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Ruling:
No. In any event, the Court cannot, even on the grounds of equity, grant
reimbursement to petitioner Beumer given that he acquired no right whatsoever over
the subject properties by virtue of its unconstitutional purchase. It is well established
that equity as a rule will follow the law and will not permit that to be done indirectly
which, because of public policy, cannot be done directly. Surely, a contract that
violates the Constitution and the law is null and void, vests no rights, creates no
obligations and produces no legal eDect at all. Corollary thereto, under Article 1412 of
the Civil Code, Beumer cannot have the subject properties deeded to him or allow
him to recover the money he had spent for the purchase thereof. The law will not aid
either party to an illegal contract or agreement; it leaves the parties where it Bnds
them. Indeed, one cannot salvage any rights from an unconstitutional transaction
knowingly entered into.
Neither can the Court grant petitioner’s claim for reimbursement on the basis
of unjust enrichment. As held in Frenzel v. Catito, a case also involving a foreigner
seeking monetary reimbursement for money spent on purchase of Philippine land,
the provision on unjust enrichment does not apply if the action is proscribed by the
Constitution.
Nor would the denial of his claim amount to an injustice based on his foreign
citizenship. Precisely, it is the Constitution itself which demarcates the rights of
citizens and non-citizens in owning Philippine land. To be sure, the constitutional ban
against foreigners applies only to ownership of Philippine land and not to the
improvements built thereon, such as the two (2) houses standing on Lots 1 and 2142
which were properly declared to be co-owned by the parties subject to partition.
Needless to state, the purpose of the prohibition is to conserve the national
patrimoni6 and it is this policy which the Court is duty-bound to protect.
HONORIO L. CARLOS v. MANUEL T. ABELARDO
G.R. No. 146504, April 9, 2002, KAPUNAN, J.
The conjugal property is liable for the debts and obligations contracted by
either spouse without the consent of the other to the extent that the family may
have been bene$ted
Facts:
Manuel Abelardo and Maria Abelardo were husband and wife. To start their
journey as spouses they contracted loan from Honorario Carlos for the payment of
the house and lot that would serve as their conjugal dwelling. Notably, Manuel’s wife
Maria executed an instrument acknowledging the loan but which respondent Manuel
did not sign. When they failed to pay for their obligation the spouses were sued by
herein petitioner Carlos.
Issue:
Whether or not the conjugal property of the spouses Abelardo is liable?
Ruling:
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Yes. Early in time, it must be noted that payment of personal debts contracted
by the husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the
conjugal partnership except insofar as they redounded to the beneBt of the family.
The defendants spouses Abelardo never denied that the check of US$25,000.00 was
used to purchase the subject house and lot. They do not deny that the same served
as their conjugal home, thus beneBting the family. On the same principle,
acknowledgment of the loan made by the defendant-wife binds the conjugal
partnership since its proceeds redounded to the beneBt of the family. Hence,
defendant-husband Manuel Abelardo and defendant-wife Maria Abelardo are jointly
and severally liable in the payment of the loan.
While respondent Manuel Abelardo did not and refused to sign the
acknowledgment executed and signed by his wife Maria Abelardo, undoubtedly, the
loan redounded to the beneBt of the family because it was used to purchase the
house and lot which became the conjugal home of respondent and his family. Hence,
notwithstanding the alleged lack of consent of respondent Manuel, under Art. 121 of
the Family Code, he shall be solidarily liable for such loan together with his wife
Maria.
SPS. TRINIDAD S. ESTONINA and PAULINO ESTONINA v. COURT OF APPEALS,
SPS. CELSO ATAYAN, HEIRS OF GARCIA, ET.AL.
G.R. No. 111547, Januiary 27, 1997, FRANCISCO, J.
For the operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership to
apply proof of its acquisition during marriage must $rst be established.
Facts:
Santiago Garcia and Consuelo Garcia were husband and wife. Santiago has
Bve children with his Brst wife Consuelo and four others from another for a total of
nine children. The subject property in controversy in this case was inherited by
Santiago prior to his marriage with Consuelo. However it was named and registered
only during their marriage in which provides”Santiago Garcia married to Consuelo
Gaza”. After the death of Santiago a writ of attachment was issued in favor of
petitioner Estonina against Consuelo Garcia. 55% of the subject property was
included in the attachment which means the ½ share plus 1/10 share of Consuelo
claiming that the subject property is presumed conjugal property since it was issued
during their marriage that would entitle Consuelo to ½ share of the property.
On the other hand, respondent Atayan claiming interest from the other heirs
claimed that it is not a Conjugal property. Hence, Consuelo only has 1/10 interest to
the property which consequently would give only 1/10 right of attachment for
petitioner Estonina. The RTC ruled in favor of Estonina. The CA on appeal reversed
the RTC and held that it is not a conjugal property.
Issue:
Whether or not the title to land ”Santiago Garcia married to Consuelo Gaza”
give rise to presumption of conjugality.
Ruling:
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No. The evidence on record as well as established jurisprudence on the matter
lead us to concur with the Bnding of the Court of Appeals that the property involved
in this dispute is indeed the exclusive property of the deceased Santiago Garcia. It
has been repeatedly held by this Court that the presumption under Article 160 of the
Civil Code that all property of the marriage belong to the conjugal partnership applies
only when there is proof that the property was acquired during the marriage.
Otherwise stated, proof of acquisition during the marriage is a condition sine qua non
for the operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership. In the case
at bench, the petitioners have been unable to present any proof that the property in
question was acquired during the marriage of Santiago and Consuelo.
Being the exclusive property of Santiago Garcia, it was the entire parcel of
land in question that formed part of his estate and which passed to his ten heirs by
compulsory succession upon his death. And as correctly held by the Court of Appeals,
what could therefore be attached and sold at public auction in Civil Case No. 88430
was only the one-tenth (1/10) pro indiviso share of Consuelo Garcia in the said parcel
of land. The sale at public auction of the disputed property in its entirety by the
SheriD in favor of Trinidad Estonina over and above the one-tenth (1/10) share of
Consuelo Garcia is null and void, belonging as it does to the other heirs of Santiago
Garcia and later to the spouses Atayan.
JOSEFA BAUTISTA FERRER v. SPS. MANUEL M. FERRER & VIRGINIA FERRER
and SPS. ISMAEL M. FERRER and FLORA FERRER
G.R. No. 166496, November 9, 2006, CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
While we could concede to the right of the spouse as contemplated in Article
120 of the Family Code to be reimbursed for the cost of the improvements, the
obligation to reimburse rests on the spouse upon whom ownership of the entire
property is vested. There is no obligation on the part of the purchaser of the
property, in case the property is sold by the owner-spouse.
Facts:
Alfredo and Josefa Ferrer were husband and wife. Alfredo owns a lot which he
acquired prior to his marriage to Josefa. Upon their marriage improvements were
introduced by Josefa. However, before the death of Alfredo and at the time when
Alfredo was allegedly was already bedridden the respondents Ferrer were able to
acquire the subject lot including its improvements through a deed of sale contracted
with Alfredo. Josefa then questioned the validity of sale. However, in a decision of the
Supreme Court it was Bnally held that it was a separate property in which Alfredo can
rightfully sell without his wife’s consent.
Hence, as a Bnal attempt to recover Josefa now claims that since she
introduced some improvements and since the subject land was the only property of
his deceased husband Alfredo she now has the right of reimbursement from the
buyer spouses Ferrer pursuant to Article 120 of the Family Code.
