PART ONE ❯❯ ETHICAL THEORY
at all to be there, where the thing moved is invis- desire, than to taste and try. But aversion we have
ible; or the space it is moved in is, for the shortness for things, not only which we know have hurt us,
of it, insensible; yet that doth not hinder, but that but also that we do not know whether they will hurt
such motions are. For let a space be never so little, us, or not.
that which is moved over a greater space, whereof
that little one is part, must first be moved over that. Those things which we neither desire, nor hate,
These small beginnings of motion, within the body we are said to contemn; CONTEMPT being nothing
of man, before they appear in walking, speaking, else but an immobility, or contumacy of the heart, in
striking, and other visible actions, are commonly resisting the action of certain things; and proceeding
called ENDEAVOR. from that the heart is already moved otherwise, by
other more potent objects; or from want of experi-
This endeavor, when it is toward something ence of them.
which causes it, is called APPETITE, or DESIRE;
the latter, being the general name; and the other And because the constitution of a man’s body is
oftentimes restrained to signify the desire of food, in continual mutation, it is impossible that all the
namely hunger and thirst. And when the endeavor same things should always cause in him the same
is fromward something, it is generally called appetites, and aversions: much less can all men con-
AVERSION. These words, appetite and aversion, we sent, in the desire of almost any one and the same
have from the Latins; and they both of them sig- object.
nify the motions, one of approaching, the other of
retiring. . . . For nature itself does often press upon But whatsoever is the object of any man’s appe-
men those truths, which afterwards, when they look tite or desire, that is it which he for his part calleth
for somewhat beyond nature, they stumble at. For good: and the object of his hate and aversion, evil;
the schools find in mere appetite to go, or move, no and of his contempt, vile and inconsiderable. For
actual motion at all: but because some motion they these words of good, evil, and contemptible, are ever
must acknowledge, they call it metaphorical motion; used with relation to the person that useth them:
which is but an absurd speech: for though words there being nothing simply and absolutely so; nor
may be called metaphorical; bodies and motions any common rule of good and evil, to be taken from
cannot. the nature of the objects themselves. . . .
That which men desire, they are also said to Felicity of this life consisteth not in the repose of
LOVE: and to HATE those things for which they a mind satisfied. For there is no such finis ultimus,
have aversion. So that desire and love are the same utmost aim, nor summum bonum, greatest good, as
thing; save that by desire, we always signify the is spoken of in the books of the old moral philoso-
absence of the object; by love, most commonly phers. Nor can a man any more live, whose desires
the presence of the same. So also by aversion, we are at an end, than he, whose senses and imagina-
signify the absence; and by hate, the presence of the tions are at a stand. Felicity is a continual progress
object. of the desire, from one object to another; the attain-
ing of the former, being still but the way to the lat-
Of appetites and aversions, some are born with ter. The cause whereof is, that the object of man’s
men; as appetite of food, appetite of excretion, and desire, is not to enjoy once only, and for one instant
exoneration, which may also and more properly be of time; but to assure for ever, the way of his future
called aversions, from somewhat they feel in their desire. . . .
bodies; and some other appetites, not many. The
rest, which are appetites of particular things, pro- So that in the first place, I put for a general incli-
ceed from experience, and trial of their effects upon nation of all mankind, a perpetual and restless desire
themselves or other men. For of things we know not of power after power, that ceaseth only in death.
at all, or believe not to be, we can have no further And the cause of this, is . . . that a man . . . cannot
assure the power and means to live well, which he
hath present, without the acquisition of more. . . .
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Chapter ❮❮ Egoism, Altruism, and the Social Contract
Nature hath made men so equal, in the facul- invader hath no more to fear, than another man’s
ties of the body, and mind; as that though there be single power; if one plant, sow, build, or possess a
found one man sometimes manifestly stronger in convenient seat, others may probably be expected to
body, or of quicker mind than another; yet when all come prepared with forces united, to dispossess, and
is reckoned together, the difference between man, deprive him, not only of the fruit of his labor, but
and man, is not so considerable, as that one man also of his life, or liberty. And the invader again is in
can thereupon claim to himself any benefit, to which the like danger of another.
another may not pretend, as well as he. For as to the
strength of body, the weakest has strength enough And from this diffidence of one another, there is
to kill the strongest, either by secret machination, no way for any man to secure himself, so reason-
or by confederacy with others, that are in the same able, as anticipation; that is, by force, or wiles, to
danger with himself. master the persons of all men he can, so long, till
he see no other power great enough to endanger
And as to the faculties of the mind, setting aside him: and this is no more than his own conserva-
the arts grounded upon words, and especially that tion requireth, and generally allowed. Also because
skill of proceeding upon general, and infallible rules, there be some, that taking pleasure in contemplating
called science; which very few have, and but in their own power in the acts of conquest, which they
few things; as being not native faculty, born with pursue farther than their security requires; if others,
us; nor attained, as prudence, while we look after that otherwise would be glad to be at ease within
somewhat else, I find yet a greater equality amongst modest bounds, should not by invasion increase
men, than that of strength. For prudence, is but their power, they would not be able, long time, by
experience; which equal time, equally bestows on all standing only on their defense, to subsist. And by
men, in those things they equally apply themselves consequence, such augmentation of dominion over
unto. That which may perhaps make such equality men being necessary to a man’s conservation, it
incredible, is but a vain conceit of one’s own wis- ought to be allowed him.
dom, which almost all men think they have in a
greater degree, than the vulgar; that is, than all men Again, men have no pleasure, but on the contrary
but themselves, and a few others, whom by fame, a great deal of grief, in keeping company, where
or for concurring with themselves, they approve. there is no power able to overawe them all. For
For such is the nature of men, that howsoever they every man looketh that his companion should value
may acknowledge many others to be more witty, or him, at the same rate he sets upon himself: and
more eloquent, or more learned; yet they will hardly upon all signs of contempt, or undervaluing, natu-
believe there be many so wise as themselves; for rally endeavors, as far as he dares, (which amongst
they see their own wit at hand, and other men’s at a them that have no common power to keep them
distance. But this proveth rather that men are in that in quiet, is far enough to make them destroy each
point equal, than unequal. For there is not ordinarily other), to extort a greater value from his contem-
a greater sign of the equal distribution of any thing, ners, by damage; and from others, by the example.
than that every man is contented with his share.
So that in the nature of man, we find three prin-
From this equality of ability, ariseth equality of cipal causes of quarrel. First, competition; secondly,
hope in the attaining of our ends. And therefore if diffidence; thirdly, glory.
any two men desire the same thing, which neverthe-
less they cannot both enjoy, they become enemies; The first, maketh men invade for gain; the sec-
and in the way to their end, which is principally their ond, for safety; and the third, for reputation. The
own conservation, and sometimes their delectation first use violence, to make themselves masters of
only, endeavor to destroy, or subdue one another. other men’s persons, wives, children, and cattle;
And from hence it comes to pass, that where an the second, to defend them; the third, for trifles, as
a word, a smile, a different opinion, and any other
sign of undervalue, either direct in their persons,
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PART ONE ❯❯ ETHICAL THEORY
or by reflection in their kindred, their friends, their is worst of all, continual fear, and danger of vio-
nation, their profession, or their name. lent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty,
brutish, and short. . . .
Hereby it is manifest, that during the time men
live without a common power to keep them all in It may peradventure be thought, there was never
awe, they are in that condition which is called war; such a time, nor condition of war as this; and I
and such a war, as is of every man, against every believe it was never generally so, over all the world:
man. For WAR, consisteth not in battle only, or the but there are many places, where they live so now.
act of fighting; but in a tract of time, wherein the For the savage people in many places of America,
will to contend by battle is sufficiently known: and except the government of small families, the concord
therefore the notion of time, is to be considered in the whereof dependeth on natural lust, have no gov-
nature of war; as it is in the nature of weather. For ernment at all; and live at this day in that brutish
as the nature of foul weather, lieth not in a shower manner, as I said before. Howsoever, it may be per-
or two of rain; but in an inclination thereto of many ceived what manner of life there would be, where
days together: so the nature of war, consisteth not in there were no common power to fear, by the manner
actual fighting; but in the known disposition thereto, of life, which men that have formerly lived under
during all the time there is no assurance to the con- a peaceful government, use to degenerate into, in a
trary. All other time is PEACE. civil war.
Whatsoever therefore is consequent to a time of But though there had never been any time,
war, where every man is enemy to every man; the wherein particular men were in a condition of war
same is consequent to the time, wherein men live one against another; yet in all times, kings, and per-
without security, than what their own strength, sons of sovereign authority, because of their inde-
and their own invention shall furnish them withal. pendency, are in continual jealousies, and in the
In such condition, there is no place for industry; state and posture of gladiators; having their weap-
because the fruit thereof is uncertain: and conse- ons pointing, and their eyes fixed on one another;
quently no culture of the earth; no navigation, nor that is, their forts, garrisons, and guns upon the
use of the commodities that may be imported by sea; frontiers of their kingdoms; and continual spies
no commodious building; no instruments of moving, upon their neighbors; which is a posture of war. But
and removing, such things as require much force; because they uphold thereby, the industry of their
no knowledge of the face of the earth; no account subjects; there does not follow from it, that misery,
of time; no arts; no letters; no society; and which which accompanies the liberty of particular men. . . .
READING
The Social Contract and Altruism
STEVEN PINKER
For more chapter resources and activities, go to MindTap.
Study Questions
As you read the excerpt, please consider the following questions:
1. How are “nepotistic altruism” and “reciprocal altruism” explained in evolutionary terms?
2. What is the problem with people caring more for their close relations or with parents preferring to save their own
children instead of the children of others?
3. How does the modern theory of evolution fall “smack into the social contract tradition?”
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Chapter ❮❮ Egoism, Altruism, and the Social Contract
It’s no mystery why organisms sometimes harm generous act. Such genes will, on average, come to
one another. Evolution has no conscience, and if predominate, as long as the cost to the helper is less
one creature hurts another to benefit itself, such as than the benefit to the recipient discounted by their
by eating, parasitizing, intimidating, or cuckolding it, degree of relatedness. Family love—the cherishing
its descendants will come to predominate, complete of children, siblings, parents, grandparents, uncles
with those nasty habits. All this is familiar from the and aunts, nieces and nephews, and cousins—can
vernacular sense of “Darwinian” as a synonym for evolve. This is called nepotistic altruism.
“ruthless” and from Tennyson’s depiction of nature
as red in tooth and claw. If that were all there was Altruism can also evolve when organisms trade
to the evolution of the human condition, we would favors. One helps another by grooming, feeding, pro-
have to agree with the rock song: Life sucks, then tecting, or backing him, and is helped in turn when
you die. But of course life doesn’t always suck. the needs reverse. This is called reciprocal altruism,
Many creatures cooperate, nurture, and make peace, and it can evolve when the parties recognize each
and humans in particular find comfort and joy in other, interact repeatedly, can confer a large benefit
their families, friends, and communities. This, too, on others at small cost to themselves, keep a mem-
should be familiar to readers of The Selfish Gene and ory for favors offered or denied, and are impelled
the other books on the evolution of altruism that to reciprocate accordingly. Reciprocal altruism can
have appeared in the years since. evolve because cooperators do better than hermits or
misanthropes. They enjoy the gains of trading their
There are several reasons why organisms may surpluses, pulling ticks out of one another’s hair,
evolve a willingness to do good deeds. They may saving each other from drowning or starvation, and
help other creatures while pursuing their own inter- baby-sitting each other’s children. Reciprocators can
ests, say, when they form a herd that confuses also do better over the long run than the cheaters
predators or live off each other’s by-products. This is who take favors without returning them, because
called mutualism, symbiosis, or cooperation. Among the reciprocators will come to recognize the cheaters
humans, friends who have common tastes, hobbies, and shun or punish them. The demands of recipro-
or enemies are a kind of symbiont pair. The two par- cal altruism can explain why the social and moral-
ents of a brood of children are an even better exam- istic emotions evolved. Sympathy and trust prompt
ple. Their genes are tied up in the same package, their people to extend the first favor. Gratitude and loy-
children, so what is good for one is good for the other, alty prompt them to repay favors. Guilt and shame
and each has an interest in keeping the other alive deter them from hurting or failing to repay others.
and healthy. These shared interests set the stage for Anger and contempt prompt them to avoid or punish
compassionate love and marital love to evolve. cheaters. And among humans, any tendency of an
individual to reciprocate or cheat does not have to
And in some cases organisms may benefit other be witnessed firsthand but can be recounted by lan-
organisms at a cost to themselves, which biologists guage. This leads to an interest in the reputation of
call altruism. Altruism in this technical sense can others, transmitted by gossip and public approval or
evolve in two main ways. First, since relatives share condemnation, and a concern with one’s own repu-
genes, any gene that inclines an organism toward tation. Partnerships, friendships, alliances, and com-
helping a relative will increase the chance of sur- munities can emerge, cemented by these emotions
vival of a copy of itself that sits inside that relative, and concerns.
even if the helper sacrifices its own fitness in the
Many people start to get nervous at this point,
“The Blank Slate [Discover Magazine 10/2002]”, adapted from The but the discomfort is not from the tragedies that
Blank Slate: The Modern Denial Of Human Nature by Steven Pinker, [Robert] Trivers explained. It comes instead from
copyright © 2002 by Steven Pinker. Used by permission of Viking two misconceptions, each of which we have
Books, an imprint of Penguin Publishing Group, a division of encountered before. First, all this talk about genes
Penguin Random House LLC.
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PART ONE ❯❯ ETHICAL THEORY
that influence behavior does not mean that we are “Antz”, an ant with the voice of Woody Allen com-
cuckoo clocks or player pianos, mindlessly execut- plains to his psychoanalyst:
ing the dictates of DNA. The genes in question are
those that endow us with the neural systems for It’s this whole gung-ho superorganism thing that I
conscience, deliberation, and will, and when we talk just can’t get. I try, but I just don’t get it. What is it, I’m
about the selection of such genes, we are talking supposed to do everything for the colony and . . . what
about the various ways those faculties could have about my needs?
evolved. The error comes from the Blank Slate and
the Ghost in the Machine: if one starts off think- The humor comes from the clash between ant
ing that our higher mental faculties are stamped in psychology, which originates in a genetic system
by society or inhere in a soul, then when biologists that makes workers more closely related to one
mention genetic influence the first alternatives that another than they would be to their offspring, and
come to mind are puppet strings or trolley tracks. human psychology, in which our genetic distinct-
But if higher faculties, including learning, reason, ness leads us to ask, “What about my needs?”
and choice, are products of a nonrandom organiza- Trivers, following on the work of William Hamilton
tion of the brain, there have to be genes that help and George Williams, did some algebra that predicts
do the organizing, and that raises the question of the extent to which people should ask themselves
how those genes would have been selected in the that question.
course of human evolution. The second misconcep-
tion is to imagine that talk about costs and benefits The rest of this chapter is about that deceptively
implies that people are Machiavellian cynics, coldly simple algebra and how its implications overturn
calculating the genetic advantages of befriending many conceptions of human nature. It discredits the
and marrying. To fret over this picture, or denounce Blank Slate, which predicts that people’s regard for
it because it is ugly, is to confuse proximate and ulti- their fellows is determined by their “role,” as if it
mate causation. People don’t care about their genes; were a part assigned arbitrarily to an actor. But it
they care about happiness, love, power, respect, also discredits some naïve views of evolution that
and other passions. The cost-benefit calculations are common among people who don’t believe in the
are a metaphorical way of describing the selection Blank Slate. Most people have intuitions about the
of alternative genes over millennia, not a literal natural state of affairs. They may believe that if we
description of what takes place in a human brain in acted as nature “wants” us to, families would func-
real time. Nothing prevents the amoral process of tion as harmonious units, or individuals would act
natural selection from evolving a brain with genu- for the good of the species, or people would show
ine big-hearted emotions. It is said that those who the true selves beneath their social masks, or, as
appreciate legislation and sausages should not see Newt Gingrich said in 1995, the male of our species
them being made. The same is true for human emo- would hunt giraffes and wallow in ditches like little
tions. So if love and conscience can evolve, where’s piglets.
the tragedy? Trivers noticed that the confluence of
genetic interests that gave rise to the social emotions Understanding the patterns of genetic over-
is only partial. lap that bind and divide us can replace simplistic
views of all kinds with a more subtle understand-
Because we are not clones, or even social insects ing of the human condition. Indeed, it can illumi-
(who can share up to three-quarters of their genes), nate the human condition in ways that complement
what ultimately is best for one person is not identical the insights of artists and philosophers through the
to what ultimately is best for another. Thus every millennia.
human relationship, even the most devoted and
intimate, carries the seeds of conflict. In the movie The most obvious human tragedy comes from
the difference between our feelings toward kin
and our feelings toward non-kin, one of the deep-
est divides in the living world. When it comes to
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Chapter ❮❮ Egoism, Altruism, and the Social Contract
love and solidarity among people, the relative vis- wealth to their children is one of the steepest imped-
cosity of blood and water is evident in everything iments to an economically egalitarian society. Yet
from the clans and dynasties of traditional societ- few people would allow the government to confis-
ies to the clogging of airports during holidays with cate 100 percent of their estate, because most peo-
people traveling across the world to be with their ple see their children as an extension of themselves
families. and thus as the proper beneficiaries of their lifelong
striving. Nepotism is a universal human bent and a
It has also been borne out by quantitative stud- universal scourge of large organizations. It is notori-
ies. In traditional foraging societies, genetic relatives ous for sapping countries led by hereditary dynasties
are more likely to live together, work in each other’s and for bogging down governments and businesses
gardens, protect each other, and adopt each other’s in the Third World. A recurring historic solution was
needy or orphaned children, and are less likely to to give positions of local power to people who had
attack, feud with, and kill each other. no family ties, such as eunuchs, celibates, slaves, or
people a long way from home.
Even in modern societies, which tend to sun-
der ties of kinship, the more closely two people are A more recent solution is to outlaw or regulate
genetically related, the more inclined they are to nepotism, though the regulations always come with
come to one another’s aid, especially in life-or-death tradeoffs and exceptions. Small businesses or, as
situations. they are often called, “family businesses” or “Mom-
and-Pop businesses” are highly nepotistic, and
But love and solidarity are relative. To say that thereby can conflict with principles of equal oppor-
people are more caring toward their relatives is to tunity and earn the resentment of the surrounding
say that they are more callous toward their non- community.
relatives. The epigraph to Robert Wright’s book on
evolutionary psychology is an excerpt from Graham The sciences of human nature are pressing on
Greene’s “The Power and the Glory,” in which the two political hot buttons, not just one. The first is
protagonist broods about his daughter: “He said, ‘Oh how we conceptualize the entity known as “society.”
god, help her. Damn me, I deserve it, but let her live The political philosopher Roger Masters has shown
forever.’ This was the love he should have felt for how sociobiology (and related theories invoking
every soul in the world: all the fear and the wish evolution, genetics, and brain science) inadvertently
to save concentrated unjustly on the one child. He took sides in an ancient dispute between two tradi-
began to weep. . . . He thought: This is what I should tions of understanding the social order.
feel all the time for everyone.” Family love indeed
subverts the ideal of what we should feel for every In the sociological tradition, a society is a cohe-
soul in the world. Moral philosophers play with a sive organic entity and its individual citizens are
hypothetical dilemma in which people can run mere parts. People are thought to be social by their
through the left door of a burning building to save very nature and to function as constituents of a
some number of children or through the right door larger super organism. This is the tradition of Plato,
to save their own child. Hegel, Marx, Durkheim, Weber, Kroeber, the soci-
ologist Talcott Parsons, the anthropologist Claude
If you are a parent, ponder this question: Is there Levi-Strauss, and postmodernism in the humanities
any number of children that would lead you to pick and social sciences. In the economic or social con-
the left door? Indeed, all of us reveal our preference tract tradition, society is an arrangement negoti-
with our pocketbooks when we spend money on tri- ated by rational, self-interested individuals. Society
fles for our own children (a bicycle, orthodontics, an emerges when people agree to sacrifice some of their
education at a private school or university) instead autonomy in exchange for security from the depre-
of saving the lives of unrelated children in the devel- dations of others wielding their autonomy. It is the
oping world by donating the money to charity. tradition of Thrasymachus in Plato’s Republic, and
Similarly, the practice of parents bequeathing their
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PART ONE ❯❯ ETHICAL THEORY
of Machiavelli, Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Smith, restated in biological terms. Of course, humans were
and Bentham. In the twentieth century it became never solitary (as Rousseau and Hobbes incorrectly
the basis for the rational actor or “economic man” surmised), and they did not inaugurate group living
models in economics and political science, and for by haggling over a contract at a particular time and
cost-benefit analyses of public choices. The mod- place. Bands, clans, tribes, and other social groups
ern theory of evolution falls smack into the social are central to human existence and have been so for
contract tradition. It maintains that complex adap- as long as we have been a species. But the logic of
tations, including behavioral strategies, evolved to social contracts may have propelled the evolution
benefit the individual (indeed, the genes for those of the mental faculties that keep us in these groups.
traits within an individual), not the community, spe- Social arrangements are evolutionarily contingent,
cies, or ecosystem. arising when the benefits of group living exceed the
costs.
