of newly independent Asian and
African states, 18–24 April 1955 in Bandung, Indonesia, Malaya, then under

Malaysia, the Cold War and beyond  189

British colonial rule, was unable to participate. It was at Bandung that the
Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) had its beginnings and was subsequently
formalized in 1961 in Belgrade, Yugoslavia.19 Within a bipolar world of the
Cold War, many newly independent nations were reluctant and uncomforta-
ble to be drawn into the two major camps, between the Soviet Union and the
US, both claiming the supremacy of their respective system of governance
and economic principles. Instead, having just unshackled the many years
(some centuries) of domination, the Asian and African states wished to be
left to their own devices in developing their own form of governance and de-
velopment of their economy without the ‘controlling’ and ‘dominating’ hand
of the major Cold War protagonists, neither Moscow or Washington; or,
indeed, from 1966, of Beijing. Interference and/or meddling from without in
domestic state affairs were roundly eschewed by NAM members.

While the Tunku was squarely committed to London, hence in Wash-
ington’s orbit, his successor Tun Abdul Razak was more resourceful and
imaginative with regards to Malaysia’s foreign relation. Razak qualified as
a barrister at Lincoln’s Inn, London, but unlike the Tunku, was less Anglo-
phile possessing neither sentimental nor obliging ties with Britain. He had
been deputy prime minister to the Tunku since Merdeka (1957) and assumed
the prime ministership in 1970 (until his untimely death in office in 1976).

Razak was basically a pragmatist. He was in the forefront in negotiations
with Suharto’s Indonesia in normalizing relations (1967) following the end
of Konfrontasi. Shortly, the Second Malayan Emergency (1968–1989)20 came
on the scene, and within a year, the ’13 May 1969’ tragedy flared up whence
Sino-Malay clashes brought the nation almost to the brink of chaos and
self-destruction. Despite facing a revived communist threat from the MCP,
and internal sectarian strife that was tearing the country apart, Razak
launched a diplomatic breakthrough in establishing formal relations with
the PRC, stigmatized then by the Western media as ‘Red China’. In an un-
precedented move, Razak journeyed to Beijing in 1974 to hold talks with
Premier Zhou Enlai (1949–1976) and the portrait of him shaking hands with
Chairman Mao Zedong21 was of great historic significance. It was a dip-
lomatic coup as the Malaysian prime minister was the first in the region
vis-à-vis other ASEAN leaders to reach out to a communist state; and not
just any state, the PRC, then in open challenge to Moscow for the leader-
ship of the communist realm. Unlike distant Moscow,22 relations and links
with the Chinese mainland had a long history and proximity to Malaysia,
in fact, there were many Chinese in Malaysia then who were first generation
mainland born whereas others still maintained close familial ties through
postal correspondence, although this was heavily guarded by authorities
from either end. Thus, owing to historical antecedence, the reconnection
with Beijing by Kuala Lumpur was significant.

Although CCP-MCP relations, viz. party-to-party ties were unaffected
by Kuala Lumpur-Beijing normalization of diplomatic ties, it was apparent
that Razak held the upper hand vis-à-vis Chin Peng and the MCP. Although

190  Ooi Keat Gin

unclear and difficult to ascertain, conjecture might suggest to a possibil-
ity of reduced backing and support of the CCP for the MCP from the sec-
ond half of the 1970s. Rapprochement with the PRC demonstrated that,
despite Malaysia’s anti-communist stance from within (notably, the Second
Malayan Emergency), Kuala Lumpur upheld its principles in establishing
friendly relations with all countries regardless of ideological orientation
from without. The Razak administration strived for neutrality, neither keen
to be drawn to either pole of the Cold War.

Razak and his deputy, Dr Ismail Abdul Rahman (t. 1970–1973),23 were
both keen of NAM as the non-alignment concept was consistent and in line
with the neutrality stance adopted by Malaysia since the mid-1960s. Com-
mitment to take the ‘middle road’, NAM, from Kuala Lumpur’s perspective,
represented non-involvement in Cold War politics. In 1970, Malaysia be-
came a member of NAM and participated at its conference in Lusaka, Zam-
bia. It was then that Wisma Putra, Malaysia’s foreign ministry, persistently
pushed its prime foreign policy objective in the realization of the ZOPFAN
concept in Southeast Asia utilizing the platforms at NAM and ASEAN.

ZOPFAN, the brainchild of Dr Ismail, gained formal recognition when
ASEAN announced the Kuala Lumpur Declaration on 27 November 1971:

At the end of their deliberations, the Foreign Ministers and the Special
Envoy signed and issued Declaration in which they stated their deter-
mination to exert initially necessary efforts to secure the recognition of
and respect for Southeast Asia as a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neu-
trality, free from any form or manner of interference by outside Powers,
and also stated that Southeast Asian countries should make concerted
efforts to broaden the areas of cooperation which would contribute to
their strength, solidarity and closer relationship.24

But owing to the protracted armed conflicts on the Indochinese peninsula
since the end of the Pacific War (1941–1945), the pursuit of ‘peace, freedom,
and neutrality’ had to be postponed, at times, it seemed an elusive aspira-
tion. All the major Cold War protagonists, notably the US who had com-
mitted ground troops in aid of the non-communist South Vietnam regime,
while the Soviet Union and the PRC were supplying military hardware and
other forms of assistance to North Vietnam. Until then (early 1970s), the
Vietnam War appeared unrelenting, and even ‘overflowing’ into ‘neutral’
Cambodia and Laos.25

However, not even one breather could be taken in the aftermath of the
US military disengagement, which subsequently led to the fall of Saigon
(1975), and the political reunification of Vietnam, immediately thereafter
a protracted conflict in neighbouring Cambodia, viz. Cambodian Civil
War (1968–1975), Cambodian-Vietnamese War (1978–1989) that plunged
the country in an unending war-ravaged condition and situation.26 Across
the border in Laos, an ongoing insurgency (since 1975) had emaciated and

Malaysia, the Cold War and beyond  191

destabilized the entire country in unsettling mode.27 Indochina then, ana-
logically speaking, was like dousing one fire (Vietnam) only to see two other
fires flaring up in its place (Cambodia and Laos).

Myanmar too, since independence in 1948, faced a series of unending
ethnic separatists’ struggles, each intending to secede through waging guer-
rilla war against the central government.28 Technically, Myanmar has been
engulfed in a long-drawn civil war where various ethnic minorities (Chin,
Shan, Kachin, etc.) have been struggling for self-determination, secession,
autonomy, etc., against the Bamar majority. At least five out of the seven
states in the country were, and still are, in open armed conflict with the
central government.

From the foregoing scenario, ZOPFAN seemed doomed. Nonetheless,
Malaysia and colleagues in ASEAN continued to pursue efforts that could
realize such a possibility. One strategy was in widening the reach of ASEAN.
The expansion of ASEAN that drew in Vietnam (1995), Laos (1997), Myan-
mar (1997), and Cambodia (1999) to some extent could help in the fulfilment
of ZOPFAN. But, ASEAN’s unrelenting principle of non-interference in do-
mestic affairs among member nations, posed a challenging obstacle towards
realizing ZOPFAN. Thailand and the Philippines too faced Muslim separa-
tists in their southern provinces and, in both cases, Malaysia attempted to
broker peace settlements with the blessings of Bangkok and Manila respec-
tively, but a lasting peace appeared elusive.29

Hussein Onn, the third Prime Minister of Malaysia, carried on the neu-
trality stance of his predecessor and Wisma Putra continued to pursue
cordial relations with all nations regardless of their system of governance,
ideological orientation, big or small. For instance, during Hussein’s tenure,
Malaysia engaged Pacific islands such as Fiji, Samoa, Vanuatu, the Solomon
Islands and Micronesia, all small island nations with scant trading engage-
ments. Fiji, a member of the Commonwealth, did contribute assistance in the
Malayan Emergency. This far-sightedness paid dividends when these very
Pacific island nations lent support to Malaysia’s argument in the definition
of ocean boundaries of coastal countries that was subsequently translated
into the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas that ‘lays down
a comprehensive regime of law and order in the world’s oceans and seas
establishing rules governing all uses of the oceans and their resources’.30
There were 157 signatories that pledged commitment to the Convention un-
dertaken on 10 December 1982 in Montego Bay, Jamaica. The Convention
was beneficial to Malaysia as it sanction access to its undersea oil reserves.31

At the same time, Malaysia played an important role in the OIC. Origi-
nally constituted on 25 September 1969, the OIC claimed to be ‘the collec-
tive voice of the Muslim world’ representing some 57 members of which 53
were Muslim-majority nations. The OIC pledged to ‘safeguard and protect
the interests of the Muslim world in the spirit of promoting international
peace and harmony among various people of the world’.32 In fact, when
a permanent general secretariat was established in March 1970 based in

192  Ooi Keat Gin

Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, its inaugural secretary general was the Tunku. He
was tasked to coordinate the activities of member states, strengthen cooper-
ation among Muslim countries in various aspects, viz. political, economic,
social, cultural, and scientific fields.

