PART ONE ❯❯ ETHICAL THEORY
no quarrels among them, if there had been no such Euthyphro. No; they do not.
differences—would there now? Socrates. Then there are some things which they
do not venture to say and do: for they do not ven-
Euthyphro. You are quite right. ture to argue that the guilty are to be unpunished,
Socrates. Does not every man love that which he but they deny their guilt, do they not?
deems noble and just and good, and hate the oppo- Euthyphro. Yes.
site of them? Socrates. Then they do not argue that the evil-
Euthyphro. Very true. doer should not be punished, but they argue about
Socrates. But, as you say, people regard the same the fact of who the evil-doer is, and what he did and
things, some as just and others as unjust—about when?
these they dispute; and so there arise wars and Euthyphro. True.
fightings among them. Socrates. And the gods are in the same case, if as
Euthyphro. Very true. you assert they quarrel about just and unjust, and
Socrates. Then the same things are hated by the some of them say while others deny that injustice is
gods and loved by the gods, and are both hateful done among them. For surely neither God nor man
and dear to them? will ever venture to say that the doer of injustice is
Euthyphro. True. not to be punished?
Socrates. And upon this view the same things, Euthyphro. That is true, Socrates, in the main.
Euthyphro, will be pious and also impious? Socrates. But they join issue about the
Euthyphro. So I should suppose. particulars—gods and men alike; and, if they dispute
Socrates. Then, my friend, I remark with surprise at all, they dispute about some act which is called in
that you have not answered the question which question, and which by some is affirmed to be just,
I asked. For I certainly did not ask you to tell me by others to be unjust. Is not that true?
what action is both pious and impious: but now it Euthyphro. Quite true.
would seem that what is loved by the gods is also Socrates. Well then, my dear friend Euthyphro,
hated by them. And therefore, Euthyphro, in thus do tell me, for my better instruction and information,
chastising your father you may very likely be doing what proof have you that in the opinion of all the
what is agreeable to Zeus but disagreeable to Cronos gods a servant who is guilty of murder, and is put
or Uranus, and what is acceptable to Hephaestus but in chains by the master of the dead man, and dies
unacceptable to Heré, and there may be other gods because he is put in chains before he who bound
who have similar differences of opinion. him can learn from the interpreters of the gods
Euthyphro. But I believe, Socrates, that all the what he ought to do with him, dies unjustly; and
gods would be agreed as to the propriety of punish- that on behalf of such a one a son ought to proceed
ing a murderer: there would be no difference of opin- against his father and accuse him of murder. How
ion about that. would you show that all the gods absolutely agree in
Socrates. Well, but speaking of men, Euthyphro, approving of his act? Prove to me that they do, and
did you ever hear any one arguing that a murderer I will applaud your wisdom as long as I live.
or any sort of evil-doer ought to be let off? Euthyphro. It will be a difficult task; but I could
Euthyphro. I should rather say that these are the make the matter very clear indeed to you.
questions which they are always arguing, especially Socrates. I understand; you mean to say that
in courts of law: they commit all sorts of crimes, and I am not so quick of apprehension as the judges:
there is nothing which they will not do or say in for to them you will be sure to prove that the act is
their own defence. unjust, and hateful to the gods.
Socrates. But do they admit their guilt, Euthy- Euthyphro. Yes indeed, Socrates; at least if they
phro, and yet say that they ought not to be will listen to me.
punished?
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Chapter ❮❮ Religion and Global Ethics
Socrates. But they will be sure to listen if they find Euthyphro. I think that I understand.
that you are a good speaker. There was a notion that Socrates. And is not that which is beloved dis-
came into my mind while you were speaking; I said tinct from that which loves?
to myself: “Well, and what if Euthyphro does prove to Euthyphro. Certainly.
me that all the gods regarded the death of the serf as Socrates. Well; and now tell me, is that which is
unjust, how do I know anything more of the nature carried in this state of carrying because it is carried,
of piety and impiety? For granting that this action or for some other reason?
may be hateful to the gods, still piety and impiety Euthyphro. No; that is the reason.
are not adequately defined by these distinctions, for Socrates. And the same is true of what is led and
that which is hateful to the gods has been shown to of what is seen?
be also pleasing and dear to them.” And therefore, Euthyphro. True.
Euthyphro, I do not ask you to prove this; I will Socrates. And a thing is not seen because it is
suppose, if you like, that all the gods condemn and visible, but conversely, visible because it is seen;
abominate such an action. But I will amend the defi- nor is a thing led because it is in the state of being
nition so far as to say that what all the gods hate is led, or carried because it is in the state of being
impious, and what they love pious or holy; and what carried, but the converse of this. And now I think,
some of them love and others hate is both or neither. Euthyphro, that my meaning will be intelligible;
Shall this be our definition of piety and impiety? and my meaning is, that any state of action or pas-
sion implies previous action or passion. It does not
Euthyphro. Why not, Socrates? become because it is becoming, but it is in a state of
Socrates. Why not! Certainly, as far as I am con- becoming because it becomes; neither does it suffer
cerned, Euthyphro, there is no reason why not. But because it is in a state of suffering, but it is in a state
whether this admission will greatly assist you in the of suffering because it suffers. Do you not agree?
task of instructing me as you promised, is a matter Euthyphro. Yes.
for you to consider. Socrates. Is not that which is loved in some state
Euthyphro. Yes, I should say that what all the either of becoming or suffering?
gods love is pious and holy, and the opposite which Euthyphro. Yes.
they all hate, impious. Socrates. And the same holds as in the previous
Socrates. Ought we to enquire into the truth of instances; the state of being loved follows the act of
this, Euthyphro, or simply to accept the mere state- being loved, and not the act the state.
ment on our own authority and that of others? What Euthyphro. Certainly.
do you say? Socrates. And what do you say of piety, Euthy-
Euthyphro. We should enquire; and I believe that phro: is not piety, according to your definition, loved
the statement will stand the test of enquiry. by all the gods?
Socrates. We shall know better, my good friend, Euthyphro. Yes.
in a little while. The point which I should first wish Socrates. Because it is pious or holy, or for some
to understand is whether the pious or holy is beloved other reason?
by the gods because it is holy, or holy because it is Euthyphro. No, that is the reason.
beloved of the gods. Socrates. It is loved because it is holy, not holy
Euthyphro. I do not understand your meaning, because it is loved?
Socrates. Euthyphro. Yes.
Socrates. I will endeavour to explain; we speak Socrates. And that which is dear to the gods is
of carrying and we speak of being carried, of leading loved by them, and is in a state to be loved of them
and being led, seeing and being seen. You know that because it is loved of them?
in all such cases there is a difference, and you know Euthyphro. Certainly.
also in what the difference lies?
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PART ONE ❯❯ ETHICAL THEORY
Socrates. Then that which is dear to the gods, have been holy because loved by him. But now you
Euthyphro, is not holy, nor is that which is holy see that the reverse is the case, and that they are
loved of God, as you affirm; but they are two differ- quite different from one another. For one (qeojtlez)
ent things. is of a kind to be loved because it is loved, and the
other (oston) is loved because it is of a kind to be
Euthyphro. How do you mean, Socrates? loved. Thus you appear to me, Euthyphro, when
Socrates. I mean to say that the holy has been I ask you what is the essence of holiness, to offer
acknowledged by us to be loved of God because it is an attribute only, and not the essence—the attribute
holy, not to be holy because it is loved. of being loved by all the gods. But you still refuse to
Euthyphro. Yes. explain to me the nature of holiness. And therefore,
Socrates. But that which is dear to the gods is if you please, I will ask you not to hide your trea-
dear to them because it is loved by them, not loved sure, but to tell me once more what holiness or piety
by them because it is dear to them. really is, whether dear to the gods or not (for that is
Euthyphro. True. a matter about which we will not quarrel); and what
Socrates. But, friend Euthyphro, if that which is impiety?
is holy is the same with that which is dear to God,
and is loved because it is holy, then that which is Euthyphro. I really do not know, Socrates, how
dear to God would have been loved as being dear to to express what I mean. For somehow or other our
God; but if that which is dear to God is dear to him arguments, on whatever ground we rest them, seem
because loved by him, then that which is holy would to turn round and walk away from us.
READING
Letter to a Christian Nation
SAM HARRIS
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Study Questions
As you read the excerpt, please consider the following questions:
1. Why does Harris suggest that it is a “ludicrous obscenity” to raise children to believe that they are Christian, Muslim,
or Jewish?
2. What kind of evolutionary purpose may religion have served?
3. Is religion an impediment to building a global society?
One of the greatest challenges facing civiliza- Nothing stands in the way of this project more than
tion in the twenty-first century is for human the respect we accord religious faith.
beings to learn to speak about their deepest personal
concerns—about ethics, spiritual experience, and the ....
inevitability of human suffering—in ways that are If we ever do transcend our religious bewilder-
not flagrantly irrational. ment, we will look back upon this period in human
We desperately need a public discourse that Sam Harris, “Letter to a Christian Nation” (New York: Knopf, 2006),
encourages critical thinking and intellectual honesty. pp. 87–89.
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Chapter ❮❮ Religion and Global Ethics
history with horror and amazement. How could it reasonably conclude on their basis. There are good
have been possible for people to believe such things reasons to believe that people like Jesus and the
in the twenty first century? How could it be that Buddha weren't talking nonsense when they spoke
they allowed their societies to become so danger- about our capacity as human beings to transform
ously fragmented by empty notions about God and our lives in rare and beautiful ways. But any gen-
Paradise? uine exploration of ethics or the contemplative life
demands the same standards of reasonableness and
.... self-criticism that animate all intellectual discourse.
Clearly, it is time we learned to meet our emotional
needs without embracing the preposterous. We must As a biological phenomenon, religion is the
find ways to invoke the power of ritual and to mark product of cognitive processes that have deep roots
those transitions in every human life that demand in our evolutionary past. Some researchers have
profundity—birth, marriage, death—without lying to speculated that religion itself may have played an
ourselves about the nature of reality. Only then will important role in getting large groups of prehistoric
the practice of raising our children to believe that they humans to socially cohere. If this is true, we can say
are Christian, Muslim, or Jewish be widely recognized that religion has served an important purpose. This
as the ludicrous obscenity that it is. And only then does not suggest, however, that it serves an impor-
will we stand a chance of healing the deepest and tant purpose now. There is, after all, nothing more
most dangerous fractures in our world. natural than rape. But no one would argue that rape
... is good, or compatible with a civil society, because
It is important to realize that the distinction it may have had evolutionary advantages for our
between science and religion is not a matter of ancestors. That religion may have served some nec-
excluding our ethical intuitions and spiritual expe- essary function for us in the past does not preclude
riences from our conversation about the world; it the possibility that it is now the greatest impediment
is a matter of our being honest about what we can to our building a global civilization.
READING
Religion and Truth
MOHANDAS K. GANDHI
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Study Questions
As you read the excerpt, please consider the following questions:
1. How does Gandhi describe “the religion that underlies all religions”?
2. Why does Gandhi think that ahimsa (nonviolence) and self-purification are important?
3. What is the one unifying element of the world’s diverse religions, according to Gandhi?
By religion, I do not mean formal religion, or cus- Let me explain what I mean by religion. It is not
tomary religion, but that religion which under- the Hindu religion which I certainly prize above all
lies all religions, which brings us face to face with other religions, but the religion which transcends
our Maker. Hinduism, which changes one’s very nature, which
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PART ONE ❯❯ ETHICAL THEORY
binds one indissolubly to the truth within and which as immovable as the Himalayas and as white and
ever purifies. It is the permanent element in human bright as the snows on their peaks?
nature which counts no cost too great in order to
find full expression and which leaves the soul utterly This belief in God has to be based on faith which
restless until it has found itself, known its Maker transcends reason. Indeed, even the so-called real-
and appreciated the true correspondence between ization has at bottom an element of faith without
the Maker and itself. which it cannot be sustained. In the very nature of
things it must be so. Who can transgress the limita-
I have not seen Him, neither have I known Him. tions of his being? I hold that complete realization
I have made the world’s faith in God my own, and is impossible in this embodied life. Nor is it neces-
as my faith is ineffaceable, I regard that faith as sary. A living immovable faith is all that is required
amounting to experience. However, as it may be for reaching the full spiritual height attainable by
said that to describe faith as experience is to tamper human beings. God is not outside this earthly case
with truth, it may perhaps be more correct to say of ours. Therefore, exterior proof is not of much
that I have no word for characterizing my belief in avail, if any at all. We must ever fail to perceive Him
God. through the senses, because He is beyond them. We
can feel Him, if we will but withdraw ourselves from
There is an indefinable mysterious Power that the senses. The divine music is incessantly going on
pervades everything. I feel it, though I do not see within ourselves, but the loud senses drown the del-
it. It is this unseen Power which makes itself felt icate music, which is unlike and infinitely superior to
and yet defies all proof, because it is so unlike all anything we can perceive or hear with our senses.
that I perceive through my senses. It transcends the
senses. But it is possible to reason out the existence But He is no God who merely satisfies the intel-
of God to a limited extent. lect, if He ever does. God to be God must rule the
heart and transform it. He must express Himself in
I do dimly perceive that whilst everything around every the smallest act of His votary. This can only
me is ever-changing, ever-dying, there is underlying be done through a definite realization more real than
all that change a Living Power that is changeless, the five senses can ever produce. Sense perceptions
that holds all together, that creates, dissolves, and can be, often are, false and deceptive, however real
re-creates. That informing Power or Spirit is God. they may appear to us. Where there is realization
And since nothing else I see merely through the outside the senses it is infallible. It is proved not by
senses can or will persist, He alone is. extraneous evidence but in the transformed conduct
and character of those who have felt the real pres-
And is this Power benevolent or malevolent? I ence of God within. Such testimony is to be found
see it as purely benevolent. For I can see that in the in the experiences of an unbroken line of prophets
midst of death life persists, in the midst of untruth and sages in all countries and climes. To reject this
truth persists, in the midst of darkness light persists. evidence is to deny oneself.
Hence I gather that God is Life, Truth, Light. He is
Love. He is the Supreme God. To me God is Truth and Love; God is ethics and
morality; God is fearlessness. God is the source of
I know, too, that I shall never know God if I do Light and Life and yet He is above and beyond
not wrestle with and against evil even at the cost all these. God is conscience. He is even the athe-
of life itself. I am fortified in the belief by my own ism of the atheist. . . . He transcends speech and
humble and limited experience. The purer I try to reason. . . . He is a personal God to those who need
become the nearer to God I feel myself to be. How His personal presence. He is embodied to those
much more should I be near to Him when my faith who need His touch. He is the purest essence. He
is not a mere apology, as it is today, but has become simply is to those who have faith. He is all things
to all men. He is in us and yet above and beyond
From Mohandas K. Gandhi, All Men Are Brothers (Lausanne, SA:
Unesco, 1969). Reprinted by permission of Navajivan Trust.
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Chapter ❮❮ Religion and Global Ethics
us. . . . He is long-suffering. He is patient but He is to me. Each step upward makes me feel stronger and
also terrible. . . . With Him ignorance is no excuse. fit for the next.
And withal He is ever forgiving for He always gives
us the chance to repent. He is the greatest democrat I am endeavouring to see God through service of
the world knows, for He leaves us ‘unfettered’ to humanity, for I know that God is neither in heaven,
make our own choice between evil and good. He is nor down below, but in every one.
the greatest tyrant ever known, for He often dashes
the cup from our lips and under the cover of free will Indeed religion should pervade every one of our
leaves us a margin so wholly inadequate as to pro- actions. Here religion does not mean sectarianism. It
vide only mirth for Himself. . . . Therefore Hinduism means a belief in ordered moral government of the
calls it all His sport. universe. It is not less real because it is unseen. This
religion transcends Hinduism, Islam, Christianity,
To see the universal and all-pervading Spirit of etc. It does not supersede them. It harmonizes them
Truth face to face one must be able to love the mean- and gives them reality.
est of creation as oneself. And a man who aspires
after that cannot afford to keep out of any field of Religions are different roads converging to the
life. That is why my devotion to truth has drawn same point. What does it matter that we take dif-
me into the field of politics; and I can say without ferent roads, so long as we reach the same goal?
the slightest hesitation, and yet in all humility, that In reality, there are as many religions as there are
those who say that religion has nothing to do with individuals.
politics do not know what religion means.
If a man reaches the heart of his own religion, he
Identification with everything that lives is has reached the heart of the others too.
impossible without self-purification; without self-
purification the observance of the law of ahimsa¯ So long as there are different religions, every
must remain an empty dream; God can never one of them may need some distinctive symbol. But
be realized by one who is not pure of heart. Self- when the symbol is made into a fetish and an instru-
purification therefore must mean purification in all ment of proving the superiority of one’s religion over
walks of life. And purification being highly infec- other’s, it is fit only to be discarded.
tious, purification of oneself necessarily leads to the
purification of one’s surroundings. After long study and experience, I have come to
the conclusion that: (1) all religions are true; (2) all
But the path of self-purification is hard and steep. religions have some error in them; (3) all religions
To attain to perfect purity one has to become abso- are almost as dear to me as my own Hinduism, in as
lutely passion-free in thought, speech and action; to much as all human beings should be as dear to one
rise above the opposing currents of love and hatred, as one’s own close relatives. My own veneration for
attachment and repulsion. I know that I have not other faiths is the same as that for my own faith;
in me as yet that triple purity, in spite of constant, therefore no thought of conversion is possible.
ceaseless striving for it. That is why the world’s
praise fails to move me, indeed it very often stings God has created different faiths just as He has the
me. To conquer the subtle passions seems to me to votaries thereof. How can I even secretly harbour
be far harder than the physical conquest of the world the thought that my neighbour’s faith is inferior to
by the force of arms. mine and wish that he should give up his faith and
embrace mine? As a true and loyal friend, I can only
I am but a poor struggling soul yearning to be wish and pray that he may live and grow perfect in
wholly good—wholly truthful and wholly non- his own faith. In God’s house there are many man-
violent in thought, word and deed; but ever failing sions and they are equally holy.
to reach the ideal which I know to be true. It is a
painful climb, but the pain of it is a positive pleasure Let no one even for a moment entertain the fear
that a reverent study of other religions is likely
to weaken or shake one’s faith in one’s own. The
Hindu system of philosophy regards all religions as
containing the elements of truth in them and enjoins
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PART ONE ❯❯ ETHICAL THEORY
an attitude of respect and reverence towards them would be only one religion on earth in practice. In
all. This of course presupposes regard for one’s own theory, since there is one God, there can be only
religion. Study and appreciation of other religions one religion. But in practice, no two persons I have
need not cause a weakening of that regard; it should known have had the same identical conception of
mean extension of that regard to other religions. God. Therefore, there will, perhaps, always be dif-
ferent religions answering to different temperaments
It is better to allow our lives to speak for us than and climatic conditions.
our words. God did not bear the Cross only 1,900
years ago, but He bears it today, and He dies and is I believe that all the great religions of the world
resurrected from day to day. It would be poor com- are true more or less. I say “more or less” because
fort to the world if it had to depend upon a historical I believe that everything that the human hand
God who died 2,000 years ago. Do not then preach touches, by reason of the very fact that human
the God of history, but show Him as He lives today beings are imperfect, becomes imperfect. Perfection
through you. is the exclusive attribute of God and it is indescrib-
able, untranslatable. I do believe that it is possible
I do not believe in people telling others of their for every human being to become perfect even as
faith, especially with a view to conversion. Faith God is perfect. It is necessary for us all to aspire after
does not admit of telling. It has to be lived and then perfection, but when that blessed state is attained,
it becomes self-propagating. it becomes indescribable, indefinable. And, I, there-
fore, admit, in all humility, that even the Vedas, the
Divine knowledge is not borrowed from books. It Koran and the Bible are imperfect word of God and,
has to be realized in oneself. Books are at best an imperfect beings that we are, swayed to and fro by a
aid, often even a hindrance. multitude of passions, it is impossible for us even to
understand this word of God in its fullness.