Social organization evolves when the long-term
benefits to the individual outweigh the immedi- With a slightly different ecosystem and evolu-
ate costs. Darwin was influenced by Adam Smith, tionary history, we could have ended up like our
and many of his successors analyze the evolution cousins the orangutans, who are almost entirely
of sociality using tools that come right out of eco- solitary. And according to evolutionary biology, all
nomics, such as game theory and other optimiza- societies “animal and human” seethe with conflicts
tion techniques. Reciprocal altruism, in particular, of interest and are held together by shifting mixtures
is just the traditional concept of the social contract of dominance and cooperation.
REVIEW EXERCISES
1. Explain the basic difference between psychological utilitarianism—in other words, the view that we
egoism and ethical egoism. ought to do what is in the best interest of all or the
greatest number?
2. Give two different formulations or versions of psy- 7. Explain how the prisoner’s dilemma can be used in
chological egoism and ethical egoism. discussions of egoism and cooperative endeavor.
8. What is meant by taking the “moral point of view?”
3. Is psychological egoism true, and what must be 9. How does the example of the “ring of Gyges” illus-
shown to prove its truth? trate the question: “Why be moral?”
10. Is Hobbes’ proposed solution to the problem of ego-
4. How is psychological egoism supposed to provide ism, via the social contract, acceptable?
support for an argument for ethical egoism? What is 11. How does the discussion of evolution (in Pinker)
one problem for this argument? inform your understanding of the conflict between
egoism and altruism?
5. Summarize the arguments regarding the consis-
tency or inconsistency of ethical egoism.
6. In what sense does the argument for ethical ego-
ism based on economics support not egoism but
For more chapter resources and activities, go to MindTap.
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Utilitarianism 5
and John Stuart Mill
Learning Outcomes
After reading this chapter, you should be able to:
• • Explain differences between utilitarianism Articulate ways that utilitarianism
• and egoism as kinds of consequentialism. is connected with hedonism and
Explain the difference between act Getty Images/Photos.com
• Epicureanism.
• utilitarianism and rule utilitarianism. Apply utilitarian reasoning to a variety of
Describe the trolley problem and how it
• cases in the real world.
• exemplifies the challenge of utilitarianism. Provide an overview of John Stuart Mill’s
Identify key components of the utilitarian
assessment of pleasure: intensity, • defense of utilitarianism.
Defend your own thesis with regard to
duration, fruitfulness, and likelihood. the value of utilitarianism.
For more chapter resources and activities, go to MindTap.
In 2015, the global population exceeded 7.3 billion people. The United Nations pre-
dicts that another billion people will be added to the world’s population by 2030,
with the population increasing to over 9 billion by 2050.1 The increase in human
population during the past two centuries has been explosive. Causes for this growth
include industrialization, a revolution in agriculture and other technologies, and bet-
ter political organization. This growing population has created problems, however, as
soils are depleted, oceans are overfished, and pollution has increased. Industrialization
and technology have led to massive use of carbon-based fuels, which contribute to
global climate change. If the world’s population keeps growing at the current pace—
and if the growing human population eats, drives, and consumes at current rates—
we may be headed for a worldwide environmental and humanitarian crisis. A recent
United Nations report concluded, “should the global population reach 9.6 billion by
2050, the equivalent of almost three planets could be required to provide the natural
resources needed to sustain current lifestyles.”2
Some argue that a prudent solution would be to take steps to limit consumption,
population growth, or both. The means that are used to control population might
include morally controversial technologies such as abortion. Moral concerns also
haunt proposals to limit consumption: each of us wants the freedom to earn, spend,
and consume as we wish. Even though individuals enjoy expanding their families
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PART ONE ❯❯ ETHICAL THEORY
and consuming products, the cumulative choices of population policies, it has struggled to manage costs
individuals pursuing their own happiness can lead and benefits. Should morality be focused on complex
to less happiness for all—as the overall increase in and changing consequences or should it be con-
population, pollution, and environmental degrada- cerned with abstract and invariable moral principles?
tion may well decrease opportunities and life pros-
pects for everyone. When we think about issues Utilitarian reasoning can be used to justify a
from this perspective—one that takes into account variety of actions and policy decisions. How do we
the general happiness of everyone—we are adopting justify speed limits on the highways? It might seem
a utilitarian point of view. that each of us should be free to go as fast as we
want. However, unbridled speed would result in
Large social engineering projects are often more accidents, which not only kill people but also
grounded in utilitarian concerns. Consider the effort slow the rest of us down. Speed limits satisfy the
in China to control population growth by limiting utilitarian goal of maximizing the greatest happi-
reproduction to one child per family. Critics of the ness for the greatest number. Some will be unhappy
policy argued that this violates a fundamental right to because they can’t drive 100 mph. But when we
reproduce. Can limitations on basic rights be justified each drive at 65 mph and arrive safely, we are each
by the larger utilitarian concerns of social policies? more likely to be better off. Some may be less happy
Utilitarian efforts to maximize good consequences because they are forced to drive more slowly, but
require that we adjust our policies in light of chang- overall, more of us are happier.
ing circumstances. The one-child policy created out-
comes that rippled across Chinese society, including, Some uses of utilitarian reasoning are controver-
for example, a shift in family structure and gender sial because they seem to run counter to our intuitions
ratios. As the Chinese government has adjusted its about basic principles of right and wrong. Consider,
for example, the use of torture in interrogations of
Annie Owen/Robert Harding World Imagery/Corbis
Crowded village ferry crossing the River Hooghly, West Bengal, India.
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Chapter ❮❮ Utilitarianism and John Stuart Mill
terror suspects. If a terrorist had planted a bomb in Such an approach begins with the belief that we
a public place that would threaten to kill thousands can measure and compare the risks and benefits of
of innocent people, would it be justifiable to torture various actions. The idea is that actions are morally
the terrorist to force him to reveal the location of better or worse depending on whether they produce
the bomb? On the one hand, some assert that tor- pleasure or pain or, more abstractly, on how they
ture is never permissible because it violates basic affect human well-being and happiness. Unlike ego-
moral principles. The Geneva Conventions regulat- ism, utilitarianism focuses on the sum of individual
ing warfare prohibit torture and define it as “any act pleasures and pains. It is not my pleasures or pains
by which severe pain or suffering, whether physi- that matter—but the cumulative happiness of a
cal or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person number of people.
for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third
person information or a confession.”3 On the other Another aspect of utilitarianism is the belief that
hand, suppose, for example, that torture could save each of us counts equally. Peter Singer, an influen-
many lives. Would it then be justified? Former Vice tial contemporary defender of utilitarianism, derives
President Dick Cheney maintained that “enhanced utilitarianism from the basic idea that each person’s
interrogation techniques” including waterboarding interests ought to be given equal consideration.
(a process that simulates drowning) produced use- Related to this is the idea that “my own interests
ful information. According to the New York Times, cannot count for more, simply because they are my
the CIA waterboarded terror suspect Khaled Sheikh own, than the interests of others.”7 The basic pro-
Mohammed 183 times.4 In a speech on the tenth cedure for utilitarianism is to add up the interests
anniversary of September 11, Cheney claimed that by of everyone who is affected by an action without
waterboarding terrorists such as Mohammed, infor- privileging the interests of anyone in particular.
mation was extracted that led to the assassination Utilitarianism is thus opposed to racist or sexist
of Osama bin Laden.5 Cheney and other members of ideas, for example, which often hold that the inter-
the Bush administration justified torture on utilitarian ests of some people matter more than the interests
grounds. Their view is shared by many. A Pentagon of others.
study of “the ethics of troops on the front line” in
Iraq found that 41 percent said that “torture should Utilitarianism suggests that we ought to consider
be allowed to save the life of a soldier or Marine,” the totality of consequences of a policy or action.
and about the same number said that it “should be Forms of utilitarianism will differ depending on how
allowed to gather important information from insur- we understand what sorts of consequences or inter-
gents.”6 From a utilitarian standpoint, it may make ests matter. Complexities arise in defining key con-
good sense to inflict pain on someone to prevent pain cepts such as happiness, interest, and well-being.
that would be inflicted on a greater number of others. Singer, for example, wants to focus on interests
From the same standpoint, however, one may argue instead of pleasures or happiness. This indicates
that practices such as torture cause greater harm that it is possible that some pleasures are not really
than good—by extracting false confessions and low- in our interest. For example, drug use can produce
ering a country’s standing with potential allies. In pleasure, but it is not in anyone’s long-term inter-
any event, the question remains: Does a good end est to be addicted to cocaine or heroin. We might
justify otherwise objectionable means? also focus on people’s preferences—that is, what
people themselves state that they prefer. But again
WEIGHING CONSEQUENCES there is an important question of whether our prefer-
ences actually coordinate with our interests—or can
One way of thinking about this is to compare the we prefer things that are not in our interest? In dif-
benefits and costs of each alternative. Whichever ferent terms, we might wonder whether pleasure is
has the greater net benefit is the best alternative. a good thing or whether genuine happiness can be
reduced to pleasure. In any case, utilitarians have to
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PART ONE ❯❯ ETHICAL THEORY
provide an account of what matters when we try to his philosophy. The basic ideas of utilitarian moral
add up benefits and harms—whether it is subjective theory are summarized in Mill’s short work Utilitari-
feeling, taste, and preference, or whether it is some- anism, in which he sought to dispel the misconcep-
thing deeper and more objective such as well-being tion that morality has nothing to do with usefulness
or other interests (in health, longevity, fulfillment, or utility or that morality is opposed to pleasure. Mill
accomplishment, etc.). was also a strong supporter of personal liberty, and
in his pamphlet On Liberty he argued that the only
Utilitarianism has to provide an account of whose reason for society to interfere in a person’s life was
interests or happiness matters. Jeremy Bentham, one to prevent him or her from doing harm to others.
of the founding fathers of utilitarianism, extended People might choose wrongly, but he believed that
his utilitarian concern in a way that included all suf- allowing bad choices was better than government
fering beings, including nonhuman animals. Peter coercion. Liberty to speak one’s own opinion, he
Singer would agree. He is well-known as an advo- believed, would benefit all. However, it is not clear
cate of animal welfare. Like Bentham, he claims that utility is always served by promoting liberty. Nor
that the interests of nonhuman animals ought to be is it clear what Mill would say about cases in which
taken into account. (We discuss the issue of animal liberty must be restricted to promote the general
ethics further in Chapter 17.) good, as in the case of speed limits or airport secu-
rity rules. In his work, On the Subjection of Women,
One important point to bear in mind when dis- Mill also emphasized the general good and criticized
cussing utilitarianism is that utilitarians generally do those social treatments of women that did not allow
not think that actions or policies are good or bad in them to develop their talents and contribute to the
themselves. Rather, for the utilitarian, the goodness good of society. Consistent with these views, he also
or badness of an action is solely a function of its supported the right of women to vote. Later in life he
consequences. Thus, even killing innocent people married his longtime companion and fellow liberal,
may be acceptable if it produces an outcome that
saves a greater number of others from harm.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND The Print Collector/Alamy Stock Photo
Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill
A portrait of the utilitarian philosopher John
The classical formulation of utilitarian moral theory Stuart Mill (1806–1873).
is found in the writings of Jeremy Bentham (1748–
1832) and John Stuart Mill (1806–1873). Jeremy
Bentham was an English-born student of law and
the leader of a radical movement for social and legal
reform based on utilitarian principles. His primary
published work was Introduction to the Principles
of Morals and Legislation (1789). The title indicates
his aim: to take the same principles that provide the
basis for morals as a guide for the formation and
revision of law. Bentham believed that the same
principles guided both social and personal morality.
James Mill, the father of John Stuart Mill, was
an associate of Bentham’s and a supporter of his
views. John Stuart was the eldest of James’s nine
children. He was educated in the classics and his-
tory at home. By the time he was twenty, he had
read Bentham and had become a devoted follower of
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Chapter ❮❮ Utilitarianism and John Stuart Mill
Harriet Taylor. Mill also served in the British Parlia- According to classical utilitarian moral theory,
ment from 1865 to 1868. when we evaluate human acts or practices, we con-
sider neither the nature of the acts or practices nor
The original utilitarians were democratic, progres- the motive for which people do what they do. As
sive, empiricist, and optimistic. They were demo- Mill puts it, “He who saves a fellow creature from
cratic in the sense that they believed that social drowning does what is morally right, whether his
policy ought to work for the good of all persons, motive be duty or the hope of being paid for his
not just the upper class. They believed that when trouble.”9 It is the result of one’s action—that a
interests of various persons conflicted, the best life is saved—that matters morally. According to
choice was that which promoted the interests of the utilitarianism, we ought to decide which action or
greater number. The utilitarians were progressive in practice is best by considering the likely or actual
that they questioned the status quo. For example, consequences of each alternative. For example, over
they believed that if the contemporary punishment the years, people have called for a suicide barrier on
system was not working well, then it ought to be the Golden Gate Bridge to prevent people from using
changed. Social programs should be judged by their it to commit suicide. More than 1,600 people have
usefulness in promoting the greatest happiness for jumped from the bridge to their deaths.10 Building a
the greatest number. Observation would determine suicide barrier on a bridge is neither good nor bad in
whether a project or practice succeeded in this goal. itself, according to utilitarianism. Nor is it sufficient
Thus, utilitarianism is part of the empiricist tradition that people supporting the building of such a barrier
in philosophy, which holds that we know what is be well intentioned. The only thing that matters for
good only by observation or by appeal to experience. the utilitarian is whether, by erecting such a barrier,
Bentham and Mill were also optimists. They believed we would actually increase happiness by preventing
that human wisdom and science would improve the suicides. After much dispute, officials have agreed
lot of humanity. Mill wrote in Utilitarianism, “All to build a suicide barrier—a net to catch would-be
the grand sources of human suffering are in a great jumpers—on the bridge.
degree, many of them almost entirely, conquerable
by human care and effort.”8 PLEASURE AND HAPPINESS
THE PRINCIPLE OF UTILITY Of course, there is an open question about whether
suicide is good or bad. Some will argue that there
The basic moral principle of utilitarianism is called is something inherently or intrinsically wrong with
the principle of utility or the greatest happiness suicide. The deontologist Immanuel Kant provides
principle. As John Stuart Mill explained it (and as this sort of argument, as you will see in Chapter 6,
you will see in the reading that follows) “actions are maintaining that suicide is wrong in principle. But
right in proportion as they tend to promote happi- utilitarians cannot argue that suicide is intrinsically
ness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of wrong—since they do not focus on the intrinsic
happiness.” rightness or wrongness of acts. Instead, utilitarians
have to consider the impact of suicide on the happi-
Utilitarianism is a form of consequentialism. It ness of all those it affects.
focuses on the consequences of actions. Egoism is
also a form of consequentialism. But unlike egoism, Since utilitarians reject the idea that certain
utilitarianism focuses on the consequences for all acts are intrinsically good or evil, they are open to
persons impacted by an action. Consider the diagram experimentation and evidence. And they are open to
used to classify moral theories provided in Chapter 1. various ways of conceiving the goodness of conse-
quences. Any sort of consequences might be con-
Motive Act Consequences sidered good—for example, power, fame, or fortune.
However, classical utilitarianism is a pleasure or
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PART ONE ❯❯ ETHICAL THEORY
happiness theory, meaning that it tends to reduce In Mill’s view, we should consider the range of
all other goods to some form of pleasure or happi- types of pleasure in our attempts to decide what
ness. Utilitarianism was not the first such theory to the best action is. We also ought to consider other
appear in the history of philosophy. Aristotle’s eth- aspects of the pleasurable or happy experience.
ics, as we shall see in Chapter 8, also focuses on According to the greatest happiness or utility princi-
happiness, although it is different from utilitarian- ple, we must measure, count, and compare the plea-
ism in its focus on virtue. Closer to utilitarianism surable experiences likely to be produced by various
is the classical theory that has come to be known alternative actions in order to know which is best.
as hedonism (from hedon, the Greek word for
pleasure) or Epicureanism (named after Epicu- CALCULATING THE GREATEST AMOUNT
rus, 341–270 bcE ). Epicurus held that the good life OF HAPPINESS
was the pleasant life. For him, this meant avoiding
distress and desires for things beyond one’s basic Utilitarianism is not an egoistic theory. As we noted
needs. Bodily pleasure and mental delight and peace in Chapter 4’s presentation on egoism, those ver-
were the goods to be sought in life. sions of egoism that said we ought to take care of
ourselves because this works out better for all in
Utilitarians believe that pleasure or happiness the long run are actually versions of utilitarianism,
is the good to be produced. As Bentham puts it, not egoism. Some philosophers have called utilitari-
“Nature has placed mankind under the governance anism universalistic because it is the happiness or
of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is for pleasure of all who are affected by an action or prac-
them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well tice that is to be considered. We are not just to con-
as to determine what we shall do.”11 Things such as sider our own good, as in egoism, nor just the good
fame, fortune, education, and freedom may be good, of others, as in altruism. Sacrifice may be good, but
but only to the extent that they produce pleasure or not in itself. As Mill puts it, “A sacrifice which does
happiness. In philosophical terms, they are instru- not increase or tend to increase the sum total of
mental goods because they are useful for attaining happiness, (utilitarianism) considers as wasted.”12
the goals of happiness and pleasure. Happiness and Everyone affected by some action is to be counted
pleasure are the only intrinsic goods—that is, the equally. We ourselves hold no privileged place, so
only things good in themselves. our own happiness counts no more than that of
others. I may be required to do what displeases me
In this explanation of utilitarianism, you may but pleases others. Thus, in the following scenario,
have noticed the seeming identification of pleasure Act B is a better choice than Act A:
and happiness. In classical utilitarianism, there is
no difference between pleasure and happiness. Both Act A makes me happy and two other people happy.
terms refer to a kind of psychic state of satisfac- Act B makes me unhappy but five others happy.
tion. However, there are different types of pleasure
of which humans are capable. According to Mill, we In addition to counting each person equally,
experience a range of pleasures or satisfactions from Bentham and his followers identified five elements
the physical satisfaction of hunger to the personal that are used to calculate the greatest amount of
satisfaction of a job well done. Aesthetic pleasures, happiness: the net amount of pleasure or happiness,
such as the enjoyment of watching a beautiful sun- its intensity, its duration, its fruitfulness, and the
set, are yet another type of pleasure. We also can likelihood of any act to produce it.13
experience intellectual pleasures such as the pecu-
liar satisfaction of making sense out of something. Pleasure Minus Pain Almost every alternative
Mill’s theory includes the idea that there are higher, that we choose produces unhappiness or pain as
uniquely human pleasures—as we will explain well as happiness or pleasure for ourselves, if not
below.
