The words you are searching are inside this book. To get more targeted content, please make full-text search by clicking here.
Discover the best professional documents and content resources in AnyFlip Document Base.
Published by siftinguw, 2017-04-18 11:32:37

S&W First Edition

S&W First Edition

Undergraduate Journal of Political Science, Law and Public Policy

Draft Journal.indd 1 Volume 1, Fall 2015 Issue

11/10/2015 3:45:25 PM

November, 2015. University of Wisconsin Madison.
All Rights Reserved.

This journal is made possible thanks to a generous grant
from the Bradley Foundation and the Center for the Study of

Liberal Democracy.

All inquiries may be directed to:
Sifting and Winnowing Editors-In-Chief

University of Wisconsin - Madison
800 Langdon St.
Madison, WI

[email protected]

Draft Journal.indd 2 2

11/10/2015 3:45:25 PM

Undergraduate Journal of Political Science, Law and Public Policy

Volume 1, Fall 2015 Issue


Kelsey Beuning - Co-Editor in Chief
Jacob Schwid - Co-Editor in Chief

Louisa Lincoln - Editor
Signe Janoska-Bedi - Editor

Sam Alhadeff - Editor
Rachel Fox - Editor
Spencer Jastrow - Editor
Jake Horwitz - Editor
Sam Kastner - Editor
Howard Schweber - Faculty Advisor

Draft Journal.indd 3 11/10/2015 3:45:29 PM


Undergraduate Journal of POLITICAL SCIENCE, law and public policy

Volume 1, Fall 2015


The Silent Sanussi State: The Jessie Steinhauer 6
Hidden History of Genocide
in Libya

Seeing Like a State Builder: Edward Knudsen 14
“High Modernist” War and Allison Myren 24
American Intervention in

Oil for (Regime) Security: Saudi
Arabian Support of the Iraq
War in 2003

Bombing Hearts and Radicalizing Sam Kastner 34
Minds: Consequences of Lauren Andraski 42
U.S. Counterrorism Policy,
and the Potential for Its Revision 11/10/2015 3:45:29 PM

‘Jebale’: The Success of
Ugandan Non-Governmental
Organizations and
Community Based Organizations
in the Face of Formidable


Draft Journal.indd 4

from the editors

“Whatever may be the limitations which trammel inquiry elsewhere, we believe that the great state Universi-
ty of Wisconsin should ever encourage that continual and fearless sifting and winnowing by which alone the

truth can be found.”
-University of Wisconsin Board of Regents, 1894
Embedded into the mission and history of University of Wisconsin-Madison is the search for truth through
academics. When Sifting and Winnowing was founded, it was done so on the principle that in-depth research,
discussion and argumentation are key to this search for truth. In our first issue, we hope that this is made ev-
ident, as these phenomenal student researchers and authors express their individual searches for answers and
understanding. It is our belief that by publishing student works which exemplify this ideal, we can foster an
environment of elevated discussion on campus while also giving student authors recognition for their excep-
tional work. By featuring papers on a wide variety of topics, from non-governmental organizations in Uganda,
to a historical analysis of U.S. policy in Vietnam, to a research based discussion of the modern hot-topic of
drones, our first edition seeks to both enable and embody the search for truth. It is our hope that Sifting and
Winnowing can become an outlet for students who have crafted excellent writing, powerful arguments and
comprehensive research. In doing so, we also hope to inspire future students to rise to the level of those who
came before them and participate in the “continual and fearless sifting and winnowing by which alone truth
can be found.” We are deeply grateful to everyone who made this possible, from the Bradley Foundation in
their generous funding, to our faculty adviser Howard Schweber and his endless musings on buttons versus
stickers; from our editors who consistently show up with positive (if irrepressibly goofy) attitudes, to all the
students who submitted their work. We also want to thank the professors who reviewed our pieces and every-
one else who has supported us along the path to our first edition. None of this would be possible without all of

On Wisconsin,
Kelsey Beuning & Jacob Schwid
Co-Editors in Chief, 2015 - 2016

Draft Journal.indd 5 11/10/2015 3:45:31 PM

The Silent
Sanussi State:

The Hidden
History of
Genocide in Libya

Jessie Steinhauer

Draft Journal.indd 6 11/10/2015 3:45:32 PM

: Sifting and Winnowing Undergraduate Journal, Volume 1

ya The Silent Sanussi State: The Hidden
History of Genocide in Libya

Jessie Steinhauer

In the study of political science, it is critically important to understand historical context in or-
der to understand modern policy applications. This is especially true when analyzing regions
with histories of colonization, genocide and other forms of extreme strife, as these events
continue to profoundly impact these regions to this day. Jessie Steinhauer’s piece offers a
thorough analysis of the relatively recent and largely undiscussed history of the Sanussi Order
in Libya and the atrocities committed against this group under the Italian fascist government.
Her analysis serves to underscore the importance of historical context when analyzing mod-
ern day policies, as the history of this region highlights flaws in the way genocide defined and
viewed in the modern world. In a region like North Africa that is fraught with conflict and
contentious politics, understanding histories like this is crucial to understanding the political
climate that exists today.

Louisa Lincoln & Spencer Jastrow, Editors

Introduction available evidence, it is clear that the Italian colonizers
possessed intent to destroy the target group as a political
In the early 1930s, Italy perpetrated brutal acts of vi- and social entity and perpetrated acts prohibited under
Article II of the United Nation’s Genocide Convention
olence against the Libyan population in an effort sub- (UNGC) in an effort to secure their imperial vision.1
due the indigenous population and colonize the land.
The imperial policy resulted in acts of genocide that However, a case of genocide has never been declared
remain virtually unknown and unidentified, ignoring in Libya. This paper seeks to analyze why a claim of
the lasting consequences felt by the Libyan people. Un- genocide in Cyrenaica is so contentious and what this
der Italian colonization, Libyans experienced deporta- means for the larger definitional issues of the UNGC.
tion, internment, violence on a massive scale and mass
destruction of the countryside. The fascist regime im- Labeling the systematic violence against the Sa-
plemented acts to repress and subdue the indigenous nussis in Cyrenaica as genocide is complicated largely
population, particularly targeting the eastern region of because of the difficulty in classifying the target group
Libya, known as Cyrenaica. Even based on limited as a ‘racial, religious, ethnic, or national’ group as these
terms are currently defined in the UNGC.2 Because of

Draft Journal.indd 7 7

11/10/2015 3:45:33 PM

Sifting and Winnowing Undergraduate Journal, Volume 1

these definitional issues, the UNGC possesses little The rise of the Sanussi Order, one of the most influ-
more than symbolic significance and needs a more nu- ential socio-religious movements of the 20th century,
anced understanding of which entities constitute a served to perpetuate Cyrenaica’s autonomy from for-
‘nation’ group to formulate a more coherent, effective eign forces.4 Founded by Muhammad Ali al-Sanussi,
definition that can better identify, prevent, and punish a religious scholar originally from Algeria, the Order
cases and perpetrators of genocide. This paper posits was able to transcend competing ethnic and tribal iden-
that despite the Sanussi Order not being classified as a tifications due to an ideology grounded in Sufi Islamic
protected group, the Italian fascist state would be able practices that espoused the virtues of universal brother-
to be indicted under the UNGC solely on the basis of its hood and education.5 Historian Ali Ahmida argues that
systematic intent to destroy and the acts it committed al-Sanussi recognized the threat imperial encroachment
against the Sanussi Order. on the North African continent presented to Cyrenaican
autonomy and endeavored to prepare the population to
Thus, it is only the UNGC’s restrictive definition defend itself against foreign colonizers by building a
of ‘protected groups’, particularly its conception of coherent, unified community.6
nation, that prevents the Cyrenaican case from being
classified as genocide. While the Sanussi Order was not Sanussi Statehood
internationally recognized as a ‘nation’ at the time these
acts were perpetrated, the expansive nature and state- The Sanussi Order provided an elaborate, coherent
like structure of the entity suggest that the individuals socioeconomic structure for the tribes of Cyrenaica and
living in Cyrenaica conformed to a Sanussi nationality. began to develop into a de facto state through a com-
Thus, the restrictive definition of ‘nation’ ignores the bination of religious, social, and commercial factors.
multi-faceted nature of the society in which individuals Mobilizing the population around a message of Sufi
orient themselves and their own perceptions of identity. revival, the religious fraternity took on the trappings of
This suggests a need to re-conceptualize the term ‘na- a state as it built an education system and developed
tional group’ under the UNGC to better protect all hu- the capacity for tax collection and law enforcement.7
man groups from the heinous crime of genocide in this To continue to expand its influence and control over
increasingly complex, interdependent world system. formerly disparate tribes, the Order constructed Sufi
lodges throughout Cyrenaica, growing to a size of 146
Cyrenaica: Rise of the Sanussi Order lodges by 1920.8 The lodges, which were the Order’s
administrative system, functioned as worship centers,
Spanning vast deserts with little natural water resourc- schools, guest houses, and storerooms. Paid staff act-
es, Libya’s topography encouraged the development of ed as de facto government officials who lead worship,
three distinct geographical regions: Tripolitania in the taught, collected taxes, and proclaimed judicial deci-
west, Fezzan in the south, and Cyrenaica in the east. sions over the followers.9
The regions developed distinct socioeconomic and po-
litical dynamics as a result of the presence of natural In 1911, Italy invaded Libya. By 1912, the Ottoman
barriers that discouraged communication. This trend Empire sued the Italian state for peace, granted inde-
was further entrenched by the lack of a strong state or pendence to the Libyans and pulled out of the county.10
ruler capable of subduing the hinterland tribes under Following the Italian invasion, the Sanussiyya began to
a central command. The tribes of Cyrenaica, majority talk more explicitly in terms of a Sanussi state, which
ethnic Bedouin with pastoralist economic practices, found expression in anti-colonial resistance. Although
were particularly effective at defeating invading cen- the Sanussiyya had developed the basic infrastructure
tralizing forces. They successfully resisted Ottoman necessary to successfully function as a state by the
rule, pushing Ottoman forces and officials to marginal 1890s, it was not until 1913 that the Sanussi leader,
urban centers, and subsequently, retained their autono- Muhammad al-Mahdi, declared the Sanussi Order an
my until the middle of the 19th century.3 independent state.11

