Imagining Ethnic Communities: Resource Conflicts and Development in Thailand

IMAGINING
ETHNIC
COMMUNITIES:

Resource Conflicts and Development in Thailand

Chayan Vaddhanaphuti
Malee Sitthikriengkrai
Charlotte Trenk-Hinterberger

Center for Ethnic Studies and Development (CESD)
Faculty of Social Sciences, Chiang Mai University



Imagining Ethnic Communities:

Resource Conflicts and
Development in Thailand

Chayan Vaddhanaphuti
Malee Sitthikriengkrai

Charlotte Trenk-Hinterberger

Center for Ethnic Studies and Development (CESD)
Faculty of Social Sciences, Chiang Mai University

Imagining Ethnic Communities:
Resource Conflicts and Development in Thailand

Chayan Vaddhanaphuti
Malee Sitthikriengkrai
Charlotte Trenk-Hinterberger

National Library of Thailand Cataloging in Publication Data
Chayan Vaddhanaphuti.

Imagining ethnic communities: resource conflicts and development in Thailand.-- Chiang
Mai : Center for Ethnic Studies and Development (CESD), Faculty of Social Sciences, Chiang
Mai University, 2022.
216 p.

1. Ethnic groups--Thailand. I. Malee Sitthikriengkrai, jt.auth. II. CharlotteTrenk-Hinterberger,
jt.auth. III. Title.

305.8
ISBN 978-616-398-658-0

© Center for Ethnic Studies and Development (CESD), Faculty of Social Sciences, Chiang Mai University

No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form without written permission from the
author.

Editor: Colin Roth
Cover Photo: CESD
Design and Layout: Wanida Press

Published in 2022 by:
Center for Ethnic Studies and Development (CESD),
Faculty of Social Sciences, Chiang Mai University
239 Huay Kaew Road, Suthep Sub-District, Muang District,
Chiang Mai, Thailand 50200

Telephone: 66 (0) 5394 3599
Fax: 66 (0) 5394 3599
Email: [email protected]
Website: www.cesd.soc.cmu.ac.th

iii

Foreword

Many ethnic communities in Thailand face conflicts over the land and
resources on which they depend for their lives and livelihoods. Even though
the nature of these conflicts greatly varies from one group to another, in
most cases it is Thai conservation law that restricts villagers’ ability to utilize
resources, criminalizes traditional agricultural practices, and neglects
traditional worldviews, customary practices, and in-depth knowledge of
natural resource management, which are not valued by the authorities and
the wider public.

In our 24-months study, generously funded by the German Gerda Henkel
Foundation, we decided to take an in-depth look at three communities that
are all facing disputes involving their access to land, forest and water due to
development, conservation policies, state power and control, growing
market integration and modernization processes: a Karen community in the
north of the country, a Dara-ang village at the Thai-Myanmar border, and a
settlement of Moken and Urak Lawoi’ in Southern Thailand. All three
communities have engaged in some form of negotiation with the authorities
and developed strategies to deal with the issues that threaten their traditional
way of life and livelihood security. But the extent of their marginalization
and the contestation of their environment, their access to various forms of
capital and their pace of development, significantly differ. Even though we
were aware that it is not feasible to directly compare communities located in
quite diverse socio-ecological and developmental contexts, we wanted to
gain a broad and systematic picture of the three communities that face
different boundaries, and, at the same time, differ substantially in their
ability to cope with development pressure and changing socio-economic
landscapes.

iv

We have developed close relationships over the past two decades with the
Karen villagers of Huay Hin Lad Nai, Chiang Rai Province, regularly
organizing study trips and seminars on relevant issues, and jointly
documenting their rich knowledge of the ecosystem. We chose this
community because the villagers manage to maintain a high degree of self-
determination and relative local autonomy in their use of land and forest
resources, despite the boundaries of state forest law, development impacts
and market forces.

We then included Nor Lae village, a Dara-ang community on the Thai-
Burmese border, squeezed between contract farming arrangements,
protected areas, citizenship regulations, and military control. We were
particularly curious as to how the villagers struggle for their rights not only
locally, but also cross-border in their negotiations with the Thai and Burmese
authorities.

The Moken/Urak Lawoi’ community in Rawai, Phuket, is facing rapid
development of tourism, urbanization and modernization, conservation
laws and degrading natural resources, and most importantly numerous land
conflicts which are adversely affecting all aspects of their community life.

In order to shed light on the different situations experienced by ethnic
communities in Thailand, and their struggles and strategies to negotiate for
their rights and concerns, we chose a participatory research approach that
recognizes the traditional ways of life and knowledge of the villagers. Rather
than just obtaining information from the local informants to develop an
academic theory, we tried to critically engage with the community, to enable
the villagers to present their own stories and versions of social reality. Our
research assistants collected data in each study site for several months
running, hoping that the systematic collection of information could support
the villagers in defending their way of life against prevailing prejudices and
misconceptions and bring about changes to them from within, towards
reduced inequality and injustice.

Once we finalized our study, we faced limitation in the use of the knowledge
that we had co-produced with the villagers. As our research shows, many of
the obstacles and boundaries faced by the communities are entrenched in
structural discriminations, policies, laws and regulations that support a path
of development which leads to the systematic political, social and economic
exclusion of ethnic communities and the marginalization of their cultures
and knowledge. To bring about far-reaching changes, root causes of the
conflicts faced by communities need to be addressed, requiring political will

v

to prioritize the rights of ethnic communities, structural and legal reforms
and public education to improve the acceptance of ethnic minorities and
their traditional way of life in Thailand. It soon became clear that complex
and deep-rooted structural inequalities and the concentration of political
and economic power that continue to limit the equal participation of ethnic
communities cannot be tackled or remedied by a single research study.

However, through our study, we are able to highlight how ethnic communities
are actively engaging in defending themselves, their land and natural
resources against external threats, trying their best to create space for
themselves within the boundaries they face. With our report, we hope to
promote understanding among the public that ethnic communities in
Thailand are not a homogenous group or passive victims, but diverse people
with agency and voices and with their own dreams and aspirations. We are
hopeful that, through the dissemination of our findings, we enhance the
visibility of local communities and foster general understanding, acceptance
and respect for their diversity. We trust that through creating greater
awareness and sensitivity for their issues and concerns, we are able to make
a contribution towards a betterment of their situation and to encourage
people to work towards change and sustainable solutions for these unique
communities in Thailand.

Chayan Vaddhanaphuti, PhD

vi

Abbreviations

AIPP: Asia Indigenous Peoples Pact
CLT: Community Land Titling
CSO: Civil Society Organisation
DSI: Department of Special Investigations (Ministry of Justice)
FDA: Food and Drugs Administration
FPP: Forest People Programme
IFAD: International Fund for Agricultural Development (UN)
IKAP: Indigenous Knowledge and Peoples Network
IMPECT: Inter Mountain People Education and Culture in Thailand
Association
INGO: International Non-Government Organisation
ISOC: Internal Security Operations Command
IMONRE: Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment
IWGIA: International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs
NCPO: National Council for Peace and Order
NGO: Non-Government Organisation
PAS: Protected Area Systems
PBS: Public Broadcasting Service
THB Thai Baht (Thailand currency)
UNESCO: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

vii

Glossary

Battue fishing:
A practice where the fish are driven into large nets spanned between
two boats. Classified as detrimental to coral reefs.

Community Land Title:
Thai law on the issuing of community land title deeds allows
communities to collectively manage and use state-owned land for
their living. The state still retains its claim to ownership of the land.
The law requires that a community has to periodically renew their
land title deeds with the respective government agencies that
formally own the land.

Khruba:
(literally “venerable teacher”): monks who have a reputation for
magical powers, and usually many followers.

Khun Sa:
A Shan drug lord, with a private army allegedly fighting for
the independence of Shan State. Dubbed the “Opium King” in
Myanmar due to his massive opium smuggling operations in the
Golden Triangle, where he was the dominant opium warlord for
approximately 1976-1996.

Rai Mun Wian:
Karen rotational farming system.

Social capital:
The sum of resources, actual or virtual, that accrue to an individual
or group via a durable network of more or less institutionalized
relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition.

viii

Tatmadaw:
Burmese military

Tee Ha Gin:
“place to find food”, an uncultivated forest area where people may
look for food.

Tee Tam Gin:
“place to make food”, an area where food is cultivated.

Wa:
An ethnic group that lives mainly in the northern part of Shan State in
Myanmar. The United Wa State Army is one largest of Burma’s ethnic
armed organizations.

Yuan Buddhism:
Yuan Buddhism is a particular variant of Theravada Buddhism that
prevails among the Tai-speaking people of the upper Mekong region.
A salient feature of Yuan Buddhism is belief in ‘holy men’, initiated by
the venerable monk Khruba Siwichai. Yuan Buddhism condemns the
modern state for its failure to uphold Buddhist morality, resists state
control and fosters visions of utopian Buddhist realms.

ix

Acknowledgements

We would like to thank everyone who has contributed to this study and the
production of this research report. First and foremost, the CESD team
would like to express its deep gratitude to the communities of Huay Hin Lad
Nai, Nor Lae and Rawai for their collaboration and assistance. This study
would not have been possible without the valuable and generous support of
the villagers. Their willingness to share their knowledge and experiences
with the team and their kind hospitality are much appreciated.

We would also like to thank all other key informants who participated in
this study and sacrificed their time to give us interesting information and
insights. We are thankful to our research assistants - Penpit Changakrum,
Orraya Chawnan and Thanyaporn Khunrat - who spent many days and
weeks in the field, collecting data and sharing the everyday life of the
villagers. Special thanks go to Charlotte Trenk-Hinterberger for her
tremendous efforts in liaising with the Gerda-Henkel Foundation, preparing,
coordinating and translating the report.

The team would like to offer special gratitude to the Gerda-Henkel
Foundation for their generosity, goodwill and patience in supporting this
project.

x

Abstract

Thailand is home to a wide variety of ethnic groups living in different parts
of the country. In recent decades, many of these groups have experienced
profound changes in their traditional cultures and sustainable livelihood
activities due to increased state control of land and repressive conservation
laws, alongside growing integration into the global market economy.
Over decades, Thai policies towards these ethnic minorities have been
shaped by widespread misrepresentations of them as threats to national
security and the environment. Aiming to secure control and to integrate
them into the state system, these policies have frequently led to their social,
cultural, and political exclusion, often in the name of national interests and
development.
The state has made considerable efforts to exercise control over land and
natural resources through the designation of protected areas, such as
National Parks, Marine National Parks, and Forest Reserves, which greatly
restrict communities’ ability to utilize resources, threatening their local
production, forest management and sustainable livelihood systems, and
their food security. Government policies aiming to promote economic
development of marginalized communities have led in some cases to a
change from their traditional agricultural practices to permanent mono-
cropping and the loss of their subsistence way of life.
Progress towards the legal recognition of community rights has been
accompanied by an expansion of civil society organizations (CSOs) and
movements. Some local communities have adopted flexible and creative
approaches to cope with development challenges and socio-economically
uncertain environments; others have entered into negotiations with the state
to claim their interests and rights.

xi

This study has explored the strategies of adaptation and negotiation of three
ethnic communities in different parts of Thailand: a Karen community in
Northern Thailand, a Dara-ang/Palaung community on the Thai-Myanmar
border, and a Chao Ley (Moken and Ural Lawoi) community in Southern
Thailand.