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Chapter ❮❮ Utilitarianism and John Stuart Mill
for others. Pain is intrinsically bad, and pleasure is is better (all other things being equal) than Act A,
intrinsically good. Something that produces pain even though Act A gives pleasure to thirty more
may be accepted, but only if it causes more plea- people; this result is because of the greater intensity
sure overall. For instance, if the painfulness of a of pleasure produced by Act B:
punishment deters an unwanted behavior, then we
ought to punish, but no more than is necessary or Act A gives forty people each mild pleasure
useful. When an act produces both pleasure or hap- (40 × 2 = 80 degrees of pleasure).
piness and pain or unhappiness, we can think of Act B gives ten people each intense pleasure
each moment of unhappiness as canceling out a (10 × 10 = 100 degrees of pleasure).
moment of happiness so that what is left to evaluate
is the remaining or net happiness or unhappiness. Duration Intensity is not all that matters regarding
We are also to think of pleasure and pain as com- pleasure. The more serene pleasure may last longer.
ing in bits or moments. We can then calculate this This also must be factored in our calculation. The
net amount by adding and subtracting units of plea- longer lasting the pleasure, the better, all else being
sure and displeasure. This is a device for calculating equal. Thus, in the following scenario, Act A is better
the greatest amount of happiness even if we cannot than Act B because it gives more total days of plea-
make mathematically exact calculations. The follow- sure or happiness. This is so even though it affects
ing simplified equation indicates how the net utility fewer people (a fact that raises questions about how
for two acts, A and B, might be determined. We can the number of people counts in comparison to the
think of the units as either happy persons or days of total amount of happiness):
happiness:
Act A produces twelve units of happiness and six of Act A gives three people each eight days of happiness
unhappiness (12 − 6 = 6 units of happiness). (3 × 8 = 24 days of happiness).
Act B produces ten units of happiness and one of Act B gives six people each two days of happiness
unhappiness (10 − 1 = 9 units of happiness). (6 × 2 = 12 days of happiness).
On this measure, Act B is preferable because it pro- Fruitfulness A more serene pleasure from con-
duces a greater net amount of happiness, namely, templating nature may or may not be more fruit-
nine units compared with six for Act A. ful than an exciting pleasure such as that derived
from running rapids. The fruitfulness of experienc-
Intensity Moments of happiness or pleasure are ing pleasure depends on whether it makes us more
not all alike. Some are more intense than others. capable of experiencing similar or other pleasures.
The thrill of some exciting adventure—say, running For example, the relaxing event may make one per-
river rapids—may produce a more intense pleasure son more capable of experiencing other pleasures of
than the serenity we feel standing before a beauti- friendship or understanding, whereas the thrilling
ful vista. All else being equal, the more intense the event may do the same for another. The fruitfulness
pleasure, the better. All other factors being equal, if I depends not only on the immediate pleasure, but
have an apple to give away and am deciding which also on the long-term results. Indulging in immedi-
of two friends to give it to, I ought to give it to the ate pleasure may bring pain later on, as we know
friend who will enjoy it most. In calculations involv- only too well. So also the pain today may be the
ing intensity of pleasure, a scale is sometimes useful. only way to prevent more pain tomorrow. The den-
For example, we could use a positive scale of 1 to tist’s work on our teeth may be painful today, but
10 degrees, from the least pleasurable to the most it makes us feel better in the long run by providing
pleasurable. In the following scenario, then, Act B
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PART ONE ❯❯ ETHICAL THEORY
us with pain-free meals and undistracted, enjoyable Mill agreed with Bentham that the greater
mealtime conversations. amount of pleasure and happiness, the better. But
Mill believed that the quality of the pleasure should
Likelihood If before acting we are attempting to also count. In his autobiography, Mill describes
decide between two available alternative actions, a personal crisis in which he realized that he had
we must estimate the likely results of each before not found sufficient place in his life for aesthetic
we compare their net utility. If we are considering experiences; he realized that this side of the human
whether to go out for some sports competition, for personality also needed developing and that these
example, we should consider our chances of doing pleasures were significantly different from others.
well. We might have greater hope of success trying This experience and his thoughts about it may have
something else. It may turn out that we ought to led him to focus on the quality of pleasures. Some
choose an act with lesser rather than greater benefi- are intrinsically better than others, he believed. For
cial results if the chances of it happening are better. example, intellectual pleasures are more valuable in
It is not only the chances that would count, but also themselves than purely sensual pleasures. Although
the size of the prize. In the following equation, A is he does not tell us how much more valuable they are
preferable to B. In this case, “A bird in the hand is (twice as valuable?), he clearly believed this greater
worth two in the bush,” as the old saying goes: value ought to be factored into our calculation of the
“greatest amount of happiness.” Although I may
Act A has a 90 percent chance of giving eight people not always be required to choose a book over food
each five days of pleasure (40 days × 0.90 = 36 days of (for example, I may now need the food more than
pleasure). the book), the intellectual pleasures that might be
Act B has a 40 percent chance of giving ten people derived from reading the book are of a higher quality
each seven days of pleasure (70 days × 0.40 = 28 days than the pleasures gained from eating.
of pleasure).
Mill attempts to prove or show that intellectual
For more chapter resources and pleasures are better than sensual ones. We are to
activities, go to MindTap. ask people who have experienced a range of plea-
sures whether they would prefer to live a life of a
QUANTITY VERSUS QUALITY human, despite all its disappointments and pains,
OF PLEASURE or the life of an animal, which is full of pleasures
but only sensual pleasures. He believes that people
Bentham and Mill are in agreement that the more generally would choose the former. They would pre-
pleasure or happiness, the better. However, there is fer, as he puts it, “to be a human being dissatisfied
one significant difference between them. According than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied
to Bentham, we ought to consider only the quantity than a fool satisfied.”15 Socrates was often frustrated
of pleasure or happiness brought about by various in his attempts to know certain things. He strug-
acts: how much pleasure, to how many people, how gled to get a grasp on true beauty and true justice.
intense it is, how long-lasting, how fruitful, and Because human beings have greater possibilities for
how likely the desired outcome will occur. Consider knowledge and achievement, they also have greater
Bentham’s own comment on this point: The “quan- potential for failure, pain, and frustration. The
tity of pleasure being equal, pushpin (a children’s point of Mill’s argument is that the only reason we
game) is as good as poetry.”14 The aesthetic or intel- would prefer a life of fewer net pleasures (the dis-
lectual pleasure that one might derive from reading satisfactions subtracted from the total satisfactions
and understanding a poem is no better in itself than of human life) to a life of a greater total amount of
the simple pleasure of playing a mindless game. pleasures (the life of the pig) is that we value some-
thing other than the amount (quantity) of pleasures;
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Chapter ❮❮ Utilitarianism and John Stuart Mill
we value the kind (quality) of pleasures as well.16 is finding a way to reduce pleasures of all kinds to
When considering this argument, you might ask some common or basic unit of measurement. A utili-
yourself two questions. First, would people gen- tarian could respond to these criticisms by arguing
erally prefer to be Socrates than a pig? Second, if that while this complexity indicates that no one can
Mill is correct in his factual assessment, then what be a perfect judge of utility, we do make better judg-
does this fact prove? Could it be that people are mis- ments if we are able to consider these variables. No
taken about what kinds of pleasures are the best, as moral theory is simple in its application.
Socrates himself often implied? This points us back
to the question of whether happiness is merely a A more difficult problem in how to apply the prin-
subjective preference or whether happiness resides ciple of utility comes from Mill’s specific formula-
in a more objective standard. tion of it. It may well be that in some cases, at least,
one cannot both maximize happiness and make the
EVALUATING UTILITARIANISM greatest number of people happy. Thus, one choice
may produce 200 units of happiness—but for just
The following are just some of the many consid- one person. The other alternative might produce
erations raised by those who wish to determine 150 units of happiness, 50 for each of three people.
whether utilitarianism is a valid moral theory. If the maximization of overall happiness is taken as
primary, then we should go with the first choice; if
Application of the Principle the number of people is to take precedence, then we
should go with the second choice. Most readings of
One reaction that students often have to calculating Mill, however, suggest that he would give preference
the greatest amount of happiness is that this theory to the overall maximization of utility. In that case,
is too complex. When we consider all of the vari- how the happiness was distributed (to one versus
ables concerning pleasure and happiness that are three) would not, in itself, count.
to be counted when trying to estimate the “greatest
amount of pleasure or happiness,” the task of doing Utilitarianism and Personal Integrity
so looks extremely difficult. We must consider how
many people will be affected by alternative actions, A more substantive criticism of utilitarianism con-
whether they will be pleased or pained by them, how cerns its universalist and maximizing agenda—that
pleased or pained they will be and for how long, and we should always do that which maximizes overall
the likelihood that what we estimate will happen, happiness. Many critics have noted that utilitarian
will, in fact, come to be. In addition, if we want to theory does not allow us to privilege our own hap-
follow Mill rather than Bentham, we must consider piness over that of others. Nor can we privilege the
whether the pleasures will be the lowlier sensual happiness of those we love. In determining what to
pleasures, the higher more intellectual pleasures, or do, I can give no more weight to my own projects
something in between. However, in reality, we may or my own children than other people’s similar proj-
at any one time have to consider only a couple of ects or their children. For some philosophers, the
these variables, depending on their relevance to the idea that I must treat all persons equally is contrary
moral question we are considering. to common sense, which tells us that we ought to
care for our own children more than we care for the
The point of this criticism is that no one can con- children of distant others. Utilitarians might respond
sider all of the variables that utilitarianism requires that we should probably give more attention to our
us to consider: the probable consequences of our own projects and our own children, but only because
action to all affected in terms of duration, inten- this is likely to have better results overall. We know
sity, fruitfulness, likelihood, and type or quality better how to promote our own projects and have
of pleasure. It also requires us to have a common more motivation to do so. Thus, giving preference to
unit of measurement of pleasure. (Elementary units ourselves will probably be more effective.
called hedons have been suggested.) The difficulty
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PART ONE ❯❯ ETHICAL THEORY
A further objection maintains that there is some- on which a trolley is speeding toward a junction.
thing wrong if utilitarianism requires us to not give On the track ahead of the trolley are five workers
preference to ourselves and to our own personal who will all be killed if the trolley continues on its
moral commitments. Utilitarianism appears to be an current course. You have access to a switch, and if
affront to our personal integrity.17 The idea is that you pull it, the trolley will be diverted onto another
utilitarianism seems to imply that I am not important track where it will kill only one worker. According
from my own point of view. However, a utilitarian to utilitarianism, if nothing else is relevant, you
might respond that it is important that people regard would not only be permitted but required to pull
themselves as unique and give due consideration to the switch, which would result in one death and
their own interests because this will probably have five lives saved. From a utilitarian standpoint, it is
better consequences both for these individuals and obvious that you should pull the switch, since not
the broader society. pulling the switch would result in greater net loss
of life. Now, compare this scenario with another. In
Ends and Means this case, you find yourself on a bridge over a single
trolley track with the five workers below you. Next
A second criticism concerns utilitarianism’s conse- to you on the bridge is an enormously fat man. The
quentialist character. You may have heard the phrase only way to stop the trolley in this case is to push
“The end justifies the means.” People often utter this the fat man off the bridge and onto the tracks ahead
phrase with a certain amount of disdain. Utilitarian- of the workers. Would you be permitted to do this?
ism, as a consequentialist moral theory, holds that it In both cases, five lives would be saved and one
is the consequences or ends of our actions that deter- lost. But are the cases the same morally? It would
mine whether particular means to them are justified. seem that according to utilitarianism, in which only
This seems to lead to conclusions that are contrary the results matter, the cases would be morally the
to commonsense morality. For example, wouldn’t it same. However, it is the intuition of most people
justify punishing or torturing an innocent person, a that the second case is significantly different. You
“scapegoat,” in order to prevent a great evil or to can’t kill one person to save five. To take another
promote a great good? Or could we not justify on example, it seems clear that a doctor who has five
utilitarian grounds the killing of some individuals for patients needing organ transplants to save their
the sake of the good of a greater number, perhaps in lives should not be permitted to take those organs
the name of population control? Or could I not make out of another healthy patient, causing his or her
an exception for myself from obeying a law, alleg- death.
ing that it is for some greater long-term good? Utili-
tarians might respond by noting that such actions It is important to note that versions of the trol-
or practices will probably do more harm than good, ley problem have been employed by psychologists
especially if we take a long-range view. In particular, to probe human decision-making procedures. Some
they might point out that practices allowing the pun- of this research examines how different parts of the
ishment of known innocents would undermine the brain are involved in different ways of making deci-
legitimacy and deterrent effect of the law—and thus sions that involve moral dilemmas.19 This sort of
reduce overall utility. research investigates the psychological sources of
our decisions—whether emotional responses pre-
THE TROLLEY PROBLEM dominate, whether we actually do calculate costs
and benefits, and whether we tend to feel bound
One particular problem for utilitarianism is exem- to abstract moral rules. One study used a virtual
plified by what has come to be called the trolley reality version of the trolley problem to pursue this
problem.18 According to one version of this sce- question. It found that 89 percent of people chose
nario, imagine you find yourself beside a train track,
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Chapter ❮❮ Utilitarianism and John Stuart Mill
the utilitarian option when confronted with at 3-D But the normative or moral question remains. Moral
virtual reality representation of a run-away boxcar philosophy is not merely interested in the psycho-
that threatened to crash into a group of people.20 logical question of how we react in these situations,
One issue exposed by these sorts of studies is that it is also concerned with the question of how we
people respond differently when confronted with ought to react.
the choice of doing something (pulling the lever
to divert the train into the group of people) or not ACT AND RULE UTILITARIANISM
doing something (allowing the train to crash into
the group). One conclusion of this sort of research Utilitarianism may appear to justify any action just
is that sometimes there are conflicts in how we so long as it has better consequences than other
actually react and how we think we should react available actions. Therefore, cheating, stealing,
to morally fraught situations. Other inquiries have lying, and breaking promises may all seem to be jus-
considered whether utilitarian calculation involves tified, depending on whether they maximize happi-
a sort of “coldness” that runs counter to empathy ness in some particular case. In response to this type
and other emotional responses.21 Another study by of criticism, contemporary utilitarians often focus on
Daniel Bartels and David Pizarro concludes, “par- general rules instead of on individual acts. The ver-
ticipants who indicated greater endorsement of utili- sion of utilitarianism that focuses on rules is usually
tarian solutions had higher scores on measures of called rule utilitarianism. This is contrasted with
psychopathy, Machiavellianism, and life meaning- act utilitarianism, which focuses solely on the
lessness.”22 This conclusion appears to follow from consequences of specific individual acts.
the fact that the utilitarian decision—to kill one
in order to save others—asks us to overcome an Both are forms of utilitarianism. They are alike in
emotional or instinctual aversion to harming oth- requiring us to produce the greatest amount of hap-
ers. And yet, it might be that—from the utilitarian piness for the greatest number of people. They differ
point of view—this is exactly what we should do in in what they believe we ought to consider in esti-
order to bring about greater happiness for the great- mating the consequences. Act utilitarianism states
est number. The psychological research into the that we ought to consider the consequences of each
dilemmas generated by utilitarianism is interesting. act separately. Rule utilitarianism states that we
ought to consider the consequences of the act per-
formed as a general practice.23
© Cengage Learning
One version of the trolley problem.
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PART ONE ❯❯ ETHICAL THEORY
Take the following example. Sue is considering would be the rule or practice: “Keep promises only if
whether to keep or break her promise to go out to the results of doing so would be better than breaking
dinner with Ken. She believes that if she breaks this them.” (This actually amounts to a kind of act utili-
promise in order to do something else with other tarian reasoning.) However, there might be a better
friends, then Ken will be unhappy—but she and the rule yet, such as: “Always keep your promise unless
other friends will be happier. According to act utili- doing so would have very serious harmful conse-
tarianism, if the consequences of her breaking the quences.” If this rule was followed, then people
promise are better than keeping it, then she ought would generally have the benefits of being able to
to break it. say, “I promise,” and have people generally believe
and trust them. The fact that the promise would not
Act utilitarianism: Consider the consequences of be kept in some limited circumstances would prob-
some particular act such as keeping or breaking one’s ably not do great harm to the practice of making
promise. promises.
A rule utilitarian, on the other hand, would tell Some utilitarians go further and ask us to think
Sue to consider what the results would be if every- about sets of rules. It is not only the practice of
one broke promises or broke them in similar situa- promise-keeping that we should evaluate, but also
tions. The question “What if everyone did that?” is a broader set of related practices regarding truthful-
familiar to us. According to rule utilitarianism, Sue ness and bravery and care for children (for exam-
should ask what the results would be if breaking ple). Moreover, we should think of these rules as
promises in similar circumstances became a gen- forming a system in which there are rules for prior-
eral practice or a general rule that people followed. ity and stringency. These rules would tell us which
It is likely that trust in promises would be weak- practices are more important and how important
ened. This outcome would be bad, she might think, they are compared to the others. We should then do
because if we could not trust one another to keep what the best system of moral rules dictates, where
promises, then we would generally be less capable best is still defined in terms of the maximization of
of making plans and relating to one another—two happiness.24
important sources of human happiness. So, even if
there would be no general breakdown in trust from Which form of utilitarianism is better is a mat-
just this one instance of promise-breaking, Sue ter of dispute. Act utilitarians can claim that we
should still probably keep her promise according to ought to consider only what will or is likely to hap-
rule utilitarian thinking. pen if we act in certain ways—not what would hap-
pen if we acted in certain ways but will not happen
Rule utilitarianism: Consider the consequences of because we are not going to so act. Rule utilitarians
some practice or rule of behavior—for example, the can claim that acts are similar to one another and
practice of promise-keeping or promise-breaking. so can be thought of as practices. My lying in one
case to get myself out of a difficulty is similar to
Another way to understand the method of rea- others’ lying in other cases to get themselves out of
soning used by the rule utilitarian is the follow- difficulties. Because we should make the same judg-
ing: I should ask what would be the best practice. ments about similar cases (for consistency’s sake),
For example, regarding promises, what rule would we should judge this act by comparing it with the
have the better results when people followed that results of the actions of everyone in similar circum-
rule? Would it be the rule or practice: “Never break stances. We can thus evaluate the general practice
a promise made”? At the other end of the spectrum of “lying to get oneself out of a difficulty.” You can
be the judge of which form of utilitarian reasoning is
more persuasive.