I believe in the fundamental truth of all great reli-
gions of the world. I believe that they are all God- I do not believe in the exclusive divinity of the
given, and I believe that they were necessary for Vedas. I believe the Bible, the Koran and the Zend
the people to whom these religions were revealed. Avesta, to be as much divinely inspired as the Vedas.
And I believe that, if only we could all of us read the My belief in the Hindu scriptures does not require
scriptures of the different faiths from the standpoint me to accept every word and every verse as divinely
of the followers of those faiths, we should find that inspired. . . . I decline to be bound by any interpreta-
they were at the bottom all one and were all helpful tion, however learned it may be, if it is repugnant to
to one another. reason or moral sense.
Belief in one God is the corner-stone of all
religions. But I do not foresee a time when there
REVIEW EXERCISES 3. If you could develop a global ethic, what would its
basic values be?
1. Describe the challenge of developing a global
ethical perspective in light of religious and national 4. Explain arguments in favor of the divine command
differences. theory of ethics, as well as arguments against that
theory. Is it true that if there were no God, then
2. What is the history of the idea of universal human everything would be permitted?
rights? How is this history susceptible to the charge
that it is Eurocentric?
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Chapter ❮❮ Religion and Global Ethics
5. Is the humanistic or secular approach to ethics bet- 7. Are you optimistic about our ability to develop a
ter than religious approaches to ethics? How so? Is global ethical consensus across our national and reli-
the humanistic or secular approach antagonistic to gious differences? Why or why not?
religion?
8. Do you think that all religions are pointing in a simi-
6. What does Socrates mean when he says in Euthyphro lar direction, or are there irreconcilable differences
that the holy or pious is holy or pious because it is among the world’s religions?
loved by the gods? Do you agree with his argument?
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3 Ethical Relativism
Learning Outcomes
After reading this chapter, you should be able to:
• Describe the difference between • Evaluate the arguments in favor of and
descriptive relativism and metaethical • against relativism.
Kisialiou Yury/Alamy Stock Photo Differentiate between relativism and a
• relativism.
Discuss criticisms of objectivism, • commitment to tolerance.
Explain how relativism might come up
• subjectivism, relativism, and moral realism. in conversations about concrete moral
Explain how relativism poses a problem
• for moral judgment. • issues.
Explain the connections between Defend your own ideas about relativism.
relativism and pluralism.
For more chapter resources and activities, go to MindTap.
Chapter 2 introduced the difficulty of trying to discover a set of universal values that
are valid for people who come from diverse religious and cultural backgrounds.
This points toward the problem of relativism. Relativism means that our judgments
about ethics are relative to (or dependent upon) something else. Cultural relativism
holds that ethical judgments are relative to cultural contexts. Individualistic versions
of relativism hold that judgments about morality are relative to an individual’s point
of view. In saying that judgments are relative to individuals or cultures, we mean that
they are a function of, or dependent on, what those individuals or cultures happen to
believe. Relativism can be based upon epistemological claims about what we know.
Relativism can also be based upon a claim about the nature of values (as discussed
in Chapter 1). The epistemological approach maintains that knowledge about values
is derived from or dependent upon a cultural context or worldview. A metaphysical
approach claims that there are no absolute, transcendent, or universal values. For the
metaphysical relativist, there are only individual perspectives and culturally defined
values—there are no absolute or objective values.
Relativism is a very difficult metaethical issue. It asks us to consider how we know
things in the realm of morality. And it asks us to consider the ultimate nature or real-
ity of moral values. The belief that guides this text—indeed, the belief that guides
most philosophical discussions of ethics—is that better and worse choices can be
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Chapter ❮❮ Ethical Relativism
made, and that morality is not simply a matter of There are a variety of examples of descriptive
what we feel to be morally right or wrong; nor is relativism. In some countries, it is acceptable for
morality simply a matter of what our culture tells us. women to wear short skirts; in others, women are
If this were not the case, then there would not seem expected to cover their legs and hair. Indeed, relativ-
to be much point in studying ethics. The purpose of ism shows up in the language we use to describe
studying ethics, as noted in Chapter 1, is to improve contested practices. Consider the practice of cutting
one’s ability to make good ethical judgments. If ethi- women’s genitals. Those who are sympathetic to the
cal relativism were true, then this purpose could not practice might call it female circumcision. But that
be achieved. practice is illegal in other societies, which condemn
it by calling it female genital mutilation (as we dis-
DESCRIPTIVE VERSUS NORMATIVE cuss in Chapters 9 and 12). You should be able to
ETHICAL RELATIVISM think of many other examples of such differences.
Ethical relativism is a kind of skepticism about ethi- Descriptive relativism might appear to lead to a
cal reasoning—it is skeptical of the idea that there normative rule of thumb, that “When in Rome,” we
are right and wrong answers to ethical questions. should “do as the Romans do.” This saying origi-
There are some good reasons why we might be nated from a discussion between Augustine and
skeptical about the existence of universal or objec- Ambrose—two important Christian saints of the
tive values (or that we can know what the objective fourth century. Augustine noticed that the Christians
or universal values are). One reason for skepticism in Rome fasted on a different day than the Christians
is the empirical and historical fact that different cul- in Milan. Ambrose explained that when in Rome, he
tures disagree about moral values. As a descriptive does what the Romans do. In many cases, it does
fact, relativism appears to be true: it is evident that appear to be wise to go along with local practices.
there are different ideas about ethics at large in the The issue of the appropriate day for fasting is a minor
world. What we call descriptive ethical relativism point and it is easy enough to “go along” with such
is the factual or descriptive claim that there are dif- minor details. But should we also go along with local
ferent ideas about values. practices that could include slavery, female genital
mutilation, child sacrifice, or cannibalism?
In support of descriptive relativism, we might list
some of the ways that cultures vary with regard to Different cultures do have different values. But it
morality. Some societies hold bribery to be morally might still be the case that some of these cultures are
acceptable, but other societies condemn it. Views wrong about certain values. Recall the “fact/value”
on appropriate sexual behavior and practices vary distinction discussed in Chapter 1. Just because
widely. Some societies believe that cannibalism, the something is a fact of the world (as descriptive rel-
eating of human flesh, is good because it ensures ativism is a fact) does not mean that it is a good
tribal fertility or increases manliness. Some groups of thing. It is possible that we ought to strive to over-
the Inuit, the native peoples of northern Canada and come our cultural differences. And it is possible that
Alaska, believed that it was appropriate to abandon some cultures (or individuals) are wrong—despite
their elderly when they could no longer travel with the fact that cultures and individuals vary in their
the group, whereas other groups once practiced ritual moral judgments. We want to say, for example, that
strangulation of the old by their children. The anthro- cultures that practice slavery (as the United States
pologist Ruth Benedict documented the case of a did until the 1860s) are wrong to do so. The mere
Northwest Indian group that believed it was justified fact that cultures disagree about values should not
in killing an innocent person for each member of the immunize cultures from moral criticism. But to say
group who had died. This was not a matter of revenge that a culture is wrong, we need an objective or non-
but a way of fighting death. In place of bereavement, relativist account of the values that would allow us
the group felt relieved by the second killing.1 to criticize that culture.
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PART ONE ❯❯ ETHICAL THEORY
A stronger version of relativism goes beyond about what is right and wrong, but some people
merely descriptive relativism and claims that there doubt that ethical judgments are the sorts of things
are no objective or absolute values that would allow about which we could agree. Some people think of
us to make such criticisms. We call this version of morality as a matter of subjective opinion. This is
relativism metaethical relativism. Metaethical basically the conclusion of ethical relativism: moral-
relativism holds that there are no universal or objec- ity is simply a function of the moral beliefs that peo-
tive norms (or that human beings cannot know such ple have. There is nothing beyond this. Specifically,
objective values). Rather, from this point of view, no category of objective moral truth or reality exists
values are simply the beliefs, opinions, practices, that is comparable to that which we seem to find in
or feelings of individuals and cultures. In saying the world of nature investigated by science.
that values are “relative” to individuals or societies,
we mean that they are a function of, or dependent INDIVIDUAL VERSUS CULTURAL
on, what those individuals or societies do, in fact, RELATIVISM
believe. According to metaethical relativism, there
is no objective right and wrong. The opposite point In further exploring the nature of ethical relativism,
of view, that there is an objective right and wrong, we should note that it has two basic and different
is often called objectivism, or sometimes simply forms.2 According to one form, called personal or
nonrelativism. individual relativism (also called subjectivism),
ethical judgments and beliefs are the expressions of
We can understand more about ethical relativ- the moral outlook and attitudes of individual per-
ism by comparing ethics with science. Most people sons. Rather than being objective, such judgments
believe that the natural sciences (biology, chemis- are subjective. I have my ethical views, and you
try, physics, geology, and their modern variants) have yours; neither my views nor yours are better
tell us things about the natural world. Through- or more correct. I may believe that a particular war
out the centuries, and in modern times, in particu- was unjust, and you may believe it was just. Some-
lar, science seems to have made great progress in one else may believe that all war is wrong. Accord-
uncovering the nature and structure of our world. ing to this form of relativism, because no objective
Moreover, science seems to have a universal valid- right or wrong exists, no particular war can be said
ity. Regardless of a person’s individual temperament, to be really just or unjust, right or wrong, nor can
background, or culture, the same natural world all wars. We each have our individual histories that
seems accessible to all who sincerely and openly explain how we have come to hold our particular
investigate it. Modern science is thought to be gov- views or attitudes. But they are just that—our own
erned by a generally accepted method and seems individual views and attitudes. We cannot say that
to produce a gradually evolving common body of they are correct or incorrect because to do so would
knowledge. Although this is the popular view of sci- assume some objective standard of right and wrong
ence, philosophers hold that the situation regarding against which we could judge their correctness.
science is much more complex and problematic. And Such a standard does not exist, according to ethical
it is possible for there to be relativism with regard to relativism.3
theories of the natural world. Not everyone agrees,
for example, that Western biomedicine holds all the The second form of ethical relativism, called
answers to good health. Nevertheless, it is useful to social or cultural relativism, holds that ethical val-
compare the ordinary view of science as providing ues vary from society to society and that the basis
objective truth about the physical world with com- for moral judgments lies in these social or cultural
mon understandings of morality. views. For an individual to decide and do what is
right, he or she must look to the norms of the soci-
Morality, in contrast to science, does not seem ety. People in a society may, in fact, believe that
so objective. Not only is there no general agreement their views are the correct moral views. However, a
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Chapter ❮❮ Ethical Relativism
cultural relativist holds that no society’s views are valued,” for example, but they will disagree about Jose Luis Cereijido/EPA/Newscom
better than any other in a transcultural sense. Some what counts as “life” and what counts as “valuing
may be different from others, and some may not be life.” It might be that both human and animal lives
the views generally accepted by a wider group of count and so no animal lives can be taken in order
societies, but that does not make these views worse, to support human beings. Or it might be that some
more backward, or incorrect in any objective sense. form of ritual sacrifice could be justified as a way of
valuing life.
For more chapter resources and
activities, go to MindTap. One version of this kind of “weak relativism” or
“soft universalism” is the “capabilities approach”
STRONG AND WEAK RELATIVISM to ethics and human welfare—as developed by the
economist Amartya Sen and the philosopher Martha
While it is obvious that different cultures or societ- Nussbaum. Nussbaum maintains that there are cer-
ies often have different views about what is morally tain central features of human flourishing or human
right and wrong, ethical relativism goes further. For well-being, including life, bodily health, bodily
the stronger versions of ethical relativism, what is integrity, and so on. But she admits the possibility
morally right for one just depends on what his or of “multiple realization” of these basic capabilities.
her society holds is right. There are no transcultural As Nussbaum explains, “each of the capabilities
moral principles, even ideally. One author often may be concretely realized in a variety of different
associated with relativism is Friedrich Nietzsche. ways, in accordance with individual tastes, local cir-
Nietzsche maintains that words like good and evil cumstances, and traditions.”5 Nussbaum’s approach
are defined by different people based upon their own
perspectives on the world. Indeed, Nietzsche is often Philosopher Martha C. Nussbaum during an
viewed as a proponent of perspectivism, the idea event at Oveido University in Spain.
that there are only perspectives on the world—and
nothing beyond these perspectives. Nietzsche also
thinks that moral judgments reflect power relations
and basic instinctual needs. For example, those who
are in power tend to call themselves “good” because
they instinctively view themselves as superior to
those who are less powerful. As Nietzsche explains,
“It is our needs that interpret the world; our drives
and their For and Against. Every drive is a kind
of lust to rule; each one has its perspective that it
would like to compel all the other drives to accept as
a norm.”4 For Nietzsche, there is no truth beneath
these perspectives, instincts, and drives other than
the “will to power.” Such a strong version of relativ-
ism makes it quite difficult to judge or criticize across
cultural divides.
A weaker version of relativism holds that there
are some abstract and basic norms or values that are
shared but that these abstract values are expressed
in different cultures in different ways. Thus, differ-
ent cultures may share the idea that “life should be
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PART ONE ❯❯ ETHICAL THEORY
leads to a sort of pluralism. Nussbaum writes that capable thinkers pursuing such a topic for millennia,
“legitimate concerns for diversity, pluralism, and one would think that some agreement would have
personal freedom are not incompatible with the rec- been reached. But this seems not to be the case. It
ognition of universal norms; indeed, universal norms is not only on particular issues such as abortion that
are actually required if we are to protect diversity, sincere people disagree but also on basic moral val-
pluralism, and freedom, treating each human being ues or principles.
as an agent and an end.”6 But critics will argue that
so long as there is no universal agreement about the Tolerance and Open-Mindedness
specific sorts of values that count for human flour-
ishing and an ethical life, we are still left with a kind Related to the fact of diversity is the desire to be
of relativism. tolerant and open-minded. Often people maintain
relativism in an attempt to refrain from judging and
Nussbaum’s Central Capabilities7 condemning others. Since we know that there are
problems with regard to ethnocentrism and bias in
1. Life judging, we may want to prevent these problems by
espousing relativism. From this perspective, the idea
2. Bodily health is that since there are a variety of cultures with dif-
ferent values, we are in no place to judge which cul-
3. Bodily integrity ture is right and wrong. Furthermore, a defender of
relativism may argue that those who try to judge are
4. Senses, imagination, and thought being ethnocentric, closed-minded, and intolerant.
5. Emotions Moral Uncertainty
6. Practical reason Another reason to believe that what relativism holds
is true is the great difficulty we often have in know-
7. Affiliation ing what is the morally right thing to believe or do.
We don’t know what is morally most important.
8. Other species For example, we do not know whether it is bet-
ter to help one’s friend or do the honest thing in a
9. Play case in which we cannot do both. Perhaps helping
the friend is best in some circumstances, but being
10. Control over one’s environment: political and honest is best in others. We are not sure which is
material best in a particular case. Furthermore, we cannot
know for sure what will happen down the line if we
REASONS SUPPORTING ETHICAL choose one course over another. Each of us is also
RELATIVISM aware of our personal limitations and the subjective
viewpoint that we bring to moral judging. Thus, we
There are many reasons for believing that ethical distrust our own judgments. We then generalize and
relativism is true. We will first summarize the three conclude that all moral judgments are simply per-
most commonly given reasons and then evaluate sonal and subjective viewpoints.
their related arguments.8
Situational Differences
The Diversity of Moral Views
Finally, people and situations, cultures and times
One reason most often given to support relativism differ in significant ways. The situations and living
is the existence of moral diversity among people worlds of different people vary so much that it is
and cultures. In fields such as science and history, difficult to believe that the same things that would
investigation tends to result in general agreement
despite the diversity among scientists. But we have
not come to such agreement in ethics. Philosophers
have been investigating questions about the basis
of morality since ancient times. With sincere and
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Chapter ❮❮ Ethical Relativism
be right for one would be right for another. In some the current human condition and prevent serious harm iStockphoto.com/David Parsons
places, overpopulation or drought is a problem; other to existing and future generations.
places have too few people or too much water. In
some places, people barely have access to the basic Many apparent moral disagreements are not
necessities of life; in other places, food is plentiful moral disagreements at all but disagreements about
and the standard of living is high. Some individuals factual or other beliefs. But suppose that at least
are healthy, while others are seriously ill. Some are some of them are about moral matters. Suppose
more outgoing, while others are more reserved. How that we do disagree about the relative value, for
can the same things be consistently right or wrong example, of health and peace, honesty and generos-
under such different circumstances and for such dif- ity, or about what rights people do and do not have.
ferent individuals? It seems unlikely, then, that any It is this type of disagreement that the moral relativ-
moral theory or judgment can apply in a general or ist would need to make his or her point.
universal manner. We thus tend to conclude that
they must be relative to the particular situation and What Would Disagreement about Basic Moral
circumstance and that no objective or universally Matters Prove? In past years, we have asked stu-
valid moral good exists. dents in our ethics classes to tell us in what year
George Washington died. A few brave souls ven-
ARE THESE REASONS CONVINCING? ture a guess: 1801, or at least after 1790? No one
is sure. Does this disagreement or lack of certitude
Let us consider possible responses by a nonrelativist prove that he did not die or that he died on no par-
or objectivist to the preceding three points. ticular date? Belief that he did die and on a particu-
lar date is consistent with differences of opinion and
The Diversity of Moral Views with uncertainty. So also in ethics: people can dis-
agree about what constitutes the right thing to do
We can consider the matter of diversity of moral and yet believe that there is a right thing to do. “Is it
views from two different perspectives. First, we can not because of this belief that we try to decide what
ask, how widespread and deep is the disagreement? is right and worry that we might miss it?” the non-
Second, we may ask, what does the fact of disagree- relativist would ask.
ment prove?
