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Published by jungmo13, 2019-11-02 10:27:15

PERSONS_AND_FAMILY_RELATIONS_LAW_First_S

PERSONS_AND_FAMILY_RELATIONS_LAW_First_S

UNIVERSITY OF SANTO AND
TOMAS

Digested by: DC 2016 Members

Editors:
Tricia Lacuesta
Lorenzo Gayya
Cristopher Reyes
Macky Siazon
Janine Arenas

PERSONSNinna Bonsol

Lloyd Javier

FAMILY

RELATIONS

LAW

First Sem Cases

Persons and Family Relations Law

Table of Contents

Preliminaries 2
Human Relations 14

Prejudicial Question 29

Civil Personality 33
Citizenship 34

Marriage 35

Void Marriages 46

Psychological Incapacity 53

Voidable Marriages 76

Legal Separation 78

Rights and Obligations between Husband & Wife 81

Property Relations 85

The Family as an Institution 103

Family Home106

Paternity and Filiation 108

Adoption 125

Support 130

Parental Authority 131

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Persons and Family Relations Law

PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS

Preliminaries

LORENZO M. TANADA v. HON. JUAN C. TUVERA
G.R. No. L-63915, April 24, 1985, ESCOLIN, J.

The requirement of publication in the O cial Gazette, even if the law itself
provides for the date of its e ectivity cannot be dispensed with.

Facts:

Tanada seeks for the issuance of writ of mandamus to compel public o>cials
to publish or cause to be published in the O>cial Gazette of various presidential
decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders,
letter of implementation and administrative orders because it involves public interest.
Tuvera dismissed the case outright beacause Tanada has no legal personality to Ble
petition for mandamus since he is not an aggrieved party which what the law
requires that only a person who is personally and directly aDected by non-publication
of laws would have the personality to Ble such. Tuvera further contends that
publication in the O>cial Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement for eDectivity of
laws where the laws themselves provide for their own eDectivity dates and since the
presidential issuances in question contain special provisions as to the date they are
to take eDect, publication in the O>cial Gazette is not indispensable for their
eDectivity.

Issue:

Whether or not the requirement of publication can be dispensed with.
Ruling:

No. The requirement of publication in the O>cial Gazette, even if the law
itself provides for the date of its eDectivity cannot be dispensed with.

Thus, Section 1 of Commonwealth Act 638 provides as follows:

Section 1.There shall be published in the O>cial Gazette [1] all important
legislative acts and resolutions of a public nature of the, Congress of the Philippines;
[2] all executive and administrative orders and proclamations, except such as have
no general applicability; [3] decisions or abstracts of decisions of the Supreme Court
and the Court of Appeals as may be deemed by said courts of su>cient importance
to be so published; [4] such documents or classes of documents as may be required
so to be published by law; and [5] such documents or classes of documents as the
President of the Philippines shall determine from time to time to have general
applicability and legal eDect, or which he may authorize so to be published.

The word "shall" used therein imposes upon public o>cials an imperative duty.
That duty must be enforced if the Constitutional right of the people to be informed on
matters of public concern is to be given substance and reality. The law itself makes a
list of what should be published in the O>cial Gazette. Such listing, to our mind,
leaves public o>cials with no discretion whatsoever as to what must be included or
excluded from such publication.

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Persons and Family Relations Law

The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public
adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct
as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the
application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It would be the height of
injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of
which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.

The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general
applicability" is mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for
Bnes, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose a burden or the
people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this category. Other
presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of persons such
as administrative and executive orders need not be published on the assumption that
they have been circularized to all concerned. It is needless to add that the
publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability"
is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound
by law, he must Brst be o>cially and speciBcally informed of its contents.

In a time of proliferating decrees, orders and letters of instructions which all
form part of the law of the land, the requirement of due process and the Rule of Law
demand that the O>cial Gazette as the o>cial government repository promulgate
and publish the texts of all such decrees, orders and instructions so that the people
may know where to obtain their o>cial and speciBc contents.

LORENZO M. TANADA ET AL v. HON. JUAN C. TUVERA
G.R. No. L-63915, December 29, 1986, CRUZ, J.

The clause "unless it is otherwise provided" under Article 2 of the Civil Code
refers to the date of e ectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, which
cannot in any event be omitted.

Facts:

Tanada requested for publication of presidential decrees for public purposes.
The government argued that while publication is necessary as a ruled, it is not so
when it is "otherwise provided," as when the decrees themselves declared that they
were to become eDective immediately upon their approval.

Issue:

Whether or not the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the date
of eDectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself

Ruling:

Yes. Article 2 of the Civil Code states that laws shall take eDect after Bfteen
days following the completion of their publication in the O>cial Gazette, unless it is
otherwise provided. This Code shall take eDect one year after such publication.

After a careful study of this provision, SC have come to the conclusion and so
hold, that the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the date of eDectivity
and not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be

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Persons and Family Relations Law

omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature may make the law eDective
immediately upon approval, or on any other date, without its previous publication.

Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its
discretion provide that the usual Bfteen-day period shall be shortened or extended. It
is not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication may be dispensed
with altogether. The reason is that such omission would oDend due process insofar as
it would deny the public knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern the
legislature could validly provide that a law e eDective immediately upon its approval
notwithstanding the lack of publication (or after an unreasonably short period after
publication), it is not unlikely that persons not aware of it would be prejudiced as a
result and they would be so not because of a failure to comply with but simply
because they did not know of its existence, SigniBcantly, this is not true only of penal
laws as is commonly supposed. One can think of many non-penal measures, like a
law on prescription, which must also be communicated to the persons they may
aDect before they can begin to operate.

SC holds therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and
private laws, shall be published as a condition for their eDectivity, which shall begin
Bfteen days after publication unless a diDerent eDectivity date is Bxed by the
legislature.

PHILSA INTERNATIONAL PLACEMENT and SERVICES CORPORATION v. THE
HON. SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, VIVENCIO DE MESA,
RODRIGO MIKIN and CEDRIC LEYSON
G.R. No. 103144, April 4, 2001, GONZAGA-REYES, J.

All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be
published as a condition for their e ectivity, which shall begin $fteen days after
publication unless a di erent e ectivity date is $xed by the legislature. Covered by
this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President
in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the
legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution: Administrative rules
and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement
existing law pursuant to a valid delegation. Interpretative regulations and those
merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the administrative
agency and the public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of the
so-called letter of instructions issued by the administrative superiors concerning the
rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their
duties

Facts:

Philsa International Placement and Services Corporation is a domestic
corporation engaged in the recruitment of workers for overseas employment. It
recruited private respondents for employment in Saudi and made to pay placement
fees. However when the private reached the Saudi they were made to sign contracts
resulting to some reduction of their beneBts but they refused to do sp. Due to their
refusal they, were terminated and repatriated back in the Philippines. Thereafter, the
Bled a complaint of illegal exaction against Philsa which the Secretary of Labor found
it guilty of such for collecting fees beyond the prescribed by law. Philsa insists
however, that it cannot be held liable for illegal exaction as POEA Memorandum

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Persons and Family Relations Law

Circular No. 11, Series of 1983, which enumerated the allowable fees which may be
collected from applicants, is void for lack of publication.

Issue:

Whether or not Philsa is guilty of illegal exaction despite the fact that the
POEA Memorandum Circular No. 11, Series of 1983 was not published.

Ruling:

No. In Tañada vs. Tuvera, the Court held, as follows: that all statutes, including
those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their
eDectivity, which shall begin Bfteen days after publication unless a diDerent
eDectivity date is Bxed by the legislature.

Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders
promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the
same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the
Constitution: Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their
purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a valid delegation.
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only
the personnel of the administrative agency and the public, need not be published.
Neither is publication required of the so-called letter of instructions issued by the
administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their
subordinates in the performance of their duties."

Applying this doctrine, SC ruled that the abovementioned Memorandum shall
be ineDective since it lacks publication which makes Philsa not liable for illegal
exaction.

UNCIANO PARAMEDICAL COLLEGE INC. v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 100335, April 7, 1993, NOCON, J.

It is a settled rule that when a doctrine of the Supreme Court is overruled and
a di erent view is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively, and
should not apply to parties who had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith
thereof.

Facts:

Elena Villegas and Ted Magallanes were students of Unciano Paramedical
College Inc. After their Brst term, they were no longer allowed to enroll due to
allegedly being members of National Union of Students of the Philippines and League
of Filipinos O>cers which they organized despite the prohibition to organize such.
Unciano cited the ruling in Alcuaz which was promulgated on 1988 that when a
college student registered in a school, it is understood that he is only enrolling for the
entire semester. Thus it also refuted the argument of Villegas and Magallanes that
since in a more recent case of Ariel Non, et al. vs. Hon. Sancho Dames promulgated
in 1990 (185 SCRA 523), the Supreme Court, abandoned and overruled its decision in
Alcuaz since it was promulgated later when the contract has already been
terminated. Thus, it cannot apply retroactively.

Issue:

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Persons and Family Relations Law

Whether or not the ruling in the case of Ariel Non et al vs. Hon Dames may be
applied retroactively.

Ruling:

No. Settled is the rule that when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a
diDerent view is adopted, the new doctrine is applied prospectively, and should not
apply to parties who relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof.

Under Article 4 of the New Civil Code, Laws shall have no retroactive eDect,
unless the contrary is provided. Furthermore, Under Article 8 of the New Civil Code
states that Judicial decision applying or interpreting the laws or constitution shall
form a part of the legal system. Thus, since judicial decisions are laws it shall not
have retroactive eDect unless otherwise provided.

The ruling in the Non case should not be given a retroactive eDect to cases
that arose before its promulgation. If it were otherwise, it would result in oppression
to petitioners and other schools similarly situated who relied on the ruling in the
Alcuaz case.

EMETERIO CUI v. ARELLANO UNIVERSITY
G.R. No. L-15127, May 30, 1961, CONCEPCION, J.

In order to declare a contract void as against public policy, a court must $nd
that the contract as to consideration or the thing to be done, contravenes some
established interest of society, or is inconsistent with sound policy and good morals
or tends clearly to undermine the security of individual rights.

Facts:

Cui was a student of Arellano University from prelaw up to fourth year Brst
semester in the College of law. By that time he was a scholar of such university and
his tuition fees were reimbursed after each semester. The scholarship agreement
however stipulates that in consideration of the scholarship granted to him by the
University, he waives his right to transfer to another school without having refunded
to the University the equivalent of his scholarship cash. But after in his fourth year
last semester, he transferred to College of Law Abad Santos University thus he
graduated therein. The conMict arose when he needed his law school records for
taking up the bar exam but Arellano University contended that it will only release
such upon payment of reimbursed tuition fees. Thus, Director of private schools
issued a Memorandum which states that the amount in tuition and other fees
corresponding to these scholarships should not be subsequently charged to the
recipient students when they decide to quit school or to transfer to another
institution for it is against public policy. When students are given full or partial
scholarships, it is understood that such scholarships are merited and earned.
Scholarships should not be oDered merely to attract and keep students in a school.

Issue:

Whether or not the Contract of Scholarship entered into by the Cui and
Arellano waiving the formers right to transfer to another school without having

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Persons and Family Relations Law

refunded to the University the equivalent of his scholarship cash is void for it is
against public policy.

Ruling:

Yes, Under Article 6 of the New Civil Code states that Rights may be waived,
unless the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals or good
customs or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.

In order to declare a contract void as against public policy, a court must Bnd
that the contract as to consideration or the thing to be done, contravenes some
established interest of society, or is inconsistent with sound policy and good morals
or tends clearly to undermine the security of individual rights. It has been
consistently held that under the principles relating to the doctrine of public policy, as
applied to the law of contracts, courts of justice will not recognize or uphold a
transaction which its object, operation, or tendency is calculated to be prejudicial to
the public welfare, to sound morality or to civic honesty.

Thus, if Arellano University understood clearly the real essence of scholarships
it should have not entered into a contract of waiver with Cui, which is a direct
violation of the Memorandum and an open challenge to the authority of the Director
of Private Schools because the contract was repugnant to sound morality and civic
honesty.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JOSE JABINAL Y CARMEN
G.R. No. L-30061, February 27, 1974, ANTONIO, J.

Decisions of the Court, although in themselves not laws, are nevertheless
evidence of what the laws mean.

Facts:

Jose Jabinal was charged with illegal possession of Brearms and ammunition
without the required license permit on 1964. However, he contended that he was a
Secret agent from the Provincial Governor of Batangas for prevention of crimes as
well as ConBdential Agent from the PC Provincial Commander for prevention of
smuggling. Thus the said appointments carried with them the authority to possess
and carry the Brearm. His argument was relied on the Supreme Court's decision in
People vs. Macarandang (1959) and People vs. Lucero (1958). However, the RTC
convicted the accused on the basis that such decisions were already overturned by
latest decision promulgated by the SC in People vs. Mapa on 1967 thereby Secret
Agents were no longer exempted from license permit. Thus such ruling shall apply
retroactively convicting the accused of such crime.

Issue:

Whether or not People vs. Mapa shall be applied retroactively, thus convicting
Jabinal for illegal possession of Brearms.

Ruling:

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Persons and Family Relations Law

No, Under Article 8 of the New Civil Code states that "Judicial decisions
applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal
system”. Decisions of this Court, although in themselves not laws, are nevertheless
evidence of what the laws mean.

The doctrine laid down in Lucero and Macarandang was part of the
jurisprudence, hence of the law, of the land, at the time Jabinal was found in
possession of the Brearm in question and when he arraigned by the trial court. It is
true that the doctrine was overruled in the Mapa case in 1967, but when a doctrine of
this Court is overruled and a diDerent view is adopted, the new doctrine should be
applied prospectively, and should not apply to parties who had relied on the old
doctrine and acted on the faith thereof. This is especially true in the construction and
application of criminal laws, where it is necessary that the punishability of an act be
reasonably foreseen for the guidance of society.

