PART TWO ❯❯ ETHICAL ISSUES
In recent years, there have been around one the woman has been raped or there is fetal impair-
million abortions performed annually in the United ment (21 percent of the world’s population).19
States, with the abortion rate slowly declining from There are more than 40 million abortions performed
a high in the 1980s. According to the Guttmacher each year around the world. Of these, 21.6 million
Institute, each year approximately two out of every are deemed unsafe—the vast majority in countries
hundred women aged fifteen to forty-four have an where abortion is illegal or highly restricted. Accord-
abortion. Half have had at least one previous abor- ing to the World Health Organization, “deaths due
tion. Eighteen percent of women obtaining abortions to unsafe abortion remain close to 13 percent of
are teenagers younger than twenty. Women in their all maternal deaths,” with forty-seven thousand
twenties account for more than 50 percent of abor- women dying each year from complications of
tions.12 African American women are five times as unsafe abortions.20
likely as white women to have an abortion, and His-
panic women are twice as likely as whites to have In China, abortion has been used as a means of
the procedure.13 One cause of this higher rate may population control in tandem with a general policy
be cuts to family planning funding in recent years, of encouraging one child per family. While this pol-
resulting in, among other things, reduced contracep- icy has recently (2015) been relaxed, in some cases,
tive use, especially among poor women.14 New York women were forced to have abortions when they
Times columnist Nicholas Kristof argues, “The cost could not pay the fine for having more than one
of birth control is one reason poor women are more child.21 This has resulted in a strange demographic
than three times as likely to end up pregnant unin- phenomenon because of Chinese parents’ prefer-
tentionally as middle-class women.”15 Indeed, 42 ences for boys (who are expected to financially sup-
percent of women who have abortions have incomes port their parents in old age). According to a study
below the federal poverty line. In terms of claimed published in 2009, the ratio of boys to girls in China
religious affiliation, 37 percent are Protestant and 28 was 120 to 100. (Among families’ second births—
percent are Catholic.16 A 2004 study reported that which were often permitted only if the first child
among the reasons that women cite for choosing an was a girl—the ratio is 143 to 100.22) This means
abortion are the following: that for children under twenty, there were thirty-two
million more boys than girls. Since the widespread
• Having a child would dramatically change their availability of ultrasound scanners in the 1990s,
lives, their ability to continue with school or work, many potential parents have chosen to terminate
or their ability to care for others (74 percent). their pregnancies if the fetus was female. This prac-
tice was less prevalent in larger cities, where women
• They could not afford children (73 percent). have a higher status.23
• They did not want to become single mothers
Similar problems have occurred in India, where
(48 percent). the ratio of boys to girls is 1,000 to 914.24 And a
• They were finished having children (38 percent). recent report indicates that immigrant communities
• Health problems of either fetus or mother in Europe and the United Kingdom also practice sex-
selective abortion.25 This practice—in which par-
(12 percent).17 ents choose to terminate a pregnancy based solely
on the fetus’s sex—is illegal in some countries.
Around the world, abortion is permitted with- There is currently no such restriction on a national
out restriction as to reason in fifty-six countries level in the United States, although American law-
(39 percent of the world’s population) and is com- makers have considered bills that would ban the
pletely illegal in thirty-two countries, with no practice (for example, the Prenatal Nondiscrimi-
exception for rape or to save the life of the woman nation Act).26 Eight American states have bans
(6 percent of the world’s population).18 Thirty-six on sex-selective abortion. States have considered
countries allow abortion only to save the life of
the mother or in exceptional cases, such as when
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Chapter ❮❮ Abortion
outlawing sex-selective abortion, abortions based on that they based upon ideas found in Aristotle and
race, and abortions based on genetic abnormalities in the Bible—a point that was noted in a footnote
in the fetus, such as Down Syndrome.27 Like many to the Roe v. Wade decision.29 It was not until 1869
of the other recent state-level abortion bills, the ulti- that Pope Pius IX decreed that the embryo’s soul
mate constitutional status of this legislation remains was present from conception, declaring abortion
unclear. to be a sin.30 Indeed, for much of Western history
and in British Common Law, abortion before the
ABORTION AND THE LAW quickening of the fetus (at twelve to sixteen weeks)
was legal and not considered immoral.31 Nor was it
Much of the contemporary debate about abortion always illegal in the United States before the 1970s.
is concerned with whether the law ought to permit As U.S. Supreme Court Justice Blackmun notes in the
abortion and, if so, what, if any, legal regulations Roe v. Wade opinion, “At the time of the adoption of
ought to be placed on it. The relationship between our Constitution, and throughout the major portion
morality and the law is often ignored in these of the 19th century, abortion was viewed with less
debates. Sometimes, it is assumed that if abortion is disfavor than under most American statutes cur-
immoral, it ought to be illegal just for that reason, rently in effect.”32
or if it is morally permissible, it therefore ought to
be legally permissible. As noted in Chapter 10 on In the first half of the twentieth century, most
euthanasia, this equivalence between morality and U.S. states passed laws regulating or making abor-
the law is questionable. We can think of actions that tion illegal, except in certain cases such as a preg-
are possibly immoral but that we would not want to nancy resulting from rape or incest or when the
be legally prohibited. For example, I may wrongly pregnant woman’s life or health was threatened.
waste my talents, but I would not want the law to However, women continued to have abortions ille-
force me to develop and use them. However, many gally and under dangerous conditions. (The most
of our laws, such as civil rights laws, are grounded notorious of these “back alley” abortion methods
in moral reasons. The profound questions about involved the use of a coat hanger to scrape the
what the law should and should not do are bound up uterine lining, which became a symbol used by the
with an entire philosophy of law. Because this is an movement to legalize abortion.) In the early 1970s,
ethics text, we will not be able to explore such ques- a pregnant woman from Texas, who was given
tions here. Nevertheless, as we review the consti- the fictitious name Jane Roe, challenged the state’s
tutional and legislative status of abortion (primarily abortion law, which allowed the procedure only to
in the United States), we should pay close attention save the life of the mother. This case, which became
to the moral reasons claimed for various positions in known as Roe v. Wade, made its way to the U.S.
the debate and the appeals made to rights and other Supreme Court, which ruled in favor of Jane Roe in
moral values. 1973. In the majority opinion, the Court concluded
that no state may ban abortion before the time of
It may be surprising to discover that abortion fetal viability based on a fundamental “right to pri-
was not always prohibited or condemned by many vacy” grounded in the Constitution, chiefly in the
of the authorities that are now most emphatically liberty and due process clauses of the Fourteenth
opposed to it, including the Roman Catholic Church. Amendment. The term privacy here does not refer to
Following the teachings of Augustine and Aquinas, matters that must be kept secret or to what goes on
the Church held that the fetus was not human until in one’s own home, but to a basic liberty, a freedom
sometime after conception when the matter was suit- from restraint in decisions about how to live and
able for the reception of a human soul.28 For exam- enjoy one’s life.33
ple, the Church fathers held that the soul did not
enter the fetus until forty days of gestation for males However, the Court noted that the state did have
and eighty or ninety days for females, a calculation some interest in protecting maternal health as well
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PART TWO ❯❯ ETHICAL ISSUES
as what it called the “potential life” of the fetus. upheld those rights as a matter of liberty and “per-
(Note that the phrase is not especially illuminating sonal autonomy.” While the Court concluded that
because most people do not deny that the fetus is states could impose such restrictions as twenty-
actually alive.) In the case of maternal health, this four-hour waiting periods and parental or state con-
interest becomes “compelling” only after the first sent requirements (for minors seeking abortions),
trimester (or third month) of pregnancy and allows they must not place an undue burden on women in
for some degree of health-related regulation. In the the exercise of their constitutional right to privacy.
case of the fetus’s “potential life,” the right to pri- This means that state laws may not create “sub-
vacy was said not to be absolute but limited, due to stantial obstacles” for women who seek to have
state or social interests that become compelling at abortions, such as the requirement that they first
the point of fetal viability. The ruling was thus based get consent from their spouses—a regulation the
on the trimester formula and concluded that: Court rejected.35
1. from approximately the end of the first trimester, Since 1992, many abortion-related legal deci-
state laws could regulate the medical safety of sions have involved the undue burden standard.
abortion procedures; In 2007, in Gonzalez v. Carhart, the U.S. Supreme
Court upheld, by a vote of five to four, a federal law
2. before the time of viability, about the end of the banning so-called “partial birth abortion” or “intact
second trimester (the sixth month), the abortion dilation and extraction.” It held that this law did not
decision should be left up to the pregnant woman impose “an undue burden on women’s exercise of
and her doctor; and their right to end a pregnancy.” The majority opinion
concluded that there were alternatives to this proce-
3. from the time of viability on, states could pro- dure and that the law enacted by Congress reflected
hibit abortion except in those cases in which the the government’s “legitimate, substantial interest
continued pregnancy would endanger the life or in preserving and promoting fetal life.”36 The deci-
health of the pregnant woman.34 sion raised controversy, however, because the law it
upheld allowed exceptions to protect a woman’s life,
While the trimester formula is considered to be but not her health. Some physicians and other critics
a rough guide to the legal status of abortion, the of the measure argued that the procedure is “often
U.S. Supreme Court has handed down several other the safest to use late in the pregnancy because it
abortion-related decisions that have altered this minimizes the chances of injury to the uterus” and
original formulation. Most important, in Casey v. was thus deemed appropriate for certain cases by
Planned Parenthood (1992), the Court rejected the the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecolo-
trimester formula and simply maintained that states gists.37 Other critics have challenged parental con-
could not ban abortion before the point of viability. sent laws as placing an undue burden on minors
(Advances in medical science had already shifted seeking abortions (especially in cases of incest) and
the point at which fetal viability was possible.) It pointed to the Court’s ruling in Planned Parenthood
also reiterated the state’s compelling interest in of Kansas City v. Ashcroft (1983) that such laws
protecting life after the point of viability. Nonethe- must offer a “judicial alternative” whereby a judge
less, the Court affirmed the basic decision in Roe can overrule parental refusals.38
v. Wade. Citing the importance of a legal precedent
on which citizens have come to depend and the As we noted at the beginning of this chapter, the
absence of significant factual or legal developments, past decade has witnessed an increasing number of
the Court again ruled in favor of a constitutional legal efforts to restrict abortion based on a number of
right to privacy and abortion. The majority opin- different criteria. In 2010, for example, the governor
ion also commented on the essential relationship of Nebraska signed into law a statute “banning most
of abortion rights to the “capacity of women to act abortions 20 weeks after conception or later on the
in society and to make reproductive decisions” and
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Chapter ❮❮ Abortion
theory that a fetus by that stage in pregnancy has of their expectant mothers in the use of alcohol bev-
the capacity to feel pain.”39 An increasing number of erages, controlled substances or controlled substance
state legislatures and referenda have also sought to analogs, exhibited to a severe degree.”42 Should a
establish full legal “personhood” beginning at con- state be able to prevent a mother from continuing
ception. Other states are in the process of enacting drug use during pregnancy by having her com-
fetal “heartbeat” laws, some of which would require mitted, against her will, to a rehab facility? Many
that women seeking abortions undergo transvagi- abortion rights supporters see such policies as with-
nal ultrasounds to detect fetal heartbeat. This last holding from women the rights of autonomy and
requirement has generated a particularly intense personal liberty that are granted to men. Those who
controversy. Antiabortion advocates support the condemn abortion, on the other hand, typically sup-
requirement based on their belief that if a woman port these measures.
views the fetus on an ultrasound, she will mostly
likely decide against abortion; while women’s rights In recent years, abortion opponents have worked
advocates have called state-mandated transvaginal to find other legal ways to restrict access to abortion.
ultrasounds a form of “medical rape.”40 Meanwhile, Consider what happened in Wichita, Kansas, after
the evidence appears to show that there is very little Dr. George Tiller was murdered. His clinic, the state’s
correlation between ultrasound viewing and wom- only abortion clinic outside of Kansas City, closed
en’s choice to abort.41 after his death in 2009. In 2013, a former employee
attempted to reopen the clinic but faced legal chal-
Questions have also been raised about the new lenges and local lobbying efforts, including attempts
“feticide” laws now enacted in more than half of to change zoning and taxation rules.43 The clinic
U.S. states. These are laws that make it a crime to reopened. But throughout the country, abortion pro-
cause harm to a fetus. Thus, someone who attacks a viders and clinics are facing similar legal challenges
pregnant woman and kills the fetus that she wanted and restrictions, effectively blocking access to abor-
to carry to term can be found guilty of murder or tion in large portions of many states. For example,
manslaughter. States differ in how they classify the laws in some states require doctors to have admit-
crime, whether as “feticide” or under general man- ting privileges at local hospitals, which frequently
slaughter or murder laws. It may seem contradictory refuse them to avoid controversy. Other laws require
that a woman can end a fetus’s life through abor- abortion clinics to adhere to architectural standards
tion but a third party who kills a fetus she wanted that apply to hospitals. And in some states insur-
may be guilty of murder. Some have said that the ance plans are prohibited from paying for abortion.
difference is between a person who exercises a A Bloomberg report from 2016 summarized the
“reproductive choice” and another person who does impact of this piecemeal approach to abortion reg-
not. Further questions are raised by state laws that ulation, concluding that “since 2011, at least 162
seek to protect fetal life from harmful actions of the abortion providers have shut or stopped offering the
pregnant woman herself, such as ingesting drugs procedure, while just 21 opened. At no time since
or alcohol. She could be punished if her fetus is before 1973, when the U.S. Supreme Court legal-
born harmed, but not if she aborts the fetus. And ized abortion, has a woman’s ability to terminate a
in some jurisdictions, the state can commit a preg- pregnancy been more dependent on her zip code or
nant woman who has drug or alcohol problems with financial resources to travel.”44
the goal of defending the health of the unborn child.
For example, a law in Wisconsin states that “unborn Recent Supreme Court decisions on abortion have
children have certain basic needs which must be not been unanimous. This indicates the difficulty
provided for, including the need to develop physi- of balancing concerns for the various moral values
cally to their potential and the need to be free from involved. In doing so, however, these decisions have
physical harm due to the habitual lack of self-control made neither side in the abortion debate particularly
happy. On the one hand, they stress the values of
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PART TWO ❯❯ ETHICAL ISSUES
privacy, liberty, and equal opportunity; on the other ARGUMENTS THAT DO NOT DEPEND ON
hand, they conclude that some recognition ought to THE MORAL STATUS OF THE FETUS
be given to the origins of human life. Because these
are moral values reflected in the law, some of the First, we will consider arguments for which the
issues surrounding the morality of abortion will be moral status of the fetus is irrelevant. These argu-
relevant to what we think the law should or should ments are typically either based on utilitarian rea-
not do. In what follows, however, we will concen- soning or on claims about the rights of persons.
trate on the underlying moral issues that typically
frame the abortion debate. Utilitarian Reasoning
ABORTION: THE MORAL QUESTION Many arguments that focus on something other
than the moral status of the fetus are consequen-
Although many people have argued that abortion is tialist in nature and broadly utilitarian. Arguments
a private decision that ought not to be a matter of for abortion often cite the bad consequences that
law, it is much more difficult to make the case that may result from a continued pregnancy—for exam-
abortion is not a moral matter at all. After all, abor- ple, the loss of a job or other opportunities for the
tion involves questions about rights, happiness, and pregnant woman, the suffering of the future child,
well-being, as well as the status and value of human the burden of caring for the child under difficult cir-
life. If these things are morally relevant, then abor- cumstances, and so on. Some utilitarian arguments
tion is a moral matter. This is not to say that abor- against abortion also cite the loss of potential hap-
tion is good, bad, or neutral, but simply that it is piness and future social contributions of the being
morally important. who is aborted.
The moral status of abortion also may have rel- According to act utilitarian reasoning, each case
evance for how we approach fetal research. For or action stands on its own, so to speak. Its own
example, promising studies have shown that embry- consequences determine whether it is good or bad,
onic stem cells (taken from human blastocysts) as better or worse than other alternatives. Act utilitari-
well as tissue from aborted fetuses might be used ans believe that the people making the abortion deci-
for treatments for diseases, such as Parkinson’s dis- sion must consider the likely consequences of the
ease, and to regenerate damaged organs and tissues. alternative actions—in other words, having or not
These issues are discussed further in Chapter 18. having an abortion (as well as such considerations
as where and when these events might occur).
In considering the morality of abortion, we can Among the kinds of consequences to consider are
distinguish two types of arguments both for and health risks and benefits, positive or negative men-
against abortion: (1) arguments for which the moral tal or psychological consequences, and financial and
status of the fetus is irrelevant, and (2) arguments social results of the alternative choices. For example,
for which it is relevant. One might suppose that all a pregnant woman should consider questions such
arguments regarding abortion hinge on the moral as these: What would be the effect on her of hav-
status of the fetus, but this is not the case. As we ing the child versus ending the pregnancy? What are
will see, when we use the phrase “moral status of the consequences to any others affected? Would the
the fetus,” we refer to questions about whether the child, if born, be likely to have a happy or unhappy
fetus is a human being or a person and whether the life, and how would one determine this? How would
fetus has inherent value or any rights, including a an abortion or the child’s birth affect her family,
right to life. We look first at arguments that do not other children, the father, the grandparents, and
concern themselves with these questions. As you so on?
examine these arguments, you may find that one or
another seems more valid or reasonable to you. Notice that the issue of whether the fetus (in the
sense we are using it here) is a person or a human
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Chapter ❮❮ Abortion
being is not among the things to consider when In any case, some critics of the utilitarian
arguing from this type of consequentialist perspec- approach would argue that the moral status of the
tive. Abortion at a later stage of pregnancy might fetus, such as whether it is the kind of being that has
have different effects on people than at an earlier a right to life, is, in fact, essential to moral decisions
stage, and it might also have different effects on the about abortion. Others would insist that we address
fetus in terms of whether it might experience pain. the matter of the rights of the pregnant woman
It is the effects on the mother, the fetus, the poten- (or others) and the problem of conflicts of rights.
tial child, and others that count in utilitarian think-
ing, not the moral status of the fetus (what kind of Some Rights Arguments
value it has) or its ontological status (i.e., what kind
of being we say it is). Also notice that on utilitar- Some arguments about abortion consider the rights
ian or consequentialist grounds, abortion sometimes of persons but still maintain that the moral status
would be permissible (the morally right thing to do) of the fetus is irrelevant. It is irrelevant in the sense
and sometimes not; it would depend on the con- that whether or not we think of the fetus as a per-
sequences of the various sorts noted earlier. Moral son with full moral rights is not crucial for decisions
judgments about abortion will be better or worse, about the morality of abortion. An influential article
according to this view, depending on the adequacy on abortion by Judith Jarvis Thomson—an excerpt of
of the prediction of consequences. which appears at the end of this chapter—presents
such an argument. Thomson assumes, for the pur-
Critics of utilitarian reasoning generally object to pose of argument, that the fetus is a person from
its seeming disregard of rights. They may point out early on in pregnancy. But her conclusion is that
that if we do not take the right to life seriously, then abortion is still justified, even if the fetus is a person
utilitarian reasoning may condone the taking of any with a right to life (and she assumes it is also per-
life if the overall consequences of doing so are good. missible if the fetus is not a person).45 This is why
A utilitarian may respond by appealing to the idea the argument does not turn on what we say about
of rule utilitarianism. A rule utilitarian must consider the moral status of the fetus.
which practice regarding abortion would be best.