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Chapter ❮❮ Utilitarianism and John Stuart Mill
“PROOF” OF THE THEORY universal and that we are so constructed that we can
desire nothing except what appears to us to be or to
One of the best ways to evaluate a moral theory is bring happiness. You may want to consider whether
to examine carefully the reasons that are given to these latter assertions are consistent with his empiri-
support it. Being an empiricist theory, utilitarianism cism. Does he know these things from experience?
must draw its evidence from experience. This is what In addition, Mill may be simply pointing to what
Mill does in his attempt to prove that the principle of we already know rather than giving a proof of the
utility is the correct moral principle. His argument is principle. You can find out what people believe is
as follows: Just as the only way in which we know good by noticing what they desire. In this case, they
that something is visible is its being seen, and the desire to be happy or they desire what they think
only way we can show that something is audible is will bring them happiness.25
if it can be heard, so also the only proof that we
have that something is desirable is its being desired. Utilitarianism is a highly influential moral theory
Because we desire happiness, we thus know it is that also has had significant influence on a wide
desirable or good. In addition, Mill holds that hap- variety of policy assessment methods. It can be quite
piness is the only thing we desire for its own sake. useful for evaluating alternative health care systems,
All else we desire because we believe it will lead to for example. Whichever system brings the most
happiness. Thus, happiness or pleasure is the only benefit to the most people with the least cost is the
thing good in itself or the only intrinsic good. All system that we probably ought to support. Although
other goods are instrumental goods; in other words, Mill was perhaps too optimistic about the ability and
they are good insofar as they lead to happiness. For willingness of people to increase human happiness
example, reading is not good in itself but only inso- and reduce suffering, there is no doubt that the ideal
far as it brings us pleasure or understanding (which is a good one. Nevertheless, utilitarianism has dif-
is either pleasurable in itself or leads to pleasure). ficulties, some of which we have discussed here. You
will know better how to evaluate this theory when
There are two main contentions in this argument. you can compare it with those treated in the follow-
One is that good is defined in terms of what people ing chapters.
desire. The other is that happiness is the only thing
desired for itself and is the only intrinsic good. Critics The reading selection in this chapter is from the
have pointed out that Mill’s analogy between what classical work Utilitarianism by John Stuart Mill.
is visible, audible, and desirable does not hold up Mill considers the importance of happiness—and the
under analysis. In all three words, the suffix means need to consider the happiness of others. His work
“able to be,” but in the case of desirable, Mill needs remains one of the important touchstones for think-
to prove not only that we can desire happiness ing about utilitarianism.
(it is able to be desired), but also that it is worth
being desired. Furthermore, just because we desire NOTES
something does not necessarily mean that we ought
to desire it or that it is good. There is a risk of the 1. United Nations Department of Economic and Social
naturalistic fallacy (as defined in Chapter 1) here. Is Affairs, http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/publications/
this a case of illegitimately deriving an ought from files/key_findings_wpp_2015.pdf (accessed January
an is? 13, 2016).
Mill recognizes the difficulty of proving matters 2. United Nations, Sustainable Development Goals:
in ethics and that the proofs here will be indirect Goal 12: Ensure Sustainable Consumption and Pro-
rather than direct. On the second point, Mill adds duction Patterns http://www.un.org/sustainablede-
a further comment to bolster his case about hap- velopment/sustainable-consumption-production/
piness. He asserts that this desire for happiness is (accessed January 13, 2015).
Copyright 2018 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part. WCN 02-200-202
PART ONE ❯❯ ETHICAL THEORY
3. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Oxford University Press, 1984). In The Limits of
Human Rights, “Convention Against Torture and Morality (New York: Oxford University Press,
Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 1989). Shelley Kagan distinguishes the uni-
Punishment,” http://www.un.org/millennium/law/ versalist element of utilitarianism—its demand that
iv-9.htm I treat all equally—from the maximizing element—
that I must bring about the most good possible.
4. Scott Shane, “Waterboarding Used 266 Times on The first element makes utilitarianism too
2 Suspects,” New York Times, April 19, 2009, demanding, whereas the second allows us to do
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/20/ anything as long as it maximizes happiness
world/20detain.html?_r50 overall.
18. Philippa Foot, “The Problem of Abortion and the
5. Chris McGreal, “Dick Cheney Defends Use of Doctrine of Double Effect,” in Virtues and Vices
Torture on Al-Qaida Leaders,” Guardian, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1978); and Judith Jarvis
September 9, 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/ Thomson, “Killing, Letting Die, and the Trolley
world/2011/sep/09/dick-cheney-defends-torture- Problem,” The Monist (1976), pp. 204–17.
al-qaida 19. See, for example, work done by Joshua Greene and
the Moral Cognition Lab at Harvard University,
6. San Francisco Examiner, February 2, 1993, A4; http://wjh.harvard.edu/~mcl/
San Francisco Chronicle, May 5, 2007, p. A5. 20. C. David Navarrete, Melissa M. McDonald, Michael
L. Mott, and Benjamin Asher, “Virtual Morality:
7. Peter Singer, Writings on an Ethical Life (New Emotion and Action in a Simulated Three-
York: HarperCollins, 2001), p. 16. Dimensional ‘Trolley Problem,’” Emotion 12, no. 2
(April 2012), pp. 364–70.
8. John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, ed. Oskar 21. K. Wiech, G. Kahane, N. Shackel, M. Farias, J.
Priest (Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill, 1957), Savulescu, and I. Tracey, “Cold or Calculating?
p. 20. Reduced Activity in the Subgenual Cingulate Cortex
Re?ects Decreased Emotional Aversion to Harming
9. Ibid., p. 24. in Counterintuitive Utilitarian Judgment,” Cognition
10. John Bateson, “The Golden Gate Bridge's fatal flaw” 126, no. 3 (March 2013), pp. 364–72.
22. Daniel M. Bartels and David A. Pizarro, “The
Los Angeles Times, May 25, 2012, http://articles. Mismeasure of Morals: Antisocial Personality
latimes.com/2012/may/25/opinion/la-oe-adv- Traits Predict Utilitarian Responses to Moral
bateson-golden-gate-20120525 (Accessed January Dilemmas,” Cognition 121, no. 1 (October 2011),
13, 2016). pp. 154–61.
11. Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles 23. See, for example, the explanation of this difference
of Morals and Legislation (New York: Oxford in J. J. C. Smart, “Extreme and Restricted
University Press, 1789). Utilitarianism,” Philosophical Quarterly (1956).
12. Mill, Utilitarianism, p. 22. 24. Richard Brandt, “Some Merits of One Form of Rule
13. These elements for calculation of the greatest Utilitarianism,” in Morality and the Language of
amount of happiness are from Bentham’s Conduct, ed. H. N. Castaneda and George
Principles of Morals and Legislation. Nakhnikian (Detroit: Wayne State University Press,
14. Bentham, Principles of Morals and Legislation. 1970), pp. 282–307.
15. Mill, Utilitarianism, p. 14. 25. This explanation is given by Mary Warnock in her
16. Note that this is an empiricist argument. It is based introduction to the Fontana edition of Mill’s
on an appeal to purported facts. People’s actual Utilitarianism, pp. 25–26.
preferences for intellectual pleasures (if true) are the
only source we have for believing them to be more
valuable.
17. J. J. C. Smart and Bernard Williams, Utilitarianism:
For and Against (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1973). Also see Samuel Scheffler,
The Rejection of Consequentialism (New York:
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Chapter ❮❮ Utilitarianism and John Stuart Mill
READING
Utilitarianism
JOHN STUART MILL
For more chapter resources and activities, go to MindTap.
Study Questions
As you read the excerpt, please consider the following questions:
1. How does Mill describe the basic moral standard of utilitarianism?
2. How does he defend himself against those who accuse utilitarianism of being a crass pleasure theory similar to
Epicureanism?
3. How do we know that happiness is a good in itself or as an end?
WHAT UTILITARIANISM IS of the doctrine are occasionally made the subject of
equally polite comparisons by its German, French,
The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals and English assailants.
“utility” or the “greatest happiness principle” holds
that actions are right in proportion as they tend to When thus attacked, the Epicureans have always
promote happiness; wrong as they tend to produce answered that it is not they, but their accusers, who
the reverse of happiness. By happiness is intended represent human nature in a degrading light, since
pleasure and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, the accusation supposes human beings to be capa-
pain and the privation of pleasure. To give a clear ble of no pleasures except those of which swine are
view of the moral standard set up by the theory, capable. If this supposition were true, the charge
much more requires to be said; in particular, what could not be gainsaid, but would then be no longer
things it includes in the ideas of pain and pleasure, an imputation; for if the sources of pleasure were
and to what extent this is left an open question. precisely the same to human beings and to swine,
But these supplementary explanations do not affect the rule of life which is good enough for the one
the theory of life on which this theory of morality would be good enough for the other. The compari-
is grounded—namely, that pleasure and freedom son of the Epicurean life to that of beasts is felt as
from pain are the only things desirable as ends; and degrading, precisely because a beast’s pleasures do
that all desirable things (which are as numerous in not satisfy a human being’s conceptions of happi-
the utilitarian as in any other scheme) are desir- ness. Human beings have faculties more elevated
able either for pleasure inherent in themselves or as than the animal appetites and, when once made
means to the promotion of pleasure and the preven- conscious of them, do not regard anything as happi-
tion of pain. ness which does not include their gratification. I do
not, indeed, consider the Epicureans to have been
Now such a theory of life excites in many minds, by any means faultless in drawing out their scheme
and among them in some of the most estimable in of consequences from the utilitarian principle. To do
feeling and purpose, inveterate dislike. To suppose this in any sufficient manner, many Stoic, as well as
that life has (as they express it) no higher end than Christian, elements require to be included. But there
pleasure—no better and nobler object of desire and
pursuit—they designate as utterly mean and grovel- From John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, (London: Parker, Son, and
ing, as a doctrine worthy only of swine, to whom Bourn, 1863), chaps. 2 and 4.
the followers of Epicurus were, at a very early
period, contemptuously likened; and modern holders *Headings added by the editor.
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PART ONE ❯❯ ETHICAL THEORY
is no known Epicurean theory of life which does not would consent to be changed into any of the lower
assign to the pleasures of the intellect, of the feel- animals for a promise of the fullest allowance of a
ings and imagination, and of the moral sentiments beast’s pleasures; no intelligent human being would
a much higher value as pleasures than to those of consent to be a fool, no instructed person would be
mere sensation. It must be admitted, however, that an ignoramus, no person of feeling and conscience
utilitarian writers in general have placed the supe- would be selfish and base, even though they should
riority of mental over bodily pleasures chiefly in the be persuaded that the fool, the dunce, or the rascal is
greater permanency, safety, uncostliness, etc., of the better satisfied with his lot than they are with theirs.
former—that is, in their circumstantial advantages They would not resign what they possess more
rather than in their intrinsic nature. And on all these than he for the most complete satisfaction of all the
points utilitarians have fully proved their case; but desires which they have in common with him. If
they might have taken the other and, as it may be they ever fancy they would, it is only in cases of
called, higher ground with entire consistency. It is unhappiness so extreme that to escape from it they
quite compatible with the principle of utility to rec- would exchange their lot for almost any other, how-
ognize the fact that some kinds of pleasure are more ever undesirable in their own eyes. A being of higher
desirable and more valuable than others. It would faculties requires more to make him happy, is capa-
be absurd that, while in estimating all other things ble probably of more acute suffering, and certainly
quality is considered as well as quantity, the estima- accessible to it at more points, than one of an infe-
tion of pleasure should be supposed to depend on rior type; but in spite of these liabilities, he can never
quantity alone. really wish to sink into what he feels to be a lower
grade of existence. We may give what explanation
Some Pleasures Are Better Than Others* we please of this unwillingness; we may attribute it
to pride, a name which is given indiscriminately to
If I am asked what I mean by difference of quality in some of the most and to some of the least estimable
pleasures, or what makes one pleasure more valu- feelings of which mankind are capable; we may refer
able than another, merely as a pleasure, except its it to the love of liberty and personal independence,
being greater in amount, there is but one possible an appeal to which was with the Stoics one of the
answer. Of two pleasures, if there be one to which most effective means for the inculcation of it; to the
all or almost all who have experience of both give love of power or to the love of excitement, both of
a decided preference, irrespective of any feeling of which do really enter into and contribute to it; but
moral obligation to prefer it, that is the more desir- its most appropriate appellation is a sense of dig-
able pleasure. If one of the two is, by those who nity, which all human beings possess in one form
are competently acquainted with both, placed so or other, and in some, though by no means in exact,
far above the other that they prefer it, even though proportion to their higher faculties, and which is so
knowing it to be attended with a greater amount of essential a part of the happiness of those in whom it
discontent, and would not resign it for any quan- is strong that nothing which conflicts with it could
tity of the other pleasure which their nature is capa- be otherwise than momentarily an object of desire to
ble of, we are justified in ascribing to the preferred them. Whoever supposes that this preference takes
enjoyment a superiority in quality so far outweigh- place at a sacrifice of happiness—that the superior
ing quantity as to render it, in comparison, of small being, in anything like equal circumstances, is not
account. happier than the inferior—confounds the two very
different ideas of happiness and content. It is indis-
Now it is an unquestionable fact that those who putable that the being whose capacities of enjoy-
are equally acquainted with and equally capable ment are low has the greatest chance of having
of appreciating and enjoying both do give a most them fully satisfied; and a highly endowed being
marked preference to the manner of existence which
employs their higher faculties. Few human creatures
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Chapter ❮❮ Utilitarianism and John Stuart Mill
will always feel that any happiness which he can because they are either the only ones to which they
look for, as the world is constituted, is imperfect. But have access or the only ones which they are any
he can learn to bear its imperfections, if they are at longer capable of enjoying. It may be questioned
all bearable; and they will not make him envy the whether anyone who has remained equally suscep-
being who is indeed unconscious of the imperfec- tible to both classes of pleasures ever knowingly and
tions, but only because he feels not at all the good calmly preferred the lower, though many, in all ages,
which those imperfections qualify. It is better to be a have broken down in an ineffectual attempt to com-
human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better bine both.
to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied. And
if the fool, or the pig, are of a different opinion, it is From this verdict of the only competent judges,
because they only know their own side of the ques- I apprehend there can be no appeal. On a question
tion. The other party to the comparison knows both which is the best worth having of two pleasures, or
sides. which of two modes of existence is the most grateful
to the feelings, apart from its moral attributes and
It may be objected that many who are capable from its consequences, the judgment of those who
of the higher pleasures occasionally, under the influ- are qualified by knowledge of both, or, if they differ,
ence of temptation, postpone them to the lower. that of the majority among them, must be admitted
But this is quite compatible with a full apprecia- as final. And there needs be the less hesitation to
tion of the intrinsic superiority of the higher. Men accept this judgment respecting the quality of plea-
often, from infirmity of character, make their elec- sures, since there is no other tribunal to be referred
tion for the nearer good, though they know it to be to even on the question of quantity. What means
the less valuable; and this no less when the choice are there of determining which is the acutest of two
is between two bodily pleasures than when it is pains, or the intenser of two pleasurable sensations,
between bodily and mental. They pursue sensual except the general suffrage of those who are familiar
indulgences to the injury of health, though perfectly with both? Neither pains nor pleasures are homo-
aware that health is the greater good. It may be fur- geneous, and pain is always heterogeneous with
ther objected that many who begin with youthful pleasure. What is there to decide whether a par-
enthusiasm for everything noble, as they advance in ticular pleasure is worth purchasing at the cost of
years, sink into indolence and selfishness. But I do a particular pain, except the feelings and judgment
not believe that those who undergo this very com- of the experienced? When, therefore, those feelings
mon change voluntarily choose the lower descrip- and judgment declare the pleasures derived from the
tion of pleasures in preference to the higher. I believe higher faculties to be preferable in kind, apart from
that, before they devote themselves exclusively to the question of intensity, to those of which the ani-
the one, they have already become incapable of the mal nature, disjoined from the higher faculties, is
other. Capacity for the nobler feelings is in most susceptible, they are entitled on this subject to the
natures a very tender plant, easily killed, not only by same regard.
hostile influences, but by mere want of sustenance;
and in the majority of young persons it speedily dies The Moral Standard
away if the occupations to which their position in
life has devoted them, and the society into which it I have dwelt on this point as being a necessary part
has thrown them, are not favorable to keeping that of a perfectly just conception of utility or happiness
higher capacity in exercise. Men lose their high aspi- considered as the directive rule of human conduct.
rations as they lose their intellectual tastes, because But it is by no means an indispensable condition to
they have not time or opportunity for indulging the acceptance of the utilitarian standard; for that
them; and they addict themselves to inferior plea- standard is not the agent’s own greatest happiness,
sures, not because they deliberately prefer them, but but the greatest amount of happiness altogether;
and if it may possibly be doubted whether a noble
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PART ONE ❯❯ ETHICAL THEORY
character is always the happier for its nobleness, Questions about ends are, in other words, ques-
there can be no doubt that it makes other people tions [about] what things are desirable. The utili-
happier, and that the world in general is immensely tarian doctrine is that happiness is desirable, and
a gainer by it. Utilitarianism, therefore, could only the only thing desirable, as an end; all other things
attain its end by the general cultivation of nobleness being only desirable as means to that end. What
of character, even if each individual were only bene- ought to be required of this doctrine, what condi-
fited by the nobleness of others, and his own, so far tions is it requisite that the doctrine should fulfill—to
as happiness is concerned, were a sheer deduction make good its claim to be believed?
from the benefit. But the bare enunciation of such an
absurdity as this last renders refutation superfluous. The only proof capable of being given that an
object is visible is that people actually see it. The
According to the greatest happiness principle, only proof that a sound is audible is that people
as above explained, the ultimate end, with refer- hear it; and so of the other sources of our experi-
ence to and for the sake of which all other things ence. In like manner, I apprehend, the sole evidence
are desirable—whether we are considering our own it is possible to produce that anything is desirable
good or that of other people—is an existence exempt is that people do actually desire it. If the end which
as far as possible from pain, and as rich as possible the utilitarian doctrine proposes to itself were not, in
in enjoyments, both in point of quantity and qual- theory and in practice, acknowledged to be an end,
ity; the test of quality and the rule for measuring it nothing could ever convince any person that it was
against quantity being the preference felt by those so. No reason can be given why the general hap-
who, in their opportunities of experience, to which piness is desirable, except that each person, so far
must be added their habits of self-consciousness and as he believes it to be attainable, desires his own
self-observation, are best furnished with the means happiness. This, however, being a fact, we have not
of comparison. This, being according to the utilitar- only all the proof which the case admits of, but all
ian opinion the end of human action, is necessarily which it is possible to require, that happiness is a
also the standard of morality, which may accord- good, that each person’s happiness is a good to that
ingly be defined “the rules and precepts for human person, and the general happiness, therefore, a good
conduct,” by the observance of which an existence to the aggregate of all persons. Happiness has made
such as has been described might be, to the greatest out its title as one of the ends of conduct and, conse-
extent possible, secured to all mankind; and not to quently, one of the criteria of morality.
them only, but, so far as the nature of things admits,
to the whole sentient creation…. But it has not, by this alone, proved itself to be
the sole criterion. To do that, it would seem, by the
OF WHAT SORT OF PROOF THE PRINCIPLE OF UTILITY same rule, necessary to show, not only that people
IS SUSCEPTIBLE desire happiness, but that they never desire any-
thing else. Now it is palpable that they do desire
It has already been remarked that questions of ulti- things which, in common language, are decid-
mate ends do not admit of proof, in the ordinary edly distinguished from happiness. They desire,
acceptation of the term. To be incapable of proof by for example, virtue and the absence of vice no
reasoning is common to all first principles, to the less really than pleasure and the absence of pain.
first premises of our knowledge, as well as to those The desire of virtue is not as universal, but it is as
of our conduct. But the former, being matters of fact, authentic a fact as the desire of happiness. And
may be the subject of a direct appeal to the facul- hence the opponents of the utilitarian standard
ties which judge of fact—namely, our senses and our deem that they have a right to infer that there are
internal consciousness. Can an appeal be made to other ends of human action besides happiness, and
the same faculties on questions of practical ends? Or that happiness is not the standard of approbation
by what other faculty is cognizance taken of them? and disapprobation.