All three communities, to a greater or lesser degree, and with varying
success, have been attempting to find ways to cope with the constraints and
restrictions they face due to their changing socio-economic and political
environment.

The Karen villagers in Huay Hin Lad Nai enjoy a relatively high degree of
local autonomy in the use of land and forest resources. They were able to
mobilize social networks and social and cultural capital to demonstrate to
the authorities and the wider public that their lifestyle in the forest is
sustainable and not harmful to the environment. They have been able to
maintain their traditional shifting cultivation practices as a sustainable way
to achieve food security for their community, and to negotiate their rights as
“people co-existing with the forest”.

The Dara-ang in Nor Lae on the other hand are greatly restricted in their
use of land and natural resources. They are new migrants to the country,
allowed to stay by King Rama IX, but without citizenship. Most of them face
debts and economic hardship due to unfavorable contract farming
arrangements with the nearby agricultural cooperative. A number of Dara-
ang have been trying, with limited success, to develop strategies to secure
their basic needs and to bring more stability into their lives. They seek to
achieve acceptance through adherence to the three “pillars” of “Thainess”:
– the nation, the religion (Buddhism), and the monarchy.

The Chao Ley community in Rawai, Phuket, faces pressure from urbanization
and modernization, and a tourist boom providing new economic
opportunities but putting their living space at risk from land grabbers.
Degraded and increasingly restricted natural resources make their former
self-sufficient subsistence lifestyle more and more difficult: an alienated and
demoralized community pre-occupied with lengthy and cost-intensive land
dispute litigation, leaving little room to address other community problems.

Research in the three study sites illustrates how all three are spaces of
struggle and negotiation, with people trying to arrive at something they
aspire to and strive for, their “imagining community” (Tanabe, 2008).
Through their everyday struggles, the villagers are attempting to contest the
effects of state policy, development, and outside power, and to protect their
rights to land, livelihood, and natural resources.

xii

Table of Contents

Foreword iii
Abbreviations vi
Glossary vii
Acknowledgements ix
Abstract x

1. Background and Research Context: 1
Ethnic Groups in Thailand 2
1.1 Northern (and Western) Thailand
1.1.1 Ethnic Groups in the Context of State Conservation Policies 2
and Programmes 7
1.1.2 Highlanders in Today’s Thailand
1.1.3 Northern Ethnic Groups and the State: Construction of the 9
“Hilltribe” Problem 11
1.2 Southern Thailand 11
1.2.1 The Chao Ley and State Conservation Efforts 12
1.2.2 Ethnic “Sea Nomads” in Thailand’s Socio-political Landscape
1.3 Creating “Within-State Space”: Towards Community Forestry and 13
Community Rights 16
1.4 Imagining Communities
1.5 Ethnic Groups under Study: The Karen, Dara-ang and 18
Moken/Urak Lawoi’

xiii

1.5.1 The Karen 18
1.5.2 The Dara-ang/Palaung 20
1.5.3 The Moken/Urak Lawoi’ 23

2. Research Objectives and Questions 29

3. Methodology: An Ethnographic Approach to 31
Negotiating Development

4. Findings and Discussion: Creating “Within-State” Space: 35
Imagining Communities amidst the Confines of the State

4.1 Huay Hin Lad Nai 36

A. Geographical/Ecological Context and Community History 36

B. Economic Livelihood Activities in the Study Site 59

C. Adaptive Strategies and Responses to Development Challenges 73

D. Negotiation Strategies with State Actors 82

4.2 Nor Lae 88

A. Geographical/Ecological Context and Community History 88

B. Economic Livelihood Activities in the Study Site 111

C. Adaptive Strategies and Responses to Development Challenges 115

D. Negotiation Strategies with State Actors 119

4.3 Rawai 127

A. Geographical/Ecological Context and Community History 127

B. Economic Livelihood Activities in the Study Site 150

C. Adaptive Strategies and Responses to Development Challenges 155

D. Negotiation Strategies with State Actors 159

5. Summary and Conclusion 167

6. Recommendations 177

7. Bibliography 185

8. Index 197

xiv

List of Figures and Tables

Figure 1: Loaction of the Huay Hin Lad Nai community 37
Figure 2:
Figure 3: Land Use Classification in the Huay Hin Lad Nai Community 60
Figure 4:
Figure 5: The Hin Lad Nai Shifting Cultivation Circle 64
Figure 6:
Forest products in the Huay Hin Lad Nai community in different
Figure 7:
Figure 8: seasons (number of different varieties in parentheses) 67

Figure 9: Location of Nor Lae village 89
Table 1:
Table 2: Nor Lae and its surroundings. This map is based on 91
Table 3: a survey by the Mae Phoe Watershed Management Unit,
Table 4: Department of National Parks, 2019.

Rawai is located in the South of Phuket Island, 129
in the Andaman Sea, Southern Thailand

The Rawai Community and its 4 sub-villages: 130
red: “West village”; yellow: “Middle village”;
blue: “East village”, green: “Upper village”

A picture of the King’s visit in Rawai at the entrance 137
of the community

Different kinds of plants, vegetables and herbs found 66
in the shifting cultivation farm in 2018

Overall picture of the forest economy 70

Summary of the main occupations in the Rawai Community

(2017-2018) 150

Income for men and women in different occupations 151
in 2017-2018

1

BACKGROUND AND RESEARCH CONTEXT:
ETHNIC GROUPS IN THAILAND

Thailand is home to a wide variety of different ethnic and indigenous
groups1, each with its own history, language, customs, belief systems, and
patterns of livelihood (Bradley, 1986; Chaturabhand, 1988; Tribal Research
Institute, 1995). These groups live mainly in three geographical regions:
various highland peoples in the north and north-west; a number of groups
on the Korat plateau of the north-east and east; and small indigenous fisher
and hunter-gatherer communities on the Andaman Sea and coastal regions
along the western shores of southern Thailand (IWGIA, 2015, p. 279).
Only nine ethnic groups have been officially recognized by the government
as “hill tribes” (in Thai: ‘Chao Kao’, ‘hill/mountain people’, or ‘highlanders’2)
and granted a legal status, albeit often not fully perceived as Thai citizens:
the Karen (Sgaw and Pwo), Hmong/Miao, Mien/Yao, Lahu, Lisu, Akha,
Lawa/Lua’, Htin/T’in and Khamu/Khmu (Buergin, 2000, p. 5; Bradley, 1986;
Kunstadter, 1983; Pholsena, 2015, p. 4). Their total population was estimated

1. The term “indigenous peoples” has been rejected by the government of Thailand
(Kesmanee & Trakansuphakorn, 2005, p. 6). Nevertheless, a number of ethnic groups
in the highlands as well as the Chao Ley (people of the sea) are widely recognized as
Thailand’s indigenous peoples (Luithui & Lasminbang, 2007, p. 239).

2. Because of its association with negative stereotypes, activists in Thailand refuse to use
the term “Chao Kao” or its direct translation as “hilltribes”. Terms that are considered
more appropriate are “chon pao phuen mueang” or “hill peoples” (Luithui & Lasimbang,
2007, p. 242).

2

in 2002 to be 1,203,149, or 164,431 households in 3,439 villages3 (Hilltribe
Welfare Department, 2002).

Other ethnic groups (e.g., the Dara-ang/Palaung and the Chao Ley) receive
no official recognition (Pholsena, 2015, p. 4; Schliesinger, 2001, p. 1; Asia-
Pacific Human Rights Information Center, 2010).

1.1 Northern (and Western) Thailand

Some of the Northern ethnic minority groups (e.g., the Lawa, H’Tin and
Karen) have been living in the area of the contemporary Thai state since
before the arrival of the ethnic Tais. Others (e.g., the Hmong, Yao and Lahu)
migrated into present-day Thailand in the middle of the nineteenth century,
or in the early twentieth century (Buergin, 2000; 2003).

1.1.1 Ethnic Groups in the Context of State Conservation Policies and
Programmes

For the different highlander groups in Thailand, the forests are the main
source of their traditional culture and livelihood (dwelling place, food
source, sacred and recreation place). Their ways of life are inextricably
connected to the forest; they have an intimate knowledge of its nature and a
vital interest in its preservation (see, for example, the 1978 World Forestry
Congress, cited in Samukkethum, 2015, p. 36). Many communities living in
the forest see themselves as an inseparable part of a larger whole that
encompasses the forest, humans, animals and supernatural powers (IMPECT
& FPP, 2006; Shimray & Rattanakrajangsr, 2017).

The Thai state does not recognize their claims to the land where they have
traditionally subsisted, nor their traditional resource management systems
and local knowledge of forest conservation. On the contrary, the association
of “hilltribes” with “forest destruction” has become an unquestioned
discourse (Laungaramsri, 2003, p. 21, 2002, p. 32), with increasing scapegoating
of ethnic minorities as mainly responsible for deforestation and forest
degradation (Pye, 2005).

3. Numbers vary greatly depending on the source cited. The Tribal Research Institute
reports a number of 794,566 with 13,770 households in 3,229 villages- these estimates
include the Karen, Hmong, Lahu, Mien and Lisu. Other sources cite official data
from 2003 that put the “hilltribe” population at 922,957, or around 1.46% of the total
population (Sakboon, 2013, p. 214).

Background and Research Context 3

In Thailand, responsibility for the management of natural resources is
divided among a number of departments under the Ministry of Natural
Resources and Environment (MONRE): the Department of National Parks,
Wildlife and Plant Conservation; the Royal Forest Department4; the
Department of Water Resources; and the Department of Coastal and Marine
Resources. The administration of land, including registration of ownership,
is under the Ministry of Interior; the Ministry of Agriculture and
Cooperatives also has responsibilities (Luithui & Lasimbang, 2007, p. 268).
The state has made considerable efforts to secure exclusive control over the
use of natural resources. State conservation policies include designating and
expanding reforestation and conservation areas, such as national parks,
wildlife sanctuaries, or watershed class 1A areas, as well as strategies of
territorial, social and political exclusion of the different ethnic groups, e.g.,
by the enforced resettlement of forest dwellers outside these areas (e.g.,
Buergin, 2000; Ganjanapan, 1997). In national parks, for example, human
settlements are prohibited and numerous rules and regulations greatly
restrict the traditional way of life and livelihood systems of forest dwellers
(McCaskill et al., 2008, p. 16).