It follows, therefore, that considering that Jabinal conferred his appointments
as Secret Agent and ConBdential Agent and authorized to possess a Brearm pursuant
to the prevailing doctrine enunciated in Macarandang and Lucero, under which no
criminal liability would attach to his possession of said Brearm in spite of the absence
of a license and permit therefor, appellant must be absolved. Certainly, He may not
be punished for an act which at the time it was done was held not to be punishable.

ALICE REYES VAN DORN v. HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR.
G.R. No. L-68470, October 8, 1985, MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.

While it is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of
the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute
divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and
morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in
the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law.

Facts:

Alice Van Dorn is a citizen of the Philippines was married to Richard Upton a
US citizen. They were married in Hongkong. Thereafter, they established their
residence in the Philippines. However due to conMicts, they obtained a divorce in
Nevada US and later on Alice Van Dorn remarried to Theodore Van Dorn. ConMict
arose when, Upton claimed in the RTC through a petition that Alice Vandorns shop in
Ermita is a conjugal property which he orders the latter to render an accounting and
that he be declared to manage the property. Van Dorn then Bled motion to dismiss on
the ground that the cause of action is barred by previous judgment in divorce
proceedings before Nevada Court which was acknowledge by Upton that they had no
community property. However, it was denied by the RTC on the ground that the
property involved is located in the Philippines so that the Divorce Decree has no
bearing in the case. Hence this petition. Upton averred that the Divorce Decree
issued by the Nevada Court cannot prevail over the prohibitive laws of the Philippines
and its declared national policy; that the acts and declaration of a foreign Court
cannot, especially if the same is contrary to public policy, divest Philippine Courts of
jurisdiction to entertain matters within its jurisdiction.

Issue:

Whether or not the Divorce decree is binding as between the parties.

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Persons and Family Relations Law

Ruling:

Yes, it is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of
the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute
divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and
morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in
the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case,
the divorce in Nevada released Upton from the marriage from the standards of
American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage.

Thus, pursuant to his national law, Upton is no longer the husband of Van
Dorn. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as Vandorn's husband
entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his
own country's Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose
decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said
Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.

To maintain, as Upton does, that, under our laws, Vandorn has to be
considered still married to him and still subject to a wife's obligations cannot be just.
Vandorn should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and Bdelity, and
render support to Upton. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with
possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her
own country if the ends of justice are to be served.

FE D. QUITA v. COURT OF APPEALS AND BLANDINA DANDAN
G.R. No. 124862, December 22, 1998, BELLOSILLO, J.

Citizenship at the time the divorce decree was obtained is necessary for the
purpose of recognition of such in the Philippine Courts.

Facts:

Fe. Quita and Arturo T. Padlan both Filipinos were married in the Philippines.
However, they obtained a divorce decree in San Francisco California USA. Later on,
she remarried twice. When Padlan died, she claimed for the estate of such and
invoking that the divorce decree was not valid in the Philippines since at the time
they obtained divorce, they were both Filipino citizens and thus, she is entitled to the
estate of Padlan. Meanwhile, Dandan the second wife of Padlan claimed that she is
the lawful wife and that Quita was already an American Citizen at the time of the
divorce which makes Padlan entitled validly remarry. RTC invoking Tenchavez v. Escao
which held that a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens sought and decreed after
the eDectivity of the present Civil Code was not entitled to recognition as valid in this
jurisdiction, thereby disregarded the divorce between Qiuta and Padlan. However the
trial court did not bother to resolve the issue of citizenship of Quita at the time the
divorce decree was obtained.

Issue:

Whether or not citizenship at the time of the divorce is necessary for the
divorce decree to be recognized in the Philippine Courts.

Ruling:

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Persons and Family Relations Law

Yes, If Quita was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of her divorce from
Arturo, this should have prompted the trial court to conduct a hearing to establish her
citizenship. The purpose of a hearing is to ascertain the truth of the matters in issue
with the aid of documentary and testimonial evidence as well as the arguments of
the parties either supporting or opposing the evidence. Instead, the lower court
perfunctorily settled her claim in her favor by merely applying the ruling in Tenchavez
v. Escao. Thus Quitas citizenship of was relevant in the light of the ruling in Van Dorn
v. Romillo Jr.that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law.

Thus, since RTC has failed to resolve the issue of citizenship of Quita at the
time of the divorce, then the case must be remanded to such for trial.

FELICITAS AMOR-CATALAN v. COURT OF APPEALS, ORLANDO CATALAN AND
MEROPE BRAGANZA

G.R. No. 167109, February 6, 2007, YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.

A petition to declare the nullity of marriage, like any other actions, must be
prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest and must be based
on a cause of action.

Facts:

Felicitas Amor-Catalan married Orlando in Mabini, Pangasinan. Thereafter,
they migrated to the United States of America and allegedly became naturalized
citizens thereof and later on allegedly divorced. Orlando remarried to Braganza
though the later had prior subsisting marriage with Eusebio Bristol. Felicitas then Bled
a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage against Orlando and Merope. RTC
granted such petition but on Appeal it was reversed by the CA ruling that Felicitas
does not have the legal capacity to Ble the petition since they already obtained
divorce thus severing her ties with Orlando.

Issue:

Whether or not Felicitas has the legal capacity to Ble the petition assuming
arguendo that they obtained divorce decree after they were naturalized as American
citizens.

Ruling:

No, If there was indeed a divorce decree obtained and which, following the
national law of Orlando, does not restrict remarriage. Freed from their existing marital
bond, each of the former spouses no longer has any interest nor should each have
the personality to inquire into the marriage that the other might subsequently
contract.

Viewed from another perspective, Felicitas has no existing interest in
Orlando’s subsequent marriage since the validity, as well as any defect or inBrmity,
of this subsequent marriage will not aDect the divorced status of Orlando and
Felicitas.

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A petition to declare the nullity of marriage, like any other actions, must be
prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest and must be based
on a cause of action. SigniBcantly, Section 2(a) of The Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, which took eDect on
March 15, 2003, now speciBcally provides that a petition for declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriage may be Bled solely by the husband or the wife.

EDGAR SAN LUIS v. FELICIDAD SAN LUIS
G.R. No. 133743, February 6, 2007, YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.

The presentation solely of the divorce decree is insu cient and that proof of
its authenticity and due execution must be presented.

Facts:

Felicisimo San Luis had three marriages. His Brst marriage was dissolve
because his Brst wife died. His second marriage was with Merry Lee an America
citizen though they obtained divorce. His third marriage was with Felicidad San Luis.
Felicisimo died, which prompted Felicidad in Bling for petition for the issuance of
letters of administration in her favor. It was then opposed by the children of Felicisimo
in his Brst marriage contending that the marriage between Felicidad and Felicisimo
was bigamous due to the fact that the divorce cannot be recognized in the Philippines
since Felicisimo is a Filipino and the Philippine Laws does not grant divorce. Felicidad
then presented the divorce decree but it was opposed by the children of Felicisimo
from his Brst wife.

Issue:

Whether or not the presentation solely of divorce decree is su>cient to prove
its authenticity and due execution.

Ruling:

No, the divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely
allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal personality
to Ble the present petition as Felicisimo’s surviving spouse.

In Garcia v. Recio, the Court laid down the speciBc guidelines for pleading and
proving foreign law and divorce judgments. It held that presentation solely of the
divorce decree is insu>cient and that proof of its authenticity and due execution
must be presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document
may be proven as a public or o>cial record of a foreign country by either (1) an
o>cial publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the o>cer having legal custody
of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a)
accompanied by a certiBcate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular o>cer in
the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is
kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his o>ce.

MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY BAYOT v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
and VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT

G.R. No. 155635, November 7, 2008, VELASCO, JR., J.

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A divorce obtained abroad by an alien married to a Philippine national may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided the decree of divorce is valid according to the
national law of the foreigner.

Facts:

Maria Rebecca Makapugay Bayot (Rebecca) and Vicente Madrigal Bayot
(Vicente) were married on April 20, 1979 in Mandaluyong City. On its face, the
Marriage CertiBcate identiBed Rebecca to be an American citizen born in Agaña,
Guam, USA. Rebecca gave birth to Marie Josephine Alexandra or Alix. From then on,
Vicente and Rebecca's marital relationship seemed to have soured as the latter
initiated divorce proceedings in the CFI of Dominican Republic which ordered the
dissolution of the couple's marriage but giving them joint custody and guardianship
over Alix.

Rebecca Bled a petition before the Muntinlupa City RTC for declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage and also sought the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership of gains with application for support pendente lite for her and Alix.
Vicente Bled a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds of lack of cause of action and that
the petition is barred by the prior judgment of divorce. Rebecca interposed an
opposition, insisting her Filipino citizenship, therefore, there is no valid divorce to
speak of.

The RTC denied Vicente's motion to dismiss and granted Rebecca's application
for support pendente lite. The CA dismissed the petition of Rebecca and set aside
incidental orders the RTC issued in relation to the case.

Issue:

1. Whether or not Rebecca was a Filipino citizen at the time the divorce
judgment was rendered in the Dominican Republic.

2. Whether or not the judgment of divorce is valid.

Ruling:

1. No. There can be no serious dispute that Rebecca, at the time she applied
for and obtained her divorce from Vicente, was an American citizen and remains to
be one, absent proof of an eDective repudiation of such citizenship. The following are
compelling circumstances indicative of her American citizenship: (1) she was born in
Agaña, Guam, USA; (2) the principle of jus soli is followed in this American territory
granting American citizenship to those who are born there; and (3) she was, and may
still be, a holder of an American passport.

And as aptly found by the CA, Rebecca had consistently professed, asserted,
and represented herself as an American citizen, particularly: (1) during her marriage
as shown in the marriage certiBcate; (2) in the birth certiBcate of Alix; and (3) when
she secured the divorce from the Dominican Republic. Mention may be made of the
A>davit of Acknowledgment in which she stated being an American citizen. The
Court can assume hypothetically that Rebecca is now a Filipino citizen. But from the
foregoing disquisition, it is indubitable that Rebecca did not have that status of, or at
least was not yet recognized as, a Filipino citizen when she secured the February 22,
1996 judgment of divorce from the Dominican Republic.

2. Yes. The Court has taken stock of the holding in Garcia v. Recio that a foreign
divorce can be recognized here, provided the divorce decree is proven as a fact and

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as valid under the national law of the alien spouse. Be this as it may, the fact that
Rebecca was clearly an American citizen when she secured the divorce and that
divorce is recognized and allowed in any of the States of the Union, the presentation
of a copy of foreign divorce decree duly authenticated by the foreign court issuing
said decree is, as here, su>cient.

Given the validity and e>cacy of divorce secured by Rebecca, the same shall be
given a res judicata eDect in this jurisdiction. As an obvious result of the divorce
decree obtained, the marital vinculum between Rebecca and Vicente is considered
severed; they are both freed from the bond of matrimony. In plain language, Vicente
and Rebecca are no longer husband and wife to each other. Consequent to the
dissolution of the marriage, Vicente could no longer be subject to a husband's
obligation under the code

ADOLFO C. AZNAR AND LUCY CHRISTENSEN v. HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA
G.R. No. L-16749, January 31, 1963, LABRADOR, J.

Doctrine of Renvoi is a legal doctrine which applies when a court is faced with
a con4ict of law and must consider the law of another state, referred to as private
international law rules.

Facts:

Edward E. Christensen executed a will bequeathing a part of his property
located in the Philippines to Maria Helen Christensen his acknowledge daughter. He
was a citizen of US and State of California but domiciled in the Philippines at the time
of his death. Lucy his other child alleged that under the State of California Law
acknowledge children shall not inherit. Furthermore, Article 16 of the Civil Code
states that in case of testamentary succession with respect to the order of succession
and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary
provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the deceased. Thus, Helen shall
not inherit. Helen Christen on the other hand alleged that since there is no single
American law to such issue for the disposition of property located in the domicile of
the deceased what shall govern is the State of California Law that under Article 946
of the Civil Code of California, if there is no law to the contrary, in the place where
personal property is situated, it is deemed to follow the person of its owner, and is
governed by the law of his domicile. Moreover in accordance therewith and following
the doctrine of the renvoi, the question of the validity of the testamentary provision
in question should be referred back to the law of the decedent's domicile, which is
the Philippines.

Issue:

Whether or not the Doctrine of Renvoi shall apply in this case.

Ruling:

Yes, Doctrine of Renvoi is a legal doctrine which applies when a court is faced
with a conMict of law and must consider the law of another state, referred to as
private international law rules. This can apply when considering foreign issues arising
in succession planning and in administering estates.

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Thus, Article 16 par. 2 of the Civil Code provides that intestate and
testamentary successions with respect to order of succession and amount of
successional right is regulated by the national law of the deceased. While California
Probate Code provides that a testator may dispose of his property in the form and
manner he desires. Furthermore, Art. 946 of the Civil Code of California provides that
if no law on the contrary, the place where the personal property is situated is deemed
to follow the person of its owner and is governed by the law of his domicile

These provisions are cases when the Doctrine of Renvoi may be applied where
the question of validity of the testamentary provision in question is referred back to
the decedent’s domicile – the Philippines. The conMicts of law rule in California Law
Probate and Art. 946 authorize the return of question of law to the testator’s
domicile. The court must apply its own rule in the Philippines as directed in the
conMicts of law rule in CA, otherwise the case/issue will not be resolved if the issue is
referred back and forth between 2 states.

SC Bnds that as the domicile of the deceased Christensen, a citizen of
California, is the Philippines, the validity of the provisions of his will depriving his
acknowledged natural child, the appellant, should be governed by the Philippine Law,
the domicile, pursuant to Art. 946 of the Civil Code of California, not by the internal
law of California.

MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS AND MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS v. EDWARD A. BELLIS ET
AL.

G.R. No. L-23678, June 6, 1967, BENGZON, J.

It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be
involved in our System of legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the same
to the succession of foreign nationals.

Facts:

Amos G. Bellis born in Texas and was a citizen of the State of Texas and of the
United States. He therefore executed a will in the Philippines in favor of his children
and his Brst wife then later on died. Thereafter, when the will is probated, Maria
Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis were claiming to be the illegitimate children of
Amog and contended that they were deprived of legitimes. However, the Probate
court denied the claim on the ground that the national law of Amos G. Bellis does not
grant legitimes to illegitimate children relying on Article 16 of the Civil Code. They
argue that their case falls under the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph
of Article 17 in relation to Article 16 of the Civil Code that prohibitive laws concerning
persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public order,
public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineDective by laws or
judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a
foreign country prevails as the exception to Art. 16, par. 2 of the Civil Code which
renders applicable the national law of the decedent, in intestate or testamentary
successions, with regard to four items: (a) the order of succession; (b) the amount of
successional rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and (d) the
capacity to succeed.

Issue:

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Whether or not Article 17 last paragraph of the civil code is an exception for
the application of national law of decedent in Article 16 of the Civil Code

Ruling:

No. This is not correct. Precisely, Congress deleted the phrase,
"notwithstanding the provisions of this and the next preceding article" when they
incorporated Art. 11 of the old Civil Code as Art. 17 of the new Civil Code, while
reproducing without substantial change the second paragraph of Art. 10 of the old
Civil Code as Art. 16 in the new. It must have been their purpose to make the second
paragraph of Art. 16 a speciBc provision in itself which must be applied in testate and
intestate succession. As further indication of this legislative intent, Congress added a
new provision, under Art. 1039, which decrees that capacity to succeed is to be
governed by the national law of the decedent.

It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be
involved in our System of legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the same to
the succession of foreign nationals. For it has speciBcally chosen to leave, inter alia,
the amount of successional rights, to the decedent's national law. SpeciBc provisions
must prevail over general ones. The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis,
was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and that under the laws of Texas, there are
no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of
the will and the amount of successional rights are to be determined under Texas law,
the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.

PAULA T. LLORENTE v. COURT OF APPEAL, AND ALICIA F. LLORENTE
G.R. No. 124371, November 23, 2000, PARDO, J.

Aliens may obtain divorces abroad, provided they are valid according to their
national law.

Facts:

Lorenzo N. Llorente (Lorenzo) was married to his Brst wife Paula llorento
(Paula). However they obtained a divorce because of Paula’s inBdelity to Lorenzo’s
brother. The divorce was obtained long after Lorenzo was naturalized as American
Citizen. He then married his second wife Alice and begot three children. He executed
a will in the Philippines and bequeathing his properties situated therein to his second
wife and three children the later on died. Paula then claimed that she was the
surviving spouse of Lorenzo and that the divorce was not valid in the Philippines.

Issue:

Whether or not the divorce was recognizable in the Philippines.

Ruling:

Yes. In long line of cases decided by the SC it ruled that owing to the
nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals
are covered by the policy against absolute divorces, the same being considered
contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. In the same case, the Court
ruled that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, provided they are valid according to
their national law. Once proven that Lorenzo was no longer a Filipino citizen when he

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obtained the divorce from Paula, the ruling in Van Dorn would become applicable and
Paula could very well lose her right to inherit from him. Thus the divorce obtained by
Lorenzo H. Llorente from his Brst wife Paula was valid and recognized in this
jurisdiction as a matter of comity.

Human Relations

ALFREDO M. VELAYO v. SHELL COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, LTD.
G.R. No. L-7817, October 31, 1956, FELIX, J.

A moral wrong or injury, even if it does not constitute a violation of a statute
law, should be compensated by damages.

Facts:

Shell supplies fuel needs of CALI. However, due to Bnancial crisis it failed to
pay Shell and its other creditors. Thus, they entered into an agreement that they
would present suits against the corporation but to strive for a pro-rata division of the
assets, and only in the case of non-agreement would the creditors Ble insolvency
proceedings. However, when Shell PH assigned the credit to Shell oil its American
Sister Corporation, the latter Bled a case against CALI for the collection of assigned
Credit attaching the C-54 plane of CALI which the creditors opposed and Bled
damages against Shell for breach of their agreement.

Issue:

Whether or not Shell shall be liable for damages.

Ruling:

Yes, Under Article 21 of the Civil Code states that any person who wilfully
causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs
or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. This is the legal remedy
for that untold numbers of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to
provide for speciBcally in the statutes.

Another rule is expressed in Article 23 which compels the return of a thing
acquired ‘without just or legal grounds’. This provision embodies the doctrine that no
person should unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another, which has been one
of the mainstays of every legal system for centuries. Now, if Article 23 of the Civil
Code goes as far as to provide that: “Even if an act or event causing damage to
another’s property was not due to the fault or negligence of the Shell, the latter shall
be liable for indemnity if through the act or event he was beneBted” with mere much
more reason the Shell should be liable for indemnity for acts it committed in bad faith
and with betrayal of conBdence.

Shell taking advantage of his knowledge that insolvency proceedings were to
be instituted by CALI if the creditors did not come to an understanding as to the
manner of distribution of the insolvent asset among them, and believing it most
probable that they would not arrive at such understanding as it was really the case —
schemed and eDected the transfer of its sister corporation in the United States,
where CALI’s plane C-54 was by that swift and unsuspected operation e>caciously

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disposed of said insolvent’s property depriving the latter, of the opportunity to
recover said plane –to the detriment of the other creditors.

GLOBE MACKAY CABLE AND RADIO CORP., and HERBERT C. HENDRY v.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and RESTITUTO M. TOBIAS
G.R. No. 81262, August 25, 1989, CORTES, J.

Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the NCC are known to contain what is commonly
referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, which sets certain standards which
must be observed not only in the exercise of one's rights but also in the performance
of one's duties. These standards are the following: to act with justice; to give
everyone his due; and to observe honesty and good faith.

Facts:

Restituto M. Tobias (Tobias) herein private respondent was an employee of
Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corp (GMCRC) herein petitioner. Herbert Hendry
(Hendry) herein petitioner, was the Executive Vice-President and General Manager of
GMCRC. Sometime in 1972, GMCRC discovered Bctitious purchases and other
fraudulent transactions for which it lost several thousands of pesos. Thereafter,
Hendry ordered Tobias to take a force leave so as to have Tobias investigated. Hendry
declared that Tobias was their number one suspect in the anomaly. Thus, criminal
complaints for estafa were Bled against Tobias. These charges were however
dismissed for lack of probable cause. Subsequently, Hendry dismissed Tobias from
employment. Claiming that he was illegally dismissed, Tobias Bled a complaint for
damages against GMCRC and Hendry with the RTC.

The RTC decided in favor of Tobias. On appeal, the CA a>rmed. Now, GMCRC
and Hendry assail the decision of the CA. It asseverates that the dismissal of Tobias
was in lawful exercise of its right. Hence this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not GMCRC and Hendry exercised lawfully their right to dismiss
Tobias.

Ruling:

No. An employer who harbors suspicions that an employee has committed
dishonesty might be justiBed in taking the appropriate action such as ordering an
investigation and directing the employee to go on a leave. Firmness and the resolve
to uncover the truth would also be expected from such employer. But the high-
handed treatment accorded Tobias by petitioners was certainly uncalled for. The
imputation of guilt without basis and the pattern of harassment during the
investigations of Tobias transgress the standards of human conduct set forth in
Article 19 of the Civil Code. The Court has already ruled that the right of the
employer to dismiss an employee should not be confused with the manner in which
the right is exercised and the eDects Mowing therefrom. If the dismissal is done
abusively, then the employer is liable for damages to the employee. Under the
circumstances of the instant case, the petitioners clearly failed to exercise in a
legitimate manner their right to dismiss Tobias, giving the latter the right to recover
damages under Article 19 in relation to Article 21 of the Civil Code.

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BARONS MARKETING CORP. v. COURT OF APPEALS and PHELPS DODGE
PHILS., INC.

G.R. No. 126486, February 9, 1998, KAPUNAN, J.

There is undoubtedly an abuse of right when it is exercised for the only
purpose of prejudicing or injuring another.

Facts:

Sometime in 1973, Barons Marketing Corp (Barons) herein petitioner,
appointed Phelps Dodge Phils Inc (Phelps) herein private respondent, as its dealer for
the sale of electrical wires and cables. Phelps was given by Barons credit for the
former’s purchases of the latter’s electric products. Thereafter, Phelps, purchased on
credit from Barons various electric wires and cables. These wires and cables in turn,
were sold by Phelps to MERALCO. Subsequently, Barons demanded payment from
Phelps the amount covering the wires and cables. However, Phelps was unable to pay
the same. This prompted Barons to Ble a complaint for collection against Phelps.

The RTC held in favor of Barons and ordered Phelps to pay Barons. On appeal
with the CA, the CA a>rmed the ruling of the RTC. Now Phelps assails the decision of
the CA. It avers that Barons abused its right as credit to the prejudice of Phelps.
Hence this appeal.

Issue:

Whether or not Barons abused its right to the prejudice of Phelps.

Ruling:

No. It is an elementary rule in this jurisdiction that good faith is presumed and
that the burden of proving bad faith rests upon the party alleging the same. In the
case at bar, petitioner has failed to prove bad faith on the part of private respondent.
Petitioners allegation that private respondent was motivated by a desire to terminate
its agency relationship with petitioner so that private respondent itself may deal
directly with Meralco is simply not supported by the evidence. At most, such
supposition is merely speculative.

Moreover, we Bnd that private respondent was driven by very legitimate
reasons for rejecting petitioners oDer and instituting the action for collection before
the trial court. As pointed out by private respondent, the corporation had its own
cash position to protect in order for it to pay its own obligations. This is not such a
lame and poor rationalization as petitioner purports it to be. For if private respondent
were to be required to accept petitioners oDer, there would be no reason for the
latter to reject similar oDers from its other debtors. Clearly, this would be inimical to
the interests of any enterprise, especially a proBt-oriented one like private
respondent. It is plain to see that what we have here is a mere exercise of rights, not
an abuse thereof. Under these circumstances, we do not deem private respondent to
have acted in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy as to
violate the provisions of Article 21 of the Civil Code.

METROPOLITAN WATERWORKS AND SEWERAGE SYSTEM v. ACT THEATER,
INC.

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G.R. No. 147076, June 17, 2004, CALLEJO SR., J.

When a right is exercised in a manner which discards the norms provided by
Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the NCC resulting in damage to another, a legal wrong is
committed for which actor can be held accountable.

Facts:

This case stems from a criminal complaint Bled by Metropolitan Waterworks
and Sewerage System (MWSS) herein petitioner, against the employees of Act
Theater (AT) herein respondent. Thereafter, MWSS disconnected the water services
provided to AT. This prompted AT to Ble a complaint for damages against MWSS for
having allegedly abused its right to the prejudice of AT.

The RTC ruled in favor of AT. The CA a>rmed. This prompted MWSS to elevate
the case, assailing the decision of the CA. Hence this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not MWSS abused its right in cutting the water supply services to
the prejudice of AT.

Ruling:

Yes, it has abused its right. In this case, the petitioner failed to act with justice
and give the respondent what is due to it when the petitioner unceremoniously cut
oD the respondent’s water service connection. As correctly found by the appellate
court:

While it is true that MWSS had sent a notice of investigation to
plainti -appellee prior to the disconnection of the latters water
services, this was done only a few hours before the actual
disconnection. Upon receipt of the notice and in order to ascertain the
matter, Act sent its assistant manager Teodulo Gumalid, Jr. to the
MWSS o ce but he was treated badly on the 4imsy excuse that he had
no authority to represent Act. Acts water services were cut at midnight
of the day following the apprehension of the employees. Clearly, the
plainti -appellee was denied due process when it was deprived of the
water services. As a consequence thereof, Act had to contract another
source to provide water for a number of days. Plainti -appellee was
also compelled to deposit with MWSS the sum of P200,000.00 for the
restoration of their water services.

There is, thus, no reason to deviate from the uniform Bndings and conclusion of the
court a quo and the appellate court that the petitioners act was arbitrary, injurious
and prejudicial to the respondent, justifying the award of damages under Article 19 of
the Civil Code.

SOLEDAD CARPIO v. LEONORA A. VALMONTE
G.R. No. 151866, September 9, 2004, TINGA, J.

To warrant recovery of damages, there must be both a right of action, for a
wrong in4icted by the defendant, and the damage resulting therefrom to the plainti .

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Wrong without damage, or damage without wrong, does not constitute a cause of
action.

Facts:

Leonora Valmonte (Valmonte) herein respondent, is a wedding coordinator
who was engaged by one Michelle del Rosario (Michelle) and Jon Sierra (Jon) for their
wedding. On the day at the wedding and within the Manila Hotel where the Michelle
and Jon were billeted, Valmonte was overseeing the preparations for the wedding.
Upon entering the suite where the bride, bride’s maids, parents, relatives, make-up
artist, assistants, photographers and fashion designers were located, Soledad Carpio
(Carpio) herein petitioner exclaimed, “Ikaw ang lumabas ng kwarto, nasaan ang dala
mong bag? Saan ka pumunta? Ikaw lang ang lumabas ng kwarto, ikaw ang kumuha.”
Thereafter, Carpio ordered one of the ladies at the suite to search the body of
Valmonte. Apparently, the million dollar pieces of jewellery owned by Carpio were
missing and Carpio was speculating the Valmonte had it. Throughout the event,
Valmonte was being accused by Carpio of taking the pieces of jewellery owned by
Carpio. Thereafter, Valmonte Bled a complaint for damages against Carpio alleging
that her ordeal has caused her humiliation, and has besmirched her reputation.