Or consider the supposed contrast between eth-
How Widespread and Deep Is the Disagreement? ics and science. Although a body of knowledge
If two people disagree about a moral matter, does this
always amount to a moral disagreement? For example, Arguments over moral matters often stem from factual
Bill says that we ought to cut down dramatically on adnisdagorteheemr seonutsrc, esuscahreacsawuhsientghecratCaOst2reomphisicsicolnims fartoemchcaanrsge.
carbon dioxide emissions, while Jane says that we do
not have a moral obligation to do this. This looks like
a basic moral disagreement, but it actually may result
from differences in their factual, rather than ethical,
beliefs. Bill may believe that the current rate of carbon
emissions is causing and will cause dramatically harm-
ful global climate effects, such as rising sea levels and
more severe weather. Jane may see no such connection
because she believes that scientists’ assessments and
predictions are in error. If they did agree on the factual
issues, then Bill and Jane would agree on the moral
conclusion. It turns out that they both agree on the
basic moral obligation to do what we can to improve
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PART ONE ❯❯ ETHICAL THEORY
exists on which those working in the physical sci- sort of dilemma is not strictly a question of relativ-
ences agree, those at the forefront of these sciences ism but of skepticism. Skepticism is the view that
often profoundly disagree. Does such disagreement it is difficult, if not impossible, to know something.
prove that no objectivity exists in such matters? If However, does the fact that we are uncertain about
people disagree about whether the universe began the answer to some question, even a moral ques-
with a “big bang” or about what happened in its first tion, prove that it lacks an answer? One reason for
millisecond, then does this prove that no answer is skepticism might be the belief that we can see things
to be found, even in principle, about the universe’s only from our own perspective and thus, in ethics
beginning? Not necessarily. and other inquiries, can never know things as they
are. This is a form of subjectivism (as defined ear-
Tolerance and Open-Mindedness lier). The nonrelativist could argue that in our very
dissatisfaction with not knowing and in our seek-
While some people think that relativism goes hand ing to know what we ought to do, we behave as
in hand with tolerance and open-mindedness, it is though we believe that a better or worse choice can
not necessarily true that these things are mutually be made.
implied. It is possible to hold that since there are a
variety of different cultures, we should simply ignore In contrast, matters of science and history often
the other cultures or show them no respect whatso- eventually get clarified and settled. We can now look
ever. If relativism holds that there are no universal up the date of George Washington’s death (1799),
norms that tell us how to deal with cross-cultural and scientists gradually improve our knowledge in
interaction, then tolerance and open-mindedness various fields. “Why is there no similar progress in
themselves must be seen as culturally relative val- ethical matters?” relativists might respond. Answers
ues, no more legitimate than intolerance or aggres- to that question will depend upon a variety of issues,
sion. Moreover, if Nietzsche is correct that the moral including our ideas about ethical theory (as dis-
world consists of perspectives and struggles for cussed in the first half of this book) and ideas about
power, then there is no good reason to remain open- progress on social issues (as discussed in the sec-
minded and tolerant. Indeed, relativism might be ond half). The fact of continued disagreement about
used to support the use of power in order to defend moral theory and moral issues reminds us that ethi-
and expand your own worldview or perspective cal inquiry is different from inquiry in history and
when it comes into conflict with others. the social sciences or in the natural sciences.
Moral Uncertainty Situational Differences
Let us examine the point that moral matters are com- Do dramatic differences in people’s life situations
plex and difficult to determine. Because of this, we make it unlikely or impossible for them to have any
are often uncertain about what is the morally best common morality? Suppose that health is taken
thing to do. For example, those who “blow the whis- as an objective value. Is it not the case that what
tle” on unscrupulous employers or coworkers must contributes to the health of some is different from
find it difficult to know whether they are doing the what contributes to the health of others? Insulin
right thing when they consider the potential costs to injections are often good for the diabetic but not
themselves and others around them. However, this for the nondiabetic. A nonrelativist might reply as
Basic Moral Agreement Factual Disagreement Different Moral Conclusions
We ought not to harm. We ought to reduce emissions.
We ought not to harm. CO2 emissions harm. We need not reduce emissions.
CO2 emissions do not harm.
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Chapter ❮❮ Ethical Relativism
follows: even though the good in these specific cases view of,” then the statement simply states the fact
differs, there is still a general value—health—that is that people do disagree. It states that “What is right
the goal. Similarly, justice involves “giving to each in the view of one person is not what is right in the
his or her due”; but what is due people is not always view of the other.” However, this is not yet relativ-
strictly the same. Those who work hard may deserve ism. Relativism goes beyond this in its belief that
something different from those who do not, and the this is all there is. Relativists will claim that there
guilty deserve punishment that the innocent do not. only are various points of view and that there is no
These different applications of justice do not mean way to reconcile what’s right for one person with
that justice is not an objective moral value. (See the what’s right for another. Similarly, if for is used in
table below.) the sense “Insulin injections are good for some peo-
ple but not for others,” then the original statement
One reason situational differences may lead us to is also not necessarily relativistic. It could, in fact,
think that no objective moral value is possible is that imply that health is a true or objective good and that
we may be equating objectivism with what is some- what leads to it is good and what diminishes it is
times called absolutism. Absolutism is the view bad. For ethical relativism, on the other hand, there
that moral rules or principles have no exceptions is no such objective good.
and are context-independent. One example of such
a rule is “Stealing is always wrong.” According to IS RELATIVISM SELF CONTRADICTORY?
absolutism, situational differences such as whether
or not a person is starving would make no difference One significant argument against relativism is that
to moral conclusions about whether that person is it is self-contradictory. If relativists claim that all
justified in stealing food—if stealing is wrong. values or truths are relative, then it is possible to
ask whether the claim of relativism is itself merely a
However, an objectivist who is not an absolut- relative truth or value judgment. But it might be that
ist can argue that although there are some objective such an argument against relativism sets up a straw
goods—for example, health or justice—what is good man, an easy-to-defeat version of the opposing
in a concrete case may vary from person to person position. The philosopher Richard Rorty argued that
and circumstance to circumstance. She or he could there are no relativists in the sense that is aimed at
hold that stealing might be justified in some circum- by this sort of an argument. Rorty explains,
stances because it is necessary for life, an objective
good, and a greater good than property. Opposing Relativism is the view that every belief on a certain
absolutism does not necessarily commit one to a topic, or perhaps about any topic, is as good as
similar opposition to objectivism. every other. No one holds this view. Except for the
occasional cooperative freshman, one cannot find
One result of this clarification should be the real- anybody who says that two incompatible opinions
ization that what is often taken as an expression of on an important topic are equally good. The
relativism is not necessarily so. Consider this state- philosophers who get called ‘relativists’ are those who
ment: “What is right for one person is not necessar- say that the grounds for choosing between such
ily right for another.” If the term for means “in the
Objective Value Situational Differences Different Moral Conclusions
Health Diabetic. Insulin injections are good.
Health Nondiabetic. Insulin injections are not good.
Justice Works hard. Deserves reward.
Justice Does not work hard. Does not deserve reward.
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PART ONE ❯❯ ETHICAL THEORY
opinions are less algorithmic than had previously people should be tolerant because tolerance cannot
been thought.9 be an objective or transcultural value, according to
relativism. We can also question whether there is
Rorty does not claim that any belief is as good any reason for an individual relativist to be tolerant,
as any other. Instead, he says that it is not so easy especially if being tolerant means not just putting up
to figure out what is better or worse—as he puts it with others who disagree with us but also listening
here, there are no “algorithms” that can be used to to their positions and arguments. Why should I lis-
give precise answers about these things. His version ten to another who disagrees with me? If ethical rel-
of relativism attempts to avoid the charge of self- ativism is true, then it cannot be because the other
contradiction by connecting relativism to skepticism. person’s moral views may be better than mine in
Rorty has described his approach to things as “prag- an objective sense, for there is no objectively better
matism” or “anti-foundationalism,” by which he position. Objectivists might argue that their position
means that we find ourselves in the middle of things provides a better basis for both believing that toler-
without access to any final account of ultimate real- ance is an objective and transcultural good and that
ity or absolute values. For pragmatists such as Rorty, we ought to be open to others’ views because they
our judgments about things (including our judgment may be closer to the truth than ours are.
about ideas such as relativism) are provisional and
embedded in contexts, cultures, and ways of life. Relativism is sometimes simply a kind of intellec-
tual laziness or a lack of moral courage. Rather than
A related objection holds that a relativist has no attempting to give reasons or arguments for my own
way to define the group or perspective to which position, I may hide behind some statement such as,
things are relative. With which group should my “What is good for some is not necessarily good for
moral views coincide: my country, my state, my others.” I may say this simply to excuse myself from
family, or myself and my peers? And how would we having to think about or be critical of my own ethi-
decide? Different groups to which I belong may have cal positions. Those who hold that there is an objec-
different moral views. Moreover, if a society changes tive right and wrong may also do so uncritically.
its views, does this mean that morality changes? If They may simply adopt the views of their parents
52 percent of its people once supported some war or peers without evaluating those views themselves.
but later only 48 percent, does this mean that ear-
lier the war was just but it became unjust when the The major difficulty with an objectivist position
people changed their minds about it? is the problem it has in providing an alternative to
the relativist position. The objectivist should give us
One problem that individual relativism faces is reason to believe that there is an objective good. To
whether its view accords with personal experience. pursue this problem in a little more detail, we will
According to individual relativism, it seems that I briefly examine two issues discussed by contem-
should turn within and consult my moral feelings porary moral philosophers. One is the issue of the
to solve a personal moral problem. This is often just reality of moral value—moral realism; and the
the source of the difficulty, however; for when I look other concerns the problem of deciding among plural
within I find conflicting feelings. I want to know not goods—moral pluralism.
how I do feel but how I ought to feel and what I ought
to believe. But the view that there is something I pos- MORAL REALISM
sibly ought to believe would not be relativism.
Realism is the view that there exists a reality inde-
As we saw above, a problem for both types of pendent of those who know it. Most people are
relativist lies in the implied belief that relativism is a probably realists in this sense about a variety of
more tolerant position than objectivism. The cultural things. We think, for example, that the external
relativist can hold that people in a society should be world is real in the sense that it actually exists, inde-
tolerant only if tolerance is one of the dominant val- pendently of our awareness of it. If a tree falls in the
ues of their society. He or she cannot hold that all
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Chapter ❮❮ Ethical Relativism
woods and no one is there, the event is still real and MORAL PLURALISM
it still makes a sound. The sound waves are real,
even if the subjective perception of them depends Another problem nonrelativists or objectivists face
upon a variety of contingent factors. is whether the good is one or many. According to
some theories, there is one primary moral principle
Now compare this to the situation regarding by which we can judge all actions. However, sup-
ethics. If I say that John’s act of saving a drown- pose this were not the case, that there were instead
ing child was good, then what is the object of my a variety of equally valid moral principles or equal
moral judgment? Is there some real existing fact of moral values. For example, suppose that autonomy,
goodness that I can somehow sense in this action? justice, well-being, authenticity, and peace were
I can observe the actions of John to save the child, all equally valuable. In this case, we would have
the characteristics of the child, John, the lake, and a plurality of values. One version of pluralism is
so forth. But in what sense, if any, do I observe grounded in the claim that human beings are differ-
the goodness itself? The British philosopher G. E. ent and diverse, and that they should be allowed to
Moore (discussed in Chapter 1) held that goodness flourish in their own way. As John Lachs explains
is a specific quality that attaches to people or acts.10 in the essay that follows at the end of the chapter,
According to Moore, although we cannot observe “sanity and toleration demand that we allow each
the goodness of acts (we cannot hear, touch, taste, person to pursue his own, possibly unique form
or see it), we intuit its presence. Philosophers like of fulfillment.”12 Another version of pluralism is
Moore have had difficulty explaining both the nature Nussbaum’s capabilities approach, discussed ear-
of the quality and the particular intuitive or moral lier. Nussbaum implies that a variety of basic goods
sense by which we are supposed to perceive it. can be realized in multiple ways in different cultural
contexts. Another version is W. D. Ross’s account
Some moral philosophers who seek to support of what he calls prima facie duties. According to
a realist view of morality attempt to explain moral Ross, there are a variety of duties—listed below.
reality as a relational matter—perhaps as a certain To say that these duties are prima facie (which
fit between actions and situations or actions and our means “at first face” or “on first look”) means that
innate sensibilities.11 For example, because of innate they are duties that are important and valuable at
human sensibilities, some say, we just would not be first blush, all other things being equal. It might be,
able to approve of torturing the innocent. The prob- however, that these duties conflict—because there
lem, of course, is that not everyone agrees. To con- are more than one of them. The fact of a plurality
tinue with this example, some people would be willing of goods or duties means that there will be conflicts
to torture an innocent person if they thought that by of values.
torturing that person they could elicit information
about a terrorist attack or send a message to frighten W. D. Ross’s Prima Facie Duties13
would-be terrorists. And some activities that we might
describe as torture—starvation, sleep deprivation, even 1. Fidelity
beatings—can be viewed as valuable in religious con-
texts, in cultural initiation rituals, and even in hazing 2. Reparation
that occurs on sports teams or fraternities. Moral real-
ists will claim that such disagreements can be resolved 3. Gratitude
by consulting the real objects of morality which are
supposed to make judgments about good and evil true. 4. Beneficence
But relativists wonder whether there are any actual
or objective qualities of actions that are intuited in the 5. Nonmaleficence
same way by all observers, just as they doubt that
moral truth rests upon objective moral reality. 6. Justice
7. Self-improvement
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PART ONE ❯❯ ETHICAL THEORY
The difficulty of this pluralistic account is that He concludes that there may in fact be universal val-
we face a problem when we are forced to choose ues that transcend cultures. In the second reading,
between competing duties or values. For example, John Lachs offers a defense of a form of relativism
what do we do when we’ve made a promise to that is pluralistic and tolerant and that is grounded
someone (and have a duty of fidelity) but that prom- in a claim about the diversity of human natures.
ise conflicts with the opportunity to do something
good for someone else (in order to fulfill the duty of NOTES
beneficence)? In such cases when duties or values
conflict, we may be forced simply to choose one or 1. Ruth Benedict, “Anthropology and the Abnormal,”
the other for no reason or on the basis of something Journal of General Psychology 10 (1934), pp. 60–70.
other than reason. Whether some rational and non-
arbitrary way exists to make such decisions is an 2. We could also think of many forms of ethical rela-
open question. Whether ultimate choices are thus tivism from the most individual or personal to the
subjective or can be grounded in an assessment of universal. Thus, we could think of individual rela-
what is objectively best is a question not only about tivism, or that based on family values, or local
how we do behave but also about what is possible in community or state or cultural values. The most
matters of moral judgment. universal, however, in which moral values are the
same for all human beings, would probably no
Pluralism about morality may be understood as longer be a form of relativism.
a form of relativism, which holds that there is no
single objective or universal standard. In response, 3. According to some versions of individual ethical
pluralists might hold that there are several equally relativism, moral judgments are similar to expres-
plausible standards of value. But—as we saw in our sions of taste. We each have our own individual
discussion of religious pluralism in Chapter 2—it is tastes. I like certain styles or foods, and you like
possible for a pluralist to hold that there is some sort others. Just as no taste can be said to be correct or
of convergence toward something unitary and uni- incorrect, so also no ethical view can be valued as
versal in the realm of values. It might be that there is better than any other. My saying that this war is or
a hierarchy of values. But genuine pluralism points all wars are unjust is, in effect, my expression of
toward a sort of equality among values, which does my dislike of or aversion to war. An entire tradition
not admit to a hierarchical organization of duties. in ethics, sometimes called emotivism (as discussed
in Chapter 1), holds this view.
In subsequent chapters, we will examine several
major ethical theories—utilitarianism, deontology, 4. Friedrich Nietzsche, Will to Power (New York:
natural law theory, and the ethics of care. These the- Random House, 1968) no. 481, p. 267.
ories are articulated from an objectivist or nonrela-
tivist standpoint: defenders of these theories claim 5. Martha C. Nussbaum, Women and Human
that the theory presents a substantive definition of Development (Cambridge: Cambridge University
what is good. But the problem of relativism returns Press, 2001), p. 105.
as soon as we ask whether there is some way to
compare or unite these normative theories—or 6. Ibid., p. 106.
whether we are left with incompatible accounts of 7. Ibid., pp. 78–80.
the good. 8. These are not necessarily complete and coherent
In this chapter’s reading selection, Louis Pojman arguments for relativism. Rather, they are more
presents an argument against relativism and in popular versions of why people generally are
favor of a version of universalism. Pojman outlines inclined to what they believe is relativism.
the difference between descriptive or cultural relativ- 9. Richard Rorty, “Pragmatism, Relativism, and
ism and the stronger claim about ethical relativism. Irrationalism,” Proceedings and Addresses of the
American Philosophical Association 53, no. 6
(1980), p. 727.
10. G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1903).
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11. Bruce W. Brower, “Dispositional Ethical Realism,” Chapter ❮❮ Ethical Relativism
Ethics 103, no. 2 (January 1993), pp. 221–49.
13. W. D. Ross, The Right and the Good (Oxford:
12. John Lachs, “Relativism and Its Benefits” Oxford University Press, 1930), Chapter 1.
Soundings 56:3 (Fall 1973), p. 319.
READING
Who’s to Judge?
LOUIS POJMAN
For more chapter resources and activities, go to MindTap.
Study Questions
As you read the excerpt, please consider the following questions:
1. How does Pojman link ethnocentrism to relativism?
2. How does Pojman explain the way that the diversity thesis and the dependency thesis lead to relativism?
3. How does Pojman explain the connection (or lack thereof ) between cultural relativism and the idea of tolerance?
There is one thing a professor can be absolutely certain desist in such terrible talk. So Herodotus concludes,
of: almost every student entering the university believes, “Culture is King o’er all.”
or says he believes, that truth is relative. If this belief is put
to the test, one can count on the students’ reaction: they Today we condemn ethnocentricism, the uncritical
will be uncomprehending. That anyone should regard belief in the inherent superiority of one’s own culture,
the proposition as not self-evident astonishes them, as as a variety of prejudice tantamount to racism and
though he were calling into question 2 + 2 = 4. … The sexism. What is right in one culture may be wrong
danger they have been taught to fear from absolutism in another, what is good east of the river may be bad
is not error but intolerance. Relativism is necessary to west of the same river, what is a virtue in one nation
openness; and this is the virtue, the only virtue, which may be seen as a vice in another, so it behooves us
all primary education for more than fifty years has dedi- not to judge others but to be tolerant of diversity.
cated itself to inculcating. (Alan Bloom, The Closing of
the American Mind) This rejection of ethnocentricism in the West has
contributed to a general shift in public opinion about
In an ancient writing, the Greek historian Herodo- morality, so that for a growing number of Western-
tus (485–430 bc) relates that the Persian King ers, consciousness-raising about the validity of other
ways of life has led to a gradual erosion of belief in
Darius once called into his presence some Greeks moral objectivism, the view that there are univer-
sal moral principles, valid for all people at all times
and asked them what he should pay them to eat the and climes. For example, in polls taken in my ethics
and introduction to philosophy classes over the past
bodies of their fathers when they died. They replied several years (in three different universities in three
areas of the country) students by a two-to-one ratio
that no sum of money would tempt them to do such
“Who’s to Judge?”, by Louis Pojman. From Vice and Virtue in
a terrible deed; whereupon Darius sent for certain Everyday Life, 6e, Sommers & Sommers. © 2003 Cengage Learning.