Would the rule “No one should have an abortion” The question Thomson poses is whether the
be likely to maximize happiness? Would the rule pregnant woman has an obligation to sustain the life
“No one should have an abortion unless the preg- of the fetus by providing it with the use of her body.
nancy threatens the mother’s health or well-being” To have us think about this, she asks us to consider
have better consequences overall? What about a rule an imaginary scenario. Suppose, she says, that you
that says “Persons who are in situations x, y, or z wake up one morning and find yourself attached
should be allowed to have abortions”? How would through various medical tubes and devices to a
easy access to abortion affect our regard for the very famous violinist. You find out that during the night,
young? How would the practice of abortion when you have been kidnapped and “hooked up” to this
the fetus has certain abnormalities affect our treat- violinist by a group of classical music enthusiasts.
ment of the physically or mentally disabled, in gen- The violinist has severe kidney problems, and the
eral? How would a restrictive abortion policy affect only way that his life can be saved is through being
women’s health as well as their ability to participate so attached to another person—so that the other per-
as equal human beings, enjoying jobs and other son’s kidneys will do the work of purifying his blood
opportunities? Whichever practice or rule is likely to for some fixed period of months, until his own kid-
have the better net result—that is, more good conse- neys have recovered. The question Thomson poses
quences and fewer bad ones—is the best practice or is this: Would you be morally permitted or justified
rule to follow. in “unplugging” the violinist, even though doing so
would result in his death? Thomson argues that you
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PART TWO ❯❯ ETHICAL ISSUES
would be justified, in particular because you have ARGUMENTS THAT DEPEND ON THE
not consented to devote your body and your time to MORAL STATUS OF THE FETUS
saving the violinist’s life. She goes on to argue that
this example has an analogy to abortion, most obvi- Abortion arguments that emphasize the moral status
ously in cases of pregnancy due to rape. of the fetus are concerned with a broad range of eth-
ical issues. They ask such questions as: Is the fetus
However, Thomson means her argument to apply a human being? A person? Alive? For the moment,
more widely, and she uses other analogies to help let us focus not on these terms and what they might
make her point. One would only have a responsibil- mean, but on an even more fundamental question,
ity to save the violinist (or nurture the fetus) if one namely, what kind of value or moral status does
had agreed to do so. The consent that Thomson has the developing fetus have? Does it have a different
in mind is a deliberate and planned choice. She moral status in various stages of development? If so,
argues that although it would be generous of you to when does the status change, and why? (Further
save the life of the violinist (or the fetus), you are questions may include how to weigh its value or
not obligated to do so. Her point is that no one has a rights in comparison to other values or the rights of
right to use your body, even to save his or her own others.) At bottom, these questions point toward the
life, unless you give him or her that right. Such ontological and moral status of the fetus. Ontology
views are consistent with a position that insists that means “theory of being,” so the ontological question
women are persons and have the same right to asks what sort of being the fetus is (whether it is
bodily integrity as men do. As persons, they ought merely a part of its mother or whether it is a unique
not to be used against their will for whatever pur- and distinct being and so on). The ontological ques-
poses by others, even noble purposes such as the tion is connected to the moral question of the moral
nurturing of children. Critics of this argument point status of the being. What we want to know is both
out that it may apply at most to abortion in cases of what kind of a being the fetus is and what sort of
rape, for in some other cases, one might be said to value that kind of being has.
implicitly consent to a pregnancy if one did what
one knew might result in it. One response to this is To begin to answer these questions, we will
that we do not always consider a person to have examine an initial approach to the value of the
consented to chance consequences of their actions. fetus and call it “Method I,” to distinguish it from a
Thomson argues that, in the end, it is the woman’s broader approach we will term “Method II.” Briefly
right to choose whether to allow her body to be used put, Method I focuses on the characteristics of the
or not—in the case of rape or in other cases of acci- fetus and asks when it has characteristics suffi-
dental pregnancy. ciently significant to classify it as a person, who is
worthy of our moral concern. Method II asks a more
For more chapter resources and general question. It asks us to think about what kind
activities, go to MindTap. of beings of any sort, human or nonhuman, have
some special moral status or rights, such as a right
Rights-based and utilitarian arguments are exam- to life.
ples of positions on abortion that do not depend on
what we say about the moral status of the fetus, but Method I
other arguments hold this issue to be crucial. Some
arguments for the moral permissibility of abortion as In using this method, we focus on fetal develop-
well as some against it rely, in crucial ways, on what ment and ask three things about each potentially
is said about the fetus. We next consider some of significant stage: (1) What is present? (2) When is
these arguments. this present (at what stage)? and (3) Why is this
significant—in other words, why does this confer
a special moral status, if it does? By “special moral
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Chapter ❮❮ Abortion
status,” we might mean various things. Among the The twins that develop from the original embryo and
most important would be a status such that the fetus are later born, we name Jim and Joe. But what hap-
would be thought to have something like a right pened to John, if there was a John? Jim and Joe are
to life. If this were the case, then abortion would two new individuals, genetically alike as twins, but
become morally problematic.46 also two different people. Is there a little of John in
each of them? Or does the fact that there are two
In the following sections, we will apply Method I individuals after twinning mean that there was not
to the various stages of fetal development and see any individual there before that time—that John
what the arguments would look like. In each case, never existed? Those who support conception as
we will consider the arguments for the position and the crucial time at which we have a being with full
then some criticisms of these arguments. moral status and rights must explain how there can
be an individual at conception, at least in the case of
Conception or Fertilization Conception, or the identical twinning.
stage at which the sperm penetrates and fertilizes
the ovum, is the time at which many opponents of Brain Development Another possible stage at
abortion say that the fetus has full moral status. The which a fetus might attain new moral status is that
reason usually given for this claim is that at concep- point at which the brain is sufficiently developed.
tion the fetus receives its full genetic makeup, from The idea is reasonable given that the human brain is
the combination of sperm and egg.47 The argument the locus of consciousness, language, and commu-
for taking this stage as morally significant appears nication, and it is what makes us crucially different
to be based on an ontological argument that goes from other animals. Moreover, we now use the ces-
something like this: If the being that is born at the sation of brain function as the determinant of death.
end of a pregnancy is a human being or person, and Why should we not use the beginning of brain func-
if there is no substantial change in its constitution tion as the beginning of an individual’s life? We can
from its initial form, then it is the same being all the detect brain activity between the sixth and eighth
way through the stages of development. Otherwise, weeks of fetal development, which makes that point
we would be implying that different beings are suc- the significant time period for this argument.
ceeding one another during this process.
Critics of the argument point out that brain activ-
Critics of this position often point out that ity develops gradually, and we cannot identify any
although fetal development is continuous, the bare single point during fetal development that presents
genetic material present at conception is not enough an entirely unique or qualitative change in brain
to constitute a person at that point. In this early activity. Of course, this may be only a practical
stage, the cells are totipotent, which means they problem. We might be satisfied with an approxima-
can become skin cells, heart cells, or many other tion, rather than a determinate time. Other questions
types of cells.48 There is no structure or differen- about the type of brain function also might be raised.
tiation at this point of development, nothing that At six to eight weeks, the brain is quite simple; only
resembles a person in this initial form. The fertilized much later do those parts develop that are the basis
egg is not even clearly an individual. For exam- of conscious function. Early in pregnancy, the brain
ple, consider what happens in the case of identical is arguably not significantly different from other
twinning. Before implantation, identical twins are animal brains in structure or function. And as men-
formed by the splitting of cells in the early embryo. tioned previously, most experts maintain that neu-
Each resulting twin has the same genetic makeup. ronal development is not advanced enough to speak
Now, what are we to think of the original embryo? of the fetus as feeling pain until somewhere between
Suppose we assume that its conception created an twenty and twenty-six weeks of development.
individual being or person, and we name him John.
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PART TWO ❯❯ ETHICAL ISSUES
Quickening Usually, the pregnant woman can feel As we can see, one practical problem with using
the fetus kick or move in approximately the fourth viability as a moral criterion is its variability. When
month of fetal development. This is what is meant Roe v. Wade took effect, the point of viability for a
by quickening. In prescientific eras, people believed premature infant was considered to be approximately
that there was no fetal movement before this time— twenty-six weeks; the estimation has since been
and if this were so, it would then constitute a persua- shortened by a couple of weeks. At twenty-three or
sive reason to consider this stage as crucial. While twenty-four weeks, a “micropreemie” weighs slightly
contemporary science can detect movement before less than a pound. Its viability is also a function of
this stage, one might still focus on quickening as the this weight and the mother’s socioeconomic status;
start of self-initiated movement in the fetus, arising if she’s poor, then the chances are that her nutrition
from a new level of brain development. This would is poor, which has negative effects on the fetus. The
constitute a better reason for identifying quickening degree of prematurity at different stages of pregnancy
as the beginning of a new moral status or right to also varies by sex and race: girls are approximately
life because the fetus would now be moving about one week ahead of boys in development, and blacks
on its own. As we saw previously, for much of West- are approximately one week ahead of whites.50
ern history, civil and religious authorities prohibited
abortion only after this stage. Why is the stage of viability singled out as the
stage at which the fetus may take on a new moral
Critics of this position may make the same argu- status? Some answer that it is the potential for life
ment about quickening as was made with regard to independent of the mother that forms the basis of
brain development, namely, that there is no dra- the new status. However, if the fetus were delivered
matic break in the development of the fetus’s ability at this stage and left on its own, no infant would
to move. Moreover, they might also point out that be able to survive. Perhaps the notion of separate
other animals and even plants move on their own, existence is a better basis for viability as a moral
and this does not give them special moral status or criterion. The idea would be that the fetus is more
a right to life. Furthermore, those who argue for ani- clearly distinct from the mother at this point in
mal rights usually do so because of their sentience— pregnancy. Or perhaps the notion of completeness
that is, their ability to feel pleasure and pain—and is what is intended. Although the fetus is not fully
not their ability to move. formed at viability because much development takes
place after birth, the argument might be made that
Viability Viability is possible at approximately the the viable fetus is sufficiently complete, enabling us
twenty-fourth week of fetal development and means to think of it as an entirely new being.
that the fetus is at least potentially capable of exist-
ing apart from the mother. Its organs and organ sys- Critics of the viability criterion may point again to
tems are sufficiently developed that it may have the the gradual nature of development and the seeming
capacity to function on its own. The last of these arbitrariness of picking out one stage of complete-
systems to be functionally complete is the respiratory ness as crucially different from the others. They also
system, which often causes fatal problems for fetuses can point out that even if it were delivered at the
delivered before six months. During previous stages point of viability, the fetus would still be dependent
of fetal development, the fetus “breathes” amniotic on others (and on an array of sophisticated medical
fluid. Before twenty-three or twenty-four weeks technologies) for its survival. They can also ques-
of gestation, “capillaries have not yet moved close tion the whole notion of making moral status a func-
enough to the air sacs to carry gases to and from the tion of independence. We are all dependent on one
lung.”49 A lubricant, called surfactant, can be admin- another, and those who are more independent (e.g.,
istered to assist the lungs’ capacity to breathe air, but because they can live apart from others) have no
even then, the chance of survival is slim. greater value than those who are more dependent.
Even someone dependent on medical machines is
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Chapter ❮❮ Abortion
not, for this reason, less human, they might argue. Finally, perhaps it is not actual ability to think
Furthermore, a viable unborn fetus is still, in fact, or communicate, but the potential for the develop-
dependent on its mother and does not have an exis- ment of such characteristics that grounds special
tence separate from her. Birth, on these terms, would moral worth and rights. A normal fetus would have
be a better stage to pick than viability, these critics this potentiality, whereas a two-year-old dog would
might argue, if it is separateness and independence not. Of course, this depends on the level or type of
that are crucial. thinking that is seen to be crucial because dogs do
have some type of mental capacity and some ability
Each point in fetal development may provide a to communicate.
reasonable basis for concluding something about
the moral status of the fetus. However, as we can Distinguishing among the different criteria dis-
clearly see, none are problem free. In any case, the cussed above, we might arrive at something like the
whole idea of grounding moral status and rights on following positions. Each gives an answer to this
the possession of certain characteristics also may be question: What kind of beings have special moral
called into question. Instead, we may want to con- status, which may include something like a right to
sider a more general approach to this problem by life?51
looking at a second method.
Being Human According to one point of view, it is
Method II being human that counts—being a member of the
human species. Now, using this criterion, we might
If the status of the fetus is crucial to arguments note that human fetuses are members of the human
about the morality of abortion, then we may want to species and conclude that they have equal moral
compare those arguments with more general argu- status with all other human beings. The argument
ments made with regard to beings other than human for this position might include something about the
fetuses. For example, why do we believe that people moral advance we make when we recognize that
generally have rights? Are we significantly different all humans have equal moral worth. This has not
from other animals, such that we have unique moral always been the case, for example, when children
status simply because we are human beings? Or is or women were treated more like property than as
the crucial determinant of that special moral sta- human beings with equal and full moral status,
tus the ability to reason, imagine, use language, or or when African American slaves were deemed
something else? If so, then if there were other intel- in the U.S. Constitution to be three-fifths of a
ligent beings in the universe, would they have the person.
same moral status as we do, even if they were not
members of our species? And what of human beings Critics of this position may point out that unfertil-
who do not have the capacity for reasoning, imagi- ized eggs and sperm, not to mention organs such
nation, and communication? as gallbladders and appendices, are also biologi-
cally human. But no one argues that they deserve
Take, for example, the case of a newborn with equal moral status with human persons. Questions
anencephaly—that is, without a developed upper can also be raised about why only members of the
brain and thus with no chance of consciousness or human species are included here. If some other spe-
thought. In fact, such an infant does not usually live cies of being were sufficiently like us in the relevant
for long. But it is a human being biologically and not respects, then should they not be considered to have
a member of some other species. Or take the case of the same worth as members of our own species? In
a person in a permanent vegetative state. There is considering this possibility, we may be better able
no doubt that the person is still human in the bio- to decide whether it is membership in a species or
logical sense, but does this person lack human rights something else that grounds moral worth. (See fur-
because he or she lacks some mental qualities that ther discussion in Chapter 17.)
are the basis for rights?
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PART TWO ❯❯ ETHICAL ISSUES
Being Like Human Beings Suppose that moral sta- Potentiality Potentiality literally means “power.”
tus (or personhood) depends on being a member of According to this criterion, all beings that have the
any species whose members have certain significant power to develop certain key characteristics have
characteristics like human beings. But what char- full moral worth. Thus, if a particular fetus had the
acteristics are significant enough to ground high potential for developing the requisite mental capaci-
moral value and status, including rights? For exam- ties, then this fetus would have full moral status.
ple, consider the abilities to communicate, reason, However, any fetus or other human being that does
and plan. Depending on how high a level of com- not have this potential (anencephalic infants or
municating, reasoning, and planning is required, those in a permanent vegetative state, for example)
perhaps other animals would qualify for the high does not have this status.
moral status envisioned. For instance, some chim-
panzees and gorillas appear to be able to commu- Some critics of abortion argue that abortion is
nicate through sign language. If there were beings wrong because it prevents a being (the fetus) from
elsewhere in the universe who were members of a actualizing its potential. One version of this argu-
different species but who could communicate, rea- ment has been articulated by the philosopher Don
son, and plan, then according to this criterion, they Marquis, who we will read at the end of this chapter.
too would have the same moral worth as humans. Marquis argues that it is seriously wrong to kill chil-
If a lower level of ability were used, then members dren and infants because we presume that children
of other animal species would also qualify. It is and infants have “futures of value.”52 According
important to aim for some kind of consistency here to Marquis, abortion is wrong for a similar reason,
in thinking about the moral standing of fetuses and which is that it deprives the fetus from obtaining the
nonhuman animals. It is useful to clarify our think- future good it would have if it were left alone and
ing about animals by considering what we think allowed to be born. Marquis concludes, “The future
about fetuses and vice versa. We might also want of a standard fetus includes a set of experiences,
to test our intuitions by considering what we think projects, activities, and such which are identical with
about cognitively disabled humans or those with the futures of adult human beings and are identi-
brain injuries. But those who want to emphasize cal with the futures of young children.”53 To kill the
species-belonging as the primary criterion for per- fetus is to deprive the fetus of those goods that it
sonhood will not be persuaded by arguments that potentially could have enjoyed.
focus on cognitive capacities.
Yet how important is potential and what, in fact,
These first two criteria are alike in that it is mem- is it? If a fetus is aborted and it is unaware that it
bership in a species that is the determinant of one’s even had the potential to develop into a person with
moral status. If any humans have this status, then a future of value, how has it been deprived of any-
they all do. If chimpanzees or Martians have this sta- thing? Is it possible to deprive you of something if
tus, then all members of their species also have this you are not aware or conscious? Potentiality appears
status. It does not matter what the individual mem- to be vague and undefined. Suppose that one had
ber of the species is like or what individual capacities the potential to become a famous star or hold high
she or he possesses. On the other hand, perhaps it is political office. Would one then deserve the same
not what species you belong to but what individual respect and powers of an actual star or legislator?
characteristics you possess that forms the basis of Consider the following fictitious story described by
the special moral status. If this were the case, then philosopher Michael Tooley.54 Suppose that we have
there would be at least three other possible positions a kitten that will grow into a mature cat if left alone.
about the basis of this moral status. These are as We also have a serum that if injected into the kit-
follows: ten will make it grow into a human being. Tooley
suggests that there is no reason to allow the kitten
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Chapter ❮❮ Abortion
to develop into a human being, since although it lack the high-level capacities relevant to full moral
has the potential to develop into a human being status is defended by the philosopher Mary Anne
(after being injected by this magic serum), it is not Warren, whose argument is included at the end of
yet actually a human being. Tooley concludes, “If this chapter.56 According to this view, although the
it is seriously wrong to kill something, the reason fetus, newborn infant, and extremely young child
cannot be that the thing will later acquire proper- are human beings biologically, they are not yet per-
ties that in themselves provide something with a sons or beings with the requisite moral status. They
right to life. . . . if it is wrong to kill a human fetus, are not yet members of the moral community. There
it cannot be because of its potentialities.”55 Tooley’s may be good reasons to treat them well and with
point is that those potentialities are merely that— respect, but it is not because they are persons with
potentialities—and so are not yet actual. rights.
Taking Tooley’s story a bit further, we might Evolving Value Finally, let us consider a position
wonder if there is an obligation to inject the kit- that is intermediate between the last two positions.
ten with the serum, since the serum possesses the Its underlying idea is that potential counts, but not
potentiality to cause the kitten to develop into a as much as actual possession of the significant char-
human being. But the same argument applies. This acteristics. Furthermore, as the potential is gradually
points toward a consideration of contraception. Is realized, the moral status of the being also grows.
contraception wrong because it somehow prevents This position also could be described in terms of
the potentiality contained in the sperm and egg from competing interests and claims. The stronger the
actualizing itself? Marquis responds to this question claim, the more it should prevail.
by maintaining that there is a qualitative difference
between contraception and abortion. Prior to fertil- In applying this criterion to fetal development,
ization, there is no actual thing—only a net of prob- the conclusion would be that the early-term fetus
abilities. We don’t know, for example, which of the has less moral value or moral status than the late-
millions of sperm will fertilize the egg. And so, no term fetus. Such an approach would parallel the idea,
definite subject is deprived of its potentiality through found in the law, that the state can regulate late-
contraception. But, according to Marquis, once the term abortions, but not early-term abortion. Less of
fetus is developing in the womb, there is a definite a claim or interest on the part of others is needed
set of potentialities that now are worthy of moral to override the early-term fetus’s claim to consider-
consideration. ation. Moderately serious interests of the pregnant
woman or of society could override the interests
Actuality At the other end of the spectrum is the or claims of the early-term fetus, but it would take
view according to which simple “potentiality” for more serious interests to override the claims of the
developing certain characteristics counts for noth- late-term fetus. In the end, according to this view,
ing (or at least does not give one the kind of moral when potentiality is sufficiently actualized, the fetus
status about which we are concerned). Only the or infant has as much right as any other person.
actual possession of the requisite characteristics is
sufficient for full moral status. Again, it makes a sig- We might note a variant view held by some femi-
nificant difference to one’s position here whether the nists. Most feminists support a woman’s legal right
characteristics are high level or low level. For exam- to abortion, but not all are happy with the rationale
ple, if a rather high level of reasoning is required for it provided in Roe v. Wade.57 For example, some
before an individual has the requisite moral status, worry that the “right to privacy” could be interpreted
then newborns probably would not be included, as in ways that are detrimental to women. If this right
well as many others. The claim that even newborns is taken to imply that everything done in the pri-
vacy of one’s home is out of the law’s reach, then
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PART TWO ❯❯ ETHICAL ISSUES
this might seem to suggest that the subordination or If the fetus does not have the requisite moral sta-
abuse of women and children is merely “domestic” tus, then abortion is probably morally permissible.
and not a matter of public concern. If it is considered to be a person, then abortion is
morally problematic. If the fetus is said to have a
Some feminists also have misgivings about deny- somewhat in-between status, then the conclusion
ing the moral status of the fetus, viewing the focus about abortion may be mixed or vary depending on
on moral status and individual rights as the product stages of development or other factors. Again, these
of a male-dominant worldview. Such a worldview are positions that put the whole weight of the moral
is taken to approach individuals as distinct atomic judgment about abortion on the status of the fetus.
beings who are separated from one another and
whose conflicts are best described as conflicts of As the utilitarian and rights-based arguments
rights. Feminists such as Catharine A. MacKinnon exemplified, however, there are other considerations
point out that, from the standpoint of women, things about what counts in thinking about the morality of
may be more complicated: abortion. For example, we might be concerned, as
Hursthouse is, about whether a mother aborts for
So long as it gestates in utero, the fetus is defined by serious reasons or whether she does so for frivo-
its relation to the pregnant woman. More than a body lous reasons. Along these lines, some will argue that
part but less than a person, where it is, is largely what abortion should not be used as birth control. But
it is. From the standpoint of the pregnant woman, it such a claim holds weight only if we believe that
is both me and not me. It “is” the pregnant woman in there is something wrong with abortion to begin
the sense that it is in her and of her and is hers more with, perhaps because of a claim about the moral
than anyone’s. It “is not” her in the sense that she is status of the fetus. Finally, remember that not every-
not all that is there. In a legal system that views the thing that we consider immoral can (or should) be
individual as a unitary self, and that self as a bundle of made illegal. Thus, even if abortion were in some
rights, it is no wonder that the pregnant woman has case thought to be immoral, one would need to give
eluded legal grasp, and her fetus with her.58 further reasons about the purpose of law to conclude
that it also ought to be illegal. At the same time,
This approach recognizes that abortion is morally we must ask if the only reason to make something
problematic precisely because of the ontological and illegal is if it is immoral. There may be cases when
moral question of motherhood—which is a circum- we want to permit people the liberty to choose for
stance in which one being gives birth to another. themselves about morally controversial issues. This
According to this approach, the loss of an early form seems to be the status quo for the moment in the
of human life is a significant loss, which is indicated United States, where even some of those who think
by the seriousness with which most women treat that abortion is morally wrong agree that women
miscarriages. However, this is not to imply that the should be permitted to make decisions about abor-
fetus has full moral status and rights. tion based upon their own conception of morality.