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Chapter ❮❮ Utilitarianism and John Stuart Mill
Happiness and Virtue be and remain indifferent, but which by association
with what it is a means to comes to be desired for
But does the utilitarian doctrine deny that people itself, and that too with the utmost intensity. What,
desire virtue, or maintain that virtue is not a thing for example, shall we say of the love of money?
to be desired? The very reverse. It maintains not There is nothing originally more desirable about
only that virtue is to be desired, but that it is to be money than about any heap of glittering pebbles. Its
desired disinterestedly, for itself. Whatever may be worth is solely that of the things which it will buy;
the opinion of utilitarian moralists as to the original the desires for other things than itself, which it is a
conditions by which virtue is made virtue, however means of gratifying. Yet the love of money is not
they may believe (as they do) that actions and dis- only one of the strongest moving forces of human
positions are only virtuous because they promote life, but money is, in many cases, desired in and for
another end than virtue, yet this being granted, and itself; the desire to possess it is often stronger than
it having been decided, from considerations of this the desire to use it, and goes on increasing when
description, what is virtuous, they not only place vir- all the desires which point to ends beyond it, to be
tue at the very head of the things which are good as compassed by it, are falling off. It may, then, be said
means to the ultimate end, but they also recognize truly that money is desired not for the sake of an
as a psychological fact the possibility of its being, end, but as part of the end. From being a means to
to the individual, a good in itself, without looking to happiness, it has come to be itself a principal ingre-
any end beyond it; and hold that the mind is not in dient of the individual’s conception of happiness.
a right state, not in a state conformable to utility, not The same may be said of the majority of the great
in the state most conducive to the general happiness, objects of human life: power, for example, or fame,
unless it does love virtue in this manner—as a thing except that to each of these there is a certain amount
desirable in itself, even although, in the individual of immediate pleasure annexed, which has at least
instance, it should not produce those other desir- the semblance of being naturally inherent in them—
able consequences which it tends to produce, and on a thing which cannot be said of money. Still, how-
account of which it is held to be virtue. This opinion ever, the strongest natural attraction, both of power
is not, in the smallest degree, a departure from the and of fame, is the immense aid they give to the
happiness principle. The ingredients of happiness attainment of our other wishes; and it is the strong
are very various, and each of them is desirable in association thus generated between them and all our
itself, and not merely when considered as swelling objects of desire which gives to the direct desire of
an aggregate. The principle of utility does not mean them the intensity it often assumes, so as in some
that any given pleasure, as music, for instance, or characters to surpass in strength all other desires. In
any given exemption from pain, as for example these cases the means have become a part of the
health, is to be looked upon as means to a collective end, and a more important part of it than any of the
something termed happiness, and to be desired on things which they are means to. What was once
that account. They are desired and desirable in and desired as an instrument for the attainment of hap-
for themselves; besides being means, they are a part piness has come to be desired for its own sake. In
of the end. Virtue, according to the utilitarian doc- being desired for its own sake it is, however, desired
trine, is not naturally and originally part of the end, as part of happiness. The person is made, or thinks
but it is capable of becoming so; and in those who he would be made, happy by its mere possession;
live it disinterestedly it has become so, and is desired and is made unhappy by failure to obtain it. The
and cherished, not as a means to happiness, but as a desire of it is not a different thing from the desire of
part of their happiness. happiness any more than the love of music or the
desire of health. They are included in happiness.
To illustrate this further, we may remember that They are some of the elements of which the desire of
virtue is not the only thing originally a means, and
which if it were not a means to anything else would
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PART ONE ❯❯ ETHICAL THEORY
happiness is made up. Happiness is not an abstract Happiness the Only Intrinsic Good
idea but a concrete whole; and these are some of
its parts. And the utilitarian standard sanctions and It results from the preceding considerations that
approves their being so. Life would be a poor thing, there is in reality nothing desired except happiness.
very ill provided with sources of happiness, if there Whatever is desired otherwise than as a means to
were not this provision of nature by which things some end beyond itself, and ultimately to happiness,
originally indifferent, but conducive to, or otherwise is desired as itself a part of happiness, and is not
associated with, the satisfaction of our primitive desired for itself until it has become so. Those who
desires, become in themselves sources of pleasure desire virtue for its own sake desire it either because
more valuable than the primitive pleasures, both in the consciousness of it is a pleasure, or because the
permanency, in the space of human existence that consciousness of being without it is a pain, or for
they are capable of covering, and even in intensity. both reasons united; as in truth the pleasure and
pain seldom exist separately, but almost always
Virtue, according to the utilitarian conception, together—the same person feeling pleasure in the
is a good of this description. There was no original degree of virtue attained, and pain in not having
desire of it, or motive to it, save its conduciveness attained more. If one of these gave him no pleasure,
to pleasure, and especially to protection from pain. and the other no pain, he would not love or desire
But through the association thus formed it may be virtue, or would desire it only for the other bene-
felt a good in itself, and desired as such with as great fits which it might produce to himself or to persons
intensity as any other good; and with this difference whom he cared for.
between it and the love of money, of power, or of
fame—that all of these may, and often do, render We have now, then, an answer to the question,
the individual noxious to the other members of the of what sort of proof the principle of utility is sus-
society to which he belongs, whereas there is noth- ceptible. If the opinion which I have now stated is
ing which makes him so much a blessing to them psychologically true—if human nature is so con-
as the cultivation of the disinterested love of virtue. stituted as to desire nothing which is not either a
And consequently, the utilitarian standard, while it part of happiness or a means of happiness—we can
tolerates and approves those other acquired desires, have no other proof, and we require no other, that
up to the point beyond which they would be more these are the only things desirable. If so, happiness
injurious to the general happiness than promotive of is the sole end of human action, and the promotion
it, enjoins and requires the cultivation of the love of of it the test by which to judge all human conduct;
virtue up to the greatest strength possible, as being from whence it necessarily follows that it must be
above all things important to the general happiness. the criterion of morality, since a part is included in
the whole.
REVIEW EXERCISES 4. Which of the following statements exemplify con-
sequentialist reasoning? Can all of them be given
1. State and explain the basic idea of the principle of consequentialist interpretations if expanded? Explain
utility or the greatest happiness principle. your answers.
a. Honesty is the best policy.
2. What does it mean to speak of utilitarianism as a b. Sue has the right to know the truth.
consequentialist moral theory?
3. What is the difference between intrinsic and instru-
mental good? Give examples of each.
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Chapter ❮❮ Utilitarianism and John Stuart Mill
c. What good is going to come from giving money d. X will make five people very happy and three
to a homeless person on the street? people mildly unhappy. Y will make six people
moderately happy and two people very
d. There is a symbolic value present in personally unhappy.
giving something to another person in need.
7. What is Mill’s argument for the difference in value
e. It is only fair that you give him a chance to com- between intellectual and sensual pleasures?
pete for the position.
8. Which of the following is an example of act utilitar-
f. If I do not study for my ethics exam, it will hurt ian reasoning and which is an example of rule utili-
my GPA. tarian reasoning? Explain your answers.
a. If I do not go to the meeting, then others will not
g. If you are not honest with others, you cannot go either. If that happens, then there would not
expect them to be honest with you. be a quorum for the important vote, which would
be bad. Thus, I ought to go to the meeting.
5. Is utilitarianism a hedonist moral theory? Why or why b. If doctors generally lied to their patients about
not? their diagnoses, then patients would lose trust
in their doctors. Because that would be bad,
6. Using utilitarian calculation, which choice in each of I should tell this patient the truth.
the following pairs is better, X or Y? c. We ought to keep our promises because it is a
a. X makes four people happy and me unhappy. Y valuable practice.
makes me and one other person happy and three d. If I cheat here, I will be more likely to cheat else-
people unhappy. where. No one would trust me then. So I should
b. X makes twenty people happy and five unhappy. not cheat on this test.
Y makes ten people happy and no one unhappy.
c. X will give five people each two hours of plea-
sure. Y will give three people each four hours of
pleasure.
For more chapter resources and activities, go to MindTap.
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6 Deontological Ethics and
Immanuel Kant
Learning Outcomes
After reading this chapter, you should be able to:
• Explain the difference between • Explain the difference between perfect
consequentialist and non- • and imperfect duties.
Georgios Kollidas/Alamy Stock Photo Apply Kantian reasoning to a variety of
• consequentialist approaches to ethics.
Describe different deontological • cases in the real world.
Defend your own thesis with regard to
• approaches to ethics. the value of deontological ethics.
Explain the difference between
• hypothetical and categorical imperatives.
Describe two formulations of the
categorical imperative.
For more chapter resources and activities, go to MindTap.
Between 1932 and 1972, experiments were conducted in Tuskegee, Alabama, in
which 390 poor and illiterate African American men who had syphilis were fol-
lowed in order to determine the progress of the disease, whether it was always fatal,
and how it was spread. The researchers even failed to give the men penicillin treat-
ment for syphilis, when it became available in the early 1940s. The study was ended
in 1972 when it became public and a source of major controversy. The reasons were
by now obvious; these men had not been treated with respect but had been used for
the purpose of obtaining information.
According to utilitarian thinking, the Tuskegee experiments could perhaps be
justifiable. If the harm done to the participants was minimal and the study had no
other negative effects, and if the knowledge gained was valuable in reducing overall
suffering, then the study might be justified. However, since the post–World War II
trials of Nazi war criminals held in Nuremberg, Germany, standards for treatment of
human research subjects have become widely accepted. One of the most basic princi-
ples of the Nuremberg Code is, “The voluntary consent of the human subject is abso-
lutely essential.”1 Consent must be informed and uncoerced. Implied in this principle
is the belief that persons are autonomous, and that autonomy ought to be respected
and protected even if it means that we cannot do certain types of seemingly beneficial
research.
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Chapter ❮❮ Deontological Ethics and Immanuel Kant
National Archives and Records Administration.
Subjects in the infamous Tuskegee syphilis experiments.
This emphasis on autonomy and the idea that emphasize the right over the good, by which we
people ought not to be used as they were in the mean that deontology focuses on right actions and
Tuskegee experiments are central tenets in the moral right intentions, while downplaying the importance
philosophy of Immanuel Kant, which we examine in of the goods or benefits that are produced by these
detail in this chapter. Kant maintains that there are actions.
certain things we ought not do, even if these things
would produce the greatest happiness for the great- While utilitarian ethics focuses on producing the
est number. greatest happiness for the greatest number, deon-
tological ethics focuses on what makes us worthy
DEONTOLOGY AND THE ETHICS of happiness. For Kant, as for the Stoics and others
OF DUTY who emphasize duty, we are worthy of happiness
only when we do our duty. As Kant explained,
Kant’s theory of ethics is best described as a morality “is not properly the doctrine of how we
deontological theory. The word deontology means are to make ourselves happy but of how we are to
“theory of duty” (the Greek word deon means become worthy of happiness.”3 For Kant, morality is
“duty”). Deontological ethics focuses on duties, not a “doctrine of happiness” or set of instructions
obligations, and rights. The term deontological on how to become happy. Rather, morality is the
was coined by the utilitarian philosopher Jeremy “rational condition of happiness.”
Bentham, who described it as “knowledge of what
is right or proper.”2 Bentham thought that deontol- There are a variety of deontological theories.
ogy points in the direction of the principle of utility. Divine command ethics, as discussed in Chapter 2,
But contemporary philosophers use the term deon- is deontological in the sense that obedience to God’s
tological to indicate a contrast with the utilitar- command is a duty that must be followed no
ian focus on the consequences of actions. Instead matter what the consequences. The biblical story
of focusing on consequences, deontological ethics of Abraham and Isaac (in Genesis 22) provides an
focuses on duties and obligations: things we ought example of duty. Out of obedience to God’s com-
to do regardless of the consequences. One way of mand, Abraham is willing to sacrifice his own son.
describing this is to say that deontological theories In this story, religious duty must be done despite the
consequences and the unhappiness that is produced.
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PART ONE ❯❯ ETHICAL THEORY
This episode shows us one of the problems for iStockphoto.com/Duncan Walker
divine command ethics—a problem that has been
recognized since Socrates discussed it with Euthy- The story of Abraham and Isaac is an example of how
phro in Plato’s dialogue (see Chapter 2). How is religious duties may conflict with ethical duties.
morality related to God’s commands? And how
are we to know that it is, in fact, God who com- with the kind of courageous and selfless obedience
mands us and not the voice of our culture or our to duty that is typical of soldiers. This image of mili-
own selfish motives or even mental illness? The tary service and duty was embodied in the Roman
Abraham and Isaac episode famously prompted Kant Stoic Emperor Marcus Aurelius, who describes the
to suggest that Abraham should have questioned life of Stoic duty as follows: “It is thy duty to order
God as follows: “That I ought not to kill my good thy life well in every single act; and if every act
son is quite certain. But that you, this apparition, are does its duty, as far as is possible, be content; and
God—of that I am not certain, and never can be, not no one is able to hinder thee so that each act shall
even if this voice rings down to me from heaven.”4 not do its duty.”6 He imagines someone objecting
For Kant, the commands of ethics are clear, certain, to the rigors of duty by claiming that some external
and without exception—and they do not include the circumstances stand in the way of the fulfillment of
command to kill our own children. In response to duty. But he replies, “Nothing will stand in the way
this sort of criticism, the Danish philosopher Søren of thy acting justly and soberly and considerately.”
Kierkegaard suggested that the story of Abraham As Marcus explains elsewhere, “it is thy business to
shows us that there may be religious duties that do thy duty like a soldier in the assault on a town.”7
transcend the duties of ethics. Kant rejects such a The basic idea of Stoicism is that we can control our
claim. For Kant, moral duties are universal and abso- own intentions and actions, even when we can-
lute, and we should use our knowledge of morality not control the consequences and external circum-
to criticize and interpret religious stories and ideas. stances. From this standpoint, you fulfill your moral
obligation by doing what you know is right, even if
Another form of deontological ethics can be the external world makes that difficult.
found in the ancient Greek and Roman philosophy
of Stoicism. The Stoics emphasized doing your duty
and playing your part as determined by the natu-
ral order of things. Rather than struggling against
external circumstances that we cannot control, the
Stoics argue that the key to morality and happiness
is internal, a matter of how we orient our will and
intentions. According to this view, duty is its own
reward. Epictetus, a Stoic philosopher who died in
135 cE , explains, “As Zeus has ordained, so act: if
you do not act so, you will feel the penalty, you will
be punished. What will be the punishment? Nothing
else than not having done your duty: you will lose
the character of fidelity, modesty, propriety. Do not
look for greater penalties than these.”5
The typical image of a Stoic is of a sternly dis-
ciplined, courageous, and emotionally composed
individual who acts solely for the sake of duty—and
whose commitment to obedience and duty infuses
every part of life. We often associate Stoic ethics
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Chapter ❮❮ Deontological Ethics and Immanuel Kant
Although Immanuel Kant admired the Stoics’ and “What ought I do?”9 While Kant’s theory of
emphasis on “strength of the soul,”8 he also believed knowledge is important and influential, our concern
they underestimated the difficulty of being moral. One here is his moral philosophy.
problem is that we are confused about moral duty—
because we often confuse moral duties with other more One way to begin your examination of Kant’s
practical concerns, including the concerns of happiness. moral theory is to think about how he would answer
To clarify this, Kant focused on the logical and ratio- the question, What gives an act moral worth? It is
nal structure of duty itself—apart from considerations not the consequences of the act, according to Kant,
of happiness, prudence, or the natural order of things. that matters most. Suppose, for example, that I try
to do what is right by complimenting a man on his
While it is easy enough to state in general that achievements. Through no fault of my own, my
there are duties and obligations that we ought to action ends up hurting that person because he mis-
fulfill, it is more difficult to establish exactly what understands my efforts. According to Kant, because
those duties and obligations are. Is patriotism an I intended and tried to do what I thought was right, I
obligation—and does it include patriotism to an unjust ought not to be blamed for things having turned out
or corrupt state? Is the duty to our parents and ances- badly. The idea is that we generally ought not to be
tors primary, as it is in the morality of Confucius? Do blamed or praised for what is not in our control. The
we have obligations of compassion and concern for consequences of our acts are not always in our con-
all sentient beings, as many Buddhists argue? These trol, and things do not always turn out as we want.
questions remind us that deontological ethics might However, Kant believed that our motives are in our
need to be supplemented with a broader theory of control. We are responsible for our intention to do
“the good,” which tells us how the theory of duty good or bad, and thus it is for this that we are held
should apply to personal, social, and political affairs. morally accountable.
Indeed, this criticism of deontological ethics was
noted by John Stuart Mill, who criticized Kant for Kant also objected to basing morality on the
defining a theory of duty that was so abstract that it consequences of our actions for another reason. To
could not rule out immoral actions. make morality a matter of producing certain states of
affairs, such as happy experiences, seems to approach
As we turn to a discussion of Kant, bear this morality backwards. In such a view, actions and even
accusation in mind. Is Kant’s conception of duty too human beings could be thought of as merely having
abstract? Or does the Kantian theory help to specify use value. We would be valued to the extent that we
our duties in sufficient detail to avoid this charge? were instrumental in bringing about what itself was
of greater value, namely, happy states or experiences.
IMMANUEL KANT However, in Kant’s view, we should not be used
in this way for we are rational beings or persons.
Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) was a German phi- Persons have intrinsic or inherent value, according
losopher who is now regarded as a central figure in to Kant, not mere instrumental value. The belief that
the history of modern philosophy. Modern philoso- people ought not to be used, but ought to be regarded
phy itself is sometimes divided into pre-Kantian and as having the highest intrinsic value, is central to
post-Kantian periods. Although he is renowned for Kant’s ethics, as is having a motive to do what is
his moral philosophy, he wrote on a variety of mat- right. As we shall see in the next two sections, Kant
ters including science, geography, beauty, and war uses this second idea to answer the question: What
and peace. He was a firm believer in the ideas of gives an act moral worth?
the Enlightenment (as discussed in Chapter 2), espe-
cially reason and freedom, and he was also a sup- What Is the Right Motive?
porter of the American Revolution.
Kant believed that an act has moral worth only
Two of the main questions that Kant believed if it is done with a right intention or motive.10 He
philosophy should address are: “What can I know?”
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PART ONE ❯❯ ETHICAL THEORY
Georgios Kollidas/Alamy Stock Photo necessarily wrong, this motive is not praiseworthy.
(2) The shopkeeper might charge a fair and equal
A portrait of Immanuel Kant (1724–1804). price because she is sympathetic toward her cus-
tomers and is naturally inclined to do them good.
referred to this as having a “good will.” Kant writes Kant said that this motive is also not the highest.
that the only thing that is unconditionally good is a We do not have high moral esteem or praise for peo-
good will. Everything else needs a good will to make ple who simply do what they feel like doing, even
it good. Without a right intention, such things as if we believe they are doing the right thing. (3) If
intelligence, wit, and control of emotions can be bad the shopkeeper did the right thing just because she
and used for evil purposes. Having a right intention believed it was right, however, then this act would
means doing what is right (or what one believes to be based on the highest motive. We have a special
be right) just because it is right. In Kant’s words, it respect, or even a moral reverence, for people who
is to act “out of duty,” out of a concern and respect act out of a will to do the right thing, especially
for the moral law. Kant was not a relativist. He when this comes at great cost to themselves. An act
believed that there is a right and a wrong thing to has moral worth only when it is motivated by con-
do, whether or not we know or agree about it. cern for the moral law.