Reprinted by permission of Gertrude “Trudy” Pojman.
people of the Callatian tribe, who eat their fathers,
and asked them in the presence of the Greeks what
he should give them to burn the bodies of their
fathers at their decease [as the Greeks do]. The Cal-
latians were horrified at the thought and bid him
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PART ONE ❯❯ ETHICAL THEORY
affirmed a version of moral relativism over moral 3. Therefore, there are no universally valid moral prin-
absolutism with hardly 3 percent seeing something ciples, objective standards which apply to all people
in between these two polar opposites. Of course, I’m everywhere and at all times.
not suggesting that all of these students have a clear
understanding of what relativism entails, for many 1. The first thesis, which may be called the Diver-
of those who say that they are ethical relativists also sity Thesis and identified with Cultural Relativism,
state on the same questionnaire that “abortion except is simply an anthropological thesis, which registers
to save the mother’s life is always wrong,” that “capi- the fact that moral rules differ from society to soci-
tal punishment is always morally wrong,” or that ety. As we noted in the introduction of this essay,
“suicide is never morally permissible.” The apparent there is enormous variety in what may count as a
contradictions signal an apparent confusion on the moral principle in a given society. The human condi-
matter. tion is malleable in the extreme, allowing any num-
ber of folkways or moral codes. As Ruth Benedict
In this essay I want to examine the central has written:
notions of ethical relativism and look at the implica-
tions that seem to follow from it. After this I want to The cultural pattern of any civilization makes use of a
set forth the outlines of a very modest objectivism, certain segment of the great arc of potential human
which holds to the objective validity of moral prin- purposes and motivations. … [A]ny culture makes use of
ciples but takes into account many of the insights of certain selected material techniques or cultural traits. The
relativism. great arc along which all the possible human behaviors
are distributed is far too immense and too full of con-
AN ANALYSIS OF RELATIVISM tradictions for any one culture to utilize even any con-
siderable portion of it. Selection is the first requirement.
Ethical relativism is the theory that there are no (Patterns of Culture, New York, 1934, p. 219)
universally valid moral principles, but that all moral
principles are valid relative to culture or individual It may or may not be the case that there is not
choice. It is to be distinguished from moral skepti- a single moral principle held in common by every
cism, the view that there are no valid moral princi- society, but if there are any, they seem to be few, at
ples at all (or at least we cannot know whether there best. Certainly, it would be very hard to derive one
are any), and from all forms of moral objectivism or single “true” morality on the basis of observation of
absolutism. The following statement by the relativist various societies’ moral standards.
philosopher John Ladd is a good characterization of
the theory. 2. The second thesis, the Dependency The-
sis, asserts that individual acts are right or wrong
Ethical relativism is the doctrine that the moral rightness depending on the nature of the society from which
and wrongness of actions varies from society to society they emanate. Morality does not occur in a vacuum,
and that there are no absolute universal moral standards but what is considered morally right or wrong must
binding on all men at all times. Accordingly, it holds that be seen in a context, depending on the goals, wants,
whether or not it is right for an individual to act in a cer- beliefs, history, and environment of the society in
tain way depends on or is relative to the society to which question. As William Graham Sumner says, “We
he belongs. (John Ladd, Ethical Relativism) learn the [morals] as unconsciously as we learn to
walk and hear and breathe, and they never know
If we analyze this passage, we derive the follow- any reason why the [morals] are what they are.
ing argument: The justification of them is that when we wake to
consciousness of life we find them facts which
1. What is considered morally right and wrong varies already hold us in the bonds of tradition, custom,
from society to society, so that there are no moral and habit.”1 Trying to see things from an indepen-
principles accepted by all societies. dent, non-cultural point of view would be like tak-
ing out our eyes in order to examine their contours
2. All moral principles derive their validity from cultural
acceptance.
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Chapter ❮❮ Ethical Relativism
and qualities. We are simply culturally determined a level of social acceptance. Not only do various
beings. societies adhere to different moral systems, but the
very same society could (and often does) change
We could, of course, distinguish a weak and a its moral views over time and place. For example,
strong thesis of dependency. The nonrelativist can the southern United States now views slavery as
accept a certain relativity in the way moral prin- immoral whereas just over one hundred years ago, it
ciples are applied in various cultures, depending did not. We have greatly altered our views on abor-
on beliefs, history, and environment. For example, tion, divorce, and sexuality as well.
Orientals show respect by covering the head and
uncovering the feet, whereas Occidentals do the 3. The conclusion that there are no absolute or
opposite, but both adhere to a principle of respect objective moral standards binding on all people fol-
for deserving people. They just apply the principle lows from the first two propositions. Cultural rela-
of respect differently. Drivers in Great Britain drive tivism (the Diversity Thesis) plus the Dependency
on the left side of the road, while those in the rest Thesis yields ethical relativism in its classic form. If
of Europe and the United States drive on the right there are different moral principles from culture to
side, but both adhere to a principle of orderly pro- culture and if all morality is rooted in culture, then it
gression of traffic. The application of the rule is follows that there are no universal moral principles
different but the principle in question is the same valid for all cultures and people at all times.
principle in both cases. But the ethical relativist
must maintain a stronger thesis, one that insists SUBJECTIVE ETHICAL RELATIVISM SUBJECTIVISM
that the very validity of the principles is a prod-
uct of the culture and that different cultures will Some people think that even this conclusion is too
invent different valid principles. The ethical relativ- tame and maintain that morality is not dependent
ist maintains that even beyond the environmental on the society but on the individual him or herself.
factors and differences in beliefs, there is a funda- As students sometimes maintain, “Morality is in the
mental disagreement between societies. eye of the beholder.” Ernest Hemingway wrote, “So
far, about morals, I know only that what is moral
In a sense, we all live in radically different is what you feel good after and what is immoral is
worlds. Each person has a different set of beliefs what you feel bad after and judged by these moral
and experiences, a particular perspective that col- standards, which I do not defend, the bullfight is
ors all of his or her perceptions. Do the farmer, very moral to me because I feel very fine while it
the real estate dealer, and the artist, looking at is going on and have a feeling of life and death and
the same spatiotemporal field, see the same field? mortality and immortality, and after it is over I feel
Not likely. Their different orientations, values, and very sad but very fine.”2
expectations govern their perceptions, so that dif-
ferent aspects of the field are highlighted and some This form of moral subjectivism has the sorry
features are missed. Even as our individual values consequence that it makes morality a useless con-
arise from personal experience, so social values cept, for, on its premises, little or no interpersonal
are grounded in the peculiar history of the com- criticism or judgment is logically possible. Heming-
munity. Morality, then, is just the set of common way may feel good about killing bulls in a bull fight,
rules, habits, and customs which have won social while Albert Schweitzer or Mother Teresa may feel
approval over time, so that they seem part of the the opposite. No argument about the matter is pos-
nature of things, as facts. There is nothing mysteri- sible. The only basis for judging Hemingway or any-
ous or transcendent about these codes of behavior. one else wrong would be if he failed to live up to
They are the outcomes of our social history. his own principles, but, of course, one of Heming-
way’s principles could be that hypocrisy is morally
There is something conventional about any permissible (he feels good about it), so that it would
morality, so that every morality really depends on be impossible for him to do wrong. For Hemingway
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PART ONE ❯❯ ETHICAL THEORY
hypocrisy and non-hypocrisy are both morally an objectively independent set of norms that bind all
permissible. On the basis of Subjectivism it could people for the common good.
very easily turn out that Adolf Hitler is as moral as
Gandhi, so long as each believes he is living by his Subjectivism treats individuals as billiard balls on
chosen principles. Notions of moral good and bad, a societal pool table where they meet only in radical
right or wrong, cease to have interpersonal evalua- collisions, each aiming for its own goal and striving
tive meaning. to do the other fellow in before he does you. This
atomistic view of personality is belied by the fact
In the opening days of my philosophy classes, that we develop in families and mutually dependent
I often find students vehemently defending subjec- communities, in which we share a common lan-
tive relativism. I then give them their first test of guage, common institutions, and habits, and that
the reading material—which is really a test of their we often feel each other’s joys and sorrows. As John
relativism. The next class period I return all the Donne said, “No man is an island, entire of itself;
tests, marked with the grade “F” even though my every man is a piece of the continent.”
comments show that most of them are of very high
quality. When the students explode with outrage Radical individualistic relativism seems incoher-
(some of them have never before seen this letter on ent. If so, it follows that the only plausible view of
their papers) at this “injustice,” I explain that I too ethical relativism must be one that grounds moral-
have accepted subjectivism for purposes of mark- ity in the group or culture. This form of relativism
ing exams, in which case the principle of justice has is called “conventionalism,” and to it we now turn.
no objective validity and their complaint is without
merit. CONVENTIONAL ETHICAL RELATIVISM
CONVENTIONALISM
You may not like it when your teacher gives you
an F on your test paper, while she gives your neigh- Conventional Ethical Relativism, the view that there
bor an A for one exactly similar, but there is no way are no objective moral principles but that all valid
to criticize her for injustice, since justice is not one of moral principles are justified by virtue of their cul-
her elected principles. tural acceptance, recognizes the social nature of
morality. That is precisely its power and virtue. It
Absurd consequences follow from Subjective Eth- does not seem subject to the same absurd conse-
ical Relativism. If it is correct, then morality reduces quences which plague Subjectivism. Recognizing
to aesthetic tastes over which there can be no argu- the importance of our social environment in gen-
ment nor interpersonal judgment. Although many erating customs and beliefs, many people suppose
students say that they hold this position, there that ethical relativism is the correct ethical theory.
seems to be a conflict between it and other of their Furthermore, they are drawn to it for its liberal
moral views (e.g., that Hitler is really morally bad or philosophical stance. It seems to be an enlightened
capital punishment is always wrong). There seems response to the sin of ethnocentricity, and it seems
to be a contradiction between Subjectivism and the to entail or strongly imply an attitude of tolerance
very concept of morality, which it is supposed to towards other cultures. As Benedict says, in recog-
characterize, for morality has to do with “proper” nizing ethical relativity “we shall arrive at a more
resolution of interpersonal conflict and the amelio- realistic social faith, accepting as grounds of hope
ration of the human predicament. Whatever else it and as new bases for tolerance the coexisting and
does, it has a minimal aim of preventing a state of equally valid patterns of life which mankind has cre-
chaos where life is “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, ated for itself from the raw materials of existence.”3
and short.” But if so, Subjectivism is no help at all The most famous of those holding this position is
in doing this, for it doesn’t rest on social agreement the anthropologist Melville Herskovits, who argues
of principle (as the conventionalist maintains) or on
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Chapter ❮❮ Ethical Relativism
even more explicitly than Benedict that ethical rela- There are other disturbing consequences of ethi-
tivism entails intercultural tolerance: cal relativism. It seems to entail that reformers are
always (morally) wrong since they go against the
1. If Morality is relative to its culture, then there is no tide of cultural standards. William Wilberforce was
independent basis for criticizing the morality of any wrong in the eighteenth century to oppose slavery;
other culture but one’s own. the British were immoral in opposing suttee in India
(the burning of widows, which is now illegal in
2. If there is no independent way of criticizing any other India). The Early Christians were wrong in refusing
culture, we ought to be tolerant of the moralities of to serve in the Roman army or bow down to Caesar,
other cultures. since the majority in the Roman Empire believed
that these two acts were moral duties. In fact, Jesus
3. Morality is relative to its culture. himself was immoral in breaking the law of his day
by healing on the Sabbath day and by advocating
Therefore, the principles of the Sermon on the Mount, since it is
clear that few in his time (or in ours) accepted them.
4. we ought to be tolerant of the moralities of other
cultures.4 Yet we normally feel just the opposite, that the
reformer is the courageous innovator who is right,
Tolerance is certainly a virtue, but is this a good who has the truth, against the mindless majority.
argument for it? I think not. If morality simply is Sometimes the individual must stand alone with
relative to each culture then if the culture does not the truth, risking social censure and persecution. As
have a principle of tolerance, its members have no Dr. Stockman says in Ibsen’s Enemy of the People,
obligation to be tolerant. Herskovits seems to be after he loses the battle to declare his town’s prof-
treating the principle of tolerance as the one excep- itable polluted tourist spa unsanitary, “The most
tion to his relativism. He seems to be treating it as dangerous enemy of the truth and freedom among
an absolute moral principle. But from a relativistic us—is the compact majority. Yes, the damned, com-
point of view there is no more reason to be toler- pact, and liberal majority. The majority has might—
ant than to be intolerant, and neither stance is objec- unfortunately—but right it is not. Right are I and a
tively morally better than the other. few others.” Yet if relativism is correct, the opposite
is necessarily the case. Truth is with the crowd and
Not only do relativists fail to offer a basis for error with the individual….
criticizing those who are intolerant, but they cannot
rationally criticize anyone who espouses what they There is an even more basic problem with the
might regard as a heinous principle. If, as seems to notion that morality is dependent on cultural accep-
be the case, valid criticism supposes an objective or tance for its validity. The problem is that the notion
impartial standard, relativists cannot morally criticize of a culture or society is notoriously difficult to define.
anyone outside their own culture. Adolf Hitler’s geno- This is especially so in a pluralistic society like our
cidal actions, so long as they are culturally accepted, own where the notion seems to be vague with unclear
are as morally legitimate as Mother Teresa’s works boundary lines. One person may belong to several
of mercy. If Conventional Relativism is accepted, rac- societies (subcultures) with different value emphases
ism, genocide of unpopular minorities, oppression of and arrangements of principles. A person may belong
the poor, slavery, and even the advocacy of war for to the nation as a single society with certain values
its own sake are as equally moral as their opposites. of patriotism, honor, courage, laws (including some
And if a subculture decided that starting a nuclear which are controversial but have majority acceptance,
war was somehow morally acceptable, we could not such as the law on abortion). But he or she may also
morally criticize these people. belong to a church which opposes some of the laws
Any actual morality, whatever its content, is
as valid as every other, and more valid than ideal
moralities—since the latter aren’t adhered to by any
culture.
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PART ONE ❯❯ ETHICAL THEORY
of the State. He may also be an integral member of a morality of its own? Of course, if my partner dies,
a socially mixed community where different prin- I could still claim that I was acting from an originally
ciples hold sway, and he may belong to clubs and a social set of norms. But why can’t I dispense with the
family where still other rules are adhered to. Relativ- inter-personal agreements altogether and invent my
ism would seem to tell us that where he is a mem- own morality—since morality, on this view, is only an
ber of societies with conflicting moralities he must be invention anyway? Conventionalist Relativism seems
judged both wrong and not-wrong whatever he does. to reduce to Subjectivism. And Subjectivism leads, as
For example, if Mary is a U.S. citizen and a mem- we have seen, to the demise of morality altogether.
ber of the Roman Catholic Church, she is wrong (qua
Catholic) if she chooses to have an abortion and not- However, while we may fear the demise of moral-
wrong (qua citizen of the U.S.A.) if she acts against ity, as we have known it, this in itself may not be a
the teaching of the Church on abortion. As a mem- good reason for rejecting relativism; that is, for judg-
ber of a racist university fraternity, KKK, John has ing it false. Alas, truth may not always be edifying.
no obligation to treat his fellow Black student as an But the consequences of this position are sufficiently
equal, but as a member of the University community alarming to prompt us to look carefully for some
itself (where the principle of equal rights is accepted) weakness in the relativist’s argument. So let us exam-
he does have the obligation; but as a member of the ine the premises and conclusion listed at the begin-
surrounding community (which may reject the prin- ning of this essay as the three theses of relativism.
ciple of equal rights) he again has no such obligation;
but then again as a member of the nation at large 1. The Diversity Thesis What is considered morally right
(which accepts the principle) he is obligated to treat and wrong varies from society to society, so that there
his fellow with respect. What is the morally right are no moral principles accepted by all societies.
thing for John to do? The question no longer makes
much sense in this moral Babel. It has lost its action- 2. The Dependency Thesis All moral principles derive their
guiding function. validity from cultural acceptance.
Perhaps the relativist would adhere to a prin- 3. Ethical Relativism Therefore, there are no universally
ciple which says that in such cases the individual valid moral principles, objective standards which
may choose which group to belong to as primary. If apply to all people everywhere and at all times.
Mary chooses to have an abortion, she is choosing to
belong to the general society relative to that principle. Does any one of these seem problematic? Let us
And John must likewise choose between groups. The consider the first thesis, the Diversity Thesis, which
trouble with this option is that it seems to lead back to we have also called Cultural Relativism. Perhaps
counter-intuitive results. If Gangland Gus of Murder, there is not as much diversity as anthropologists
Incorporated, feels like killing Bank President Ortcutt like Sumner and Benedict suppose. One can also see
and wants to feel good about it, he identifies with the great similarities between the moral codes of various
Murder, Incorporated society rather than the general cultures. E. O. Wilson has identified over a score of
public morality. Does this justify the killing? In fact, common features, and before him Clyde Kluckhohn
couldn’t one justify anything simply by forming a has noted some significant common ground.
small subculture that approved of it? Charles Man-
son would be morally pure in killing innocents simply Every culture has a concept of murder, distinguishing this
by virtue of forming a little coterie. How large must from execution, killing in war, and other “justifiable homi-
the group be in order to be a legitimate subculture cides.” The notions of incest and other regulations upon
or society? Does it need ten or fifteen people? How sexual behavior, the prohibitions upon untruth under
about just three? Come to think about it, why can’t defined circumstances, of restitution and reciprocity, of
my burglary partner and I found our own society with mutual obligations between parents and children—
these and many other moral concepts are altogether
universal. (“Ethical Relativity: Sic et Non,” Journal of Phi-
losophy, LII, 1955)
And Colin Turnbull, whose description of the sadis-
tic, semi-displaced Ik in Northern Uganda, was seen
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Chapter ❮❮ Ethical Relativism
as evidence of a people without principles of kind- because of their belief that such infants belong to
ness and cooperation, has produced evidence that the hippopotamus, the god of the river. We believe
underneath the surface of this dying society, there that they have a false belief about this, but the point
is a deeper moral code from a time when the tribe is that the same principles of respect for property
flourished, which occasionally surfaces and shows and respect for human life are operative in these
its nobler face. contrary practices. They differ with us only in belief,
not in substantive moral principle. This is an illustra-
On the other hand, there is enormous cultural tion of how nonmoral beliefs (e.g., deformed chil-
diversity and many societies have radically differ- dren belong to the hippopotamus) when applied to
ent moral codes. Cultural Relativism seems to be a common moral principles (e.g., give to each his due)
fact, but, even if it is, it does not by itself establish generate different actions in different cultures. In our
the truth of Ethical Relativism. Cultural diversity in own culture the difference in the nonmoral belief
itself is neutral between theories. For the objectivist about the status of a fetus generates opposite moral
could concede complete cultural relativism, but still prescriptions. So the fact that moral principles are
defend a form of universalism; for he or she could weakly dependent doesn’t show that Ethical Rela-
argue that some cultures simply lack correct moral tivism is valid. In spite of this weak dependency on
principles. non-moral factors, there could still be a set of gen-
eral moral norms applicable to all cultures and even
On the other hand, a denial of complete Cultural recognized in most, which are disregarded at a cul-
Relativism (i.e., an admission of some universal ture’s own expense.
principles) does not disprove Ethical Relativism. For
even if we did find one or more universal principles, What the relativist needs is a strong thesis of
this would not prove that they had any objective dependency, that somehow all principles are essen-
status. We could still imagine a culture that was tially cultural inventions. But why should we
an exception to the rule and be unable to criticize choose to view morality this way? Is there anything
it. So the first premise doesn’t by itself imply Ethi- to recommend the strong thesis over the weak the-
cal Relativism and its denial doesn’t disprove Ethical sis of dependency? The relativist may argue that
Relativism. in fact we don’t have an obvious impartial stan-
dard from which to judge. “Who’s to say which cul-
We turn to the crucial second thesis, the Depen- ture is right and which is wrong?” But this seems
dency Thesis. Morality does not occur in a vacuum, to be dubious. We can reason and perform thought
but what is considered morally right or wrong must experiments in order to make a case for one system
be seen in a context, depending on the goals, wants, over another. We may not be able to know with
beliefs, history, and environment of the society in certainty that our moral beliefs are closer to the
question. We distinguished a weak and a strong truth than those of another culture or those of oth-
thesis of dependency. The weak thesis says that ers within our own culture, but we may be justified
the application of principles depends on the partic- in believing that they are. If we can be closer to the
ular cultural predicament, whereas the strong the- truth regarding factual or scientific matters, why
sis affirms that the principles themselves depend can’t we be closer to the truth on moral matters?
on that predicament. The nonrelativist can accept Why can’t a culture simply be confused or wrong
a certain relativity in the way moral principles are about its moral perceptions? Why can’t we say that
applied in various cultures, depending on beliefs, the society like the Ik which sees nothing wrong
history, and environment. For example, a raw envi- with enjoying watching its own children fall into
ronment with scarce natural resources may justify fires is less moral in that regard than the culture
the Eskimos’ brand of euthanasia to the objectiv- that cherishes children and grants them protection
ist, who in another environment would consistently and equal rights? To take such a stand is not to
reject that practice. The members of a tribe in the
Sudan throw their deformed children into the river
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PART ONE ❯❯ ETHICAL THEORY
commit the fallacy of ethnocentricism, for we are the basis of the best reasoning we can bring forth
seeking to derive principles through critical rea- and with sympathy and understanding.
son, not simply uncritical acceptance of one’s own
mores…. NOTES
In conclusion I have argued (1) that Cultural 1. Folkways, New York, 1906, section 80. Ruth Bene-
Relativism (the fact that there are cultural differ- dict indicates the depth of our cultural conditioning
ences regarding moral principles) does not entail this way: “The very eyes with which we see the
Ethical Relativism (the thesis that there are no problem are conditioned by the long traditional
objectively valid universal moral principles); (2) habits of our own society” (“Anthropology and the
that the Dependency Thesis (that morality derives Abnormal,” in The Journal of General Psychology
its legitimacy from individual cultural acceptance) [1934], pp. 59–82).
is mistaken; and (3) that there are universal moral
principles based on a common human nature and a 2. Ernest Hemingway, Death in the Afternoon (New
need to solve conflicts of interest and flourish. York: Scribner’s, 1932), p. 4.