The dictum ‘keeping old friends while making new ones’ was, and still
is, the guiding principle of the Hussein administration. While maintaining
good relations and actively contributing to the Commonwealth since 1957,
Malaysia had gone on to make ‘new friends’ as well as to play an influen-
tial role in the international arena. Even in the early years as a newly in-
dependent nation-state, the Tunku, then prime minister, had utilized the
Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Meeting in 1960 to bravely raise the issue
of apartheid in South Africa. Subsequent to the Tunku’s criticisms, South
Africa withdrew from the Commonwealth in the following year.33

But Hussein’s successor, for better or for worse, but guided by practicality,
reoriented Malaysia’s foreign relations and national outlook. Malaysia
acquired a sense of assertiveness.

A reorientation in focus

Dr Mahathir Mohamed became Malaysia’s fourth Prime Minister
(1981–2003), and almost at the time he took office, he made two unparalleled
policy turnarounds, the first being ‘Buy Britain Last’, followed by ‘Look
East’. Both policy changes were significant milestones in the country’s for-
eign policy stance.

Malaya, and later Malaysia, had possessed close and cordial relations
with the UK, its former colonial master. In spite of colonialism, there was
scant animosity between colonizer and colonized. Comparatively, the West-
ern colonialism that was imposed was undoubtedly exploitative, particu-
larly from the economic perspective, but overall benign, in fact admittedly
beneficial in terms of infrastructure development, social services (educa-
tion, public health).

Independence was gained through negotiations and the subsequent
handover on 31 August 1957 was without blood or tears; at midnight, Ma-
layans of various ethnicity saw the final lowering of the Union Jack and
the raising of the Malayan flag, predecessor of present-day Jalur Gemi-
lang (Glorious Stripes). No blood was spilled, neither were any tears
shed; unlike in neighbouring Indonesia, which had to struggle to attain
its independence – Revolusi Indonesia (1945–1949) – and was drenched in
blood, had created hatred and overall animosity. Malaya/Malaysia in the
post-independence period enjoyed good relations with the UK and the
Commonwealth. To the extent, for instance, that even in the post-1957 pe-
riod, British and Commonwealth military units continued to contribute
and assist in the suppression of the MCP’s armed struggle (the Malayan
Emergency).

But Mahathir shattered the hitherto good relations between Malaysia
and the UK with his unprecedented move in launching a ‘Buy Britain Last’

Malaysia, the Cold War and beyond  193

policy. Two events sparked this turnaround that soured Kuala Lumpur-
London ties. Guthrie, founded in Singapore in 1821, was reputedly the first
British trading house in Southeast Asia. When rubber, the miracle crop ex-
perienced its initial boom during the first decade of the twentieth century,
Guthrie, like all its competitors, jumped on the rubber bandwagon to ac-
quire plantations. Fast forward to the 1970s and early 1980s, Guthrie, which
then owned 200,000 acres of rubber estates in Malaysia, decided to divest
some of its subsidiaries with intent to sell them to Multi-Purpose Holding,
a commercial company owned by the MCA. The federal government was
less than pleased of such an acquisition by the MCA, as this ran contrary to
the New Economic Policy (NEP) (1970–1990) that targeted a 30 percent cor-
porate ownership by bumiputera (lit. ‘son or prince of the soil’, indigenous)
(read: ethnic Malays) by 1990. In response, the Malaysian government’s Per-
badanan Nasional Berhad (PNB, National Equity Corporation) executed an
unexpected corporate takeover of Guthrie at the London Stock Exchange
(LSE) in 1981. Thereafter, rules and regulations at the LSE were changed to
avert future similar dawn raids and takeovers. The LSE changes prevented
another Guthrie-style takeover thereby frustrating future possibilities of
acquiring any British company that possessed substantial assets (mines,
plantations) to the natural resources of Malaysia. Kuala Lumpur-London
relations were uneasy.

The second bone of contention was the UK government’s decision to im-
pose a threefold increase in tuition fees for foreign students. British uni-
versities had traditionally served Malaysian students in pursuit of higher
education. By the early 1980s, there were 17,000 Malaysian government-
sponsored students in British universities, the majority were bumiputera.34
At that time, there were only three public universities in the country, namely
University of Malaya (1949), Universiti Sains Malaysia (1969) and Universiti
Kebangsaan Malaysia (1969). No private universities or colleges of higher
learning existed then. Such an exceptional hike in tuition fees undoubtedly
had an adverse impact on public expenditure. The Mahathir administration
then considered alternative avenues of quality higher education, hence the
‘Look East’ policy.35

In retaliation of the two grievances, Mahathir launched the ‘Buy Brit-
ain Last’ policy whereby governmental restrictions were imposed on British
imports and commercial contracts, to the extent that all imports and con-
tracts required mandatory sanction from the Prime Minister’s Office. At
the same time, application for sanction need to be accompanied by a list
of alternatives or substitutes, and product samples, from non-British com-
panies. To all intents and purposes, it was outright discrimination against
British-made products and British companies. It was in contrast to colonial
times and during the 1960s and 1970s where the ‘Made in England’ label was
highly sought after owing to the high quality it implied. The policy adversely
impacted local firms that dealt with British imports, and those which were
in contract relations with British counterparts. Delays and cumbersome pa-
perwork to overcome the bureaucratic red tape were costly outcomes that in

194  Ooi Keat Gin

turn made ‘Made in England’ products expensive in the domestic market-
place. It was exactly what the Mahathir administration intended.

Besides impacting on trade relations, the Mahathir administration ex-
tended ostracizing the UK in the diplomatic arena as well. Mahathir refused
to attend the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) in
1981, and again in 1983. Rumours of Malaysia intending to withdraw alto-
gether from the Commonwealth was a cause for concern at the FO as well as
at Number 10 Downing Street.

In response, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher (t. 1979–1990) sought
a diplomatic resolution. Both Foreign Minister Baron Carrington and
Defence Minister Jon Notts flew to Kuala Lumpur to hold talks with
Mahathir; but no positive outcomes resulted from the meeting. In the midst
of tense relations, the Carcosa Hill Estate incident erupted over posses-
sion and repossession of this invaluable piece of real estate in the heart of
Kuala Lumpur. It was formerly the official residence of the British High
Commissioner during the colonial period with property rights held by
the British government. On independence in 1957, and in good faith, the
Tunku restored the deeds of Carcosa Hill Estate and its surrounding 40
acres (160,000 m2) to Britain.36 Mahathir, on his part, in retaliation against
Britain, the Carcosa Hill Estate was repossessed by the federal govern-
ment. Such a move undoubtedly aggravated matters and marred the long-
standing ties.

Mrs Thatcher invited Mahathir for talks in London. In a four-eyed
meeting and discussion in March 1983, both finally met and their fruitful
discussions resolved outstanding issues, viz. the ‘Buy Britain last’ policy
was aborted, the British government allocated a £160 million fund to as-
sist Malaysians pursuing higher education in Britain37 and the Carcosa Hill
Estate episode was resolved with the Malaysian government offering a new
site as replacement.38 In a turnaround, Mahathir not only graced the 1985
CHOGM, but also offered Malaysia as host and chair to the 1989 CHOGM.
The 1998 Commonwealth Games held in Kuala Lumpur was an unqualified
success that in turn restored the equilibrium in Anglo-Malaysian relations.