To explain his views on the importance of a right Now, we do not always know whether our acts
motive or intention, Kant provides the example of a are motivated by self-interest, inclination, or pure
shopkeeper who does the right thing, who charges respect for morality. Also, we often act from mixed
her customers a fair price and charges the same to motives. We are more certain that the motive is pure,
all. But what is her motive? Kant discusses three however, when we do what is right even when it is
possible motives: (1) The shopkeeper’s motive or not in our best interest (when it costs us dearly) and
reason for acting might be because it is a good busi- when we do not feel like doing the right thing. In
ness practice to charge the same to all. It is in her these cases, we can know that we are motivated by
own best interest that she do this. Although not concern to do the right thing because the other two
motives are missing. Moreover, this ability to act for
moral reasons, while resisting other inclinations, is
one reason that human beings have a unique value
and dignity. The person who says to himself, “I feel
like being lazy (or mean or selfish), but I am going
to try not to because it would not be right,” is oper-
ating out of the motive of respect for morality itself.
This ability to act for moral reasons or motives, Kant
believes, is one part of what gives human beings
dignity and worth.
What Is the Right Thing to Do?
For our action to have moral worth, according to
Kant, we must not only act out of a right motivation
but also do the right thing. Consider again the dia-
gram that we used in Chapter 1.
Motive Act Consequences
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Chapter ❮❮ Deontological Ethics and Immanuel Kant
As noted earlier, Kant does not believe that goals and plans. For example, I ought to take intro-
morality is a function of producing good conse- duction to sociology because I want to be a sociol-
quences. We may do what has good results, but if ogy major, while you ought to take a course on the
we do so for the wrong motive, then that act has philosophy of Kant because you have chosen to be
no moral worth. However, it is not only the motive a philosophy major. These are obligations only for
that counts for Kant. We must also do what is right. those who have these goals or desires. Think of
The act itself must be morally right. Both the act and them in this form: “If (or because) I want X, then
the motive are morally relevant. In Kant’s terms, I ought to do Y.” Whether I ought to do Y is totally
we must act not only “out of duty” (have the right contingent or dependent on my wanting X.
motive) but also “according to duty” or “as duty
requires” (do what is right). How then are we to Moral obligation, on the other hand, is quite dif-
know what is the right thing to do? Once we know ferent in nature. Kant believed that we experience
this, we can try to do it just because it is right. moral obligation as something quite demanding.
If there is something I morally ought to do, I ought
To understand Kant’s reasoning on this matter, to do it no matter what—whether or not I want to,
we need to examine the difference between what he and whether or not it fulfills my desires and goals or
calls a hypothetical imperative and a categori- is approved by my society. Moral obligation is not
cal imperative. First of all, an imperative is simply contingent on what I or anyone happens to want or
a form of statement that tells us to do something, for approve. Moral “oughts” are thus, in Kant’s terminol-
example, “Stand up straight” and “Close the door” ogy, unconditional or necessary. Moreover, whereas
and also “You ought to close the door.” Some, but hypothetical “oughts” relate to goals we each have
only some, imperatives are moral imperatives. Other as individuals, moral “oughts” stem from the ways in
imperatives are hypothetical. For example, the state- which we are alike as persons, for only persons are
ment: “If I want to get there on time, I ought to leave subject to morality. This is because persons are ratio-
early” does not embody a moral “ought” or a moral nal beings, and only persons can act from a reason or
imperative. What I ought to do in that case is a func- from principles. These “oughts” are thus not individu-
tion of what I happen to want—to get there on time— alized but universal as they apply to all persons. Kant
and of the means necessary to achieve this—leaving calls moral “oughts” categorical imperatives because
early. Moreover, I can avoid the obligation to leave they tell us what we ought to do no matter what,
early by changing my goals. I can decide that I do not under all conditions, or categorically.
need or want to get there on time. Then, I need not
leave early. These ends may be good or bad. Thus, It is from the very nature of categorical or moral
the statement, “If I want to harm someone, then I imperatives, as unconditional and universally bind-
ought to use effective means” also expresses a hypo- ing, that Kant derives his views about morality. In
thetical “ought.” These “oughts” are avoidable, or, as fact, he uses the term the categorical imperative
Kant would say, contingent. They are contingent or to describe the basic moral principle by which we
dependent on what I happen to want or the desires determine what we ought and ought not to do.
I happen to have, such as to please others, to harm
someone, to gain power, or to be punctual. THE CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE
These “oughts” are also quite individualized. The categorical imperative, Kant’s basic moral prin-
What I ought to do is contingent or dependent on ciple, is comparable in importance for his moral phi-
my own individual goals or plans. These actions losophy to the principle of utility for utilitarians. It is
serve as means to whatever goals I happen to have Kant’s test for right and wrong. Several formulations
(or whatever goals my particular community or soci- of the categorical imperative are found in Kant’s
ety happens to approve). Other people ought to do writings. We will concentrate on just two and call
different things than I because they have different them the first and second forms of the categorical
imperative. The others, however, do add different
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PART ONE ❯❯ ETHICAL THEORY
elements to our understanding of his basic moral is not being rational. “Make up your mind,” we say.
principle and will be mentioned briefly. “If you eat it, it is gone.”
The First Form How I know whether I can will something uni-
versally without contradiction can be explained by
Recall that moral obligation is categorical; that is, it using one of Kant’s own examples. He asks us to
is unconditional and applies to all persons as per- consider whether it is morally permissible for me to
sons rather than to persons as individuals. It is in “make a lying or false promise in order to extricate
this sense universal. Moreover, because morality myself from some difficulty.” Thus, I would consider
is not a matter of producing good consequences of the maxim, “Whenever I am in some difficulty that I
any sort (be it happiness, knowledge, or peace), the can get out of only by making a lying or false prom-
basic moral principle will be formal, without content. ise, I will do so.” To know whether this would be
It will not include reference to any particular good. morally acceptable, it must pass the test of the cat-
Knowing this, we are on the way to understanding egorical imperative. If I were to use this test, I would
the first form of the categorical imperative, which ask whether I could will that sort of thing for all.
simply requires that we do only what we can accept I must ask whether I could will a general practice
or will that everyone do. Kant’s own statement of it in which people who made promises—for example,
is basically the following: to pay back some money—could make the prom-
ises without intending to keep them. If people who
Act only on that maxim that you can will as a generally made such promises did so falsely, then
universal law. others would know this and would not believe the
promises. Consider whether you would lend money
In other words, whatever I consider doing, it must be to a woman if she promised to pay you back but you
something that I can consistently will or accept that knew she was lying. The reasoning is thus: If I tried
all others do. To will something universally is simi- to will a general practice of false promise-making, I
lar to willing it as a law, for a law by its very nature would find it impossible to do so because by willing
has a degree of universality. By maxim, Kant means that promises could be false, I would also will a situ-
a description of the action or policy that I will put to ation in which it would be impossible to succeed in
the test. This is expressed in the form of a rule or making a lying promise. Everyone would know that
principle. For example, I might want to know whether all promises were potential lies. No one could then
“being late for class” or “giving all my money to the make a promise, let alone a false promise, because
homeless” describes a morally permissible action. no one would believe him or her. Part of being
I need only formulate some maxim or rule and ask able to make a promise is to have it believed. The
whether I could will that everyone follow that maxim. universal practice of false promise-making is self-
For example, I might ask whether I could will the contradictory and could not exist. If everyone made
universal maxim or general rule, “Whenever I have such lying promises, no one could!
money to spare, I will give it to the homeless.” How-
ever, this needs further clarification. Now consider the example at the beginning of this
chapter: the Tuskegee syphilis experiments, in which
How do I know what I can and cannot will as a people were used as medical test subjects without their
universal practice? As a rational being, I can only full knowing consent. Using Kant’s categorical impera-
will what is noncontradictory. What do we think of a tive to test this, one would see that if it were a general
person who says that it is both raining and not rain- practice for researchers to lie to their subjects in order
ing here now? It can be raining here and not there, to get them into their experiments, they would not be
or now and not earlier. But it is either raining here able to get people to participate. A general practice of
or it is not. It cannot be both. So also we say that a deceiving potential research subjects would under-
person who wants to “have his cake and eat it, too” mine the credibility of all researchers. The only way
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Chapter ❮❮ Deontological Ethics and Immanuel Kant
a particular researcher could lie would be if most other persons is their ability to set their own goals. Per-
researchers told the truth. Only then could he or she sons are autonomous (from the Greek auto, mean-
get prospective subjects to believe him or her. But this ing “self,” and nomos, meaning “rule” or “law”).
would be to make himself or herself an exception to They are literally self-ruled, or at least capable of
the universal rule. Like false promising, a universal being self-ruled. As persons, we choose our own life
practice in which researchers lied to their prospective plans, what we want to be, our friends, our college
subjects is self-contradictory and cannot be willed with courses, and so forth. We have our own reasons for
consistency. Therefore, lying to prospective research doing so. We believe that although our choices are
subjects fails the test of the categorical imperative and influenced by our circumstances and by the advice
is morally impermissible. and opinions of others, we knowingly allow our-
selves be so influenced, and thus, these choices are
In some ways, Kant’s basic moral principle, the cat- still our own choices. In this way, persons are dif-
egorical imperative, is a principle of fairness. I should ferent from things. Things cannot choose what they
not do what I am not able to will that everyone do. For wish to do. We decide how we shall use things. We
me to succeed in making a lying promise, others must impose our own goals on things, using wood to
generally make truthful promises so that my lie will be build a house and a pen or computer to express our
believed. This would be to treat myself as an excep- ideas. It is appropriate to use things for our ends, but
tion. But this is not fair. In some ways, the principle is it is not appropriate to use persons as though they
similar to the so-called Golden Rule, which requires us were things purely at our disposal and without wills
only to do unto others what we would be willing for of their own. Kant’s statement of this second form of
them to do unto us. However, it is not the same, for the categorical imperative is as follows:
Kant’s principle requires our not willing self-canceling
or contradictory practices, whereas the Golden Rule Always treat humanity, whether in your own person
requires that we appeal in the final analysis to what or that of another, never simply as a means but
we would or would not like to have done to us. Kant always at the same time as an end.
explains that the Golden Rule
This formulation tells us how we ought to treat our-
…cannot be a universal law, for it does not contain selves as well as others, namely, as ends rather than
the principle of duties to oneself, nor of the duties of merely as means. Kant believes that we should treat
benevolence to others (for many a one would gladly persons as having value in themselves and not just
consent that others should not benefit him, provided as having instrumental value. People are valuable,
only that he might be excused from showing regardless of whether they are useful or loved or val-
benevolence to them), nor finally that of duties of ued by others. We should not simply use others or let
strict obligation to one another, for on this principle ourselves be used. Although I may in some sense use
the criminal might argue against the judge who a woman—for example, to paint my house—I may not
punishes him, and so on.11 simply use her. The goal of getting my house painted
must be shared by the painter, who is also a person
To explain, the Golden Rule is only about what I and not just an object to be used by me for my own
or you like or don’t like (what we would have others ends. She must know what is involved in the project.
“do unto us”). But this fails to get us to the level of I cannot lie to manipulate her into doing something to
universal duty that is central to Kant’s moral theory. which she otherwise would not agree. And she must
agree to paint the house voluntarily rather than be
The Second Form coerced into doing it. These and similar requirements
are necessary for treating another person as an end
The first form of Kant’s categorical imperative rather than merely as a means to my ends or goals.
requires universalizing one’s contemplated action or
policy. In the second form, we are asked to consider
what constitutes proper treatment of persons as per-
sons. According to Kant, one key characteristic of
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PART ONE ❯❯ ETHICAL THEORY
We can use this second form of the categorical EVALUATING KANT’S MORAL THEORY
imperative to evaluate the examples we considered
for the first form. The moral conclusions should be There is much that is appealing in Kant’s moral
the same whether we use the first or second form. philosophy, particularly its central aspects—its focus
Kant believes that in lying to another person—for on motives, its emphasis on fairness, its aim of con-
example, saying that we will pay back money when sistency, and its basic idea of treating persons as
we have no intention of doing so—we would be autonomous and morally equal beings. Kant’s deon-
attempting to manipulate another person against tological approach is quite different from that exem-
that person’s will. (He or she is presumably unwill- plified by utilitarianism, with its emphasis on the
ing to just give us the money.) This would violate maximization of happiness and the production of
the requirement not to use persons. Similarly, in the good consequences. To more fully evaluate Kant’s
Tuskegee experiments, the deceptive researchers theory, consider the following aspects of his thought.
used the subjects as means to an end rather than as
ends in themselves. The Nature of Moral Obligation
We noted that Kant provided more formulations of One of the bases on which Kant’s moral philosophy
his categorical imperative than the two discussed here. rests is his view about the nature of moral obliga-
In another of these formulations, Kant relies on his tion. He believes that moral obligation is real and
views about nature as a system of everything that we strictly binding. According to Kant, this is how we
experience because it is organized according to laws. generally think of moral obligation. If there is any-
Thus, he says that we ought always to ask whether thing that we morally ought to do, then we sim-
some action we are contemplating could become a ply ought to do it. Thus, this type of obligation is
universal law of nature. The effect of this version is unlike that which flows from what we ought to do
to emphasize morality as universal and rational, for because of the particular goals that we each have
nature necessarily operates according to coherent laws. as individuals. To evaluate this aspect of Kant’s
Other formulations of the categorical imperative stress moral philosophy, you must ask yourself whether
autonomy. We are to ask whether we could consider this is also what you think about the nature of
ourselves as the author of the moral practice that we moral obligation. This is important for Kant’s moral
are about to accept. We are both subject to the moral philosophy because acting out of respect for the
law and its author because it flows from our own moral law is required for an action to have moral
nature as a rational being. Another formulation ampli- worth. Furthermore, being able to act out of such
fies what we have here called the second form of the a regard for morality is also the source of human
categorical imperative. This formulation points out that dignity, according to Kant.
our rationality makes us alike as persons, and together,
we form a community of persons. He calls the com- The Application of the Categorical Imperative
munity of rational persons a kingdom of ends—that
is, a kingdom in which all persons are authors as well Critics such as Mill (as noted previously) have
as subjects of the moral law. Thus, we ask whether pointed out problems with the universalizing form
the action we are contemplating would be fitting for of the categorical imperative. For example, some
and promote such a community. These formulations have argued that when using the first form of the
of the categorical imperative involve other interesting categorical imperative, there are many things that I
elements of Kant’s philosophy, but they also involve could will as universal practices that would hardly
more than we can explore here. seem to be moral obligations. I could will that every-
one write their names on the top of their test papers.
For more chapter resources and If everyone did that, it would not prevent anyone
activities, go to MindTap. from doing so. There would be no contradiction
involved if this were a universal practice. Neverthe-
less, this would not mean that people have a moral
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Chapter ❮❮ Deontological Ethics and Immanuel Kant
obligation to write their names on their test papers. this count as deception on my part? Although these
A Kantian might respond that to write your name are real problems for anyone who tries to apply Kant’s
on your test paper is an example of a hypothetical, views about deceit and coercion, they are not unique
not a categorical, imperative. I write my name on to his moral philosophy. Theories vary in the ease of
my paper because I want to be given credit for it. If their use or application. Difficulty of application is a
I can will it as a universal practice, I then know it is problem for most, if not all, moral philosophies.
a morally permissible action. If I cannot will it uni-
versally, then it is impermissible or wrong. Thus, the Duty
categorical imperative is actually a negative test—in
other words, a test for what we should not do, more Some of the language and terminology found in
than a test for what we ought to do. Whether or not Kant’s moral theory can sound harsh to modern
this is a satisfactory response, you should know that ears. Duty, obligation, law, and universality may
this is just one of several problems associated with not be the moral terms most commonly heard
Kant’s universalizing test. today. Yet if one considers what Kant meant by
duty, the idea may not seem so strange to us. Kant
Concern for the universality of moral rules is not was not advocating any particular moral code or
unique to Kantian ethics. We saw in Chapter 5 that set of duties held by any society or group. Rather,
rule utilitarianism is focused on the general utility of duty is what reason tells us is the right thing to do.
rules. Although Kantians and rule utilitarians are both However, Kant might acknowledge that there is a
interested in universalized rules, there is a difference streak of absolutism in his philosophy. Absolutists
in how Kantian and rule utilitarian reasoning pro- think that morality consists of a set of exception-
ceeds. Rule utilitarians require that we consider what less rules. Kant does, at times, seem to favor abso-
the results would be if some act we are contemplating lutism. He provides examples in which it seems
were to be a universal practice. Reasoning in this way, clear that he believes it is always wrong to make
we ask what would be the results or consequences of a false promise or to lie deliberately. There is even
some general practice, such as making false promises, one example in which Kant himself suggests that
or whether one practice would have better results if a killer comes to the door asking for a friend of
than another. Although in some sense Kant’s theory yours inside whom he or she intends to kill, you
requires that we consider the possible consequences must tell the truth. But Kant’s moral theory pro-
when universalizing some action, the determinant of vides only one exceptionless rule, and that is given
the action’s morality is not whether it has good or bad in the categorical imperative. We are never permit-
consequences, but whether there would be anything ted to do what we cannot will as a universal law
contradictory in willing the practice as a universal or what violates the requirement to treat persons
law. Because we are rational beings, we must not will as ends in themselves. Even with these two tests
contradictory things. in hand, it is not always clear just how they apply.
Furthermore, they may not give adequate help in
The second form of the categorical imperative deciding what to do when they seem to produce
also has problems of application. In the concrete, it contradictory duties, as in the conflict between tell-
is not always easy to determine whether one is using ing the truth and preserving a life.
a person—for example, what is coercion and what
is simply influence, or what is deception and what Moral Equality and Impartiality
is not. When I try to talk a friend into doing some-
thing for me, how do I know whether I am simply One positive feature of Kant’s moral theory is its
providing input for my friend’s own decision-making emphasis on the moral equality of all persons, which
or whether I am crossing the line and becoming is implied in his view that the nature of moral obli-
coercive? Moreover, if I do not tell the whole truth gation is universally binding. We should not make
or withhold information from another person, should exceptions for ourselves; we should only do what
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PART ONE ❯❯ ETHICAL THEORY
we can will for all. Moral obligation and morality will it for all and because it violates our obligation
itself flow from our nature as rational and autono- to treat persons as persons and not to use them
mous persons. Morality is grounded in the ways in only for our own purposes. Kant calls such duties
which we are alike as persons, rather than the ways perfect duties (they are sometimes described as
in which we are different as individuals. This pro- necessary duties). As the term suggests, perfect
vides a source for those who want to argue for moral duties are absolute. We can and should absolutely
equality and equal moral rights. If we do not treat refrain from making false or lying promises. From
others as equal persons, we are disrespecting them. the perspective of the first form of the categorical
If we are not willing to make the same judgment for imperative, we have a perfect duty not to do those
cases similar to our own, or if we are not willing to things that could not even exist and are inconceiv-
have the same rules apply to all, we can be accused able as universal practices. Using the second form
of hypocrisy. When we criticize hypocrisy, we act in of the categorical imperative, we have a perfect
the spirit of Kant. duty not to do what violates the requirement to
treat persons as ends in themselves.