Issue:
Whether or not Josefa Ferrer may claim reimbursement from the buyer
spouses pursuant to Art.120 of the Family Code.
Ruling:
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No. Indeed, Article 120 provides the solution in determining the ownership of
the improvements that are made on the separate property of the spouses at the
expense of the partnership or through the acts or eDorts of either or both spouses.
Thus, when the cost of the improvement and any resulting increase in value are more
than the value of the property at the time of the improvement, the entire property of
one of the spouses shall belong to the conjugal partnership, subject to
reimbursement of the value of the property of the owner-spouse at the time of the
improvement; otherwise, said property shall be retained in ownership by the owner-
spouse, likewise subject to reimbursement of the cost of the improvement. The
subject property was precisely declared as the exclusive property of Alfredo on the
basis of Article 120 of the Family Code.
However, in this case what is incontrovertible is that the respondents Ferrer,
despite the allegations contained in the Complaint that they are the buyers of the
subject premises, are not petitioner Josefa’s spouse nor can they ever be deemed as
the owner-spouse upon whom the obligation to reimburse Josefa for her costs rested.
It is the owner-spouse Manuel Ferrer who has the obligation to reimburse the conjugal
partnership or the spouse who expended the acts or eDorts, as the case may be.
Otherwise stated, respondents Ferrer do not have the obligation to respect petitioner
Josefa Ferrer’s right to be reimbursed.
HOMEOWNERS SAVINGS & LOAN BANK v. MIGUELA C. DAILO
G.R. No. 153802, March 11, 2005, TINGA, J.
A real estate mortgage without the consent or authority of the wife is void.
Facts:
Marcelino Dailo Jr. and Miguela Dailo were husband and wife married in 1967.
During their marriage they acquired house and lot. In 1993, Marcelino Dailo, Jr.
executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) in favor of one Lilibeth Gesmundo,
authorizing the latter to obtain a loan from petitioner Homeowners Savings and Loan
Bank to be secured by the spouses Dailos house and lot in San Pablo City. Pursuant to
the SPA, Gesmundo obtained a loan in the amount of P300,000.00 from petitioner
Homeowners Bank. As security therefor, Gesmundo executed on the same day a Real
Estate Mortgage constituted on the subject property in favor of Homeowners Bank.
The abovementioned transactions, including the execution of the SPA in favor of
Gesmundo, took place without the knowledge and consent of Miguela.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the Mortgage executed by Marcelino Dailo Jr. without the
consent of his wife Miguela valid as to his undivided share.
2. Whether or not the obligation redounded to the beneBt of the family.
Ruling:
1. No. The basic and established fact is that during his lifetime, without the
knowledge and consent of his wife, Marcelino Dailo, Jr. constituted a real estate
mortgage on the subject property, which formed part of their conjugal partnership.
By express provision of Article 124 of the Family Code, in the absence of (court)
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authority or written consent of the other spouse, any disposition or encumbrance of
the conjugal property shall be void.
2. No. For the subject property to be held liable, the obligation contracted by
the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. must have redounded to the beneBt of the conjugal
partnership. Here, it was not su>ciently provided. There must be the requisite
showing then of some advantage which clearly accrued to the welfare of the spouses.
Certainly, to make a conjugal partnership respond for a liability that should appertain
to the husband alone is to defeat and frustrate the avowed objective of the new Civil
Code to show the utmost concern for the solidarity and well-being of the family as a
unit
IN RE: PETITION FOR SEPARATION OF PROPERTY: ELENA BUENAVENTURA
MULLER v. HELMUT MULLER
G.R. No. 149615, August 29, 2006, YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
An alien spouse cannot claim reimbursement from the money used to
purchase a land property due to the constitutional prohibition.
Facts:
Elena Buenaventura Muller and Helmut Muller were husband and wife married
in Germany in 1989. During the subsistence of their marriage the spouses acquired a
land in Antipolo from the money of Helmut but was named after Elena due to their
acknowledgement of the constitutional prohibition. However, Due to incompatibilities
and Helmut’s alleged womanizing, drinking, and maltreatment, the spouses
eventually separated. Consequently, Helmut now claims reimbursement of the
money used for the acquisition of the land property in Antipolo.
Issue:
Whether or not Helmut Muller is entitled to reimbursement of the funds used
for the acquisition of the Antipolo property.
RULING:
No. Aliens, whether individuals or corporations, are disqualiBed from acquiring
lands of the public domain. Hence, they are also disqualiBed from acquiring private
lands. The primary purpose of the constitutional provision is the conservation of the
national patrimony. The Court of Appeals erred in holding that an implied trust was
created and resulted by operation of law in view of Elena Muller’s marriage to Helmut
Muller. Save for the exception provided in cases of hereditary succession, Helmut
Muller’s disqualiBcation from owning lands in the Philippines is absolute. Not even an
ownership in trust is allowed. Besides, where the purchase is made in violation of an
existing statute and in evasion of its express provision, no trust can result in favor of
the party who is guilty of the fraud.To hold otherwise would allow circumvention of
the constitutional prohibition.
Thus, in the instant case, Helmut cannot seek reimbursement on the ground
of equity where it is clear that he willingly and knowingly bought the property despite
the constitutional prohibition. Further, the distinction made between transfers of
ownership as opposed to recovery of funds is a futile exercise on Helmut Muller’s
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part. To allow reimbursement would in eDect permit Helmut to enjoy the fruits of a
property which he is not allowed to own. Thus, it is likewise proscribed by law
EUSTAQUIO MALLILIN, JR. v. MA. ELVIRA CASTILLO
G.R. No. 136803, June 16, 2000, MENDOZA, J.
Art. 148 of the Family Code now provides for a limited co-ownership in cases
where the parties in union are incapacitated to marry each other.
Facts:
Eustaquio Mallilin,Jr. and Ma. Elvira Castillo, both married and with children,
but separated from their respective spouses, cohabited after a brief courtship
sometime in 1979 while their respective marriages still subsisted. During their union,
they set up the Superfreight Customs Brokerage Corporation, with Eustaquio as
president and chairman of the board of directors, and Ma. Elvira as vice-president and
treasurer. The business Mourished and Eustaquio and Ma. Elvira acquired real and
personal properties which were registered solely in Ma. Elvira’s name. In 1992, due to
irreconcilable diDerences, the couple separated. Eustaquio demanded from Ma.Elvira
his share in the subject properties, but Elvira refused alleging that said properties had
been registered solely in her name. In her defense, Elvira claimed that it was her sole
property and that there cannot be a co-ownership between them because of an illicit
relationship.
Issue:
Whether or not co-ownership can occur in an illicit/adulterous relationship.
Ruling:
Yes. It was error for the trial court to rule that, because the parties in this case
were not capacitated to marry each other at the time that they were alleged to have
been living together, they could not have owned properties in common. The Family
Code, in addition to providing that a co-ownership exists between a man and a
woman who live together as husband and wife without the beneBt of marriage,
likewise provides that, if the parties are incapacitated to marry each other, properties
acquired by them through their joint contribution of money, property or industry shall
be owned by them in common in proportion to their contributions which, in the
absence of proof to the contrary, is presumed to be equal. There is thus co-ownership
even though the couple are not capacitated to marry each other.