In the midst of the rift with the UK, the Mahathir administration
launched its ‘Look East’ policy in contrast to the hitherto pro-Western (UK,
US, Western Europe) stance in terms of seeking technological advances,
skills training, higher education, industrial and management models, etc.
Instead, there was a recalibration of outlook in orientating towards East
Asia, viz. Japan in particular, also South Korea and Taiwan. Mahathir was
especially impressed with the phoenix rise of post-war Japan (1950s–1970s),
from near complete devastation at the close of the Pacific War to transform
into a global economic powerhouse in less than three decades. Specifically,
Japanese economic models of excellence, management style and organi-
zational structure and work ethics were worthy to be emulated. While the
private sector should adopt (from the Japanese) and adapt (to local con-
ditions) management style and organizational structure, the Malaysian

Malaysia, the Cold War and beyond  195

civil service should emulate the Japanese work ethics of diligence, commit-
ment, selfless contribution, and collective responsibility. The reliance and
over-dependency on the West were cause for concern, for such a trend was
deemed ‘unhealthy’, hence alternatives were sought. The meteoroidal rise of
Japan, South Korea and Taiwan as well, should be considered as role models
for mimicking and benchmarking:

For this purpose, Malaysia decided to dispatch their students to Japan,
to study not only academics and technical know-how but also to learn
labour ethics and discipline of the Japanese people. … The programme
consists of two parts. The first is to send Malaysian students to Japanese
universities and institutes of technology. The second is to send trainees
to Japanese industries and training institutes. These programmes are
funded by the Government of Malaysia, and the Government of Japan
supports these programmes by sending Japanese teachers to Malaysia
and also by sharing a part of its costs.39

Hence, between 1982 and 1994, a total of 1,793 Malaysians underwent train-
ing and studies in Japan.40 On the 20th anniversary of the ‘Look East’ pol-
icy in 2002, Mahathir detailed its successful outcome:

Malaysia is perhaps less bashful and announced loudly that it intended
to look East, to look at Japan mainly for inspiration and guidance. …
Malaysia identified what we believed to be the factors which contributed
towards Japan’s success. They are the patriotism, discipline, good work
ethics, competent management system and above all the close cooper-
ation between the Government and the private sector. And so we tried
to adopt these practices and instil these cultures in our people. And
everyone now acknowledges that Malaysia has made better progress
than most other developing countries. The fastest pace of Malaysia’s
progress and development took place in the last two decades coinciding
with Malaysia’s Look East policy. … For a country with a population
of just over 20 million, Malaysia’s position as the 18th biggest trading
nation in the world is something that Malaysians are proud of. More
than most countries Malaysia is dependent on foreign trade. Malaysia’s
trade is almost two times as big as its Gross Domestic Product (GDP).
Japan, which is a very big trader, has a trade that is less than 30 percent
of its GDP.41

Mahathir has convincingly proved with his two policies – ‘Buy Britain Last’
and ‘Look East’ – that Malaysia could survive, and even achieved success,
in turning to new directions. His forthright manner in speaking his mind
characterized his long tenure premiership whence he utilized regional plat-
forms and international forums in voicing Malaysia’s opinions and/or com-
mitments to a wider and global audience.

196  Ooi Keat Gin

In 2003, at the UN in New York, Mahathir openly criticized the mech-
anism of decision making in the world body. Although there are non-
permanent members in the UN Security Council, the domination by
Western powers did not bode well for non-Western nations, particularly the
less developed nation-states of the Third World that had to abide by the
decision of a skewered few. Mahathir, in fact, urged the world body to un-
dertake reform of the entire organization, inter alia to include Third World
countries and Japan as permanent members in the UN Security Council;
and the Council to abolish the veto powers of its permanent members, to
do away with this long overdue anachronism that was once relevant (in the
early years of the UN).42

Mahathir had been most critical of the Western powers in relation to
Third World nations and Islamic causes. In 1986, for instance, at the NAM
Conference in Harare, Zimbabwe he proposed the convening of a South-
South Commission.43 The ‘South’ refers to relatively poor and developing
countries mainly in the Third World; the ‘North’, by the same token, points
to the developed nations, the economically rich and politically powerful and
dominant states. Malaysia since its independence tended to lean towards the
‘South’, and ever critical of the ‘North’.

In the post-Cold War era, Mahathir continued to speak on behalf of
the ‘South’ and the Third World. He mooted the concept of a biennial get-
together named the Langkawi International Dialogue (LID) whence to hold
a series of formal and informal meetings between leaders of Malaysia and
their counterparts throughout Africa. The inaugural 1995 LID was on the
beautiful island of Langkawi, off the northwest coast of Kedah. This in-
tellectual exchange involved not only participation of politicians and sen-
ior government officials, but also corporate and business leaders, labour
organizers, media practitioners, academics, cultural activists and a host
of non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Exchanges were focused on
challenges confronting Third World and developing countries including in
facing the rich and powerful nations (‘North’), helping and assisting one
another between Malaysia and African countries. But Mahathir, in his sig-
nature direct manner, forewarned participants in the 1997 LID:

A dialogue is not a soliloquy. It involves exchanges of views, ideas and ex-
perience. The LID is not a talk shop. It is a process in educating ourselves.
We all have responsibilities and we all want to discharge our responsi-
bilities well. This dialogue can help us in doing what is expected of us.

I hope we will all follow up on this dialogue with action and I hope we
can help monitor each other`s action. Hopefully we, our countries and
our peoples, will make tangible gains from our sojourn in this resort
island of many legends.44

In the field of Islamic causes, Mahathir accused the West of practising dou-
ble standards, and harbouring prejudice and bias towards Islamic nations.

Malaysia, the Cold War and beyond  197

The Bosnian War (1992–1995), as an illustrative example, witnessed the West
turning away from the massacre of Bosnian Muslims by Serbs and Croats
that undertook an ethnic cleansing to create ethnically pure states, namely
Republika Srpska and Herzegovina-Bosnia.45 Mahathir ‘expressed concern
about the lack of attention by the international community to the violation
of human rights’ referring to the systematic pogroms of Muslims.46 Ma-
laysia contributed three battalions to the United Nations Protection Force
(UNPROFOR) peacekeeping operations in 1993–1995.47 Again, when the
US and its allies invaded Iraq in expanding Washington’s so-called ‘war on
terror’ without the backing of a specific UN resolution, Mahathir lashed
out at such arbitrary and wanton acts. For instance, Reuters and the British
Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) quoted his criticisms:

President Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair are war criminals
with more Iraqi blood on their hands than Saddam Hussein, former
Malaysian premier Mahathir Mohamad said on Monday.48

Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad has condemned the
US-led war on Iraq, calling it the action of a ‘cowardly and imperialist’
bully. Dr Mahathir said Washington’s decision to sideline the United
Nations in its desire to depose Iraqi President Saddam Hussein had un-
dermined world order and rendered both the UN and international law
meaningless.49

The Atlanta-based CNN (Cable News Network), to a certain extent, even
‘praise’ Mahathir:

Rather, Mahathir is seen as a fiery and unpredictable defender of the
developing world whose comments are just as often designed to shock
his local audience out of apathy. He frequently urges the Islamic world
to use brainpower in combating its competitors or enemies.50

Within the region, Malaysia was a prime mover for the creation of the
Southeast Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ) when a treaty
was signed by ASEAN leaders at the Bangkok Summit in December 1995.51
SEANWFZ was mooted a decade ago at the ASEAN Foreign Ministers’
Meeting in Jakarta in July 1984. SEANWFZ was a critical component in
the fulfilment of ZOPFAN. But SEANWFZ’s realization as a treaty only
became practical in the post-Cold War era. Accordingly, the five recognized
nuclear-weapon states China, France, Russia, the UK and the US were
urged to pen their commitment in the SEANWFZ protocol that they would
not use, or threaten to use, any of their nuclear weapons within the zone,
namely Southeast Asia. To date (mid-February 2020), none of the five has
penned its signature.52

Malaysia was fully committed to ASEAN. It was Mahathir who had ini-
tiated and persistently sought the expansion of ASEAN, that between 1995

198  Ooi Keat Gin

and 1999, brought into its fold all the mainland nation-states. Apart from
Timor Leste,53 all nation-states within the Southeast Asian region are mem-
bers of ASEAN. Through ASEAN, Malaysia and other fellow members
benefitted from the collective bargaining power as a bloc with other groups,
the European Commission (EC) as an example. In 1997 saw the emergence
of ASEAN Plus Three, the ‘Three’ being PRC, Japan and South Korea that
further strengthened closer cooperation between East and Southeast Asia.