This conclusion points toward a broader conversa-
Another approach along these lines is associ- tion about the importance of liberty, tolerance, and
ated with the work of philosopher Rosalind Hurst- individual conscience.
house, who uses virtue ethics to consider the topic
of abortion. Hursthouse is critical of those who have In the readings in this chapter, we begin with a
abortions for frivolous reasons, but she argues that short excerpt from Judith Jarvis Thomson’s article
there may be a number of virtuous reasons that a published in 1971, before the U.S. Supreme Court
woman could choose to have an abortion.59 One guaranteed abortion rights across the United States.
reason might be that the mother is concerned for the Thomson’s basic argument is in defense of abortion
well-being of her other children when an unexpected rights for women, even if we grant that a fetus is a
pregnancy occurs. Or perhaps a mother wants to person. Her argument is outlined above. The next
prevent possible suffering for a fetus that would suf-
fer from severe disability.
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Chapter ❮❮ Abortion
essay is from Don Marquis, who provides an argu- pp. 46–50. Also see American Congress of
ment against abortion that focuses on the potential Obstetricians and Gynecologists, ACOG Statement
of the fetus to experience significant goods in its on HR 3803, June 18, 2012, http://www.acog.org/
future. Finally, Mary Anne Warren’s argument pro- ~/media/Departments/Government%20Relations
vides a response that focuses on the criteria for per- %20and%20Outreach/20120618DCAborStmnt
sonhood. Finally, we have recent article by Bertha .pdf?dmc=1&ts=20120915T2120559712
Alvarez Manninen that looks at abortion from the (accessed April 23, 2013).
vantage point of care ethics, virtue ethics, and from 7. Joyce Salisbury, Women in the Ancient World
the psychological perspective of women. (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2001), p. 1.
8. Plato, “Theatetus,” 149d and Plato, “Republic,”
NOTES 461c both in Plato: Collected Dialogues, ed. Edith
Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (Princeton:
1. Gallup Poll data on public opinion regarding Bollingen, 1961).
morality of abortion, http://www.gallup.com/ 9. Hippocrates, “The Oath” (Internet Classics Archive:
poll/183434/americans-choose-pro-choice-first- http://classics.mit.edu//Hippocrates/hippooath
time-seven-years.aspx; Gallup Poll data on public .html)
opinion regarding Roe v. Wade: http://www.gallup. 10. Salisbury, Women in the Ancient World, p. 2.
com/poll/160058/majority-americans-support-roe- 11. “Facts about Mifepristone (RU-486),” National
wade-decision.aspx (accessed February 25, 2016). Abortion Federation, http://www.prochoice.org/
about_abortion/facts/facts_mifepristone.html
2. In fact, the National Cancer Institute, in a 2003 (accessed April 23, 2013).
study, found no increased risk of breast cancer 12. “Facts on Induced Abortion in the United States,”
associated with abortion. Other studies note that Guttmacher Institute, July 2014, https://www
“fewer than 0.3% of patients experience a compli- .guttmacher.org/fact-sheet/induced-abortion-united-
cation serious enough to require hospitalization.” states (accessed July 21, 2016).
Abortion, rather, is said to be “one of the most com- 13. “Abortion and Women of Color: The Bigger Picture,”
mon surgical procedures” and especially in the first Guttmacher Policy Review 11, No. 3 (Summer
trimester is “extremely safe.” (Time, February 26, 2008), http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/gpr/11/3/
2007, p. 28). gpr110302.html (accessed April 23, 2013).
14. New York Times, May 5, 2006, p. A19.
3. David Barstow, “An Abortion Battle, Fought to the 15. Nicholas D. Kristof, “Beyond Pelvic Politics,” New York
Death,” New York Times, July 25, 2009, http:// Times, February 11, 2012, http://www.nytimes
www.nytimes.com/2009/07/26/us/26tiller.html? .com/2012/02/12/opinion/sunday/kristof-beyond-
pagewanted=all&_r=0 (accessed April 23, 2013). pelvic-politics.html (accessed April 23, 2013).
16. “Facts on Induced Abortion in the United States,”
4. “With emotions high, Colorado Planned Parenthood Guttmacher Institute, http://www.guttmacher.org/
clinic reopens after gunman’s attack” Los Angeles pubs/fb_induced_abortion.html
Times, February 15, 2016, http://www.latimes.com/ 17. “Reasons U.S. Women Have Abortions: Quantitative
nation/la-na-planned-parenthood-reopen-20160215- and Qualitative Perspectives” Perspectives on Sexual
story.html (accessed February 25, 2016). and Reproductive Health 37: 3 (September 2005),
http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/journals/3711005
5. Based on a report in the New York Times, March 7, .pdf (accessed July 27, 2013).
1993, p. B3, and March 11, 1993, p. A1. Also see 18. Guttmacher Institute, Abortion Worldwide: A
Jennifer Gonnerman, “The Terrorist Campaign Decade of Uneven Progress (2009), http://www
against Abortion,” Village Voice, November 3–9, .guttmacher.org/pubs/Abortion-Worldwide.pdf
1998, www.villagevoice.com/features/9845/ (accessed February 22, 2016).
abortion.shtml
6. Bonnie Steinbock, Life Before Birth: The Moral and
Legal Status of Embryos and Fetuses, Second
Edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011),
Copyright 2018 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part. WCN 02-200-202
PART TWO ❯❯ ETHICAL ISSUES
19. Singh S et al., Abortion Worldwide: A Decade of final.pdf (accessed February 24, 2016). And also
Uneven Progress (New York: Guttmacher Institute, “Abortion Bans in Cases of Sex or Race Selection
2009), http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/Abortion- or Genetic Anomaly” (February 1, 2016),
Worldwide.pdf (accessed July 27, 2013). http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_
SRSGAAB.pdf (accessed February 24, 2016).
20. “Expanding Access to Medical Abortion in 28. See John Noonan, The Morality of Abortion
Developing Countries,” World Health Organization, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970),
http://www.who.int/reproductivehealth/topics/ p. 18ff.
unsafe_abortion/en/index.html; also see http://www 29. Associate Justice Harry A. Blackmun, majority
.who.int/reproductivehealth/topics/unsafe_abortion/ opinion in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973),
magnitude/en/index.html (accessed July 21, 2016). footnote 22.
30. Dorothy E. McBride, Abortion in the United States:
21. Frank Langfitt, “After a Forced Abortion, a Roaring A Reference Book (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO,
Debate in China,” NPR’s All Things Considered, 2008), p. 7.
July 5, 2012, http://www.npr.org/2012/07/05/ 31. “Historical Attitudes to Abortion,” BBC Ethics
156211106/after-a-forced-abortion-a-roaring- Guide, http://www.bbc.co.uk/ethics/abortion/legal/
debate-in-china (accessed February 15, 2013). history_1.shtml (accessed July 21, 2016).
32. Associate Justice Harry A. Blackmun, majority
22. Wei Xing Zhu, Li Lu, and Therese Hesketh, opinion in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
“China’s Excess Males, Sex Selective Abortion, and 33. See comments about this interpretation in Ronald
One Child Policy: Analysis of Data from 2005 Dworkin, “Feminists and Abortion,” New York
National Intercensus Survey,” British Medical Review of Books, No. 11 (June 10, 1993),
Journal (April 9, 2009), p. 388, http://dx.doi.org/ pp. 27–29.
10.1136/bmj.b1211 (accessed February 15, 2013). 34. Blackmun, Roe v. Wade.
35. Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, majority
23. Stanley K. Henshaw, Sushelela Singh, and Taylor opinion in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Haas, “Recent Trends in Abortion Rates Worldwide,” Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
Family Planning Perspectives 25, No. 1 36. Gonzalez v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
(March 1999). 37. David Stout, “Supreme Court Upholds Ban on
Abortion Procedure,” New York Times, April 18,
24. Sneha Barol, “A Problem-and-Solution Mismatch: 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/18/us/
Son Preference and Sex-Selective Abortion Bans,” 18cnd-scotus.html?_r=0 (accessed July 21, 2016).
Guttmacher Policy Review 15, No. 2 (Spring 2012), 38. Planned Parenthood Assn. v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S.
http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/gpr/15/2/ 476 (1983).
gpr150218.html (accessed February 15, 2013). 39. New York Times, April 14, 2010, p. A15.
40. Kathy Lohr, “Virginia Governor Backs Down from
25. Rowena Mason, “The Abortion of Unwanted Girls Ultrasound Bill,” NPR’s All Things Considered,
Taking Place in the UK,” Telegraph, January 10, February 23, 2012, http://www.npr.org/2012/02/
2013, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/ 23/147297375/virginia-governor-backs-down-
crime/9794577/The-abortion-of-unwanted-girls- from-ultrasound-bill (accessed April 4, 2013).
taking-place-in-the-UK.html (accessed February 15, 41. “Ongoing Study Shows Ultrasounds Do Not
2013). Have Direct Impact on Abortion Decision,”
American Independent, February 6, 2012, http://
26. Ed O’Keefe, “Bill Banning ‘Sex-Selective Abortions’ americanindependent.com/210411/ongoing-study-
Fails in the House,” Washington Post, May 31, shows-ultrasounds-do-not-have-direct-impact-on-
2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/ abortion-decision (accessed March 8, 2013).
2chambers/post/bill-banning-sex-selective-abortions-
fails-in-the-house/2012/05/31/gJQAgCYn4U_blog
.html (accessed February 15, 2013).
27. Replacing Myths with Facts: Sex Selective Abortion
Laws in the United States (University of Chicago
Law School, 2014), https://napawf.org/wp-content/
uploads/2014/06/Replacing-Myths-with-Facts-
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Chapter ❮❮ Abortion
42. WIS. STAT. § 48.193 (2003); see Erin N. Linder, 48. This issue has recently arisen with developments in
“Punishing Prenatal Alcohol Abuse: The Problems stem cell research and cloning.
Inherent in Utilizing Civil Commitment to Address
Addiction,” University of Illinois Law Review 49. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, “Definition of Fetal Viability
2005, No. 3. Is Focus of Debate in Senate,” New York Times,
May 15, 1997, p. A13.
43. “Four Years Later, Slain Abortion Doctor’s Aide
Steps into the Void,” New York Times, February 13, 50. Ibid.
2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/14/us/ 51. Compare this discussion with similar discussions
kansas-abortion-practice-set-to-replace-tiller-clinic.
html (accessed February 15, 2013). in Chapters 16 and 17 on the environment and
animal rights. In particular, note the possible
44. “Abortion Clinics Are Closing at Record Pace” distinction between having moral value and having
Bloomberg, February 24, 2016, http://www rights.
.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-02-24/ 52. Don Marquis, “Why Abortion Is Immoral,” Journal
abortion-clinics-are-closing-at-a-record-pace of Philosophy 86, No. 4 (1989), p. 191.
(accessed February 24, 2016). 53. Ibid., p. 192.
54. This is taken from Michael Tooley’s “Abortion and
45. Judith Jarvis Thomson, “A Defense of Abortion,” Infanticide,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 2, No. 1
Philosophy and Public Affairs 1, No. 1 (Fall 1971), (1972), pp. 37–65.
pp. 47–66. 55. Ibid., p. 62.
56. Mary Anne Warren in “On the Moral and Legal
46. Note that if the fetus had no right to life, then this Status of Abortion,” Monist 57, No. 1 (January
would not automatically make abortion problem 1973), pp. 43–61.
free. See the comments in the last paragraph under 57. See the summary of these views in Dworkin,
“Method II.” “Feminists and Abortion,” op. cit.
58. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Women’s Lives—Men’s
47. In the prescientific era, many people held that the Laws (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
egg provided the entire substance and the sperm 2005), p. 140.
only gave it a charge or impetus to grow, or that 59. See Rosalind Hursthouse, “Virtue Theory and
the sperm was “the little man” and only needed a Abortion,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 20, No. 3
place to grow and obtain nourishment, which the (1991).
egg provided. We now know about the contribution
of both sperm and ovum to the zygote.
READING
A Defense of Abortion
JUDITH JARVIS THOMSON
For more chapter resources and activities, go to MindTap.
Study Questions
As you read the excerpt, please consider the following questions:
1. Why does Thomson suggest that abortion is not murder?
2. Why does Thomson say that “a sick and desperately frightened fourteen-year-old schoolgirl, pregnant due to rape,
may of course choose abortion”?
3. What is the moral difference between a woman’s right to end her pregnancy and a woman’s desire to secure the
death of her fetus?
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PART TWO ❯❯ ETHICAL ISSUES
If directly killing an innocent person is murder, and be cases in which carrying the child to term required
thus is impermissible, then the mother’s directly only Minimally Decent Samaritanism of the mother,
killing the innocent person inside her is murder, and this is a standard we must not fall below. I am
and thus is impermissible. But it cannot seriously inclined to think it a merit of my account precisely
be thought to be murder if the mother performs an that it does not give a general yes or a general no.
abortion on herself to save her life. It cannot seri- It allows for and supports our sense that, for exam-
ously be said that she must refrain, that she must sit ple, a sick and desperately frightened fourteen-year-
passively by and wait for her death. . . . old schoolgirl, pregnant due to rape, may of course
choose abortion, and that any law which rules this
Nobody is morally required to make large sacri- out is an insane law. And it also allows for and sup-
fices, of health, of all other interests and concerns, ports our sense that in other cases resort to abortion
of all other duties and commitments, for nine years, is even positively indecent. It would be indecent in
or even for nine months, in order to keep another the woman to request an abortion, and indecent in a
person alive. . . . doctor to perform it, if she is in her seventh month,
and wants the abortion just to avoid the nuisance of
If a set of parents do not try to prevent preg- postponing a trip abroad. . . .
nancy, do not obtain an abortion, but rather take it
home with them, then they have assumed responsi- Secondly, while I am arguing for the permissibil-
bility for it, they have given it rights, and they can- ity of abortion in some cases, I am not arguing for
not now withdraw support from it at the cost of its the right to secure the death of the unborn child. It
life because they now find it difficult to go on provid- is easy to confuse these two things in that up to a
ing for it. But if they have taken all reasonable pre- certain point in the life of the fetus it is not able to
cautions against having a child, they do not simply survive outside the mother’s body; hence removing
by virtue of their biological relationship to the child it from her body guarantees its death. But they are
who comes into existence have a special responsibil- importantly different. . . .
ity for it. They may wish to assume responsibility
for it, or they may not wish to. And I am suggesting Judith Jarvis Thomson, “A Defense of Abortion,” Philosophy & Public
that if assuming responsibility for it would require Affairs 1, No. 1 (Fall 1971), pp. 47–66. Copyright © 1971 Wiley
large sacrifices, then they may refuse. . . . While I do Periodicals, Inc.
argue that abortion is not impermissible, I do not
argue that it is always permissible. There may well
READING
Why Abortion Is Immoral
DON MARQUIS
For more chapter resources and activities, go to MindTap.
Study Questions
As you read the excerpt, please consider the following questions:
1. What is it that makes killing a person wrong?
2. Why does Marquis believe that this also makes killing a fetus wrong?
3. Why does it not follow, according to Marquis, that contraception is wrong?
Copyright 2018 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part. WCN 02-200-202
Chapter ❮❮ Abortion
The view that abortion is, with rare exceptions, Consider the way a typical anti abortionist argues.
seriously immoral has received little support in She will argue or assert that life is present from the
the recent philosophical literature. No doubt most moment of conception or that fetuses look like babies
philosophers affiliated with secular institutions or that fetuses possess a characteristic such as a
of higher education believe that the anti abortion genetic code that is both necessary and sufficient for
position is either a symptom of irrational religious being human. Anti abortionists seem to believe that:
dogma or a conclusion generated by seriously con- (1) the truth of all of these claims is quite obvious,
fused philosophical argument. The purpose of this and (2) establishing any of these claims is sufficient
essay is to undermine this general belief. This essay to show that abortion is morally akin to murder.
sets out an argument that purports to show, as well
as any argument in ethics can show, that abortion A standard pro choice strategy exhibits simi-
is, except possibly in rare cases, seriously immoral, larities. The pro choicer will argue or assert that
that it is in the same moral category as killing an fetuses are not persons or that fetuses are not ratio-
innocent adult human being. nal agents or that fetuses are not social beings. Pro
choicers seem to believe that: (1) the truth of any
The argument is based on a major assumption. of these claims is quite obvious, and (2) establish-
Many of the most insightful and careful writers on ing any of these claims is sufficient to show that an
the ethics of abortion—such as Joel Feinberg, Michael abortion is not a wrongful killing.
Tooley, Mary Anne Warren, H. Tristram Engelhardt,
Jr., L. W. Sumner, John T. Noonan, Jr., and Philip In fact, both the pro choice and the anti abortion
Devine1—believe that whether or not abortion is claims do seem to be true, although the “it looks like
morally permissible stands or falls on whether or a baby” claim is more difficult to establish the earlier
not a fetus is the sort of being whose life it is seri- the pregnancy. We seem to have a standoff. How
ously wrong to end. The argument of this essay will can it be resolved?
assume, but not argue, that they are correct.
As everyone who has taken a bit of logic knows,
Also, this essay will neglect issues of great impor- if any of these arguments concerning abortion is
tance to a complete ethics of abortion. Some anti a good argument, it requires not only some claim
abortionists will allow that certain abortions, such as characterizing fetuses, but also some general moral
abortion before implantation or abortion when the life principle that ties a characteristic of fetuses to hav-
of a woman is threatened by a pregnancy or abortion ing or not having the right to life or to some other
after rape, may be morally permissible. This essay moral characteristic that will generate the obligation
will not explore the casuistry of these hard cases. The or the lack of obligation not to end the life of a fetus.
purpose of this essay is to develop a general argu- Accordingly, the arguments of the anti abortion-
ment for the claim that the overwhelming majority of ist and the pro choicer need a bit of filling in to be
deliberate abortions are seriously immoral. regarded as adequate.
I Note what each partisan will say. The anti abor-
tionist will claim that her position is supported by
A sketch of standard anti abortion and pro choice such generally accepted moral principles as “It is
arguments exhibits how those arguments possess always prima facie seriously wrong to take a human
certain symmetries that explain why partisans of life” or “It is always prima facie seriously wrong to
those positions are so convinced of the correctness end the life of a baby.” Since these are generally
of their own positions, why they are not successful accepted moral principles, her position is certainly
in convincing their opponents, and why, to others, not obviously wrong. The pro choicer will claim that
this issue seems to be unresolvable. An analysis of
the nature of this standoff suggests a strategy for Don Marquis, “Why Abortion is Immoral,” The Journal of Philosophy,
surmounting it. vol. LXXXVI, no. 4 (April 1989), pp. 183–195, 200–202. Reprinted by
permission from the Journal of Philosophy.