So, returning to the question asked at the begin- 3. Patterns of Culture (New American Library, 1934),
ning of this essay, “Who’s to judge what’s right or p. 257.
wrong?” the answer is: We are. We are to do so on
4. Melville Herskovits, Cultural Relativism (New York:
Random House, 1972).
READING
Relativism and Its Benefits
JOHN LACHS
For more chapter resources and activities, go to MindTap.
Study Questions
As you read the excerpt, please consider the following questions:
1. What is Lachs’s problem with the idea that we have firm ethical intuitions or that there are self-evident truths?
2. How is Lachs’s account of the variety of human natures connected to his defense of tolerance?
3. What are the benefits of relativism, as imagined by Lachs?
Perhaps it is our animal urge for security that turns conspiracy everywhere, and fights each deviation from
us into dogmatists in manners and morals. As his norms as if his life depended on it. The steadfast
dogmatists we live in glorious and safe ignorance of dogmatist is, therefore, immune to external change. He
alternatives; we find it not unlikely but actually incon- may be destroyed, but he will not change his mind;
ceivable that a style of life and a form of behavior— he would sooner lose his life than his illusions. In put-
perhaps even a mode of dress and a fashion of wearing ting his life on the line in their defense, he will fancy
hair—different from ours could have any legitimacy
or value. Being essentially insecure, the dogmatist John Lachs, “Relativism and Its Benefits”, in Soundings: An Interdisci-
pounces with fury upon each innocent change and plinary Journal, Vol. 56, No. 3 (Fall 1973), pp. 312–322. Published by
contrary current; he senses danger, opposition, or Penn State University Press.
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Chapter ❮❮ Ethical Relativism
himself the defender of all that is good and wholesome; The analogy of color vision is striking and inven-
the collapse of his cause and his inability to impose his tive. But in reality it does not work to the intuition-
will on the rest of this restless world will seem to him a ist’s advantage. The color any given object appears
tragic defeat of everything true and noble. to have is only partly the result of its objective prop-
erties. The light in which we bathe it and the nature
Faced with the need to show that his own ultimate and condition of the sensory mechanism involved
values are universal and defensible, the dogmatist can are equally indispensible determining conditions.
rely on two strategies. He may say that certain ulti- The color varies with changes in any one of these
mate values stand in no need of being justified: they three factors, at least one of which is the psychologi-
are self-evident and shine by their own light. Alterna- cal and physiological condition of the subject.
tively, he may admit that every moral judgment must
be vindicated. Specific ones can be supported by show- This is sometimes countered by the claim that
ing their relation to more general principles we hold. although an object may appear to have a variety of
General principles, in turn, are justified in terms of colors, its real color is that which an observer with
some being or attitude or non-moral state of affairs. normal sense organs operating under standard light-
ing conditions will perceive. This objection is, of
Will these strategies work? Not much can be said for course, worthless. The very fact that we have to sta-
the first of them. It is reassuring to think that there are bilize the variables of lighting and sensory organs
universal moral standards that can be known merely by calling them “standard” and “normal” constitutes
by reflection. If there were such principles, self-evident an admission that all color determinations are rela-
and knowable by mere intuition, moral disagreements tive to them. And what we shall call “normal” is
could result only from haste in judgment or a clouding perfectly arbitrary. Standard lighting conditions are
of the moral sense; nothing, surely, that sound educa- those that resemble sunshine. But what if our sun
tion and a clear head could not cure. were a red star? Normal observers are those that can
see a “full” spectrum of colors, including red. But
Bishop Joseph Butler, the great eighteenth- what if the bulk of the population were red-green
century British moralist, writes as if he believed this color defective? We simply cannot talk of colors
when he recommends that to be sure our judgments without tacit or explicit reference to the nature and
are right we reflect on them “in a cool afternoon.” condition of the perceiver. The shrill insistence of
But is the matter quite so simple as that? We are all the majority cannot make the color they see the real
familiar with what it is like to be totally convinced color of the object. Though I may have to heed their
of the legitimacy of a value or the universal applica- view, it will always remain a fact that the object
bility of a moral standard. Yet the very firmness of appears red to many but a rich brown to me.
the conviction makes it suspect. Could it not be the
expression and result of our gullibility? Does it really The case of values is analogous. What appears
have the marks of objective truth? good is only partly a result of the objective features
of the action or event. The principles or categories in
What response can the defender of such ethical terms of which a given culture or subculture views
intuitions make to the man who is unable to see the an action are in some respects similar to the light-
self-evidence of some principle? What reply is pos- ing conditions we may use on an object of percep-
sible to the philosopher who, after many earnest tion. And the nature and condition of the sensory
attempts, cannot see the universal truth of any moral mechanism is paralleled by those of the mechanisms
judgment? What we want to say is that persons, of desire and preference in the agent.
actions, and consequences are good or bad as objec-
tively as physical objects are red or green or blue. The Pleasure may appear good to some and evil to oth-
colors are there for everyone to see. Similarly, the ers. We cannot infer from this that one or the other
moral features of things are open to every sensitive side must be right though, as G.E. Moore generously
person’s scrutiny. Those who cannot recognize them conceded, it may be very difficult to establish which
are simply blind to the moral hues of life.
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PART ONE ❯❯ ETHICAL THEORY
one. If disagreement is genuine and ultimate, as in claim that all societies share a single vision of the
morals it often is, pleasure will seem as genuinely good. Values, if social in origin, vary with societies.
good for Aristippus as it is bad for Cotton Mather. If they do, the similarity of societies is the measure
The natural conclusion to draw is that “good” and of the uniformity of the good.
“bad” are relational terms: as with colors, we cannot
meaningfully speak of the value of persons, actions, A similar observation should be made about the
and consequences without reference to the categories view that locates the source of values in human
of a culture and the standards and commitments of nature. If the view is true, values are uniform only
the man who judges. The moral hue of the world of to the extent that individual human natures coin-
action will change with changes in our social milieu cide. It is clear, therefore, that absolute values could
and in the organ of our moral sight. not be grounded this way without the ancillary tenet
of a shared and unchanging human nature. Ques-
It is clear, then, that there are no self-evident tions about the nature of man are notoriously diffi-
objective—that is, universally true—moral princi- cult to handle. In any case, this would be no place to
ples. But if absolute values are, after all, in need of handle them, even if I could. There are a few things,
justification, where shall we look for the principles however, that need to be said. They can be said
that might support them? There are four areas to briefly and with a reasonable degree of certainty.
which we may turn for the foundation of morals: (1) The question of what we shall be satisfied to call
society with its rules and attitudes and institutions, the nature of man is partly a definitional, and hence
(2) human nature with its structure and laws of conventional, and partly an impirical matter. We
operation, (3) nature and its purposive constitution always have the option of permitting our definitions
and (4) God as the Infinite Lawgiver of creation. to be guided by our preconceptions or our changing
whims. We can go so far as to take the heroic course
Let me remark at once that if social rules and of disregarding most of the empirical evidence in our
attitudes were to serve as the foundation upon steadfast conviction that many of those who appear
which the structure of morality is erected, we could human do not properly deserve the compliment. If,
not legitimately say that values are absolute and however, we allow the suggestions of good sense to
unchanging. Persons, actions, and consequences guide our concept formation, we shall find ourselves
would then be good as a result of their relation to overwhelmingly committed to the view that human
socially established norms. While every society nature is no constant and that what we are dealing
would have some values, there is no reason to sup- with is, at best, a wide spectrum of resembling indi-
pose that the values of any one would coincide with viduals who do not share a single common essence.
those of any other. If human nature is to serve as the foundation of
morals, the more reason we have to doubt the uni-
One might attempt to argue for the universality formity of man, the more we are entitled to deny the
at least of such generic values as social cooperation existence of universal values.
and the survival of the members of the group. Yet
this is a verbal gloss: it is a way of reading identity This leaves us with only two possible foundations
into diverse views and values by the expedient of for absolutistic morals. The first is the possibly infinite
calling them by the same name. “Social cooperation” realm of facts we call Nature. Our dogmatist might take
among primitive Eskimos involves different values a cosmic perspective and assert that the world is satu-
and fundamentally diverse modes of behavior from rated with potentialities that demand actualization. It is
what is required for it in a tour-group from Hobo- a law of nature, we might think, that beings with spe-
ken or in the Pentagon. And even today “survival cific potencies must strive to reach fruition: perfection
of the members of the group” means radically differ- consists in having what is latent discharged. Actual-
ent things in Washington and Peking. Generalities ized being is both the aim and the result of potenti-
sometimes reach the stage of becoming vacuous and ality; without it everything would be frustrated and
verbal: there is no better example of this than the
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Chapter ❮❮ Ethical Relativism
incomplete. Thus value is or is grounded in the actual- in grounding the good in divine commands we are
ity which lures matter to create it. presupposing the existence of a God who can make
laws, proclaim rules of behavior and create values
The lawlike and natural connection between fact as he sees fit. The existence of such a God seems
and fulfillment would amply suffice as the foundation highly dubious to me. I say this not as a person who
of morals, were it not for the fact that it does not exist. believes in the existence of no deity at all, nor as one
The view that Nature is replete with potentialities who refuses to accept the reality of a Christian God.
aiming at self-realization and values that, although My objection to the conception of God as an untram-
they do not yet exist, charm the world to make them melled creator of values and laws is precisely that it
actual is perhaps the most colorful of human fables. is not Christian enough, that it introduces the disturb-
There is struggle and striving in the natural world. ing and religiously unacceptable element of arbitrary
But who would want to say that each of a plenitude power into the concept of a Being of pure love.
of beings aims at achieving some minor element of
the cosmic good? We can look at things this way, just One could dwell on the grave philosophical dif-
as we can see shadows as giants and each frog as ficulties of such a concept of God. But that is another
a metamorphosed minor royalty. But in doing so we story. For now it is enough to make two points. If
commit a great blunder: tacitly we impute aim and God is the source of all values, in one important
consciousness to every natural impulse. The flux of sense they are not objective or absolute. At a mini-
nature has direction and frequently results in the pro- mum, they are binding values only because God
duction of some value. But to suppose that direction chooses them. It is, to spell this out, only because of
implies an aim, that motion requires an underlying their relation to God that they are values at all. This
love of the beautiful and the good to generate it, is should incline those who object to everything rela-
to view simple physical fact as if it had an element of tive to mend their ways or at least to realize that it
mind animating it at every turn. is not relativity they quarrel with but its terms. They
think it all right for values to be relative to the whim
If we examine the facts calmly and free of the of God, but not to the will of man.
persistent drive to find more rationality in the world
than it in fact displays, we will be struck less by the Secondly, what are the conditions requisite for
remarkable adaptation of means to ends and the making the commands of an Infinite Being relevant
direction of every impulse at its own actualization to our finite lives? No command, whatever its source,
than by the spectacle of the mindless impartiality could be binding on a person who lacked the intel-
with which nature fulfills or frustrates its own poten- ligence to grasp it or the capacity to act on it. One
tials. There are millions of acorns for every tree: the cannot command a stone, nor an Eskimo in Latin, no
phenomenon of discharged potency is the exception matter how elegant or fluent. Commands and values
rather than the rule. Why should we disregard the must suit the station and the circumstances, the
wide compass of dysteleology and the plenitude of nature and the capacities of the person who is to act
crushed potentials in nature? If we must see pur- on them or adopt them. Hence even if all Values have
poses in the flux, we might agree with the disen- their source in God, their uniformity is not guaran-
chanted Schopenhauers of the world that perpetual teed. If human nature is varied, commands and val-
frustration of the will is the rule in nature and actu- ues relevant to one man may be unsuited, perhaps
alized good is for most a rare and furtive joy. In any even unintelligible, to others. The uniformity of God’s
case, to ground the concrete values of the moral life effective commands thus becomes dependent on the
in some hypothetical cosmic principle which reads uniformity of human nature.
vestiges of mind into a mindless flux is as implau-
sible as it is ill-advised. Was Protagoras, then, right in the end and is noth-
ing good but thinking makes it so? There are a few
Let me finally speak of God’s decrees as a pos- things farther from the truth, but not many. We do not
sible support for human values. It is obvious that think or act as if mere thoughts and feelings could make
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PART ONE ❯❯ ETHICAL THEORY
much difference to what is good or bad. And if Protago- little self-realization there may be that interferes with
ras were right, we could never be mistaken in our aims the fulfillment of others can be readily controlled by
and values: whatever we desired at any time would threats or a measure of force. In an orchestra each
then be good, for us. Yet what could be a more painful instrument plays its own tune; is this reason for say-
or pervasive fact of life than moral error in choosing our ing that there is anarchy in the pit? The fact that val-
goals? Inadequate self-knowledge frequently makes us ues are individual does not entail that people must fail
adopt ends that do not satisfy. And who has not chosen to agree on common goods and goals.
the lesser over the greater, the nearer over the remote,
the apparent over the real good? Consider the benefits that would accrue if we
could make this relativism generally accepted. The
Such short-sighted and inhumane relativ- view is a secular variant of the beautiful thought of
ism could never account for the bitter complexity many theologians that even the least of his creatures
of moral experience. But there is a relativism that has dignity and justification in the eyes of God. If
many candid and tolerant minds spontaneously sincerely believed, this thought could transform the
believe. Human nature is various: this variety, due soul. It would help allay our suspicion of all things
to biological, social and psychological conditions, alien. It could render us more modest and loving by
must be construed not as a threat or an evil, but as showing the monstrous egotism displayed in judging
a God-given bounty of being. A variety of natures another. As a result, we may develop a more toler-
implies a variety of perfections. Only the egotist, ant and helpful attitude toward life-styles and values
committed to seeing pale replicas of himself every- different from those we like or admire: we could then
where in the world, would want to impose the same begin to appreciate moral variety or the bounty of ful-
values and the same mode of behavior on every liv- fillment and perfection open to humans. The person-
ing soul. Sanity and toleration demand that we allow alities shaped by such beliefs and attitudes would be
each person to pursue his own, possibly unique form attuned to the beauty and harmony of life. The vast
of fulfillment; if we had even a vestige of Christian energy we consume in hate and in trying to shove
love, we would rejoice in seeing the growth of any our desires down reluctant throats could be harnessed
man toward his goal. to enhance our appreciation and joy. If such attitudes
were dominant in it, human personality may for the
Values vary with the individual’s nature. The first time reach the stage of not being disgusting.
good, therefore, is not a question of what we think
or how we feel but of who we are. A person’s If private improvement would be extensive, pub-
nature, though not unchanging, is perfectly definite. lic benefits would likely be immense. Children could
This makes it possible for him to progress in self- be brought up with fewer useless precepts and dam-
knowledge. It also renders the goals that would aging attitudes. Education, both of intellect and
fulfill him definable and his values precise. These of character, could at last lose some of its rigidity.
values may differ from the ideal of the next man, but Human relations could be infused with an element of
they are not less vital or legitimate. humanity and understanding, and cooperation may
well take the place of blind antagonism. Condemna-
Would moral or social anarchy not flow if we acted tion of other persons or nations becomes difficult in
as though this view were true? Not in the least. If proportion as we see the legitimacy of differing ide-
the nature of the individual determines his val- als. Moral pseudo-justifications of much hatred and
ues, similar natures yield similar commitments. The war would, therefore, at once be closed off to those
fact that human beings live in cooperative societies who take the relativity of values seriously.
is the best evidence that their natures are similar or
at least compatible. This is assured by processes of The greatest beneficiary of the universal accep-
socialization which are, on occasion, so successful tance of moral relativism would, without doubt, be
that even people left free to do precisely what they human liberty. There is a shrill, constrictive tone to
want continue to do their usual, useful tasks. What many of our laws. They impinge on fields where
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Chapter ❮❮ Ethical Relativism
compulsory social prescriptions are inappropriate. not yet accepted it? I cannot think so. Our beliefs
Most of the laws we loosely group as designed to and acts surely express our nature; what violates the
enforce the uniformity of morals would be seen as integrity of our being or would tend to change it is
unjustified, if we were all relativists. This would difficult to embrace. Instinctive dogmatists will find
increase the scope of human choice and render all it hard to see the merits of relativism on intellectual
manner of human action free. grounds alone.
Evidently the firmest social or state controls are Our best hope to escape egotism is by appealing
necessary to protect persons from the real harm oth- to it. The individual’s choice of making the world
ers would do them. But due allowance must be made or even a small segment of it live by his values is
for the difficulty of generalizing about what is to negligible. With the increase in social regimentation
count as harm. The experience that would be harm- and the growth of large impersonal institutions each
ful to a child may well mean fulfillment to an adult person finds, in fact, ever more trouble in freely con-
homosexual. If we forbid that children be tempted forming even his own conduct to his ideals. A cut-
into such actions, must we also forbid it to consent- back in scope promises increase in intensity: sound
ing adults? And what is the imaginary public inter- self-interest demands that each attend to his own
est requiring that monogamy be the sole law of the life and leave the moral state of others their sole
land? Attention to differences in desires and tem- business. The alternative is to lose control even of
peraments would reveal such restrictions on human one’s self, a frequent condition of ambitious egotists.
interaction as intolerant, if not insane.
At stake is the eternal hope to tame human nature.