The RTC dismissed the complaint of Valmonte. On appeal, the CA reversed and
set aside the decision of the RTC. It held Carpio liable for damages in favor of
Valmonte. Now, Carpio comes before the Supreme Court assailing decision of the CA.
Hence this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not Carpio’s imputations has prejudiced Valmonte.

Ruling:

Yes. In the case at bar, petitioners verbal reproach against respondent was
certainly uncalled for considering that by her own account nobody knew that she
brought such kind and amount of jewellery inside the paper bag. This being the case,
she had no right to attack respondent with her innuendos which were not merely
inquisitive but out-rightly accusatory. By openly accusing respondent as the only
person who went out of the room before the loss of the jewellery in the presence of
all the guests therein, and ordering that she be immediately bodily searched,
petitioner virtually branded respondent as the thief. True, petitioner had the right to
ascertain the identity of the malefactor, but to malign respondent without an iota of
proof that she was the one who actually stole the jewellery is an act which, by any
standard or principle of law is impermissible. Petitioner had wilfully caused injury to
respondent in a manner which is contrary to morals and good customs. Her Brmness
and resolve to Bnd her missing jewellery cannot justify her acts toward respondent.
She did not act with justice and good faith for apparently, she had no other purpose
in mind but to prejudice respondent. Certainly, petitioner transgressed the provisions
of Article 19 in relation to Article 21 for which she should be held accountable.

ELEAZAR S. PADILLO v. RURAL BANK OF NABUNTURAN, INC. and MARK S.
OROPEZA

G.R. No. 199338, January 21, 2013, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

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Damages may be recoverable due to an abuse of right under Article 21 in
conjunction with Article 19 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the following elements
must, however, obtain: ( 1) there is a legal right or duty; (2) exercised in bad faith;
and (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.

Facts:

Eleazar Padillo (Padillo) herein petitioner, deceased and represented by his
heirs, was an employed by Rural Bank of Nabunturan Inc. (RBNI) herein respondent,
as its Bookkeeper. Thereafter, on 2007, Padillo suDered a mild stroke due to
hypertension which consequently impaired his ability to eDectively pursue his work.
On September 10 2007 he wrote a letter addressed to Mark Oropeza (Oropeza)
President of RBNI expressing his intention to avail of an early retirement package.
However despite several follow-ups, Padillo’s request remained unheeded. Thus, on
October 3, 2007, Padillo was separated from employment due to his poor and failing
health. Not having received his claimed retirement beneBts, Padillo Bled a complaint
for recovery of unpaid retirement beneBts.

The LA dismissed the complaint of Padillo. On appeal with the NLRC, the NLRC
reversed and set aside the decision of the LA. Subsequently, the CA reversed the
ruling of the NLRC and a>rmed the decision of the LA. Among others, Padillo avers
that the act of RBNI and Oropeza in ignoring his request for the early retirement
package constitutes bad faith and thus susceptible for the damages. Hence this
petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the act of ignoring the request of Padillo is a violation of the
NCC on Human Relations

Ruling:

No, it is not. The Court Bnds no bad faith in any of respondents’ actuations as
they were within their right, absent any proof of its abuse, to ignore Padillo’s
misplaced claim for retirement beneBts. Respondents’ obstinate refusal to accede to
Padillo’s request is precisely justiBed by the fact that there lies no basis under any
applicable agreement or law which accords the latter the right to demand any
retirement beneBts from the Bank. While the Court mindfully notes that damages
may be recoverable due to an abuse of right under Article 21 in conjunction with
Article 19 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the following elements must, however,
obtain: (1) there is a legal right or duty; (2) exercised in bad faith; and (3) for the sole
intent of prejudicing or injuring another. Records reveal that none of these elements
exists in the case at bar and thus, no damages on account of abuse of right may he
recovered.

ORLANDO D. GARCIA, JR., doing business under the name and style
COMMUNITY DIAGNOSTIC CENTER and BU CASTRO v. RANIDA D. SALVADOR

and RAMON SALVADOR
G.R. No. 168512, March 20, 2007, YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.

Article 20, NCC provides the legal basis for the award of damages to a party
who su ers damage whenever one commits an act in violation of some legal

21 | P a g e

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provision. This was incorporated by the Code Commission to provide relief to a
person who su ers damage because another has violated some legal provision.

Facts:

Ranida Salvador (Ranida) herein respondent underwent a HBs Ag test for the
purpose of determining whether Ranida had Hepatitis B. The test was conducted by
Bu Castro (Castro) of the Community Diagnostic Center (CDC) represented by
Orlando Garcia (Garcia) herein petitioners. Subsequently, it was determined that
Ranida was positive of Hepatitis B. As a result, Ranida was terminated from her
employment. Because of Ranida’s alleged positive identiBcation for Hepatitis B which
resulted to her termination, Ramon Salvador (Ramon) herein respondent and father
of Ranida, suDered a heart attack and was forced to be admitted to the hospital for
medication. Thereafter, Ranida sought further tests from other medical practitioners
and it was later found out that Ranida was in truth and in fact, not suDering from
Hepatitis B. Verily, CDC conducted a second test on Ranida the test yielded a
negative result. Thus Ranida was reinstated in her employment. Thereafter, Ranida
and Ramon Bled a complaint for damages. They anchored their claim on the fact that
Ranida lost her job, suDered serious mental anxiety, trauma and sleepless night. In
the same vein, Ramon avers that he was hospitalized and had therefore lost business
opportunities because of the erroneous test results of CDC.

The RTC dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of
the RTC and held CDC and Castro liable. Now, CDC and Castro comes before the
Supreme Court assailing the decision of the CA. Hence this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not CDC and Castro are liable for damages in favor of Ranida and
Ramon.

Ruling:

Yes. The failure of petitioners to comply with the laws and rules promulgated
and issued for the protection of public safety and interest is failure to observe that
care which a reasonably prudent health care provider would observe. Thus, their act
or omission constitutes a breach of duty.

Indubitably, Ranida suDered injury as a direct consequence of Garcia’s failure
to comply with the mandate of the laws and rules aforequoted. She was terminated
from the service for failing the physical examination; suDered anxiety because of the
diagnosis; and was compelled to undergo several more tests. All these could have
been avoided had the proper safeguards been scrupulously followed in conducting
the clinical examination and releasing the clinical report.

MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY and PEDRO YAMBAO v. THE HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS and ISAAC CHAVEZ, SR., ISAAC O. CHAVEZ, JR., ROSENDO O.
CHAVES, and JUAN O. CHAVES
G.R. No. L-39019, January 22, 1988, YAP, J.

The act of MERALCO in disconnecting the electricity of the Chavez' without
prior notice constitutes a violation of Article 21, NCC and hence, therefore a ground
for award of damages.

22 | P a g e

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Facts:

Sometime in 1965 Pedro Yambao (Yambao) representing Manila Electric
Company (MERALCO) herein petitioners, sent two (2) overdue bills representing the
unpaid electricity of Isaac Chavez Sr. et al (Chavez et al). Thereafter, Chavez et al
caused the payment of one (1) of the electric bills. Subsequently, MERALCO
disconnected its power services without prior notice to the prejudice of Chavez et al.
The day after, Chavez et al caused the payment of the other overdue bill. Later on,
Chavez et al sued MERALCO for damages on the ground that they have suDered
embarrassment, humiliation, wounded feelings, and hurt pride because of the undue
disconnection.

The RTC ruled in favor of Chavez et al and held MERALCO liable. On appeal,
the CA a>rmed the decision of the RTC. Hence this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not Meralco’s act of disconnecting the electricity of Chavez et al
without prior notice is a ground for damages

Ruling:

Yes it is a ground. We Bnd no reversible error in the decision appealed from.
One cannot deny the vital role which a public utility such as MERALCO, having a
monopoly of the supply of electrical power in Metro Manila and some nearby
municipalities, plays in the life of people living in such areas. Electricity has become a
necessity to most people in these areas justifying the exercise by the State of its
regulatory power over the business of supplying electrical service to the public, in
which petitioner MERALCO is engaged. Thus, the state may regulate, as it has done
through Section 97 of the Revised Order No. 1 of the Public Service Commission, the
conditions under which and the manner by which a public utility such as MERALCO
may eDect a disconnection of service to a delinquent customer. Among others, a prior
written notice to the customer is required before disconnection of the service. Failure
to give such prior notice amounts to a tort, as held by us in a similar case, where we
said:

Petitioner's act in 'disconnecting respondent Ongsip's gas
service without prior notice constitutes breach of contract amounting
to an independent tort. The prematurity of the action is indicative of
intent to cause additional mental and moral su ering to private
respondent. This is a clear violation of Article 21 of the Civil Code
which provides that any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to
another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy shall compensate the latter for damages. This is reiterated by
paragraph 10 of Article 2219 of the Code. Moreover, the award of
moral damages is sanctioned by Article 2220 which provides that wilful
injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages
if the court should $nd that, under the circumstances, such damages
are justly due. The same rule applies to breaches of contract where the
defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith.

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SPOUSES CRISTINO and BRIGIDA CUSTODIO and SPOUSES LITO and MARIA
CRISTINA SANTOS v. COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF PACIFICO C. MABASA

and REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASIG,
METRO MANILA, BRANCH 181

G.R. No. 116100, February 9, 1996, REGALADO, J.

In order that the principle of abuse of right provided in Article 21 of the Civil
Code can be applied, it is essential that the following requisites concur: (1) The
defendant should have acted in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy; (2) The acts should be willful; and (3) There was damage or injury to
the plainti .

Facts:

This case stems from a civil case Bled by PaciBco Mabasa (Mabasa) against
Spouses Custodio (Sps.Custodio) and Spouses Santos (Sps. Santos) herein petitioner
for easement or right of way in favor of Mabasa. The RTC decided in favor of Mabasa
and ordered Sps. Custodio and Santos to give Mabasa his right of way. In the same
case however, the RTC denied the claim of damages Bled by Mabasa. Thus, the Heirs
of Mabasa (Heirs) appealed to the CA only as regards the claim for damages. The CA
held in favor of the Heirs and ordered the Spouses Custodio and Santos to pay the
Heir damages for unrealized rentals resulting from the easement or right of way. Now,
Sps. Custodio and Santos come before the Supreme Court, assailing, among others
the award of damages. Hence this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not Sps. Custodio and Santos are liable for damages.

Ruling:

No. The act of petitioners in constructing a fence within their lot is a valid
exercise of their right as owners, hence not contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy. The law recognizes in the owner the right to enjoy and dispose of a
thing, without other limitations than those established by law. It is within the right of
petitioners, as owners, to enclose and fence their property. Article 430 of the Civil
Code provides that every owner may enclose or fence his land or tenements by
means of walls, ditches, live or dead hedges, or by any other means without
detriment to servitudes constituted thereon.

At the time of the construction of the fence, the lot was not subject to any
servitude. There was no easement of way existing in favor of private respondents,
either by law or by contract. The fact that private respondents had no existing right
over the said passageway is conBrmed by the very decision of the trial court granting
a compulsory right of way in their favor after payment of just compensation. It was
only that decision which gave private respondents the right to use the said
passageway after payment of the compensation and imposed a corresponding duty
on petitioners not to interfere in the exercise of said right.

Hence, prior to said decision, petitioners had an absolute right over their
property and their act of fencing and enclosing the same was an act which they may
lawfully perform in the employment and exercise of said right. To repeat, whatever
injury or damage may have been sustained by private respondents by reason of the
rightful use of the said land by petitioners is damnum absque injuria.

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GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MARILOU T.
GONZALES

G.R. No. 97336, February 19, 1993, DAVIDE JR. J.

The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an
actionable wrong.

Facts:

Gashem Shookat Baksh (Baksh) herein petitioner is an Iranian citizen who is
studying here in the Philippines. On the other hand Marilou Gonzales (Gonzales)
herein private respondent is a Filipino citizen. Sometime in 1987 Baksh courted and
proposed to Gonzales for the purpose of marrying the latter. Thereafter, Baksh and
Gonzales went to the latter’s parent so as to obtain their consent. Thus, Baksh and
Gonzales started to live together under one roof. Subsequently, a week before their
marriage, their relationship turned sour. Baksh started to abuse, maltreat and
threatened to kill Gonzales. This ordeal culminated to a confrontation before the
barangay whereby Baksh repudiated their marriage agreement, asked Gonzales to
leave and disclosed that he was already married to another woman. Aggrieved,
Gonzales Bled a complaint for damages against Baksh with the RTC.

The RTC held in favor of Gonzales and awarded damages in her favor. On
appeal with the CA, the CA a>rmed the decision of the RTC. Now, Baksh comes
before the Supreme Court assailing the decision of the CA. Hence this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not Baksh can be held liable for damages for his breach of promise
to marry Gonzales.

Ruling:

Yes. The Court is of the opinion that where a man's promise to marry is in fact
the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation
to fulBll that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself
unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying
her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or
inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify
the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to marry
but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the wilful injury to her honour and
reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential however, that such injury should
have been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.

In the instant case, respondent Court found that it was the petitioner's
"fraudulent and deceptive protestations of love for and promise to marry plaintiD that
made her surrender her virtue and womanhood to him and to live with him on the
honest and sincere belief that he would keep said promise, and it was likewise these
fraud and deception on appellant's part that made plaintiD's parents agree to their
daughter's living-in with him preparatory to their supposed marriage." In short, the
private respondent surrendered her virginity, the cherished possession of every
single Filipina, not because of lust but because of moral seduction.