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PART TWO ❯❯ ETHICAL ISSUES
her position is supported by such plausible moral killing in terms of human beings. Now we end up
principles as “Being a person is what gives an indi- with: “It is always prima facie seriously wrong to
vidual intrinsic moral worth” or “It is only seriously end the life of a human being.” This principle has
prima facie wrong to take the life of a member of the advantage of avoiding the problem of the human
the human community.” Since these are generally cancer-cell culture counterexample. But this advan-
accepted moral principles, the pro choice position is tage is purchased at a high price. For although it is
certainly not obviously wrong. Unfortunately, we clear that a fetus is both human and alive, it is not
have again arrived at a standoff. at all clear that a fetus is a human being. There is at
least something to be said for the view that some-
Now, how might one deal with this standoff? The thing becomes a human being only after a process
standard approach is to try to show how the moral of development, and that therefore first trimester
principles of one’s opponent lose their plausibility fetuses and perhaps all fetuses are not yet human
under analysis. It is easy to see how this is possible. beings. Hence, the anti abortionist, by this move,
On the one hand, the anti abortionist will defend a has merely exchanged one problem for another.2
moral principle concerning the wrongness of killing
which tends to be broad in scope in order that even The pro choicer fares no better. She may attempt
fetuses at an early stage of pregnancy will fall under to find reasons why killing infants, young children,
it. The problem with broad principles is that they and the severely retarded is wrong which are inde-
often embrace too much. In this particular instance, pendent of her major principle that is supposed to
the principle “It is always prima facie wrong to take explain the wrongness of taking human life, but
a human life” seems to entail that it is wrong to end which will not also make abortion immoral. This is
the existence of a living human cancer-cell culture, no easy task. Appeals to social utility will seem sat-
on the grounds that the culture is both living and isfactory only to those who resolve not to think of
human. Therefore, it seems that the anti abortion- the enormous difficulties with a utilitarian account
ist’s favored principle is too broad. of the wrongness of killing and the significant social
costs of preserving the lives of the unproductive.3
On the other hand, the pro choicer wants to find A pro choice strategy that extends the definition of
a moral principle concerning the wrongness of kill- “person” to infants or even to young children seems
ing which tends to be narrow in scope in order that just as arbitrary as an anti abortion strategy that
fetuses will not fall under it. The problem with nar- extends the definition of “human being” to fetuses.
row principles is that they often do not embrace Again, we find symmetries in the two positions and
enough. Hence, the needed principles such as “It is we arrive at a standoff.
prima facie seriously wrong to kill only persons” or
“It is prima facie wrong to kill only rational agents” There are even further problems that reflect
do not explain why it is wrong to kill infants or symmetries in the two positions. In addition to
young children or the severely retarded or even counterexample problems, or the arbitrary applica-
perhaps the severely mentally ill. Therefore, we tion problems that can be exchanged for them, the
seem again to have a standoff. The anti abortionist standard anti abortionist principle “It is prima facie
charges, not unreasonably, that pro choice principles seriously wrong to kill a human being,” or one of
concerning killing are too narrow to be acceptable; its variants, can be objected to on the grounds of
the pro choicer charges, not unreasonably, that ambiguity. If “human being” is taken to be a bio-
anti abortionist principles concerning killing are too logical category, then the anti abortionist is left with
broad to be acceptable. the problem of explaining why a merely biological
category should make a moral difference. Why, it is
Attempts by both sides to patch up the difficul- asked, is it any more reasonable to base a moral con-
ties in their positions run into further difficulties. The clusion on the number of chromosomes in one’s cells
anti abortionist will try to remove the problem in her than on the color of one’s skin?4 If “human being,”
position by reformulating her principle concerning
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Chapter ❮❮ Abortion
on the other hand, is taken to be a moral category, conscious; have a sense of their personal identities;
then the claim that a fetus is a human being cannot have plans, goals, and projects; experience emotions;
be taken to be a premise in the anti abortion argu- are liable to pains, anxieties, and frustrations; can
ment, for it is precisely what needs to be established. reason and bargain, and so on—it is because of these
Hence, either the anti abortionist’s main category is attributes that people have values and interests,
a morally irrelevant, merely biological category, or desires and expectations of their own, including
it is of no use to the anti abortionist in establishing a stake in their own futures, and a personal well-
(noncircularly, of course) that abortion is wrong. being of a sort we cannot ascribe to unconscious
or nonrational beings. Because of their developed
Although this problem with the anti abortionist capacities they can assume duties and responsibilities
position is often noticed, it is less often noticed that and can have and make claims on one another. Only
the pro choice position suffers from an analogous because of their sense of self, their life plans, their
problem. The principle “Only persons have the right value hierarchies, and their stakes in their own futures
to life” also suffers from an ambiguity. The term can they be ascribed fundamental rights. There is
“person” is typically defined in terms of psychologi- nothing arbitrary about these linkages (op. cit., p. 270).
cal characteristics, although there will certainly be
disagreement concerning which characteristics are The plausible aspects of this attempt should not
most important. Supposing that this matter can be be taken to obscure its implausible features. There is
settled, the pro choicer is left with the problem of a great deal to be said for the view that being a psy-
explaining why psychological characteristics should chological person under some description is a neces-
make a moral difference. If the pro choicer should sary condition for having duties. One cannot have a
attempt to deal with this problem by claiming that an duty unless one is capable of behaving morally, and
explanation is not necessary, that in fact we do treat a being’s capability of behaving morally will require
such a cluster of psychological properties as having having a certain psychology. It is far from obvious,
moral significance, the sharp-witted anti abortion- however, that having rights entails consciousness or
ist should have a ready response. We do treat being rationality, as Feinberg suggests. We speak of the
both living and human as having moral significance. rights of the severely retarded or the severely men-
If it is legitimate for the pro choicer to demand that tally ill, yet some of these persons are not rational.
the anti abortionist provide an explanation of the We speak of the rights of the temporarily uncon-
connection between the biological character of being scious. The New Jersey Supreme Court based their
a human being and the wrongness of being killed decision in the Quinlan case on Karen Ann Quinlan’s
(even though people accept this connection), then right to privacy, and she was known to be perma-
it is legitimate for the anti abortionist to demand nently unconscious at that time. Hence, Feinberg’s
that the pro choicer provide an explanation of the claim that having rights entails being conscious is,
connection between psychological criteria for being on its face, obviously false.
a person and the wrongness of being killed (even
though that connection is accepted).5 Of course, it might not make sense to attribute
rights to a being that would never in its natural his-
Feinberg has attempted to meet this objection tory have certain psychological traits. This modest
(he calls psychological personhood “commonsense connection between psychological personhood and
personhood”): moral personhood will create a place for Karen Ann
Quinlan and the temporarily unconscious. But then
The characteristics that confer commonsense it makes a place for fetuses also. Hence, it does not
personhood are not arbitrary bases for rights and serve Feinberg’s pro choice purposes. Accordingly, it
duties, such as race, sex or species membership; rather seems that the pro choicer will have as much dif-
they are traits that make sense out of rights and duties ficulty bridging the gap between psychological per-
and without which those moral attributes would sonhood and personhood in the moral sense as the
have no point or function. It is because people are anti abortionist has bridging the gap between being
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PART TWO ❯❯ ETHICAL ISSUES
a biological human being and being a human being more powerful countervailing reasons. Such gen-
in the moral sense. eralizations would not be merely accidental gener-
alizations; they would point to, or be based upon,
Furthermore, the pro choicer cannot any more the essence of the wrongness of killing, what it is
escape her problem by making person a purely that makes killing wrong. All this suggests that a
moral category than the anti abortionist could necessary condition of resolving the abortion contro-
escape by the analogous move. For if person is a versy is a more theoretical account of the wrongness
moral category, then the pro choicer is left with- of killing. After all, if we merely believe, but do not
out the resources for establishing (noncircularly, of understand, why killing adult human beings such as
course) the claim that a fetus is not a person, which ourselves is wrong, how could we conceivably show
is an essential premise in her argument. Again, we that abortion is either immoral or permissible?
have both a symmetry and a standoff between pro
choice and anti abortion views. II
Passions in the abortion debate run high. There In order to develop such an account, we can start
are both plausibilities and difficulties with the stan- from the following unproblematic assumption con-
dard positions. Accordingly, it is hardly surprising cerning our own case; it is wrong to kill us. Why is
that partisans of either side embrace with fervor it wrong? Some answers can be easily eliminated. It
the moral generalizations that support the conclu- might be said that what makes killing us wrong is
sions they preanalytically favor, and reject with dis- that a killing brutalizes the one who kills. But the
dain the moral generalizations of their opponents as brutalization consists of being inured to the perfor-
being subject to inescapable difficulties. It is easy to mance of an act that is hideously immoral; hence,
believe that the counterexamples to one’s own moral the brutalization does not explain the immorality.
principles are merely temporary difficulties that It might be said that what makes killing us wrong
will dissolve in the wake of further philosophical is the great loss others would experience due to
research, and that the counterexamples to the prin- our absence. Although such hubris is understand-
ciples of one’s opponents are as straightforward as able, such an explanation does not account for the
the contradiction between A and O propositions in wrongness of killing hermits, or those whose lives
traditional logic. This might suggest to an impartial are relatively independent and whose friends find it
observer (if there are any) that the abortion issue is easy to make new friends.
unresolvable.
A more obvious answer is better. What primarily
There is a way out of this apparent dialectical makes killing wrong is neither its effect on the mur-
quandary. The moral generalizations of both sides derer nor its effect on the victim’s friends and rela-
are not quite correct. The generalizations hold for tives, but its effect on the victim. The loss of one’s
the most part, for the usual cases. This suggests life is one of the greatest losses one can suffer. The
that they are all accidental generalizations, that the loss of one’s life deprives one of all the experiences,
moral claims made by those on both sides of the dis- activities, projects, and enjoyments that would oth-
pute do not touch on the essence of the matter. erwise have constituted one’s future. Therefore, kill-
ing someone is wrong, primarily because the killing
This use of the distinction between essence and inflicts (one of) the greatest possible losses on the
accident is not meant to invoke obscure metaphysi- victim. To describe this as the loss of life can be mis-
cal categories. Rather, it is intended to reflect the leading, however. The change in my biological state
rather atheoretical nature of the abortion discussion. does not by itself make killing me wrong. The effect
If the generalization a partisan in the abortion dis- of the loss of my biological life is the loss to me of
pute adopts were derived from the reason why end- all those activities, projects, experiences, and enjoy-
ing the life of a human being is wrong, then there ments which would otherwise have constituted my
could not be exceptions to that generalization unless
some special case obtains in which there are even
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Chapter ❮❮ Abortion
future personal life. These activities, projects, experi- the loss of a future to them that they would other-
ences, and enjoyments are either valuable for their wise have experienced is what makes their prema-
own sakes or are means to something else that is ture death a very bad thing for them. A better theory
valuable for its own sake. Some parts of my future of the wrongness of killing would require a different
are not valued by me now, but will come to be val- natural property associated with killing which better
ued by me as I grow older and as my values and fits with the attitudes of the dying. What could it be?
capacities change. When I am killed, I am deprived
both of what I now value which would have been The view that what makes killing wrong is the
part of my future personal life, but also what I would loss to the victim of the value of the victim’s future
come to value. Therefore, when I die, I am deprived gains additional support when some of its implica-
of all of the value of my future. Inflicting this loss tions are examined. In the first place, it is incompat-
on me is ultimately what makes killing me wrong. ible with the view that it is wrong to kill only beings
This being the case, it would seem that what makes who are biologically human. It is possible that
killing any adult human being prima facie seriously there exists a different species from another planet
wrong is the loss of his or her future.6 whose members have a future like ours. Since hav-
ing a future like that is what makes killing someone
How should this rudimentary theory of the wrong, this theory entails that it would be wrong to
wrongness of killing be evaluated? It cannot be kill members of such a species. Hence, this theory is
faulted for deriving an “ought” from an “is,” for it opposed to the claim that only life that is biologically
does not. The analysis assumes that killing me (or human has great moral worth, a claim which many
you, reader) is prima facie seriously wrong. The anti abortionists have seemed to adopt. This opposi-
point of the analysis is to establish which natural tion, which this theory has in common with person-
property ultimately explains the wrongness of the hood theories, seems to be a merit of the theory.
killing, given that it is wrong. A natural property
will ultimately explain the wrongness of killing, In the second place, the claim that the loss of
only if: (1) the explanation fits with our intuitions one’s future is the wrong-making feature of one’s
about the matter, and (2) there is no other natural being killed entails the possibility that the futures
property that provides the basis for a better explana- of some actual nonhuman mammals on our own
tion of the wrongness of killing. This analysis rests planet are sufficiently like ours that it is seriously
on the intuition that what makes killing a particular wrong to kill them also. Whether some animals do
human or animal wrong is what it does to that par- have the same right to life as human beings depends
ticular human or animal. What makes killing wrong on adding to the account of just what it is about my
is some natural effect or other of the killing. Some future or the futures of other adult human beings
would deny this. For instance, a divine-command which makes it wrong to kill us. No such additional
theorist in ethics would deny it. Surely this denial is, account will be offered in this essay. Undoubtedly,
however, one of those features of divine-command the provision of such an account would be a very
theory which renders it so implausible. difficult matter. Undoubtedly, any such account
would be quite controversial. Hence, it surely should
The claim that what makes killing wrong is the not reflect badly on this sketch of an elementary
loss of the victim’s future is directly supported by theory of the wrongness of killing that it is inde-
two considerations. In the first place, this theory terminate with respect to some very difficult issues
explains why we regard killing as one of the worst regarding animal rights.
of crimes. Killing is especially wrong, because it
deprives the victim of more than perhaps any other In the third place, the claim that the loss of one’s
crime. In the second place, people with AIDS or can- future is the wrong-making feature of one’s being
cer who know they are dying believe, of course, that killed does not entail, as sanctity-of-human-life
dying is a very bad thing for them. They believe that theories do, that active euthanasia is wrong. Per-
sons who are severely and incurably ill, who face
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PART TWO ❯❯ ETHICAL ISSUES
a future of pain and despair, and who wish to die its future has obvious consequences for the ethics of
will not have suffered a loss if they are killed. It abortion. The future of a standard fetus includes a set
is, strictly speaking, the value of a human’s future of experiences, projects, activities, and such which
which makes killing wrong in this theory. This being are identical with the futures of adult human beings
so, killing does not necessarily wrong some persons and are identical with the futures of young children.
who are sick and dying. Of course, there may be Since the reason that is sufficient to explain why it
other reasons for a prohibition of active euthanasia, is wrong to kill human beings after the time of birth
but that is another matter. Sanctity-of-human-life is a reason that also applies to fetuses, it follows that
theories seem to hold that active euthanasia is seri- abortion is prima facie seriously morally wrong.
ously wrong even in an individual case where there
seems to be good reason for it independently of pub- This argument does not rely on the invalid infer-
lic policy considerations. This consequence is most ence that, since it is wrong to kill persons, it is
implausible, and it is a plus for the claim that the wrong to kill potential persons also. The category
loss of a future of value is what makes killing wrong that is morally central to this analysis is the category
that it does not share this consequence. of having a valuable future like ours; it is not the
category of personhood. The argument to the con-
In the fourth place, the account of the wrongness clusion that abortion is prima facie seriously morally
of killing defended in this essay does straightfor- wrong proceeded independently of the notion of per-
wardly entail that it is prima facie seriously wrong son or potential person or any equivalent. Someone
to kill children and infants, for we do presume that may wish to start with this analysis in terms of the
they have futures of value. Since we do believe value of a human future, conclude that abortion is,
that it is wrong to kill defenseless little babies, it except perhaps in rare circumstances, seriously mor-
is important that a theory of the wrongness of kill- ally wrong, infer that fetuses have the right to life,
ing easily account for this. Personhood theories of and then call fetuses “persons” as a result of their
the wrongness of killing, on the other hand, can- having the right to life. Clearly, in this case, the cat-
not straightforwardly account for the wrongness of egory of person is being used to state the conclusion
killing infants and young children.7 Hence, such of the analysis rather than to generate the argument
theories must add special ad hoc accounts of the of the analysis.
wrongness of killing the young. The plausibility of
such ad hoc theories seems to be a function of how The structure of this anti abortion argument can
desperately one wants such theories to work. The be both illuminated and defended by comparing it to
claim that the primary wrong-making feature of a what appears to be the best argument for the wrong-
killing is the loss to the victim of the value of its ness of the wanton infliction of pain on animals.
future accounts for the wrongness of killing young This latter argument is based on the assumption
children and infants directly; it makes the wrong- that it is prima facie wrong to inflict pain on me (or
ness of such acts as obvious as we actually think it you, reader). What is the natural property associated
is. This is a further merit of this theory. Accordingly, with the infliction of pain which makes such inflic-
it seems that this value of a future-like-ours the- tion wrong? The obvious answer seems to be that
ory of the wrongness of killing shares strengths of the infliction of pain causes suffering and that suf-
both sanctity-of-life and personhood accounts while fering is a misfortune. The suffering caused by the
avoiding weaknesses of both. In addition, it meshes infliction of pain is what makes the wanton infliction
with a central intuition concerning what makes kill- of pain on me wrong. The wanton infliction of pain
ing wrong. on other adult humans causes suffering. The wanton
infliction of pain on animals causes suffering. Since
The claim that the primary wrong-making feature causing suffering is what makes the wanton inflic-
of a killing is the loss to the victim of the value of tion of pain wrong and since the wanton infliction of
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Chapter ❮❮ Abortion
pain on animals causes suffering, it follows that the who is hard in his dealings with animals (or crab-
wanton infliction of pain on animals is wrong. grass or stones) should also be hard in his dealings
with men. After all, men are persons: animals are
This argument for the wrongness of the wanton no more persons than crabgrass or stones. Persons
infliction of pain on animals shares a number of are Kant’s crucial moral category. Why, in short,
structural features with the argument for the serious should a Kantian accept the basic claim in Kant’s
prima facie wrongness of abortion. Both arguments argument?
start with an obvious assumption concerning what
it is wrong to do to me (or you, reader). Both then Hence, Kant’s argument for the wrongness of
look for the characteristic or the consequence of the inflicting pain on animals rests on a claim that, in
wrong action which makes the action wrong. Both a world of Kantian moral agents, is demonstra-
recognize that the wrong-making feature of these bly false. Therefore, the alternative analysis, being
immoral actions is a property of actions sometimes more plausible anyway, should be accepted. Since
directed at individuals other than postnatal human this alternative analysis has the same structure as
beings. If the structure of the argument for the the anti abortion argument being defended here, we
wrongness of the wanton infliction of pain on ani- have further support for the argument for the immo-
mals is sound, then the structure of the argument for rality of abortion being defended in this essay.
the prima facie serious wrongness of abortion is also
sound, for the structure of the two arguments is the Of course, this value of a future-like-ours argu-
same. The structure common to both is the key to the ment, if sound, shows only that abortion is prima
explanation of how the wrongness of abortion can facie wrong, not that it is wrong in any and all cir-
be demonstrated without recourse to the category of cumstances. Since the loss of the future to a stan-
person. In neither argument is that category crucial. dard fetus, if killed, is, however, at least as great
a loss as the loss of the future to a standard adult
This defense of an argument for the wrongness human being who is killed, abortion, like ordinary
of abortion in terms of a structurally similar argu- killing, could be justified only by the most com-
ment for the wrongness of the wanton infliction pelling reasons. The loss of one’s life is almost the
of pain on animals succeeds only if the account greatest misfortune that can happen to one. Pre-
regarding animals is the correct account. Is it? In sumably abortion could be justified in some circum-
the first place, it seems plausible. In the second stances, only if the loss consequent on failing to
place, its major competition is Kant’s account. Kant abort would be at least as great. Accordingly, mor-
believed that we do not have direct duties to ani- ally permissible abortions will be rare indeed unless,
mals at all, because they are not persons. Hence, perhaps, they occur so early in pregnancy that a
Kant had to explain and justify the wrongness of fetus is not yet definitely an individual. Hence, this
inflicting pain on animals on the grounds that “he argument should be taken as showing that abortion
who is hard in his dealings with animals becomes is presumptively very seriously wrong, where the
hard also in his dealing with men.”8 The problem presumption is very strong—as strong as the pre-
with Kant’s account is that there seems to be no sumption that killing another adult human being is
reason for accepting this latter claim unless Kant’s wrong. . . .
account is rejected. If the alternative to Kant’s
account is accepted, then it is easy to understand V
why someone who is indifferent to inflicting pain
on animals is also indifferent to inflicting pain on In this essay, it has been argued that the correct
humans, for one is indifferent to what makes inflict- ethic of the wrongness of killing can be extended to
ing pain wrong in both cases. But, if Kant’s account fetal life and used to show that there is a strong pre-
is accepted, there is no intelligible reason why one sumption that any abortion is morally impermissible.