Society would not collapse if we were to let a hun- Benevolence may be too high an ideal. Toleration
dred flowers bloom. To be sure, it would be different of others would be enough or, as an absolute mini-
in structure and operation from what it is today. But mum, indifference to how they shape their fate. If we
I cannot count myself among those who think there could only believe moral relativity, we would have
can be no improvement of the way things are. the intellectual foundation of such indifference. Our
nature could then be changed enough to merit being
But if believing and acting on moral relativism called human. We might even render our lives joyous
would have such profound impact on the nature of and our survival assured. When shall we go to work?
men and society, is it a mere accident that we have
REVIEW EXERCISES
1. Explain the definition of ethical relativism given in particular, what is the basic difference between the
the text: “the view that there is no objective standard first and second? Between the first and third?
of right and wrong, even in principle.” 5. How would you know whether a moral disagree-
ment was based on a basic difference in moral values
2. What is the difference between individual and social or facts? As an example, use differences about the
or cultural relativism? moral justifiability of torture.
6. What is moral realism? How does your understand-
3. What is the difference between the descriptive claim ing about the reality of the external world differ from
that people do differ in their moral beliefs and the
metaethical theory of relativism? your intuitions about morality?
4. What are the differences among the three reasons for
supporting ethical relativism given in this chapter? In
For more chapter resources and activities, go to MindTap.
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4 Egoism, Altruism, and the
Social Contract
Learning Outcomes
After reading this chapter, you should be able to:
• Describe the differences between
Jupiterimages/Photos.com/Thinkstock descriptive (or psychological) egoism and • Discuss how egoism is connected to
• laissez-faire capitalism and economics.
• ethical egoism.
Explain criticisms of altruism and the Evaluate the challenge that egoism
• importance of reciprocal altruism. • poses for the moral point of view.
Evaluate disputes about the sources of Defend your own ideas about egoism,
altruism, and the social contract.
• morality and reasons to be moral.
Explain the prisoner’s dilemma and how
it relates to the discussion of egoism and
the social contract.
For more chapter resources and activities, go to MindTap.
Morality seems to require that individuals sacrifice their own selfish interests
for the benefit of others. We tend to praise altruists and condemn egoists.
Altruism means, most basically, concern for the well-being of others. Some ver-
sions of altruism may even appear to hold that truly self-sacrificial behavior is the
peak of moral development. Unlike altruists, egoists are primarily concerned with
their own well-being. Sometimes egoists are purely selfish, even to the point of
being willing to take advantage of others. But less selfish defenders of egoism may
claim that egoism is not about taking advantage or being uncaring. Rather, egoism
may be a descriptive thesis about human behavior, which claims that even appar-
ently altruistic behavior is ultimately motivated by self-interest. From this perspec-
tive, people behave altruistically because they hope to gain something in return,
even behaving altruistically in hope of developing social relations of cooperation,
which are valuable in the long run. A further form of egoism holds that we would
all be better off if people just looked out for themselves and left other people alone.
From an egoistic perspective, social rules can be understood as resulting from agree-
ments among rational and self-interested individuals. That idea is known as the
social contract theory. This chapter considers egoism, altruism, and the theory of
the social contract.
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Chapter ❮❮ Egoism, Altruism, and the Social Contract
Popular culture is full of examples of the con- psychologists call pro-social behaviors—that is,
flict between egoism and altruism. Television pro- behaviors that are not primarily self-interested and
grams like Survivor create circumstances in which that are motivated by basic concern for others.
people are forced to forge short-term alliances to
maximize their own self-interest. The film and book The empirical question of whether human
The Hunger Games shows us a life-and-death com- beings are motivated by self-interest or by non-
petition in which children struggle for survival in a self-interested concern for others is not so easy
war of all against all. In these contexts, egoism is to answer. How do we really know what moti-
to be expected and altruism is an exceptional and vates others? Indeed, are you sure that you know
heroic virtue. what motivates you all of the time? Scientists have
examined this question from various perspectives.
Disagreements about ethics and political life often Psychological studies, including accounts of devel-
rest upon divergent ideas about human nature. We opmental psychology, can give us some insight into
wonder whether people are basically egoistic or what actually motivates people. Another line of
altruistic, whether we are motivated by self-interest, inquiry looks at pro-social behavior from an evo-
or whether we are able to genuinely concern our- lutionary perspective. It turns out that pro-social
selves with the interests of others. Our conception of cooperation produces an evolutionary advantage,
social organizations, politics, and the law often rests especially in social species of animals such as our
upon what we think about the motives of individu- own. Individuals who cooperate with others tend
als. Are individuals basically cooperative or competi- to be able to pass on their genes better than selfish
tive? Are individuals motivated primarily by egoistic egoists and those who cheat. This is especially true
or altruistic concerns? Should social organizations be when we cooperate with and support those who are
set up to minimize the dangers of an inevitable cut- related to us. Our genes get passed on when we are
throat competition? Or is there a more cooperative altruistic toward our close relations, helping those
and altruistic basis for social cooperation? who share our genes to survive. This might explain
why parents are willing to sacrifice for their own
To think about these issues, we need to consider a children—but not so willing to sacrifice for children
basic empirical question: Are people basically selfish to whom they are not related. It might also explain
and primarily motivated by self-interest or are people why we may be more willing to help a cousin than
altruistic and motivated by concern for others? We a stranger. Such an evolutionary explanation points
also have to ask a normative question: Is selfishness toward instinctive forces that lie below the surface of
good or bad? These two issues illustrate two differ- our more explicit motivations and intentions.
ent versions or meanings of egoism and altruism. One
version is descriptive and answers the empirical ques- Of course, an account of human behavior that is
tion. According to this version, egoism (or altruism) solely focused on the ways that pro-social behav-
is a theory that describes what people are like. Simply ior functions in evolutionary contexts fails to con-
put, descriptive egoism holds that people are basi- sider the subjective side of experience and human
cally self-centered or selfish; that is, people primar- freedom. Sometimes our motivations and intentions
ily pursue their own self-interest. It is a view about run at cross-purposes to attitudes and behaviors that
how people behave or why they do what they do. It provide evolutionary advantage. Furthermore, it is
is often referred to as psychological egoism. possible to ask a normative question with regard
to the descriptive science of pro-social behavior.
Egoism is opposed to altruism. Altruism is often We may be instinctively motivated to help those to
viewed as pure concern for the well-being of others. whom we are more closely related. But should we
Sometimes altruism is thought to require entirely really help our close relations and only our close
unselfish behavior, even to the point at which we relations? The term nepotism is used to condemn
sacrifice ourselves for others. But a broader con- those who show favoritism to their close relations.
ception of altruism involves a variety of what
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PART ONE ❯❯ ETHICAL THEORY
Pictorial Press Ltd/Alamy Stock Photo
Films such as The Hunger Games illustrate conflicts between egoism and altruism.
Maybe we should ignore everyone else and focus Ron Paul (who ran for president in 2012); his son,
only on our own needs and interests. Or maybe we Kentucky Senator Rand Paul (a presidential candi-
should focus our concern more broadly on humanity date in 2016); and Wisconsin Congressman Paul
at large, possibly even extending moral concern to Ryan (who was Mitt Romney’s vice presidential
members of other species. running mate in 2012 and Speaker of the House of
Representatives in 2016). Paul Ryan has explained
We must, then, ask a moral question with regard that his reading of Ayn Rand is “the reason I got
to the empirical science of egoism and altruism. involved in public service.”1 These politicians tend
Should we be motivated by self-interest or should to hold to a libertarian ideology, which emphasizes
we be concerned with the well-being of others? As laissez-faire capitalism and limited government
a normative theory, ethical egoism holds that it intervention (these political and economic issues are
is good for people to pursue their own self-interest. discussed in more detail in Chapter 14).
Some versions of ethical egoism also hold that altru-
ism is misguided and wrong. In this view, people A fiercely individualistic émigré from Bolshevik
should pursue their own self-interest, while minding Russia, Ayn Rand thought that altruism was perni-
their own business and ignoring others. In defense cious. She argues that altruistic morality “regards
of this idea, ethical egoists may argue that altruism man as a sacrificial animal” and that altruism
breeds dependency and undermines the self-esteem “holds that man has no right to exist for his own
of those who receive benefits and gifts from do- sake, that service to others is the only justification
gooder altruists. of his existence, and that self-sacrifice is his highest
moral duty, virtue and value.” Her argument goes
Various authors have defended egoism. One on to present the altruistic idea of self-sacrifice as
of the most influential is the novelist and essay- a kind of death wish: “altruism holds death as its
ist Ayn Rand. Rand’s ideas have had a significant ultimate goal and standard of value—and it is logical
influence on the thinking of a variety of American that renunciation, resignation, self-denial, and every
politicians—including former Texas Congressman
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Chapter ❮❮ Egoism, Altruism, and the Social Contract
other form of suffering, including self-destruction, claim that the moral point of view simply ought to
are the virtues it advocates.”2 point toward altruism. Baier explains that one of our
“most widely held moral convictions” is that “in cer-
While Rand condemns altruism, most main- tain circumstances it is morally wrong to promote
stream moralists tend to hold that altruism is better one’s own best interest or greatest good.”4 We tend
than egoism. We tend to praise self-sacrifice. And to think that morality involves overcoming ego-
we tend to agree with the basic principle of altru- ism and learning to develop an altruistic (or at least
ism that is outlined in the Golden Rule—that you impartial and non-self-interested) point of view.
should “do unto others as you would have them do
unto you.” One might say that the moral point of A further issue has to do with the question of how
view is one that involves some basic level of altru- social cooperation is supposed to occur. Defenders of
ism. While altruists need not go to the extremes altruism can argue that there is something natural
that Rand criticizes—in advocating suicidal self- about developing and nurturing caring relation-
sacrifice, for example—most people tend to think ships with others—perhaps grounded in an account
that pro-social and cooperative behavior are mor- of natural family bonds or group belonging. It may
ally praiseworthy. Indeed, philosophers such as Kurt appear to be more difficult for egoists to explain how
Baier, James Sterba, and Alan Gewirth have argued self-interested egoists can avoid brutal and coun-
in various ways that egoism is basically inconsis- terproductive competition and develop a system of
tent. As Gewirth explains, the egoist’s moral claims cooperation. But cooperation can be explained as
do not apply to all other people in the same way paying off in terms of self-interest. From the per-
that they apply to himself.3 Furthermore, one might spective of egoism, it is rational for self-interested
persons to cooperate, since cooperation tends to
produce good outcomes for those who cooperate.
One way of describing this is in terms of reciprocal
altruism, which holds that altruistic behavior makes
sense for self-interested persons when it is repaid in
kind. A more elaborate development of reciprocal
altruism is found in the social contract theory, which
holds that it is in each person’s self-interest to join
with others in a social contract that helps us each to
maximize our self-interest in community with oth-
ers. We discuss the social contract theory in more
detail at the end of this chapter.
CSU Archives/Everett Collection/Alamy Stock Photo PSYCHOLOGICAL EGOISM
What Is Psychological Egoism?
Ayn Rand (1905–1982) was a well-known proponent
of egoism. Psychological egoism is a descriptive theory about
our motivations and interests. In one interpreta-
tion, it might be taken to say that people are basi-
cally selfish. Here, psychological egoism holds that
people usually or always act for their own narrow
and short-range self-interest. But a different formu-
lation of this theory asserts that although people do
act for their own self-interest, this self-interest is to
be understood more broadly and as being more con-
cerned with long-term outcomes. Thus, we might
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PART ONE ❯❯ ETHICAL THEORY
distinguish between acting selfishly and acting in version of psychological egoism asserts that human
our own self-interest. beings act for the sake of their own best interests.
In this version, the idea is not that people sometimes
In the broader view, many things are in a per- or always act in their own interests, but that this
son’s interest: good health, satisfaction in a career is the only thing that ultimately motivates people.
or work, prestige, self-respect, family, and friends. If they sometimes act for others, it is only because
Moreover, if we really wanted to attain these things, they think that it is in their own best interests to
we would need to avoid shortsighted selfishness. do so. A stronger version of psychological egoism
For example, we would have to be self-disciplined asserts that people cannot do otherwise than act for
in diet and lifestyle to be healthy. We would need to the sake of their own interests. But how would we
plan long-term for a career. And we would need to know this? We know how people act, but how could
be concerned about others and not be overbearing if we show that they cannot act otherwise?
we wanted to make and retain friends.
For more chapter resources and
However, a friendly egoist does not actually need activities, go to MindTap.
to be concerned about others but only to appear to
be concerned. In this view, doing good to others Is Psychological Egoism True?
would be not for the sake of others but, rather, to
enable one to call on those friends when they are In the early 1990s, a study was done in which
needed. This would be helping a friend not for the people were asked whether they believed in or sup-
friend’s sake but for one’s own sake. ported the jury system; that is, should people be
judged guilty or not guilty by a group of peers? Most
Putting the matter in this way also raises another responded that they do support the jury system.
question about how to formulate this theory. Is psy- However, when asked whether they would serve on
chological egoism a theory according to which peo- a jury if called, significantly fewer said they would.6
ple always act in their own best interests? Or does it Those who answered the two questions differently
hold that people are always motivated by the desire might have wanted justice for themselves but were
to attain their own best interests? The first version not willing to extend it to others. Some of our most
would be easily refuted; we notice that people do not cherished social values may involve more selfish
always do what is best for them. They eat too much, motivation than we generally like to admit. Consider
choose the wrong careers, waste time, and so forth. the following story about Abraham Lincoln.7 It is
This may be because they do not have sufficient reported that one day as he was riding in a coach
knowledge to be good judges of what is in their best over a bridge he heard a mother pig squealing. Her
interests. Or it may be because of a phenomenon piglets were drowning after having fallen into the
known as weakness of will. For example, I may creek and she could not get them out. Lincoln sup-
want to lose weight or get an A in a course but may posedly asked the coachman to stop, waded into the
fail to do what I have to do in order to achieve my creek, and rescued the piglets. When his companion
goal. Philosophers have puzzled over this problem, cited this as an example of unselfishness, Lincoln
which is also called the problem of akrasia (to use responded that it was not for the sake of the pigs
the Greek term for the problem of weakness of will). that he acted as he did. Rather, it was because he
This is a complex issue in moral psychology; to treat would have no peace later when he recalled the
it adequately would take us beyond what we can do incident if he did not do something about it now. In
here.5 But the basic concern is why we fail to do the other words, although it seemed unselfish, his action
things we know we ought to do. If we really know was quite self-centered. Advocates for psychological
what we ought to do, it might seem that we would egoism often draw on such accounts of underlying
never fail to do what we ought. selfish motivations to bolster their arguments.
On the other hand, it might be true that people
always do what they think is best for them. Another
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Chapter ❮❮ Egoism, Altruism, and the Social Contract
But how are we to evaluate the claims of psycho- obtain happiness while pursuing other worthwhile
logical egoism? As a theory about human motiva- objects.
tion, it is difficult, if not impossible, to prove. How
do we assess the motivations of people? We cannot Thus, we have seen that the most reasonable
just assume that apparently altruistic individuals are or common form of psychological egoism, a theory
acting for the sake of the selfish satisfaction they about human motivation, is especially difficult to
receive from what they do. Nor can we ask them, prove. It also can’t be disproved or falsified. Even
for individuals are often poor judges of what actu- if it were shown that we often act for the sake of
ally motivates them. We commonly hear or say to our own interest or satisfaction, this is not enough
ourselves, “I don’t know why I did that!” to prove that psychological egoism is true. Accord-
ing to this theory, we must show that people always
Furthermore, it is difficult to distinguish different act to promote their own interests. Next, we need to
sources of our motivations. Are we innately egoistic consider whether this has any relevance to the nor-
or altruistic—that is, are we born with a tendency mative question of how we ought to act.
toward egoism or altruism? Or do our cultural val-
ues contribute to our egoistic (or altruistic) tenden- ETHICAL EGOISM
cies? For example, we might consider differences in What Is Ethical Egoism?
socialization between boys and girls. It might be that
female children are expected to be altruistic and car- Ethical egoism is a normative theory. It is a theory
ing, while male children are taught to be indepen- about what we ought to do, how we ought to act.
dent and self-motivated. And it might be that these As with psychological egoism, we can formulate
differences in socialization are also dependent upon ethical egoism in different ways. One version is
other cultural differences, with boys and girls from individual ethical egoism. According to this version,
different cultures growing up with divergent disposi- I ought to look out only for my own interests. I ought
tions toward altruism or egoism. to be concerned about others only to the extent that
this concern also contributes to my own interests.
Leaving aside the issue of socialization, suppose A slightly broader formulation of ethical egoism,
that people do, in fact, get satisfaction from helping sometimes called universal ethical egoism, main-
others. This is not the same thing as acting for the tains that people ought to look out for and seek only
purpose of getting that satisfaction. What psycho- their own best interests. As in the individual form, in
logical egoism needs to show is not that people get this second version, people ought to help others only
satisfaction from what they do, but that achieving when and to the extent that it is in their own best
such satisfaction is their aim. Now, we can find at interests to do so. It is possible to explain cooperation
least some examples in our own actions to test this from this perspective as a kind of reciprocal altruism:
theory. Do we read the book to get satisfaction or to we cooperate because we each see that it is in our
learn something? Do we pursue that career oppor- own self-interest to cooperate. As the saying goes,
tunity because of the satisfaction that we think it I’ll scratch your back, if you scratch mine. From this
will bring or because of the nature of the opportu- point of view, what I really want is to get my back
nity? Do we volunteer to help the sick or the needy scratched (something I cannot do for myself) and I
because we think it will give us personal satisfac- realize that in order to get what I want, I have to give
tion or because we think it will actually help some- you something you want in return.
one? In addition, directly aiming at satisfaction may
not be the best way to achieve it. Henry Sidgwick Is Ethical Egoism a Good Theory?
described this as the paradox of hedonism: “The
impulse toward pleasure, if too predominant, defeats We can evaluate ethical egoism in several ways.
its own aim.”8 We probably have a better chance of We will consider its grounding in psychological
being happy if we do not aim at happiness itself, but egoism and its consistency or coherence. We will
also consider how it explains social cooperation in
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PART ONE ❯❯ ETHICAL THEORY
the social contract theory as well as its derivation game in which I can say that the other player ought
from economic theory. Finally, we will consider its to block my move, even though, at the same time,
conformity to commonsense moral views. I hope that she or he does not do so.
Grounding in Psychological Egoism Let us con- The Prisoner’s Dilemma A serious problem plagu-
sider first whether psychological egoism, if true, ing agreements that are made among egoists is the
would provide a good foundation for ethical egoism. temptation to cheat. If I agree to scratch your back
It might be that we should affirm ethical egoism after you scratch mine, what guarantee do you have
because people are basically and unavoidably ego- that I will follow through on my promise once I’ve
istic. But recall the discussion of the naturalistic fal- gotten my back scratched? If we are both convinced
lacy in Chapter 1: it is not clear that we can derive that human beings are basically egoistic, then you
the value of ethical egoism from the fact of psycho- will suspect that I will cheat (and I’ll suspect that
logical egoism. If people were in fact always moti- you will cheat), in which case it will be difficult to
vated by their own interests, then would this be a cooperate. For this reason, there is a worry that ego-
good reason to hold that they ought to be so moti- ism will lead to conflict and war. To prevent this
vated? It seems superfluous to tell people that they from happening, even egoists might agree that we
ought to do what they always do anyway or will need something external to ourselves to guaran-
do, no matter what. One would think that at least tee that we do not renege on our promises. This is
sometimes one of the functions of moral language the basis for the development of the social contract,
is to try to motivate ourselves or others to do what which can be interpreted as an agreement made by
we are not inclined to do. For example, I might tell self-interested persons who want to establish a legal
myself that even though I could benefit by cheating system that ensures promises are kept and that pre-
on a test, it is wrong, and so I should not do it. vents cheating by egoists.