The Thai government’s nature conservation policy and their advocacy of
nature without human interference are based on models of Northern
American national parks where nature is considered as a wilderness that
needs to be protected from human disturbance. At the same time, forestry
is seen as in need of a management approach based on scientific knowledge,
the alleged lack of which, and the generally low standards of formal
education of highlander groups, have been used as a powerful tool to exclude
these supposedly unqualified groups - “class differentiation and ethnic
discrimination have become an integral part of the structure of nature
conservation ideology in Thai society” (Laungaramsri, 2001, p. 221).

Over recent decades, the Thai state has enacted a number of different laws
to end deforestation and restore forests. In the 1950s and 60s, forest policies
shifted towards the restriction of local forest use and increasing territorial
control through the demarcation of protected areas (Buergin, 2000, p. 9;

4. The Royal Forest Department was founded in 1896 with the aim of securing control
over valuable natural resources, particularly teak (Buergin, 2000, p. 9). It was set up by
Mr. H. Slade, an English forester (Laungaramsri, 2001, p. 68), who had a background
of German and British forestry, a tradition where villagers were excluded from forests.
He aimed at introducing permanent agriculture to swiddeners and to exploit forests
commercially (Renard, 2000, p. 71). Forest conservation paradigms along with prejudices
against shifting cultivation can be traced back to British colonial authorities based in
Burma (Vaddhanaphuti, 2018).

4

2003, pp. 47-48). The Forest Act of 1941 defines any land to which no
individual has legal claim as “forest”, and thus as state property (IMPECT &
FPP, 2006, p. 65; Laungaramsri, 2001, p. 72). The Act further prohibits the
clearing, burning and possession of any forest land (Luithui & Lasimbang,
2007, p. 262). The National Parks Act 1961 forms the legal basis for the
creation of national parks as areas in which people are prohibited from
performing certain activities (See AIPP, 2012, p. 139; IFAD, 2014, p. 47;
IMPECT & FPP, 2006, p. 65; Luithui & Lasimbang, 2007, p. 265). The
National Reserved Forest Act 1964 focuses on forest conservation by
declaring certain areas as forest reserve land and by demarcating boundaries,
without consultation with the public, converting forest dwellers into illegal
trespassers (IMPECT & FPP, 2006, p. 6). The Act stipulates that “within
National Reserve Forests, no person shall occupy, possess, exploit and
inhabit the land, develop, clear, burn the forest, collect forest products nor
cause by any other means whatsoever any damage to the nature of the
National Reserved Forest” (section 14). The government also set targets for
maintaining forested areas5.

The concept of zoning land within the country based on its aptness and
function (in accordance with notions of international conservationism)
formed the basis for Thailand’s National Forest Policy of 1985. It placed
forest policy within the context of overall national development by stressing
the importance of partnership between state and private sector. It also
identified hill peoples and their traditional shifting cultivation as causes of
deforestation (Luithui & Lasimbang, 2007, p. 261). This policy formed the
core of the Thai Forestry Sector Master Plan of 1993 and its concept of
Protected Area Systems (PAS) which aimed at nature conservation free from
human interference (Vandergeest, 1996).

Despite the efforts of the state to increase state-managed forestry, forest
areas in the country declined steadily, from more than 50% in 1961 to only
25% in 1998 (with some regeneration over the last two decades; Gershkovich,
2014). The declaration of protected areas free from human interference has
caused the forced relocation of ethnic communities who had been living in
the forest for generations (e.g., Buergin & Kessler, 1999; Ganjanapan, 2000,
pp. 176-180). Other measures included arbitrary detentions and intimidation

5. In 1972, the Third National Economic and Social development Plan was adopted, aiming
at increasing forest land in Thailand to 40 percent. However, deforestation continued,
and in 1983, only around 29% of the total forest area remained. The government set a
target to retain 40% of forested areas, including 25 % for economic use, and 15% for
forest conservation (IMPECT & FPP, 2006, p. 65; Samukkethum, 2015, p. 30).

Background and Research Context 5

of farmers practicing their traditional farming systems (Buergin, 2003, p. 56;
Laungaramsri, 2003, p. 21; 2002, p. 31; Trakansuphakon, 2010, p. 52). While
villagers were considered destructive and incapable of managing the forest,
reforestation rights were issued to capitalists, leading to substantial
deforestation from logging for export, and land claimed for cash crop
cultivation and infrastructure development (Samukkethum, 2015). In the
course of rapid economic growth, agricultural expansion and logging
concessions are principal causes of deforestation and forest destruction
(IFAD et al., 2012; 2013). In addition, since the 1960s, the government has
approved mining activities and road and dam construction inside national
parks, wildlife sanctuaries, and watersheds (Laungaramsri, 2001, p. 82).

Despite their comparatively small population and restricted land use, hill
farmers practicing rotational farming easily become scapegoats for
deforestation and the deterioration of forest resources (IFAD et al., 2013, p.
28; Hayami & Darlington, 2000, p, 145). As Kunstadter points out, “…the
number of ethnic Thai lowlanders (…), and the areas of forest that they
have cleared and use, are much greater than the numbers of hill and highland
ethnic minorities, and the area of land used for swiddens by these minorities”
(Kunstadter, 2015, p. 137).

In sum, the Thai government has attempted to manage natural resources in
a rigid and top-down way (Trakansuphakon, 2010, p. 52). However, policies
that rely on top-down control without the participation of local people, that
negate the possibility of a harmonious co-existence of people and forests,
and that favor individual property rights and economic interests before
communal property, have failed. They have led to increased deforestation
and violations of the rights of local farmers (Ganjanapan, 1997;
Samukkethum, 2015).

Between the late 1980s and early 1990s conflicts between local communities
and the Royal Forest Department (RFD) sharply increased, and a strong
civil society movement arose, related to a more “people-oriented” approach
to nature conservation (Buergin, 2003, p. 50). In the 1990s, community
forests became an important field of societal controversy, between “dark
green” nature conservationists who rejected human settlement in protected
areas, and “light green” or community rights groups (NGOs and academics)
who focused on the interests of rural communities (Buergin, 2003, p. 51).
The latter stressed local participation in resource management as an
alternative to state approaches (Laungaramsri, 2001, pp. 110, 111). The
conflict was reflected at national level in the debate on the Community
Forestry Bill, when “dark green” conservationists tried to push forward their

6

aim to relocate ethnic communities out of forest areas (see, for example, e.g.,
Buergin & Kessler, 1990, pp. 22-23). Several draft Bills were prepared by
different interest groups (e.g., villagers, academics, NGOs, and political
parties), based on different interests, conservation ideologies and values
(Buergin, 2000, p. 11). Known as the First People’s Bill, a Community Forest
Bill to legalize community-based forest management was drafted, rejected,
redrafted, and finally dismissed in 2002 (Pye, 2005, p. 312). In 2007, the
National Legislative Assembly passed its own draft of a community bill,
which annihilated the rights of forest communities (AIPP, 2012, p. 138).

In the late 1990s there were big demonstrations in Chiang Mai, sponsored
by different NGOs, demanding the enactment of legislation to promote
community forest management and to accelerate granting of Thai citizenship.
Opponents of hilltribes known as the “Chomthong group” actively
campaigned against the demonstrators by stirring up nationalistic feelings.
Effigies of prominent highlander advocates at Chiang Mai University were
burned6 (Howard & Wattana, 2001).

Over the past 5 decades, numerous highland development programs and
Royal Projects were initiated in order to improve the economic and living
conditions of the different ethnic groups in the country. The Thai state
obtained support from national and international NGOs and agencies,
including the World Health Organization and the United Nations, as well as
other agencies from the USA, Australia, the Netherlands, and Germany
(McKinnon, 2005, p. 38). From the 1970s to the 1990s, many projects were
aimed at opium elimination through cash crop substitution - the cultivation
of fruit trees, coffee and temperate vegetables (Ganjanapan, 1997, p. 211).
Highland people were encouraged to change their agricultural practices and
to settle permanently in villages more easily accessible to state representatives
(McKinnon, 2005, p. 38). While the projects have significantly contributed
to opium eradication (Ganjanapan, 1997, p. 205), they have also had
tremendous impacts on the villagers’ traditional farming practices, way of
life and economic livelihoods (McCaskill et al., 2008, p. 16). Changes of
farming practice, such as from multicropping and rotational farming to
permanent monocropping, have created dependency on external inputs
(pesticides, fertilizers, chemicals, seeds), resulting in the loss of traditional
seed crops and an increase in soil and environmental pollution (IFAD et al.,
2013, p. 47). Highlanders have become increasingly integrated into the
national market economy.

6. including of Dr. Chayan Vaddhanaphuti

Background and Research Context 7

The Royal Projects also aimed at raising incomes and prospects of highland
communities, as well as benefiting the wider environment (Kunstadter,
2015, p. 144). From the beginning, they offered research and support for
permanent-field farming. They prohibited shifting cultivation, and farmers
instead cultivated irrigated fields with fertilizers and pesticides (Kunstadter,
2015, p. 144). In many cases, the Project provided seeds and fertilizer to
farmers who accepted to produce and to sell a certain part back to the
project at a price fixed in advance, independent of the market price at
harvest time.

1.1.2 Highlanders in Today’s Thailand

Over two million individuals in Thailand depend on forests for their
livelihoods, with a number of them now living illegally in protected areas
(Gershkovich, 2014). They rely on land and resources that the government
has designated as conservation areas, national parks, forest parks, wildlife
sanctuaries, and do not have the right to pursue their traditional occupations
within these protected areas, even though their communities were often
living there prior to the creation of the protected area (IFAD et al., 2013, p.
47; Gershkovich, 2014).

In May 2014, after the coup d’état, the National Council for Peace and Order
(NCPO) declared the 2007 constitution invalid. In April 2015, a new draft
constitution was rejected by the military and a second draft was finally
approved by a referendum in August 20167 (Baird, Leepreecha &
Yangcheepsutjarit, 2017, p. 543). The term “Hilltribe” was reintroduced,
even though many ethnic groups continued to oppose the term (Baird,
Leepreecha & Yangcheepsutjarit, 2017, p. 547). On 14 June 2014, the leader
of the military junta, General Prayuth Chan-ocha, issued NCPO order No.
64/2014 regarding the suppression of encroachment and destruction of
forest resources (Pawakapan, 2015). The NCPO announced the elimination
of deforestation throughout the nation, and an increase in forested land to
40% over the next decade by repossessing illegally encroached forest and
introducing a new forest zoning system. Provincial authorities promptly
took back land from villagers, resort owners, and logging companies
(Gershkovich, 2014).

Between 2009 and 2013, the Forest Department prosecuted 6656 local
villagers, charged with forest encroachment. In 2014 and 2015 alone, 9231

7. This draft constitution recognized, for the first time in history, the existence of ‘indigenous
peoples’ in Thailand (Baird et al., 2017).