THELMA A. JADER-MANALO v. NORMA FERNANDEZ C. CAMAISA and
EDILBERTO CAMAISA
G.R. No. 147978, January 23, 2002, KAPUNAN, J.
The law requires that the disposition of a conjugal property by the husband as
administrator in appropriate cases requires the written consent of the wife,
otherwise, the disposition is void.
Facts:
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An advertisement was posted by the spouses Camaisa with regard to the
property they are selling. After seeing the Ad petitioner Jader-Manalo became
interested and oDered to buy the property to the spouses Camaisa. An initial
negotiation took place in which the spouses Camaisa and Jader-Manalo was present.
In their second meeting Manalo paid a down payment to Edilberto Camaisa
(husband) who received it, based on the latter’s promised of the follow up consent of
her wife Norma Camaisa. When Norma was later on informed of the payment she did
not consent and did not sign the contract. Consequently, the initial down payment
was returned then to Manalo. However, Manalo now claims that the sale was already
perfected and valid.
Issue:
Whether or not the sale of the conjugal property without the wife’s written
consent is valid.
Ruling:
No. The properties subject of the contracts in this case were conjugal; hence,
for the contracts to sell to be eDective, the consent of both husband and wife must
concur. Respondent Norma Camaisa admittedly did not give her written consent to
the sale. Even granting that respondent Norma Camaisa actively participated in
negotiating for the sale of the subject properties, which she denied, her written
consent to the sale is required by law for its validity. SigniBcantly, petitioner herself
admits that Norma refused to sign the contracts to sell. Respondent Norma may have
been aware of the negotiations for the sale of their conjugal properties. However,
being merely aware of a transaction is not consent.
Finally, Manalo argues that since respondent Norma unjustly refuses to a>x
her signatures to the contracts to sell, court authorization under Article 124 of the
Family Code is warranted. The argument is bereft of merit. Manalo is correct insofar
as she alleges that if the written consent of the other spouse cannot be obtained or is
being withheld, the matter may be brought to court which will give such authority if
the same is warranted by the circumstances. However, it should be stressed that
court authorization under Art. 124 is only resorted to in cases where the spouse who
does not give consent is incapacitated. In this case, Manalo failed to allege and prove
that respondent Norma was incapacitated to give her consent to the contracts. In the
absence of such showing of the wife’s incapacity, court authorization cannot be
sought
IMELDA RELUCIO v. ANGELINA MEJIA LOPEZ
G.R. No. 138497, January 16, 2002, PARDO, J.
Article 128 of the Family Code refers only to spouses. Stated otherwise, the
administration of the property of the marriage is entirely between husband and wife,
to the exclusion of all other persons
Facts:
Angeline Lopez Bled for judicial appointment as administratrix of the conjugal
partnership or absolute community property, accounting and forfeiture arising from
her marriage to Alberto J. Lopez. In addition to his husband, Imelda Relusion was also
impleaded by Angeline on the alleged illicit relationship thereof to his husband which
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resulted to the abandonment and the abuse of their conjugal property’s
administration to the detriment of Angeline and four children. Nonetheless, Imelda
defended by claiming lack of cause of action against her that should warrant the
dismissal of the case against her.
Issue:
Whether or not the inclusion of Imelda as a party defendant in special
proceeding for judicial appointment as administratrix of the conjugal partnership or
absolute community property, accounting and forfeiture between spouses Lopez
should prosper.
Ruling:
No. The administration of the property of the marriage is entirely between
them, to the exclusion of all other persons. Angeline alleges that Alberto J. Lopez is
her husband. Therefore, her Brst cause of action is against Alberto J. Lopez. There is
no right-duty relation between Imelda and Angeline that can possibly support a cause
of action. In fact, none of the three elements of a cause of action exists.
The second cause of action is for an accounting by Angeline’s husband. The
accounting of conjugal partnership arises from or is an incident of marriage. Imelda
has nothing to do with the marriage between Angeline and Alberto J. Lopez. Hence,
no cause of action can exist against Imelda on this ground.
Further, Angeline’s asserted right to forfeit extends to Alberto J. Lopez share
alone. Failure of Alberto J. Lopez to surrender such share, assuming the trial court
Bnds in Angeline’s favor, results in a breach of an obligation to Angeline and gives
rise to a cause of action. Such cause of action, however, pertains to Alberto J. Lopez,
not Imelda.
ANTONIO DOCENA and ALFREDA DOCENA v. HON. RICARDO P. LAPESURA,
RUFINO M. GARADO, and CASIANO HOMBRIA
G.R. No. 140153, March 28, 2001, GONZAGA-REYES, J.
The husband alone in a suit involving the conjugal property may sign the
certi$cate against forum shopping pursuant to the right granted by law to administer
it.
Facts:
A case in which the conjugal property of the spouses Docena was involved is
Bled. Pursuant to this case, however, rather than both spouses signing the
certiBcation against forum shopping it is only Antonio the husband in behalf of the
conjugal property signed the certiBcation against forum shopping. The private
respondent Casiano Hombria assails this claiming that the certiBcation is invalid.
Issue:
Whether or not the certiBcation against forum shopping signed by the
husband alone involving conjugal property is valid.
Ruling:
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Yes. Under the New Civil Code, the husband is the administrator of the
conjugal partnership. In fact, he is the sole administrator, and the wife is not entitled
as a matter of right to join him in this endeavor. The husband may defend the
conjugal partnership in a suit or action without being joined by the wife. Corollary, the
husband alone may execute the necessary certiBcate of non-forum shopping to
accompany the pleading. The husband as the statutory administrator of the conjugal
property could have Bled the petition for certiorari and prohibition alone, without the
concurrence of the wife. If suits to defend an interest in the conjugal properties may
be Bled by the husband alone, with more reason, he may sign the certiBcate of non-
forum shopping to be attached to the petition.
Under the Family Code, the administration of the conjugal property belongs to
the husband and the wife jointly. However, unlike an act of alienation or
encumbrance where the consent of both spouses is required, joint management or
administration does not require that the husband and wife always act together. Each
spouse may validly exercise full power of management alone, subject to the
intervention of the court in proper cases as provided under Article 124 of the Family
Code. It is believed that even under the provisions of the Family Code, the husband
alone could have Bled the petition for certiorari and prohibition to contest the writs of
demolition issued against the conjugal property with the Court of Appeals without
being joined by his wife. The signing of the attached certiBcate of non-forum
shopping only by the husband is not a fatal defect.
Therefore, in view of the circumstances of this case, namely, the property
involved is a conjugal property, the petition questioning the writ of demolition thereof
originated from an action for recovery brought against the spouses, and is clearly
intended for the beneBt of the conjugal partnership, and the wife, as pointed out in
the Motion for Reconsideration in respondent court, was in the province of Guian,
Samar, whereas the petition was prepared in Metro Manila, a rigid application of the
rules on forum shopping that would not authorize a husbands signing the certiBcation
in his behalf and that of his wife is too harsh and is clearly uncalled for.
SPOUSES ANTONIO and LUZVIMINDA GUIANG v. COURT OF APPEALS and
GILDA CORPUZ
G.R. No. 125172, June 26, 1998, PANGANIBAN, J.
Without authority or consent of the spouse any disposition or encumbrance by
the other spouse is null and void.