If the ethic of killing adopted here entails, however,
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PART TWO ❯❯ ETHICAL ISSUES
that contraception is also seriously immoral, then VI
there would appear to be a difficulty with the analy-
sis of this essay. The purpose of this essay has been to set out an
argument for the serious presumptive wrongness of
But this analysis does not entail that contracep- abortion subject to the assumption that the moral
tion is wrong. Of course, contraception prevents the permissibility of abortion stands or falls on the moral
actualization of a possible future of value. Hence, it status of the fetus. Since a fetus possesses a prop-
follows from the claim that futures of value should erty, the possession of which in adult human beings
be maximized that contraception is prima facie is sufficient to make killing an adult human being
immoral. This obligation to maximize does not exist, wrong, abortion is wrong. This way of dealing with
however; furthermore, nothing in the ethics of kill- the problem of abortion seems superior to other
ing in this paper entails that it does. The ethics of approaches to the ethics of abortion, because it rests
killing in this essay would entail that contraception on an ethics of killing which is close to self-evident,
is wrong only if something were denied a human because the crucial morally relevant property clearly
future of value by contraception. Nothing at all is applies to fetuses, and because the argument avoids
denied such a future by contraception, however. the usual equivocations on “human life,” “human
being,” or “person.” The argument rests neither on
Candidates for a subject of harm by contraception religious claims nor on Papal dogma. It is not sub-
fall into four categories: (1) some sperm or other, ject to the objection of “speciesism.” Its soundness
(2) some ovum or other, (3) a sperm and an ovum is compatible with the moral permissibility of eutha-
separately, and (4) a sperm and an ovum together. nasia and contraception. It deals with our intuitions
Assigning the harm to some sperm is utterly arbi- concerning young children.
trary, for no reason can be given for making a sperm
the subject of harm rather than an ovum. Assigning Finally, this analysis can be viewed as resolv-
the harm to some ovum is utterly arbitrary, for no ing a standard problem—indeed, the standard
reason can be given for making an ovum the subject problem—concerning the ethics of abortion. Clearly,
of harm rather than a sperm. One might attempt to it is wrong to kill adult human beings. Clearly, it is
avoid these problems by insisting that contraception not wrong to end the life of some arbitrarily chosen
deprives both the sperm and the ovum separately of single human cell. Fetuses seem to be like arbitrarily
a valuable future like ours. On this alternative, too chosen human cells in some respects and like adult
many futures are lost. Contraception was supposed humans in other respects. The problem of the ethics
to be wrong, because it deprives us of one future of abortion is the problem of determining the fetal
of value, not two. One might attempt to avoid this property that settles this moral controversy. The the-
problem by holding that contraception deprives the sis of this essay is that the problem of the ethics of
combination of sperm and ovum of a valuable future abortion, so understood, is solvable.
like ours. But here the definite article misleads. At
the time of contraception, there are hundreds of NOTES
millions of sperm, one (released) ovum and mil-
lions of possible combinations of all of these. There 1. Feinberg, “Abortion,” in Matters of Life and Death:
is no actual combination at all. Is the subject of the New Introductory Essays in Moral Philosophy,
loss to be a merely possible combination? Which Tom Regan, ed. (New York: Random House, 1986),
one? This alternative does not yield an actual sub- 256–93; Tooley, “Abortion and Infanticide,”
ject of harm either. Accordingly, the immorality of Philosophy and Public Affairs, II, 1 (1972):37–65,
contraception is not entailed by the loss of a future- Tooley, Abortion and Infanticide (New York:
like-ours argument simply because there is no non- Oxford, 1984); Warren, “On the Moral and Legal
arbitrarily identifiable subject of the loss in the case Status of Abortion,” The Monist, LVII, 1 (1973):
of contraception. 43–61; Engelhardt, “The Ontology of Abortion,”
Copyright 2018 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part. WCN 02-200-202
Ethics, LXXXIV, 3 (1974):217–234; Sumner, Chapter ❮❮ Abortion
Abortion and Moral Theory (Princeton: University
Press, 1981); Noonan, “An Almost Absolute Value Humanistic Perspectives in Gerontology (Atlantic
in History,” in The Morality of Abortion: Legal and Highlands, NJ: Humanities, 1978), 341–55.
Historical Perspectives, Noonan, ed. (Cambridge: 4. See Warren, op. cit., and Tooley, “Abortion and
Harvard, 1970); and Devine, The Ethics of Infanticide.”
Homicide (Ithaca: Cornell, 1978). 5. This seems to be the fatal flaw in Warren’s treat-
2. For interesting discussions of this issue, see Warren ment of this issue.
Quinn, “Abortion: Identity and Loss,” Philosophy 6. I have been most influenced on this matter by
and Public Affairs, XIII, 1 (1984):24–54; and Jonathan Glover, Causing Death and Saving Lives
Lawrence C. Becker, “Human Being: The (New York: Penguin, 1977), Chapter 3; and Robert
Boundaries of the Concept,” Philosophy and Young, “What Is So Wrong with Killing People?”
Public Affairs, IV, 4 (1975):334–59. Philosophy, LIV, 210 (1979):515–28.
3. For example, see my “Ethics and the Elderly: Some 7. Feinberg, Tooley, Warren, and Engelhardt have all
Problems,” in Stuart Spicker, Kathleen Woodward, dealt with this problem.
and David Van Tassel, eds., Aging and the Elderly: 8. “Duties to Animals and Spirits,” in Lectures on
Ethics, Louis Infeld, trans. (New York: Harper,
1963), 239.
READING
The Value of Choice and the Choice to Value: Expanding the
Discussion About Fetal Life within Prochoice Advocacy
BERTHA ALVAREZ MANNINEN
For more chapter resources and activities, go to MindTap.
Study Questions for Manninen
As you read the excerpt, please consider the following questions:
1. How does Manninen’s account deal with the difference between the legality and morality of abortion as well as the
difference between prochoice, antichoice, prolife, and proabortion positions?
2. How does Manninen explain the difference between rights-based discussions such as Thomson’s and those that
focus on virtues such as care and vices such as callousness?
3. What are the two ways that Manninen suggests we reduce the abortion rate; and how do those concerns relate to
larger feminist and social justice concerns?
In 2005, prochoice advocate Frances Kissling, the and clear expressions of respect for fetal life. . . .There
former president of Catholics for a Free Choice, is a strong distaste of the prochoice community in
challenged prochoice advocates to begin viewing the many facets of society because of the inability or
fetus as a being with some degree of intrinsic worth. unwillingness to acknowledge one iota of value in
To refuse to do so, she argued, paints a picture of fetal life. (Kissling 2005)
prochoice advocacy as hardened or callous toward
fetal life. Copyright of Hypatia is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its
content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted
I am deeply struck by the number of thoughtful, to a listserv without the copyright holder’s express written per-
progressive people who have been turned off to mission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for
the prochoice movement by the lack of adequate individual use.
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PART TWO ❯❯ ETHICAL ISSUES
Kissling seems to conclude that there is some- people agree that abortion should remain legal in all
thing intrinsic about prochoice advocacy that results or most cases, “legalities aside, 59% believe abortion
in a “hardening of the heart” in regard to fetal life, is morally wrong.” One telling finding is that “[f]or
and her evidence for this is that many individuals, millennials, three-quarters said they identified with
including those who are sympathetic to the view that the term prochoice, while 65% said they could also
women possess abortion rights, perceive prochoice be described as pro-life” (Rovner 2011). In other
advocates in this way. This conclusion, of course, words, the younger generation holds complex and
does not follow—we cannot conclude that belief x is nuanced views regarding abortion; although most of
intrinsic to position y simply because many individ- them support keeping abortion legal, they also rec-
uals believe that it is. However, Kissling’s conclusion ognize that there is a moral dimension to abortion
is one that is shared by many individuals, including that expands beyond the issue of legalities. Accord-
many young women who make up the new genera- ing to one young prochoice woman: “I only get mad
tion of abortion rights supporters. when [a friend] tries telling me, ‘It is nothing, oh
well, it is just an abortion.’ It wasn’t the abortion
Consider the words of Heidi, a young woman itself that seemed to trouble the woman; rather, it
who obtained an abortion and, while supporting was her friend’s nonchalance. ‘Even if it was like
abortion choice for other women, is hesitant to self- nothing,’ the woman told NARAL, ‘it was some-
identify as a prochoice advocate: thing’” (Kliff 2010).
Heidi also feels alienation from reproductive rights What we can conclude from all this is that a ste-
activists, whom she feels treat abortion too casually. reotype of prochoice advocacy exists that paints
She says, “I find myself not being a great supporter abortion rights supporters as callous toward fetal life
of the pro-choice movement. When I ask myself why and unwilling to acknowledge the moral ambiguities
that is, since I believe in the right to choose, what of abortion. Antichoice advocates have seized upon
comes back as my answer is that it is something this stereotype, and have used it to advance their
you are killing.” Heidi laments that so much of the cause. As Kathleen McDonnell notes:
pro-choice side “tries to pretend that’s not true.”
(Kushner 1997, 148) Abortion rights, and, indeed, feminism itself had
come to be identified in the popular mind with an
Even though Heidi shared the core belief of the anti-family, anti-child mentality that had little respect
prochoice movement that women have a right to for traditional values and cultural traditions. The
decide whether they will continue a pregnancy, she opponents of feminism and abortion attempted to
did not want to be labeled “prochoice” because she capitalize on this: feminists, they said, see children
did not want to be associated with views that she as mere inconveniences, obstacles to career
regarded as intrinsic to the position: that the taking fulfillment; pro-abortionists, they said, have no
of fetal life is of little or no consequence. respect for the value of life and, even worse, want
to impose their lack of values on the rest of society.
A recent article in Newsweek entitled “Remem- (McDonnell 1984, 68)
ber Roe!” tells about how women of the post-Roe
generation have become lax in defending abortion Francke’s and Little’s respective citations illus-
rights, mostly because they take them for granted. trate that this view of prochoice advocacy is indeed
Young members of NARAL Pro-Choice America a stereotype—there are prochoice feminists, academ-
don’t “view abortion as an imperiled right in need ics, and even women who themselves have obtained
of defenders.” Moreover, “young voters flat-out dis- abortions who deeply grapple with the moral ambi-
approved of a woman’s abortion, called her actions guity of abortion. From where, then, does this perva-
immoral, yet maintained that the government had sive stereotype come? To be sure, there are prochoice
absolutely no right to intervene” (Kliff 2010). advocates who do not regard abortion as a moral
Another poll finds that although 52% of young
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Chapter ❮❮ Abortion
issue, and who disagree that fetal life is valuable of a woman who “reached out her beautifully deli-
and worthy of some degree of protection. But given cate young hand, gently touched the cheek of her
that there is disagreement among prochoice advo- newly aborted tiny fetus and said ‘I’m sorry, baby’”
cates concerning this issue, why isn’t this disagree- (Kennedy 1988, 1067). Another woman obtained
ment more showcased, and why has the pendulum an abortion after her fetus was diagnosed with
swung in favor of representing prochoice advocacy a deformity: “The woman said: ‘I don’t want to
in the spirit of Warren, rather than in the spirit of deny that this baby existed.’ She gave it a name,
Francke or Little? Much of it can be attributed to the had a funeral for it, and buried it in the family plot
pervasive distortion of the prochoice view from the alongside her grandmother” (1068). Discussing
rhetoric of some antichoice advocates themselves. this moral dimension does not entail regretting the
But prochoice supporters are also to blame, for we abortion, or even feeling that the choice to abort in
have allowed this misrepresentation of our position a particular circumstance is wrong. Also, the reac-
to go largely unchecked. tions of the above-cited women should not be taken
as evidence for what some antichoice advocates call
Reading about the experiences of women who “Post-Abortion Syndrome,” a kind of posttraumatic
obtain abortions reveals that regarding the fetus as stress disorder that they argue is intrinsic to abor-
a subject of little value does not reflect the phenom- tion choice (see, for example, Reardon 1987). There
enology of pregnancy or abortion for many women. is no evidence such a condition exists; although
Consider these two examples: some women (but certainly not all) may feel sad-
ness in the aftermath of an abortion, emotions of
The whole handling of the abortion issue is wrong. sadness are not equivalent to a clinical or patho-
You don’t toss [the fetus] in the garbage. I mean, logical disease.2 What these women pine for is
I’ve had an abortion, it was an incredibly painful acknowledgment of their emotions, and they desire
experience. I didn’t toss it in the garbage. And I find to ground their abortion decision not via a dismissal
it really distressing to hear it referred to in that way. of the worth of fetal life, but, rather, by acknowl-
(Cannold 1998, 36) edging its value and still defending abortion rights
through this lens. As is illustrated in “Remember
I desperately wanted a feminist article, pamphlet, Roe!” and in Heidi’s comment, it is the percep-
speech, anything that would let me have both the tion of prochoice advocates as having “hardened
abortion and my own ambivalence. . . . I wanted to hearts” that has resulted in some women turning
deal with the moral balance sheet of abortion, not to their backs on the prochoice movement. Indeed,
have to deny that one existed for me. Instead people as a result of her conversation with the younger
kept telling me I was misguided, brainwashed by the members of NARAL, pollster Anna Greenberg has
patriarchy. They patiently explained that the fetus was concluded that the prochoice community needs to
just a bunch of cells. (Van Gelder 1978, 66–67) start “an open discussion about the moral, ethical,
and emotional complexity of abortion that would
This last citation reveals a need many women have be more likely to resonate with young Americans”
that it seems the prochoice community is failing to (Kliff 2010).
meet. When prochoice supporters dismiss fetal life
as being no more valuable than a “clump of cells,” Most antichoice advocates also hold a highly
we do a disservice to the many women who obtain negative view of prochoice advocacy. Writing about
abortions but who, nevertheless, feel quite strongly the experiences and activities of antichoice advo-
that there is a moral dimension to their action that cates, Carol J. C. Maxwell reports the following words
they wish to openly discuss. Even in the immediate from an interviewee: “I think that we do not value
aftermath of an abortion, a woman can feel some people and we do not value ourselves. . . . That’s part
degree of sadness. Bobbie Jeanne Kennedy, an abor-
tion nurse, writes about dealing with the emotional
reactions of postabortive women. She tells the story
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PART TWO ❯❯ ETHICAL ISSUES
of why we have all these women killing their kids” mere “tissue.” The prochoice community must work
(Maxwell 2002, 141). Similarly, some maintain that toward satiating this hunger.
women who abort must think it permissible to kill
anyone who is unwanted (98). According to Faye MEETING KISSLING’S CHALLENGE
Ginsburg in her book Contested Lives, antichoice
women regard women who abort as callous, mate- In this section I will outline three ways prochoice
rialistic, and uncaring (Ginsburg 1998 185). Many advocates can meet Kissling’s challenge by doing
antichoice supporters take these views and use them more to acknowledge the moral complexities, and
to gain political influence for restrictive abortion at times ambiguities, of abortion. Weaving these
laws. For example, Kristi Burton, sponsor of 2008’s suggestions into prochoice ideology can help soften
Personhood Amendment in Colorado (which, had it the view of prochoice advocacy as necessarily cal-
passed, would have granted embryos and fetuses lous toward fetal life, and to respect the women who
the legal status of persons from fertilization), argued regard abortion as a choice they indeed ought to
in favor of passing the amendment by stating that possess, but one that carries with it serious moral
abortion rights have resulted in the cheapening of dimensions. This, in turn, will allow us to begin the
the value of life, and that it is only through grant- conversation in which it seems the younger genera-
ing fetuses the status of persons that society can tion of prochoice supporters is eager to partake.
“restore the dignity and respect unborn children
have lost” (Ertelt 2008). For all these reasons, in Abortion, Decency, and Virtue
the general reluctance to openly discuss abortion as
a hard moral question, or acknowledge the value In Judith Jarvis Thomson’s “A Defense of Abor-
of fetal life, the prochoice position has suffered. As tion,” she argues that, in terms of maintaining a
McDonnell writes: pro-abortion-rights stance, it matters not whether
the fetus is regarded as a person with rights equal
the feminist tendency has been to sidestep the entire to that of any extra-uterine person. Because no per-
moral discussion of abortion, either because we didn’t son’s right to life entails that another person can be
see it as relevant to our concerns or because, though compelled to use her body for continued sustenance,
we may have been uncomfortable with the “clump the fetus cannot be given this right over the woman
of tissue” argument, we couldn’t see anything else either. Thomson’s argument is regarded as a semi-
that didn’t pose a threat to our basic position that nal defense of abortion rights, but it has also been
women must control their own bodies. Consequently, met with much criticism (see, for example, Wilcox
we have largely abdicated any role in the moral 1989; Beckwith 1992; and Kaczor 2011, among
discussion of abortion, and Right-to-Life ideology has many others). Yet although she spends the bulk of
filled the vacuum. (McDonnell 1984, 47) her essay arguing in favor of abortion rights, there is
one aspect of her argument that is often overlooked.
There are two interconnected reasons, then, why Although she argues that abortions are never unjust,
prochoice feminists should strive to move away she does argue that there are some abortions that
from Warren-like views regarding the value of fetal are indecent. Although she never defines what she
life.3 First, because many pregnant women do view means by an “indecent” abortion, she does give an
fetal life as valuable, even though some may nev- example of what such an abortion would look like:
ertheless opt for abortion, regarding fetal life in “It would be indecent in the woman to request an
a disparaging manner is insensitive to their views abortion, and indecent in a doctor to perform it, if
and alienates them from the prochoice community. she is in her seventh month, and wants the abor-
Second, the younger prochoice generation is hungry tion just to avoid the nuisance of postponing a
for a discussion of the moral complexities of abor- trip abroad” (Thomson 1971, 65). She also lumps
tion, one that includes a discussion of the moral “indecency” together with other displays of nonvir-
value of the fetus that moves beyond regarding it as tuous character traits, such as self-centeredness and
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Chapter ❮❮ Abortion
callousness (61). Therefore, Thomson seems to be desirable states of affairs, is to do something callous
arguing that although a woman is always within her and light-minded, the sort of thing that no virtuous or
moral rights to obtain an abortion, some reasons for wise person would do. (237–38)
doing so do not reflect a good character.
Yet she also argues that some abortions do not reflect
Rosalind Hursthouse develops this position in a vicious character; that, indeed, some abortions can
her article “Virtue Theory and Abortion.” She argues be obtained for reasons that manifest virtues such as
that, from a virtue ethics perspective, although responsibility and care.
it may be the case that women possess a right to
abort, this does not exhaust the moral dimensions Consider, for instance, a woman who has already had
of the matter. According to Hursthouse, we must several children and fears that to have another will
ask the further, complex, question: are women using seriously affect her capacity to be a good mother
their abortion rights well? to the ones she has—she does not show a lack of
appreciation of the intrinsic value of being a parent
[I]n exercising a moral right I can do something cruel by opting for abortion. Nor does a woman who has
or callous, or selfish, light-minded, self-righteous, been a good mother and is approaching the age at
stupid, inconsiderate, disloyal, dishonest—that is, act which she may be looking forward to being a good
viciously. Love and friendship do not survive their grandmother. Nor does a woman who discovers that
parties’ constantly insisting on their rights, nor do her pregnancy may well kill her. Nor, necessarily, does
people live well when they think that getting what a woman who has decided to lead a life centered
they have a right to is of preeminent importance; they around some other worthwhile activity or activities
harm others, and they harm themselves. (Hursthouse with which mother-hood would compete . . . (241)
1991, 235)
Hursthouse is not arguing, then, that women should
Hursthouse spends the rest of her article detail- not have a right to an abortion. Rather, what she
ing the difference between a vicious and a nonvi- is maintaining is that we extend the conversation
cious/virtuous abortion. Because of her adherence beyond the question of rights. With all our rights
to virtue theory, this will be determined largely by there are responsible and irresponsible, callous and
whether the woman in question was manifesting a caring, ways of exercising them. Although some
virtuous or vicious character when coming to her prochoice advocates may recoil at the thought
decision to abort. As an example of an abortion that of subjecting the abortion right to this analysis, it
would betray a less-than-virtuous character, Hurst- seems that, in light of the abovementioned desire
house cites aborting for the sake of avoiding one’s to have this conversation by prochoice supporters
responsibilities in exchange for “‘having a good themselves, we have come to a point where it is
time,’ or for the pursuit of some false vision of ide- essential to start doing so.
als of freedom or self-realization” (242). Hursthouse
also offers a criticism of Warren’s disparaging view Leslie Cannold’s research, featured in her book
of fetal life. The Abortion Myth, illustrates that there are many
prochoice women who already make judgments
The fact that the premature termination of a about particular abortion decisions in a manner simi-
pregnancy is, in some sense, the cutting off of a lar to that of Hursthouse and Thomson.
new human life, and thereby, like the procreation
of a new human life, connects with all our thoughts Almost all the women I interviewed saw the abortion
about human life and death, parenthood, and family issue as revolving around the pregnant woman’s
relationships, must make it a serious matter. To decision-making process. An abortion decision that
disregard this fact about it, to think of abortion as did not reflect a woman’s “feelings” and “love” for her
nothing but the killing of something that does not could-be child and other significant people in her life,
matter, or as nothing but the exercise of some right and that was not motivated by care and protective
or rights one has, or as the incidental means to some concern for all those she loves, was just plain wrong.