8

lawsuits were filed. A similar trend can be observed for the Department of
National Parks: from 2009 to 2013, around 5000 cases were filed against
villagers in protected areas, while in 2014-2016 over 6000 cases were
recorded (Pongbunchan, 2018). In April 2015, the Thai National Police
announced that during the first six months of the implementation of the
order, “1,622 people were accused in 2,758 cases of destruction of forest, 235
people were accused in 265 cases of the sale of prohibited wild animals or
forest products, 110 people were accused in 108 cases of destruction of
natural resources and the environment, and 602 people were accused in
1,920 cases of forest and public land encroachment” (Pratchatai, 2015, cited
in Pawakapan, 2015, p. 4).

Many forest-dependent villagers reported Human Rights violations by the
junta during the reforestation campaign (Gershkovich, 2014). According to
representatives of small-scale peasants and Thai Lawyers for Human Rights,
a large number of villagers dwelling in areas declared as forest areas and
depending on forest resources were detained, prosecuted and even forcibly
removed from their homes and communities (Pawakapan, 2015). According
to Pawakapan (2015), armed soldiers raided communities and arrested
villagers, including old people and women with children. The NCPO
ignored methods of verifying community land rights, e.g., by examining the
historical and cultural context of the communities. Livelihood insecurity
among the ethnic communities increased (Gershkovich, 2014). The fact that
the Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC) was put in charge of
determining a strategy to resolve forest-related issues, albeit in collaboration
with the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment, implies that the
military leaders perceived the conflict over natural resources as part of a
national security problem (Pawakapan, 2015).

As of 2015, Thailand’s protected areas encompassed 147 national parks, 58
wildlife sanctuaries, 67 non-hunting areas, and 120 forest parks, equaling
almost 20 percent of the territory (Suksawang & McNeely, 2015, p. 10).
Most of them are terrestrial – only 22 are marine parks.

Negative stereotypes associated with “hilltribes” continue to be prevalent
and to be used in the debate around conservation, natural resource use and
community forestry. The government keeps on decrying the highlanders’
traditional worldviews and knowledge systems (McCaskill et al., 2008, p. 14).
Their shifting cultivation systems, often negatively labeled as “slash and
burn”, were deemed uncivilized, ecologically harmful and a backward form
of agricultural practice (e.g., IFAD et al., 2013, p. 48; IKAP, 2006, p. 45; NDF
& Huay Hin Lad Nai, 2011; Trakansuphakon, 2010, p. 52). A reference to

Background and Research Context 9

climate change - accusing highlanders of causing deforestation and carbon
emission, and thus contributing to rising temperatures - was added into the
discourse (Trakansuphkon, 2010, 2015). One key objective of the government
was to reduce or eradicate shifting cultivation (IFAD, 2013, p. 49;
Trakansuphakon, 2010, p. 52), and in Northern Thailand, villagers were
arrested for engaging in this form of agriculture (Trakansuphkon, 2015, p.
336). In contrast, rotational farming has increasingly been shown to be a
valid conservation system that is not destructive of the environment but on
the contrary offers manifold environmental benefits: conservation of
biodiversity; vital forest re-growth; minimal soil erosion; good water quality
and quantity in down-slope streams; protection and enhanced diversity of
wildlife (McCaskill et al., 2008, p. 14; Kammerer, 1988, p. 12; Trakansuphkon,
2015, p. 335; Walker, 2001, p. 149).

1.1.3 Northern Ethnic Groups and the State: Construction of the
“Hilltribe” Problem

For centuries, the non-ethnic Thai population of the western highlands of
what is nowadays Northern Thailand served as a buffer between the ethnic
Thai lowland states and what is now Myanmar (Burma) (Kunstadter, 2015,
p. 138). But at the beginning of the 20th century the “multicultural” area
became part of a territorial national state, dominated by the ethnic Siamese
(central Thai) (Buergin, 2000, p. 3). The territorial demarcation of the state
was characterized by an increasing centralization and bureaucratization, an
emerging sense of “Thai-ness”, and the rise of Thai nationalist and racial
ideology. Ethnic differences between Thai and non-Thai gained greater
relevance, and Thai-ness became more and more related to specific forms of
livelihood and residence. Non-Thai ethnic groups were increasingly
perceived as a threat to the Thai nation state - from being seen as
insignificant, strange, primitive and uncivilized others, to being ungovernable
and harmful outsiders (Laungaramsri, 2002, 2003). Lumped together under
the term “hilltribes”, their diverse cultures, languages and historical origins
were disregarded (Laungaramsri, 2003). The construction of Thailand as a
bureaucratic, capitalistic and liberal-progressive nation-state, in line with
nineteenth-century Western ideas (Renard, 2000, p. 69) was rooted in the
idea of one territory, one nation, one race; hence negative attributions placed
“hilltribes” in opposition to a sense of Thai-ness, a Thai national identity
centering around being loyal to the Thai race (chat), to Buddhist religion
(sasana) and the King (mahakasat) (McKinnon, 2005; Renard, 2000).

10

Major concerns that have since been associated with highlander groups are
threats to national security (communist insurgency), drug cultivation and
trafficking (opium) as well as deforestation and environmental destruction
through their allegedly harmful agricultural practices8. Hilltribe/Chao Khao
is a derogatory term, with negative connotations (Ashley, 2013, p. 6). These
stereotypes have greatly influenced the way in which the state perceived
ethnic minority groups within the Thai “geo-body” (Thongchai, 1994), with
forest destruction and deforestation requiring particularly intense state
control and intervention (Laungaramsri, 2003, p. 40). The public perception
of the ethnic and highland people was largely formed by these stereotypes
which in turn reinforced policies related to the highlander populations
(Luithui & Lasminbang, 2007). Shaped by widespread misrepresentations,
these policies have largely been policies of assimilation, and often of
repression (Buergin, 2000, p. 3)9. While in the 60s and 70s hilltribe policies
mainly centered on the fight against communist insurgency and the
elimination of opium, these issues had lost their urgency by the mid-80s
(e.g., Kunstadter, 2015). Instead, forest and nature conservation became the
major issues, which largely turned into resettlement policies (Buergin, 2000,
2003; Kammerer, 1988).

8. While insurgency, disloyalty and disobedience have been broadly associated with the
term “hilltribes” in general, differences have been perceived between the diverse ethnic
groups: while the Hmong are seen as the most problematic, malign, “aggressive” group,
the Karen are considered as “good” - benign, unambitious, submissive, idle and, peace-
loving forest dwellers (e.g., Laungaramsri, 2003, pp. 22, 34, 36; 2002, pp. 50, 54).

9. Three key state mechanisms of assimilation have been identified: the assignment of
Thai surnames to members of ethnic groups; public education (imposing a standard
Thai curriculum in Central Thai language); and the promotion of Buddhism (aiming
to substitute ethnic minority traditional belief systems) (McCaskill et al., 2008, p. 16).
Other measures include the creation of a centralized village administration system, the
construction of infrastructure, and the extension of national TV and radio (Buadeng
& Boonyasaranai, 2008, p. 85).

Background and Research Context 11

1.2 Southern Thailand

1.2.1 The Chao Ley and State Conservation Efforts

Chao Ley (“sea people”) is a collective term for three different ethnic groups
in Southern Thailand, the Moken, Moklen, and the Urak Lawoi’. They
belong to the few indigenous hunter-gatherer populations in Southeast Asia
(Human Rights Watch, 2015, p. 2; Tauli-Corpuz, 2016)10.

While the different ethnic minority groups in Northern Thailand gained a
lot of attention in the political arena, the Southern groups were little known
until after the tsunami disaster in 2004 (Arunotai, 2012, p. 1), when the
Moken understood the withdrawal of the sea and changes in animal
behavior, anticipated the “seven rollers” or “La Boon”11, and were able to
take refuge on higher ground to survive and to save the lives of many tourists
(Arunotai, 2006, 2008a, p. 74; 2017; Arunotai et al., 2007, p. 14; Elias,
Rungmanee, & Cruz, 2005; Scheper & Patel, 2006, p. 21, Steckley &
Doberstein, 2011; Suzuki, 2018, p. 16; UNESCO, 2005).

Since the 1980s, the Thai government has promoted marine national parks
in the Andaman (Suzuki, 2015), which have brought tremendous changes to
the lives of the Chao Ley, as the rules and regulations have severely restricted
their traditional use of resources, their foraging grounds, practices and
nomadic movements (Suzuki, 2011, 2018; Wongbusarakum, 2007, p. 53;
Human Rights Watch, 2015).

National Park legislation prohibits private ownership and occupation of
land as well as activities that might have an adverse impact on the eco-
system, e.g., cutting of wood, or collection of flora and fauna (Elias,
Rungmanee, & Cruz, 2005, p. 20; Suzuki, 2015, p. 48; 2018, p. 4). Due to
these regulations, the Chao Ley are no longer allowed to harvest certain
marine resources and aquatic species (Suzuki, 2018, p. 38; UNESCO, 2005,
p. 55). It also became impossible for them to build their traditional boats,
the kabang (Suzuki, 2018, 2018, p. 4). Enforcement by local park authorities

10. The terms “sea gypsies” and “sea nomads” have been used for the Urak Lawoi’, Moken
and Moklen by tourist agencies and Western writers (Wongbusarakum, 2007, p. 13). In
their own language, the Urak Lawoi’ call themselves “people (urak) of the sea (Lawoi’)”
(Arunotai, na Pombejra, & Buntaotook, 2008b, p. 358; Wongbusarakum, 2007, p. 12),
while the Moken refer to themselves as Mawken, meaning “the Sea-drowned” (Nawichai,
2008, p. 5).

11. In an oral legend of the Moken that has been passed down for generations, the withdrawal
of the sea indicates the arrival of the “Seven rollers” or “La Boon”, a big wave that floods
the world (Suzuki, 2018, p. 7).

12

has become more frequent, often including confiscation of boats and
equipment and the levying of fines (Arunotai et al., 2008b, p. 362). As a
consequence, the Chao Ley are caught in a restricted environment where
they can no longer practice their traditional livelihoods (Wasinrapee, 2006,
p. 6).

1.2.2 Ethnic “Sea Nomads” in Thailand’s Socio-political Landscape

As with the ethnic highlanders in the North, the Chao Ley have been
culturally, politically and economically marginalized in Thailand and
beyond. Moken have been exploited and harassed by different groups,
including the British, Japanese, Thai, and Burmese (Ivanoff, 2005, p. 2).
Besides poverty, and non-recognition and discrimination by the government,
they often face oppression from land-based communities. They mostly have
no means of redress (Human Rights Watch, 2015).