Facts:
Gilda Corpuz and Judie Corpuz where spouses. In January of 1990 when Gilda
was away looking for work Judie Corpuz sold their house to spouses Guiang. Upon her
return, she was informed that his husband Judie already left with his new wife and
that their house was already sold to the spouses Guiang. When Gilda stayed in the
house and refused to accede with spouses Guiang’s order to leave the house, the
latter Bled a case for trespassing against Gilda Corpuz and children.
At the barangay level, Gilda Corpuz was forced to sign an amicable settlement
in relation to the trespassing case Bled against her. Nonetheless, she stayed and
claimed that she was forced by the barangay captain to sign it. Spouses Guiang now
claims that the sale is valid and if ever it is voidable on account of Gilda’s lack of
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consent it was nonetheless ratiBed by the amicable settlement subsequently
rendered.
Issue:
Whether or not the sale of the house without the wife’s consent is valid.
Ruling:
No. Petitioner spouses Guiang insist that the questioned Deed of Transfer of
Rights was validly executed by the parties-litigants in good faith and for valuable
consideration. The absence of private respondent Gilda’s consent merely rendered
the Deed voidable under Article 1390 of the Civil Code. However we cannot agree for
ART. 124 of the Family Code is clear. The disposition or encumbrance is void. It
becomes still clearer if we compare the same with the equivalent provision of the
Civil Code of the Philippines. The provision in the civil code giving the wife ten (10)
years during the marriage to annul the alienation or encumbrance was not carried
over to the Family Code. It is thus clear that any alienation or encumbrance made
after August 3, 1988 when the Family Code took eDect by the husband of the
conjugal partnership property without the consent of the wife is null and void.
Furthermore, it must be noted that the fraud and the intimidation referred to
by petitioners were perpetrated in the execution of the document embodying the
amicable settlement. Gilda Corpuz alleged during trial that barangay authorities
made her sign said document through misrepresentation and coercion. In any event,
its execution does not alter the void character of the deed of sale between the
husband Judie Corpuz and the petitioners-spouses Guiang for doctrinally and clearly,
a void contract cannot be ratiBed. The fact remains that such contract was entered
into without the wife’s consent.
In sum, the nullity of the contract of sale is premised on the absence of Gilda’s
consent. To constitute a valid contract, the Civil Code requires the concurrence of the
following elements: (1) cause, (2) object, and (3) consent. Here, the last element
being indubitably absent in the case at bar.
GUILLERMA TUMLOS v. SPOUSES MARIO FERNANDEZ and LOURDES
FERNANDEZ
G.R. No. 137650, April 12, 2000, PANGANIBAN, J.
Under Article 148 of the Family Code, a man and a woman who are not legally
capacitated to marry each other, but who nonetheless live together conjugally, may
be deemed co-owners of a property acquired during the cohabitation only upon proof
that each made an actual contribution to its acquisition. Hence, mere cohabitation
without proof of contribution will not result in a co-ownership.
Facts:
Spouses Mario and Lourdez Fernandez Bled an ejectment suit against
Guillarma Tumlos. Spouses Fernandez claimed that the apartment building where
Guillerma stays is owned by them and that they allowed Guillerma’s possession by
mere tolerance. In her defense, Guillerma said that she had a relationship with Mario
that would entitle her to the possession of the property being the co-owner thereof.
Guillerma alleged that they bought the property as their love nest; that they lived
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together in the property with their 2 children and that Guillerma administered the
property by collecting rentals, until she discovered that Mario deceived her as to the
annulment of his marriage.
Issue:
Whether or not Guillerma is entitled to the possession of the property.
Ruling:
No. In this case, Guillerma failed to present any evidence that she had made
an actual contribution to purchase the subject property. Indeed, she anchors her
claim of co-ownership merely on her cohabitation with Respondent Mario Fernandez.
Likewise, her claim of having administered the property during the cohabitation is
unsubstantiated. In any event, this fact by itself does not justify her claim, for nothing
in Article 148 of the Family Code provides that the administration of the property
amounts to a contribution in its acquisition. Clearly, there is no basis for Guillerma’s
claim of co-ownership. The property in question belongs to the conjugal partnership
of respondent spouses Fernandez.
LUPO ATIENZA v. YOLANDA DE CASTRO
G.R. No. 169698, November 29, 2006, GARCIA, J.
There can clearly be no co-ownership when, as here, De Castro su ciently
established that she derived the funds used to purchase the property from her
earnings, not only as an accountant but also as a businesswoman engaged in foreign
currency trading, money lending and jewelry retail.
Facts:
Despite Lupo Atienza being a married man, he and Yolanda eventually lived
together in consortium. However, after the birth of their second child, their
relationship turned sour until they parted ways. Consequently, Lupo Bled in the RTC a
complaint against Yolanda De Castro for the judicial partition between them of a
parcel of land with improvements located in Bel-Air Subdivision, Makati City wherein
he alleged that the subject property was acquired during his union with Yolanda as
common-law husband and wife, hence the property is co-owned by them. Moreover,
he averred that the property in question was acquired by De Castro sometime in
1987 using his exclusive funds and that the title thereto was transferred by the seller
in De Castro’s name without his knowledge and consent. He did not interpose any
objection thereto because at the time, their aDair was still thriving. He further argued
that pursuant to Article 144 of the Civil Code, he was in no way burdened to prove
that he contributed to the acquisition of the subject property because with or without
the contribution by either partner, he is deemed a co-owner thereof, adding that
under Article 484 of Civil Code, as long as the property was acquired by either or
both of them during their extramarital union, such property would be legally owned
by them in common and governed by the rules on co-ownership, which apply in
default of contracts, or special provisions.
Issue:
Whether or not the subject property is commonly owned by the parties.
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Ruling:
No. Atienza’s claim of co-ownership in the disputed property is without basis
because not only did he fail to substantiate his alleged contribution in the purchase
thereof but likewise the very trail of documents pertaining to its purchase as
evidentiary proof redounds to the beneBt of the respondent. True, the mere issuance
of a certiBcate of title in the name of any person does not foreclose the possibility
that the real property covered thereby may be under co-ownership with persons not
named in the certiBcate or that the registrant may only be a trustee or that other
parties may have acquired interest subsequent to the issuance of the certiBcate of
title. However, as already stated, petitioners evidence in support of his claim is either
insu>cient or immaterial to warrant the trial courts Bnding that the disputed property
falls under the purview of Article 148 of the Family Code. In contrast to Atienza’s
dismal failure to prove his cause, De Castro was able to present preponderant
evidence of her sole ownership. There can clearly be no co-ownership when, as here,
De Castro su>ciently established that she derived the funds used to purchase the
property from her earnings, not only as an accountant but also as a businesswoman
engaged in foreign currency trading, money lending and jewelry retail. She presented
her clientele and the promissory notes evincing substantial dealings with her clients.
She also presented her bank account statements and bank transactions, which reMect
that she had the Bnancial capacity to pay the purchase price of the subject property.
ELNA MERCADO-FEHR v. BRUNO FEHR
G.R. No. 152716, October 23, 2003, PUNO, J.
Article 147 applies to unions of parties who are legally capacitated and not
barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless
void, as in the case at bar. This provision creates a co-ownership with respect to the
properties they acquire during their cohabitation.
Facts:
The RTC declared the marriage between Bruno and Elna Fehr void ab
initio under Article 36 of the Family Code and ordered the dissolution of their conjugal
partnership of property. Petitioner however questioned the order of the RTC with
respect to the adjudication of Suite 204, LCG Condominium and the support of the
children. Petitioner alleged that Suite 204 was purchased on installment basis at the
time when petitioner and respondent were living exclusively with each other as
husband and wife without the beneBt of marriage, hence the rules on co-ownership
should apply in accordance with Article 147 of the Family Code.