Continuity in foreign policy developed during the Abdullah Ahmad Bad-
awi (2003–2009) and Najib Abdul Razak (2009–2018) administrations with-
out any significant deviations or reversals. Abdullah chaired both NAM
(2003–2006) and the OIC (2003–2006). When the US-led invasion of Iraq
was underway, it prompted Abdullah to call for an OIC Special Meeting
on the Middle East at Putrajaya in April 2004. Najib was in Beijing in May
2014 for the 40th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic ties be-
tween Malaysia and the PRC. It was his father’s initiative four decades ago
to risk the unprecedented move in seeking rapprochement with Beijing, then
feared and loathed by many non-communist nations. Within the region, the
Najib administration played peace broker between the Philippines govern-
ment and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). Najib’s efforts paid
dividend when on 24 January 2014, Philippine government chief negotiator
Miriam Coronel Ferer and MILF chief negotiator Mohagher Iqbal signed a
peace agreement in Kuala Lumpur that:

[C]alls for Muslim self-rule in parts of the southern Philippines in
exchange for a deactivation of rebel forces by the … MILF. … the
guerrillas would turn over their firearms to a third party… In return, a
regional police force would be established in the new Muslim autono-
mous area… [to] be created in 2016. [Meanwhile] the Philippine military
would reduce the presence of troops and help disband private armies in
the area.54

Concluding remarks

Against a background of a world split between two centres of influence
and power, viz. Washington and Moscow and later also Beijing (after the
Sino-Soviet split), Malaya, and later (from 1963), Malaysia, chose a realistic
and practical path in negotiating relations with other nations. The Tunku,
understandably, brought independent Malaya within the orbit of the UK,
hence the US; Razak, however, despite actively suppressing a communist
insurgency (Second Malayan Emergency), took the unprecedented move in
a rapprochement with the PRC journeying to Beijing in 1974. Steadfast to
the principle of ‘keeping old friends while making new ones’, Razak and
Dr Ismail steered Malaysia to the neutrality path initiating and advocating
ZOPFAN, and participating in NAM. Hussein reached out to the Pacific
island states and the OIC, a move that, in the long haul, proved profitable

Malaysia, the Cold War and beyond  199

in engaging friends across the globe, regardless big or small, rich or poor.
Mahathir with his forthright personality and outspoken speech made a par-
adigm shift in Malaysia’s external relations. In a surprise move, his ‘Buy
Britain Last’ policy almost severed relations with the country’s former col-
onizer. At the same time, he recalibrated Malaysia’s outlook in his ‘Look
East’ policy. Mahathir’s criticism of the UN, its Security Council in particu-
lar, the veto principle of permanent members, the dominance of the West
set him apart from other Third World leaders. His outspoken support of the
‘South’, the Third World, the OIC and his brainchild LID, established him
as the uncrowned champion and spokesman for the disenfranchised of the
world vis-à-vis the rich, powerful and influential. Being a realist and at the
same time a pragmatist, Mahathir sought alternatives (to dependency on
the West) in East Asia and engaged Africa nations.

Malaysian leaders moved away from the Cold War protagonists to avoid
being drawn in as pawns in their rivalry for supremacy, having taken heed
of the traditional Malay saying:

Gajah sama gajah berjuang,
Pelanduk mati di tengah-tengah.
[When elephants struggle,
The mouse-deer in between perishes.]

The clash of great powers results in the sufferings of smaller, weaker nations
and Malaysia avoided being the ‘mouse-deer’ as the unfortunate victim.

Fortuitously, Malaysia possessed down-to-earth leaders, from Tunku,
Razak to Mahathir, who had the wisdom and fortitude, guided by pragma-
tism and fortunate in being able to steer the nation through the rough and
stormy Cold War seas, as well as beyond.

Notes

200  Ooi Keat Gin

Malaysia, the Cold War and beyond  201
Politics: The Unfinished Memoirs of Tun Dr Ismail Abdul Rahman (Singapore:
ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, 2015).
2 4 ‘Joint Press Statement Special ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting To Issue The
Declaration Of Zone Of Peace, Freedom And Neutrality Kuala Lumpur, 25–26
November 1971’, Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN); https://
asean.org/?static_post=joint-press-statement-special-asean-foreign-ministers-
meeting-to-issue-the-declaration-of-zone-of-peace-freedom-and-neutrality-
kuala-lumpur-25-26-november-1971 (accessed 29 August 2019).
25 For the undeclared war in Cambodia and Laos, for instance, see Gordon Hardy,
Pawns of War: Cambodia and Laos (New York: Time Life Education, 1988);
Joshua Kurlantzick, A Great Place to Have a War: America in Laos and the Birth
of a Military CIA (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2016).
2 6 See Wilfred P. Deac, Road to the Killing Fields: The Cambodian War of 1970–
1975 (College Station, TX: Texas A & M University Press, 1997); Boraden Nhem,
The Chronicle of a People’s War: The Military and Strategic History of the Cam-
bodian Civil War, 1979–1991 (London: Routledge, 2018).
27 Jane Hamilton-Merritt, Tragic Mountains: The Hmong, the Americans, and the
Secret Wars for Laos, 1942–1992 (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press,
1999); Kenneth Conboy, Shadow War: The CIA’s Secret War in Laos (Boulder,
CO: Palladin Press, 1995).
2 8 Mac McClelland, For Us Surrender Is Out of the Question: A Story from Burma’s
Never-Ending War (Berkeley, CA: Soft Skull Press, 2010).
29 Zachary Abuza, Conspiracy of Silence: The Insurgency in Southern Thailand
(Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2009); Thomas M. McK-
enna, Muslim Rulers and Rebels: Everyday Politics and Armed Separatism in the
Southern Philippines (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California
Press, 1998).
30 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982: Over-
view and full text, Oceans & Law of the Seas United Nations, Division for Ocean
Affairs and the Law of the Seas; https://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_
agreements/convention_overview_convention.htm (accessed 26 August 2019).
31 The 1980s and 1990s saw offshore exploration in Terengganu, Sabah, and Sar-
awak where oil and gas were later exploited. See Ooi, Historical Dictionary of
Malaysia, p. 359.
32 Organisation of Islamic Conference: About OIC; https://web.archive.org/web/
20131030064136/ http://www.oic-oci.org/oicv2/page/?p_id=52&p_ref=26&lan=en
(accessed 26 August 2019).
33 Some three decades later after apartheid was proscribed, South Africa rejoined
the Commonwealth in 1994.
34 See Sunora Sagi, and Azlizan Mat Enh, ‘Polisi Buy British Last (1981–1983):
Reaksi-reaksi British dan Implikasi terhadap Hubungan Bilateral Jangka Pendek
Malaysia dan Britain (Buy British Last Policy (1981–1983): British Reactions and
Implication towards Malaysia and Britain in Short-Term Bilateral Relations)’,
Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities, 12, 3 (2017), p. 3.
35 See below.
36 William Warren, and Jill Gocher, ‘Carcosa Seri Negara’. Asia’s Legendary
Hotels: The Romance of Travel (Singapore: Periplus Editions (HK) Ltd., 2007),
p. 164
37 Sunora, and Azlizan, ‘Polisi Buy British Last (1981–1983)’, p. 8.
38 The Malaysia government repurposed it into a hotel that opened in 1989 as Car-
cosa Seri Negara. Coincidentally, but rather ironic, it served as the temporary
official residence for British monarch, Queen Elizabeth II, and her consort, Prince
Philip during the 1989 Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting that was
held in Kuala Lumpur. Warren, and Gocher, ‘Carcosa Seri Negara’, p. 164.