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The pari delicto rule does not apply in this case for while indeed, the private
respondent may not have been impelled by the purest of intentions, she eventually
submitted to the petitioner in sexual congress not out of lust, but because of moral
seduction. In fact, it is apparent that she had qualms of conscience about the entire
episode for as soon as she found out that the petitioner was not going to marry her
after all, she left him. She is not, therefore, in pari delicto with the petitioner. Pari
delicto means "in equal fault; in a similar oDense or crime; equal in guilt or in legal
fault." At most, it could be conceded that she is merely in delicto.

VICENTE RELLOSA, CYNTHIA ORTEGA assisted by husband Roberto Ortega v.
GONZALO PELLOSIS, INESITA MOSTE, and DANILO RADAM
G.R. No. 138964, August 9, 2001, VITUG, J.

The abuse of rights rule established in Article 19 of the Civil Code requires
every person to act with justice, to give everyone his due; and to observe honesty
and good faith. When a right is exercised in a manner which discards these norms
resulting in damage to another, a legal wrong is committed for which the actor can
be held accountable.

Facts:

Gonzalo Pellosis, Inesita Moste, and Danilo Radam (Pellosis et al) herein
respondents, were lessee on the land of one Marta Reyes. During their lease, they
erected houses upon the land owned by Reyes. Thereafter, Reyes died. Without the
knowledge of Pellosis et al, Vicente Rellosa (Rellosa) and his daughter Cynthia Ortega
(Ortega) herein petitioners, bought the leased land where the houses of Pellosis et al
were located. Thus, titles covering the aforementioned land were issued in favor of
Ortega. Subsequently, Ortega Bled a petition for condemnation with the O>ce of the
Building O>cial (OBO) praying for the demolition of the houses and evacuation of its
occupants, namely Pellosis et al. The OBO issued a resolution ordering the demolition
of the houses. Copies of the resolution were served upon Pellosis et al on December
7, 1989. The following day, Ortega hired workers to commence the demolition of the
houses of Pellosis et al. Pellosis et al were able to timely intervene averring that the
resolution for demolition was not yet Bnal and executory hence appealable. On
December 11, 1989, Pellosis et al Bled their appeal to the OBO. However, on
December 12, 1989 Ortega once again hired workers and proceeded with the
demolition of the houses of Pellosis et al. This prompted, Pellosis et al to Ble a
complaint for damages for untimely demolition of the houses against Ortega.

The RTC dismissed the complaint of Pellosis et al. On appeal, the CA reversed
and set aside the decision of the RTC. It held Ortega liable for damages in favor of
Pellosis et al. Now, Ortega comes before the Supreme Court assailing the decision of
the CA. Hence this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the act of Ortega of demolishing prematurely the houses of
Pellosis et al is a ground for damages.

Ruling:

Yes. Petitioner might verily be the owner of the land, with the right to enjoy
and to exclude any person from the enjoyment and disposal thereof, but the exercise

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of these rights is not without limitations. The abuse of rights rule established in
Article 19 of the Civil Code requires every person to act with justice, to give everyone
his due; and to observe honesty and good faith. When a right is exercised in a
manner which discards these norms resulting in damage to another, a legal wrong is
committed for which the actor can be held accountable. In this instance, the issue is
not so much about the existence of the right or validity of the order of demolition as
the question of whether or not petitioners have acted in conformity with, and not in
disregard of, the standard set by Article 19 of the Civil Code.

At the time petitioners implemented the order of demolition, barely Bve days
after respondents received a copy thereof, the same was not yet Bnal and executory.
The law provided for a Bfteen-day appeal period in favor of a party aggrieved by an
adverse ruling of the O>ce of the Building O>cial but by the precipitate action of
petitioners in demolishing the houses of respondents (prior to the expiration of the
period to appeal), the latter were eDectively deprived of this recourse. The fact that
the order of demolition was later a>rmed by the Department of Public Works and
Highways was of no moment. The action of petitioners up to the point where they
were able to secure an order of demolition was not condemnable but implementing
the order unmindful of the right of respondents to contest the ruling was a diDerent
matter and could only be held utterly indefensible.

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION v. PHILIPP BROTHERS OCEANIC, INC.
G.R. No. 126204, November 20, 2001, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.

Where a person merely uses a right pertaining to him, without bad faith or
intent to injure, the fact that damages are thereby su ered by another will not make
him liable.

Facts:

Sometime in 1987 the National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) herein
petitioner issued invitations to bid for the supply of imported coal for its Batangas
Coal-Fired Thermal Power Plant in Batangas. One of the bidders was the Philipp
Brother Oceanic Inc (PHIBRO) herein respondent. After public bidding, PHIBRO’s bid
was accepted. Thereafter a contract was entered into between NAPOCOR and PHIBRO
whereby it stipulates that within thirty (30) days from the transmission of the Letter
of Credit (LC) by NAPOCOR, PHIBRO would ship the coal. However, PHIBRO failed to
undertake such obligation. PHIBRO imputed such failure on the fact that there was an
on-going strike somewhere in Australia involving workers who carry out the
exportation and transfer of the coal. PHIBRO was able to transmit the coal only after
ninety (90) days after the LC was sent. Subsequently, NAPOCOR advertised once
more for the delivery of coal. PHIBRO again submitted an application to bid. However
NAPOCOR disapproved PHIBRO’s application because of PHIBRO’s purported failure to
ship the coal on time as per their contract. This prompted PHIBRO to Ble a complaint
for damages against NAPOCOR.

The RTC and CA held in favor of PHIBRO and ordered NAPOCOR to pay PHIBRO
damages for proscribing PHIBRO to bid. Now, NAPOCOR comes before the Supreme
Court assailing the decision of the CA. Hence this petition.

Issue:

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Whether or not NAPOCOR exercised its right legally when it disapproved
PHIBRO’s application to bid.

Ruling:

Yes, it exercised its right legally. Accordingly, a bidder has no ground of action
to compel the Government to award the contract in his favor, nor to compel it to
accept his bid. Verily, a reservation of the government of its right to reject any bid,
generally vests in the authorities a wide discretion as to who is the best and most
advantageous bidder. The exercise of such discretion involves inquiry, investigation,
comparison, deliberation and decision, which are quasi-judicial functions, and when
honestly exercised, may not be reviewed by the court. The discretion to accept or
reject a bid and award contracts is vested in the Government agencies entrusted with
that function. The discretion given to the authorities on this matter is of such wide
latitude that the Courts will not interfere therewith, unless it is apparent that it is
used as a shield to a fraudulent award.

Owing to the discretionary character of the right involved in this case, the
propriety of NAPOCORs act should therefore be judged on the basis of the general
principles regulating human relations, the forefront provision of which is Article 19 of
the Civil Code which provides that every person must, in the exercise of his rights
and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith. Accordingly, a person will be protected only when he
acts in the legitimate exercise of his right, that is, when he acts with prudence and in
good faith; but not when he acts with negligence or abuse. We went over the record
of the case with painstaking solicitude and we are convinced that NAPOCORs act of
disapproving PHIBRO's application for pre-qualiBcation to bid was without any intent
to injure or a purposive motive to perpetrate damage. Apparently, NAPOCOR acted
on the strong conviction that PHIBRO had a seriously-impaired track record.
NAPOCOR cannot be faulted from believing so.

ALFRED FRITZ FRENZEL v. EDERLINA P. CATITO
G.R. No. 143958, July 11 2003, CALLEJO, SR., J.

Article 22, NCC is expressed in the maxim “MEMO CUM ALTERIUS DETER
DETREMENTO PROTEST" (No persons should enrich himself at the expense of
another). However, this article does not apply if the action is proscribed by the
Constitution or by the application of the pari delicto doctrine.

Facts:

Alfred Fritz Frenzel (Frenzel) a German national met Ederlina Catito (Catito) a
Filipino citizen. Frenzel and Catito were married respectively to other persons.
However, despite such marriage of each, Frenzel and Catito decided to have an
amorous or common law relationship without the beneBt of marriage. Thereafter,
Frenzel bought real properties in the Philippines but had it named to Frenzel.
Sometime after, their relationship turned sour resulting to their separation. Now,
Frenzel seeks the return of the real properties he allegedly bought and named in
favor of Catito contending that it was his money which was used in the acquisition of
such real properties.

The RTC and CA found scant merit in the position of Frenzel. They opine that
Frenzel is not qualiBed to own real properties in the Philippines since it is proscribed

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by the Constitution. Now, Frenzel comes before the Supreme Court assailing the
decision of the CA. Hence this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not Frenzel has a legal right to cause the return of the real
properties in his favor.

Ruling:

No. The respondent was herself married to Klaus Muller, a German citizen.
Thus, the petitioner and the respondent could not lawfully join in wedlock. The
evidence on record shows that the petitioner in fact knew of the respondent's
marriage to another man, but nonetheless purchased the subject properties under
the name of the respondent and paid the purchase prices therefor. Even if it is
assumed gratia arguendi that the respondent and the petitioner were capacitated to
marry, the petitioner is still disqualiBed to own the properties in tandem with the
respondent.

The reliance of petitioner on Art. 22 of the New Civil Code is misplaced. The
said provision does not apply if, as in this case, the action is proscribed by the
Constitution or by the application of the pari delicto doctrine. It may be unfair and
unjust to bar the petitioner from Bling an accion in rem verso over the subject
properties, or from recovering the money he paid for the said properties, but, as Lord
MansBeld stated in the early case of Holman vs. Johnson: "The objection that a
contract is immoral or illegal as between the plaintiD and the defendant, sounds at all
times very ill in the mouth of the defendant. It is not for his sake, however, that the
objection is ever allowed; but it is founded in general principles of policy, which the
defendant has the advantage of, contrary to the real justice, as between him and the
plaintiD."

DAVID REYES (Substituted by Victoria R. Fabella) v. JOSE LIM, CHUY CHENG
KENG and HARRISON LUMBER, INC.

G.R. No. 134241, August 11, 2003, CARPIO, J.

The principle that no person may unjustly enrich himself at the expense of
another is embodied in Article 22 of the Civil Code. This principle applies not only to
substantive rights but also to procedural remedies.

Facts:

David Reyes (Reyes) herein petitioner, was the owner of a parcel of land
somewhere in Pasay City. Chuy Cheng Keng (Keng) and Harrison Lumber Inc (HLI)
herein respondents, are lessee in the aforementioned parcel of land owned by Reyes.
Sometime in 1994, Reyes entered into a Contract to Sell with Jose Lim (Lim) herein
respondent for the sale of the parcel of land owned by Reyes. In the Contract to Sell,
it was stipulated that in case of failure by Reyes to have Keng and HLI vacate the
premises, Reyes would pay Lim a percentage of the contract price agreed into
between Reyes and Lim. The agreed contract price was P28M. P10M was paid when
the Contract to Sell was entered into. Thereafter the remaining P18M would be paid
after the Deed of Absolute Sale has been entered into and the lessee namely Keng
and HLI, be vacated from the land. However, Keng and HLI did not vacate the
aforementioned land. This prompted Reyes to sue for annulment of contract against

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Lim, Keng and HLI. Reyes imputed that Lim, Keng and HLI were in connivance in
making sure that Keng and HLI would not vacate the premises. During the
proceedings with the RTC, Lim requested in open court that Reyes be ordered to
deposit the P10M down payment with the cashier of the RTC. The RTC granted said
motion. Thereafter, Reyes Bled a motion to set aside the aforementioned ordered on
the ground that it is not one of the remedies provided for by the Rules of Court in civil
proceedings.

The RTC denied the motion. On appeal with the CA, the CA a>rmed the
decision of the RTC. Hence this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the deposit of P10M ordered by the trial court is valid.

Ruling:

Yes, it is valid. The principle that no person may unjustly enrich himself at the
expense of another is embodied in Article 22 of the Civil Code. This principle applies
not only to substantive rights but also to procedural remedies. One condition for
invoking this principle is that the aggrieved party has no other action based on
contract, quasi-contract, crime, quasi-delict or any other provision of law. Courts can
extend this condition to the hiatus in the Rules of Court where the aggrieved party,
during the pendency of the case, has no other recourse based on the provisional
remedies of the Rules of Court.

Thus, a court may not permit a seller to retain, pendente lite, money paid by a
buyer if the seller himself seeks rescission of the sale because he has subsequently
sold the same property to another buyer. By seeking rescission, a seller necessarily
oDers to return what he has received from the buyer. Such a seller may not take back
his oDer if the court deems it equitable, to prevent unjust enrichment and ensure
restitution, to put the money in judicial deposit.

There is unjust enrichment when a person unjustly retains a beneBt to the loss
of another, or when a person retains money or property of another against the
fundamental principles of justice, equity and good conscience. In this case, it was
just, equitable and proper for the trial court to order the deposit of the P10 million
down payment to prevent unjust enrichment by Reyes at the expense of Lim.

NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMPANY v. MADRIGAL WAN HAI LINES
CORPORATION

G.R. No. 148332, September 30, 2003, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.

The case at bar calls to mind the principle of unjust enrichment Nemo Cum
Alterius Detrimento Locupletari Potest. No person shall be allowed to enrich himself
unjustly at the expense of others.

Facts:

The National Development Company (NDC) herein petitioner, wholly owns the
subsidiary National Corporation (NSCP) which oDers shipping services for
containerized cargo between the Far East ports and the US West Coast.
Subsequently, the NDC Board of Directors sent out invitations to bid for stock

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ownership of the NSCP as well as its three (3) ocean-going vessels. Thereafter, a
Notice of Award was issued to Madrigal Wan Hai Lines Corporation (MWHLC) since it
won the bidding process. Thus, NDC and MWHLC entered into a Contract of Sale
whereby MWHLC acquired NSCP, its assets, personnel, records and its three (3)
vessels. Later on, MWHLC was Mabbergasted when the US Internal Revenue Service
sent MWHLC a Notice of Final Assessment against NSCP for deBciency taxes on gross
transportation income derived from US sources for the years 1990, 1991 and 1992
when NSCP was still owned by NDC. Thus MWHLC was constrained to pay.
Subsequently, MWHLC sought reimbursement from the NDC for the expenses it
incurred for the payment of NSCP’s taxes. However, MWHLC’s demand fell on stony
ground. This prompted MWHLC to sue NDC.