Issue:
Whether or not the subject property is a common property of the parties and
their property regime should be divided in accordance with the law on co-ownership.
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Ruling:
Yes. For Article 147 to operate, the man and the woman: (1) must be
capacitated to marry each other; (2) live exclusively with each other as husband and
wife; and (3) their union is without the beneBt of marriage or their marriage is
void. All these elements are present in the case at bar. It has not been shown that
Elna and Bruno suDered any impediment to marry each other. They lived exclusively
with each other as husband and wife when petitioner moved in with respondent in his
residence and were later united in marriage. Their marriage, however, was found to
be void under Article 36 of the Family Code because of respondent’s psychological
incapacity to comply with essential marital obligations. The disputed
property, Suite 204 of LCG Condominium, was purchased on installment basis on July
26, 1983, at the time when they were already living together. Hence, it should be
considered as common property of the parties.
JACINTO SAGUID v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, BRANCH 94, BOAC, MARINDUQUE and GINA S. REY
G.R. No. 150611. June 10, 2003, YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
The issue of co-ownership of properties acquired by the parties to a bigamous
marriage and an adulterous relationship requires proof of actual contribution in the
acquisition of the property.
Facts:
Seventeen-year old Gina Rey was married, but separated de facto from her
husband, when she met Jacinto Saguid. However, after 9 years of cohabitation, the
couple decided to separate. Rey Bled a complaint for Partition and Recovery of
Personal Property with Receivership against Saguid wherein she alleged that from her
salary of $1,500.00 a month as entertainer in Japan, she was able to contribute
P70,000.00 in the completion of their unBnished house. Also, from her own earnings
as an entertainer and Bsh dealer, she was able to acquire and accumulate
appliances, pieces of furniture and household eDects, with a total value of
P111,375.00. She prayed that she be declared the sole owner of these personal
properties and that the amount of P70,000.00, representing her contribution to the
construction of their house, be reimbursed to her.
Issue:
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Whether or not Saguid was able to prove her actual contribution as provided
under Art.148 of the Famiy Code.
Ruling:
No. It is not disputed that Rey and Saguid were not capacitated to marry each
other because the former was validly married to another man at the time of her
cohabitation with the latter. Their property regime therefore is governed by Article
148 of the Family Code, which applies to bigamous marriages, adulterous
relationships, relationships in a state of concubinage, relationships where both man
and woman are married to other persons, and multiple alliances of the same married
man. Under this regime, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through
their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them
in common in proportion to their respective contributions. Proof of actual contribution
is required.
In the case at bar, the controversy centers on the house and personal
properties of the parties. Rey alleged in her complaint that she contributed
P70,000.00 for the completion of their house. However, nowhere in her testimony did
she specify the extent of her contribution. What appears in the record are receipts in
her name for the purchase of construction materials on November 17, 1995 and
December 23, 1995, in the total amount of P11,413.00. On the other hand, while
there is no question that both parties contributed in their joint account deposit, there
is, however, no su>cient proof of the exact amount of their respective shares
therein. Pursuant to Article 148 of the Family Code, in the absence of proof of extent
of the parties respective contribution, their share shall be presumed to be
equal. Here, the disputed personal properties were valued at P111,375.00, the
existence and value of which were not questioned by the petitioner. Hence, their
share therein is equivalent to one-half, i.e., P55,687.50 each.
The Family as an Institution
SPOUSES AUGUSTO HONTIVEROS and MARIA HONTIVEROS v. REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT, Branch 25, Iloilo City and SPOUSES GREGORIO HONTIVEROS
and TEODORA AYSON
G.R. No. 125465. June 29, 1999, MENDOZA, J.
Whenever a stranger is a party in a case involving family members, the
requisite showing of earnest e orts to compromise is no longer mandatory.
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Facts:
Spouses Hontiveros Bled a complaint for damages against private respondents
before the RTC. Later, the spouses Bled an Amended Complaint to insert therein an
allegation that earnest eDorts towards a compromise have been made between the
parties but the same were unsuccessful. In due time, private respondents Bled an
answer in which they denied that earnest eDorts had been made to reach a
compromise but the parties were unsuccessful. The RTC dismissed the case on the
ground that the complaint was not veriBed as required by Art. 151 of the Family Code
and, therefore, it did not believe that earnest eDorts had been made to arrive at a
compromise.
Issue:
Whether or not the Art. 151 of the Family Code is applicable herein.
Ruling:
NO. Art. 151 of the Family Code does not apply in this case since the suit is
not exclusively among family members. The inclusion of Ayson as defendant and
Maria Hontiveros as plaintiD takes the case out of the ambit of Art. 151 of the Family
Code. Under this provision, the phrase members of the same family refers to the
husband and wife, parents and children, ascendants and descendants, and brothers
and sisters, whether full or half-blood. Religious relationship and relationship by
a>nity are not given any legal eDect in this jurisdiction. Consequently, Ayson, who is
described in the complaint as the spouse of respondent Hontiveros, and Maria
Hontiveros, who is admittedly the spouse of petitioner Augusto Hontiveros, are
considered strangers to the Hontiveros family, for purposes of Art. 151.
HEIRS OF DR. MARIANO FAVIS, SR. v. JUANA GONZALES, ET. AL
G.R. No. 185922, January 15, 2014, PEREZ, J.
If the respondents as parties–defendants could not, and did not, after $ling
their answer to petitioner’s complaint, invoke the objection of absence of the
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required allegation on earnest e orts at a compromise, the appellate court
unquestionably did not have any authority or basis to motu propio order the
dismissal of petitioner’s complaint.
Facts:
Claiming that the donation made prejudiced their legitime, Dr. Favis’ children
with Capitolina Bled an action for annulment of the Deed of Donation, inventory,
liquidation and partition of property before the RTC. The latter nulliBed the said deed.
On appeal, the CA motu proprio ordered the dismissal of the complaint for failure of
petitioners to make an averment that earnest eDorts toward a compromise have
been made, as mandated by Article 151 of the Family Code.
Issue:
Whether or not the appellate court may dismiss the order of dismissal of the
complaint for failure to allege therein that earnest eDorts towards a compromise have
been made.
Ruling:
NO. A failure to allege earnest but failed eDorts at a compromise in a
complaint among members of the same family is not a jurisdictional defect but
merely a defect in the statement of a cause of action. The defect may however be
waived by failing to make seasonable objection, in a motion to dismiss or answer, the
defect being a mere procedural imperfection which does not aDect the jurisdiction of
the court. In the case at hand, no motion to dismiss the complaint based on the
failure to comply with a condition precedent was Bled in the trial court; neither was
such failure assigned as error in the appeal that respondent brought before the CA.
Therefore, the rule on deemed waiver of the non–jurisdictional defense or objection is
wholly applicable to respondent. If the respondents as parties–defendants could not,
and did not, after Bling their answer to petitioner’s complaint, invoke the objection of
absence of the required allegation on earnest eDorts at a compromise, the appellate
court unquestionably did not have any authority or basis to motu propio order the
dismissal of petitioner’s complaint.
GAUDENCIO GUERRERO v. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ILOCOS NORTE, BR.