(Cannold 1998, xix–xx)
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PART TWO ❯❯ ETHICAL ISSUES
In her interviews with the young women who sup- need to be asked are: “Are there irresponsible preg-
port abortion choice, Cannold notes that they were nancies? Which reasons for having an abortion are
eager to move beyond the discussion of abortion bad ones? Even if women have a right to choose
qua rights and more toward discussion of the moral- abortion, is it always right for them to do so? Why,
ity of individual abortion choices; a “morally right” after all this time, have these questions never been
abortion is one that displays certain virtues: respon- answered, and so rarely been asked?” (Cannold
sibility, caring, compassion, and respect for fetal life 1998, 17). Even NARAL President Nancy Keenan
(17). As an illustration of this, Cannold asks many of has noticed the need to engage in this discussion:
the women to give their thoughts on what is known “our reluctance to address the moral complexity of
as “abortion doping”: the rumored practice among this debate is no longer serving our cause or our
olympian female runners to deliberately become country well. In our silence, we have ceded moral
pregnant in order to abort right before a competition; ground” (Kliff 2010).
the added hormones produced by the recently termi-
nated pregnancy are said to enhance performance. No doubt some antichoice advocates will attempt
According to Cannold, the “vast majority of women to usurp the discussion as evidence that even pro-
found the idea of using pregnancy as a means to choice advocates recognize the moral wrongness
another end completely repugnant.” one prochoice of abortion, but this is why it is critical that pro-
woman, Carey, chastised anyone who participated choice advocates have this discussion on their own
in abortion doping for failing to “‘honor’ pregnancy terms. Moreover, acknowledging that there is a
as ‘the phenomenal creation of life’” (91). Another moral dimension to abortion beyond the subject of
prochoice woman, Frances, maintained that what’s rights recognizes what so many pro- and antichoice
wrong about abortion doping is that it leaves out women already believe: that fetal life has value,
“the ‘emotional’ and ‘spiritual’ aspects of the preg- and that, therefore, there has to be a framework for
nancy . . . ” (91). Notice that what is being judged is determining what constitutes a morally acceptable
not the act of abortion itself, but rather the moti- reason for taking that life. This, of course, needs
vations for the abortion, or what traits of charac- much more development than I can provide here,
ter were being expressed by women who engage in but expanding upon Hursthouse’s use of virtue eth-
abortion doping. Whereas an abortion obtained for ics provides a promising way.
reasons having to do with caring for dependents,
out of respect for the value of motherhood (and per- Caring for Women Who Grieve
haps being honest about one’s inability to fulfill the
requirements of motherhood to a particular fetus at As mentioned above, the evidence strongly sug-
a particular time), and even out of love for the fetus, gests that there is no such thing as Post-Abortion
would be considered acceptable, aborting for reasons Syndrome. Most women typically handle their deci-
such as abortion doping, or for the sake of “having a sion to abort well; there is even evidence that some
good time” would be considered morally repugnant. women who choose abortion see it as an overall
These women never contested the right to an abor- positive life experience (see, for example, Zabin et
tion, but the reasons for which one exercises that al. 1989 and Warren et al. 2010). However, there
right can be subject to moral scrutiny. are women who do experience postabortion mal-
adjustment. Some risk factors include events that
From this we can conclude that the newer gener- occur after the abortion, perceived lack of support
ation of prochoice women are already having these for the abortion decision, ambivalence concerning
discussions among themselves, and that, in general, the decision to abort, compromised coping capaci-
the prochoice community must keep up with these ties in general, quality of relationship with male
women by taking up the discussion as an important partner, and feeling coerced into the abortion (see,
aspect of prochoice ideology. The new questions that for example, Adler et al. 1990; Major and Cozzarelli
1992; Major et al. 1997). Moreover, many women
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Chapter ❮❮ Abortion
who experience psychiatric disorders after an abor- for twenty years, tried to get Planned Parenthood
tion likely suffered from psychiatric disorders before to help market her book Peace After Abortion, she
the abortion as well (Major et al. 2008, 89). Con- was denounced by the director as being a “dupe of
sequently, it is “likely that psychological maladjust- the antis” (Bazelon 2007). Torre-Bueno is an ardent
ment occurring subsequent to an abortion frequently prochoice advocate who firmly maintains that there
is misattributed to the abortion experience, whereas is no such condition as Post-Abortion Syndrome
it may be more indicative of adjustment problems (Torre-Bueno 1997, 78). Nevertheless, she legiti-
present prior to pregnancy” (Major and Cozzarelli mizes postabortion grief (4–7) and argues that the
1992, 136).4 However, this is not to say that there prochoice community should as well: “what you
aren’t women who feel some degree of sadness, sor- hear in the movement is ‘Let’s not make noise about
row, or feelings of loss after an abortion, for “[a] this’ and ‘Most women are fine, I’m sure you will be
bortion is an experience often hallmarked by ambiv- too.’ And that is unfair” (Bazelon 2007).
alence, and a mix of positive and negative emotions
is to be expected” (Major et al. 2008, 885). What can prochoice advocates do to support these
women? One pivotal step is to ensure excellent pre-
Ambivalent postabortion feelings are sometimes abortion counseling that would be sensitive to the
not taken very seriously, even by members of the abovementioned markers for postabortion malad-
prochoice community. In her book, Cannold writes justment. One example of stellar pre-abortion coun-
about the reaction of a prochoice colleague when she seling can be found in Dr. Susan Wicklund’s book
shared her research findings that many women who This Common Secret, which chronicles her decades-
abort do indeed regard the fetus as a valuable entity long experiences as an abortion provider. In her
worthy of respect: “When I pointed out to him how practice, she offers extensive pre-abortion counsel-
women’s views and experiences repeatedly con- ing, where she insists on ensuring that the woman
tradicted established moral thought on abortion he is acting out of her own volition. If there seems to
replied: ‘Well, who cares what women think? That be any hesitation regarding the extent to which a
they think it doesn’t make it right’” (Cannold 1998, woman is certain of her decision to abort, Wicklund
xxxi). Consider Heather’s experiences after her abor- refuses to perform the procedure. In one example,
tion; she writes that she felt “angry at the feminist she sends a prospective patient away twice because
movement, which I am whole-heartedly a part of. of her ambivalence, performing the abortion only
I didn’t expect such an emotional experience. . . . I after she is sure that her uncertainty has abated. The
felt betrayed that abortion was made to look like patient thanks Wicklund for her patience, admitting
an easy decision, and it wasn’t for me. I had care- to her that “I’d have been a wreck if you had done
fully weighed it all out. It was still the right decision the abortion the first time I came in” (Wicklund and
at the time. But I still had to cry, to grieve the loss Kesselheim 2007, 100).
of this potential child, and the loss of my pregnant
state” (Banoit 1983, 21). Another woman, Naomi, Counseling sessions at Wicklund’s practice often
writes that “[t]he women I talked to weren’t all that last hours before the abortion is performed to ensure
supportive of my feelings. In fact some of them were the woman’s emotional stability and, most impor-
cruel, telling me not to be so upset. After all, I had tant, to make certain that the decision to abort is
chosen this” (20). Another woman is hesitant to entirely autonomous (Wicklund and Kesselheim
express sadness over an abortion precisely because 2007, 98). Her methods are the epitome of what
she fears being regarded as traitorous to the femi- prochoice philosophy ought to be. Despite what
nist movement: “[t]here seemed to be this unspoken some antichoice advocates may believe, being pro-
rule that a good feminist isn’t supposed to grieve” choice is not about pushing or touting abortion as
(McDonnell 1984, 34). When Ava Torre-Bueno, a the best option for all women facing an unplanned
head counselor at San Diego’s Planned Parenthood pregnancy. Being prochoice is about three things:
one, ensuring that women have access to safe and
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PART TWO ❯❯ ETHICAL ISSUES
legal abortion if they so choose; two, ensuring that a Finally, postabortion counseling services should
woman’s choice to abort really is a genuine choice of provide, for the women who desire them, posta-
her own accord and free will; and three, respecting bortion rituals designed to help women deal with
and supporting any choice that a woman makes in any negative feelings they may be experiencing.
regard to her pregnancy, whether that be abortion, Torre-Bueno’s book describes many different kinds
adoption, or parenting. of postabortion rituals, some as simple as “lighting
candles on the anniversary of your abortion, or the
Excellent pre-abortion counseling must be date you would have delivered if you hadn’t had the
accompanied by excellent postabortion counseling abortion” as a way of working through grief (Torre-
as well. Rachel Needle and Lenore Walker’s book Bueno 1997, 23). A prochoice grieving ritual should
Abortion Counseling illustrates effective postabor- affirm the validity of a woman’s decision to abort,
tion counseling techniques. one case study involves both by acknowledging the reasons she aborted as
a woman, Laura, who felt sadness, loss, and guilt well as the difficulties she may have experienced in
after her abortion. Her counselor writes: reaching that decision. Moreover, the ritual should
serve as an open forum to allow women to express
The most important thing for me to do when Laura any and all emotions that come with her abortion,
came back to my office was to be empathic and from sorrow to relief or any feelings in between,
allow her to express her feelings of guilt and sadness. and allow her an opportunity to say goodbye to the
I gave Laura permission to cry. We then began to fetus.5 Finally, the ritual should acknowledge that
explore her decision to have an abortion. Laura had fetal death is of some consequence; that the very
a long list of reasons why having the abortion was reason a ritual is desired, and that abortion can be
the right thing for her to do. I reinforced her decision, painful, is because the destruction of fetal life is so
by reflecting back her reasons that helped her make very unlike the destruction of any other part of a
the decision to terminate the pregnancy Being woman’s body. Prochoice advocates consistently
empathic, listening, and helping Laura reflect on her (and correctly) argue that abortion is never an easy
decision proved helpful to her. (Needle and Walker decision for women, that they typically make the
2008, 134) decision carefully and responsibly. The likely reason
for this is that women who abort typically under-
Similar examples abound throughout the book, stand the significance of their decision precisely
but the common denominator is that, in all cases because they understand that aborting a fetus is not
where women express postabortion grief or sorrow, like removing any other organic material from one’s
the therapist creates a “safe, compassionate, non- body. That is, women do not typically experience
judgmental and trusting environment” (Needle and pregnancy and abortion as a form of “disembodi-
Walker 2008, 135) for the patient. One important ment, of separation of woman from fetus, of mother
thing to note is how the use of dismissive language from child. These are the experiences that speak to
to refer to the fetus may have an adverse affect on a the complexity of abortion as it is lived by women
woman’s postabortion coping abilities. Torre-Bueno rather than as it is expounded by activists” (Ludlow
notes that one of her patients had lingering sor- 2008, 44).
row after an abortion partly because “[s]he couldn’t
grieve for them earlier because she had no one to Reducing Abortions
support her in thinking of them as babies or chil-
dren she had lost” (Torre-Bueno 1997, 23). The Although prochoice advocates need to continue
employees at another abortion clinic justify their use fighting for a woman’s right to safe and legal abor-
of the term “baby” to describe fetuses given similar tion, they should also make it an important part
concerns: “if the woman who is choosing abortion of prochoice advocacy that abortion is a right that
experiences this as a baby, how are we helping her is exercised with less frequency. Adopting this
deal with her decision if we tell her she is wrong?”
(Ludlow 2008, 43).
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Chapter ❮❮ Abortion
secondary goal helps to draw a distinction between If poverty is the reason she is terminating the
being “prochoice” and being “proabortion”; a dis- pregnancy, if in fact she wants the child but cannot
tinction that is often collapsed. The term “proabor- afford to have it, she is actually being coerced into
tion” denotes someone who encourages abortion, an abortion. She does not, in fact, have a choice at all
who celebrates abortion, who desires to see women Feminists should make our position clear that when
choose abortion over other options. I know of no we talk about the “right to choose,” we are not talking
prochoice advocate who meets this definition. about women having abortions solely because they
can’t afford the child. Obviously, if we are going to
There are, essentially, two ways to reduce abor- work for choice in our reproductive lives, we also
tion rates: one, via the prevention of unplanned have to work to bring about the conditions—social,
pregnancies and two, via changing certain aspects economic, cultural—that will make it a real possibility.
of society so that women aren’t coerced into choos- (McDonnell 1984, 71)
ing abortion because they fear having a child will
force them to compromise other worthwhile goals. Tellingly, the countries with the fewest incidences of
Achieving the first goal is rather straightforward— abortion are the ones that have implemented com-
various studies have confirmed that an essential prehensive sex education programs and access to
component to reducing unplanned pregnancies is to contraception, in addition to offering social support
increase access to effective contraception, in addi- programs that provide a financial safety net for their
tion to comprehensive sex education that ensures citizens and residents. The Netherlands, for exam-
its correct and consistent use (see, for example, ple, has one of the lowest rates of abortion in the
Bongaarts and Westoff 2000; Deschner and Cohen world (7 for every 1,000 women). It also provides
2003). The second part of the abortion-reducing
equation is more difficult to achieve. The reality fac- a range of what sociologists call “social” and what
ing single young women if they decide to bring an reproductive health advocates call “human” rights: the
unplanned pregnancy to term is stark enough to right to housing, healthcare, and a minimum income.
understand why so many decide to abort. Women Not only do such rights ensure access, if need be, to
who live below the poverty line are about four times free contraceptive and abortion services, government
as likely to obtain an abortion when compared to support makes coming of age less perilous for both
women who live 300% above the poverty level teenagers and parents. This might make the prospect
(Jones, Darroch, and Henshaw 2002). On average, of sex derailing a child less haunting. Ironically, the
single women have higher poverty rates than single very lack of such rights and high rates of childhood
men, a phenomenon described by Diana Pearce as poverty in the U.S. contribute to high rates of births
“the feminization of poverty” (Pearce 1978, 28–36; among teenagers. Without adequate support systems
see also Casper, McLanahan, and Garfinkel 1994; or education and job opportunities, young people
Pressman 2002). are simply more likely to start parenthood early in life.
(Schalet 2010, 20)
Children born to unwed teenage mothers, and
the mothers themselves, face a host of difficulties, There is evidence that providing assistance in the
including an increased risk of failure in school, of form of financial help, childcare services, and medi-
poverty, and even of incidences of physical and cal services results in decreased abortion rates (Reid
mental illness (American Academy of Child and 2010). In addition to providing postnatal medical
Adolescent Psychiatry 2004). One of the most prev- support, which eases the economic hardship that
alent reasons women choose abortion is financial comes with raising a child, easy access to medical
difficulty (see, for example, Finer et al. 2005; Jones, care means easy access to effective contraception,
Finer, and Singh 2008). This should concern pro- which, in turn, reduces the need to seek abortions
choice advocates because aborting for such reasons in the first place. Joseph Wright, writing on behalf
compromises genuine choice. As McDonnell writes: of the group Catholics in Alliance for the Common
Good, issued a report on the various studies that
illustrate the socioeconomic factors that influence
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PART TWO ❯❯ ETHICAL ISSUES
many women’s decision to abort. Because he rep- For those whose political theory regards the state
resents a Catholic organization, Wright makes it as having an important role in social welfare, advo-
clear that he is in favor of restrictive abortion laws; cating for this particular instance of social welfare
however, he also argues that, if the goal is to reduce should be regarded as a core component of their
abortion, criminalizing it without offering concurrent position on abortion.6 In addition to fostering gen-
social support will be ineffective. Rather, a genuine uine choice, this helps meet Kissling’s challenge
effort to reduce abortions would include implement- because it illustrates that not even prochoice advo-
ing social policies that would offer prenatal and cates see abortion as an innocuous action; rather,
postnatal care, nutritional care for both mother and that they see it as a choice that, ideally, fewer and
child, as well as pediatric care for the child, quality fewer women would have to make. Of course, this
and affordable childcare so that young parents can will not eliminate abortions—contraception will
either complete their education or obtain full-time occasionally fail, even with perfect use, and some
work, and support for victims of sexual and physical women simply do not want to be mothers, neither
abuse (Wright 2008). at the time of their unplanned pregnancy nor ever.
Moreover, as long as sexual violence exists against
In reference to the impact financial assistance women, abortion access is needed for the women
has on the decision to abort, Wright notes that who cannot bring themselves to gestate after being
“[i]n states where families typically have higher victimized.
incomes, there may be less economic pressure to
end a pregnancy through abortion because the cost WHY ENDORSING ABORTION RIGHTS AND FETAL
of caring for a child constitutes a smaller share of VALUE ARE NOT MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE
the typical family’s income” (Wright 2008). In refer-
ence to the correlation between increased financial If successful, Thomson’s argument illustrates that
assistance to poor families and reduced abortion granting fetuses the status of persons is not suf-
rates, Wright reports that an increase of $100 per ficient for justifying a ban on abortion. Even if we
person in the form of child-centered welfare “was grant the fetus all the rights of any extra-uterine
correlated with a decrease in the abortion rate of person, this does not entail that abortions are
about 20% . . . approximately 195,000 abortions per impermissible, since no extra-uterine person has a
year” (Wright 2008). Increasing poverty by 3.8% right to use the body of another for sustenance.
increased the rate of abortion by 10% (90,000 But Thomson’s argument may serve a secondary
more abortions per year). In terms of employment, function as well: if successful, it allows us to simul-
increasing male employment by 4% is correlated taneously express respect for fetal life while main-
with a 21% drop in abortion rates, whereas increas- taining that women have a right to an abortion.
ing female employment by 4% is correlated with a As much as we can feel for the life of patients in
17% increase in abortion rates. Wright argues this need of organ transplants, we cannot force other-
increase may be related to a lack of affordable and wise healthy persons to donate nonvital organs to
quality childcare (Wright 2008). What seems to be save the sick. This does not mean that the lives of
effective in reducing abortion rates is not simply these patients have no value; rather what it means
criminalizing abortions (research illustrates that is that no matter how valuable they are, this value
countries with restrictive abortion laws nevertheless cannot be used as grounds to infringe upon the
have high incidences of abortion) (Deschner and rights of other persons. Similarly, we can argue
Cohen 2003, 7). Rather, what is effective is support that being prochoice need not entail a wanton dis-
for families once the infant is born: commitment to regard of fetal life, but, rather, an acknowledgment
nutritional and health care, quality childcare, and that, like all persons, pregnant women have a right
access to education or work programs designed to to decide if they want to use their bodies to sustain
help single mothers overcome poverty. another.