Tourism Development and Land Conflicts: Over the last decades, the rich
natural environment of the Andaman Sea has increasingly attracted tourists
from all over the world (Suzuki, 2018, pp. 4, 8; Wongbusarakum, 2007, p.
48). This has significantly impacted the Chao Ley’s semi-nomadic life style,
their culture, and their traditional religions (Granbom, 2005; Nilsson, 2010).
On the other hand, tourism has become their most significant alternative
source of income (Arunotai et al., 2007, p. 38; Wongbusarakum, 2007,
p. 48).

With the rise of tourism, land (particularly beach fronts) has become
desirable, profitable and expensive. Since the December 2004 tsunami
disaster, land conflicts have increased (Rajah, 2010). In a number of cases
land on which the Chao Ley have subsisted and settled for generations has
been claimed by individuals and private companies who acquire land deeds
in an illegal process, while the fishing communities who had been living on
the disputed land for centuries had never applied for formal land titles
(Rajah, 2010): they owned and used the resources communally (Human
Rights Watch, 2015, p. 11; Ivanoff & Bountry, n.d.; Na Pombejra, 2003, p.
67, cited in Wasinrapp, 2006, p. 78; Wongbusarakum, 2007, pp. 20, 52).
Since 1998, many land conflicts between Chao Ley and private land
speculators, and also with the National Marine Parks, have been before the
courts. Many of them remain unresolved (Wongbusarakum, 2007, p. 53).

Background and Research Context 13

1.3 Creating“Within-State Space”: Towards Community Forestry and
Community Rights

In Thailand, the past three decades were marked by a broad movement
towards the recognition of the rights of ethnic communities, particularly
those residing in the forest.

It had become clear that the state’s increasing control over land and forest
areas was largely unsuccessful as a conservation policy, and had produced
negative impacts on the forest (Ganjanapan, 1997). From the 1980s onwards,
Thailand opened greater political space for the participation of different
social groups. In particular, environmental movements have greatly
increased and have made the environment a public concern (Laungaramsri,
2001, pp. 110, 221). As a response to exploitative state development schemes
and resettlement projects, various civil society organizations, NGOs,
networks and peoples’ movements, related e.g., to the use rights of forest
and natural resources, were formed and expanded.

From the late 1980s/early 1990s, community forest concepts were developed,
aiming at allocating control over forest resources to local communities,
based on the idea that they are the best managers of forest resources.
Between 1991 and 1993 research on community forests in different parts of
Northern Thailand (e.g., Ramitanon, Ganjanapan, & Ganjanapan, 1993) has
emphasized the rights of local people to manage their resources in line with
their customary rules and practices. For the first time, the Constitution of
1997 recognized community rights by emphasizing the role of local groups
in environmental management. Ethnic communities have increasingly
lobbied for greater involvement in natural resource management, and
networks of ethnic and indigenous groups intensified their collaboration
with other social forces (e.g., academics and NGOs) to push for legislation
that recognizes community rights in line with the 1997 Constitution. The
Community Forestry Act passed in 2007 curtailed the autonomy of local
communities while favoring state interests (Fisher, 2011). The land reform
network P-Move (People’s Movement for a Just Society - a network
organization campaigning for land rights and citizenship rights for the rural
poor and small-scale farmers) emerged to lobby for community land titling
(Ingalls, 2018. p. 148).

The Constitution of 2007 reiterated the decentralization of the management
of natural resources from the state to local communities. According to
Article 66 local communities have the right to maintain their cultural
traditions, and to protect their environment and natural resources. Article
67 provides that people have the right to participate with the state and

14

communities in the conservation of natural resources (Asian Legal
Information Institute, 2007). The 2017 Constitution retained recognition of
community rights in article 43a. However, even though these articles in the
1997, 2007 and 2017 Constitutions provide the basis for the protection of
the ethnic communities’ rights to natural resources, they do not clearly
define these rights - it remains unclear if they relate to access or use.

Apart from the Constitution, there are other laws, regulations and resolutions
that recognize the rights of local communities regarding the use of natural
resources. For example, developers, ethnic groups and academics jointly
proposed a policy to revitalize the Karen traditional lifestyle; this was
approved by Cabinet Resolution on 3rd August 2010. The resolution specifies
the right to “Restoration of the Traditional Practices and Livelihoods of
Karen people” (Baird et al., 2017, p. 548). A further example is the Cabinet
Resolution of 2 June 2010 regarding the restoration of the way of life of the
Chao Ley in southern Thailand, titled “Revitalizing the Sea People’s Way of
Life” (Baird et al., 2017, p. 548). The two Cabinet Resolutions have led to the
creation of “Special Cultural Zones” (Khet Wattanatam Phiset) for Karen
communities in Northern Thailand and Moken communities in Southern
Thailand. The practical value of these concepts remains questionable, and
they have been criticized by Thai academics for their limitations, but
nevertheless they are a promising development towards the recognition of
some aspects of the traditional livelihoods and lifestyle of these ethnic
groups (Gerharz, Uddin, & Chakkarath, 2018).

Another example is the “Regulation on Community Land Titling” issued in
2010 which temporarily allows communities to collectively occupy and use
state land for settlements and farming. Even though it has various limitations,
this regulation can be considered a move towards the state’s recognition of
community land rights (IFAD et al., 2013, p. 47). However, there are still a
number of laws (e.g., National park law) that continue to pose obstacles to
the realization of the rights stipulated in the Thai Constitution and other
instruments (IFAD et al., 2013, p. 47).

A public referendum in 2016 accepted a new National Constitution which
made no provision for community rights or public participation, leaving
local communities more vulnerable to the power of the state and investors
(Areerat, 2016). Despite the failed implementation of the Community
Forestry Bill and the military’s reforestation campaign, however, efforts to
involve local people in resource management go on, for example by

Background and Research Context 15

proponents of community forestry12. Community forestry has now been
implemented in over 9000 villages (outside protected areas), and regardless
of the military coup in 2014, policy developments related to Community
Land Titling (CLT) have continued13 (e.g., Hayward, 2017).

In sum, over the past three decades, an active network of civil society and
ethnic minorities and indigenous groups has developed, advocating for
forestry rights and community land titling, for example, through promotion
of a range of community forest projects, resulting in the drafting of a
Community Forestry Bill, the formation of P-Move in response to the failure
of this Bill, as well as the push towards the passing of Cabinet Resolutions
and the creation of Special Cultural Zones.

These movements can be understood as an attempt by ethnic minority
groups in Thailand to fight for and create space to limit the power and
control of the state and its agents, although not in the sense of physical
space. The term “non-state space” was coined by Scott (2009) who has
argued that people living in the mountainous region of “Zomia14” have
constantly attempted to evade the influence and control of states as well as
arbitrarily drawn national borders. Accordingly, these “hill people” have
found avenues to not being integrated into a nation state and to withdraw
into “non-state spaces” located beyond the control of governments, often in
remote areas difficult to access. Scott’s approach focuses on the time before
World War II. However, with the development of new technologies, states
have been able to gain control over previously inaccessible terrain. Even
though “non-state spaces” in a physical sense no longer exist to the same
extent as in the past, it can be argued that attempts of communities to escape

12. Even within the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment, the approval of
community forestry differs between departments. While the Royal Forest Department
and sub-departments are supporting community forestry, the Department of National
Parks, Wildlife, and Plant Conservation, responsible for protected-area forests, is trying
to prevent community forestry in protected areas by making use of the National Park
law.

13. A new pilot scheme of ‘common land registration’ was introduced in 2015, aiming to
reallocate land for local use over a period of 30 years, representing a form of leasehold
where the state retains stronger control than in the case of CLT. The policy can be seen as
an attempt to legitimize certain forms of land use in forest areas, while clamping down
on further encroachment. However, it seems that so far only one area in Chiang Mai
Province and 4 areas in four districts of Nan Province have received the government-
sanctioned certificates (Hayward, 2017).

14. The term “Zomia” was first employed by Willem van Schendel (2002), referring to
the parts of Burma, Cambodia, China, India, Laos, Vietnam and Thailand, Nepal and
Tibet.

16

and bypass state control and domination can be found in Thailand today. In
this sense, communities are attempting to withdraw from or limit
government influence, to create what can be called “within-state space”. In
this space, people are able to withdraw themselves from the restrictions of
the state without actually seeking physical distance, but rather by developing
ways to live within the state and to deal with its influence, power and
control.

A number of local communities in Thailand have set up their own
management systems, and have managed to adopt flexible and creative
adaptation strategies to cope with development challenges and uncertain
environments (Pholsena, 2015, p. 10). While some groups have entered into
negotiations with the state to promote their sustainable resource management
systems, including community forest and land management, others have
engaged in direct or indirect contestation in order to retain their rights and
identities (e.g., Vaddhanaphuti & Jirattikorn, 2011). These communities
have found new means of liberating themselves from the confines and
limitations of the state. In order to understand what mechanisms facilitate
the negotiations, interaction, and cooperation of groups that are able to
define and defend some kind of space apart from the constraints of the state,
it is useful to consider the concept of imagining communities.

1.4 Imagining Communities

For over a century, sociologists and anthropologists have been debating the
idea of community, and theoretical approaches to the concept of community
have greatly altered over time. In early approaches, community was largely
considered in structural terms, as a particular locality in which people live
together, based on common interests, norms, and beliefs, sharing a social
system or structure (e.g. Frankenberg, 1966; Minar & Greer, 1969; Warner,
1941). In the mid-twentieth century, this structural-functionalist tradition
was replaced by a new symbolic approach; the conception of community as
something essential, a unitary entity with common meanings and values,
was replaced by a focus on how ideas of community are given meaning, how
such meanings relate to each other, and on the process by which communities
are constructed, maintained or dissolved (Rapport & Overing, 2000, pp.
61-62).

Cohen (1985) was the first to argue that community should be seen as the
symbolic construction of boundaries by people who share common values,
norms, and symbolic meanings of culture and who utilize and symbolize

Background and Research Context 17

these boundaries to give meaning to their identities, i.e. a perspective on
community as based on what distinguishes people from one another, rather
than on what they have in common. The social anthropologist Frederik
Barth (1969, 1995) described how ethnic groups achieve their own identity
by defining themselves as different from other groups and by creating
boundaries between them - a system of signals through ethnically specific
behavior which creates social boundaries between different ethnic groups
and which affirms the group members’ commitment to the value orientation
of the collective.

From the early 1990s onwards, community as a process has become
associated with the notion of imagination. Anderson (1991) developed the
idea of modern communities being constructed with boundaries. He
described ways in which people imagine communities, and how the image
of their community is constructed by a set of values, institutions, laws, and
symbols common to a particular society through which people imagine
their social whole. He introduced the concept of “imagined community” to
conceptualize the process of nation building, but applicable also to a wide
range of social groups in which members feel connected in a web of
imagined experiences and affirm their membership against other opposing
and contesting groups and ideas, even though they might have never met,
known, and even heard of their fellow members. However, it has been
argued that nation-building processes differ in different parts of the world
(e.g., Chatterjee, 1993) and that the concept of “imagined community”
presupposes the construction process of a homogenous nation while in
reality nations tend not to be homogenous. It has thus been argued that a
theoretical approach to community should allow for marginalized places
and people, such as ethnic minorities, who experience a loss of their identity
and who face difficulties in identifying themselves with the nation-state
(Tanabe, 2008).