XVI, JUDGE LUIS B. BELLO, JR., PRESIDING, and PEDRO G. HERNANDO
G.R. No. 109068 January 10, 1994, BELLOSILLO, J.
"Sisters-in-law" (hence, also "brothers-in-law") are not listed under Art. 217 of
the New Civil Code as members of the same family.
Facts:
A complaint was Bled against Pedro Hernando. However the same was
dismissed by the RTC on the ground that the parties being brother-in-law, the
complaint should have alleged that earnest eDorts were Brst exerted towards a
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compromise. Gaudencio Guerrero argued however that since brothers by a>nity are
not members of the same family, he was not required to exert eDorts towards a
compromise.
Issue:
Whether brothers by a>nity are considered members of the same family
contemplated in Art. 217, par. (4), and Art. 222 of the New Civil Code, as well as
under Sec. 1, par. (j), Rule 16, of the Rules of Court requiring earnest eDorts towards
a compromise before a suit between them may be instituted and maintained.
Ruling:
No. The Court already ruled in Gayon v. Gayon that the enumeration of
"brothers and sisters" as members of the same family does not comprehend "sisters-
in-law". In that case, then Chief Justice Concepcion emphasized that "sisters-in-law"
(hence, also "brothers-in-law") are not listed under Art. 217 of the New Civil Code as
members of the same family. Since Art. 150 of the Family Code repeats essentially
the same enumeration of "members of the family", the Court Bnd no reason to alter
existing jurisprudence on the matter. Consequently, the court a quo erred in ruling
that Guerrero, being a brother-in-law of Hernando, was required to exert earnest
eDorts towards a compromise before Bling the present suit.
HIYAS SAVINGS and LOAN BANK, INC. v. HON. EDMUNDO T. ACUÑA, in his
capacity as Pairing Judge of Regional Trial Court, Branch 122, Caloocan City,
and ALBERTO MORENO
G.R. NO. 154132 August 31, 2006, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
Once a stranger becomes a party to a suit involving members of the same
family, the law no longer makes it a condition precedent that earnest e orts be made
towards a compromise before the action can prosper.
Facts:
Alberto Moreno Bled with the RTC a complaint against Hiyas Savings and Loan
Bank, Inc., his wife Remedios, the spouses Felipe and Maria Owe and the Register of
Deeds of Caloocan City for cancellation of mortgage. Hiyas Savings and Loan Bank
Bled a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that Moreno failed to comply with Article 151
of the Family Code wherein it is provided that no suit between members of the same
family shall prosper unless it should appear from the veriBed complaint or petition
that earnest eDorts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have
failed. The RTC however denied the motion and agreed with Moreno that earnest
eDorts towards a compromise is not required before the Bling of the instant case
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considering that the above-entitled case involves parties who are strangers to the
family. Also, as it is Remedios who stands to be beneBted by Art. 151 of the Family
Code, being a member of the same family as that of Alberto, only she may invoke
said Art. 151.
Issue:
Whether or not earnest eDorts towards a compromise is required in the case
herein.
Ruling:
NO. In Magbaleta, the Court ruled that once a stranger becomes a party to a
suit involving members of the same family, the law no longer makes it a condition
precedent that earnest eDorts be made towards a compromise before the action can
prosper. Article 151 of the Family Code applies to cover when the suit is exclusively
between or among family members. Petitioner makes much of the fact that the
present case involves a husband and his wife while Magbaleta is a case between
brothers. However, the Court Bnds no speciBc, unique, or special circumstance that
would make the ruling in Magbaleta inapplicable to suits involving a husband and his
wife, as in the present case. In the Brst place, Article 151 of the Family Code and
Article 222 of the Civil Code are clear that the provisions therein apply to suits
involving "members of the same family" as contemplated under Article 150 of the
Family Code. Since the Court has ruled that the requirement under Article 151 of the
Family Code is applicable only in cases which are exclusively between or among
members of the same family, it necessarily follows that the same may be invoked
only by a party who is a member of that same family.
Family Home
FLORANTE F. MANACOP v. COURT OF APPEALS and E & L MERCANTILE, INC.
G.R. No. 97898. August 11, 1997, PANGANIBAN, J.
There being absolutely no proof that the subject property was judicially or
extrajudicially constituted as a family home, it follows that the laws protective
mantle cannot be availed of by Manacop.
Facts:
Jose Manacop and his wife purchased on March 10, 1972 a residential lot with
a bungalow. E & L Mercantile, Inc. Bled a complaint against petitioner and F.F.
Manacop Construction Co., Inc. before the RTC to collect indebtedness. Instead of
Bling an answer, Manacop and his company entered into a compromise agreement
which was approved by the court. A motion for execution was Bled which the lower
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court granted. Manacop and his company Bled a motion to quash the alias writs of
execution and to stop the sheriD from continuing to enforce them.
Issue:
Whether or not a Bnal and executory decision promulgated and a writ of
execution issued before the eDectivity of the Family Code can be executed on a
family home constituted under the provisions of the said Code.
Ruling:
Yes. True, under the Family Code which took eDect on August 3, 1988, the
subject property became his family home under the simpliBed process embodied in
Article 153 of said Code. However, Modequillo ruling explicitly enunciated that said
provision of the Family Code does not have retroactive eDect. In other words, prior to
August 3, 1988, the procedure mandated by the Civil Code had to be followed for a
family home to be constituted as such. There being absolutely no proof that the
subject property was judicially or extrajudicially constituted as a family home, it
follows that the laws protective mantle cannot be availed of by Manacop. Since the
debt involved herein was incurred and the assailed orders of the trial court issued
prior to August 3, 1988, Manacop cannot be shielded by the benevolent provisions of
the Family Code.
JOSE MODEQUILLO v. HON. AUGUSTO V. BREVA, ET. AL
G.R. No. 86355 May 31, 1990, GANCAYCO, J.
Article 162 simply means that all existing family residences at the time of the
e ectivity of the Family Code, are considered family homes and are prospectively
entitled to the bene$ts accorded to a family home under the Family Code. Article 162
does not state that the provisions of Chapter 2, Title V have a retroactive e ect.
Facts:
A judgment against Jose Modequillo was rendered by the CA. The said
judgment having become Bnal and executory, a writ of execution was issued. The
sheriD levied on a parcel of residential land owned by Modequillo. A motion to quash
and/or to set aside levy of execution was Bled by defendant Jose Modequillo alleging
therein that the residential land is where the family home is built since 1969 prior to
the commencement of this case and as such is exempt from execution, forced sale or
attachment under Articles 152 and 153 of the Family Code except for liabilities
mentioned in Article 155 thereof, and that the judgment debt sought to be enforced
against the family home of defendant is not one of those enumerated under Article
155 of the Family Code.
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Issue:
Whether or not the Bnal judgment of the CA in an action for damages may be
satisBed by way of execution of the subject residential property.