Draft Journal.indd 8 8

11/10/2015 3:45:33 PM

Sifting and Winnowing Undergraduate Journal, Volume 1

Italian Colonization: Ideology and preoccupation with WWI and the economic and politi-
cal fallout from the war.18 Reflecting this atmosphere of
Resistance accommodation, the Italians even signed treaties with
the Sanussi Order in 1915, 1917, and 1920.19 Thus, be-
Italian invasion and colonization was motivated by tween 1914 and 1922, Cyrenaica operated largely au-
diverse ideological, economic, and political forces. Be- tonomously from both Tripolitania and Fezzan and the
ginning in 1886, increasing nationalist sentiment led to Italian colonizing forces enabling the Sanussi Order to
calls for colonial expansion as a means to return Italy to continue to function as a de facto state.
its historic imperial authority and protect its sovereign-
ty in an unstable European region.12 In keeping with the E. E. Evans-Pritchard, an expert on Cyrenaica, refers
overt imperialism present in Italy’s colonization policy, to the Sanussi authority as a ‘Theocratic Empire’ that
it was believed that as an heir to the Roman Empire, the transcended tribal allegiances and provided a broader,
colonization of Libya was well within Italy’s legitimate regional layer of governance and political authority.20
right.13 Economic depression in 1880 also spurred moti- The Sanussi Order created a strong resistance move-
vations for colonial expansion as Italy sought new mar- ment under its political umbrella that supplied resourc-
kets to bolster stagnated European trade. Further, grow- es, organized volunteer fighters, and provided symbolic
ing domestic, societal, and political tensions threatened motivation behind which the population rallied. Led by
the status quo. As landless and sharecropping peasants Umar al-Mukhtar, the most famous symbol of foreign
began vying for land and voting rights, the ruling class resistance in modern Libya, the Bedouin fighters devel-
labeled the discontent due to overpopulation and adver- oped into an organized, guerilla resistance movement
tised the colonization of North Africa as a convenient complete with a military council and base camps.21 The
solution.14 Bedouin population’s famed mobility and fighting ca-
pabilities combined with the political leadership and
Following the invasion’s success, Italy viewed col- mobilizing power of the Sanussi Order enabled Cyre-
onization as essential to its sovereignty and status. In naica to hold off the militarily-superior Italian forces
Tripoli and Young Italy, the author Charles Lapworth, for almost a decade from 1923-1932.22 It is evident that
who investigated Italy’s socialist movement at the the Cyrenaican population did not operate on ideas of
time of the invasion, declared that colonization was individualism but acted as a member of a collective
perceived as necessary to “save the soul” of Italy and community, one that solidified as a community in op-
subsequently, the “citizen’s first duty was towards his position to colonial forces and operated under Sanussi
own country; his duty towards humanity took second authority.
place.”15 In keeping with the notion that Libya fell
within Italy’s legitimate sphere of influence, the long- Regime Change: A Policy of
term goal was to make the disparate regions of Libya a
part of Italy proper. Subsequently, in 1939, Cyrenaica Genocide
was formally incorporated into the Italian Kingdom.16
Political upheaval resulted in the rise of a totalitarian
Italian colonization faced resistance from all three regime in 1923 that possessed an exclusionary ideology.
regions in Libya. Tripolitania and Fezzan were suc- This ideology and the instability created by the ongoing
cessfully conquered for a short time and Italian forces conflict with the strong guerilla resistance movement in
occupied coastal areas after 1915.17 Because of a lack Cyrenaica combined to help foster a permissive envi-
of political coherence due to the dominance of tribal ri- ronment for acts of genocide. Reflecting a shift in pol-
valries, Tripolitania and Fezzan did not develop strong, icy, all treaties with the Sanussi Order were voided as
long-term resistance movements and in later colonial the Italians re-initiated a campaign of conquest.23 Mus-
policy, were not targeted with the same vengeance as solini’s promises of stability and international prestige
in Cyrenaica. Until 1922, Italian policy in Libya was necessitated the pacification of the indigenous Libyan
largely one of concessions when dealing with tribal and population. Thus, the new regime aspired to gain un-
regional forces. This was due to an inability to consoli-
date control, in part because of Italy’s contested control over the territory and finally secure


Draft Journal.indd 9 11/10/2015 3:45:33 PM

Sifting and Winnowing Undergraduate Journal, Volume 1

hegemony over the Sanussi in Cyrenaica. General Gra- marginally more conducive to survival. Daily life
ziani was tasked with suppressing the population and during internment is difficult to verify because of the
ending any previous indications of collaboration. Sub- lack of documentation, but the oral history of the sur-
sequently any treaty conditions or rights granted before vivors makes for a compelling case for the destructive
1922 were dismissed.24 Yet these measures, particularly effects of internment on the group’s psychological and
the negation of the Acroma treaty in 1923, served to physical wellbeing.
further unite the Cyrenaican population, as they mobi-
lized under Sanussi leadership in resistance to the Ital- From 1929-1934, the total death toll, including
ians, and solidified the Sanussi Order’s conception as shootings, hangings, forced deportation, starvation, and
an economically and politically viable state structure.25 disease is estimated to be at least 60,000 of the original
In response, Mussolini ratcheted up the campaign and 185,000 Cyrenaican population.33 The nomadic, pasto-
ordered Pietro Badoglio, the colonial governor of Lib- ralist population also lost about 90-95% of sheep, goats,
ya, and Graziani to quell the resistance by any means and horses and almost 80% of cattle and camels because
necessary, even it meant killing civilians.26 of confiscation or death during that same time period.34
A Bedouin man interned in the al-Agheila camp recalls
Italian rhetoric became increasingly vitriol with the daily death toll: “fifty corpses a day, each day. We
the nomadic society of the Cyrenaican interior be- always counted them. People who had been killed. Peo-
ing perceived as “deviant” and “uncivilized”.27 Ev- ple who had been hung or shot. Or people who had died
ans-Pritchard writes: “the Italians spoke of [the Bedou- of hunger or illness.”35 The camp conditions were par-
ins] as barbarians, little better than beasts, and treated ticularly devastating for an independent, nomadic and
them accordingly.”28 The perception that the nomadic semi-nomadic population accustomed to freely roam-
population was rooted in the natural landscape influ- ing the open land. The camps stripped the Bedouin-Sa-
enced the notion that the entire society was resistant nussi of their dignity and autonomy and their traditional
to ‘modern’ Italy. Therefore, the Italians believed the modes of social and economic existence, which result-
entire population needed to be subdued through the ed in lasting physical, ecological, and psychological
most modern technologies capable of violence on a damage. Evans-Pritchard underscores this by writing,
large-scale.29 Badoglio alludes to this mentality of total “hunger, disease, and broken hearts took heavy toll of
destruction with a 1929 message that threatened that the imprisoned population. Bedouins die in a cage.”36
“no rebel will be left in peace, neither he nor his family
nor his heirs [because the Italians] will destroy every- Yet, destroying the group physically and culturally
thing, men and things.” The resultant 1929-1932 policy was the aim of the Italians. Evidence that the Italians
of genocide was not an isolated event, but the prod- knew their policies would result in large-scale civilian
uct of cumulative radicalization over two decades as deaths is found in a letter written from Pietro Badoglio
authorities became ever more willing to adopt extreme to General Graziani on June 20, 1930. Describing the
measures in search of a final solution.30 heightened repression tactics, he writes, “I do not con-
ceal from myself the significance and gravity of this
Cyrenaica: A Time of Genocide action, which may spell the ruin of the so-called sub-
ject population. But by now the path has been marked
Colonial policy entered a new phase in which the out and we must follow it to the end, even if the whole
Cyrenaican population was uprooted and incarcerated population of Cyrenaica should perish.”37 Thus, it is
in concentration camps. The Italians spent thirteen clear that the Italians were aware of the widespread de-
million Italian liras on the construction of 16 camps struction their systematic policies would bring to the
that featured double barbed-wire fences surrounding indigenous population and nonetheless, proceeded with
them.31 In 1929, two-thirds of the Cyrenaican popu- calculated malice. These policies targeting the entire
lation was deported, which amounted to an estimated Cyrenaican population constitute actions prohibited in
70,000-100,000 men, women, and children.32 They Article II as acts of genocide. These include: 1) kill-
were marched over 600 miles of desert during inhospi- ing members of the group; 2) causing serious bodily or
table winter conditions to camps that were only mental harm to members of the group; 3) deliberately
inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated


Draft Journal.indd 10 11/10/2015 3:45:33 PM

Sifting and Winnowing Undergraduate Journal, Volume 1

to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in at an unprecedented level which was not experienced
part.38 While the exact number of individuals directly in Libya’s other regions. By analyzing the context in
killed is unknown, it is evident that both direct killings which the Italian colonization of Libya occurred, it is
and the constructed situation perpetuating starvation, evident that the imperial policy eventually resulted in
disease, sexual assault, and displacement signal Italian genocide. The Italians believed that the Sanussi resis-
intent to bring about the group’s mental and physical tance threatened regime stability and subsequently, vi-
destruction. The notion that Italy targeted the entire Sa- olence was used in order to quell an uprising. This is in
nussi Order and its members, not only resistance fight- keeping with the theory that the majority of genocidal
ers, is evidenced in Graziani’s statement in 1932: “the episodes have been carried out within the context of
Cyrenaican rebellion, was an expression of hostility to conflict whereby authorities rationalize violence ac-
our rule that has been developed and consolidated in tions as necessary to preserve their status and ideolo-
the people’s spirit by the Sanussi…all of the population gy.42 Further, political scientist Barbara Harff’s geno-
of Cyrenaica participated in the rebellion…the poten- cidal preconditions were virtually all present: regime
tial [rebels]: the so-called submissive population…all change, exclusionary ideology, conflict and a perceived
of Cyrenaica, in a word, was rebellious.”39 Thus, the security threat from the indigenous population, and an
entire Cyrenaican population was implicated and tar- uninterested international community.43 All genocidal
geted for destruction. preconditions created by Italian authorities in the Cyre-
naican case served to weaken factors of restraint and
The brutal policy of genocide and the capture and ex- created an environment conducive to acts of genocide.
ecution of resistance hero, Umar al-Mukhtar, succeed- The rhetoric espoused by colonial leaders and the sys-
ed in demoralizing and decimating the civilians and the tematic, widespread policy of violence and displace-
resistance fighters, who surrendered in 1932.40 In pos- ment signify Italian intent to destroy the Sanussi state
session of stable Italian rule over a decimated, defeated and prevent it from functioning independently. In The
population, Mussolini’s colonial vision could finally be History and Sociology of Genocide: Analyses and Case
implemented. He planned to settle between ten and fif- Studies, authors Chalk and Jonassohn classify types of
teen million Italians in North Africa to populate what genocide based on the desired outcome. Two of these
he heralded as the “Second Roman Empire” and sub- types fit the Cyrenaican case: 1) to eliminate a real or
sequently, developed the country to benefit the Italian potential threat and 2) to spread terror among real or
nationals through the construction of roads, railways, potential enemies.44 The Italians perceived the whole
airfields, and re-allocation of collectively used land.41 of Cyrenaica to be under the umbrella of the Sanussi
The policy of genocide left the Cyrenaican population Order and thus, everyone in Cyrenaica was inherently
without their pre-colonial state and societal structures antagonistic to Italian rule and needed to be subdued.
while simultaneously stunting the population’s ability
for future growth. At the time of independence in 1951, However, reaching a conclusion of genocide is con-
Libya was considered the poorest independent nation in sidered contentious because of the difficulty in defining
the world and possessed no real conception of unified the Sanussi Order as an identifiable ‘national, ethnic,
Libyan statehood as individuals and tribal confedera- racial, or religious’ group as currently defined in Article
tions remained suspicious of central rule. II of the United Nation’s Genocide Convention. Mem-
bers of the Sanussi Order were targeted for systematic
Classifying Genocide: Problems and destruction, yet defining this group is inherently diffi-
cult because of its complex conception as a religious,
Paradoxes ethnic, political, and state-like entity. Rather than pos-
sessing a distinct identity, the people in Cyrenaica oper-
Under Article II of the UNGC, the Italian coloniza- ated from a myriad of loyalties and identities that cross-
tion policy of Cyrenaica between 1929 and 1932 con- cut religion, politics, and ethnicity. However, because
stitutes genocide in regards to intent and the perpetra- the vast majority of the Libyan population throughout
tion of prohibited acts. Members of the Sanussi Order the three regions was Arab-Bedouin-Muslim, it cannot
were explicitly targeted by the Italians for destruction be maintained that the population in Cyrenaica was

Draft Journal.indd 11 11

11/10/2015 3:45:34 PM

Sifting and Winnowing Undergraduate Journal, Volume 1

military operations on the ground, the various intel- convince them that they could not win. To achieve this
ligence and information technology programs, and end, American generals attempted to fight a war of at-
pacification attempts to win the hearts and minds of trition and slowly grind the communist forces down.8
the Vietnamese people. These three elements were not
disparate components of one war; they comprised one Generals had no good way to perceive progress in
massive overarching project of state building. Thus, a war without accurate battle maps or any other mean-
Scott’s four main points can be applied to each aspect ingful metric of progress. Robert Komer, the lead ci-
of the war effort. All three forms of American action vilian in charge of pacification in Vietnam, admitted in
were based on standardization and ignoring local dif- 1970 that the question of finding out what to measure
ferences, rested upon an unshakeable belief in the be- in Vietnam was “one of the trickiest and most painful
neficent power of modern technology, and could only in this highly atypical war.”9 Komer responded to this
be implemented due to the coercive South Vietnamese problem by creating measurements for village safe-
government and weak, impoverished South Vietnamese ty, and the generals found their own way to measure
population. These failed strategies all stemmed from a progress. Chief among them was enemy body count.
misguided belief that the United States military could Keeping records of this figure was an attempt to make
pacify Vietnam according to high modernist principles, the conflict legible against an enemy that they were of-
and each was an attempt to see the war and the Viet- ten quite literally unable to see. The North Vietnamese
namese people from the perspective of numbers. This rarely occupied one piece of land for an extended pe-
error in the American way of thinking about the war re- riod of time and American action rarely resulted in a
sulted in a failure to capture the nuances of the conflict deliberate encounter with the enemy, so ground won or
and led to American defeat. lost could not be measured.10 Therefore, the only way
that the United States felt it could understand and gauge
The War of Numbers victory was to measure the quantity of enemy bodies
that its operations produced. This turned out to be to
It may reveal a great deal about the United States’ woefully inadequate measure of success.
war effort in Vietnam that the man who shaped strategy
on the ground in Vietnam did not hold a defense-relat- In Seeing Like a State, Scott argues that efforts to
ed job directly before coming to Washington in 1960. describe and simplify a situation do not only result in
Instead, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara was new methods to understand it, they actually shape and
famous for turning the Ford Motor Company around. change the reality on the ground. This was true of the
McNamara did serve in the military in World War II, war in Vietnam. The numbers-based way of war infil-
when he worked to determine the effects of U.S. fire- trated every aspect of the American military effort. Offi-
bombing over Japan. He famously relied heavily on cers had orders from their superiors to produce a certain
systems analysis and data to accomplish both tasks.6 body count quota, and pressure was exerted downward
He took a similar approach to the war in Vietnam, but to their men to achieve this highly nebulous objective.
instead of manufacturing cars, he set his men to the Even the media covered wins and losses in this skewed
task of producing dead bodies. He describes this in his manner. So ingrained was the idea, that some units cre-
1995 memoir, In Retrospect. The United States’ aim ated a rewards system for killing Vietnamese, and units
was to reach a “crossover point,” or the point at which were ranked according to their ratio of American dead
the North Vietnamese Army and Viet Cong casualties to enemy dead.11 The entire structure for promotion of
were no longer sustainable. The American military pur- officers was based on the system of body count. As
sued this goal at the expense of achieving any actual would be expected, such a distorted way of measuring
strategic objective.7 William Gibson makes a similar success in a war had profoundly negative consequenc-
comparison in his book, The Perfect War. He equates es. American ground units were essentially used as bait,
the “search and destroy” tactics to an assembly line. By soldiers rampantly exaggerated body counts, and Viet-
waging this type of war, the U.S. military sought not to namese noncombatants were frequently killed in an ef-
actually defeat the North Vietnamese, but rather to fort to boost numbers of dead.

The entire American strategy of “search and destroy”
was based on luring the enemy with scouts, and then