Furthermore, the fact that we do behave in a The problem for egoism can be clarified with
certain way seems a poor reason for believing that reference to a thought experiment known as the
we ought to do so. If people always cheated, would prisoner’s dilemma. Imagine that the cops arrest
that make cheating right? Thus, although it may at two suspects, X and Y. The cops have the prisoners
first seem reasonable to rely on a belief about peo- in two separate rooms. They offer each prisoner the
ple’s basic selfishness to prove that people ought to following deal: If you betray the other suspect, you
look out for themselves alone, this seems far from will go free instead of getting a twenty-year term in
convincing. prison; but if you both betray each other, you will
each end up with ten years in prison. On the other
Consistency or Coherence Universal ethical ego- hand, if both prisoners keep their mouths shut and
ism may be inconsistent or incoherent. Ethical ego- refuse to betray each other, there will be no convic-
ism holds that everyone ought to seek his or her tion and they will both go free. The choices look like
own best interests. But could anyone consistently this:
support such a view? Wouldn’t this mean that we
would want our own best interests served and, at Y betrays X Y does not
the same time, be willing to allow that others serve betray X
their interests—even to our own detriment? If food X betrays Y Each ends up
was scarce, then I would want enough for myself, with 10 years X goes free; Y gets
and yet, at the same time, I would have to say that X does not 20 years
I should not have it for myself when another needs betray Y Y goes free; X
it to survive. This view seems to have an internal gets 20 years Each goes free
inconsistency. We might compare it to playing a
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Chapter ❮❮ Egoism, Altruism, and the Social Contract
For the prisoners, the best option is if they coor- result, the state of nature will be one of war, of all
dinate their choices and both refuse to betray each against all, and the results, as Hobbes describes
other. But if the prisoners suspect each other of them, are quite bleak,
being self-interested egoists, they will not trust each
other. Each will suspect that the other prisoner will In such condition there is no place for industry,
betray him or her in pursuit of a better deal. And so, because the fruit thereof is uncertain, and
it is likely that self-interested prisoners will end up consequently, not culture of the earth, no navigation,
with less-than-optimal outcomes. Each prisoner will nor the use of commodities that may be imported
suspect the other of operating out of self-interested by sea, no commodious building, no instruments of
motives that will lead toward cheating and reneging moving and removing such things as require much
on prior promises. The prisoner’s dilemma thought force, no knowledge of the face of the earth, no
experiment is often used as a model to show why account of time, no arts, no letters, no society, and
we need some larger structure to ensure that we which is worst of all, continual fear and danger of
do not break our promises. It might be that moral- violent death, and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty,
ity itself provides that larger structure: if we would brutish, and short.9
just agree to comply with the dictates of morality, we
would be able to guarantee cooperation. But if there The solution is peace via an agreement in which
are egoists who would break moral rules when they one gives up as much liberty “as against other men,
think that they can get away with it, we might need as he would allow other men against himself.”10 For
something stronger than morality—we might need Hobbes, the social contract is an agreement to give
an enforcement mechanism, that is, something like up certain things to better secure one’s own self-
a legal and political system that helps to guarantee interest. Thus, individuals will agree to certain rules,
cooperation. It is possible, then, that rational, self- which would be in each individual’s best interest
interested individuals would agree to something like to accept and obey. To secure the peace and ensure
a social contract. that these rules are obeyed, Hobbes believes that an
absolute sovereign ruler is required.
The Social Contract
Hobbes’s social contract theory is based on a
A justification of the legal system can be grounded in desire of each person to secure his own advantage
the rational self-interest of human beings. The idea while agreeing to social rules enforced by a sover-
of the social contract is that it is rational for self- eign; it is a view of how society should function and
interested individuals to join together and submit to thus both a political and a moral position. Other ver-
the rule of law in order to ensure that promises are sions of the social contract idea were proposed by
kept and that social cooperation will occur. One of philosophers such as John Locke and Jean-Jacques
the earliest versions of this idea is found in the writ- Rousseau. Contemporary moral and political theo-
ings of the seventeenth-century English philosopher ries that appeal to contract ideas can be found in the
Thomas Hobbes. Hobbes holds that individuals are works of Thomas Scanlon, David Gauthier, and John
self-interested; that is, they seek to fulfill their inter- Rawls.11 Gauthier’s idea is that we should imagine
ests and desires and above all seek self-preservation. basic moral rules that rational, self-interested parties
Hobbes maintains that in the state of nature, indi- would voluntarily agree to. Gauthier suggests that
viduals would be equal in terms of strength, since rational, self-interested agents would recognize the
even weak individuals can band together with need for mutual restraint: it is in the interest of self-
others or use sneak attacks to overpower stronger interested agents to agree to restrain the unbridled
individuals. Conflict arises when these equally pow- pursuit of self-interest. John Rawls imagines an ideal
erful individuals seek the same thing. The compet- form of the social contract. He asks what rational
ing individuals will thereby become enemies. As a self-interested people would agree to, in terms of
justice, if they did not know if they were young or
old, rich or poor, male or female, healthy or disabled.
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PART ONE ❯❯ ETHICAL THEORY
Rawls’s influential ideas are considered in more contributes to the general well-being is not ethical
detail in Chapter 14. egoism at all—since self-interest is merely used here
as a means to pursuing a broader collective value. As
Derivation from Economic Theory One argument we will come to see more clearly when we examine
for ethical egoism is taken from economic theory— it, this is a form of utilitarianism (see Chapter 5).
for example, that proposed by Adam Smith. He
and other proponents of laissez-faire capitalism Conformity to Commonsense Morality Finally, is
(a form of capitalism with minimal government ethical egoism supported by commonsense moral-
regulation or intervention) argue that self-interest ity? Some elements of ethical egoism seem to be
provides the best economic motivation. The idea is contrary to commonsense morality. For example,
that when the profit motive or individual incentives egoism seems to assume that anything is all right
are absent, people will either not work or not work as long as it serves an individual’s best interests.
as well. If it is my land or my business, then I will Torturing human beings or animals would be per-
be more likely to take care of it than if the profits go mitted so long as this served one’s interests. When
to others or to the government. In addition, Smith not useful to one’s interests, traditional virtues of
believes that in a system in which each person looks honesty, fidelity, and loyalty would have no value.
out for his or her own economic interests, the gen- Ethical egoists could argue on empirical or factual
eral outcome will be best, as though an “invisible grounds that the torturing of others is never in one’s
hand” were guiding things.12 best interests because this would make one less sen-
sitive, and being sensitive is generally useful to an
Although this is not the place to go into an individual’s objectives. Similarly, they might argue
extended discussion of economic theory, it is enough that the development of traditional virtues is often
to point out that not everyone agrees on the merits in one’s own best interests because these traits are
of laissez-faire capitalism. Much can be said for the valued by society. For example, possessing these
competition that it supports, but it does raise ques- traits may enable me to get what I want more read-
tions, for example, about the breakdown of “winners” ily. Whether these are good enough reasons to value
and “losers” in such a competition. Is it acceptable if these virtues or condemn torture is something you
the same individuals, families, or groups consistently must judge for yourself.
win or lose, generation after generation? What if
there are many more economic “losers” and a few Part of the intuitive appeal of egoism may derive
extremely wealthy “winners”? And what about those from the sense that people ought to take better care
with innate or inherited disadvantages that prevent of themselves. By having a high regard for ourselves,
them from competing? Is care for these people a com- we increase our self-esteem. We then depend less
munity responsibility? Recent community-oriented on others and more on ourselves. We might also be
theories of social morality stress just this notion of stronger and happier. These are surely desirable traits.
responsibility and oppose laissez-faire capitalism’s The altruist, moreover, might be too self-effacing.
excessive emphasis on individual rights.13 (Further He or she might be said to lack a proper regard for
discussion of capitalism can be found in Chapter 14.) himself or herself. There is also some truth in the
In any case, a more basic question can be asked view that unless one takes care of oneself, one is not
about the relevance of economics to morality. Even if of much use to others. This view implies not ethical
an economic system worked well or efficiently, would egoism, however, but again a form of utilitarianism.
this prove that morality ought to be modeled on it? Is
not the moral life broader than the economic life? Are THE MORAL POINT OF VIEW
all human relations economic relations?
Suppose that a person cares for no one but himself
Furthermore, the argument that everyone ought or herself. Would you consider that person to be a
to seek his or her own best interests because this moral person? This is not to ask whether the person
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Chapter ❮❮ Egoism, Altruism, and the Social Contract
is a morally good person, but rather whether one operating in the moral domain? Questions can be
can think of that person as even operating in the raised about the extent to which impartiality influ-
moral realm, so to speak. In other words, the ques- ences the moral domain or is required in order to be
tion concerns not whether the person’s morality is moral. Some feminists, for example, would rather
a good one, but whether he or she has any morals define morality in terms of sympathy and caring.
at all. (See Chapter 9 for further treatment of this issue.)
Suppose we want to know whether a person has WHY BE MORAL?
been given a moral education.14 A woman might
answer that she had because she had been taught Let us assume that morality does involve consider-
not to lie, to treat others kindly, not to drink to ing other people’s points of view and treating people
excess, and to work hard. When asked what rea- equally or impartially. Why should anyone do that,
sons she had been given for behaving thus, sup- especially when it is not in one’s best interests to do
pose she responded that she was taught not to lie so? In other words, are there any reasons we can
because others would not trust her if she did. She give to show why one should be moral? One rea-
was taught to treat others well because then they son is that doing what one ought to do is just what
would treat her well in return. She was taught to being moral means. But how can we explain why
work hard because of the satisfaction this brought we ought to do what we ought to do?
her or because she would then be better able to sup-
port herself. Would you consider her to have been We could argue that it is generally better for peo-
given a moral education? ple to have and follow moral rules. Without such
rules, our social lives would be pretty wretched.
It might be that this woman was given counsels As Hobbes suggests, a life of egoism in the state of
of prudence, not morality. She was told what she nature would be one of constant conflict and war.
should do to succeed in life in order to secure her However, this does not answer the question con-
own self-interest. But morality seems to imply more cerning why I should be moral when it is not in my
than prudence. We don’t lie because it is wrong to best interests to do so.
do so, or because others have a right to know the
truth. We treat others well because they deserve to If you were trying to convince a man why he
be so treated, or because it would be wrong to do should be moral, how would you do it? You might
otherwise. It seems that moral education cannot be appeal to his fear of reprisal if he did not generally fol-
merely egoistic. Do you agree? low moral rules. If he is not honest, then he will not
be trusted. If he steals, he risks being punished. In the
Taking the moral point of view appears to selection from Plato’s Republic that appears in this
involve being able to see beyond ourselves and our chapter, Glaucon tells the story of a shepherd named
own interests. It may also mean that we attempt Gyges. Gyges comes into possession of a ring that
to see things from another’s point of view; or that makes him invisible. He proceeds to use his invisibil-
we attempt to be impartial. Morality seems to require ity to take what he wants from others. Glaucon then
that moral rules apply equally to all, or that we have asks whether we all would not do the same if we, like
to give reasons why some persons are treated differ- Gyges, could get away with it. He believes we would.
ently than others. But is he right? Is avoiding punishment the only rea-
son that people do the right thing?
But this view of morality as a set of neutral and
impartial social rules raises a number of tricky ques- There are other more positive but still self-
tions. We usually do not think that we have to jus- interested reasons you might offer someone to con-
tify treating those close to us differently and more vince that person that he or she ought to be moral.
favorably than others. If we are nepotistic and care You might tell the individual that being virtuous is
more for our own children or our own friends than to one’s own advantage. You might recall some of
we do for strangers, does this mean that we are not the advice from Benjamin Franklin’s Poor Richard’s
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PART ONE ❯❯ ETHICAL THEORY
Almanac.15 “A stitch in time saves nine.” “Observe offers a thought experiment involving invisibility
all men, thyself most.” “Spare and have is better and a magic ring to help us think about what we
than spend and crave.” Many of the moral apho- would really do if no one was looking. In the second
risms put forward by motivational speakers and reading, the English philosopher Thomas Hobbes
self-help gurus—from Dr. Phil and Oprah Winfrey provides an answer to the question of what people
to Deepak Chopra—are focused on maximizing self- would do if they were not regulated by social rules.
interest. These are the self-interested counsels of a He argues not only that all human beings tend to
practical morality. It turns out that most of the tradi- pursue their own safety and interests—but also why
tional virtues are usually in our own best interests. it is rational for self-interested individuals to cre-
It is in our interest to be temperate, courageous, ate a social contract that furthers the goal of self-
thrifty, kind, honest, and so on—because these protection. Finally, drawing on the resources of
virtues help us live a stable life in a world that we modern biological science, Steven Pinker offers an
share with others. Indeed, it does appear to be in our account of how selfishness and pro-social behavior
interests to be altruistic, since concern for others is are related to the social contract.
often reciprocated.
NOTES
You might go even further in thinking about rea-
sons to be moral. You might make the point that being 1. Stephen Prothero, “You Can’t Reconcile Ayn Rand
moral is ennobling. Even when it involves sacrifice and Jesus,” USA Today, June 5, 2011, accessed
for a cause, being a moral person gives one a certain March 13, 2013, http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/
dignity, integrity, and self-respect. Only humans are news/opinion/forum/2011-06-05-Ayn-Rand-and-
capable of being moral, you might say, and human Jesus-dont-mix_n.htm
beings cannot flourish without being moral. You can
give more thought to this question when you read 2. Ayn Rand, “The Objectivist Ethics,” available at the
about Kant’s moral theory in Chapter 6. For Kant, Ayn Rand Institute website: http://www.aynrand.
human dignity and worth is wholly bound up with org/site/PageServer?pagename=ari_ayn_rand_
being able to act for moral reasons. the_objectivist_ethics
Nevertheless, one can point to many examples in 3. Alan Gewirth, Reason and Morality (Chicago:
which people who successfully break the moral rules University of Chicago Press, 1981), p. 85.
seem to fare better than those who follow them.
“Nice guys [and gals?] finish last,” as baseball 4. Kurt Baier, The Rational and the Moral Order
great Leo Durocher put it. If being moral seems too (Open Court, 1995), p. 159. Also see James P.
demanding, then some say this is too bad for moral- Sterba, “Morality and Self-Interest,” Philosophy
ity. We ought to have a good life, even if it means and Phenomenological Research 59, no. 2
sacrificing something of morality. In another view, (June 1999).
if being moral involves sacrificing something of the
personally fulfilling life and perhaps even “finishing 5. For a discussion of “weakness of will,” see
last” sometimes, then this is what must be done. No Gwynneth Matthews, “Moral Weakness,” Mind
one ever said being moral was going to be easy!16 299 (July 1966), pp. 405–19; Donald Davidson,
“How Is Weakness of the Will Possible?” in Moral
The discussion of egoism, altruism, and the social Concepts, ed. Joel Feinberg (New York: Oxford
contract is an old one that extends throughout the University Press, 1970), pp. 93–113.
history of philosophy. The reading selections for this
chapter span that history. In the first reading, Plato’s 6. Amitai Etzioni, a presentation at the University of
characters in The Republic explore the contention San Francisco, December 1, 1992.
that we always act in our own interests—one of the
reasons given in support of an egoist theory. Plato 7. From the Springfield Monitor (ca. 1928), cited in
Louis Pojman, Ethics (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth,
1990), p. 41.
8. Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics (London:
MacMillan and Co., 1884), p. 47.
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Chapter ❮❮ Egoism, Altruism, and the Social Contract
9. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, in The English Works 14. See W. D. Falk, “Morality, Self, and Others,” in
of Thomas Hobbes, ed. Sir William Molesworth Morality and the Language of Conduct, ed.
(London: John Bohn, 1839), pp. 2:38–41, 85. Hector-Neri Castaneda and George Nakhnikian
(Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1963),
10. Ibid., Chapter 14. pp. 25–67.
11. Tom Scanlon, What We Owe Each Other
15. Benjamin Franklin, “Poor Richard’s Almanac,” in
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998); American Philosophy: A Historical Anthology, ed.
David Gauthier, Morals by Agreement (Oxford: Barbara MacKinnon (New York: State University of
Oxford University Press, 1987); John Rawls, A New York Press, 1985), pp. 46–47.
Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1971). 16. See Thomas Nagel’s discussion of these different
12. See Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations possibilities of the relation between the good life
(New York: Edwin Cannan, 1904). and the moral life in “Living Right and Living
13. See the communitarian views in Robert Bellah, Habits Well,” in The View from Nowhere (New York:
of the Heart (Berkeley: University of California Oxford University Press, 1986), pp. 189–207.
Press, 1985); and Amitai Etzioni, The Spirit of Com- Also see David Gauthier, “Morality and
munity: Rights, Responsibilities, and the Communi- Advantage,” The Philosophical Review (1967),
tarian Agenda (New York: Crown, 1993). pp. 460–75.
READING
The Ring of Gyges
PLATO
For more chapter resources and activities, go to MindTap.
Study Questions
As you read the excerpt, please consider the following questions:
1. What view of morality is described using the story of the ring of Gyges?
2. How does this story describe the difference between appearing just and being just?
3. According to the story, what do parents (and religions, myths, and poetry) teach their children and us about
morality?
Glaucon (to Socrates). They say that to do injus- and not be punished, and the worst of all, which is
tice is, by nature, good; to suffer injustice, evil; to suffer injustice without the power of retaliation;
but that the evil is greater than the good. And so and justice, being at a middle point between the two,
when men have both done and suffered injustice is tolerated not as a good, but as the lesser evil, and
and have had experience of both, not being able to honoured by reason of the inability of men to do
avoid the one and obtain the other, they think that injustice. For no man who is worthy to be called a
they had better agree among themselves to have man would ever submit to such an agreement if he
neither; hence there arise laws and mutual cov- were able to resist; he would be mad if he did. Such
enants; and that which is ordained by law is termed
by them lawful and just. This they affirm to be the From Plato, The Republic, bk. 2, in The Dialogues of Plato, 3rd
origin and nature of justice;—it is a mean or compro- ed., trans. B. Jowett (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1892),
mise, between the best of all, which is to do injustice pp. 357a–369.