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Chapter ❮❮ Abortion
Even if Thomson’s argument is rejected, how- ought not to be taken lightly. This, for example,
ever, there are other avenues open to those who is the position of Ronald Dworkin, who spends
wish to simultaneously endorse abortion rights most of his book Life’s Dominion defending the
and respect for fetal life. As mentioned above, we right to an abortion on the grounds that early to
can appeal to Hursthouse’s use of virtue ethics to mid-term fetuses lack interests due to their lack of
distinguish between supporting a right to x, with- sentience and consciousness. Nevertheless, he still
out always endorsing how that right is exercised. regards an abortion as “a waste of a human life
Drawing this distinction allows one to argue that and is, therefore, in itself, a bad thing to happen, a
there are really two pertinent questions in abortion shame” (Dworkin 1993, 84). In other words, one
rights discourse: 1. Do women have a right to obtain can simultaneously deny that fetuses possesses
abortions? 2. Are all exercises of this right virtu- moral status and rights equal to those of persons
ous ones? one can answer the first question in the (because they lack certain morally relevant traits),
affirmative, while admitting that in some cases the but also deny that they are completely devoid of
second can be answered in the negative. The reason value altogether (because they possess other mor-
we may sometimes frown upon certain justifications ally relevant traits).
for obtaining an abortion is that it does involve the
death of a being that has moral value, and the death These are brief sketches of possible ways a pro-
of that being should be regarded with respect rather choice advocate can simultaneously endorse abor-
than flippancy (the latter, for example, is certainly tion rights and embrace the value of fetal life. All
the way the death of the fetus is regarded in cases of deserve more elaboration than I can offer here, and
abortion doping). none are devoid of difficulties. What I want to show
is that we do not have to completely erase the fetus
A third way is to deny that human fetuses are from moral consideration in order to defend abortion
persons who have interests, and therefore are not rights. The stereotype that prochoice advocacy inev-
rights-bearers (so that killing them does not vio- itably entails the dehumanization of the fetus does
late a right to life), but still maintain that they are not advance the prochoice position in the eyes of
valuable beings in virtue of their status as nascent American society. Prochoice advocates must do more
human life. A way to understand this perspec- to combat this stereotype, and we must do more to
tive is to consider our treatment of nonhuman broaden our arguments in favor of abortion rights
animals; although they are not typically consid- in a way that is open to respecting fetal life. Given
ered persons with a right to life (euthanizing an the constant onslaught of restrictive abortion laws,
animal, for example, is not considered homicide), prochoice advocacy cannot afford to be reduced or
many would agree that they should be treated erased from public discourse. Fetal life matters to
humanely and with respect in virtue of their sen- many women, including women who abort and who
tient nature, and that they should not be unjustifi- defend the right to abortion. Prochoice discourse
ably or wantonly killed, even if, ultimately, their could become stronger if we “embraced discussion
deaths are not tantamount to murder. Similarly, and images of the fetus and honest stories of the full
one can argue, because embryos and early fetuses range—from joy to grief—of women’s relationships
lack certain morally relevant traits (for example, to their fetuses and emotional responses to abortion”
embryos and early fetuses are nonsentient and (Ludlow 2008, 46).
lack the capacity for conscious awareness), kill-
ing them is not tantamount to murder. Yet because To trivialize fetal life is to dismiss the phenom-
they are living members of the species Homo sapi- enology of pregnancy and abortions for many
ens and because they are potential persons, they women. It is to be dismissive not just of nascent
possess morally relevant traits that render them human life, but of the very women whose rights we
worthy of some degree of respect, and their deaths fight so vehemently to defend and whose support
we may stand to lose.
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PART TWO ❯❯ ETHICAL ISSUES
NOTES* unsupportive, or that they will attempt to thwart
the abortion. Consequently, laws that require her to
Many thanks to Nina Anton, Jackie Gately (Arizona do so will likely put her in a situation of perceived
State University), Kate Padgett Walsh (Iowa State lack of support, which, in turn, may serve to retard
University), and Michelle Beer (Florida International her postabortion emotional adjustment.
University), for their help with earlier drafts and 5. I should emphasize here that I am not condemning
incarnations of this paper. Also, thank you to women who fail to grieve after an abortion. Women
who grieve should be allowed to do so, but that is
Ann Cudd, Asia Ferrin, and to the anonymous not to say that women must grieve, or that they are
Hypatia reviewers for all their comments, sugges- morally remiss if they fail to do so. In 2000, a post-
tions, and patience. Finally, as always, thank you abortion telephone counseling service called
to my husband Tuomas Manninen and our daughter “Exhale” opened its doors for any woman, partners,
Michelle for their support and love. family, or friends who wish to talk about any dif-
ficulties they are facing after an abortion. Their mis-
I would like to dedicate this paper to Professors sion statement reads: “Exhale creates a social
Jack and Melissa Mulder (Hope College). Although climate where each person’s unique experience with
we share differing views on abortion, they have abortion is supported, respected and free from
helped me realize the need that exists for prochoice stigma.” Although founded by women who have
and prolife advocates to dialogue about the difficult procured abortions, Exhale counselors do not
issues that are present on both sides of the abortion describe themselves as either “prochoice” or “pro-
debate, and the need that exists to take each other’s life,” but, rather, “provoice.” The popularity of
concerns more seriously. Exhale points to a need for their services, and pro-
choice advocates should make it a priority, as an
2. Some examples of studies that conclude there is no essential aspect of prochoice advocacy, to help meet
such condition as Post-Abortion Syndrome: Buckels the needs of these women.
1982; Adler et al. 1990; Dagg 1991; Stotland 6. Thank you to my anonymous Hypatia reviewer for
1991; Major and Cozzarelli 1992; Wilmouth et al. this wording.
1992; Gilchrist et al. 1995; Major et al. 2000;
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Ludlow, Jeannie. 2008. Sometimes, it’s a child and a
Francke, Linda. 1978. The ambivalence of abortion. choice: Toward an embodied abortion praxis. Femi-
New York: Random House. nism Formations 20 (1): 26–50.
Finer, Lawrence B., Lori F. Finer, Lindsay Frohwirth, Major, Brenda, and Catherine Cozzarelli. 1992. Psycho-
A. Dauphinee, Sushella Singh, and Ann M. Moore. social predictors of adjustment to abortion. Journal
2005. Reasons U.S. women have abortions: Quan- of Social Issues 48 (3): 121–42.
titative and qualitative perspectives. Perspectives on
Sexual and Reproductive Health 37 (3): 110–18. Major, Brenda, Josephine Zubek, M. Lynne Cooper, Cath-
erine Cozzarelli, and Caroline Richards. 1997. Mixed
Gilchrist, A. C., P. C. Hannaford, P. Frank, and C. R. Kay. messages: Implications of social conflict and social
1995. Termination of pregnancy and psychiatric support within close relationships for adjustment
morbidity. British Journal of Psychiatry 167 (2): to a stressful life event. Journal of Personality and
243–48. Social Psychology 72 (6): 1349–63.
Ginsburg, Faye. 1998. Contested lives: The abortion Major, Brenda, Mark Appelbaum, Linda Beckman, Mary
debate in an American community. Los Angeles: Ann Dutton, Nancy Felipe Russo, and Carolyn West.
University of California Press. 2009. Abortion and mental health—evaluating the
evidence. American Psychologist 64 (9): 863–90.
Hursthouse, Rosalind. 1991. Virtue theory and abortion.
Philosophy and Public Affairs 20 (3): 223–46.
Copyright 2018 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part. WCN 02-200-202
PART TWO ❯❯ ETHICAL ISSUES
Major, Brenda, Catherine Cozzarelli, M. Lynne Cooper, health/2011/06/09/137079714/poll-generation-
Josephine Zubek, Caroline Richards, Michael y-supports-gay-mar-riage-but-is-divided-on-
Wilhite, and Richard Gramzow. 2000. Psychologi- abortion?sc=fb&cc=fp (accessed November 21,
cal response of women after first-trimester abortion. 2011).
Archives of General Psychiatry 57: 777–78. Schalet, Amy. 2010. Sex, love, and autonomy in the
teenage sleepover. Contexts 9 (3): 16–21.
Major, Brenda, Mark Applebaum, Linda Beckman, Mary Stotland, Nada, ed. 1991. Psychiatric aspects of
Ann Dutton, Nancy Felipe Russo, and Carolyn West. abortion. Washington, D.C.: American Psychiatric
2008. Report of the APA task force on mental health Press.
and abortion. http://www.apa.org/pi/wpo/mental- Thomson, Judith Jarvis. 1971. A defense of abortion.
health-abortion-report.pdf (accessed November 21, Philosophy and Public Affairs 1 (1): 47–66.
2011). Torre-Bueno, Ava. 1997. Peace after abortion. San
Diego: Pimpernel Press.
Maxwell, Carol. 2002. Pro-life activists in America. Van Gelder, Linsy. 1978. Cracking the women’s
New York: Cambridge University Press. movement protection game. Ms. Magazine,
December.
McDonagh, Eileen. 1996. Breaking the abortion dead- Warren, Jocelyn T., S. Marie Harvey, and Jillian T.
lock: From choice to consent. New York: oxford Henderson. 2010. Do depression and low self-
University Press. esteem follow abortion among adolescents?
Evidence from a national study. Perspectives on
McDonnell, Kathleen. 1984. Not an easy choice: A fem- Sexual and Reproductive Health 42 (4): 230–35.
inist re-examines abortion. Toronto: The Women’s Warren, Mary Anne. 1973. On the moral and legal sta-
Press. tus of abortion. The Monist 57 (1): 43–61.
———. 1997. Moral status: Obligations to persons and
Munk-Olsen, Trine, Thomas Munk Laursen, Carsten other living things. New York: Oxford University
B. Pedersen, Øjvind Lidegaard, and Preben Bo Press.
Mortensen. 2011. Induced first-trimester abortion Wicklund, Sue, and Alan Kesselheim. 2007. This com-
and risk of mental disorder. New England Journal of mon secret: My journey as an abortion doctor. New
Medicine 364 (4): 332–38. York: Perseus Books.
Wilcox, John. 1989. Nature as demonic in Thomson’s
Needle, Rachel, and Lenore Walker. 2008. Abortion defense of abortion. New Scholasticism 63 (4):
counseling: A clinician s guide to psychology, legis- 463–84.
lation, politics, and competency. New York: Springer Wilmouth, Gregory, Martin de Alteriis, and Danielle Bus-
Publishing Company. sell. 1992. Prevalence of psychological risks follow-
ing legal abortion in the U.S.: Limits of the evidence.
Pearce, Diana. 1978. The feminization of poverty: Journal of Social Issues 48 (3): 37–66.
Women, work, and welfare. Urban and Social Wright, Joseph. 2008. Reducing abortion in America:
Change Review 11 (1-2): 28–36. The effect of socioeconomic factors. http://www.
catholicsinalliance.org/files/CACG_Final.pdf
Poppema, Suzanne. 1996. Why I am an abortion (accessed November 12, 2011).
doctor. New York: Prometheus Books. Zabin, L. S., M. B. Hirsch, and M. R. Emerson. 1989.
When urban adolescents choose abortion: Effects
Pressman, Steven. 2002. Explaining the gender pov- on education, psychological status, and subsequent
erty gap in developed and transitional economies. pregnancy. Family Planning Perspective 21 (6):
Journal of Economic Issues 36 (1): 17–40. 248–55.
Reardon, David. 1987. Aborted women: Silent no more.
Westchester, Ill.: Crossway Books.
Reid, T. R. 2010. Universal healthcare tends to cut
abortion rate. The Washington Post, March 14.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/
article/2010/03/12/AR2010031202287.html
(accessed November 12, 2011).
Rovner, Julie 2011. Poll: Generation Y divided on abor-
tion, like their parents. http://www.npr.org/blogs/
Copyright 2018 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part. WCN 02-200-202
REVIEW EXERCISES Chapter ❮❮ Abortion
1. Outline the various stages of fetal development. b. Only when a being can think and communicate
2. Explain the conclusions of Roe v. Wade and Planned does it have full moral status. Because a fetus
does not have these abilities, it has neither moral
Parenthood v. Casey. rights nor claims.
3. Give a utilitarian argument for abortion. Give one
c. If a fetus is a human being, then it has full moral
against abortion. Are these act or rule utilitarian status and rights.
arguments? Explain.
4. Describe how Thomson uses the violinist analogy to d. Its capacity to feel pain gives a being full moral
make an argument about the moral permissibility of status. The fetus has this capacity beginning in
abortion. the fifth or sixth month, and so abortion is not
5. Use Method I to make one argument for and one morally justifiable beyond that stage.
against abortion.
6. Which of the positions under Method II does each of e. Early-term fetuses do not have as much
the following statements exemplify? moral significance as later-term fetuses
a. Because this fetus has all the potential to develop because their potential is not as fully realized as
it is later.
the abilities of a person, it has all the rights of a
person.
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PART TWO ❯❯ ETHICAL ISSUES
DISCUSSION CASES
1. Abortion for Sex Selection. The sex of a child 3. Parental Consent to Abortion. Judy is a high
can now be determined before birth. In the waiting school sophomore and fifteen years old. She
room of a local women’s clinic, June has started a recently became sexually active with her boyfriend.
conversation with another woman, Ann. She finds She does not want to tell him that she is now preg-
out that each woman is there for an amniocentesis nant, and she does not feel that she can talk to her
to determine the sex of her fetus. June reveals that parents. They have been quite strict with her and
she wants to know the sex because her husband would condemn her recent behavior. They also
and his family really want a boy. Because they plan oppose abortion. Judy would simply like to end this
to have only one child, they plan to end this preg- pregnancy and start over with her life. However,
nancy if it is a girl and try again. Ann tells her that minors in her state must get parental consent for an
her reason is different. She is a genetic carrier of a abortion; it is viewed as a medical procedure like any
particular kind of muscular dystrophy. Duchenne other, and parents must consent to other medical
muscular dystrophy is a sex-linked disease that is procedures for their children.
inherited through the mother. Only males develop What should Judy do? Do you agree that states
the disease, and each male child has a 50 percent should require parental consent for abortion for
chance of having it. The disease causes muscle minors? Why or why not?
weakness and often some mental retardation. It also
causes death through respiratory failure, usually in 4. Pregnant Woman Detained. In 1995, a woman
early adulthood. Ann does not want to risk having who was pregnant and refused to discontinue
such a child, and this abnormality cannot yet be her use of cocaine was reported by her obstetri-
determined through prenatal testing. Thus, if the cian to child-abuse authorities.1 They obtained an
prenatal diagnosis reveals that her fetus is male, she order from the juvenile court to take custody of the
plans to end this pregnancy. unborn child, which, in this case, involved detaining
Is Ann justified in her plan to abort a male fetus? the mother against her will. The court maintained
Is June justified? Should there be laws regulating that in order to protect the fetus, it had to detain
sex-selective abortion? the mother. The mother gave birth while in a drug
treatment center. She sued the state for detaining
2. Father’s Consent to Abortion. Jim and Sue have her illegally. The case was settled after the child was
been planning to have a child for two years. Finally, born, with the court finding that the state acted
Sue becomes pregnant. However, their marriage has wrongly in taking protective custody of the fetus
been a rough one, and by the time she is in her third while it was still in the womb. As a result of these
month of pregnancy, they have decided to divorce. sorts of cases, state legislatures have passed laws
At this point, both parents are ambivalent about the such as the Wisconsin law mentioned above, which
pregnancy. They had both wanted the child, but define fetuses more clearly as children deserving
now things are different. Sue finally decides that she protection.2
does not want to raise a child alone and does not If the fetus is regarded as a child who is being
want to raise Jim’s child. She wants to get on with abused, then is it reasonable, in your view, to
her life. However, Jim has long wanted a child, and detain the mother? If the fetus is thus viewed as
he argues that the developing fetus is partly his own a person, should it have access to other rights
because he has provided half of its genetic makeup. and privileges? Would it also be reasonable for a
He does not want Sue to end the pregnancy. He pregnant woman to be able to use a car-pool lane
wants to keep and raise the child. by counting her fetus as a second person in the
Do you think that Jim has any moral rights in this car? If a pregnant woman is killed, resulting in the
case or should the decision be strictly Sue’s? Why or death of the fetus, does that count as one murder
why not? or two?
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NOTES Chapter ❮❮ Abortion
2. Robert D. Miller, Problems in Health Care Law
1. “Detention of Pregnant Woman for Drug Use Is
Struck Down,” New York Times, April 23, 1997, (Sudbury, MA: Jones & Bartlett, 2006), p. 395.
http://www.nytimes.com/1997/04/23/us/
detention-of-pregnant-woman-for-drug-use-is- For more chapter resources and
struck-down.html (accessed May 13, 2013). activities, go to MindTap.
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12 Sexual Morality
Learning Outcomes
After reading this chapter, you should be able to:
• Summarize disputes about same-sex • Evaluate moral arguments about sexual
marriage and other topics in sexual ethics including both consequentialist
• • morality. and non-consequentialist arguments.
Explain key cases and examples, includingUnderstand and criticize natural law
Eyecandy Images/Thinkstock • • recent developments. approaches to sexual morality.
Explain the importance of autonomy and Defend your own ideas about sexual
consent in thinking about sexual morality. ethics.
For more chapter resources and activities, go to MindTap.
In 2015, the United States Supreme Court ruled that same-sex marriages should be
legally recognized in all states. The Court concluded in its landmark Obergefell v.
Hodges decision, “same-sex couples may exercise the fundamental right to marry in
all States . . . there is no lawful basis for a State to refuse to recognize a lawful same-
sex marriage performed in another State on the ground of its same-sex character.”1
This decision concluded a decades-long debate that had raged across the country
regarding the legality of same-sex marriage. The moral question remains open, how-
ever. Soon after the Obergefell decision was reached, a county clerk in Kentucky, Kim
Davis, refused to issue a marriage licenses. She stated, “To issue a marriage license
which conflicts with God’s definition of marriage, with my name affixed to the certifi-
cate, would violate my conscience.”2 Davis was jailed as a result of her refusal. For
some, Davis is a hero. For others, Davis’s moral and religious objection to same-sex
marriage is old-fashioned and intolerant.
Some may think that the same-sex marriage issue is merely a matter of civil rights,
more properly discussed in Chapter 13 on equality and discrimination. They might
point out that interracial marriage was once viewed as a “moral” issue, while today
it is viewed almost exclusively as a question of civil rights. But underlying many of
the arguments against same-sex marriage is a moral claim about the proper form of
sexual relationships. It has only been since 2003 that the Supreme Court (in its deci-
sion in Lawrence v. Texas) declared that laws against sodomy are unconstitutional—
sodomy is usually taken to include any form of homosexual sex, as well as oral and
anal sex between heterosexual couples. The late Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia,
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Chapter ❮❮ Sexual Morality
who died in 2016, explained the thinking of those There are some 1,100 benefits that do not extend to
who want to avoid homosexuals in his dissent in the same-sex partners, including eligibility to file joint
Lawrence v. Texas decision: “Many Americans do income taxes, to inherit Social Security benefits, and
not want persons who openly engage in homosexual to defer estate taxes by passing property on to sur-
conduct as partners in their business, as scoutmas- viving spouses.5 In June 2013, the Supreme Court
ters for their children, as teachers in their children’s ruled, in United States v. Windsor, that part of the
schools, or as boarders in their home. They view this Defense of Marriage Act was unconstitutional. The
as protecting themselves and their families from a Court concluded, “DOMA instructs all federal offi-
lifestyle that they believe to be immoral and destruc- cials, and indeed all persons with whom same-sex
tive.”3 The claim that homosexuality is immoral and couples interact, including their own children, that
destructive points beyond the question of civil rights their marriage is less worthy than the marriages of
toward a deeper moral analysis of sexual morality. others.” The Court ruled that by “treating those per-
sons as living in marriages less respected than oth-
The evolution of Americans’ perspectives on ers” the law violated citizens due process rights.6
same-sex marriage has ranged across several During the course of the past two decades, homo-
decades. The federal Defense of Marriage Act was sexuals have gradually been granted legal rights and
passed in 1996 and signed into law by President Bill equal opportunities, culminating in the Obergefell
Clinton. The Act is intended to “define and protect decision of 2015. In 2011, for example, homosex-
the institution of marriage” and defines marriage as uals were allowed to openly serve in the military;
follows: “The word ‘marriage’ means only a legal in 2013, the Pentagon extended medical and other
union between one man and one woman as hus- benefits to the partners of gay soldiers.7
band and wife, and the word ‘spouse’ refers only to
a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a While the United States has been debating the
wife.”4 The law stipulated that states do not have issue, other countries have also legalized same-
to recognize marriages between homosexual cou- sex marriage. According to research published in
ples or provide these couples with the federal ben- 2015, nearly two dozen countries permit same-
efits accorded to couples in heterosexual marriages. sex marriage, primarily in Western Europe and the
Rob Melnychuk/Digital Vision/Getty Images
Tori (Left) and Kate Kuykendall with their five-month-old daughter, Zadie, celebrate
their civil marriage ceremony in West Hollywood, California.
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PART TWO ❯❯ ETHICAL ISSUES
Americas.8 While the legal tides appear to be rapidly well-known acronym LGBT stands for “Lesbian,
turning in favor of same-sex marriage in some parts Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender” (some add other let-
of the world, homosexuality and legal recognition ters and identities here including Queer, Questioning,
of homosexual relationships are fiercely contested Intersex, Pansexual, Asexual, and so on). And new
in other parts of the world. In 75 countries (mostly terms entered the public vocabulary, including the
in Africa and the Middle East), homosexuality is term cisgender, which is more or less the opposite
illegal. In some countries, homosexuality is punish- of transgender. Cisgender individuals feel at home in
able by death, including in Iran, Mauritania, Saudi traditional gender identities, while transgender indi-
Arabia, Sudan, and Yemen.9 And violence against viduals do not feel so at home. Discussions of the
homosexual people continues to be a problem. In ethics of gender overlap somewhat with discussions
June of 2016, a mass murderer opened fire in a gay of feminist concerns (as discussed in Chapter 9). The
nightclub in Orlando, killing 49 people in the worst question of sex or gender-reassignment surgeries and
atrocity committed against homosexual people in other procedures also overlap with issues in biotech-
the history of the United States. nology (see Chapter 18). But they also connect with
questions of sexual ethics. For example, one basic
While some may think that discussions of sexual question is whether we should be free to choose or
ethics are of minor importance since sex is a pri- change our gender—or whether obedience to the nat-
vate matter, the fact that some people are liable to ural law should lead us to conform to supposed natu-
be killed because of their sexual orientation indicates ral gender and sexual categories.
the importance of the discussion and the depth of
the dispute about sexual ethics. While homosexuality and transgender issues have
been in the public eye lately, one important basic
CURRENT ISSUES moral idea has to do with consent and autonomy.