Draft Journal.indd 17 11/10/2015 3:45:37 PM

Sifting and Winnowing Undergraduate Journal, Volume 1

bringing American firepower to bear on the communist acknowledged in In Retrospect that the United States
troops. After initial contact, the patrol would withdraw relied too heavily on superior military technology and
and artillery and airstrikes were called on the enemy paid little attention to actual conditions on the ground.
location. The American military intended to use its 19 Unknowingly, McNamara reached the same conclu-
superior firepower to annihilate the enemy and mini- sion that Scott did: ignoring local information in favor
mize U.S. casualties by avoiding prolonged contact. of standardized means of measurement often results in
Although American forces had some initial success, the failure.
Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army quickly adapt-
ed to this strategy, while American forces stayed fixated Although it may seem counterintuitive to compare
on the relative successes of earlier battles, such as Ia Scott’s examples of social engineering to a systemat-
Drang Valley.12 Some changes were made to Ameri- ic campaign to produce large numbers of dead bod-
can strategy over time, but the fundamental premise ies, they are surprisingly similar. The war of numbers,
remained the same. Even when the death ratios were which manifested itself in search-and destroy tactics,
favorable, the illogic of this strategy was apparent. was fundamentally a social engineering program which
In late 1966 American forces attacked the Binh Dinh intended to rid the countryside of Viet Cong and NVA
Province. The operation was considered a success, al- soldiers and allow the Saigon government to take hold.
though the U.S. suffered heavy casualties and ended up Like Scott’s other examples of catastrophic high-mod-
destroying several villages full of Vietnamese noncom- ernist experiments, the assembly line way of war failed.
batants. However, holding ground permanently was not The United States thought that it could modernize war
their primary objective. The Americans quickly aban- to suit its own purposes, and make an elusive and ev-
doned the territory they had fought so hard for, much er-changing opponent legible through the metric of
to reporter Neil Sheehan’s disbelief.13 It was not just the casualties. As seen in other state projects, this strate-
media that did not fully grasp the logic behind Amer- gy relied on standardization and simplification, rested
ica’s conduct of the war. Dangerous search missions on belief that a modern way of war would be superior,
for the sole purpose of finding Viet Cong often resulted and depended on the coercive US-backed Saigon re-
in ambushes and heavy casualties, which demoralized gime imposing its will on the powerless peasants in the
U.S. forces.14 countryside. With these four “pernicious” elements in
place, the American war of numbers inevitably failed,
Not only was body count a poor way to document the and resulted in pointless destruction to the people and
trends of the war, the figures that the United States mil- landscape of Vietnam. The U.S. Army left Vietnam bro-
itary produced were largely made up. Artillery would ken and demoralized, an unknown number of civilians
fire into the distance and, as a rule of thumb, the artil- were killed unnecessarily, and Saigon fell to the North
lery unit would report as dead half the number of ene- Vietnamese Army in 1975. American strategy, and the
my soldiers that it estimated it was firing upon.15 Bod- ensuing results, represents a high-modernist failure just
ies in graves that had already been counted would be like those that Scott describes.
recounted as enemy casualties.16 When asked how he
knew a dead Vietnamese was a Viet Cong, one soldier The Intelligence War
replied jokingly, “because he was dead.”17 Miscounts
did not happen just at the unit level. The estimate that In another attempt to make the complicated politi-
285,000 communist troops were in South Vietnam in cal, social, and military battle for Vietnam sensible to
1967 may have understated actual troop strength by as American planners, the United States waged a massive
much as half.18 intelligence campaign. This consisted of several dif-
ferent components. Most prominent were the massive
Ultimately, this strategy did not produce the desired data accumulation and analysis of the North Vietnam-
outcome. Instead, it resulted in unnecessary civilian ese counterinsurgency, the Phoenix Program, and the
deaths and unsustainable levels of American casualties. IGLOO WHITE electronic barrier in Laos designed to
Additionally, it failed to “attrit” the enemy to the point prevent movement along the Ho Chi Minh Trail. All of
of defeat. Although he was initially a proponent of this these efforts attempted to impose a modern,
assembly-line way of war, Robert McNamara


Draft Journal.indd 18 11/10/2015 3:45:37 PM

Sifting and Winnowing Undergraduate Journal, Volume 1

quantifiable structure on a complex landscape that re- significant parts of the population in both Vietnam and
sisted such standardization and centralized understand- America against the war. It claimed to be wildly suc-
ing. Each ignored local realities and nuances, and did cessful, with over 80,000 Viet Cong eliminated, and
not achieve its desired objective. some positive media reports.24 However, these esti-
mates were almost surely inflated. One CIA veteran
As Alfred McCoy argues in his essay “Imperial Il- even claimed that in the whole history of the Phoenix
lusions,” the Vietnam War was the beginning of a new program, not one single high-level target was taken
era in intelligence for the United States. In an attempt to out.25 Overall, the effort was counterproductive. The
reduce the complex nature of the insurgency into easily United States was wrong in thinking that the North
understandable numbers, the Pentagon’s Advanced Re- Vietnamese would not adapt to the program. The Viet
search Project Agency created thousands of studies on Cong managed to use Phoenix against the United States
counterinsurgency tactics.20 These reports attempted to by planting misleading information, which resulted in
reduce the resistance to a simple explanation, but like innocent civilians being targeted. Additionally, the per-
other similarly-minded projects, they failed to reach ceived brutality of the program undermined American
their goal. Additionally, the United States imposed its credibility both at home and abroad.26
own concept of military structure on the North Vietnam-
ese Army and the Viet Cong. Even in his 1976 memoir, In Laos, the United States Air Force attempted to use
General Westmoreland insisted that a centralized com- high-tech sensors to “see” the battlefield without actu-
munist headquarters (Central Office for South Vietnam ally having place soldiers there. OPERATION IGLOO
or “COSVN”) existed somewhere near the Cambodian WHITE, as the U.S. effort was called, employed a sys-
border.21 Massive operations to seek out and destroy the tem of motion sensors, computers, and fighter-bomb-
headquarters were never to any avail because it sim- ers to disrupt the supply line to South Vietnam known
ply did not exist.22 This represents yet another failure of as the Ho Chi Minh Trail.27 Sensors were designed to
American intelligence in its effort to impose a logical pick up enemy movements and then dispatch aircraft
structure on an enemy that the American leaders did not to destroy them. Despite the sophisticated sensors and
understand. dominant U.S. advantage in airpower, advanced Amer-
ican technology was no match for local knowledge and
The Phoenix Program is one more key example of the experience shaped by the decades North Vietnamese
United State’s attempts to comprehend the Vietnamese forces had spent in Laos.
political landscape, and act on it according to its own
desires. Even considering its massive scope, however, The predecessor of the Viet Cong, the Viet Minh, had
it was consistently ineffective. A CIA program designed extensive experience fighting and moving through the
to erode the National Liberation Front’s infrastructure dense Laotian jungle since the early 1940s, when they
in South Vietnam, Phoenix encompassed infiltration, battled against the Japanese occupation.28 Although the
torture, and assassination as tools for undermining the rough, mountainous terrain made it difficult for them
Viet Cong’s influence. It was designed as a response to to transport military equipment through the country,
the National Liberation Front’s psychological warfare it made it even harder for American and South Viet-
techniques in the Vietnamese villages. However, unlike namese forces to stop them.29 Throughout the 1960s,
the North Vietnamese strategy, it relied too heavily on attempt after attempt to sever the Ho Chi Minh trail was
data and shaky intelligence, and ignored the true nature unsuccessful. Communist forces quickly cleared choke
of the situation in Vietnamese villages.23­ points, and areas of the road that had been damaged
were easily bypassed. Thick jungle and poor weather
The focal point of the Phoenix program was comput- conditions obscured American reconnaissance. The
erized data collection. After adequate data was collect- United States Air Force changed tactics, ordinances,
ed, necessary actions would then be taken to identify and aircraft throughout the 1960s, but never succeeded
suspected communist leaders in South Vietnam. These in stopping the North Vietnamese supply route.30
targets would then be captured, converted or killed. Al-
though the program was intended to be a metaphori- The conditions in the Laotian jungle were so opaque
cal scalpel rather than a broadsword, it resulted in high that the United States did not even know the extent of
numbers of civilian causalities and ended up turning its failure to stop the movement of communist war

Draft Journal.indd 19 19

11/10/2015 3:45:38 PM

Sifting and Winnowing Undergraduate Journal, Volume 1

Oil For (Regime) Security: Saudi Arabian
Support of the Iraq War in 2003

Allison Myren

The 2003 invasion of Iraq is well remembered for its criticism, though it went not entirely
without crucial international support. Saudi Arabia willingly provided fundamental strategic
support for U.S. operations, despite pre-war confidence in Saudi Arabia’s interest to preserve a
Middle Eastern status quo. Aligned religious majorities and compatible regime types suggested
Saudi Arabia would be unlikely to benefit from the removal of Saddam Hussein and the regional
instability it would inevitably generate. Allison Myren’s piece contends that a series of counter-
vailing forces—most importantly the growing threat of Islamic extremism, and the desire for
regime security assured through continued U.S. support and oil hegemony—led to Saudi support
of American activities in Iraq. Saudi Arabia remains a formative regional power, though today’s
world poses considerably more risks to Saudi stability than in 2003, despite a continued alliance
with the United States. ISIL and Syria’s civil war to the north and Yemeni conflict to the south
both contend for Saudi attention, while a decreasing global reliance on Saudi oil undermines
long-term stability and international significance. This paper provides an essential context for
understanding U.S.-Saudi relations, as well as a means to view Saudi decisions with hindsight
that may also inform speculation on the future of Middle Eastern stability.

Sam Kastner & Jake Horwitz, Editors

Introduction identified publicly with the Afghanistan
campaign, it is unlikely that Riyadh will
Saudi Arabia broke ties with the Taliban in 2001 fol- sign on for a campaign against Saddam
Hussein without some very explicit prom-
lowing the September 11 terrorist attacks and began ises… if it will sign on at all.”2
working to eliminate domestic terrorism financing. It
promised its citizens that it would not allow the U.S. to Despite these prewar doubts, Saudi Arabia provided
extend its military campaign from Afghanistan to oth- vital assistance to the United States in its invasion of
er Arab states.1 In 2002, Middle East scholar Gregory Iraq in 2003. Support from the Al Saud for the invasion
Gause expressed skepticism over Saudi support for the included permission for the use of the command and
impending war in Iraq, stating that: control center at the Prince Sultan Airbase to direct the
air war, permission for Special Forces to operate from
“if the Bush administration chooses to Saudi territory into Iraq, and permission for the use of
attack Iraq, it will need and expect logisti- Saudi airspace.3 Saudi Arabia also expanded its oil pro-
cal support and access to bases from Saudi duction of more than one million barrels per day to
Arabia. Given the Saudi reluctance to be