The RTC and CA found MWHLC’s position meritorious. Now, NDC comes before
the Supreme Court assailing the decision of the CA holding it liable for
reimbursement of taxes paid by MWHLC. Hence this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not NDC is liable for reimbursing MWHLC.

Ruling:

Yes. There is no dispute that petitioner was aware of its US tax liabilities
considering its numerous communications with the agents of the United States
Internal Revenue Service, just prior to the sale of NSCP and the marine vessels to
respondent. The NSCP itself made an ambiguous contingent provision in its
Unaudited Financial Statements for the year ending December 1993, thereby
indicating its awareness of a possible US tax assessment. It bears stressing that
petitioner did not convey such information to respondent despite its inquiries.
Obviously, such concealment constitutes bad faith on its part.

The case at bar calls to mind the principle of unjust enrichment Nemo cum
alterius detrimento locupletari potest. No person shall be allowed to enrich himself
unjustly at the expense of others. This principle of equity has been enshrined in our
Civil Code, Article 22 of which provides:

Art. 22. Every person who through an act or performance by another or
by any other means, acquires or comes into possession of something at
the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the
same to him.

Justice and equity thus oblige that petitioner be held liable for NSCPs tax
liabilities and reimburse respondent for the amounts it paid. It would be unjust
enrichment on the part of petitioner to be relieved of that obligation.

ROY PADILLA, FILOMENO GALDONES, ISMAEL GONZALGO and JOSE FARLEY
BEDENIA v.

COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-39999, May 31, 1984, GUTIERREZ JR., J.

What Article 29 clearly and expressly provides is a remedy for the plainti in
case the defendant has been acquitted in a criminal prosecution on the ground that
his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. It merely emphasizes that a

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civil action for damages is not precluded by an acquittal for the same criminal act or
omission.

Facts:

Roy Padilla, Filomeno Galdones, Ismael Gonzalgo, and Jose Farley (Padilla et al)
herein petitioners, were charged with the crime of Grave Coercion by one Antonio
Vergara (Vergara) for allegedly preventing the latter from closing his stall at the
public market and by subsequently forcibly opening the door of the said stall and
thereafter brutally demolishing and destroying the same.

The RTC found Padilla et al guilty beyond reasonable doubt. On appeal with
the CA, acquitted Padilla et al on the ground of reasonable doubt but were ordered to
pay jointly and severally the amount of P9,600.00 as damages. To this, Padilla et al
appealed as regards the civil aspect of the case. Hence this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not Padilla et al may be held civilly liable for damages despite
their acquittal

Ruling:

Yes, they may still be held civilly liable. There is nothing contrary to the Civil
Code provision in the rendition of a judgment of acquittal and a judgment awarding
damages in the same criminal action. The two can stand side by side. A judgment of
acquittal operates to extinguish the criminal liability. It does not, however, extinguish
the civil liability unless there is clear showing that the act from which civil liability
might arise did not exist.

We further note the rationale behind Art. 29 of the Civil Code in arriving at the
intent of the legislator that they could not possibly have intended to make it more
di>cult for the aggrieved party to recover just compensation by making a separate
civil action mandatory and exclusive.

A separate civil action may be warranted where additional facts have to be
established or more evidence must be adduced or where the criminal case has been
fully terminated and a separate complaint would be just as e>cacious or even more
expedient than a timely remand to the trial court where the criminal action was
decided for further hearings on the civil aspects of the case. The oDended party may,
of course, choose to Ble a separate action. These do not exist in this case.
Considering moreover the delays suDered by the case in the trial, appellate, and
review stages, it would be unjust to the complainants in this case to require at this
time a separate civil action to be Bled.

Prejudicial Question

LEONILO C. DONATO v. HON. ARTEMON D. LUNA, PRESIDING JUDGE, COURT
OF

FIRST INSTANCE OF MANIIA, BRANCH XXXII HON. JOSE FLAMINIANO,
CITY FISCAL OF MANILA; PAZ B. ABAYAN

G.R. No. L-53642 April 15, 1988, GANCAYCO, J.

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The civil case for declaration of nullity of marriage does not determine the
guilt or innocence of the accused, and is thus not a prejudicial question in the crime
of bigamy. Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves
its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of the competent courts;
otherwise, the presumption is that the $rst marriage exists.

Facts:

Paz B. Abayan and Leonilo C. Donato lived together as husband and wife
without the beneBt of wedlock for at least Bve (5) years. In 1978, Paz married Leonilo,
without knowing that the latter had a subsisting marriage with another woman. Upon
discovering the truth, Paz left Leonilo and Bled a criminal complaint for bigamy.
Before Leonilo was arraigned, Paz Bled a civil action for declaration of nullity of her
marriage with Leonilo. Taking advantage of the situation, Leonilo moved to suspend
the criminal proceedings on the ground that civil case for nullity of marriage Bled by
private respondent raises a prejudicial question.

Issue:

Whether or not the civil case for declaration of nullity of marriage poses a
prejudicial question to the criminal case.

Ruling:

No. A prejudicial question is one based on a fact distinct and separate from
the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence
of the accused. For a prejudicial question to suspend the criminal action, it must
appear that (1) the civil case involves facts intimately related to those upon which
the criminal prosecution would be based, and that (2) the resolution of the issue/s
raised in the civil case would necessarily determine the guilt or innocence of the
accused.

The requisites of a prejudicial question do not obtain in the case at bar. The
civil case does not determine Leonilo’s guilt or innocence in the crime of bigamy.
Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for
the same must be submitted to the judgment of the competent courts; otherwise, the
presumption is that the Brst marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts a second
marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the Brst marriage assumes the
risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.

RICARDO QUIAMBAO v. HON. ADRIANO OSORIO, ZENAIDA GAZA
BUENSUCERO, JUSTINA GAZA BERNARDO, AND FELIPE GAZA
G.R. No. L-48157 March 16, 1988, FERNAN, J.

Even if the cases involved are civil and administrative in nature, a prejudicial
question exists so long as the following requisites are present: (a) the
(administrative) case involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue in
the (civil) case; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the
(civil) action may proceed.

Facts:

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Ricardo Quiambao Bled an administrative case against Zenaida Gaza
Buensucero, et al. before the O>ce of the Land Authority. Ricardo questioned
Zenaida, et al.’s right of possession over a parcel of land in Malabon, Rizal. During
the pendency of the case, Ricardo went to the subject property, fenced it, and began
construction of a house thereon. Zenaida, et al. thereafter Bled a civil case against
Ricardo for forcible entry. Ricardo argued that the pending administrative case poses
a prejudicial question which bars the civil case.

Issue:

Whether or not the administrative case questioning Zenaida, et al.’s right of
possession over the property poses a prejudicial question to the civil case for forcible
entry.

Ruling:

Yes. The actions involved in the case at bar being respectively civil and
administrative in character. This means that technically speaking, prejudicial question
does not exist. Equally apparent, however, is the intimate correlation of the issues
between the said cases. The right of Zenaida, et al. in the civil case to eject petitioner
over the subject property is intertwined on their right of possession over the said
parcel of land, which is the subject of the administrative case. Likewise, the
resolution of the administrative case necessarily determines whether or not the civil
case may proceed. Hence, the administrative case posed a prejudicial question as
against the civil case.

ISABELO APA, MANUEL APA AND LEONILO JACALAN v. HON. RUMOLDO R.
FERNANDEZ, HON. CELSO V. ESPINOSA, AND SPS. FELIXBERTO TIGOL, JR.

AND ROSITA TAGHOY TIGOL
G.R. No. 112381 March 20, 1995, MENDOZA, J.

A prejudicial question is a question which is based on a fact distinct and
separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that its resolution is
determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused.

Facts:

A case for declaration of nullity of Rosita’s title over a parcel of land in Lapu
Lapu City was Bled in 1990. Three (3) years later, Rosita and her husband Bled a
criminal complaint against Isabelo Apa, et al. for violation of the Anti-Squatting law,
alleging therein that Rosita’s ownership over the subject lot was violated by Isabelo,
et al.’s occupation of a portion of Rosita’s said real property. Isabelo, et al. moved for
the suspension of the arraignment on the ground that the civil case for declaration of
nullity of Rosita’s title posed a prejudicial question to the criminal case.

Issue:

Whether or not the civil case questioning Rosita’s title over the property poses
a prejudicial question to the criminal case for violation of the Anti-Squatting law.

Ruling:

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Yes. A prejudicial question exists if: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar
or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution
of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. The issue
of Rosita’s ownership in the prior civil case is intimately related to the criminal case,
which alleges violation of Rosita’s right of ownership. Likewise, resolving Rosita’s
right of ownership in the civil case will determine if the criminal action for violation of
the Anti-Squatting Law, which hinges on Rosita’s claim of ownership, will proceed.

MEYNARDO L. BELTRAN v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, AND HON. JUDGE
FLORENTINO TUAZON, JR., BEING THE JUDGE OF THE RTC, BRANCH 139,

MAKATI CITY
G.R. No. 137567 June 20, 2000, BUENA, J.

A prejudicial question exists if the resolution of the common issue of the civil
and criminal cases determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.

Facts:

Meynardo L. Beltran and Charmaine E. Felix were married in 1973. Years later,
Meynardo abandoned the conjugal home and cohabited with another woman. In
1997, Meynardo Bled a petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage with
Charmaine on the ground of psychological incapacity. Charmaine responded with a
criminal complaint for concubinage against Meynardo. To forestall his arrest,
Meynardo moved to suspend the criminal proceedings on the ground that the civil
case for declaration of nullity of marriage poses a prejudicial question the criminal
case for concubinage.

Issue:

Whether or not the civil case for declaration of nullity of Meynardo’s marriage
poses a prejudicial question to the criminal case for concubinage.

Ruling:

No. A prejudicial question exists if the resolution of the common issue of the
civil and criminal cases determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
Since Article 40 of the Family Code provides that “the absolute nullity of a previous
marriage may be invoked for purposes of marriage on the basis solely of a Bnal
judgment declaring such previous marriage void”, Meynardo does not need the Bnal
judgment in the civil case to prove the nullity of his marriage for purposes of his
acquittal in the criminal case.

In any case, a subsequent declaration of nullity of his marriage in the civil
case is not a valid defense in a criminal complaint for concubinage. Parties to the
marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same
must be submitted to judgment of the competent courts and only when the nullity of
the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such
declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists for all intents and purposes.
Therefore, he who cohabits with a woman not his wife before the judicial declaration
of nullity of the marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for concubinage.

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SPOUSES ANTONIO S. PAHANG AND LOLITA T. PAHANG v. HON. AUGUSTINE
A. VESTIL, PRESIDING JUDGE OF REGIONAL TRIAL COURT- BRANCH 56,
MANDAUE CITY,
DEPUTY SHERIFF, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT-BRANCH 56 AND
METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY
G.R. No. 148595 July 12, 2004, CALLEJO, SR., J.

A prejudicial question exists if the issues involved in the $rst case are similar or
intimately related to the issues raised in the second case.

Facts:

Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company (Metrobank) extrajudicially foreclosed
the real estate mortgage which secured Sps. Antonio and Lolita Pahang’s loan upon
the latter’s default. The property was sold to Metrobank at public auction and a
certiBcate of sale was issued. Metrobank informed Sps. Pahang about the looming
deadline of the redemption period. But instead of redeeming the property, Sps.
Pahang Bled a complaint for annulment of extrajudicial sale on the ground that their
obligations were bloated by Metrobank.

After expiration of the redemption period, Metrobank consolidated its
ownership over the foreclosed property and Bled a Petition for Writ of Possession.
Sps. Pahang opposed the Petition on the ground that their complaint for annulment of
extrajudicial sale constituted a prejudicial question to Metrobank’s petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the civil case for annulment of extrajudicial sale poses a
prejudicial question to the land registration case for the issuance of writ of
possession.

Ruling:

No. In the present case, the complaint of the petitioners for Annulment of
Extrajudicial Sale is a civil action and the respondents petition for the issuance of a
writ of possession of Lot No. 3-A, Block 1 is but an incident in the land registration
case and, therefore, no prejudicial question can arise from the existence of the two
actions.

The focal issue in the civil case Bled by Sps. Pahang was whether the
extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage executed by Sps. Pahang in favor
of Metrobank and the sale of their property at public auction are null and void. The
issue in the land registration case was whether Metrobank was entitled to the
possession of the property after the statutory period for redemption had lapsed and
title was issued.

Civil Personality

ANTONIO GELUZ v. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND OSCAR LAZO
G.R. No. L-16439 July 20, 1961, REYES, JBL, J.

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Under Article 40 of the Civil Code, a conceived child only has a provisional
personality (conceptus pro nato habetur), or a personality burdened with a condition or
an express limitation that the child be subsequently born alive.

Facts:

Nita Villanueva became pregnant for a third time with her husband Antonio
Geluz’s child. Unknown to Antonio, Nita had two (2) previous abortions and is
planning another one through the aid of Dr. Oscar Lazo. Nita succeeded again in
aborting her two-month old fetus; but this time, Antonio discovered the latest
abortion. Thereafter, Antonio, for and in behalf of the dead foetus, Bled an action for
damages against Dr. Oscar.

Issue:

Whether or not an action for damages may be instituted in behalf of the
unborn child on account of the injuries it received.