Ruling:
Yes. In the present case, the residential house and lot of Modequillo was not
constituted as a family home whether judicially or extrajudicially under the Civil
Code. It became a family home by operation of law only under Article 153 of the
Family Code. It is deemed constituted as a family home upon the eDectivity of the
Family Code on August 3, 1988 not August 4, one year after its publication in the
Manila Chronicle on August 4, 1987 (1988 being a leap year). Under Article 162 of the
Family Code, it is provided that "the provisions of this Chapter shall also govern
existing family residences insofar as said provisions are applicable." It does not mean
that Articles 152 and 153 of said Code have a retroactive eDect such that all existing
family residences are deemed to have been constituted as family homes at the time
of their occupation prior to the eDectivity of the Family Code and are exempt from
execution for the payment of obligations incurred before the eDectivity of the Family
Code. Thus, the family home of Modequillo is not exempt from execution of the
money judgment. The debt or liability which was the basis of the judgment arose or
was incurred at the time of the vehicular accident on March 16, 1976 and the money
judgment arising therefrom was rendered by the appellate court on January 29, 1988.
Both preceded the eDectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988. This case does
not fall under the exemptions from execution provided in the Family Code.
PERLA G. PATRICIO v. MARCELINO G. DARIO III and
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, Second Division
G.R. No. 170829, November 20, 2006, YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
Despite residing in the family home and his being a descendant of Marcelino
Dario, Marcelino Lorenzo Dario IV cannot be considered as bene$ciary contemplated
under Article 154 because he did not ful$ll the third requisite of being dependent on
his grandmother for legal support.
Facts:
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Perla Patricio and her two sons inherited from her husband several properties
including a parcel of land with a residential house. Marcelino Marc, one of her sons,
instituted an action for partition before the RTC which was granted. Upon a motion for
reconsideration Bled by Dario III on appeal, the CA dismissed the complaint for
partition Bled by Patricio and Marcelino Marc for lack of merit. It held that the family
home should continue despite the death of one or both spouses as long as there is a
minor beneBciary thereof. The heirs could not partition the property unless the court
found compelling reasons to rule otherwise. The appellate court also held that the
minor son of private respondent, who is a grandson of spouses Marcelino Dario and
Perla Patricio, was a minor beneBciary of the family home.
Issue:
Whether or not partition of the family home is proper where one of the co-
owners refuse to accede to such partition on the ground that a minor beneBciary still
resides in the said home.
Ruling:
Yes. The rule is that if there are beneBciaries who survive and are living in the
family home, it will continue for 10 years, unless at the expiration of 10 years, there
is still a minor beneBciary, in which case the family home continues until that
beneBciary becomes of age. Marcelino Lorenzo Dario IV is dependent on legal support
not from his grandmother, but from his father. Thus, despite residing in the family
home and his being a descendant of Marcelino Dario, Marcelino Lorenzo Dario IV
cannot be considered as beneBciary contemplated under Article 154 because he did
not fulBll the third requisite of being dependent on his grandmother for legal support.
It is his father whom he is dependent on legal support, and who must now establish
his own family home separate and distinct from that of his parents, being of legal
age.
Paternity and Filiation
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MARIANO ANDAL, assisted by mother Maria Dueñas as guardian ad litem,
and MARIA DUEÑAS v. EDUVIGIS MACARAIG
G.R. No. L-2474, May 30, 1951, BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.
As a rule, a child presumed to be legitimate if he was born within three
hundred (300) days following the dissolution of the marriage. This presumption can
only be rebutted by proof that it was physically impossible for the husband to have
had access to his wife during the $rst 120 days of the 300 next preceding the birth of
the child.
Facts:
Emiliano Andal became sick of tuberculosis in January 1941. Sometime
thereafter, his brother, Felix, went to live in his house to help him work his house to
help him work his farm. His sickness became worse that on or about September 10,
1942, he became so weak that he could hardly move and get up from his bed. On
September 10, 1942, Maria Duenas, his wife, eloped with Felix, and both went to live
in the house of Maria's father, until the middle of 1943. Since May, 1942, Felix and
Maria had sexual intercourse and treated each other as husband and wife. On January
1, 1943, Emiliano died without the presence of his wife, who did not even attend his
funeral. On June 17, 1943, Maria Dueñas gave birth to a boy, who was given the
name of Mariano Andal.
Issue:
Whether or not Mariano can be considered as the legitimate son of Emiliano.
Ruling:
Yes. Since the boy was born on June 17, 1943, and Emiliano Andal died on
January 1, 1943, that boy is presumed to be the legitimate son of Emiliano and his
wife, he having been born within three hundred (300) days following the dissolution
of the marriage. This presumption can only be rebutted by proof that it was physically
impossible for the husband to have had access to his wife during the Brst 120 days of
the 300 next preceding the birth of the child.
There was no evidence presented that Emiliano was absent during the initial
period of conception, specially during the period comprised between August 21, 1942
and September 10, 1942, which is included in the 120 days of the 300 next preceding
the birth of the child Mariano. On the contrary, there is enough evidence to show that
during that initial period, Emiliano and his wife were still living under the marital roof.
Even if Felix, the brother, was living in the same house, and he and the wife were
indulging in illicit intercourse since May, 1942, that does not preclude cohabitation
between Emiliano and his wife. The Court admit that Emiliano was already suDering
from tuberculosis and his condition then was so serious that he could hardly move
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and get up from bed, his feet were swollen and his voice hoarse. But experience
shows that this does not prevent carnal intercourse. There are cases where persons
suDering from this sickness can do the carnal act even in the most crucial stage
because they are more inclined to sexual intercourse. There is neither evidence to
show that Emiliano was suDering from impotency, patent, continuous and incurable,
nor was there evidence that he was imprisoned. The presumption of legitimacy under
the Civil Code in favor of the child has not, therefore, been overcome.
TEOFISTA BABIERA v. PRESENTACION B. CATOTAL
G.R. No. 138493. June 15, 2000, PANGANIBAN, J.
The present action involves the cancellation of Babiera's Birth Certi$cate, it
does not impugn her legitimacy. The speci$c attendant in the case at bar and the
totality of the evidence presented during trial, su ciently negates the presumption
of regularity in the issuance of birth certi$cate.
Facts:
Presentacion Catotal questioned the authenticity of the entry of birth of
TeoBsta Babiera. She asserted that the birth certiBcate is void ab initio, as it was
totally a simulated birth, the signature of informant forged, and contained false
entries. Catotal ask the court to declare Babiera's certiBcate of birth void and
ineDective, and to order the City Civil Registrar to cancel the same as it aDect the
hereditary rights of Catotal who inherited the estate. Babiera countered that she and
Catotal are full-blooded sisters, as showed therein her certiBcate of birth, CertiBcate
of Baptism, and her School Report Card.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not Catotal has legal capacity to Ble the special proceedings
pursuant to Art. 171.
(2) Whether or not the special proceedings is improper and barred by the
statute of limitation.
(3) Whether or not the public record of Babiera's birth is superior to the oral
testimony of Catotal.
Ruling:
(1) No. Article 171 is not applicable in this case. Article 171 of the Family Code
shows that it applies to instances which the father impugns the legitimacy of his
wife's child. The provision, however, presupposes that the child was the undisputed
child of the mother. Present case alleges and shows that the alleged mother,
Hermogena, did not give birth to Babiera. The present action does not impugn
Babiera's Bliation to Eugenio and Hermogena, be there is no blood relation to impugn
in the Brst place. The reason why Catotal took interest on Babiera's status is to
protect the former's successional rights.
(2) No. Article 170 of the FC does not apply. The provision provides a
prescriptive period for action to impugn the legitimacy of the child. The present
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action involves the cancellation of Babiera's Birth CertiBcate, it does not impugn her
legitimacy. The action to nullify the birth certiBcate does not prescribe because it was
allegedly declared void ab initio.