Draft Journal.indd 25 11/10/2015 3:45:40 PM

Sifting and Winnowing Undergraduate Journal, Volume 1

smooth out the global market4; “in short, virtually every brought the Islamist government of the Ayatollah Kho-
request made by the U.S. Administration for military or meini to power. Iran’s new government was viewed as
logistical support was met positively.”5 a threat to Saudi Arabia because it called for the over-
throw of monarchy.7 Iran was also majority Shi’a and
The question is, why? Why did the Al Saud pro- therefore a challenge to Wahhabism, which is the main
vide this crucial support to the U.S.-led effort to depose Islamic influence in Saudi government and society and
Saddam Hussein? While it is true that Saudi Arabia is generally anti-Shi’ite.8 The Al Saud provided Sadd-
and the U.S. had enjoyed three decades of a strategic am’s Baath regime with substantial financial aid from
alliance based on an oil-for-security trade, in this pa- the beginning of the eight-year war, and its support sub-
per I will show that various security, geopolitical, and sequently extended to use of Saudi air bases as well as
domestic political concerns appear to suggest that sup- Saudi ports for the transshipment of goods to Iraq, mili-
porting the Iraq War would not be in the interest of the tary equipment, and oil profits from sales from the Sau-
Saudi regime, making Saudi assistance more puzzling di-Kuwaiti neutral zone.9­ Notwithstanding the strong
and requiring a closer analysis of the ways in which the interests that the Al Saud must have had in preventing
Al Saud must have balanced their interests. Ultimately, an Iranian takeover of Iraq, this substantial and vital
Saudi support cannot be explained as the simple result support also suggests that the Saudi government did not
of a historical alliance, but was instead a product of a see Saddam’s regime as an imminent threat.
prioritization of the emerging threat of Jihadi extremism
and al Qaeda, with a gamble that the government could The Iraqi threat to Saudi Arabia is further called into
hedge and control public opinion. I will first explain question after considering the context and timing of the
how Saudi Arabia’s security, geopolitical, and domestic Iraq War, which followed a sound defeat of Saddam’s
political interests would make Saudi Arabia an unlikely military in the 1990-91 Gulf War and a decade of crip-
supporter of the Iraq War. Then, within the framework pling sanctions. While the Bush administration made
of regime security, I will examine the concerns which its argument for war on the imminent security threat
the Al Saud must have prioritized as well as the domes- posed to the world by Saddam and his weapons of mass
tic political controls they employed in order to form the destruction (WMD), Saddam had never used nor threat-
decision to support the U.S. invasion. ened to use WMDs against Saudi Arabia. Saddam fur-
thermore had not threatened the stability of the Gulf
Undermining Saudi Arabian Support: region since his invasion of Kuwait in 1990, lending
support to the perspective that Saddam’s regime was
Security, Geopolitical and Domestic firmly contained. Gause notes Iraq’s reduction of politi-
cal capacity and military capabilities following the Gulf
Concerns War and, therefore, a reduction in the overall potential
threat of Iraq to the region.10 He further declares that
There was one clear advantage for Saudi Arabia in Saudi Arabia did not see Iraq as either “an immediate or
supporting the U.S. invasion of Iraq: namely, the re- potential threat to its state or regime security” and that
moval of the “long-lasting threat” of Saddam Hussein’s Saddam presented neither “an aggressive intentions
dictatorship and the Baath regime.6 However, upon fur- threat [n]or an aggregate power threat in 2003.”11
ther investigation, it is questionable that this positive
consequence of the war would truly increase the secu- Even taking a pessimistic view of the possible threat
rity of Saudi Arabia or whether the general war would, posed by Saddam to Saudi Arabia (i.e. that his regime
in fact, make Saudi Arabia more vulnerable. At min- did pose a threat and that a WMD threat was worth
imum there was likely to be an even trade in security countering), the security gains from his deposition
concerns, with some being eliminated and others being would likely, and foreseeably, have been offset by in-
unleashed. creased instability in the region caused by war. Remov-
ing an entrenched regime which ruled for more than 30
Firstly, the threat posed by Saddam’s regime to the years with the absence of any opposing political party
Al Saud was dubious. At the height of Saddam’s power or movement would inevitably create some uncertainty
in the 1980s, Saudi Arabia chose to back him against in Iraq. Add to that uncertainty the possibility of a
the other regional power, Iran, after Iran’s revolution

Draft Journal.indd 26 26

11/10/2015 3:45:40 PM

Sifting and Winnowing Undergraduate Journal, Volume 1

Baathist insurgency, sectarian violence or an emerging become “a country where the Shi’ites will have a dom-
insurgency of Islamist extremists taking advantage of inant, or at least a leading position,” thereby creating
the chaos of the warzone, and the security threats to a regional multipolar system in which Iraq and Iran
Saudi Arabia could be substantial. While Saddam was shared a base of religious beliefs.17 This shared belief
a ruthless dictator, he was firmly in control of his ter- system would increase the possibility of alliance be-
ritory and population, as evidenced by his extensive tween the two countries, giving Iran greater influence
security apparatus and the fact that the U.S. had only in Iraqi affairs and decreasing the overall power of Sau-
four intelligence sources in Iraq prior to 2003, none of di Arabia in the system.
whom had penetrated Saddam’s inner circle and who
had “real trouble getting inside the military, the Repub- Finally, there are also domestic political concerns
lican Guard or the Special Security Organization.”12 that appear to undermine Saudi interest in supporting
the U.S. invasion of Iraq. One of these concerns is
The question of Iraqi stability for the security of connected to the regional balance of power question,
Saudi Arabia feeds into geopolitical considerations regarding Saudi Arabia’s own traditionally repressed
concerning the stability of the region which also cast Shi’a minority, which constitutes a tenth of Saudi
doubt on the Al Saud’s interest in supporting the U.S. Arabia’s population.18 Henner Furtig suggests that “a
invasion. Indeed, these concerns were recognized by strong Shi’a rule in Iraq could awaken Saudi Arabia’s
Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal in Feb- own oppressed Shi’a minority,” a situation made more
ruary 2003 before the war when he commented that likely after factoring in Iranian religious and political
“there has never been in the history of the world a coun- sympathies to the post-Saddam regional system.19 This
try in which a regime change happened at the bayonets would create potential problems for the Al Saud con-
of guns that has led to stability.”13 War in Iraq and the cerning domestic security and stability.
acknowledged inevitable instability and destruction
it would create would alter the multipolar balance of Perhaps the most obvious question regarding Sau-
power in the Gulf region, historically shared between di Arabian support for the war results from the Bush
Iraq, Iran, and Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, the change administration’s stated goal of democracy for Iraq and
in the balance of power would almost certainly favor for the region. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld
Iran over Saudi Arabia. declared in 2003 that the U.S. wanted to “help the Iraqi
people establish a new government…which respects
There are multiple reasons for which the Al Saud the right of its diverse population and the aspirations
should have been apprehensive of an increase in Iran’s of all the Iraqi people to live in freedom and have a
relative power. Since the Shah of Iran was overthrown voice in their government.”20 Given the Al Saud mon-
in 1979, Saudi-Iranian relations have been intermittent- archy’s absolutism, “the emergence of a pluralistic and
ly hostile, with only a minimal rapprochement in the democratic Iraqi republic…would present an enormous
mid-1990s.14 As mentioned previously, Iran threatens ideological challenge.”21 The Bush administration’s
Saudi Arabia through Khomeinism’s insistence that Is- dream that regime change in Iraq would set off a series
lam and monarchy are incompatible.15 of democratic revolutions in the Middle East would di-
rectly threaten the interests of the Saudi Arabian gov-
While the removal of Iraq from the regional balance ernment.
of power equation would increase Iran’s relative power
in the short term, the deposition of Saddam specifically Furthermore, the concern of domestic stability is
would also pose challenges to the regional balance of made more salient given the extreme antipathy of the
power for Saudi Arabia and would likely increase the Saudi public to the United States. As the Bush adminis-
power of Iran over the long term. The long-term effects tration launched the war on terror following September
would result from the anticipated shift in religious in- 11, various polls show that anti-Americanism increased
fluence in Iraq that would favor Iran. Saddam’s Baathist in Saudi public opinion. Gause observed that after the
regime ruled as a Sunni minority over a repressed 60 invasion of Afghanistan, “Saudi popular discourse
percent Shi’a majority.16 With the removal of Saddam shifted from rejection of the American military attack
and the (planned) imposition of a democratic govern- on fellow Muslims to accusations of American desires
ment, however, it could be expected that Iraq would for hegemony over the Muslim world.”22 This was an

Draft Journal.indd 27 27

11/10/2015 3:45:40 PM

Sifting and Winnowing Undergraduate Journal, Volume 1

62 Gause, “The Political Economy of National Security in the GCC Hegghammer, Thomas. “Islamist Violence and Regime Stability in
States,” 66, emphasis in original. Saudi Arabia,” International Affairs 84, no. 4 (July 2008).
63 Jean-Francois Seznec, “Stirrings in Saudi Arabia,” Journal of
Democracy 13, no. 4 (2002): 35. “Joint Statement by President George W. Bush and Crown Prince
64 Gause, “Kings for All Seasons: How the Middle East’s Monar- Abdullah bin Adulaziz Al Saud,” Weekly Compilation of Presi-
chies Survived the Arab Spring,” 25. dential Documents 41, no. 17 (May 2, 2005).
65 Dris-Ajt-Hamadouehe and Zoubir, “The US-Saudi Relationship
and the Iraq War: The Dialectics of a Dependent Alliance.” Matthiesen, Toby. “Saudi Arabia’s Shiite Problem,” Foreign Poli-
66 Gause, “Balancing what? Threat perception and alliance choice cy (March 7, 2007).
in the Gulf,” 304.
67 Gause, “Be Careful What You Wish For,” 42. Palmeri, Christopher et al., “Oil & War,” Businessweek no. 3824
(March 17, 2003).