Most would agree that rape is wrong—because it
The issue of homosexuality and same-sex mar- violates the autonomy of the victim. But what about
riage is one example of the sorts of ethical issues sexual acts that are freely consented to: masturba-
that arise with regard to sex and sexuality. Some of tion, anal or oral sex, sex with multiple partners,
these issues may overlap with considerations found and so on—are those actions somehow intrinsically
in other chapters. Sexual relations produce offspring, wrong, or should consenting adults be permitted to do
which may point toward discussions of contraception whatever they want with their own bodies? A related
and abortion (as we discuss in Chapter 11), as well as question is whether the law should regulate these
discussions of the use of biotechnologies including in practices, or whether the law should leave individu-
vitro fertilization and genetic testing (as discussed in als alone to pursue their own sexual gratification and
Chapter 18). Questions about sexuality are connected sexual relationships.
to issues related to gender identity, women’s rights,
and issues related to male dominance (as discussed in With regard to consent, there has been a renewed
Chapter 9). A thorough examination of sexual moral- public focus on the importance of obtaining affirma-
ity would include considerations of a range of issues tive consent for sexual relations. In California, for
including honor crimes, genital mutilation, sex traffick- example, in 2014, a law was passed which requires
ing, prostitution, pornography, polygamy, and so on. “affirmative consent” for sexual relations. One intent
of the so-called “yes means yes” law was to rule out
For example, consider the issue of transgender sexual relations that happened, for example, when
transitions and non-traditional gender and sexual someone was drunk or otherwise unable to consent.
identities. In the summer of 2015, just as the Supreme Defenders of the legislation worried that in some cases
Court was ruling on the Obergefell case, Caitlyn Jenner “no means no” was not enough. And behind this was
publicly announced that her transition from the male a concern about an epidemic in sexual assaults and
Bruce to the transgender woman Caitlyn was com- rapes on college campuses. One bit of data is impor-
plete. Suddenly, a range of issues related to gender tant to note with regard to unwanted sexual activity.
and sexual identity came into public focus. The now
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Chapter ❮❮ Sexual Morality
The Center for Disease Control report from 2011 notes be done to prevent sexually transmitted disease—
that “among females aged 18–24 whose first sex was including common sense use of condoms for pro-
before age 20, 11% ‘‘didn’t really want it to happen tection. But some argue that condom use—and
at the time,’’ 48% had mixed feelings.” Only 41% contraception in general—is immoral. For example,
‘‘really wanted it to happen at the time.’’10 The stan- the Catholic Church has been opposed to condom
dard of “yes means yes” rules out indifference, igno- use on moral grounds—and condemned by some for
rance, and mixed feeling. If someone doesn’t say no, this. But in recent years, the Church has softened
that’s not enough; consensual sex requires a positive its position. In 2010, Pope Benedict XVI hinted that
affirmation—and if you don’t know whether your condom use might be a sort of lesser evil, since it
partner says “yes,” you are obligated to ask. would prevent sexually transmitted disease.17
It is clear that there are a variety of ways that Sexually transmitted diseases raise a number of
human beings engage in sexual activity. Recent CDC ethical issues. Lying or concealing one’s STD status
data on sexuality offer some details about sexuality in from sexual partners is generally considered to be
the United States.11 For example, only about half of a violation of moral standards, although ethicists
teenagers 15–19 years old have had sex at least once. disagree about when in a romantic relationship this
This is a decline from previous decades. And the data information must be disclosed. One could also argue
indicate that teenagers are more responsible than that risky sexual behavior is not only dangerous for
they have been in previous generations, using birth the individuals involved but also for society. From a
control and condoms during sexual encounters.12 The utilitarian perspective that is concerned with public
good news is that teen pregnancy rates have been health—including the costs of sexually transmitted
declining in recent years. In 2011, teen birth rates diseases—it is important to work to reduce the inci-
fell to an historic low of only 31.3 per 1,000 women. dence of such diseases. One conservative strategy is
That rate represents a 49 percent drop from the high to minimize casual sexual encounters and encourage
teen birth rate of 61.8 per 1,000 in 1991.13 Teen sex monogamous sex within the confines of marriage.
is more consensual and teen pregnancy rates are A more liberal strategy is to find ways to increase
declining, even though American teen pregnancy usage of condoms, especially among sex workers
rates are higher than in European countries.14 and others who are at an increased risk of contract-
ing and transmitting disease. One interesting related
In the United States, adult sexual activity is varied, case is the effort to require adult film stars to use
as reported by the Centers for Disease Control.15 More condoms. Proponents of such regulation argue that
than 80 percent of adults aged 18–44 report that they this models appropriate sexual behavior and pre-
have engaged in oral sex. 35 percent of women and vents disease in an era when pornography is more
42 percent of men report that they have had anal sex. readily available. Opponents will argue that when
17 percent of women and 6 percent of men report adults engage in sexual activity in the pornography
having engaged in same-sex sexual contact. More industry, it is up to them to make their own deci-
than 92 percent of women and 95 percent of men sions about protection against disease.
identify as heterosexual or straight. 1.3 percent of
women and 1.9 percent of men identified as homo- This brings us to a discussion of pornography. In
sexual, gay, or lesbian, and 5 percent of women and the Internet age, pornography is easily found, even
2 percent of men identified as bisexual. stumbled upon. Defenders of pornography will argue
that it provides an outlet for sexual desire and a source
Sexual activity is not risk free. The CDC estimates of sexual stimulation which can enhance sexual rela-
that there are 19 million new cases of sexually tions, and that as long as it is consensual, there is no
transmitted infections every year, including 50,000 harm done. On the other hand, opponents of pornog-
new cases of HIV. More than one million Americans raphy will argue that pornography represents a general
are currently living with HIV. The good news is that loosening of sexual mores in our culture. Opponents
HIV infections and deaths are declining—which is may also argue that pornography has a negative
a worldwide trend.16 But more work still needs to
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PART TWO ❯❯ ETHICAL ISSUES
impact on gender relations because pornography tends One solution to unwanted pregnancy and sexu-
to objectify women (see further discussion in ally transmitted disease is better sex education.
Chapter 9). Opponents will also argue that pornogra- But in the United States, sex education is a con-
phy can undermine healthy sexual relations, especially tested area. Some want to promote abstinence and
when men expect women to behave and respond as discourage sexual activity among teenagers and
they do in pornography or when pornography helps outside of marriage. Others maintain that the key
create sex-addiction and unhealthy attitudes toward is to teach sexual health, including information
sex. Opponents will also argue that pornography can about condoms—which prevent STDs—and other
be produced as a result of coercion and sex-trafficking, forms of birth control. Studies do not clearly indi-
which is linked to illegal prostitution and rape. Other cate whether any single approach to sex educa-
problems include: child pornography, in which images tion has any significant impact on the subsequent
of underage minors are exchanged; so-called “revenge sexual behavior of students.20 But some studies do
pornography,” where people post pornographic images indicate that comprehensive sex education may help
of former partners; and the emerging problem of “sex- reduce teen pregnancies without increasing levels of
ting.” Sexting involves trading explicit photos via sexual intercourse or sexually transmitted disease.21
email or through text messages. While sexting between Sexual education curricula pose ethical challenges.
consenting adults might seem to be morally unprob- Proponents of comprehensive sex education want to
lematic, sexting has become a problem in high schools. empower students to make informed choices about
Minors who exchange sexually explicit pictures are sexuality, without imposing moral values on stu-
actually engaging in the exchange of child pornogra- dents. But proponents of abstinence-only sex edu-
phy. Although the legal system and disciplinary sys- cation maintain that teenagers are too young to be
tems in the schools have tried to find a way to deal engaging in sexual acts, which they believe should
with high school sexting that does not result in label- take place only within marriages. Defenders of
ing experimenting teens as child pornographers and abstinence-only sex education also worry that when
sex offenders, this issue points toward the problem of sexual practices are discussed with children, this dis-
sexual morality and pornography in the era of smart cussion can stimulate unhealthy interest in having
phones and social media. sex. Opponents of abstinence-only sex education
complain that abstinence programs sneak religious
For more chapter resources and ideas about marriage and sexuality into the class-
activities, go to MindTap. room, while proponents of abstinence maintain that
their primary concern is student health.22
In addition to its impact on physical health, sex-
uality can also affect emotional and psychological While teen pregnancy has declined, the over-
health. A 2007 study that explored teens’ post-sex all rate of births outside of marriage is rising. More
emotions found that many first-time experiences than half of births to women under age 30 occur
resulted in guilt or feeling manipulated, with girls outside of marriage.23 In addition, the incidence of
more often reporting this than boys. Of the teens who cohabitation, or living with one’s partner before
had engaged in oral sex, 41 percent “said they felt marriage, has increased dramatically in recent years,
bad about themselves later” and “nearly 20 percent nearly tripling between 1990 and 2000.24 As of May
felt guilty, and 25 percent felt used,” while the fig- 2009, there were more than five million cohabiting
ures were 42 percent and 38 percent for sexual inter- couples in the United States. Further, “the major-
course.18 It’s not just teens who report mixed feelings ity of cohabitants either break up or marry within
about sexual experiences and their outcomes. The five years.”25 This rise in cohabitation comes at a
CDC found that that 13.8 percent of all pregnancies time when Americans are delaying marriage until
were “unwanted at the time of conception.”19 later in life. Those who marry after age twenty-
five are less likely to divorce than those who marry
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Chapter ❮❮ Sexual Morality
in their teens. It is often assumed that cohabiting anesthetic and often performed with unclean and
couples who marry are more likely to divorce than crude instruments. If the labia have been stitched
those who did not live together before marriage, and together, a reverse cutting is frequently necessary
there is some evidence for this.26 “Couples who live before intercourse can take place—this subsequent
together before they get married are less likely to procedure can also be quite painful. In addition, FGM
stay married,” a recent study has found.27 However, can cause problems in childbirth.32 In fact, the more
this may also be because of the type of people who extensive forms of this procedure raise “by more
cohabitate, being more liberal and less religious, for than 50 percent the likelihood that the woman or
example. If they are engaged or committed or their her baby will die.”33 The World Health Organization
relationship is based on love, then they are no less explains, “the FGM procedure that seals or narrows
likely to later divorce.28 a vaginal opening needs to be cut open later to allow
for sexual intercourse and childbirth. Sometimes
Almost everywhere in the world, different sexual it is stitched again several times, including after
standards apply to men and to women. In many childbirth, hence the woman goes through repeated
traditional societies, women’s sexuality is viewed opening and closing procedures, further increasing
as unclean or sinful and in need of control or sup- both immediate and long-term risks.”34
pression. In some Arab countries, women are not
allowed to appear in public without special clothing The 1996 U.S. Federal Criminalization of Female
to preserve their “modesty” or without the presence Genital Mutilation Act prohibited this practice for
of a male relative. Many religious traditions, includ- women under eighteen years of age. Human rights
ing Orthodox Judaism, prohibit men from coming groups have lobbied internationally for an end to
into contact with women while they are menstru- this practice, which in some countries is “routinely
ating and require rituals to “cleanse” women after forced on girls as young as four or five years old,
menstruation. and . . . sustained through social coercion.”35 In
Africa, between 60 and 90 percent of all women
A particularly extreme example of societal con- and girls in certain countries undergo the procedure,
trol of women’s sexuality is that of female genital even in countries where it is illegal. Many Muslim
mutilation (FGM), or so-called female circumci- critics argue that there is no basis for this practice
sion. Although many countries have outlawed it, the in the Qur’an; in fact, they note that this holy book
practice persists in more than twenty-eight African commands parents to protect their children from
countries and several countries in Asia and the harm and regards people’s anatomy as part of God’s
Middle East, as well as some immigrant communi- creation.36 Despite the fact that FGM is already illegal
ties in the West.29 According to the World Health in this country, the practice persists in some immi-
Organization, 140 million girls and women are liv- grant communities, and parents have been known
ing with the consequences of FGM, while more than to take their daughters to other countries for this
three million girls have this done to them every year procedure. In early 2013, President Obama signed
(that’s more than eight thousand girls per day).30 the Transport for Female Genital Mutilation Act,
FGM can involve different degrees of severity— which amended the 1996 law by making it a crime
from excision of the skin surrounding the clitoris, to to take girls from the United States to foreign coun-
removal of all or part of the clitoris and some of the tries for the purpose of mutilating their genitals. This
surrounding tissues, to stitching the labia together followed closely a United Nations General Assem-
so that only a small opening remains. Among the bly resolution that called for a global ban against
cultural and parental reasons given for these prac- the practice of FGM. According to the UN Women
tices are to enable families to exercise control over website, “the FGM resolution urges countries to con-
reproduction, to keep women virgins until marriage, demn all harmful practices that affect women and
and to reduce or eliminate female sexual pleasure.31 girls, in particular female genital mutilations, and
The procedure is usually done without even a local
Copyright 2018 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part. WCN 02-200-202
PART TWO ❯❯ ETHICAL ISSUES
to take all necessary measures, including enforcing sexual assault has fallen by more than 60 percent
legislation, awareness-raising and allocating suffi- in recent years.41 Rape is clearly wrong according to
cient resources to protect women and girls from this many different ethical standards. In most places, it is
form of violence.”37 illegal. But in many parts of the world, women are
still blamed (to varying degrees) for being victims of
A central idea in the move to eliminate female rape. As we mentioned in our discussion of honor
genital mutilation is the idea that women as well as crimes in Chapter 9, in some cultures, rape victims
men have a right to benefit from sexual pleasure and are forced to marry their rapists or are even killed by
that individuals have a right to control their own family members for bringing shame on the family.
anatomy. According to the World Health Organiza-
tion, one significant motivation behind the practice Rape can happen within the family. In most cases,
appears to be the desire to control female sexuality. incest is a form of rape because it involves minors
One common theme in cultures that practice FGM is who cannot consent to sexual acts. And since the
an effort to minimize women’s sexual urges, which 1970s, European countries and individual states in
would “thereby increase their ability to remain a vir- the United States have recognized that women can
gin prior to marriage, and to remain faithful and not be raped by their husbands. It wasn’t until 1993
too demanding within marriage.”38 The issue of con- that all states in the United States criminalized spou-
trolling female sexuality is obviously connected to sal rape.42 But married women in other parts of the
feminist concerns (as discussed in Chapter 9). world are not protected by marital rape laws. There
is no law against raping one’s wife in India, China,
Attempts to exercise control over female sexu- Afghanistan, Pakistan, or Saudi Arabia.43
ality is also closely connected to the problem of
rape. At one point, rape was rationalized as being Another issue of profound moral concern is sex
the result of uncontrollable male lust. But starting trafficking, which generally involves women and
in the 1970s, feminists such as Susan Brownmiller girls being coerced into the sex trade both in the
began pushing society to recognize that rape is “not United States and abroad. Sex trafficking is a subset
a crime of irrational, impulsive, uncontrollable lust, of human trafficking, which involves the transport
but is a deliberate, hostile, violent act of degrada- and captivity of individuals across international bor-
tion and possession on the part of a would-be con- ders for a variety of illegal purposes. According to a
queror.”39 While it is important to recognize that 2012 report by the United Nations Office on Drugs
rape is a crime of violence and domination, it also and Crime, “trafficking for the purpose of sexual
has an unmistakably sexual element. Reliable sta- exploitation accounts for 58 percent of all traffick-
tistics on the incidence of rape are difficult to estab- ing cases detected globally.”44 The FBI states that,
lish. One reason is underreporting. Another reason “human sex trafficking is the most common form of
is the incidence of acquaintance rape. Two-thirds modern-day slavery. Estimates place the number of
of rapes are committed by someone known to the domestic and international victims in the millions,
victim.40 One form of this is so-called “date rape,” a mostly females and children enslaved in the com-
form of sexual assault that is particularly prevalent mercial sex industry for little or no money.”45 The
among young adults of college age. While there are report continues,
problems with regard to the way that data on rape
and sexual assault are collected, one estimate, from The average age at which girls first become victims
the Rape, Abuse & Incest National Network, is that of prostitution is 12 to 14. It is not only the girls on
every two minutes someone in the United States the streets who are affected; boys and transgender
is sexually assaulted. In raw numbers, that means youth enter into prostitution between the ages of 11
that more than two hundred thousand people are and 13 on average. . . .These women and young girls
sexually assaulted in the United States every year. are sold to traffickers, locked up in rooms or brothels
These numbers remain high despite the fact that for weeks or months, drugged, terrorized, and raped
repeatedly. These continual abuses make it easier for
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Chapter ❮❮ Sexual Morality
the traffickers to control their victims. The captives in order to have moral significance. However, most
are so afraid and intimidated that they rarely speak of us would not want to hold that personal mat-
out against their traffickers, even when faced with an ters cannot be moral matters. Furthermore, con-
opportunity to escape. sider that sexual behavior lends itself to valuable
experiences—those of personal relations, pleasure,
The bleak and brutal reality of the sex trade fruitfulness and descendants, and self-esteem and
throws a moral wrench in the arguments of those enhancement. It also involves unusual opportuni-
who would defend consensual prostitution as a vic- ties for cruelty, deceit, unfairness, and selfishness.
timless crime. (It also raises questions about por- Because these are moral matters, sexual behavior
nography, some of which clearly involves victims of must have moral significance.
sex trafficking.) It might be that some sex transac-
tions are consensual and mutually beneficial both CONCEPTUAL PROBLEMS: WHAT IS AND
for the prostitute and for the customer. But in many IS NOT SEXUAL
cases, there is coercion and exploitation. One pro-
posal to solve this problem is to legalize prostitu- Discussions of sexual morality are likely to benefit
tion to encourage healthy and noncoercive sexual from a more intensive analysis of sexuality itself.
exchanges. In the state of Nevada, some counties Just what are we talking about when we speak of
allow highly regulated brothels to operate legally. sexual pleasure, sexual desire, or sexual activ-
And in some countries, such as the Netherlands, ity? Consider the meaning of the qualifier sexual.
prostitution is legal. In other countries, such as Thai- Suppose we said that behavior is sexual when it
land and Belgium, prostitution is nominally illegal— involves “pleasurable bodily contact with another.”
but, in practice, it is tolerated. It remains an open Will this do? This definition is quite broad. It
question whether legal sex trades prevent or reduce includes passionate caresses and kisses as well as
sex crimes and abuse. sexual intercourse. But it would not include activ-
ity that does not involve another individual, such
Sex trafficking, rape, and FGM clearly raise seri- as masturbation or looking at pornography. It would
ous moral issues about human autonomy, agency, also exclude erotic dancing, phone sex, and “sex-
and rights to bodily integrity. Some ethicists would ting” because these activities do not involve physi-
argue that it is these ethical standards that should be cal contact with another. So the definition seems to
the focus of what we call “sexual morality”—rather be too narrow.
than any judgments we make about the sexual pref-
erences and practices between consenting adults. However, this definition is also too broad. It cov-
They would further argue that we make too much of ers too much. Not all kisses or caresses are sexual,
the morality of sexual behavior and often talk about even though they are physical and can be pleasur-
it as the only moral issue. When we hear expressions able. And the contact sport of football is supposedly
such as “Doesn’t he have any morals?” or “She has pleasurable for those who play it, but presumably
loose morals,” the speakers are often referring to the not in a sexual way. It seems reasonable to think
person’s sexual morals. But many other moral issues of sexual pleasure as pleasure that involves our so-
are arguably more important than sexual behavior called erogenous zones—those areas of the body that
between consenting adults. are sexually sensitive. Could we then say that sexu-
ality is necessarily bodily in nature? To answer this
Some people may even be inclined to say that question, try the following thought experiment. Sup-
one’s sexual behavior is not a moral matter at all. pose we did not have bodies—in other words, sup-
Is it not a private matter and too personal and indi- pose we were ghosts or spirits of some sort. Would
vidual to be a moral matter? To hold that it is not we then be sexual beings? Could we experience sex-
a moral matter, however, would seem to imply that ual desire, for example? If we did, it would surely
our sexual lives are morally insignificant. Or it might be different from that which we now experience.
imply that something has to be public or universal
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