202  Ooi Keat Gin

7 The Philippines’ claim
over Sabah from the
Cold War perspective

Mat Zin Mat Kib

The Philippines’ claim on Sabah which began in 1963 did not end in 1991
and has in fact persisted to the post-Cold War era of today.1 It is clear that
the Cold War (1947–1990) was not confined to Europe alone but had spilled
over to Southeast Asia. Any discussion on the Cold War would inevitably in-
volve super power conflicts with the American-British democracy-capitalist
ideology against the Soviet Union’s communist-socialist ideology. In the
context of Southeast Asian nations, the existence of the Partai Komunis
Indonesia (PKI, Indonesian Communist Party) was officially sanctioned
when President Sukarno and his government did not allow for any anti-
communist sentiments to emerge,2 a policy, which according to Morgan,
‘had been seen in Indonesia where the American fear of communism had
played such an important role in forcing the Dutch to withdraw’.3

The present chapter discusses the issue of the Philippines’ claim on Sabah
since 1963 and how it impacted on Kuala Lumpur-Manila relations against
the backdrop of the regional and international political arenas. Specifically,
it focuses on the significant role of the US and the UK during the Cold War,
in particular, their influence on Manila and Kuala Lumpur respectively. The
US but also the UK, albeit to a lesser extent, were perceived as superpower
nations in the post-war bipolar world. UK-Malaysia and US-Philippines re-
lations were determinant influences in the political relations between the
two Southeast Asian nations with the support of both powers leading to the
creation of Malaysia, and therein, explaining the dissimilarities in interrela-
tions between Malaysia-Indonesia and Malaysia-Philippines. In view of the
ongoing Philippines’ claim on Sabah, it is entirely justified to discuss this
claim in the context of the post-Cold War era as well.

The Philippines’ claim on Sabah during the Cold War era

The year 1947 witnessed the dissolution of the wartime alliance between the
US and the USSR, and the beginning of what became known as the Cold
War,4 which only ended at the collapse of the latter in 1991.5 It was during
this era that both the US and the Soviet Union embarked on the dissemina-
tion and export of their political system and economy model; the former to

204  Mat Zin Mat Kib

contemporary times is still steadfast in such efforts through its democracy
promotion programmes.6 The fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 led to Russia
losing its superpower status that had been attained after the Second World
War (1939–1945).7 Discussion of the Cold War perspective would invaria-
bly involve the structure of Anglo-American and Soviet Union superpower
relations and rivalry that were closely interwoven with the arms race, the
capitalism versus socialism and security issues.8 These three issues were ex-
tensively discussed in official communications between the governments of
Malaysia and the Philippines specifically in 1962;9 security issues, in fact,
became the factor for Malaya to push for the formation of Malaysia in the
wake of the Sukarno and Macapagal conspiracy to thwart the establishment
of the new nation.10

In the context of the regional political structure, both Malaysia and the
Philippines were pro-Western with the former pro-Britain and the latter
heavily inclined towards America. In terms of international political struc-
tures, Southeast Asia was faced with the conflict that emerged due to the
misalignment in ideology between democracy spearheaded by Britain-
America and Communism pioneered by the Soviet Union; this conflict is
similarly mirrored in the mismatch between capitalist (British-American)
and socialist (Soviet Union) economic structures. This is a clear indication
that the Philippines’ claim on Sabah resulted in conflict at the regional level,
this issue involving the republic’s internal politics and as political campaign
fodder during the presidential elections. In the 1986 presidential election,
for example, President Corazon C. Aquino on 25 March 1986 launched the
‘Freedom Constitution’ relating to national boundary demarkations and
alluded to Sabah as part of the Philippines.11 In contrast, Malaysia had
never highlighted the issue of the Philippines’ claim, either in the country’s
National Constitution or in its parliamentary general elections. This claim
at both regional and domestic levels was influenced more by international
political structures that perceived actors (namely, Malaysia and the Philip-
pines) as less important because structures compel them in certain ways,
and structures (competition of ideas, marketing, and security issues), more
or less, determine actions.12 The ‘actions’, in this aspect, refer to the issues
and handling of the Philippines’ claim on Sabah.

In terms of international political structures, there are differences be-
tween Malaysia-Philippines and Indonesia; however, Malaysia and the Phil-
ippines in actuality should not be at conflict since the real enemy was the
then left-leaning state of Indonesia. The communist movement in Indonesia
that begun in 1914, subsequently led to the formation of the PKI in 1920,
with a menacing form of ideology and movement engineered by the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) that was able to create a form of indigenous-based
Communism. CCP generated and led communist groups in Singapore, Sar-
awak and Malaya, wherever its ideology was deeply entrenched, especially
among the Chinese community, and other groups. CCP also played a signif-
icant role in triggering Konfrontasi (Confrontation), and the 30 September

Philippines’ claim over Sabah  205

Movement (GESTAPU, Gerakan September Tiga Puluh).13 It was perceived
that when Indonesia became communist, the indigenous peoples of Bor-
neo, Malaya and the Philippines would be more susceptible to the ideol-
ogy and follow suit. This was proved with the establishment of the Malayan
Communist Party (MCP) in 1930.14 This in fact was what differentiated the
Malaysia-Indonesia Confrontation from the Philippines’ claim on Sabah in
the Cold War interplay: Sukarno’s Indonesia was not pro-Western, but in-
stead, more oriented towards the Soviet Union, whilst Malaysia-Philippines
were geared towards Britain-America. It was only after GESTAPU 1965
that Indonesia assumed a more pro-Western stance when General Suharto
assumed power.

Although communist groups initiated by the Soviet Union managed
to expand their influence in Indonesia, Vietnam and China, the British-
American liberal ideology in Southeast Asia still remained strong. Concern
over the involvement of Britain and America as allies in Southeast Asia
was not detrimental to Malaysia-Philippines relations, even with the Sabah
claim issue, and at the same time, did not affect British and American inter-
ests in Southeast Asia.

At the regional level, the Philippines’ claim on Sabah was in contradiction
to the Cold War power play effected at the international level. It became ap-
parent that despite the existence of such a claim, Washington was still push-
ing for cordial Malaysia-Philippines relations, and did not wish for both
countries to be dragged into Communism. US concern of the Philippines
with regard to the Sabah claim was reflected in its written correspondence
and telegram.15 It could be deduced that both the US and UK, two major
powers, were determined to prioritize international interest – democracy
and liberalism – in the two countries, viz. the Philippines and Malaysia.
Since the establishment of the Federation of Malaysia in 1963 was to con-
solidate Western power, which in this instance was American and British
democracy, the Philippines’ defiance was in effect contradictory to the sur-
vival of the Cold War at the international level.

The claim on Sabah although longitudinal was still under control and did
not lead to war either between Malaysia and the Philippines or Britain and
the US. What is perhaps notable here is that the Philippines government is
unlikely to drop its claim on Sabah since this is enshrined in Article 1 of the
Philippines Constitution in 1987:

The national territory comprises the Philippines archipelago, with all
the islands and waters embraced therein, and all other territories over
which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction, consisting of its
terrestrial, fluvial and aerial domains, including its territorial sea, the
seabed, the subsoil, the insular shelves, and other submarine areas. The
waters around, between, and connecting the islands of archipelago, re-
gardless of their breadth and dimensions, form part of the internal wa-
ters of the Philippines.16

206  Mat Zin Mat Kib

These stated areas, interpreted as ‘consisting of its terrestrial, fluvial and
aerial domains, including its territorial sea, the seabed, the subsoil, the in-
sular shelves, and other submarine areas’ in Article 1 of this Constitution
are as defined in the grant by the Sulu Sultanate of territories and lands on
Mainland Borneo dated 22 January 1878.17

Creation of the Federation of Malaysia

The formation of Malaysia on 16 September 1963 comprised Malaya,
Sabah, Sarawak and Singapore. Singapore subsequently left the Federation
in 1965 with Lee Kuan Yew signing the agreement to secede on 7 August
1965. A day later on 8 August 1965, Tunku Abdul Rahman communicated
his stand to the Alliance Executive Council, and on 9 August, the motion
was presented at Dewan Rakyat (Lower House of Parliament) and passed
two hours later at Dewan Negara (Upper House of Parliament). Since then
Sabah and Sarawak remained in the Federation of Malaysia. The existence
of Sabah (referred to as British North Borneo until 1963) in Malaysia, how-
ever, remained a contentious point with the Philippines still laying claim
on the state. Malaysia was formed to consolidate its anti-communist defi-
ance, a stand which the Philippines concurred with through its statement
of Malaya being ‘a robust anti-communist country which managed to put
down the communist rebellion in its own territory’.18 The Philippines also
agreed that Malaya-Philippines security was seriously compromised with
the advent of Communism.19 Inter-nation cooperation therefore was vital
among non-communist nations in Southeast Asia such as the Philippines
and Thailand.