Works Cited Riedel, Bob and Saab, Bilal Y. “Al Qaeda’s Third Front: Saudi
Arabia,” Washington Quarterly 31, no. 2 (Spring 2008).
Chanin, Clifford and Gause, F. Gregory, III. “U.S.-Saudi Rela-
tions: Bump in the Road or End of the Road? Rockefeller Founda- “Saudis warn US over Iraq war,” BBC News, February 17, 2003,
tion Report,” Middle East Policy 10, no. 4 (December 2003). Final Edition.

Chanin, Clifford and Gause, F. Gregory, III. “U.S.-Saudi Rela- Schneller, Rachel. “Who Speaks for the Shi’a of Iraq?” Council on
tions: A Rocky Road,” Middle East Policy 11, no. 4 (Winter 2004). Foreign Relations (February 19, 2010).

Cole, Juan. “A ‘Shiite Crescent’? The Regional Impact of the Iraq Seznec, Jean-Francois. “Stirrings in Saudi Arabia,” Journal of De-
War,” Current History 105, no. 687 (January 2006). mocracy 13, no. 4 (2002).

Dris-Ajt-Hamadouehe, Louisa and Zoubir, Yahia H. “The US-Sau- Telhami, Shibley. “Arab Public Opinion on the United States and
di Relationship and the Iraq War: The Dialectics of a Dependent Iraq: Postwar Prospects for Changing Prewar Views,” Brookings
Alliance,” Journal of Third World Studies 24, no. 1 (Spring 2007). Institute (Summer 2003).

Furtig, Henner. “Conflict and Cooperation in the Persian Gulf: The “The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia: Initiatives and Actions to Combat
Interregional Order and U.S. Policy,” Middle East Journal 61, no. Terrorism,” Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia (November 2012).
4 (Autumn 2007).
Woodward, Bob. Plan of Attack (New York: Simon & Schuster
Gause, F. Gregory, III. “Balancing what? Threat perception and Paperbacks, 2004).
alliance choice in the Gulf,” Security Studies 13, no. 2 (2004).

Gause, F. Gregory, III. “Be Careful What You Wish For,” World
Policy Journal 19, no. 1 (Spring 2002).

Gause, F. Gregory, III. “Kings for All Seasons: How the Middle
East’s Monarchies Survived the Arab Spring,” Brookings Doha
Center Analysis Paper no. 8 (2013).

Gause, F. Gregory, III. “Saudi Perceptions of the United States
since 9/11” in With Us or Against Us: Studies in Global An-
ti-Americanism, edited by Tony Judt and Denis Lacorne (New
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).

Gause, F. Gregory, III. “The Kingdom in the Middle: Saudi Ara-
bia’s Double Game” in How Did This Happen? : Terrorism and
the New War, edited by James Hoge and Gideon Rose (New York:
Public Affairs, 2001).

Gause, F. Gregory, III. “The Political Economy of National Securi-
ty in the GCC States” in The Persian Gulf At the Millennium: Es-
says In Politics, Economy, Security, and Religion, edited by Gary
Sick and Lawrence G. Potter (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997).


Draft Journal.indd 33 11/10/2015 3:45:41 PM

Hearts and

Consequences of U.S.
policy and the
potential for its

Sam Kastner

Draft Journal.indd 34 11/10/2015 3:45:42 PM

S. Sifting and Winnowing Undergraduate Journal, Volume 1

Bombing Hearts and Radicalizing Minds:
Consequences of U.S. Counterrorism

Policy and the Potential for Its Revision

Sam Kastner

Since the unfortunate events on September 11th, the United States’ embarked on a “War on Ter-
ror”, focusing its foreign policy almost exclusively in terrorism in the Middle East and worldwide.
The eventual goal of the war being the elimination of terrorist operations to provide more security
for American citizens and people around the world. During this war, the United States has elected
two different U.S. Presidents, from two different political parties, and both have employed two
different foreign policies using a wide variety of military tactics with varying degrees of success.
Despite almost 15 years of military operations in multiple countries in the Middle East, terrorist
organizations still function successfully. To be sure, the War on Terror does not seem to have an
end date in sight, promising continued United States involvement in the region. The latest iteration
of US counterterrorism strategy has been an increased use of drone technology to strike terrorists
in the region. In his piece, Sam Kastner has investigated the impact of the various foreign policies
the United States, focusing especially on drone warfare. Kastner’s research includes analysis of the
effects of the drone policy on the communities targeted and the success of the targeted strikes in
achieving US goals.. As Kastner argues in this piece, there is far more involved in fighting terror-
ism than simply killing suspected terrorists.

Sam Alhadeff, Editor

Introduction motivated the attacks on September 11. Paradoxi-
cally, that ideology would be intensified by efforts to
The War on Terror is one of self-perpetuating conflict. extinguish it. That is, the counterterrorism strategies
employed by the United States to dissuade terrorist
Thirteen years ago, on a fateful autumn morning, Amer- activity—primarily through the development of drone
ica stalled, suspended in disbelief as hijacked planes warfare—would inspire future attacks, and radicalize a
were flown into the World Trade Center and Pentagon. formerly moderate population against the overly zeal-
From that day forward, the United States has been ag- ous United States.
gressively preoccupied with locating and eradicating
any remnants of the terrorist organization responsible: As an analysis of the futility of U.S. counterterrorism
al-Qaeda. It quickly became apparent, however, that policy and the potential for its revision, this paper will
this “War on Terror” would not be restricted to al-Qae- proceed in four stages. The first will examine the for-
da. Rather, the United States would exercise its vast eign policies of the United States and the characteristics
political influence and military hegemony to launch a of such policies that might motivate resentment—and
crusade against an ideology - the ideology that more specifically, Islamic extremism—in both a pre
and post 9/11 world. Second, this paper will investigate


Draft Journal.indd 35 11/10/2015 3:45:42 PM

Sifting and Winnowing Undergraduate Journal, Volume 1

the actual strategies used in the War on Terror and as- bin Laden’s 1998 fatwa, or ideological pronouncement,
sess empirical models for measurements of resentment, condemned the United States’ foreign policy, especially
radicalization, and relative effectiveness. The princi- its history of intervention in Arab countries and pro-
ple counterterrorism strategy to be considered is drone motion of secular institutions. One can deduce a likely
warfare, a policy popular for its lethality, efficiency, correlation between frequency of contact (through oc-
and absence of direct accountability—traits conversely cupation or military activities) and likelihood of resent-
responsible for the fear and condemnation that it arous- ment. The blanket of good intention shielded Western
es among targeted populations (primarily in Pakistan eyes from the gritty realities of U.S. foreign policy. The
but also in Yemen). Third, counterarguments will be interpretation of benevolent missions to restore peace,
given due consideration. Finally, this paper will dis- punish evil, and enable populations now starkly con-
cuss the potentials for counterterrorism policy revision, trasted with a history of Western incursions on sover-
including the differing advantages of soft versus hard eignty and ideology.2
counterterrorism and counterterrorism versus counter-
insurgency. In the immediate aftermath of September 11, there
was little international opposition to an American mil-
Foreign Policy Tendencies of the itary initiative to bring those responsible to justice.
According to the international community, this exclu-
United States sively warranted a military invasion of Afghanistan,
the country in which al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden
Since the Second World War, the United States has— were hiding. The United States’ hubris and ideologi-
with intermittent deviation—been staunchly interven- cal objectives precluded such a limited conflict, how-
tionist. In the face of Hitler’s fascism, Franklin Delano ever. Iraq would be subject to a subsequent invasion
Roosevelt’s 1941 State of the Union proclaimed four and concurrent occupation, with the remarkably ideal-
freedoms to which every person on the planet is entitled: istic intentions of deposing Saddam Hussein and estab-
freedom of speech, freedom of religion, freedom from lishing a legitimate democratic government. However
want, and freedom from fear. Implicitly, this proclama- suspicious the federal government may have been of
tion delegated the United States with the promotion of Iraq’s nuclear capacity, it was only after September 11
freedom and equality throughout all the world. Such an that that suspicion was presented as justification for an
objective was ostensibly legitimized by the Cold War: extensive military operation. It proved an opportunity
a dichotomy of good and evil that led to the creation of for bin Laden to substantiate his contempt of Ameri-
international agreements and organizations, and justi- can foreign policy—a tendency to engage in protracted
fied otherwise inappropriate military endeavors. It was interventions and nation-building activities. One can
understood to be the duty of capable, democratic na- readily envisage the antipathy that might accompany
tions to sponsor pursuits of international security and such grandiose objectives.3
stability with, as the future would show, little regard
for sovereignty. When the Soviet Union dissolved in The aforementioned analysis supports the theory that
1991, however, there no longer existed that ideological the interventionist nature of the United States makes it
framework on which these far-reaching, quixotic ini- a target for denunciation and attack. The extent of mil-
tiatives could be based. On September 11, 2001, that itary power and the expansiveness of activities in Iraq
ceased to be so. The United States was, once again, and Afghanistan do logically motivate Islamic resent-
justified in proclaiming a virtuous war, a war on terror- ment, but these are not, strictly speaking, counterterror-
ism—one that would quash terrorist organizations and ism policies. Intervention in Afghanistan was launched
extremist sentiments, and install righteous democratic in response to an assault, and regardless of the justifi-
institutions in its place.1 cation for the extent of that intervention, the resultant
wars have decreased in intensity as the years advanced.
Eager to embark on this anti-terrorism crusade, Unit- Conversely, counterterrorism operations in the Middle
ed States policymakers placed inadequate significance East have increased since then, and spread beyond the
on the factors that initially motivated the attack. Osama borders of Iraq and Afghanistan. As the conflict spread
beyond theaters of military engagement, conventional