Tanabe (2008) introduced the concept of “imagining communities” to
explore how newly emerging communities and associations in Thailand
imagine and create their own sense of knowledge, power, and identity to
deal with development problems and crisis. Contrary to Anderson’s notion
of an “imagined community” of collective, national narratives that form the
homogenous space and time of the nation state (Anderson, 1991), Tanabe
looks at communities as new and transforming spaces of struggle and
negotiation rather than as homogenous entities. In this sense, an imagining
community is understood as a movement of people forming their identity
while affected by state policy, development, and outside power.

18

In line with Tanabe (2008), this study focuses on ways in which people, to
varying degrees, regulate and manage themselves to create power within
their “imagining community”, to challenge the state and its representatives,
and to find ways to cope with state power. A particular focus is on processes
in which people imagine their communities to create their own space
through strategies of adaptation and negotiation in the face of state control,
development policies, economic integration and market pressure. Along
these lines, community is understood as something that is continuously
created in practice, through people’s imaginative and reflexive practice.

1.5 Ethnic Groups under Study: The Karen, Dara-ang and Moken/Urak
Lawoi’

1.5.1 The Karen

The Karen form one of the largest ethnic minority groups residing in the
hills and lowlands on both sides of the Thailand-Burma border (Hayami &
Darlington, 2000). In 2002, the Karen population in Thailand was 438,131,
or 47.5 percent of the total “hill tribe” population. They lived in 1,912
villages across fifteen provinces (Social Welfare and Development
Department, 2002, cited in Buadeng & Boonyasaranai, p. 63).

The English term “Karen” refers to a heterogeneous set of ethnic groups in
Thailand and Burma. There are four major subgroups that academics
recognize as Karen, the Sgaw, Pwo, Bghe, and P-O (or Taungthu) (Hayami
& Darlington, 2000, p. 138). The Karen in Thailand can be divided into two
major subgroups, the Karen Sgaw and the Karen Pwo15 (Buadeng &
Boonyasaranai, 2008, p. 62; Delang, 2003, p. x; IMPECT & FPP, 2006, p. 15).
The Sgaw Karen mainly live in an area ranging from the northernmost
provinces of Chiang Rai, west to Mae Hong Son and Tak, southwards
towards Kanchanaburi, and south to Phetchaburi. Most of the communities
are located on lower altitude hills, in valleys and lowlands (Hayami &
Darlington, 2000, p. 139).

There is uncertainty as to which language family the Karen language belongs,
with most linguists maintaining that it is part of the Tibeto-Burman family
(Renard, 2003, p. 7). While the language of the Karen Pwo has many
similarities to Karen Sgaw, the two languages are not mutually intelligible
(IMPECT & FPP, 2006, p. 15; Schliesinger, 2001, p. 209). Even though there

15. In this study, “Karen” means “the Sgaw Karen in Thailand”.

Background and Research Context 19

are a number of theories regarding the ethnic origin and languages of the
Karen, they lack recorded early history, and their past and migratory paths
remain unknown (Hayami & Darlington, 2000, p. 138). They seem to have
moved south into Burma about the sixth or seventh century AD, and a small
group proceeded from there into Thailand, most likely before the arrival of
the first Tai people (Schliesinger, 2001, pp. 203-204). According to other
authors, there is no conclusive evidence that the Karen have lived in what is
now Thailand before the seventeenth century (Hayami & Darlington, 2000,
p. 138); but despite the lack of written early history, old references indicate
that the Karen were living on the fringes of the lowland kingdoms (Renard,
2000). While in pre-modern society they played an important role as
“frontier guardians”, the demarcation of the Thai state within fixed
boundaries and the creation of a new Thai national identity and notion of
‘Thai-ness” at the end of the 19th century yielded a new differentiation
between the ethnic categories of Thai and non-Thai (or the uncivilized
Khon Pa; wild people), with the cultural distinctiveness of the highland
people putting in question the nation’s desired homogeneity and national
security (Laungaramsri, 2003, p. 32). When the spirit of nationalism spread,
officials in the North began to perceive Karen as foreigners that needed to
be tamed, and the younger population as needing to be nationally-educated.
Thais came to see them as a race apart - drug-abusing, forest destroyers who
were unclean and backward, just like the other so-called hilltribes (Renard,
2000, pp. 79-80).

According to Karen tradition, a village is headed by a Hi Hko, or traditional
leader who tries to ensure that the villagers follow Karen customary law and
rules (Buadeng & Boonyasaranai, 2008, pp. 64-65). Traditionally, the Karen
supported each other in a broad range of every-day life activities, e.g., during
planting, harvesting, fishing and hunting (Schliesinger, 2001, p. 206).

The religious beliefs of the Karen are quite diverse. In the mid-nineteenth
century, Burmese Karen Christians began to send missionaries to Thailand
(Buadeng & Boonyasaranai, 2008; Hayami & Darlington, 2000, p. 142).
Since the 1990s, the majority of Karen families in Thailand have converted
to Buddhism or Christianity (Buadeng & Boonyasaranai, 2008), while a
number of them follow traditional spirit beliefs. Today, the majority adhere
to Buddhism. Animists (or Traditionalists) are officially classified as
‘Buddhists’ so that no exact estimates are available for this particular group16.

16. Platz (2003) refers to the Tribal Research Institute according to which animists accounted
for 16 % of the Karen population in 1989, while the estimate in 1983 was still 42.9 per
cent; in recent times, the number has been much lower (p. 474).

20

Approximately 20 to 30 per cent are Christians, mainly Baptists and
Catholics (Platz, 2003, p. 474), forming one of the biggest Christian groups
in Thailand.

Traditional Karen livelihood is based on subsistence dry or hill rice
cultivation, although from the early twentieth century onwards they have
increasingly adopted the wet-rice cultivation of the Thais (Platz, 2003, p.
474). Today, most Karen make their living by cultivating either dry rice/
rotational farming, or wet rice, cash cropping, foraging for forest products
and animal husbandry (IMPECT & FPP, 2006, pp. 15-16; Schliesinger, 2001,
p. 206). In the hill areas, the Karen usually cultivate paddy rice and rotational
farms in yearly cycles, and grow various kinds of fruits and vegetables
around the paddies or in backyard gardens (Hayami & Darlington, 2000, p.
140). They have developed a rotational-farming system (Rai Mun Wian)
that cyclically combines fallow and farming periods with an intertwined and
balanced use of natural resources. This shifting cultivation system has been
described as “a cultural and physical integration of forest and agriculture; it
is a type of agroforestry that stresses the connection between the agricultural
system and the ecosystem” (Trakansuphakon, 2015, p. 337). After a brief
period of cultivation (usually one year), the fields are permitted to lie fallow
for several years, giving the forest sufficient time to re-grow (Doklamyai, n.d.;
Hayami & Darlington, 2000, p. 140). Thus, the cycle aids the regeneration of
the soil, fauna and flora and consequently upholds biodiversity, conserving
both animals and plants (Shimray & Rattanakrajangsri, 2017, p. 26;
Trakansuphakon, 2010, p. 54; 2015, p. 337). Studies also found that rotational
agriculture with integrated agroforestry has a high capacity to reduce
greenhouse gases by absorbing carbon, and thus to maintain the balance of
the ecosystem (e.g., Doklamyai, n.d.; Trakansuphakon, 2010, 2015). Often
misunderstood as environmentally destructive “slash-and burn” practice,
this form of agriculture has been the subject of highly controversial scientific
and political debate, leading to government policies that prohibit rotational
farming by declaring certain areas as protected zones (IKAP, 2006). Research
has shown that rotational farming has declined drastically over the past
years and has been largely replaced by permanent cultivation (e.g.,
Ganjanapan, 1998, p. 76; Chotikijphiwat, 1999, cited in Laungaramsri, 2001,
p. 210).

1.5.2 The Dara-ang/Palaung

The majority of the Dara-ang or Palaung live in Shan State, Myanmar, but
can also be found in Yunnan, China, along the Burmese-Chinese border,

Background and Research Context 21

and in Northern Thailand (Chaichompoo, 2013, p. 22; Deepadung, 2009, p.
9; Howard & Wattana, 2001; Nattapoolwat, 2015, p. 333; Ashley, 2005, p. 72;
2008, p. 44). While they are most commonly known as “Palaung”, they call
themselves “Dara-ang”17. The total population of ethnic Dara-ang in
Thailand in 2016 is estimated at 8000 (personal interview with Oon Sunanta,
Chair of the Dara-ang Culture Network Thailand, 2016), located in 9 villages
in three districts of Chiang Mai Province, i.e. Fang, Chiang Dao and Mae Ai
(Nattapoolwat, 2015).

Their language belongs to the Austro-Asiatic stock of languages, Palaungic
branch of the Mon-Khmer sub-group (Ashley, 2009, p. 332; Chaichompoo,
2013; p. 22; Deepadung, 2009, p. 7; Sornsrisom, 2010, p. 7), or more
specifically, the Eastern Palaungic sub-branch of the Northern Mon-Khmer
Palaungic languages (Grimes, 1996). The language of the Dara-ang has no
written script, but often the Shan script is used (Nattapoolwat, 2015, p. 335).

Unlike most highland groups in Northern Thailand, the Palaung uphold a
long tradition of Theravada Buddhist belief and practices (e.g., Ashley,
2005). Even though it is unclear when they first adopted Theravada
Buddhism, today most of the Dara-ang describe themselves as Buddhists
(Ashley, 2013). According to Howard and Wattana (2001) the Buddhism
practiced by the Palaung has been influenced by both the Shan and Burmese
schools. The Silver Palaung are described as adhering to the “Yuan” form of
Buddhism which can be found among Tai-speaking groups of Northern
Thailand, Lao, Southern China and Shan state. This particular style of
Buddhism differs from the Burmese and Central Thai traditions in its
religious script, ritual system, the organization of the ministry and the
institution of Khruba monks (Ashley, 2005, 2008, 2009). They have
developed an intimate relationship with Khruba Jaw Thueang, a popular
monk believed to be the reincarnation of Khruba Siwicha (e.g., Ashley,
2009). The Palaung also believe in an array of spirits, many of them deriving
from Shan (Tai Yai) culture (Ashley, 2008, p. 46).