Another feature of Kant’s moral philosophy is its
spirit of impartiality. For an action to be morally per- However, some duties are more flexible. Kant
missible, we should be able to will it for all. However, calls these duties imperfect duties (sometimes also
persons differ in significant ways. Among these are called meritorious duties). Consider another example
differences in gender, race, age, and talents. In what he provides: egoism. Ethical egoism is the view that
way does morality require that all persons be treated we may rightly seek only our own interest and help
equally, and in what way does it perhaps require others only to the extent that doing so also bene-
that different persons be treated differently?12 fits us (see Chapter 4). Is this a morally acceptable
philosophy of life? Using the first form of Kant’s
Some critics have wondered about Kant’s stress categorical imperative to test the morality of this
on the nature of persons as rational and autono- practice, we must ask whether we could will that
mous beings. It might be that human beings are not everyone was an egoist. If I try to do this, I would
best conceived as rational autonomous beings, such need to will that I was an egoist as well as others,
as Kant describes. Kant seems to forget our emo- even in those situations when I needed others’ help.
tions and our dependency on relationships. But Kant In those situations, I must allow that they not help
might reply that we often have no control over how me when it is not in their own best interest. But
we feel and thus that our feelings should not be a being an egoist myself, I would also want them to
key element of our moral lives. He might also argue help me. In effect, I would be willing contradictories;
that it is the common aspects of our existence as per- that they help me (I being an egoist) and that they
sons, and not the ways in which we are different and not help me (they being egoists). Although Kant
unique, that give us dignity and are the basis for the admits that a society of egoists could indeed exist,
moral equality that we possess. In short, even if we no rational person could will it, for a rational person
are often not fully autonomous or rational, we ought does not will contradictories. We have an imperfect
to consider ourselves as autonomous and rational— or meritorious duty, then, not to be egoists but to
and treat others as if they were autonomous and help people for their own good and not just for ours.
rational—for this is the source of human dignity. However, just when to help others and how much
to help them is a matter of some choice. There is a
PERFECT AND IMPERFECT DUTIES certain flexibility here. One implication of this view
is that there is no absolute duty to give one’s whole
In his attempt to explain his views, Kant provides life to helping others. We, too, are persons and thus
us with several examples. We have already consid- have moral rights and also can at least sometimes
ered one of these: making a false promise. His con- act for our own interests.
clusion is that we should not make a false or lying
promise, both because we could not consistently
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Chapter ❮❮ Deontological Ethics and Immanuel Kant
The same conclusion regarding the wrongness involved in some action? Don’t people have different
of egoism results from the application of the second intuitions about the rightness or wrongness of any
form of the categorical imperative. If I were an ego- particular action? This is a problem for anyone who
ist and concerned only about myself, I might argue holds that intuition is the basis for morality.
that I was not thereby committed to using other peo-
ple. I would simply leave them alone. But according One of the most noted contemporary versions
to Kant, such an attitude and practice would still be of Kant’s moral philosophy is found in the political
inconsistent with the duty to treat others as persons. philosophy of John Rawls. In A Theory of Justice,
As persons, they also have interests and plans, and to Rawls applies some aspects of Kantian principles
recognize this, I must at least sometimes and in some to issues of social justice. According to Rawls, jus-
ways seek to promote their ends and goals. Thus, tice is fairness.14 To know what is fair, we must put
avoiding egoism appears to be an imperfect duty, ourselves imaginatively in the position of a group
according to Kant’s theory. The distinction between of free and equal rational beings who are choosing
perfect and imperfect duties will have implications principles of justice for their society. In thinking of
for handling conflicts among different duties. Perfect persons as free and equal rational beings in order
duties will take precedence over imperfect ones; we to develop principles of justice, Rawls is securely in
cannot help some by violating the rights of others. the Kantian tradition of moral philosophy. Kant also
stresses autonomy. It is this aspect of our nature that
VARIATIONS ON KANT gives us our dignity as persons. Kant’s categorical
AND DEONTOLOGY imperative also involves universalization. We must
do only those things that we could will that every-
Just as there are contemporary versions of and one do. It is only a short move from these notions
developments within the utilitarian tradition, there of autonomy and universalization to the Rawlsian
are also many contemporary versions of Kantian requirement to choose those principles of justice that
and deontological moral theory. One is found in the we could accept no matter which position in society
moral philosophy of W. D. Ross, who also held that we happen to occupy. For details about Rawls’ prin-
there are things we ought and ought not do regard- ciples, see Chapter 14. Kantian and other versions
less of the consequences.13 We discussed Ross of deontology continue to be influential. You will be
in Chapter 3 in relation to pluralism. According to able to better evaluate the Kantian theory as you see
Ross, we have duties not only of beneficence, but aspects of it applied to issues in Part Two of this text.
also to keep promises, pay our debts, and be good
friends and parents and children. Contrary to Kant, The reading selection in this chapter from Kant’s
Ross believed that we can know through moral intu- Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals
ition in any instance what we ought to do. Some- contains the key elements of his moral philosophy.
times, we are faced with a conflict of moral duties. As the title implies, Kant is trying to establish the
It seems intuitive that we ought to be both loyal foundations of morality. He begins by claiming that
and honest, but we cannot be both. We have prima the only thing that is good without qualification is a
facie, or conditional duties, of loyalty and honesty. good will. He goes on to explain duty and the cat-
In case of conflicting duties, according to Ross, we egorical imperative, while applying these ideas to
have to consider which duty is the stronger—that some basic examples.
is, which has the greater balance of rightness over
wrongness. In choosing honesty in some situations, NOTES
however, one does not negate or forget that one also
has a duty to be loyal. Obvious problems arise for 1. From Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg
such a theory. For example, how does one go about Military Tribunals under Control Council Law No.
determining the amount of rightness or wrongness 10, Vol. 2 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1949), pp. 181–82.
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PART ONE ❯❯ ETHICAL THEORY
2. Jeremy Bentham, Deontology or the Science of 9. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans.
Morality (Edinburgh, William Tait, 1834), vol. 1, Norman Kemp Smith (New York: St. Martin’s,
Chapter 2. 1965), p. 635.
3. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, in 10. We will not distinguish here motive and intention,
Practical Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge although the former usually signifies that out of
University Press, 1999), 5: 130, p. 244. which we act (an impetus or push) and the latter
that for which we act (an aim or objective).
4. Immanuel Kant, The Conflict of the Faculties, in
Religion and Rational Theology, ed. A.W. Wood 11. Kant, Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics
and G. di Giovanni (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer- of Morals trans. Abbott (Project Gutenburg: http://
sity Press, 1996), p. 283. www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/5682/pg5682.
html), second section.
5. Epictetus, Discourses, 3.7 (Internet Classics
Archive: http://classics.mit.edu//Epictetus/ 12. See also the criticism of Kantian theories of justice
discourses.html). in the treatment of gender and justice in Susan
Moller Okin, Justice, Gender, and the Family (New
6. Marcus Aurelius, Meditations (Internet Classics York: Basic Books, 1989), pp. 3–22. See also
Archive: http://classics.mit.edu//Antoninus/ Marilyn Friedman, “The Social Self and the Partial-
meditations.html), bk. 8. ity Debates,” in Feminist Ethics, ed. Claudia Card
(Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1991).
7. Aurelius, Meditations, bk. 7.
8. Kant, Critique of Practical Reason 5: 127, p. 242. 13. W. D. Ross, The Right and the Good (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1930).
Also see J. B. Schneewind, “Kant and Stoic Ethics,”
in Essays on the History of Moral Philosophy 14. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA:
(Oxford University Press, 2009). Harvard University Press, 1971).
READING
Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals
IMMANUEL KANT
For more chapter resources and activities, go to MindTap.
Study Questions
As you read the excerpt, please consider the following questions:
1. How does Kant state his basic moral principle?
2. What is the difference between a rule of skill, a counsel of prudence, and a command of morality?
3. Explain how Kant uses the categorical imperative in his four examples. Make sure you understand his application of
both forms of the categorical imperative.
THE GOOD WILL* but these gifts of nature may also become extremely
bad and mischievous if the will which is to make use
Nothing can possibly be conceived in the world,
or even out of it, which can be called good with- From Immanuel Kant, Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of
out qualification, except a good will. Intelligence, Morals, trans. Thomas Kingsmill Abbott, (1879; Project Gutenberg
wit, judgment, and the other talents of the mind, 2004), secs. 1 and 2, http://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/5682
however they may be named, or courage, resolu- *Headings added by the editor.
tion, perseverance, as qualities of temperament, are *Some notes have been deleted and the remaining ones
undoubtedly good and desirable in many respects; renumbered.
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Chapter ❮❮ Deontological Ethics and Immanuel Kant
of them, and which, therefore, constitutes what is by its own light, as a thing which has its whole value
called character, is not good. It is the same with the in itself. Its usefulness or fruitlessness can neither add
gifts of fortune. Power, riches, honor, even health, nor take away anything from this value. It would be,
and the general well-being and contentment with as it were, only the setting to enable us to handle it the
one’s condition which is called happiness, inspire more conveniently in common commerce, or to attract
pride, and often presumption, if there is not a good to it the attention of those who are not yet connois-
will to correct the influence of these on the mind, and seurs, but not to recommend it to true connoisseurs, or
with this also to rectify the whole principle of acting to determine its value . . . .
and adapt it to its end. The sight of a being who
is not adorned with a single feature of a pure and ACTING FROM DUTY
good will, enjoying unbroken prosperity, can never
give pleasure to an impartial rational spectator. Thus We have then to develop the notion of a will which
a good will appears to constitute the indispensable deserves to be highly esteemed for itself, and is good
condition even of being worthy of happiness. without a view to anything further, a notion which
exists already in the sound natural understanding,
There are even some qualities which are of service requiring rather to be cleared up than to be taught,
to this good will itself, and may facilitate its action, and which in estimating the value of our actions
yet which have no intrinsic unconditional value, but always takes the first place, and constitutes the con-
always presuppose a good will, and this qualifies the dition of all the rest. In order to do this we will take
esteem that we justly have for them, and does not the notion of duty, which includes that of a good
permit us to regard them as absolutely good. Modera- will, although implying certain subjective restrictions
tion in the affections and passions, self-control and and hindrances. These, however, far from conceal-
calm deliberation are not only good in many respects, ing it, or rendering it unrecognizable, rather bring
but even seem to constitute part of the intrinsic worth it out by contrast, and make it shine forth so much
of the person; but they are far from deserving to be the brighter. I omit here all actions which are already
called good without qualification, although they have recognized as inconsistent with duty, although they
been so unconditionally praised by the ancients. may be useful for this or that purpose, for with these
For without the principles of a good will, they may the question whether they are done from duty cannot
become extremely bad, and the coolness of a villain arise at all, since they even conflict with it. I also set
not only makes him far more dangerous, but also aside those actions which really conform to duty, but
immediately makes him more abominable in our eyes to which men have no direct inclination, performing
than he would have been without it. them because they are impelled thereto by some other
inclination. For in this case we can readily distinguish
A good will is good not because of what it performs whether the action which agrees with duty is done
or effects, not by its aptness for the attainment of some from duty, or from a selfish view. It is much harder
proposed end, but simply by virtue of the volition, that to make this distinction when the action accords with
is, it is good in itself, and considered by itself is to be duty, and the subject has besides a direct inclination
esteemed much higher than all that can be brought to it. For example, it is always a matter of duty that
about by it in favour of any inclination, nay even of a dealer should not overcharge an inexperienced pur-
the sum total of all inclinations. Even if it should hap- chaser, and wherever there is much commerce the
pen that, owing to special disfavour of fortune, or the prudent tradesman does not overcharge, but keeps a
niggardly provision of a step-motherly nature, this will fixed price for every one, so that a child buys of him
should wholly lack power to accomplish its purpose, if as well as any other. Men are thus honestly served;
with its greatest efforts it should yet achieve nothing, but this is not enough to make us believe that the
and there should remain only the good will (not, to be tradesman has so acted from duty and from princi-
sure, a mere wish, but the summoning of all means ples of honesty: his own advantage required it; it is
in our power), then, like a jewel, it would still shine
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PART ONE ❯❯ ETHICAL THEORY
out of the question in this case to suppose that he sympathy in the heart of this or that man; if he, sup-
might besides have a direct inclination in favour of posed to be an upright man, is by temperament cold
the buyers, so that, as it were, from love he should and indifferent to the sufferings of others, perhaps
give no advantage to one over another. Accordingly because in respect of his own he is provided with the
the action was done neither from duty nor from direct special gift of patience and fortitude, and supposes,
inclination, but merely with a selfish view. or even requires, that others should have the same—
and such a man would certainly not be the mean-
On the other hand, it is a duty to maintain est product of nature—but if nature had not specially
one’s life; and, in addition, every one has also a framed him for a philanthropist, would he not still
direct inclination to do so. But on this account the find in himself a source from whence to give himself
often anxious care which most men take for it has a far higher worth than that of a good-natured tem-
no intrinsic worth, and their maxim has no moral perament could be? Unquestionably. It is just in this
import. They preserve their life as duty requires, no that the moral worth of the character is brought out
doubt, but not because duty requires. On the other which is incomparably the highest of all, namely, that
hand, if adversity and hopeless sorrow have com- he is beneficent, not from inclination, but from duty.
pletely taken away the relish for life; if the unfortu-
nate one, strong in mind, indignant at his fate rather To secure one’s own happiness is a duty, at least
than desponding or dejected, wishes for death, and indirectly; for discontent with one’s condition under
yet preserves his life without loving it—not from a pressure of many anxieties and amidst unsatisfied
inclination or fear, but from duty—then his maxim wants might easily become a great temptation to
has a moral worth. transgression of duty. . . .
To be beneficent when we can is a duty; and It is in this manner, undoubtedly, that we are
besides this, there are many minds so sympathetically to understand those passages of Scripture also in
constituted that without any other motive of vanity which we are commanded to love our neighbour,
or self-interest, they find a pleasure in spreading joy even our enemy. For love, as an affection, cannot be
around them, and can take delight in the satisfaction commanded, but beneficence for duty’s sake; even
of others so far as it is their own work. But I maintain though we are not impelled to it by any inclination,
that in such a case an action of this kind, however nay, are even repelled by a natural and unconquer-
proper, however amiable it may be, has neverthe- able aversion. This is practical love, and not patho-
less no true moral worth, but is on a level with other logical, a love which is seated in the will, and not
inclinations, e.g., the inclination to honour, which, if in the propensions of sense, in principles of action
it is happily directed to that which is in fact of pub- and not of tender sympathy; and it is this love alone
lic utility and accordant with duty, and consequently which can be commanded.
honourable, deserves praise and encouragement, but
not esteem. For the maxim wants the moral import, The second proposition1 is: That an action done
namely, that such actions be done from duty, not from duty derives its moral worth, not from the
from inclination. Put the case that the mind of that purpose which is to be attained by it, but from the
philanthropist were clouded by sorrow of his own, maxim by which it is determined, and therefore
extinguishing all sympathy with the lot of others, and does not depend on the realization of the object of
that while he still has the power to benefit others in the action, but merely on the principle of volition by
distress he is not touched by their trouble because he which the action has taken place, without regard to
is absorbed with his own; and now suppose that he any object of desire. It is clear from what precedes
tears himself out of this dead insensibility, and per- that the purposes which we may have in view in our
forms the action without any inclination to it, but actions, or their effects regarded as ends and springs
simply from duty, then first has his action its genu- of the will, cannot give to actions any unconditional
ine moral worth. Further still; if nature has put little or moral worth. In what then can their worth lie,
if it is not to consist in the will and in reference to
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Chapter ❮❮ Deontological Ethics and Immanuel Kant
its expected effect? It cannot lie anywhere but in we call moral can therefore consist in nothing else
the principle of the will without regard to the ends than the conception of law in itself, which certainly
which can be attained by the action. For the will is only possible in a rational being, in so far as this
stands between its a priori principle which is for- conception, and not the expected effect, determines
mal, and its a posteriori spring which is material, the will. This is a good which is already present in the
as between two roads, and as it must be determined person who acts accordingly, and we have not to wait
by something, it follows that it must be determined for it to appear first in the result.3
by the formal principle of volition when an action is
done from duty, in which case every material prin- THE CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE
ciple has been withdrawn from it.
But what sort of law can that be, the conception of
RESPECT FOR THE MORAL LAW which must determine the will, even without pay-
ing any regard to the effect expected from it, in order
The third proposition, which is a consequence of that this will may be called good absolutely and with-
the two preceding, I would express thus: Duty is out qualification? As I have deprived the will of every
the necessity of acting from respect for the law. I impulse which could arise to it from obedience to any
may have inclination for an object as the effect of law, there remains nothing but the universal confor-
my proposed action, but I cannot have respect for mity of its actions to law in general, which alone is to
it, just for this reason, that it is an effect and not serve the will as a principle, i.e., I am never to act oth-
an energy of will. Similarly, I cannot have respect erwise than so that I could also will that my maxim
for inclination, whether my own or another’s; I can should become a universal law. Here now, it is the
at most if my own, approve it; if another’s, some- simple conformity to law in general, without assum-
times even love it; i.e., look on it as favorable to my ing any particular law applicable to certain actions,
own interest. It is only what is connected with my that serves the will as its principle, and must so serve
will as a principle, by no means as an effect—what it, if duty is not to be a vain delusion and a chimeri-
does not subserve my inclination, but overpow- cal notion. The common reason of men in its practi-
ers it, or at least in case of choice excludes it from cal judgments perfectly coincides with this, and always
its calculation—in other words, simply the law of has in view the principle here suggested. Let the ques-
itself, which can be an object of respect, and hence tion be, for example: May I when in distress make a
a command. Now an action done from duty must promise with the intention not to keep it? I readily dis-
wholly exclude the influence of inclination, and with tinguish here between the two significations which the
it every object of the will, so that nothing remains question may have: Whether it is prudent, or whether
which can determine the will except objectively the it is right, to make a false promise. The former may
law, and subjectively pure respect for this practical undoubtedly often be the case. I see clearly indeed
law, and consequently the maxim2 to follow this law that it is not enough to extricate myself from a pres-
even to the thwarting of all my inclinations. ent difficulty by means of this subterfuge, but it must
be well considered whether there may not hereafter
Thus the moral worth of an action does not lie spring from this lie much greater inconvenience than
in the effect expected from it, nor in any principle of that from which I now free myself, and as, with all
action which requires to borrow its motive from this my supposed cunning, the consequences cannot be so
expected effect. For all these effects—agreeableness of easily foreseen but that credit once lost may be much
one’s condition, and even the promotion of the hap- more injurious to me than any mischief which I seek
piness of others—could have been also brought about to avoid at present, it should be considered whether
by other causes, so that for this there would have it would not be more prudent to act herein accord-
been no need of the will of a rational being; it is in ing to a universal maxim, and to make it a habit to
this, however, alone that the supreme and uncondi- promise nothing except with the intention of keeping it.
tional good can be found. The preeminent good which
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PART ONE ❯❯ ETHICAL THEORY
But it is soon clear to me that such a maxim will still respect for the practical law is what constitutes duty,
only be based on the fear of consequences. Now it is to which every other motive must give place, because
a wholly different thing to be truthful from duty, and it is the condition of a will being good in itself, and
to be so from apprehension of injurious consequences. the worth of such a will is above everything.
In the first case, the very notion of the action already
implies a law for me; in the second case, I must first Thus then, without quitting the moral knowl-
look about elsewhere to see what results may be com- edge of common human reason, we have arrived at
bined with it which would affect myself. For to deviate its principle. And although no doubt common men
from the principle of duty is beyond all doubt wicked; do not conceive it in such an abstract and univer-
but to be unfaithful to my maxim of prudence may sal form, yet they always have it really before their
often be very advantageous to me, although to abide eyes, and use it as the standard of their decision . . . .
by it is certainly safer. The shortest way, however, and
an unerring one, to discover the answer to this ques- MORAL AND NONMORAL IMPERATIVES
tion whether a lying promise is consistent with duty,
is to ask myself, Should I be content that my maxim Everything in nature works according to laws.