Draft Journal.indd 36 36

11/10/2015 3:45:43 PM

Sifting and Winnowing Undergraduate Journal, Volume 1

indiscriminate targeting and high civilian casualties, 15 Kronfeld, Melissa J. 2012. Killing them With Kindness: A Softer
according to host government statistics and local ac- Approach to Preventing Violent Extremism and Countering Rad-
counts. Resultantly, large numbers of previously mod- icalization in the War on Terror. Rutgers University, Division of
erate individuals have become radicalized to Islamic Global Affairs. 1-45.
extremism, whether through loss of loved ones or by 16 Tamanaha, Brain Z. 2010. “Are We Safer from Terrorism? No,
witnessing the drone’s capacity for destruction. Such a but We Can Be.” Yale Law & Policy Review 28.2: 419-438.
snowballing policy will never be able to kill (suspect-
ed) terrorists faster than affected persons will become Works Cited
radicalized, and so a complete overhaul is necessary.
Cooperation with host governments in the form of Sta- Boyle, Michael J. 2013. “The Costs and Consequences of Drone
tus of Forces Agreements would be required, as would Warfare.” International Affairs 89: 1-29.
international coalition efforts and the deployment of
ground forces into local communities. Military action Boyle, Michael J. 2010. “Do Counterterrorism and Counterinsur-
must become secondary to building social trust, through gency Go Together?” International Affairs 86: 333-353.
educational propaganda and social services that pro-
vide healthcare, education, construction, and outlets for Cavatorta, Francesco. 2005. “The ‘War on Terrorism’- Perspec-
activity. The trust created will result in enhanced intelli- tives from Radical Islamic Groups.” Irish Studies in Internation-
gence, legitimizing the use of drones, and damming the al Affairs 16: 35-50.
source of radicalization.
Deri, Aliya R. 2012. “‘Costless’ War: American and Pakistani Re-
actions to the U.S. Drone War.” Intersect: The Stanford Journal
of Science, Technology and Society 5: 1-16.

Notes Kronfeld, Melissa J. 2012. Killing them With Kindness: A Soft-
er Approach to Preventing Violent Extremism and Countering
1 Walt, Stephen M. 2002. “Beyond Bin Laden: Reshaping U.S. Radicalization in the War on Terror. Rutgers University, Divi-
Foreign Policy.” International Security 26.3: 56-78. sion of Global Affairs. 1-45.
2 Savun, Burcu & Phillip, Brian J. 2009. “Democracy, Foreign
Policy, and Terrorism.” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 53.6: Mason, R. Chuck. 2012. Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA):
878-904. What Is It, and How Has It Been Utilized? CRS, RL34531. 1-30.
3 Cavatorta, Francesco. 2005. “The ‘War on Terrorism’- Perspec-
tives from Radical Islamic Groups.” Irish Studies in International Savun, Burcu & Phillip, Brian J. 2009. “Democracy, Foreign Pol-
Affairs 16: 35-50. icy, and Terrorism.” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 53.6:
4 Deri, Aliya R. 2012. “‘Costless’ War: American and Pakistani 878-904.
Reactions to the U.S. Drone War.” Intersect: The Stanford Journal
of Science, Technology and Society 5: 1-16. Sterio, Milena 2012. “The United States’ use of Drones in the War
5 Sterio, Milena 2012. “The United States’ use of Drones in the on Terror: The (Il)Legality of Targeted Killings under Internation-
War on Terror: The (Il)Legality of Targeted Killings under Inter- al Law”, 45 Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law:
national Law”, 45 Case Western Reserve Journal of International 197-214.

Law: 197-214. Tamanaha, Brain Z. 2010. “Are We Safer from Terrorism? No, but
6 Boyle, Michael J. 2013. “The Costs and Consequences of Drone We Can Be.” Yale Law & Policy Review 28.2: 419-438.
Warfare.” International Affairs 89: 1-29.
7 Deri “Costless’ War: American and Pakistani Reactions to the Walt, Stephen M. 2002. “Beyond Bin Laden: Reshaping U.S. For-
U.S. Drone War.” 1-16. eign Policy.” International Security 26.3: 56-78.
8 Ibid., 1-16.
9 Boyle “The Costs and Consequences of Drone Warfare.” 1-29.

10 Ibid., 1-29.
11 Deri “Costless’ War: American and Pakistani Reactions to the
U.S. Drone War.” 1-16.
12 Ibid., 1-16.
13 Sterio “The United States’ use of Drones in the War on Terror:
The (Il)Legality of Targeted Killings under International Law.”

14 Mason, R. Chuck. 2012. Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA):
What Is It, and How Has It Been Utilized? CRS, RL34531. 1-30.


Draft Journal.indd 41 11/10/2015 3:45:44 PM


Success of Ugandan
organizations and
community based
organizations in
the face of

Lauren J. andraski

Draft Journal.indd 42 11/10/2015 3:45:45 PM

Sifting and Winnowing Undergraduate Journal, Volume 1

‘Jebale’: The Success of Ugandan
Non-Governmental Organizations and
Community-Based Organizations in the

Face of Formidable Challenges

Lauren J. Andraski

It was a pleasure editing Lauren Andraski’s piece. As a Nonprofit Leadership major, I firmly
believe in the importance of the nonprofit sector and community based organizations to make
change in our communities. Her particular attention to nongovernmental organizations and
community-based organizations collaborations and possibilities are especially relevant to the
field at this time. In addition, her international view was fascinating to me. While developed
countries often look to help developing countries improve their economic infrastructure, An-
draski’s piece shines a light on a sector that can be easily overlooked. Nongovernmental
organizations and community-based organizations provide vital support to communities and
should be developed with the same vigor as other sectors. I applaud her first hand experience
and primary research in exposing others to this important sector and area of the world.

Rachel Fox, Editor

Introduction prevention and alleviation in or near Jinja, Uganda.
Organizations were asked to describe their strategies,
This study focuses on the work of those Communi- goals, successes and challenges as well as their gener-
al understanding of poverty in Uganda. The results of
ty-Based Organizations (CBOs) and Non-Governmen- this study led to the creation of the Women’s Micro-fi-
tal Organizations (NGOs) while painting a picture of nancing Network (WoMiN), to facilitate collaboration
poverty in various geographic areas of Uganda, includ- between social protection organizations that offer IGA
ing rural (islands and villages) and urban (towns and training and micro-financing loans to women in Ugan-
cities) areas. While many international organizations da. The organic, member-run network commenced in
travel to African countries to immediately intervene or February of 2014 and aims to serve as a catalyst for the
implement a development project, this study aims to sharing of ideas, resources and support. In the future,
gain a more personal understanding of existing prob- the network hopes to create a framework to be made
lems and services before offering solutions. Informa- available to other groups of organizations with hopes
tion for this study was collected via interviews with 10 to increase collaboration and recognize the ability and
CBOs and NGOs with expressed goals of poverty good work, or “jebale,” of local poverty alleviation or


Draft Journal.indd 43 11/10/2015 3:45:45 PM

Sifting and Winnowing Undergraduate Journal, Volume 1

ganizations to create positive change. in towns and, similarly, poverty in villages looks much
different than poverty on the islands. By grouping these
Background locations into only two broad categories of urban and
rural, the contextual differences are lost. These four ar-
Poverty is widespread in Uganda, with estimates eas will be categorized based on population, modernity
of between 24 and 38 percent of Ugandans living on of infrastructure and access to resources.
$1.25 or less each day.1;2 While these numbers are high,
the poverty rate has been steadily declining since 1992 Cities are the most populated locations in Uganda
when it was roughly 56 percent, primarily due to the and tend to have the most modern infrastructure and
combined efforts of public and private nonprofit orga- technologies, as well as greater access to resources
nizations.3;4 There exists a wide range of public and pri- including transportation, goods, and services such as
vate programs aimed at poverty alleviation and preven- healthcare and legal assistance. For example, Ugan-
tion by both domestic and international actors. da’s capital and largest city, Kampala (population:
1,723,300), is a hub for national news stations, large
Official poverty statistics generally utilize the inter- businesses, supermarkets and the majority of foreign
national poverty threshold, with the current and most and domestic aid organizations in the country.9
widely accepted measure based on daily consumption.
This measure is based on what an individual in the US Following cities, towns are the next most populated
in 2005 could consume for $1.25 which is then translat- areas in Uganda. While towns have fairly contemporary
ed using the purchasing-power parity (PPP) equation.5 buildings and businesses and have high access to trans-
The PPP equation looks at consumption rather than in- portation within the town and to other areas, the build-
come and does not include an individual’s savings or ings tend to be older than those in cities. Towns like
assets, which allows for simplified data collection at Jinja (population: 501,300), for example, attract many
the potential expense of accuracy and inflated poverty tourists as they contain several banks, comfortable hos-
rates. tels and markets and are fairly easy to navigate; how-
ever, they lack supermarkets and tend to have a lower
Using a more qualitative measure, Development Re- range of available healthcare and other services.10 This
search and Training (DRT) based in Kampala, Uganda report will focus on social protection agencies based in
defines poverty as “the inability to meet basic necessi- Jinja, as many organizations working in nearby villages
ties of life, poor access and quality of social services choose to locate their offices there.
and inadequate infrastructure.” According to Lwan-
ga-Ntale and McClean of DRT, “poverty is recognised Villages in Uganda, the second least populated set-
by the government, civil society organisations and the ting, are generally poor and lack access to resources
poor themselves as a lack of the means to satisfy ba- such as healthcare, education, transportation and gen-
sic material and social needs, as well as a feeling of eral consumer goods. Although these areas tend to be
powerlessness”.6 Various programs attempt to prevent farther from city and town centers, and therefore re-
and alleviate poverty through various social protection sources, it is not entirely accurate to equate them with
services, defined by DRT as “interventions from public, rural areas due to a frequently high population density
private, voluntary organizations and informal networks, in a small area. The buildings in villages tend to be con-
to support communities, households and individuals, in structed with mud, straw, wood or metal scraps, consist
their efforts to prevent, manage, and overcome a de- of very few rooms, and rarely contain proper latrines.
fined set of risks and vulnerabilities”.7 Many social protection agencies predominantly work
with individuals and groups in these settings due to the
Poverty in Uganda can look very different depending high levels of both absolute and relative poverty and
on the geographic context. While many authors make overall lack of access to resources. Agencies may be
the distinction solely between rural and urban areas, located either directly in the village or in nearby cities
this study goes a step further to separate urban locations or towns and travel to the village to implement their
between cities and towns, and rural areas between vil- programs. Some villages are easy to access via matatus
lages and islands.8 This distinction is important because (public taxis) to and from Jinja, although transportation
poverty in cities looks much different than poverty may not be affordable for many individuals in these