Women can be identified as Silver Palaung by the rattan and bamboo hoops
which they wear in addition to a wide metal belt around their waists. The
hoops are believed to protect and bring luck (Howard & Wattana, 2001) and

17. Sometimes also spelled ‘Dara’ung’, meaning Mountain People - Da means human, and
Ra Ung or Deu Ung means mountain (Nattapoolwat, 2015, p. 334; Ashley, 2005, p. 72;
2008, p. 44). Palaung people use different terms to designate themselves, depending
on their origin (Ashley, 2009, p. 333). In Thailand, the Palaung designate themselves
as Dara-ang Ren, or “Red Dara-ang” (Ashley, 2009, p. 333; Deepadung, 2019, p. 18)
though in Burma they are also known as “Pale Dara-ang” or “Silver Dara-ang”.

22

are a symbol in remembrance of the angel Roi Nguen who is believed to be
an ancestor of the Dara-ang and an integral part of their ethnic identity18
(Srirat, 2011; Srivattananukulkit, 2007).

The Palaung are among the large number of ethnic minorities who were
forced to flee across the border into Thailand due to political conflicts in
Burma (Howard & Wattana, 2001). Most Palaung entering Thailand came
from the hills of south-eastern Shan State (Howard & Wattana, 2001). In the
early 1960s, widespread conflict broke out in Shan State following General
Ne Win’s 1962 coup. The armed conflict that lasted until the 1992 cease-fire
badly affected numerous Palaung communities in the state. Particularly in
the 1970s and early 1980s, the Silver Palaung were increasingly drawn into
the fighting: the forces of the Communist Party of Burma demanded food,
shelter, porters and recruits, and the Burmese army repeatedly attacked
them for their alleged support of the communists. The villagers faced
various human rights violations, including dispossession and destruction of
their houses, livestock and belongings, rape, and forced labor (e.g., as
porters). As a consequence, a growing number of Palaung fled, until in 1984
the village leaders decided that all villagers had to leave. They crossed the
Salween River into Muang Ton (Mongton), and later the border into Thailand
to settle down in the area of today’s Nor Lae village on the Thai side of the
border (Howard & Wattana, 2001), located close to the Royal Project
Agricultural Research Centre on Doi Angkang (Ashley, 2009, p. 333).

As a non-Thai speaking group, the Palaung were labelled as “hilltribes” after
their arrival in Thailand, with some of them being classified as “Karen” on
their ID forms, since the state did not recognize “Palaung” or “Dara-ang” at
that time (Ashley, 2009, p. 332). Due to their relatively late arrival in
Thailand, they were not recognized as one of the kingdom’s official “hilltribe”
groups, but were nevertheless sub-subsumed under this term by state actors,
based on their traditional rotational farming practices, their high altitude
settlements, and their non-Tai language. As a “hilltribe”, various state
interventions, such as development projects and opium substitution
programs, were launched in Dara-ang communities (Ashley, 2009, p. 335).
Most Dara-ang settlements, in common with other highland communities,
are located on land held by the state, e.g., national parks, forest reserves or
watershed areas (Ashley, 2013, p. 7).

18. According to a legend, the angel Roi Ngoen descended to the earth and was captured
in a trap by a Lisu hunter, so that she was unable to return to heaven. Palaung women
wear waist hoops to symbolize the trap and to remind them of being descendants of
the angel (Chaichompoo, 2011, p. 115).

Background and Research Context 23

Since their arrival in Thailand, the Dara-ang have faced a challenging
struggle for citizenship rights, since they lacked legal status at first, and thus
were unable to legally possess land (Ashley, 2013, p. 7). Several Thai
researchers have conducted studies on the socio-cultural, economic and
environmental aspects of the villagers’ life and its concordance with the
Sufficiency Economy Philosophy of his Majesty the King Rama IX (e.g.,
Rueanchompoo, 2008).

1.5.3 The Moken/Urak Lawoi’

Three different ethnic groups in Southern Thailand are subsumed under the
term “Chao Ley”: the Moken, Moklen, and the Urak Lawoi’. The sub-groups
are distinct in a number of ways, such as their mobility and settlement
patterns, cultural traditions, and languages (McDuie-Ra, Robinson, &
Kaewmahanin, 2013). While the Moklen19 and Urak Lawoi’ are mainly
sedentary communities, more assimilated into Thai culture, the Moken are
more traditional and uphold their nomadic lifestyle to some degree
(Arunotai, 2006; Wasinrapee, 2006, p. 74).

It is difficult to find accurate population figures for the “sea nomads” for a
number of reasons20. The total population of “Chao Ley” in Thailand is
estimated at approximately 13,000 people living in 44 communities spread
over five provinces adjacent to the Andaman coastal area (Tauli-Corpuz,
2016). In Thailand, estimates of the total Moken population vary from 800
(Human Rights Watch, 2015, p. 4) to 1000 (Arunotai, 2017, p. 4)21. The total
population of Urak Lawoi’ is reported to be approximately 7000 (Arunotai,
2017, p. 5).

The Moken mainly live in Phuket province (Rawai), the islands in Ranong
Province (i.e., Lao, Sinhai, Phayam and Chang), and Phang-nga province
(e.g., Surin Islands) (Arunotai, 2008a, p. 73; 2017, p. 4), while the ethnic
Urak Lawoi’ live mainly between Phuket (e.g., Sapam, Laem Tukkae, and

19. The Moklen are ethnic seafarers who are now settled in the area of Phang Nga and
Phuket provinces (UNESCO, 2001, p. 21). Since the community of Rawai is composed
only of Moken and Urak Lawoi’’, we will focus on these two ethnic groups, and not
include the Moklen.

20. Their still existing mobility, particularly across national borders and into Burma, makes
it hard to compile census data. And ethnic Moken might not necessarily be counted as
such due to cultural assimilation, migration patterns and inter-marriage (McDuie-Ra
et al., 2013, p. 146).

21. The total Moken population in the Mergui Archipelago in Burma is estimated to be
between 2000 (Arunotai, 2006, p. 140) and 3000 (Human Rights Watch, 2015, p. 4).

24

Rawai), Krabi and the Satun provinces/Malaysian border (Arunotai et al.,
2008b, p. 357; Asia-Pacific Human Rights Information Center, 2010).

The origins of the Chao Ley remain unresolved and speculative despite
linguistic, sociocultural and genetic analyses (Dancause, 2009, p. 86). There
are a number of different theories relating to the origin of the Moken, e.g.,
in Myanmar-Mainland, coastal mainland SEA, China, or Taiwan (Dancause,
2009; Ivanoff, 2005; Ivanoff & Bountry, n.d.; Sopher, 1965, White, 1922). It
also still remains disputed whether the three groups of Chao Ley have a
common line of ancestry, and developed different languages and cultures
because of their movement throughout Southeast Asia, or whether they all
have distinct origins (UNESCO, 2001, p. 21).

Despite a rather vague oral prehistory of the Urak Lawoi’, there is some
sociological, geographical, historical and linguistic evidence that they are of
Malay origin, and that they are distinct in origin from the Moken, whose
relationship to the Malays is even more distant (Pattemore & Hogan, 1989).
The languages of the Moken, Moklen and Urak Lawoi’ belong to the same
language family - the Malayo-Polynesian branch of the Austronesian
languages (Kraisame, 2017, p. 2; Larish, 1999; Wongbusarakum, 2007, p. 9;
Nawichai, 2008, p. 52). The Moken and Moklen are members of the Moken-
Moklen sub-branch, while the Urak Lawoi’ fall under the Malay sub-branch22
(Kraisame, 2017, p. 2). The languages of these three sea-oriented groups are
spoken in the area of southern Burma on the Mergui Archipelago to the
west coast of Southern Thailand and the Malaysian border (Pittayaporn,
2005, p. 1). As Moken and Urak Lawoi’ languages have no script and no
written sources, transmission of language via text is not possible (Arunotai
et al., 2007, pp. 33, 35; Arunotai, Wongbusarakum, & Elias, 2007, p. 15;
Arunotai, 2008a, p. 76). Even though they have vibrant and abundant oral
traditions (Arunotai, 2007, p. 2), Moken is regarded as an endangered and
dying language (Kraisame, 2017).

The majority of Chao Ley are animists and practice shamanism
(Wongbusarakum, 2007, p. 40). At the same time, many Urak Lawoi’ state
that they are Buddhists, like the majority of Thais. However, there are little
signs of formal practice, and most Urak Lawoi’ continue to pay respect to
ancestral spirits and guardian spirits of natural places. Christianity is also
practiced (Arunotai et al. 2007, p. 33; Wongbusarakum, 2007, p. 40).

22. Although all three languages are part of the Austronesian family, the languages of the
Moken and Urak Lawoi’ are very different, and they cannot understand each other.
Moken and Moklen are partly mutually understandable, but the Moklen have included
Thai words in their vocabulary (Arunotai, 2017, p.4).

Background and Research Context 25

In the past, the Chao Ley used a wide variety of resources from the forest
and coral reefs for subsistence living. They maintained a self-sufficient
(semi-)nomadic way of life along the Andaman coast for hundreds of years
(Human Rights Watch, 2015; Wongbusarakum, 2007, p. 21).

Moken: Traditionally, the Moken travelled along coastal areas and islands
throughout the year. During the dry season, they lived in small, covered
wooden boats, called Kabang, traveling along the Mergui Archipelago to
forage and trade with taukay (middlemen) (Arunotai et al., 2007, p. 9;
Arunotai, 2008a, p. 73). The trading mainly involved marine products, e.g.,
sea cucumbers and turtle shells, in exchange for rice and other necessities
(Arunotai et al., 2007, p. 17; UNESCO, 2001, p. 9; Wasinrapee, 2006, p. 5).
During the rainy season they lived sedentary lives building temporary
shelters on beaches in protected bays or in the forest. This allowed them to
perform their ceremonies and to collect natural products (Arunotai et al.,
2007, p. 9; Arunotai, 2008a, p. 73; Ivanoff et al., 2002). Eventually they
settled in Thailand and the Mergui Archipelago23 (Arunotai, 2017, p. 5;
Ivanoff, 1997).

Urak Lawoi’: In comparison to the Moken, the Urak Lawoi’ have traditionally
led a semi-nomadic lifestyle. Throughout the dry season, they foraged for
food for between a few days and several months throughout the Archipelago.
During these trips, called bagad, they built simple shelters along the beach
(Arunotai et al., 2007, p. 31; Arunotai et al., 2008b, p. 359; Wongbusarakum,
2007, pp. 11, 19). In the rainy season, they stayed in bigger settlements
(Arunotai et al., 2008b, p. 359). Traditionally, they collected sea animals and
products to consume and trade, e.g., sea cucumbers or shells, and foraged in
the forests; some even grew wild rice (Arunotai et al., 2008b, pp. 357, 359;
2017, p. 4). Over the past 30-40 years, however, they have changed from
marine hunter-gatherers to sedentary fishermen (Arunotai et al., 2008b, p.
369).