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PART ONE ❯❯ ETHICAL THEORY
is the received account, Socrates, of the nature and just put on one of them and the unjust the other; no
origin of justice. man can be imagined to be of such an iron nature
that he would stand fast in justice. No man would
Now that those who practise justice do so invol- keep his hands off what was not his own when he
untarily and because they have not the power to could safely take what he liked out of the market, or
be unjust will best appear if we imagine something go into houses and lie with any one at his pleasure,
of this kind: having given both to the just and the or kill or release from prison whom he would, and
unjust power to do what they will, let us watch and in all respects be like a God among men. Then the
see whither desire will lead them; then we shall actions of the just would be as the actions of the
discover in the very act the just and unjust man to unjust; they would both come at last to the same
be proceeding along the same road, following their point. And this we may truly affirm to be a great
interest, which all natures deem to be their good, proof that a man is just, not willingly or because he
and are only diverted into the path of justice by thinks that justice is any good to him individually,
the force of law. The liberty which we are suppos- but of necessity, for wherever any one thinks that
ing may be most completely given to them in the he can safely be unjust, there he is unjust. For all
form of such a power as is said to have been pos- men believe in their hearts that injustice is far more
sessed by Gyges the ancestor of Croesus the Lydian. profitable to the individual than justice, and he who
According to the tradition, Gyges was a shepherd in argues as I have been supposing, will say that they
the service of the king of Lydia; there was a great are right. If you could imagine any one obtaining
storm, and an earthquake made an opening in the this power of becoming invisible, and never doing
earth at the place where he was feeding his flock. any wrong or touching what was another’s, he
Amazed at the sight, he descended into the opening, would be thought by the lookers-on to be a most
where, among other marvels, he beheld a hollow wretched idiot, although they would praise him to
brazen horse, having doors, at which he stoop- one another’s faces, and keep up appearances with
ing and looking in saw a dead body of stature, as one another from a fear that they too might suffer
appeared to him, more than human, and having injustice. Enough of this.
nothing on but a gold ring; this he took from the
finger of the dead and reascended. Now the shep- Now, if we are to form a real judgment of the
herds met together, according to custom, that they life of the just and unjust, we must isolate them;
might send their monthly report about the flocks to there is no other way; and how is the isolation to
the king; into their assembly he came having the be effected? I answer: Let the unjust man be entirely
ring on his finger, and as he was sitting among them unjust, and the just man entirely just; nothing is to
he chanced to turn the collet of the ring inside his be taken away from either of them, and both are to
hand, when instantly he became invisible to the rest be perfectly furnished for the work of their respective
of the company and they began to speak of him as lives. First, let the unjust be like other distinguished
if he were no longer present. He was astonished at masters of craft; like the skilful pilot or physician,
this, and again touching the ring he turned the collet who knows intuitively his own powers and keeps
outwards and reappeared; he made several trials of within their limits, and who, if he fails at any point,
the ring, and always with the same result—when he is able to recover himself. So let the unjust make his
turned the collet inwards he became invisible, when unjust attempts in the right way, and lie hidden if he
outwards he reappeared. Whereupon he contrived to means to be great in his injustice (he who is found
be chosen one of the messengers who were sent to out is nobody): for the highest reach of injustice is,
the court; where as soon as he arrived he seduced to be deemed just when you are not. Therefore I say
the queen, and with her help conspired against the that in the perfectly unjust man we must assume the
king and slew him, and took the kingdom. Suppose most perfect injustice; there is to be no deduction,
now that there were two such magic rings, and the but we must allow him, while doing the most unjust
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Chapter ❮❮ Egoism, Altruism, and the Social Contract
acts, to have acquired the greatest reputation for “His mind has a soil deep and fertile,
justice. If he have taken a false step he must be able Out of which spring his prudent counsels.”
to recover himself; he must be one who can speak
with effect, if any of his deeds come to light, and In the first place, he is thought just, and there-
who can force his way where force is required by his fore bears rule in the city; he can marry whom he
courage and strength, and command of money and will, and give in marriage to whom he will; also he
friends. And at his side let us place the just man in can trade and deal where he likes, and always to
his nobleness and simplicity, wishing, as Aeschylus his own advantage, because he has no misgivings
says, to be and not to seem good. There must be no about injustice; and at every contest, whether in
seeming, for if he seem to be just he will be hon- public or private, he gets the better of his antago-
oured and rewarded, and then we shall not know nists, and gains at their expense, and is rich, and
whether he is just for the sake of justice or for the out of his gains he can benefit his friends, and harm
sake of honours and rewards; therefore, let him be his enemies; moreover, he can offer sacrifices, and
clothed in justice only, and have no other cover- dedicate gifts to the gods abundantly and magnifi-
ing; and he must be imagined in a state of life the cently, and can honour the gods or any man whom
opposite of the former. Let him be the best of men, he wants to honour in a far better style than the
and let him be thought the worst; then he will have just, and therefore he is likely to be dearer than they
been put to the proof; and we shall see whether he are to the gods. And thus, Socrates, gods and men
will be affected by the fear of infamy and its conse- are said to unite in making the life of the unjust bet-
quences. And let him continue thus to the hour of ter than the life of the just.
death; being just and seeming to be unjust. When
both have reached the uttermost extreme, the one Adeimantus. Socrates, you do not suppose that
of justice and the other of injustice, let judgment be there is nothing more to be urged?
given which of them is the happier of the two.
Socrates. Why, what else is there?
Socrates. Heavens! my dear Glaucon, I said, Adeimantus. The strongest point of all has not
how energetically you polish them up for the deci- been even mentioned.
sion, first one and then the other, as if they were Socrates. Well, then, according to the proverb,
two statues. “Let brother help brother”—if he fails in any part do
you assist him; although I must confess that Glaucon
Glaucon. I do my best. And now that we know has already said quite enough to lay me in the dust,
what they are like there is no difficulty in tracing and take from me the power of helping justice.
out the sort of life which awaits either of them. This Adeimantus. Nonsense. But let me add some-
I will proceed to describe; but as you may think thing more: There is another side to Glaucon’s argu-
the description a little too coarse, I ask you to sup- ment about the praise and censure of justice and
pose, Socrates, that the words which follow are not injustice, which is equally required in order to bring
mine.—Let me put them into the mouths of the out what I believe to be his meaning. Parents and
eulogists of injustice: They will tell you that the just tutors are always telling their sons and their wards
man who is thought unjust will be scourged, racked, that they are to be just; but why? not for the sake
bound—will have his eyes burnt out; and, at last, of justice, but for the sake of character and reputa-
after suffering every kind of evil, he will be impaled: tion; in the hope of obtaining for him who is reputed
Then he will understand that he ought to seem only, just some of those offices, marriages, and the like
and not to be, just; the words of Aeschylus may be which Glaucon has enumerated among the advan-
more truly spoken of the unjust than of the just. For tages accruing to the unjust from the reputation of
the unjust is pursuing a reality; he does not live with justice. More, however, is made of appearances by
a view to appearances—he wants to be really unjust this class of persons than by the others; for they
and not to seem only— throw in the good opinion of the gods, and will tell
you of a shower of benefits which the heavens, as
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PART ONE ❯❯ ETHICAL THEORY
they say, rain upon the pious; and this accords with in public and private when they are rich or in any
the testimony of the noble Hesiod and Homer, the other way influential, while they despise and over-
first of whom says, that the gods make the oaks of look those who may be weak and poor, even though
the just— acknowledging them to be better than the others.
But most extraordinary of all is their mode of speak-
“To bear acorns at their summit, and bees in the ing about virtue and the gods: they say that the gods
middle; And the sheep are bowed down with the apportion calamity and misery to many good men,
weight of their fleeces,”1 and good and happiness to the wicked. And mendi-
cant prophets go to rich men’s doors and persuade
and many other blessings of a like kind are pro- them that they have a power committed to them
vided for them. And Homer has a very similar strain; by the gods of making an atonement for a man’s
for he speaks of one whose fame is— own or his ancestor’s sins by sacrifices or charms,
with rejoicings and feasts; and they promise to harm
“As the fame of some blameless king who, like a god, an enemy, whether just or unjust, at a small cost;
Maintains justice; to whom the black earth brings with magic arts and incantations binding heaven, as
forth Wheat and barley, whose trees are bowed with they say, to execute their will. And the poets are the
fruit, And his sheep never fail to bear, and the sea authorities to whom they appeal, now smoothing
gives him fish.”2 the path of vice with the words of Hesiod—
Still grander are the gifts of heaven which “Vice may be had in abundance without trouble; the
Musaeus and his son3 vouchsafe to the just; they way is smooth and her dwelling-place is near. But
take them down into the world below, where they before virtue the gods have set toil,”4
have the saints lying on couches at a feast, everlast-
ingly drunk, crowned with garlands; their idea seems and a tedious and uphill road: then citing Homer as
to be that an immortality of drunkenness is the a witness that the gods may be influenced by men;
highest meed of virtue. Some extend their rewards for he also says—
yet further; the posterity, as they say, of the faithful
and just shall survive to the third and fourth genera- “The gods, too, may be turned from their purpose;
tion. This is the style in which they praise justice. and men pray to them and avert their wrath by
But about the wicked there is another strain; they sacrifices and soothing entreaties, and by libations
bury them in a slough in Hades, and make them and the odour of fat, when they have sinned and
carry water in a sieve; also while they are yet living transgressed.”5
they bring them to infamy, and inflict upon them the
punishments which Glaucon described as the portion And they produce a host of books written by
of the just who are reputed to be unjust; nothing else Musaeus and Orpheus, who were children of the
does their invention supply. Such is their manner of Moon and the Muses—that is what they say—
praising the one and censuring the other. according to which they perform their ritual, and
persuade not only individuals, but whole cities, that
Once more, Socrates, I will ask you to consider expiations and atonements for sin may be made by
another way of speaking about justice and injustice, sacrifices and amusements which fill a vacant hour,
which is not confined to the poets, but is found in and are equally at the service of the living and the
prose writers. The universal voice of mankind is dead; the latter sort they call mysteries, and they
always declaring that justice and virtue are honour- redeem us from the pains of hell, but if we neglect
able, but grievous and toilsome; and that the plea- them no one knows what awaits us.
sures of vice and injustice are easy of attainment,
and are only censured by law and opinion. They And now when the young hear all this said about
say also that honesty is for the most part less profit- virtue and vice, and the way in which gods and
able than dishonesty; and they are quite ready to men regard them, how are their minds likely to be
call wicked men happy, and to honour them both affected, my dear Socrates,—those of them, I mean,
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Chapter ❮❮ Egoism, Altruism, and the Social Contract
who are quickwitted, and, like bees on the wing, we are just, although we may escape the vengeance
light on every flower, and from all that they hear of heaven, we shall lose the gains of injustice; but,
are prone to draw conclusions as to what manner if we are unjust, we shall keep the gains, and by our
of persons they should be and in what way they sinning and praying, and praying and sinning, the
should walk if they would make the best of life? gods will be propitiated, and we shall not be pun-
Probably the youth will say to himself in the words ished. “But there is a world below in which either
of Pindar— we or our posterity will suffer for our unjust deeds.”
Yes, my friend, will be the reflection, but there are
“Can I by justice or by crooked ways of deceit ascend mysteries and atoning deities, and these have great
a loftier tower which may be a fortress to me all my power. That is what mighty cities declare; and the
days?” children of the gods, who were their poets and
prophets, bear a like testimony.
For what men say is that, if I am really just and
am not also thought just, profit there is none, but On what principle, then, shall we any longer
the pain and loss on the other hand are unmistake- choose justice rather than the worst injustice? when,
able. But if, though unjust, I acquire the reputation if we only unite the latter with a deceitful regard
of justice, a heavenly life is promised to me. Since to appearance, we shall fare to our mind both with
then, as philosophers prove, appearance tyrannizes gods and men, in life and after death, as the most
over truth and is lord of happiness, to appearance numerous and the highest authorities tell us. Know-
I must devote myself. I will describe around me a ing all this, Socrates, how can a man who has any
picture and shadow of virtue to be the vestibule and superiority of mind or person or rank or wealth, be
exterior of my house; behind I will trail the subtle willing to honour justice; or indeed to refrain from
and crafty fox, as Archilochus, greatest of sages, laughing when he hears justice praised? And even
recommends. But I hear some one exclaiming that if there should be some one who is able to disprove
the concealment of wickedness is often difficult; to the truth of my words, and who is satisfied that
which I answer, Nothing great is easy. Nevertheless, justice is best, still he is not angry with the unjust,
the argument indicates this, if we would be happy, but is very ready to forgive them, because he also
to be the path along which we should proceed. With knows that men are not just of their own free will;
a view to concealment we will establish secret broth- unless, peradventure, there be some one whom the
erhoods and political clubs. And there are professors divinity within him may have inspired with a hatred
of rhetoric who teach the art of persuading courts of injustice, or who has attained knowledge of the
and assemblies; and so, partly by persuasion and truth—but no other man. He only blames injustice
partly by force, I shall make unlawful gains and not who, owing to cowardice or age or some weak-
be punished. Still I hear a voice saying that the gods ness, has not the power of being unjust. And this is
cannot be deceived, neither can they be compelled. proved by the fact that when he obtains the power,
But what if there are no gods? or, suppose them to he immediately becomes unjust as far as he can be.
have no care of human things—why in either case
should we mind about concealment? And even if The cause of all this, Socrates, was indicated
there are gods, and they do care about us, yet we by us at the beginning of the argument, when my
know of them only from tradition and the geneal- brother and I told you how astonished we were to
ogies of the poets; and these are the very persons find that of all the professing panegyrists of justice—
who say that they may be influenced and turned by beginning with the ancient heroes of whom any
“sacrifices and soothing entreaties and by offerings.” memorial has been preserved to us, and ending with
Let us be consistent then, and believe both or nei- the men of our own time—no one has ever blamed
ther. If the poets speak truly, why then we had bet- injustice or praised justice except with a view to the
ter be unjust, and offer of the fruits of injustice; for if glories, honours, and benefits which flow from them.
No one has ever adequately described either in verse
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PART ONE ❯❯ ETHICAL THEORY
or prose the true essential nature of either of them this question, unless I hear the contrary from your
abiding in the soul, and invisible to any human or own lips, I expect something better. And therefore,
divine eye; or shown that of all the things of a man’s I say, not only prove to us that justice is better than
soul which he has within him, justice is the greatest injustice, but show what they either of them do to
good, and injustice the greatest evil. Had this been the possessor of them, which makes the one to be a
the universal strain, had you sought to persuade good and the other an evil, whether seen or unseen
us of this from our youth upwards, we should not by gods and men.
have been on the watch to keep one another from
doing wrong, but every one would have been his Socrates. Sons of an illustrious father, that was
own watchman, because afraid, if he did wrong, of not a bad beginning of the Elegiac verses which
harbouring in himself the greatest of evils. I dare say the admirer of Glaucon made in honour of you after
that Thrasymachus and others would seriously hold you had distinguished yourselves at the battle of
the language which I have been merely repeating, Megara—
and words even stronger than these about justice
and injustice, grossly, as I conceive, perverting their “‘Sons of Ariston,’ he sang, ‘divine offspring of
true nature. But I speak in this vehement manner, an illustrious hero.’”
as I must frankly confess to you, because I want to
hear from you the opposite side; and I would ask The epithet is very appropriate, for there is some-
you to show not only the superiority which justice thing truly divine in being able to argue as you have
has over injustice, but what effect they have on the done for the superiority of injustice, and remain-
possessor of them which makes the one to be a good ing unconvinced by your own arguments. And I do
and the other an evil to him. And please, as Glaucon believe that you are not convinced—this I infer from
requested of you, to exclude reputations; for unless your general character, for had I judged only from
you take away from each of them his true reputa- your speeches I should have mistrusted you. But
tion and add on the false, we shall say that you now, the greater my confidence in you, the greater
do not praise justice, but the appearance of it; we is my difficulty in knowing what to say. For I am in
shall think that you are only exhorting us to keep a strait between two; on the one hand I feel that I
injustice dark, and that you really agree with Thra- am unequal to the task; and my inability is brought
symachus in thinking that justice is another’s good home to me by the fact that you were not satisfied
and the interest of the stronger, and that injustice with the answer which I made to Thrasymachus,
is a man’s own profit and interest, though injurious proving, as I thought, the superiority which justice
to the weaker. Now as you have admitted that jus- has over injustice. And yet I cannot refuse to help,
tice is one of that highest class of goods which are while breath and speech remain to me; I am afraid
desired indeed for their results, but in a far greater that there would be an impiety in being present
degree for their own sakes—like sight or hearing or when justice is evil spoken of and not lifting up a
knowledge or health, or any other real and natural hand in her defence. And therefore I had best give
and not merely conventional good—I would ask you such help as I can.
in your praise of justice to regard one point only: I
mean the essential good and evil which justice and Glaucon and the rest entreated me by all means
injustice work in the possessors of them. Let oth- not to let the question drop, but to proceed in the
ers praise justice and censure injustice, magnifying investigation. They wanted to arrive at the truth,
the rewards and honours of the one and abusing the first, about the nature of justice and injustice,
other; that is a manner of arguing which, coming and secondly, about their relative advantages. I told
from them, I am ready to tolerate, but from you who them, what I really thought, that the enquiry would
have spent your whole life in the consideration of be of a serious nature, and would require very good
eyes. Seeing then, I said, that we are no great wits,
I think that we had better adopt a method which I
may illustrate thus; suppose that a short-sighted
person had been asked by some one to read small
Copyright 2018 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part. WCN 02-200-202
Chapter ❮❮ Egoism, Altruism, and the Social Contract
letters from a distance; and it occurred to some one Socrates. Then in the larger the quantity of jus-
else that they might be found in another place which tice is likely to be larger and more easily discern-
was larger and in which the letters were larger—if ible. I propose therefore that we enquire into the
they were the same and he could read the larger let- nature of justice and injustice, first as they appear in
ters first, and then proceed to the lesser—this would the State, and secondly in the individual, proceed-
have been thought a rare piece of good fortune. ing from the greater to the lesser and comparing
them.
Adeimantus. Very true. But how does the illus-
tration apply to our enquiry? Adeimantus. That is an excellent proposal.
Socrates. I will tell you. Justice, which is the sub- NOTES
ject of our enquiry, is, as you know, sometimes spo-
ken of as the virtue of an individual, and sometimes 1. Hesiod, Works and Days, p. 230.
as the virtue of a state. 2. Homer, Od, xix, p. 109.
3. Eumolpus.
Adeimantus. True. 4. Hesiod, Works and Days, p. 287.
Socrates. And is not a State larger than an 5. Homer, Iliad, ix, p. 493.
individual?
Adeimantus. It is.
READING
Self Love*
THOMAS HOBBES
For more chapter resources and activities, go to MindTap.
Study Questions
As you read the excerpt, please consider the following questions:
1. In what ways are men equal and unequal? Which is more significant?
2. What does Hobbes mean when he says that nature has given everyone a right to all?
What is the result of this?
3. Beyond society and its rules, is there any right or wrong, or just or unjust, according to Hobbes?
There be in animals, two sorts of motions pecu- fancy is but the relics of the same motion, remain-
liar to them: one called vital; begun in genera- ing after sense. . . . And because going, speaking,
tion, and continued without interruption through and the like voluntary motions, depend always
their whole life; such as are the course of the blood, upon a precedent thought of whither, which way,
the pulse, the breathing, the concoction, nutrition, and what; it is evident, that the imagination is the
excretion, etc. to which motions there needs no help first internal beginning of all voluntary motion. And
of imagination: the other is animal motion, other- although unstudied men do not conceive any motion
wise called voluntary motion; as to go, to speak, to
move any of our limbs, in such manner as is first From Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, in The English Works of Thomas
fancied in our minds. That sense is motion in the Hobbes, ed. Sir William Molesworth (London: John Bohn, 1839),
organs and interior parts of man’s body, caused by pp. 2:38–41, 85.
the action of the things we see, hear, etc.; and that
*Title supplied by the editor.
Copyright 2018 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part. WCN 02-200-202
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