Draft Journal.indd 44 11/10/2015 3:45:46 PM

Sifting and Winnowing Undergraduate Journal, Volume 1

other necessities or will not be served. who have either requested or been identified as needing
Kigere Rose, Director of WORI, points out that the services. WORI’s reproductive health program, for
example, targets communities and schools, especially
many adults have never received any professional in- those in rural areas, based entirely on expressed need.
formation about reproductive and sexual health, so ad- The programs are flexible and utilize participants’ in-
dressing basic misperceptions is a critical step. Accord- put for education that is customized to their needs, but
ing to WORI, considering that curriculum regarding generally includes information on reproductive health
sexual and reproductive health is not generally taught and rights, HIV/AIDs, nutrition and sanitation. Other
in schools, information about HIV/AIDs is even more organizations that provide similar reproductive health
rare. This includes information on partner discordancy trainings include Community Concerns Uganda, who
(when one partner has a sexually transmitted disease, also carries out sexual health programs in schools, and
such as HIV/AIDs, and the other does not), prevention Clemency Uganda, who helps create awareness and
of mother to child transmission (PMTCT) and condom provide HIV/AIDs testing, condom distribution and ac-
use, despite high prevalence rates. Again, there exists a cess to safe male circumcision. Clemency Uganda also
gap between prevalence rates reported by literature and provides care and support packages and a malaria con-
organizations on the ground. While WORI and other or- trol program by educating individuals on prevention
ganizations reported HIV/AIDs rates in Jinja at roughly and treatment, on the premise that “a healthy mind is
40 percent, the literature shows much lower rates at or a wealthy mind,” because those who are unhealthy are
below 10 percent.26; 27 also unable to work.

These cultural barriers are even more extreme when In an effort to provide healthcare to the LGBTi com-
working with the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender munity, GEHO must utilize different methods. Similar
and intersex (LGBTi) community in Uganda, due to to other organizations, GEHO provides condoms and
institutional discrimination. Although already illegal, lubricant as well as information about HIV/AIDs and
President Museveni signed the Uganda Anti-Homosex- sexually transmitted infections (STIs). The additional
uality Act on February 24, 2014, which increased the fear of persecution, however, has led GEHO to form
sentence for LGBTi individuals from 14 years in pris- a network of doctors that can be trusted to be fully
on, as denoted by the previous law, to life in prison as informed and treat LGBTi individuals correctly and
well as a clause for mandated reporting.28; 29 LGBTi in- anonymously. While these individuals may not neces-
dividuals are unable to seek proper help in public health sarily be turned away at a general health care facility,
care facilities as, according to GEHO, doctors and other they may receive improper care when seeking help for
professionals are mandated to report suspicion of ho- a sexual health issue. GEHO’s network of doctors en-
mosexual behavior. If they do not, they can face arrest sures provisions for safe and proper health care for their
and a potential prison sentence. LGBTi individuals, clients.
therefore, risk life in prison for attempting to gain even
rudimentary information that could prove life saving. Minimal Government Assistance
A macro-level barrier identified by five of the eight
In response to a desire for increased and improved
health care, many organizations have made health a pri- organizations was the failure of government assistance
ority in combating poverty. Through various approach- to meet their responsibility to serve the needs of indi-
es, they aim to alleviate transportation, financial and viduals in poverty. Some organizations acknowledged
informational barriers to accessing health care. In order promising government policies, but also pointed to a
to overcome the issue of transportation, FABIO issues lack of or poor implementation. For GEHO specifically,
Village Health Teams (VHTs) that bring health infor- the government poses a direct threat due to the recently
mation and care directly to the villages. Additionally, signed Anti-Homosexuality Act.30 Other organizations
FABIO provides bike ambulances for individuals to that do not face persecution still saw the government as
reach the hospital more affordably and safely. impeding progress towards poverty alleviation.

To supplement the lack of reproductive health educa- Kigere Rose stated that, “[t]he government is solely
tion, many organizations teach sexual health programs responsible in ensuring reduction of poverty starting
in schools, communities or for groups of individuals

Draft Journal.indd 49 49

11/10/2015 3:45:47 PM

Sifting and Winnowing Undergraduate Journal, Volume 1

with…a law and police on the minimum wage to ensure any member who defaults on the loan. Applying as a
workers are not exploited and paid rightly and engaging group will also yield a higher total loan amount, al-
people to engage in decision making and accountability though loans are still given on an individual basis for
to ensure services provided by government have qual- individual proposals within the group. Loans for indi-
ity.” This strong belief was echoed by other organiza- viduals may be a maximum of 75,000UGX (30USD)
tions, including Agapewo Ministries, Clemency Ugan- while groups may apply for loans up to 2.4 million
da, Community Concerns Uganda and DRT. Agapewo UGX (9,500USD).
once received a government subsidized vehicle as a
promise to help with transportation needs but were Once groups are formed, the IGA trainings are held,
only allowed to keep it for three days, while Clemen- offering various trainings depending on the organiza-
cy Uganda, Community Concerns Uganda, and DRT tion, though generally including similar topics. IGAs
agree that corruption and poor implementation of good may train individuals in trades such as shoemaking,
policies are the main barriers to preventing problems bead making, carpentry, tailoring, selling vegetables or
at the governmental level. Although the majority of the other food items, harvesting rainwater, farming, har-
organizations identified this issue, their focus remains vesting or selling mukene (a small silver fish), entrepre-
at the micro-level, working to provide social protection neurial skill training and more, often alongside a mon-
services to individuals. ey management and savings course. Individuals then
present proposals to WORI with a plan of action and a
Micro-financing and Income Generating Activity requested loan amount at a community loan disburse-
(IGA) Training for Women ment meeting, which can be either accepted or rejected.
If accepted, individuals sign a contract that binds them
Surprisingly, only two organizations explicitly identi- to the terms of the loan, allowing individuals who are
fied lack of income or unemployment as having a strong illiterate to use their fingerprint in place of a signature.
correlation to poverty, yet micro-financing loans and The loans include interest rates so that the organiza-
income generating activity (IGA) training are among tions can operate in a revolving fashion and use the rev-
the most frequently employed strategies. Organizations enue from interest to provide loans for others and have
reported high success rates for these programs, with a a multiplier effect.
general repayment rate of over 90 percent despite no
collateral requirement. All organizations with the ex- Overall, the outcomes according to the organiza-
ception of GEHO utilized IGA training, most of which tions seem promising. They shared that individuals
also provided micro-financing loans to help those in- rarely default on loans, and if they do, it is for legiti-
dividuals use their skills to start their own businesses. mate reasons such as the loss of a relative, improper
Among loan recipients, women are more highly rep- investment, school fees or other unexpected events.
resented due to the belief that they will spend the loan DRT contested this view and suggested that while the
more wisely and invest in the entire family, whereas organizations interviewed for this research may have
men will only invest in their own well-being.31 Of the been successful, many micro-financing organizations
two organizations with IGA training that did not in- lack access to credit, misuse resources and use donor
clude micro-financing loans (Agapewo Ministries and funds for personal purposes. Without standardized data
WELL) WELL aspires to offer them as soon as they can and accountability, there is currently no way to accu-
afford it in order to allow the women to use their skills rately determine the overall success of micro-financing
to start their own bakeries. organizations in Jinja.

The general framework for micro-financing pro- Successes
grams can be presented using WORI as an example.
First, WORI evaluates vulnerable women according to The organizations noted many successes through
an expressed need in a community. Individuals who are their work in poverty alleviation. In line with the fo-
selected may then be awarded an individual or group cus on education, seven of the nine organizations have
loan. Group loans are utilized by many organizations to achieved increased school attendance. Through their
increase accountability, as the group is responsible for efforts, Clemency Uganda has been able to support the


Draft Journal.indd 50 11/10/2015 3:45:47 PM

Click to View FlipBook Version
Previous Book
tricor_digital_ebrochure copy
Next Book
rise and shine