Ruling:

No. An action for damages on account of personal injury or death pertains
primarily to the one injured. The action presupposes that the one injured has juridical
personality. Under Article 40 of the Civil Code, a conceived child only has a
provisional personality (conceptus pro nato habetur), or a personality burdened with
a condition or an express limitation that the child be subsequently born alive.

Here, there is no dispute that the child was dead when separated from its
mother’s womb. Since the conceived child’s personality was extinguished by its pre-
natal death, no cause of action for such damages accrued in behalf of the said
unborn child. Likewise, since no action for damages could be instituted on account of
the injuries the unborn child received, no such right of action could derivatively
accrue to its parents or heirs.

Citizenship

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CHULE Y. LIM
G.R. No. 153883 January 13, 2004, YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.

Article IV, Section 1(3) of the 1935 Constitution, provides that the citizenship
of a legitimate child born of a Filipino mother and an alien father followed the
citizenship of the father, unless, upon reaching the age of majority, the child elected
Philippine citizenship. Since the requirement applies only to legitimate children, an
illegitimate child of a Filipino mother automatically becomes a Filipino upon birth.

Facts:

Chule Y. Lim was born as an illegitimate child of her Chinese father and Filipino
mother in 1954. Her birth records show that she is a Chinese citizen. Nearly four (4)
decades later, Chule Bled a petition for correction of entries of her birth records,
alleging among others that she is a Filipino citizen.

Issue:

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Whether or not Chule’s citizenship as shown in her birth records should be
changed from Chinese to Filipino.

Ruling:

Yes. Article IV, Section 1(3) of the 1935 Constitution, provides that the
citizenship of a legitimate child born of a Filipino mother and an alien father followed
the citizenship of the father, unless, upon reaching the age of majority, the child
elected Philippine citizenship. Likewise, Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 625,
states that legitimate children born of Filipino mothers may elect Philippine
citizenship by expressing such intention in a statement to be signed and sworn to by
the party concerned before any o>cer authorized to administer oaths, and shall be
Bled with the nearest civil registry. The said party shall accompany the aforesaid
statement with the oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of the
Philippines.

Plainly, the above constitutional and statutory requirements of electing Filipino
citizenship apply only to legitimate children. These do not apply in the case of Chule
who was concededly an illegitimate child. As such, Chule was not required to comply
with said constitutional and statutory requirements to become a Filipino citizen. By
being an illegitimate child of a Filipino mother, Chule automatically became a Filipino
upon birth. Stated diDerently, she is a Filipino since birth without having to elect
Filipino citizenship when she reached the age of majority.

CASAN MACODE MACQUILING v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
ROMMEL ARNADO Y CAGOCO, AND LINOG G. BALUA
G.R. No. 195649 July 2, 2013, SERENO, J.

By using a passport, a person positively declares that he is a citizen of the
country which issued the passport. In the same vein, a passport proves that the
country which issued it recognizes the person named therein as its national.

Facts:

Rommel Arnando was a natural-born Filipino. Thereafter, he acquired
American citizenship by naturalization. By virtue of Republic Act No. 9225, Rommel
reacquired his Filipino citizenship by taking his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines. Rommel likewise renounced his American citizenship as a prerequisite
for running as Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte for the May 2010 elections.
Nevertheless, Rommel continued using his American passport at least six (6) times
after his renunciation, even if he already holds a Philippine passport. His
qualiBcations were soon challenged before the COMELEC on the ground that Section
40(d) of the Local Government Code disqualiBes those with dual citizenship from
running for local elective positions.

Issue:

Whether or not Rommel is a dual citizen disqualiBed to run for local elective
positions on the ground that his renunciation was rendered nugatory by his
subsequent use of his American passport.

Ruling:

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Yes. The renunciation of foreign citizenship must be complete and
unequivocal. The requirement that the renunciation must be made through an oath
emphasizes the solemn duty of the one making the oath of renunciation to remain
true to what he has sworn to.

Allowing the subsequent use of a foreign passport because it is convenient for
the person to do so is rendering the oath a hollow act. It devalues the act of taking of
an oath, reducing it to a mere ceremonial formality. After all, by using a passport, a
person positively declares that he is a citizen of the country which issued the
passport. In the same vein, a passport proves that the country which issued it
recognizes the person named therein as its national.

Here, since Rommel continued to use his American issued passport long after
his renunciation, he is still deemed to be both a Filipino and an American citizen for
purposes of applying the dual citizenship disqualiBcation found in Sec. 40(d) of the
Local Government Code.

Marriage

PEREGRINA MACUA VDA. DE AVENIDO v. TECLA HOYBIA AVENIDO
G.R. No. 173540 January 22, 2014, PEREZ, J.

While a marriage certi$cate is considered the primary evidence of a marital
union, it is not the sole and exclusive evidence of marriage. The fact of marriage may
be proven by relevant evidence other than the marriage certi$cate.

Facts:

Tecla Hoybia Avenido and Eustaquio Avenido were married in 1942 in Talibon,
Bohol, but the records of the Local Civil Registrar therein, including their marriage
certiBcate, were lost due to World War II. Their union bore four (4) children. Eustaquio
soon abandoned his family in 1952, and married Peregrina Hoybia Avenido in 1979.

After Eustaquio’s death, Tecla Bled a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage of Peregrina and Eustaquio on the ground that Tecla is Eustaquio’s legal
wife. Tecla presented as evidence the certiBcations of loss of her marriage certiBcate,
the birth certiBcates of her children, as well as the testimonies of witnesses who
attended Tecla and Eustaquio’s marriage ceremony.

Issue:

Whether or not the evidence presented during trial proves the existence of
Tecla’s marriage to Eustaquio.

Ruling:

Yes. While a marriage certiBcate is considered the primary evidence of a
marital union, it is not the sole and exclusive evidence of marriage. The fact of
marriage may be proven by relevant evidence other than the marriage certiBcate.

Hence, even a person’s birth certiBcate, the testimony of the witnesses to the
marriage, and even the testimony of the solemnizing o>cer may be recognized as
competent evidence of the marriage between the parties. Likewise, since the due

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execution and loss of the marriage certiBcate were clearly shown by the evidence
presented, secondary evidence—testamentary and documentary—may be admitted
to prove the fact of marriage.

ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 174689 October 22, 2007, CORONA, J.

The sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant
by examining the genitals of the infant. Without a law recognizing sex reassignment,
the determination of a person’s sex at the time of birth is immutable, if not attended
by error.

Facts:

Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio, a Filipino, was born male per his birth
certiBcate. Feeling trapped inside a man’s body, he underwent sex reassignment
surgery in Bangkok, Thailand and transformed himself into a “woman”. Since then,
Rommel lived as a female and is in fact engaged to his American Bancé. To allow him
to marry his Bancé under Philippine law, Rommel Bled a petition to change his name
from “Rommel Jacinto” to “Mely”, and his sex from “male” to “female”.

Issue:

Whether or not Rommel can change his sex from “male” to “female” by law or
equity.

Ruling:

No. Under the Civil Register Law (Act 3753), a birth certiBcate, which includes
a declaration of a person’s sex, is a historical record of the facts as they existed at
the time of birth. Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by
the birth attendant (the physician or midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant.
Since there is no law legally recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a
person’s sex made at the time of his or her birth, if not attended by error, is
immutable.

The change cannot also be granted even on the grounds of equity, since the
changes would have serious and wide-ranging consequences. Marriage, one of the
most sacred social institutions, is a special contract of permanent union between a
man and a woman. One of its essential requisites is the legal capacity of the
contracting parties who must be a male and a female. Changing Rommel’s sex in his
birth certiBcate will substantially alter the laws on marriage and family relations. It
will allow the union of a man with another man who has undergone sex
reassignment.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JENNIFER B. CAGANDAHAN
G.R. No. 166676 September 12, 2008, Quisumbing, J.

Where the person is biologically or naturally intersex the determining factor in
his gender classi$cation would be what the intersexed person, having reached the age
of majority, with good reason thinks of his/her sex.

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Facts:

Jennifer B. Cagandahan was born and registered as a female in her birth
certiBcate. She was later diagnosed with Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH), a
condition wherein a person is genetically female but secretes male hormones.
Because of Jennifer’s very rare condition, she has both male and female sex organs,
did not develop breasts or ovaries, and never had her monthly period. Feeling that
she has become a male person in mind and body, she Bled a Petition to change her
name from “Jennifer” to “JeD”, and her sex from “female” to “male”.

Issue:

Whether or not Jennifer can change her sex from “female” to “male”.

Ruling:

Yes. Where the person is biologically or naturally intersex the determining
factor in his gender classiBcation would be what the individual, like Jennifer (now
JeD), having reached the age of majority, with good reason thinks of his/her sex.
Sexual development in cases of intersex persons makes the gender classiBcation at
birth inconclusive. Since the gender of intersexed persons is Bxed only at maturity,
the original entries in the birth certiBcate are thus correctible under Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court.

In this case, intersexed JeD lets nature take its course without taking unnatural
steps to interfere with such development. Nature made him male over time and JeD
simply chose what nature has given him.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. LIBERTY D. ALBIOS
G.R. No. 198780 October 16, 2013, MENDOZA, J.

For consent to be valid, it must be “freely given”, i.e. real in the sense that it
is not vitiated, and conscious or intelligent, in the sense that the parties must be
capable of intelligently understanding the nature of, and both the bene$cial or
unfavorable consequences of their act of marriage.

Facts:

Liberty D. Albios, a Filipina, paid Daniel Lee Fringer, an American, $2,000.00
for the latter to marry Liberty for purposes of immigration. In 2004, Liberty and
Daniel were married out of jest. Immediately after the marriage, they separated and
never lived as husband and wife. However, Liberty’s immigration application was
denied. In 2006, Liberty Bled a Petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage with
Daniel on the ground that they never really had any intention of entering into a
married state or complying with any of their essential marital obligations.

Issue:

Whether or not a marriage, contracted for the sole purpose of acquiring
American citizenship and in consideration of $2,000.00, void ab initio on the ground
of lack of consent.

Ruling:

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No. For consent to be valid, it must be freely given. A "freely given" consent
must be real in the sense that it is not vitiated by any of the vices of consent under
Articles 45 and 46 of the Family Code, and must also be conscious or intelligent, in
the sense that the parties must be capable of intelligently understanding the nature
of, and both the beneBcial or unfavorable consequences of their act.

Here, Liberty and Daniel’s freely given consent is best evidenced by their
conscious purpose of acquiring American citizenship through marriage. There was a
clear intention to enter into a real and valid marriage to fully comply with the
requirements of an application for citizenship. There was a full and complete
understanding of the legal tie that would be created between them, since it was that
precise legal tie which was necessary to accomplish their goal.

In any case, so long as all the essential and formal requisites prescribed by
law are present, and it is not void or voidable under the grounds provided by law, it
shall be declared valid, notwithstanding the possibility that the parties in a marriage
might have no real intention to establish a life together.

SYED AZHAR ABBAS v. GLORIA GOO ABBAS
G.R. No. 183896 January 30, 2013, VELASCO, JR., J.

A certi$cation issued by the civil registrar enjoyed probative value, as his duty
was to maintain records of data relative to the issuance of a marriage license. The
certi$cation likewise enjoys the presumption of regularity.

Facts:

Syed Azhar Abbas, a Pakistani, decided to stay in the Philippines two (2) years
after meeting Gloria Goo Abbas, a Filipina. While Syed was staying at the house of
Gloria’s mother in Manila, Gloria’s mother arrived with two (2) men. Syed underwent
a “ceremony” as a requirement for his stay in the Philippines. They signed a
document, which Syed learned later on was a “marriage certiBcate”. Upon
investigation, Syed discovered that the marriage license was procured in Carmona,
Cavite, where neither Syed nor Gloria resided. Likewise, the marriage license was
issued under a diDerent name, and that no marriage license was ever issued for Syed
and Gloria per certiBcation of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite.

Issue:

Whether or not the marriage between Syed and Gloria should be declared
void ab initio based on the lack of marriage license.

Ruling:

Yes. A certiBcation issued by the civil registrar enjoyed probative value, as his
duty was to maintain records of data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.
The certiBcation likewise enjoys the presumption of regularity, and such presumption
may only be rebutted upon proof of the claimant that no diligent search was made or
that the certiBcation did not categorically state that no such marriage license was
made or found.

In this case, not only did Gloria fail to explain why she procured a marriage
license in Carmona, Cavite, where neither party resides. There is also proof that

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diligent search was made by the Municipal Civil Registrar to Bnd Syed and Gloria’s
marriage license since they were able to trace the marriage license written at the
marriage certiBcate, albeit registered in another couple’s names.

Since a marriage is generally void ab initio if celebrated without a marriage
license, then the marriage between Syed and Gloria without the requisite marriage
license should be declared null and void.

SALLY GO-BANGAYAN v. BENJAMIN BANGAYAN, JR.
G.R. No. 201061, July 03, 2013, CARPIO, J.

Under Article 35 of the Family Code, a marriage solemnized without a license,
except those covered by Article 34 where no license is necessary, "shall be void from
the beginning."

Facts:

On September 1973, Benjamin married Azucena. In 1979, Benjamin developed
a romantic relationship with Sally. Sally’s father was against the relationship. On 7
March 1982, in order to appease her father, Sally brought Benjamin to an o>ce in
Santolan, Pasig City where they signed a purported marriage contract. Sally,
knowing Benjamin’s marital status, assured him that the marriage contract would not
be registered.

The relationship of Benjamin and Sally ended in 1994 when Sally left for
Canada. She then Bled criminal actions for bigamy and falsiBcation of public
documents against Benjamin, using their simulated marriage contract as evidence.
Benjamin, in turn, Bled a petition for declaration of a non-existent marriage and/or
declaration of nullity of marriage before the trial court on the ground that his
marriage to Sally was bigamous and that it lacked the formal requisites to a valid
marriage.

Issues:

Whether or not the marriage of Benjamin to Sally was valid and existing.