(to extricate myself from difficulty by a false promise) Rational beings alone have the faculty of acting
should hold good as a universal law, for myself as well according to the conception of laws, that is accord-
as for others? and should I be able to say to myself, ing to principles, i.e., have a will. Since the deduc-
“Every one may make a deceitful promise when he tion of actions from principles requires reason, the
finds himself in a difficulty from which he cannot oth- will is nothing but practical reason. If reason infal-
erwise extricate himself”? Then I presently become libly determines the will, then the actions of such a
aware that while I can will the lie, I can by no means being which are recognised as objectively necessary
will that lying should be a universal law. For with such are subjectively necessary also; i.e., the will is a fac-
a law there would be no promises at all, since it would ulty to choose that only which reason independent
be in vain to allege my intention in regard to my future of inclination recognises as practically necessary,
actions to those who would not believe this allegation, i.e., as good. But if reason of itself does not suffi-
or if they over hastily did so would pay me back in my ciently determine the will, if the latter is subject also
own coin. Hence my maxim, as soon as it should be to subjective conditions (particular impulses) which
made a universal law, would necessarily destroy itself. do not always coincide with the objective conditions;
in a word, if the will does not in itself completely
I do not therefore need any far-reaching penetra- accord with reason (which is actually the case with
tion to discern what I have to do in order that my will men), then the actions which objectively are recog-
may be morally good. Inexperienced in the course of nised as necessary are subjectively contingent, and
the world, incapable of being prepared for all its con- the determination of such a will according to objec-
tingencies, I only ask myself: Canst thou also will that tive laws is obligation, that is to say, the relation of
thy maxim should be a universal law? If not, then it the objective laws to a will that is not thoroughly
must be rejected, and that not because of a disadvan- good, is conceived as the determination of the will
tage accruing from it to myself or even to others, but of a rational being by principles of reason, but which
because it cannot enter as a principle into a possible the will from its nature does not of necessity follow.
universal legislation, and reason extorts from me
immediate respect for such legislation. I do not indeed The conception of an objective principle, in so far
as yet discern on what this respect is based (this the as it is obligatory for a will, is called a command (of
philosopher may inquire), but at least I understand reason), and the formula of the command is called
this, that it is an estimation of the worth which far an Imperative.
outweighs all worth of what is recommended by incli-
nation, and that the necessity of acting from pure All imperatives are expressed by the word ought
(or shall), and thereby indicate the relation of an
objective law of reason to a will, which from its sub-
jective constitution is not necessarily determined by
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Chapter ❮❮ Deontological Ethics and Immanuel Kant
it (an obligation). They say that something would Thus the imperative declares what action possible
be good to do or to forbear, but they say it to a will by me would be good, and presents the practical rule
which does not always do a thing because it is con- in relation to a will which does not forthwith per-
ceived to be good to do it. That is practically good, form an action simply because it is good, whether
however, which determines the will by means of the because the subject does not always know that it is
conceptions of reason, and consequently not from good, or because, even if it know this, yet its max-
subjective causes, but objectively, that is, on princi- ims might be opposed to the objective principles of
ples which are valid for every rational being as such. practical reason.
It is distinguished from the pleasant, as that which
influences the will only by means of sensation from Accordingly the hypothetical imperative only
merely subjective causes, valid only for the sense of says that the action is good for some purpose, pos-
this or that one, and not as a principle of reason, sible or actual. In the first case it is a problematical,
which holds for every one.4 in the second an assertorical practical principle. The
categorical imperative which declares an action to be
A perfectly good will would therefore be equally objectively necessary in itself without reference to
subject to objective laws (viz., of good), but could any purpose, that is, without any other end, is valid
not be conceived as obliged thereby to act lawfully, as an apodictic (practical) principle.
because of itself from its subjective constitution it
can only be determined by the conception of good. Whatever is possible only by the power of some
Therefore no imperatives hold for the Divine will, or rational being may also be conceived as a possible
in general for a holy will; ought is here out of place, purpose of some will; and therefore the principles
because the volition is already of itself necessarily of action as regards the means necessary to attain
in unison with the law. Therefore imperatives are some possible purpose are in fact infinitely numer-
only formulae to express the relation of objective ous. All sciences have a practical part consisting of
laws of all volition to the subjective imperfection problems expressing that some end is possible for us,
of the will of this or that rational being, e.g., the and of imperatives directing how it may be attained.
human will. These may, therefore, be called in general impera-
tives of skill. Here there is no question whether the
Now all imperatives command either hypotheti- end is rational and good, but only what one must do
cally or categorically. The former represent the in order to attain it. The precepts for the physician
practical necessity of a possible action as means to make his patient thoroughly healthy, and for a
to something else that is willed (or at least which poisoner to ensure certain death, are of equal value
one might possibly will). The categorical imperative in this respect, that each serves to effect its purpose
would be that which represented an action as neces- perfectly. Since in early youth it cannot be known
sary of itself without reference to another end, that what ends are likely to occur to us in the course
is, as objectively necessary. of life, parents seek to have their children taught a
great many things, and provide for their skill in the
Since every practical law represents a possible use of means for all sorts of arbitrary ends, of none
action as good, and on this account, for a subject of which can they determine whether it may not per-
who is practically determinable by reason as neces- haps hereafter be an object to their pupil, but which
sary, all imperatives are formulae determining an it is at all events possible that he might aim at; and
action which is necessary according to the principle this anxiety is so great that they commonly neglect
of a will good in some respects. If now the action is to form and correct their judgment on the value of
good only as a means to something else, then the the things which may be chosen as ends.
imperative is hypothetical; if it is conceived as good
in itself and consequently as being necessarily the There is one end, however, which may be
principle of a will which of itself conforms to reason, assumed to be actually such to all rational beings (so
then it is categorical. far as imperatives apply to them, viz., as dependent
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PART ONE ❯❯ ETHICAL THEORY
beings), and, therefore, one purpose which they not the first kind of imperatives technical (belonging to
merely may have, but which we may with certainty art), the second pragmatic6 (belonging to welfare),
assume that they all actually have by a natural the third moral (belonging to free conduct generally,
necessity, and this is happiness. The hypothetical that is, to morals).
imperative which expresses the practical necessity of
an action as means to the advancement of happiness Now arises the question, how are all these imper-
is assertorical. We are not to present it as necessary atives possible? This question does not seek to know
for an uncertain and merely possible purpose, but how we can conceive the accomplishment of the
for a purpose which we may presuppose with cer- action which the imperative ordains, but merely how
tainty and a priori in every man, because it belongs we can conceive the obligation of the will which
to his being. Now skill in the choice of means to his the imperative expresses. No special explanation is
own greatest well-being may be called prudence,5 in needed to show how an imperative of skill is pos-
the narrowest sense. And thus the imperative which sible. Whoever wills the end wills also (so far as
refers to the choice of means to one’s own happi- reason decides his conduct) the means in his power
ness, that is, the precept of prudence, is still always which are indispensably necessary thereto . . . .
hypothetical; the action is not commanded abso-
lutely, but only as means to another purpose. We shall therefore have to investigate a priori the
possibility of a categorical imperative, as we have
Finally, there is an imperative which commands not in this case the advantage of its reality being
a certain conduct immediately, without having as its given in experience, so that (the elucidation of) its
condition any other purpose to be attained by it. This possibility should be requisite only for its explana-
imperative is categorical. It concerns not the matter tion, not for its establishment. In the meantime it
of the action, or its intended result, but its form and may be discerned beforehand that the categorical
the principle of which it is itself a result; and what imperative alone has the purport of a practical law;
is essentially good in it consists in the mental dis- all the rest may indeed be called principles of the will
position, let the consequence be what it may. This but not laws, since whatever is only necessary for
imperative may be called that of morality. the attainment of some arbitrary purpose may be
considered as in itself contingent, and we can at any
There is a marked distinction also between the time be free from the precept if we give up the pur-
volitions on these three sorts of principles in the dis- pose; on the contrary, the unconditional command
similarity of the obligation of the will. In order to leaves the will no liberty to choose the opposite,
mark this difference more clearly, I think they would consequently it alone carries with it that necessity
be most suitably named in their order if we said they which we require in a law . . . .
are either rules of skill, or counsels of prudence, or
commands (laws) of morality. For it is law only that In this problem we will first inquire whether the
involves the conception of an unconditional and mere conception of a categorical imperative may
objective necessity, which is consequently univer- not perhaps supply us also with the formula of it,
sally valid; and commands are laws which must be containing the proposition which alone can be a cat-
obeyed, that is, must be followed, even in opposi- egorical imperative; for even if we know the tenor
tion to inclination. Counsels, indeed, involve neces- of such an absolute command, yet how it is possi-
sity, but one which can only hold under a contingent ble will require further special and laborious study;
subjective condition, viz., they depend on whether which we postpone to the last section.
this or that man reckons this or that as part of his
happiness; the categorical imperative, on the con- When I conceive a hypothetical imperative in
trary, is not limited by any condition, and as being general, I do not know before hand what it will con-
absolutely, although practically, necessary may be tain, until I am given the condition. But when I con-
quite properly called a command. We might also call ceive a categorical imperative I know at once what it
contains. For as the imperative contains, besides the
law, only the necessity of the maxim7 conforming to
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Chapter ❮❮ Deontological Ethics and Immanuel Kant
this law, while the law contains no condition restrict- 2. Another finds himself forced by necessity to
ing it, there remains nothing but the general state- borrow money. He knows that he will not be able
ment that the maxim of the action should conform to repay it, but sees also that nothing will be lent
to a universal law, and it is this conformity alone to him, unless he promises stoutly to repay it in a
that the imperative properly represents as necessary. definite time. He desires to make this promise, but
he has still so much conscience as to ask himself:
There is therefore but one categorical imperative, Is it not unlawful and inconsistent with duty to
namely this: Act only on that maxim whereby thou get out of a difficulty in this way? Suppose how-
canst at the same time will that it should become a ever that he resolves to do so: then the maxim of
universal law. his action would be expressed thus: When I think
myself in want of money, I will borrow money and
Now if all imperatives of duty can be deduced promise to repay it, although I know that I never
from this one imperative as from their principle, then can do so. Now this principle of self-love or of one’s
although it should remain undecided whether what own advantage may perhaps be consistent with my
is called duty is not merely a vain notion, yet at whole future welfare; but the question now is, Is it
least we shall be able to show what we understand right? I change then the suggestion of self-love into
by it and what this notion means. a universal law, and state the question thus: How
would it be if my maxim were a universal law? Then
APPLYING THE CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE I see at once that it could never hold as a universal
law of nature, but would necessarily contradict itself.
Since the universality of the law according to which For supposing it to be a universal law that every
effects are produced constitutes what is properly called one when he thinks himself in a difficulty should be
nature in the most general sense (as to form), that is able to promise whatever he pleases, with the pur-
the existence of things so far as it is determined by pose of not keeping his promise, the promise itself
general laws, the imperative of duty may be expressed would become impossible, as well as the end that
thus: Act as if the maxim of thy action were to become one might have in view in it, since no one would
by thy will a Universal Law of Nature. consider that anything was promised to him, and
would ridicule all such statements as vain pretences.
We will now enumerate a few duties, adopting
the usual division of them into duties to ourselves 3. A third finds in himself a talent which with the
and to others, and into perfect and imperfect duties.8 help of some culture might make him a useful man
in many respects. But he finds himself in comfort-
1. A man reduced to despair by a series of misfor- able circumstances, and prefers to indulge in pleasure
tunes feels wearied of life, but is still so far in posses- rather than to take pains in enlarging and improv-
sion of his reason that he can ask himself whether it ing his happy natural capacities. He asks, however,
would not be contrary to his duty to himself to take whether his maxim of neglect of his natural gifts,
his own life. Now he inquires whether the maxim of besides agreeing with his inclination to indulgence,
his action could become a universal law of nature. agrees also with what is called duty. He sees then
His maxim is: From self-love I adopt it as a principle that a system of nature could indeed subsist with
to shorten my life when its longer duration is likely such a universal law, though men (like the South Sea
to bring more evil than satisfaction. It is asked then islanders) should let their talents rust, and resolve
simply whether this principle of self-love can become to devote their lives merely to idleness, amusement,
a universal law of nature. Now we see at once that a and propagation of their species, in a word to enjoy-
system of nature of which it should be a law to destroy ment; but he cannot possibly will that this should be
life by the very feeling which is designed to impel to a universal law of nature, or be implanted in us as
the maintenance of life would contradict itself, and such by a natural instinct. For, as a rational being, he
therefore could not exist as a system of nature; hence
that maxim cannot possibly exist as a universal law of
nature and consequently would be wholly inconsistent
with the supreme principle of all duty.
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PART ONE ❯❯ ETHICAL THEORY
necessarily wills that his faculties be developed, since If now we attend to ourselves on occasion of any
they serve him for all sorts of possible purposes, and transgression of duty, we shall find that we in fact
have been given him for this. do not will that our maxim should be a universal
law, for that it is impossible for us; on the contrary
4. A fourth, who is in prosperity, while he sees that we will that the opposite should remain a universal
others have to contend with great wretchedness and law, only we assume the liberty of making an excep-
that he could help them, thinks: What concern is it of tion in our own favour or (just for this time only) in
mine? Let every one be as happy as heaven pleases favour of our inclination . . . .
or as he can make himself; I will take nothing from
him nor even envy him, only I do not wish to contrib- The will is conceived as a faculty of determining
ute anything either to his welfare or to his assistance oneself to action in accordance with the conception
in distress! Now no doubt if such a mode of thinking of certain laws. And such a faculty can be found
were a universal law, the human race might very well only in rational beings. Now that which serves the
subsist, and doubtless even better than in a state in will as the objective ground of its self-determination
which every one talks of sympathy and good will, or is the end, and if this is assigned by reason alone,
even takes care occasionally to put it into practice, but it must hold for all rational beings. On the other
on the other side, also cheats when he can, betrays the hand, that which merely contains the ground of pos-
rights of men or otherwise violates them. But although sibility of the action of which the effect is the end,
it is possible that a universal law of nature might exist this is called the means. The subjective ground of
in accordance with that maxim, it is impossible to will the desire is the spring, the objective ground of the
that such a principle should have the universal validity volition is the motive; hence the distinction between
of a law of nature. For a will which resolved this would subjective ends which rest on springs, and objec-
contradict itself, inasmuch as many cases might occur tive ends which depend on motives that hold for
in which one would have need of the love and sympa- every rational being. Practical principles are formal
thy of others, and in which by such a law of nature, when they abstract from all subjective ends, they
sprung from his own will, he would deprive himself of are material when they assume these, and therefore
all hope of the aid he desires. particular springs of action. The ends which a ratio-
nal being proposes to himself at pleasure as effects
These are a few of the many actual duties, or at of his actions (material ends) are all only relative,
least what we regard as such, which obviously fall for it is only their relation to the particular desires of
into two classes on the one principle that we have the subject that gives them their worth, which there-
laid down. We must be able to will that a maxim fore cannot furnish principles universal and neces-
of our action should be a universal law. This is the sary for all rational beings and for every volition,
canon of the moral appreciation of the action gener- that is to say practical laws. Hence all these relative
ally. Some actions are of such a character, that their ends can give rise only to hypothetical imperatives.
maxim cannot without contradiction be even con-
ceived as a universal law of nature, far from it being PERSONS AS ENDS
possible that we should will that it should be so. In
others this intrinsic impossibility is not found, but Supposing, however, that there were something
still it is impossible to will that their maxim should whose existence has in itself an absolute worth,
be raised to the universality of a law of nature, since something which being an end in itself, could
such a will would contradict itself. It is easily seen be a source of definite laws, then in this and this
that the former violate strict or rigorous (inflexible) alone would lie the source of a possible categorical
duty; the latter only laxer (meritorious) duty. Thus it imperative, i.e., a practical law. Now I say, man and
has been completely shown how all duties depend as generally any rational being exists as an end in him-
regards the nature of the obligation (not the object of self, not merely as a means to be arbitrarily used
the action) on the same principle. by this or that will, but in all his actions, whether
Copyright 2018 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part. WCN 02-200-202
Chapter ❮❮ Deontological Ethics and Immanuel Kant
they concern himself or other rational beings, must deduced. Accordingly the practical imperative will be
always be regarded at the same time as an end. All as follows: So act as to treat humanity, whether in
objects of the inclinations have only a conditional thine own person or in that of any other, in every
worth, for if the inclinations and the wants founded case as an end withal, never as a means only . . . .
on them did not exist, then their object would be
without value. But the inclinations themselves being We will now inquire whether this can be practi-
sources of want, are so far from having an abso- cally carried out.
lute worth for which they should be desired, that on
the contrary it must be the universal wish of every To abide by the previous examples:
rational being to be wholly free from them. Thus First, under the head of necessary duty to oneself:
the worth of any object which is to be acquired He who contemplates suicide should ask himself
by our action is always conditional. Beings whose whether his action can be consistent with the idea
existence depends not on our will but on nature’s, of humanity as an end in itself. If he destroys him-
have nevertheless, if they are irrational beings, only self in order to escape from painful circumstances,
a relative value as means, and are therefore called he uses a person merely as a means to maintain a
things; rational beings on the contrary, are called tolerable condition up to the end of life. But a man
persons, because their very nature points them out is not a thing, that is to say, something which can
as ends in themselves, that is as something which be used merely as means, but must in all his actions
must not be used merely as means, and so far there- be always considered as an end in himself. I cannot,
fore restricts freedom of action (and is an object of therefore, dispose in any way of a man in my own
respect). These, therefore, are not merely subjec- person so as to mutilate him, to damage or kill him.
tive ends whose existence has a worth for us as an (It belongs to ethics proper to define this principle
effect of our action, but objective ends, that is things more precisely, so as to avoid all misunderstanding,
whose existence is an end in itself; an end moreover for example, as to the amputation of the limbs in
for which no other can be substituted, which they order to preserve myself; as to exposing my life to
should subserve merely as means, for otherwise danger with a view to preserve it, etc. This question
nothing whatever would possess absolute worth; is therefore omitted here.)
but if all worth were conditioned and therefore con- Secondly, as regards necessary duties, or those of
tingent, then there would be no supreme practical strict obligation, towards others: He who is think-
principle of reason whatever. ing of making a lying promise to others will see at
once that he would be using another man merely as
If then there is a supreme practical principle or, a means, without the latter containing at the same
in respect of the human will, a categorical impera- time the end in himself. For he whom I propose by
tive, it must be one which, drawn from the concep- such a promise to use for my own purposes cannot
tion of that which is necessarily an end for every one possibly assent to my mode of acting towards him,
because it is an end in itself, constitutes an objective and therefore cannot himself contain the end of this
principle of will, and can therefore serve as a univer- action. This violation of the principle of humanity in
sal practical law. The foundation of this principle is: other men is more obvious if we take in examples of
rational nature exists as an end in itself. Man nec- attacks on the freedom and property of others. For
essarily conceives his own existence as being so; then it is clear that he who transgresses the rights
so far then, this is a subjective principle of human of men intends to use the person of others merely as
actions. But every other rational being regards its means, without considering that as rational beings
existence similarly, just on the same rational principle they ought always to be esteemed also as ends, that
that holds for me:9 so that it is at the same time an is, as beings who must be capable of containing in
objective principle, from which as a supreme practi- themselves the end of the very same action.10
cal law all laws of the will must be capable of being Thirdly, as regards contingent (meritorious)
duties to oneself: It is not enough that the action
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