On 27 May 1961 at the Foreign Correspondents Association in Singapore,
Tunku Abdul Rahman, the Prime Minister of Malaya, announced the pos-
sible formation of Malaysia comprising Malaya, Singapore, Brunei, Sar-
awak and British North Borneo.20 The announcement, issued at the Adelphi
Hotel in Singapore, reiterated that:

Malaya today as a nation realises that she cannot stand alone and in iso-
lation. Outside of international politics the national one must be broad
based. Sooner or later she should have an understanding with Britain
and the peoples of Singapore, North Borneo, Brunei and Sarawak. It is
premature for me to say how this closer understanding can be brought
about, but it is inevitable that we should look ahead to this objective and
think of a plan whereby these territories can be brought closer together in
a political and economic cooperation.21

Britain’s reaction to the Tunku’s announcement as a whole was a non-
surprise, since he had on previous occasions, voiced the wish to unite Malaya
with the colonies in Borneo under a ‘super federation’.22 It was based on this
understanding that a meeting was held on 29 March 1960 at the Colonial
Office (CO) to discuss the future of the Borneo regions, and concluded that:

Philippines’ claim over Sabah  207

There was general agreement that the territories might move towards
a closer association in varying stages. It was felt, however, that it would
be undesirable to move too quickly in encouragement of a wider Fed-
eration and for the present the best course was to encourage the closer
association of North Borneo and Sarawak and at the same time neither
encourage nor discourage a closer alignment between Brunei and the
Federation of Malaya.23

This announcement was a culmination of the wish expressed in a radio
broadcast over the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), London in
1956 whereby a special clause had been inserted in the 1957 Malayan Con-
stitution relating to the entry of new states. Tunku Abdul Rahman’s wish
was intensified after Malaya’s independence and this was officially commu-
nicated at the end of 1958 to Malcolm MacDonald, the former British High
Commissioner in Southeast Asia. The discussion between Tunku Abdul
Rahman and MacDonald indicated that the British was similarly disposed
towards the formation of a super federation involving the Borneo states with
Malaya although it was deemed necessary for Sabah, Sarawak and Bru-
nei to first nurture closer relations between themselves before forming any
cooperation with Malaya.24 Singapore, meanwhile, acquired self-governing
status in 1955, with a review of its Constitution scheduled in 1963, whereby
it might possibly obtain full independence from the British. Britain, from
the outset, was geared towards the merging of Singapore with Malaya on
the former’s independence based on the view that the island could not be
a viable independent state on its own; this direction was supported by
the political parties in Singapore at that time such as the People’s Action
Party (PAP), which once opined that, a ‘merger between Singapore and the
Federation is our immediate task to be accomplished’.25 Thus, Britain as a
democratic-capitalist major power, implemented efforts towards strength-
ening Malaya-Singapore relations although these initiatives were rejected
by Tunku Abdul Rahman due to a perceived racial imbalance.26 Tunku was
willing to accept Singapore if Britain allowed the Borneo territories to be-
come part of the super federation.27

Following this, a CO meeting held on 29 March 1960 to discuss the future
of the Borneo territories concluded that:

There was general agreement that the territories might move towards a
closer association in varying stages. It was felt, however, that it would
be undesirable to move too quickly in encouragement of a wider Fed-
eration and for the present the best course was to encourage the closer
association of North Borneo and Sarawak and at the same time neither
encourage nor discourage a closer alignment between Brunei and the
Federation of Malaya.28

The Borneo territories quandary was subsequently discussed by William
Goode, the Governer of North Borneo during his visit to the Colonial

208  Mat Zin Mat Kib

Office. This discussion gave rise to the desire to merge together Malaya,
Sabah, Sarawak, Brunei and even Singapore in the Federation. In June
1960, Tunku met with Lord Perth, Minister of State for Colonial Affairs
(1957–1962) in Harold Macmillan’s government (1957–1963), to deliberate on
the position of the Borneo states with the former emphasizing the proba-
bility of these territories falling under Indonesian rule if they were to gain
independence from Britain and his willingness to face any possible issues
that might emerge from the merger initiative.29

Further discussions on Malaysia were held by British officials during a
conference in Kuching on 20 October 1960. Through this unofficial discus-
sion was borne a ‘Grand Design’, seen as a long-term plan for the political
future of the region.30 Nevertheless, Britain at the same time, emphasized
the strengthening of relations between the Borneo states, as had been its
initial aim. The meeting also resolved that any political and economic plan
that might be detrimental to the Grand Design was to be prevented, and this
decision was accepted by the CO.31 In the meantime, Britain’s effort to push
the Tunku to accept Singapore was still unsuccessful, since he, even until
April 1961, remained resolute on his principle regarding the racial imbal-
ance issue. On 18 April 1961, for instance, he put forward his refusal of Sin-
gapore on the basis that ‘the silk of the Chinese in Singapore was incapable
of adopting a truly Malayan viewpoint and therefore of being assimilated
safely into the Federation’.32

Tunku’s stance, however, showed signs of change towards the end of April
1961 following his meeting with Singapore Chief Minister Lee Kuan Yew in
Kuala Lumpur on the 23rd of that month. This shift in stance was linked
to his concerns on the security risks that would confront Malaya should
Singapore gain its independence, with the state at that material time under
leftist threat.33

Tunku suggested this since it would not only end British rule in Borneo
but also to avoid the two colonies from being claimed by other countries
such as the Philippines and Indonesia.34 Tunku’s declaration, however, met
with various reactions. Duncan Sandy, Secretary for Commonwealth Rela-
tions (1960–1964), was the first principal official to extend his views when he
proposed that Britain would adopt a more cautious approach with regards
to the position of the people of Borneo with Tunku’s views requiring deeper
thought and deliberation.35 On 26 June 1961, Tunku sent a memorandum
to the British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan (1957–1963) regarding the
Malaysia concept that specifically involved Brunei and Malaya relations.
In this memorandum, Tunku implored the British government to give due
consideration to the Malaysia idea and demanded the merger between Ma-
laya and Borneo prior to accepting Singapore.36 Tunku, inter alia, voiced
his concern of the rapid dissemination of communist influence in Asia and
Southeast Asia with the success of the communist movement in Laos as an
example.37

Philippines’ claim over Sabah  209

Tunku had in 1958 declared to the Malayan Parliament that Malaysia’s
external policy was one of non-neutrality towards the East-West conflict
that was proclaimed as:

There is no question whatsoever of our adopting a neutral policy while
Malaya is at war with the Communists. Only when we are certain that
people here have become truly Malayan-minded and have set their
minds on making Malaya their only home can the government declare
our policy of neutrality. So long as this fight continues, I consider that
we would be breaking faith with the people if this government were
to enter into any form of diplomatic relationship with the communist
countries … let me tell you that there are no such things as local com-
munists. Communism is an international organization which aims for
world domination, not by aggression if they can avoid it, but by the
use of tactics and methods among the sons of the country to overthrow
democracy and set up in its place a government after the pattern of all
communist countries.38

From another perspective, the British government in its reply cautioned
Tunku against haste in pushing through the Malaysia concept, since issues
related to defence and the position of the Borneo territories necessitated de-
tailed deliberation.39 Britain adopted this stance to prevent any accusation
of involvement in promoting the Malaysia idea as a means of consolidating
its defence position in the region, and also to allay concerns that it might be
seen as deciding the future of Borneo without taking into consideration the
views of the people in the state.40 Tunku Abdul Rahman, not satisfied with
the views expressed by Harold Macmillan, reminded the British govern-
ment that it would be unforgivable if Singapore in future were to be domi-
nated by the Chinese who might possibly be dominant in both regions at the
same time.41 In a letter to Harold Macmillan dated 11 August 1961, Tunku
demanded for negotiations to be held in London to discuss the notion of the
Grand Design.42