Ruling:

No. The Court sees no inconsistency in Bnding the marriage between
Benjamin and Sally null and void ab initio and, at the same time, non-existent. Under
Article 35 of the Family Code, a marriage solemnized without a license, except those
covered by Article 34 where no license is necessary, "shall be void from the
beginning." In this case, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was solemnized
without a license. It was duly established that no marriage license was issued to
them and that Marriage License No. N-07568 did not match the marriage license
numbers issued by the local civil registrar of Pasig City for the month of February
1982. The case clearly falls under Section 3 of Article 35 which made their marriage
void ab initio. The marriage between Benjamin and Sally was also non-existent.

In relation to the above ruling, the marriage of petitioner and respondent was
not bigamous. For bigamy to exist, the second or subsequent marriage must have all
the essential requisites for validity except for the existence of a prior marriage. In this
case, there was really no subsequent marriage. Benjamin and Sally just signed a

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purported marriage contract without a marriage license. The supposed marriage was
not recorded with the local civil registrar and the National Statistics O>ce. In short,
the marriage between Benjamin and Sally did not exist. They lived together and
represented themselves as husband and wife without the beneBt of marriage.

RENE RONULO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 182438, July 02, 2014, BRION, J.

While the petitioner may view this merely as a "blessing," the presence of the
requirements of the law constitutive of a marriage ceremony quali$ed this "blessing"
into a "marriage ceremony" as contemplated by Article 3(3) of the Family Code

Facts:

Joey Umadac and Claire Bingayen were scheduled to marry each other at the
Sta. Rosa Catholic Parish Church. However, on the day of the wedding, the supposed
o>ciating priest refused to solemnize the marriage upon learning that the couple
failed to secure a marriage license. As a recourse, Joey, who was then dressed in
barong tagalong, and Claire, clad in a wedding gown, together with their parents,
sponsors and guests, proceeded to the Aglipayan Church. They requested the
petitioner, an Aglipayan priest, to perform a ceremony to which the latter agreed
despite having been informed by the couple that they had no marriage certiBcate.

Now, Fr. Ronulo, while admitting that he conducted a ceremony, denied that
his act of blessing the couple was tantamount to a solemnization of the marriage as
contemplated by law.

Issues:

Whether the solemnization by the petitioner of this marriage ceremony was
illegal.

Ruling:

Yes. Under Article 3(3) of the Family Code, one of the essential requisites of
marriage is the presence of a valid marriage certiBcate. In the present case, the
petitioner admitted that he knew that the couple had no marriage license, yet he
conducted the "blessing" of their relationship.

Undoubtedly, the petitioner conducted the marriage ceremony despite
knowledge that the essential and formal requirements of marriage set by law were
lacking. The marriage ceremony, therefore, was illegal. The petitioner’s knowledge of
the absence of these requirements negates his defense of good faith.

OSCAR P. MALLION v. EDITHA ALCANTARA
G.R. No. 141528, October 31, 2006, AZCUNA, J.

The losing party who $les another action regarding the same controversy will
be needlessly squandering time, e ort and $nancial resources because he is barred
by law from litigating the same controversy all over again. Having expressly and
impliedly conceded the validity of their marriage celebration, petitioner is now
deemed to have waived any defects therein.

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Facts:

In 1995, petitioner Oscar Mallion (Oscar) Bled a petition before the San Pablo
City RTC (Civil Case 4341-95) seeking a declaration of nullity of his marriage to
respondent alleging his wife’s psychological incapacity. The case was dismissed upon
the Bnding that petitioner failed to adduce preponderant evidence to warrant the
grant of the relief he is seeking.

In 1999, Oscar Bled another petition for declaration of nullity of marriage, this
time alleging that his marriage with respondent Edith Alcantara (Edith) was null and
void due to the fact that it was celebrated without a valid marriage license.

Issue:

Whether or not a Bnal judgment denying a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity bars a subsequent petition for
declaration of nullity on the ground of lack of marriage license.

Ruling:

Yes. Res judicata as a bar by prior judgment obtains in the present case.
Petitioner forgets that he is simply invoking diDerent grounds for the same cause of
action. In both petitions, petitioner has the same cause - the declaration of nullity of
his marriage to respondent. What diDers is the ground upon which the cause of
action is predicated.

Litigants are provided with the options on the course of action to take in order
to obtain judicial relief. Once an option has been taken and a case is Bled in court, the
parties must ventilate all matters and relevant issues therein. The losing party who
Bles another action regarding the same controversy will be needlessly squandering
time, eDort and Bnancial resources because he is barred by law from litigating the
same controversy all over again. Having expressly and impliedly conceded the
validity of their marriage celebration, petitioner is now deemed to have waived any
defects therein. For this reason, the Court Bnds that the present action for declaration
of nullity of marriage on the ground of lack of marriage license is barred by the
decision in Civil Case No. 4341-95.

RODOLFO G. NAVARRO v. JUDGE HERNANDO C. DOMAGTOY
A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088. July 19, 1996, ROMERO, J.

While magistrates may at times make mistakes in judgment, for which they
are not penalized, the respondent judge exhibited ignorance of elementary
provisions of law, in an area which has greatly prejudiced the status of married
persons.

Facts:

Municipal Mayor Navarro of Dapa, Surigao del Norte Bled a complaint on two
speciBc acts committed by MCTC Judge Domagtoy on the grounds of gross
misconduct, ine>ciency in o>ce and ignorance of the law. First, that respondent
Judge Domagtoy solemnized the wedding between Tagadan and Borga, despite the
knowledge that the groom is merely separated from his Brst wife without institution

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of summary proceeding for the declaration of wife’s presumptive death; and second,
that the judge performed a marriage ceremony between Sumaylo and del Rosario
outside his court's jurisdiction upon the written request of del Rosario only. Judge
Domagtory holds o>ce and has jurisdiction in the MCTC of Sta. Monica-Burgos,
Surigao del Norte. The wedding was solemnized at the respondent judge's residence
in the municipality of Dapa, which does not fall within his jurisdictional area of the
municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos, located some 40 to 45 km away from the
municipality of Dapa.

Issues:

(1) Whether or not the marriage between Tagadan and Borga is valid.
(2) Whether or not the marriage between Sumaylo and del Rosario is valid.

Ruling:

(1) No. Article 41 of the Family code provides that for the purpose of
contracting the subsequent marriage, the spouse present must institute a summary
proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without
prejudice to the eDect of reappearance of the absent spouse. Tagadan did not
institute a summary proceeding for the declaration of his Brst wife's presumptive
death. Absent this judicial declaration, he remains married to his Brst wife.

(2) Yes. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court's jurisdiction,
there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which
while it may not aDect the validity of the marriage, may subject the o>ciating o>cial
to administrative liability. Hence, while it was only the latter who made the written
request where it should have been both parties as stated in Article 8 of the Family
Code, their non-compliance did not invalidate their marriage however, Domagtoy
may be held administratively liable.

ZENAIDA S. BESO v. Judge JUAN DAGUMAN, MCTC, Sta. Margarita-Tarangan-
Pagsanjan, Samar

A.M. No. MTJ-99-1211. January 28, 2000, YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.

Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court’s jurisdiction, there is
a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it
may not a ect the validity of the marriage, may subject the o ciating o cial to
administrative liability.

Facts:

Juan Daguman, MCTC Judge of Sta. Margarita-Tarangan_Pagsanjan, Samar,
solemnized the marriage of complainant Zenaida Beso to Bernardito Yman, on August
28, 1987, at the Judge’s residence in Calbayog City, Samar. Respondent alleged that
was prompted more by urgency to solemnize the marriage of Beso and Yman
because complainant was "an overseas worker, who, respondent realized deserved
more than ordinary o>cial attention under present Government policy." Respondent
Judge further averred that in solemnizing the marriage in question, "he believed in
good faith that by doing so he was leaning on the side of liberality of the law so that
it may not be too expensive and complicated for citizens to get married.”

Issue:

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Persons and Family Relations Law

Whether or not the marriage between Beso and Yman conducted outside the
judge’s jurisdiction is valid.

Ruling:

Yes. A marriage can be held outside the judge’s chambers or courtroom only
(1) at the point of death; (2) in remote places in accordance with Article 29; or (3)
upon the request of both parties in writing in a sworn statement to this eDect. None
of these instances was present in this case. Considering that respondent Judges
jurisdiction covers the municipality of Sta. Margarita-Tarangan-Pagsanjan, Samar only,
he was not clothed with authority to solemnize a marriage in the City of Calbayog.
Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court’s jurisdiction, there is a
resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may
not aDect the validity of the marriage, may subject the o>ciating o>cial to
administrative liability.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CRASUS L. IYOY
G.R. No. 152577, September 21, 2005, CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

In any case, any doubt shall be resolved in favor of the validity of the
marriage. No less than the Constitution of 1987 sets the policy to protect and
strengthen the family as the basic social institution and marriage as the foundation
of the family.

Facts:

In 1997, Respondent Crasus L. Iyoy, married to Fely Ada Rosal-Iyoy, sought the
nullity of their marriage held on the year 1961 on the basis of Article 36, FC, alleging
that Fely was hot-tempered, a nagger and extravagant. He averred also that in 1984,
Fely left the Philippines for USA and obtained a divorce. She married another man in
1985. In Fely’s Answer, she alleged that she had been an American citizen since
1988.

RTC and CA declared their marriage null and void Bnding merit on Fely’s
psychological incapacity and the applicability of Article 26 paragraph 2 of the Family
Code. Consequently, OSG Bled this petition for review alleging that abandonment by
and sexual inBdelity of respondent’s wife do not per se constitute psychological
incapacity and that Article 26, paragraph 2 is inapplicable to the case at bar.

Issues:

(1) Whether or not RTC and CA correctly declared the marriage as null and
void on the ground of psychological incapacity of Fely.

(2) Whether or not paragraph 2 Article 26 of the Family Code applies in the
case.

Ruling:

(1) No. The evidence may have proven that Fely committed acts that hurt and
embarrassed respondent Crasus and the rest of the family. Nonetheless, the root
cause for such was not identiBed. If the root cause of the incapacity was not
identiBed, then it cannot be satisfactorily established as a psychological or mental

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defect that is serious or grave; neither could it be proven to be in existence at the
time of celebration of the marriage; nor that it is incurable.

(2) No. Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a special situation wherein one of the couple
getting married is a Filipino citizen and the other a foreigner at the time the marriage
was celebrated. By its plain and literal interpretation, the said provision cannot be
applied to the case of respondent Crasus and his wife Fely because at the time Fely
obtained her divorce, she was still a Filipino citizen. Pursuant to the nationality
principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, she was still
bound by Philippine laws on family rights and duties, status, condition, and legal
capacity, even when she was already living abroad. Philippine laws, then and even
until now, do not allow and recognize divorce between Filipino spouses. Thus, Fely
could not have validly obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III
G.R. No. 154380, October 5, 2005, QUISUMBING, J.

Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving
parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but
later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce
decree.

Facts:

On May 1981, Cipriano Orbecido (Cipriano) married Villanueva. Their marriage
was blessed with a son and a daughter. In 1986, Villanueva, the wife left for the US
bringing along their son KristoDer. A few years later, Cipriano discovered that his wife
had been naturalized as an American citizen. Sometime in 2000, Cirpriano learned
that his wife had obtained a divorce decree and then married a certain Innocent
Stanley. Cipriano thereafter Bled with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry
invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition was Bled. Finding
merit in the petition, the court granted the same.

The OSG now contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the FC is not
applicable because it only applies to a valid mixed marriage; that is, a marriage
celebrated between a Filipino citizen and an alien. Hence, Orbecido cannot remarry.

Issue:

Whether or not Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the FC applies in the case at bar.

Ruling:

Yes. Taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of
reason, we hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases
involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino
citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and
obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as
if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage.
To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice.

The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is

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obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry. In this case,
when Cipriano’s wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there was still a valid
marriage that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate would have it,
the naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to
remarry. Thus Cipriano, the divorced Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry.

GERBERT R. CORPUZ v. STO. TOMAS and The SOLICITOR GENERAL
G.R. No. 186571 August 11, 2010, BRION, J.

The foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence of a right that clothes the
party with legal interest to petition for its recognition in this jurisdiction.

Facts:

Petitioner Corpuz is a naturalized Canadian citizen who married respondent
Sto. Tomas but subsequently left for Canada due to work and other professional
commitments. When he returned to the Philippines, he discovered that Sto. Tomas
was already romantically involved with another man. Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert
returned to Canada and Bled a petition for divorce which was eventually granted.

Two years later, Corpuz has fallen in love with another Filipina and wished to
marry her. He went to the civil registry to register the divorce decree of his marriage
certiBcate with Sto. Tomas. However, despite the registration, an o>cial of NSO
informed Corpuz that the former marriage still subsists under the Philippine law until
there has been a judicial recognition of the Canadian divorce by a competent judicial
court in view of NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982.

Consequently, he Bled a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce
and/or declaration of dissolution of marriage with the RTC. RTC denied the same and
concluded that Corpuz was not the proper party to institute the action for judicial
recognition of the foreign divorce decree as he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It
ruled that only the Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy, under the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code.

Issue:

Whether or not Corpuz has no legal interest to petition the RTC for the
recognition of his foreign divorce decree.

Ruling:

No. The foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence of a right that clothes
the party with legal interest to petition for its recognition in this jurisdiction. While the
alien spouse can claim no right under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code as the substantive right it establishes is in favor of the Filipino spouse,
such unavailability does not necessarily strip Corpuz of legal interest to petition the
RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The foreign divorce decree itself,
after its authenticity and conformity with the aliens national law have been duly
proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of right
in favor of Corpuz, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which
provides for the eDect of foreign judgments.

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