The entire culture of the Chao Ley is based on an intimate relationship with
fishing and the ocean (Wongbusarakum, 2007, p. 19). Traditionally, they are

23. Several reasons have been identified for their decreasingly nomadic lifestyle: the
demarcation of national boundaries has made travelling across national borders
more difficult; increased privatization of land and touristic development have
restricted potential settlement areas; and due to the declaration of national parks and
protected areas, different laws and regulations prohibit the use of natural resources,
so that traditional boats can no longer be built. Finally, a sedentary lifestyle provides
certain benefits, such as improved access to education, health care, and employment
opportunities (Arunotai et al., 2007, pp. 12-12; 2017, p. 6).

26

highly knowledgeable about the sea and aquatic life, e.g., the tides, wind and
wave patterns, lunar cycles, and local marine species (Arunotai et al., 2007,
pp. 9, 14, 34; Wongbusarakum, 2007, pp. 58, 69). The Urak Lawoi’ possess
indigenous knowledge on the management of marine and coastal ecosystems
(Prapruit, Somboonsuke, Nissapa, & Torell, 2015, p. 178), reflected in their
language which has more than 20 words to describe different types of sea
cucumber, and which can differentiate between six types of giant clams,
where marine biologists can only identify three (Chantrapornsyl,
Kittiwattanawong, & Adulyanukosol, 1996; Wongbusarakum, 2007, p. 58).
Besides the commonly known wind types, the Urak Lawoi’ identify six
others with different characteristics and effects on fishing and traveling
conditions (Arunotai et al., 2007, p. 35; Wongbusarakum, 2007, p. 58).

Traditionally, Chao Ley also have an in-depth indigenous knowledge of the
local geography and the marine and terrestrial environment, and profound
skills in sea-related activities, particularly fishing and diving, and hunting
aquatic life, as well as in using plants and herbs for nutrition and medicinal
purposes (Arunotai et al., 2007, pp. 14, 34; Arunotai et al., 2008b, p. 358).
Based on their in-depth indigenous knowledge, they have efficiently and
responsibly managed the natural resources of the Adang Archipelago for
generations. According to Arunotai et al. (2006, 2007), their traditional
knowledge has been developed through interaction with and observation of
local ecosystems, and represents a form of natural resource conservation. It
includes knowledge and skills related to simple technologies that have
minimal impact on the natural environment; a (semi-)nomadic lifestyle and
rotating resource utilization that prevents over-use and allows the
replenishment of marine and forest resources; knowledge about forest and
marine species, allowing the Moken to make use of the biodiversity of
marine and terrestrial resources; a subsistence livelihood with little
accumulation of material goods; and certain cultural belief systems (e.g.,
belief in natural spirits) and taboos, as well as the notion of common
property to be shared among everyone (Arunotai, 2006; Arunotai et al.,
2007, pp. 21, 40; Ivanoff & Bountry, n.d.; UNESCO, 2001, p. 22;
Wongbusarakum, 2007, p. 21). Arunotai et al. (2007) elaborate how local
governments and park authorities usually do not recognize indigenous
knowledge and traditional harvesting practices, nor the fact that the people
have lived in the area since before the designation of the Marine National
Parks. The interests of the Chao Ley are largely ignored, while they are
blamed for resource degradation and depletion. Their traditional practices
are considered environmentally harmful, and are thus prohibited (Nawichai,
2008, p. xx).

Background and Research Context 27

In sum, this chapter has outlined how state policies targeting “hilltribes”
and other ethnic minority groups in Thailand have been marked by social,
cultural, political and territorial exclusion strategies. State-led conservation
policies, largely formulated without the participation of the ethnic minority
groups, have restricted the use of and management rights over land and
natural resources to government authorities, prohibiting local people from
engaging in resource management on land where they have subsisted for
generations. The different ethnic populations have experienced tremendous
impacts on their cultures, traditions and livelihoods due to increased
territorial control by the state and their growing integration into the global
market economy, while government policies have threatened their local
production systems, community-based resource management, and
sustainable livelihood activities. At the same time, the expansion of civil
society organizations and people’s movements has greatly contributed to an
increased recognition of community rights. A number of local communities
have engaged in negotiations with the state to create “within-state” space, to
free themselves to some degree from the constraints of the state, and to
promote their community rights, customary land use, and resource
management systems.

Against this backdrop, this study sheds light on proactive responses of
communities to state policy and development and on their negotiations
with those in power. It extends knowledge and provides empirical data on
constructive and successful aspects of cooperation and complementary co-
existence as well as challenges and difficulties that communities face in their
locally initiated negotiations.

28

2

RESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND QUESTIONS

This research has focused on the adaptive responses and negotiation
strategies of three ethnic communities in different parts of Thailand where
land and resource conflicts are of major concern for their members. The
three case studies were selected to provide insights into a range of negotiation
scenarios in different geographical and ethnic contexts of the country. Even
though these communities are distinct in terms of location, history, language,
and culture, they all face tenure insecurity and conflicts revolving around
land and natural resources in the context of protected areas, development
and conservation policies. They further experience various degrees of socio-
cultural marginalization and discrimination by the majority society. They
have all engaged in more or less successful negotiation processes with state
authorities as a means to address conflicts that threaten their livelihood
security and access to land, forest, or water.

The general objectives of the study are

• To enhance knowledge on adaptation and negotiation processes of ethnic
communities in the context of land and resource-related conflicts, which
is of great importance to future development in Thailand and the wider
region, particularly in the light of wide-spread territorial disputes between
local communities and authorities;

• To strengthen the involved ethnic communities through a participatory
research approach, and to enable government workers to find solutions in
collaboration with local communities.

30

In line with this, the CESD research project pursues the following specific
objectives:

1. To shed light on the development context and history of each particular
study site;

2. To explore “imagining communities” (Tanabe, 2008), including the
economic livelihoods of the members of each community;

3. To analyze adaptive strategies that local communities adopt in order to
cope with development challenges and resource conflicts, and which
incorporate their shared imaginations, desires and intentions;

4. To understand the negotiation processes of local communities with state
actors in attempts to create some “within state” space;

5. To come up with policy recommendations for socially fair and sustainable
development strategies in the case study areas and beyond.

Accordingly, the research questions were as follows:

1. What is the history and context of development as shaped by the state’s
development policies and practices, and what are the major problems
experienced by the three different ethnic communities?

2. What are key aspects of the socio-economic livelihoods in these three
communities?

3. What are the strategies that each community pursues to deal with
development challenges and resource conflicts?

4. What are the strengths and challenges of negotiation processes between
local actors and state authorities towards their “imagining communities”?

3

METHODOLOGY: AN ETHNOGRAPHIC
APPROACH TO NEGOTIATING
DEVELOPMENT

Through an ethnographic research approach it was possible to gain a deeper
understanding and comprehensive picture of the communities under study,
particularly through in-depth interviews and prolonged participatory
observation.
Over a total of 22 months, field researchers spent several months in each of
the three study sites, and lived and worked closely together with the villagers
in each community24.
Based on a participatory research design, community members in all three
sites were involved in the project as informants and contributors. In this
way, the study aimed at encouraging in-depth reflection and understanding
among the community members, as well as at promoting their sense of
partnership and agency. The study has made use of a number of ethnographic
research methods, with a slightly different approach for each community:
Formal and Informal Interviews with key informants were conducted in all
research sites. The forms of interviews varied from short, casual conversations
to more formal and structured, guided full length interviews. In some cases,
additional in-depth interviews were conducted to explore particular issues

24. The time that each field researcher spent in the community varied for each research
site, and all of them withdrew from the field in between their stays in order to reflect
on the data collection process from a distant perspective. The extensive fieldwork,
systematic long-term participation in and observation of the every-day practices of
the community as well as conversations with informants allowed the production of
detailed and rich descriptions of the people in their social setting.

32

in greater detail, e.g., on local history, development challenges, community
relationships, cooperation and conflicts.

Participatory Observation: In all three communities, researchers made use of
participatory observation to assess community features and structures. They
joined the everyday life of the community members and attended numerous
special events in the villages, such as Dara-ang New Year, traditional Karen
funerals, and meetings on land conflict solutions between the Chao Ley and
the National Legislative Assembly of Thailand. The participatory observational
research involved reflection on what was observed and on the questions and
objectives guiding the observations, leading to further data collection. The
opportunity for reflection was crucial to the process and was facilitated
through regular dialogue between members of the research team.

Focus Group Discussions: In all three communities, Focus Group Discussions
(FGD) were organized with different groups of villagers. The FGDs proved
to be helpful in identifying shared narratives on the community development
context.

Exchanges among Communities: The project further created space for the
three communities to share and exchange knowledge and experiences
on sustainable resource utilization, community rights and development
negotiations. Inter-community exchanges facilitated discussion and
reflections on community-relevant topics, such as the role of communities
in development and the potential of the youth to contribute to “imagining
communities”. Moreover, the event opened opportunities for the villagers to
establish relationships and networks with each other.

Sampling strategies followed purposive and snowball principles. Across all
three communities, around 100 informants were interviewed. These
included female and male villagers of different ages and with different
educational and professional backgrounds and social positions, e.g., village
leaders, community headmen, traditional leaders, representatives of
community groups, such as women, fishermen, or farmers, and other
knowledgeable community members. Interviews were conducted with NGO
staff working with the community, and local government officials (e.g.,
National Park authorities, staff of the sub-district hospital for health
promotion, Department of Health, and the Royal Project).

Methodology 33

Limitations of the Study

1. Challenges during data collection: in contrast to Huay Hin Lad Nai,
where the research team has established long-term relationships, less
contact was established with the community of Nor Lae prior to the
launch of the research project. Accordingly, it took the researcher several
weeks to gain the community members’ trust. Data collection, especially
by participatory observation, proved to be particularly difficult in Rawai.
The prolonged stay of the researcher caused confusion and discomfort
among some of the community members, and the researcher remained
socially excluded for several months before friendly relations could be
established. Also, as the Chao Ley community is facing multiple and
complex social conflicts (e.g., drug abuse, illegal gambling, and domestic
violence), the researcher found herself repeatedly drawn into social
problems and community internal difficulties, leading to her withdrawal
from the field and early termination of work.

2. Language barrier: Community members in all three research sites
communicate in a language other than Thai, the native language of the
three data collectors. Accordingly, in some situations the latter were
facing language barriers, e.g., when specific terms were used during
traditional cultural practices and rituals that do not have an equivalent in
Thai. However, most of the villagers in all three sites are able to speak
Thai fluently, and particularly young people were often able to resolve
uncertainties and ambiguities. Also, the ability of field researchers to
speak and write in English turned out to be limited, so that collected data
had to be translated into English in a time-consuming process. The
multiple language barriers and translations within the research process
have restricted the communication and interpretation of results, and
might have affected the analysis and interpretation of the results.

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