The Indonesian government up to August 1962 has yet to display any
public sign of opposition towards the Malaysia idea due to the reasons
stated earlier. However, opposition to this suggestion began emerging
at the end of 1961, brought about by political parties in that country.
Partai Indonesia (PARTINDO, Indonesia Party), for instance, viewed the
Malaysia idea as one initiated by Britain with Tunku Abdul Rahman as
a tool for achieving their aim.43 Through their official newspaper Bintang
Timor, they accused the British of using the formation of Malaysia as
a means of consolidating their military presence in Southeast Asia and
paving the way for Britain to control the natural resources of Brunei,
Sabah and Sarawak through Malaysia which they perceived as a form of
neocolonialism.44

210  Mat Zin Mat Kib

Tunku’s announcement on the Malaysia proposal was met with violent
opposition from PKI. This opposition was made official in a declaration
issued during the party’s Assembly on 30–31 December 1961.45 As with
PARTINDO, PKI claimed that the formation of Malaysia was no more than
a British front to protect and consolidate their interests in the region, while
at the same time, intended to prevent North Borneo, Sarawak, Singapore
and Brunei from seeking independence:

By establishing this Federation [of Malaysia], the British Colonies
[sic., Colonials] intend to utilise native hands, particularly those of the
Prime Minister of this Federation of Malaysia[,] to suppress the dem-
ocratic and patriotic movements of the people in these five countries
[Malaya, Singapore, Sarawak, North Borneo, and Brunei] which aim
at the attainment of genuine national independence and freedom from
imperialism.46

Although these parties had begun disseminating anti-Malaysia Federation
sentiments, the Indonesian government has yet to voice any negative reac-
tion due to their pursuit of the West Irian issue.47 Among the aspects that
had provoked Indonesian resistance was the action of Malaya and Britain
in issuing a joint declaration to promote the concept of the Anglo-Malayan
Defence Agreement (AMDA) on 23 November 1961. It sanctioned Britain
to utilize the military base in Singapore for the purpose of the Southeast
Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) through the agreement of Malaysia.
Indonesia, which from the beginning, had opposed SEATO, did not issue
any comment due to its concern of losing the support of the US in the han-
dling of the West Irian issue and, also, because Washington was the founder
of SEATO.48

Besides Indonesia, the Tunku’s announcement and suggestion also became
issues of contention with the heirs of the Sulu Sultanate and the Republic
of the Philippines.49 Both parties supported the US, which along with Brit-
ain, embraced democratic-capitalist leanings that were contradictory to
the communist-socialist principles of the Soviet Union. In this connection,
Malaysia and the Philippines subscribed to democratic-capitalist over-
views, each under the ambit of British-American superpowers opposed to
the Soviet Union.

However, towards the end of 1961, an agreement was reached between
British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan, and the Tunku, that subse-
quently led to the signing of the assent to form Malaysia by the latter in
August 1963.50 Filipino leaders were unhappy with the idea of a Malaysian
federation; President Diosdado Macapagal, for instance, in his address to
the Philippines Congress on 28 January 1963, stated that the efforts to merge
North Borneo together with Brunei and Sarawak under Malaya, had led to
revolt in Brunei (1962), and possibly in Indonesia too, with its leanings to-
wards the Soviet Union and pro communist-socialist outlook. It was based

Philippines’ claim over Sabah  211

on this stance inter alia that Indonesia objected to the Malaya authority over
Sarawak, Brunei and North Borneo. Moreover, the Malaysia concept was
perceived as incongruent to the principles of self-determination and more
akin to a form of colonialism perpetuating a false sense of security.51

From his speeches, Macapagal, who had been involved in the negotiations
to reclaim the Turtle islands in 1946–1947, and was responsible for the sub-
mission of Resolution 1950, made the Borneo issue his presidential election
campaign material. During his campaign rounds, Macapagal pledged that
he would work towards reclaiming North Borneo from the British. When he
won the election,52 Macapagal was bound by this promise, and as such, put
forward the Philippines’ claim on North Borneo, as reported by J. A Pilcher
in a letter to F. A. Warner:

[T]here have been signs that the Filipino politicians have begun to use
the North Borneo dispute, as they eventually use everything as ammu-
nition in their ceaseless game of their internal ‘politicking’. Most of the
press coverage has been devoted to this and in particular to the Marcos/
Pelaez ‘feud’53 (and) … there have been at least begun to be serious signs
that the Borneo question has now become ammunition for purely inter-
nal political squabbles and this stage has been marked by cartoon in
The Philippines Herald of October 8.54

The Philippines Congress, which convened on 30 April 1962, reiterated their
commitment to pursue the Sabah claim by endorsing fully a resolution to
urge their President to initiate consistent actions through procedure and
international law to reclaim specific regions of Borneo and its neighbouring
islands55 and to ensure the Republic retain its legal rights when pushing for-
ward its demand.56 It was in this scenario that the situation became compli-
cated57 and unreasonable58 and began to verge on the ridiculous especially
when the Philippines Foreign Affairs Department produced a claim against
the British for merging 29,500 square miles of North Borneo into its terri-
tory in 194759 at the height of the Cold War era. Britain, however, treated
this claim as an ‘on-off’ distraction initiated in recent years with the British
in possession of evidence to deny the Philippines demand. This effort was
viewed by the British as more of an attempt to force the UK to make a lump
sum payment.60

Genesis of the Philippines’ claim on Sabah

The Philippines’ claim on Sabah emerged from the dispute over the allo-
cation of territory lease by the Brunei monarch, Sultan Abdul Mu’min ibn
Al-Marhum Seri Paduka Maulana Abdul Wahab (1852–1885) to Baron Gus-
tavus von Overbeck and Alfred Dent which was sealed on 29 December 1877
with the two individuals representing the Overbeck and Dent Association.61
On this date, Sultan Abdul Mu’min signed three letters granting Overbeck

212  Mat Zin Mat Kib

and Dent lease over three separate areas.62 Annual lease payments at differ-
ent rates were to be made for these three areas – Straits S$4,000.00 (Grant
by Sultan of Brunei of Territory Comprising Gaya Bay and Sepanggar),
S$2,000.00 (Grant by Sultan of Brunei of Territories from Paitan to Sibuku
River), and S$6,000.00 (Grant by Sultan of Brunei of Territories from Sula-
man River to River Paitan) – the amount differences based on area and total
income generated from the respective leases.

Although the lease payments differed according to area, Sultan Abdul
Mu’min fixed a common condition for Overbeck and Dent:

[F]rom this date been granted to said Baron de Overbeck and Alfred
Dent Esquire their heirs, associates, successors, and representatives
holding this grant, to pay every year for so long as they desire to use these
territories and islands provided however that if for three years they do
not pay the quit-rent of this grant, this agreement shall be void and His
Highness may resume all the above mentioned territories and islands.63

The first letter of agreement pertained to an area starting from Tanjung
Gaya to Tanjung Lutut, Pulau Gaya, Pulau Sepanggar including the small
islands located within nine miles from the coast; this included the coastal
areas of Papar (then referred as Papar state) to Benoni (known then as
Benoni state).64

These historical letters began when Seri Paduka Maulana al-Sultan
Muhammad Jẻmal al-Aazam ibn al-marhum Seri Paduka Muhammad
Fadzalun (1862–1881) together with his dignitaries governing the Solok (Sulu)
territories declared that he had leased out the Brunei East Coast region from
the Pandasan River. This included the shore areas along Sungai Sibuko, the
Paitan coast, Sugut, Bogaya, Labuk, Sandakan, Kinabatangan, Memiang
and its surrounding areas, and from the Teluk Darvel coast to the islands off
Sungai Sibuko.65 This lease was to be ‘for ever and in perpetuity’ and as long
as there were the moon and the sun.66 The term ‘lease’ here also included a
clause which stated that ‘whereby the cession moneys should be augmented
accordingly as the profit of the British North Borneo Company increased’.67
This would be further supplemented by three requests by Seri Paduka Sultan
Mohammed Jamelluel Kiram, the Sultan of Sulu, to the British government:
(1) for additional income, (2) for a piece of land for farming purposes, and (3)
for the construction of a palace.68 Based on this evidence, the Sulu Sultanate
had effectively lost its rights to the territories it had ceded to the British.

The handing over of territories which included Gaya Bay and Sepanggar69
and the Brunei regions from Paitan to Sungai Sibuku70 and from Sungai
Sulaman to Sungai Paitan71 by the Sultan of Brunei was effected on 29
December 1877. This act would have a major impact on the external relations
between the Malaysia-Philippines governments, and between Malaysia and
the heirs of the Sulu Sultanate to the present day.

From the perspective of the Philippines government, the claim on Sabah
is with basis, and therefore merits due consideration by all parties, since it

Philippines’ claim over Sabah  213

involves three major interests that impinge on the existence and well-being
of any state or nation. These interests are summarized as: constitutional
rights, national security and expansion and freedom of geographical area in
which it is located.72

The Philippines officially laid claim on North Borneo on 22 June 1962
through a statement made by Diosdado Macapagal, its ninth President. On
this date, Salvador Lopez the Philippines Under-Secretary for Foreign Af-
fairs, submitted a note to the British Embassy to discuss either in Manila or
London, issues of law and sovereignty pertaining to the dispute over North
Borneo.73 This request, ignored by the latter, subsequently reached the at-
tention of Whitehall on 8 August 1962.74

Nevertheless, the suceeding Philippines presidents after Macapagal
focused on putting aside the country’s claim on Sabah. In 1973, Presi-
dent Marcos requested the 1970 Constitution Convention to re-define the
interpretation pertaining to the country’s borders; this resulted in Filipino
borders as enshrined in Constitution 1973 being defined as those based on
historical rights or legal titles. During the Second Association of South-
east Asian Nations (ASEAN) Summit in Kuala Lumpur in August 1977,
the Philippines government attempted to push aside the Sabah claim by
reiterating that ‘as a contribution, therefore, I say in earnest to the future
ASEAN, I wish to announce that the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines is therefore taking definite steps to eliminate one of the burdens
of ASEAN  – the claim of the Philippine Republic to Sabah’;75 there was,
however, no official action taken to realise this statement. When Corazon C.
Aquino became Philippines president in 1986, she entrusted the Philippines
Congress in November 1987 with the task of officially removing any con-
firmation of the Sabah claim. Thus, 1987 Constitution no longer included
Sabah in the definition of the borders of the Philippines.76

This claim, according to information from Paul S. Manglapus,77 was also
related to the arrival of many Filipino workers in Sabah to assist the Philip-
pines government assume once more the disputed territory;78 as such, these
arrivals were part of the Philippines government plans on Sabah.

The Philippines’ claim on Sabah issue: effects of Kuala
Lumpur–Manila relations on regional and international
political landscape

From the time it was ceded until the present, Sabah has been pursued, not
only by the heirs of the Sulu Sultanate, but also the Philippines’ claiming
their rights over the state, despite the aide memoire issued by the British
government on 24 May 1962 reaffirming once again, their full confidence on
their sovereign claim over North Borneo. This was conveyed in the follow-
ing statement:

Her Majesty’s Government is convinced that the British Crown is enti-
tled to and enjoy sovereignty over North Borneo and that no valid claim

214  Mat Zin Mat Kib

to such sovereignty could lie from any quarter, whether by inheritance
of the rights of the Sultan of Sulu (the only right of his heirs to continue
of the cession money) or by virtue of former Spanish and American
sovereignty over the Sulu Archipelago in the Philippine Islands. In the
interest of the people of British North Borneo, no less than because
of their undoubted resistance of any claim to parts of North Borneo,
whether advanced by the Philippines Government or by private persons
in the Philippines.79

The Philippines government reaction to the special British rights over North
Borneo was that the conflict over the state could lead to undesirable out-
comes in Malaya and Borneo. The conflict could also be detrimental to
the cordial relations between the Philippines and Britain and might lead to
regional claims by other Southeast Asian nations which would then com-
promise the fight against communist insurgency and subversive elements.
The Philippines government passed a resolution urging for the speedy set-
tlement of the North Borneo claim.80

On the part of the Philippines, Diosdado Macapagal, who possessed es-
pecial interest in international affairs, led the government as its ninth Pres-
ident, from 30 December 1961 to 30 December 1965, stated with sarcasm
that freedom was the birth right of every man while the right to a nation was
freedom which did not requite the grant or acknowledgement of others and
was instead endowed by God to the individual.81

The Philippines resolve to dispute the five historical documents pertain-
ing to the Sabah claim – three grants pertaining to the granting of the Sulu
Sultanate regions on 29 December 1877 and supported by the Grant by
the Sultan of Sulu of Territories and Lands on the Mainlands of the Island
of Borneo82 and Commission from the Sultan of Sulu appointing Baron
­Gustavus von Overbeck, Dato’ Bendahara and Rajah of Sandakan,83 with
the last, two documents issued by Seri Paduka Maulana as-Sultan Muham-
mad Jamaluladzam ibn Seri al-Marhum as-Sultan Muhammad Fadzalun
Sultan – was based on the view that these grants had paved the way to the
inclusion of North Borneo (now Sabah) into the newly formed Malaysia
along with Sarawak (and Singapore, and Brunei, initially),84 an act deemed
by the Philippines government as not in accordance with the principle of
self-determination.85

These two important events which occurred on 22 January 1878 with the
seal for both witnessed and signed by W. H. Treacher, the Acting British
Consul General in Borneo, were subsequent to the three grants made on
29 December 1877. This effectively consolidated the status of Sabah within
Malaysia.

What happened, that became a major issue in the Philippines’ claim on
Sabah in the 1900s was, whether the handing over of areas effected through
the Grant of Gaya Bay and Sepanggar by the Sultan of Brunei on 29 De-
cember 1877, the grant by the Sultan on 29 December 1877 involving the

Philippines’ claim over Sabah  215

territories from Paitan to Sibuku River and the grant for the regions from
Sulaman River to Paitan River, the grant by the Sultan of Sulu of Territories
and Lands on the Mainlands of the Island of Borneo on 22 January 1878,
and the appointment of Baron Gustavus von Overbeck by the Sultan of Sulu
as Dato’ Bendahara and Rajah of Sandakan on 22 January 1878, were con-
sidered whether as lease, rent, or cession.

Salvador Lopez, the Acting Under Secretary for Philippines Foreign
Affairs, in an interview on the North Borneo issue, with a Philippines tele-
vision station on 3 October 1962, reiterated the government rights over the
sovereignty of the Sulu Sultanate since the 1878 ‘agreement’ between the
Sultan with Dent and Overbeck was for the transaction as a lease, and not,
a handover.86 The US$1,600 amount paid to the Sultan of Sulu was a matter
of amusement since this figure was very small,87 considering that the regions
in the ‘agreement’ were rich with resources with an estimated annual export
value of US$27 million.88 Lopez also challenged the British government to
transfer its assets to a third party and queried why this wealth was moved to
Malaya located 1,000 miles away and not retained for the owners or heirs of
the Sulu Sultanate.89

It became apparent that Lopez did not properly scrutinise the documents
issued on 29 December 1877 and 22 January 1988 whereby, the terms ‘grant’
and ‘commission’ were indicated, and not the ‘agreement’ as put forward
by him. The documents had, in fact, mentioned ‘lease’ but this term did not
stand in isolation. In all four documents – Grant of Gaya Bay and Sepang-
gar Bay territories by the Sultan of Brunei on 29 December 1877, grant by
the Sultan on 29 December 1877 involving territories from Paitan to Sibuku
River, grant for the regions from Sulaman River to Paitan River, and grant
by the Sulu Sultanate of territories and lands on Mainland Borneo Island on
22 January 1878 – the definition of ‘lease’ was clearly stated:

[W]ith the consent of all the Datos in council assembled have been
pleased to grant of our own will and pleasure to Gustavus Baron de
Overbeck residing in Hongkong and Alfred Dent Esquire residing in
London, as representatives of a British Company, together with their
heirs, associates, successors and representatives for ever all the rights
and powers belonging to us over all the territories and lands which are
tributary to us.

From the excerpt above, it is clearly stated that the Sultan of Sulu, on behalf
of his heirs and successors, was resigned to leasing these regions in perpetuity.
In this instance then, the issue of questions regarding the lease did not arise
as stated by Lopez, who perceived this action as a common practice and
could be redeemed once it matured. This, however, was not the case for this
particular lease.90

Lopez also challenged the validity of the British transferring the terri-
tories to Malaya as stated in the excerpt whereby Overbeck and Dent as