(3) No. The speciBc attendant in the case at bar and the totality of the
evidence presented during trial, su>ciently negates the presumption of regularity in
the issuance of birth certiBcate. First, the birth certiBcate was not signed by the local
civil registrar, and the mother's signature was diDerent from other signatures.
Second, no medical records or doctor's prescription that provide as evidence of
Hermogena's pregnancy. It was impossible for her to have given birth at 54 years of
age. Third, the disposition of Hermogena which states that she did not give birth to
TeoBsta and that the latter was not hers of Eugenio.
MARISSA BENITEZ-BADUA v. COURT OF APPEALS, ET. AL
G.R. No. 105625, January 24, 1994, PUNO, J.
Articles 164, 166, 170 and 171 of the Family Code cannot be applied in the
case at bar because said provisions do not contemplate a situation where a child is
alleged not to be the biological child of a certain couple.
Facts:
Spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian had various properties. They
both died intestate. The special proceedings for administration of the properties were
Bled with the trial court. Vicente’s sister, Victoria Lirio, Bled for issuance of letters of
administration in favor of the nephew. Marissa Badua opposed the petition, saying
that she is the sole heir of deceased Marissa and that she is capable of administering
his estate. She submitted the pieces of documentary evidence and testiBed that the
spouses treated her as their own daughter. The relatives of Vicente tried to prove
through testimonial evidence, that the spouses failed to beget a child during their
marriage. Victoria categorically declared that Marissa was not the biological child of
the spouses who were unable to physically procreate. The RTC relied on Arts. 166 and
170 of the Family Code and ruled in favor of Marissa. On appeal, the CA reversed the
lower court decision and declared Marissa Benitez-Badua is not the biological child of
the late spouses.
Issue:
Whether or not Marissa is the legitimate child and the sole heir of the late
spouses.
Ruling:
NO. Articles 164, 166, 170 and 171 of the Family Code cannot be applied in
the case at bar. The above provisions do not contemplate a situation where a child is
alleged not to be the biological child of a certain couple. In Article 166, it is the
husband who can impugn the legitimacy of the child by: (1) it was physically
impossible for him to have sexual intercourse, with his wife within the Brst 120 days
of the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the child; (2) that for
biological or other scientiBc reasons, the child could not have been his child; and (3)
that in case of children conceived through artiBcial insemination, the written
authorization or ratiBcation by either parent was obtained through mistake, fraud,
violence, intimidation or undue inMuence. Articles 170 and 171 speak of the
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prescription period within which the husband or any of his heirs should Ble an action
impugning the legitimacy of the child. In this case, it is not where the heirs of the late
Benitez are contending that Marissa is not his child or a child by Isabel, but they are
contending that Marissa was not born to Vicente and Isabel.
Marissa was not the biological child of the dead spouses. Marissa's CertiBcate
of Live Birth was repudiated by the Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate of
the late Isabel by Vicente, saying that he and his brother-in-law are the sole heirs of
the estate.
ARTEMIO G. ILANO v. THE COURT OF APPEALS and MERCEDITAS (sic) S.
ILANO, represented by her mother, LEONCIA DE LOS SANTOS
G.R. No. 104376, February 23, 1994, NOCON, J.
The possession of illegitimate status means that the father has treated the
child as his own, directly and not through other, spontaneously and without
concealment though without publicity.
Facts:
While Leoncia De Los Santos and Artemio Ilano were living together,
Merceditas Ilano was born. Her birth was recorded as Merceditas de los Santos Ilano,
child of Leoncia Aguinaldo de los Santos and Artemio Geluz Ilano. During the time
that Artemio and Leoncia were living as husband and wife, he showed concern as the
father of Merceditas. When Merceditas was in Grade I at the St. Joseph Parochial
School, he signed her Report Card for the fourth and Bfth grading periods as her
parent. Those signatures were both identiBed by Leoncia and Merceditas because he
signed them in their residence in their presence and of Elynia. Since Merceditas
started to have discernment, he was already the one whom she recognized as her
Daddy. He treated her as a father would to his child. He would bring home candies,
toys, and anything a child enjoys. He would take her for a drive, eat at restaurants,
and even cuddle her to sleep.
Issue:
Whether or not Merceditas is a duly acknowledged and recognized illegitimate
child.
Ruling:
Yes. Since Artemio had a subsisting marriage to another at the time
Merceditas was conceived, she is a spurious child. The possession of illegitimate
status means that the father has treated the child as his own, directly and not
through other, spontaneously and without concealment though without publicity.
There must be a showing of the permanent intention of the supposed father to
consider the child as his own, by continuous and clear manifestation of paternal
aDection and care.
The mere denial by Artemio of his signature is not su>cient to oDset the
totality of the evidence indubitably showing that the signature thereon belongs to
him. The entry in the CertiBcate of Live Birth that Leoncia and Artemio was falsely
stated therein as married does not mean that Merceditas is not appellee's daughter.
This particular entry was caused to be made by Artemio himself in order to avoid
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embarrassment. It is di>cult to believe that plaintiDs mother, who is a mere
dressmaker, had long beforehand diabolically conceived of a plan to make it appear
that defendant, who claims to be a total stranger to be a total stranger, was the
father of her child, and in the process falsiBed the latter's signatures and handwriting.
The natural, logical and coherent evidence of plaintiD from the genesis of the
relationship between Leoncia and Artemio, their living together as circumstances of
Merceditas birth, the acts of Artemio in recognizing and supporting Merceditas, Bnd
ample support from the testimonial and documentary evidence which leaves no room
to reasonably doubt his paternity which may not be inBrmed by his belated denials.
JANICE MARIE JAO v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and PERICO V.
JAO
G.R. No. L-49162, July 28, 1987, PADILLA, J.
There is now almost universal scienti$c agreement that blood grouping tests
are conclusive as to non-paternity, although inconclusive as to paternity.
Facts:
Arlene Salgado, Janice Marie's mother, Bled a case for recognition and support
against Perico Jao. Perico denied the paternity so they agreed to a blood grouping
test which was in due course conducted by the NBI. The test came out indicating that
Janice could not have been the possible oDspring of Perico and Arlene. Upon
Salgado's motion for reconsideration, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court
declared the child the oDspring of Jao. Jao appealed to the CA, arguing that the blood
grouping test could have been conclusive and disputable evidence of his non-
paternity, because there was no showing of irregularity or mistake in the conduct of
the tests. CA upheld Perico's contention and reversed the trial court decision.
Issue:
Whether or not the result of blood grouping test is admissible and conclusive
to prove paternity.
Ruling:
Yes. As held by the Court in the case of Co Tao v. CA, the NBI expert’s report of
the blood tests stated that "from their blood groups and types, the defendant Co Tao
is a possible father of the child." From this statement the defendant contended that
the child must have been the child of another man. The Court noted: "For obvious
reasons, the NBI expert cannot give assurance that the appellant was the father of
the child; he can only give his opinion that he is a "possible father." This possibility,
coupled with the other facts and circumstances brought out during the trial, tends to
deBnitely establish that appellant is the father of the child."
Where the issue is admissibility and conclusiveness of blood grouping tests to
disprove paternity, rulings have been much more deBnite in their conclusions. For the
past three decades, the use of blood typing in cases of disputed parentage has
already become an important legal procedure. There is now almost universal
scientiBc agreement that blood grouping tests are conclusive as to non-paternity,
although inconclusive as to paternity — that is, the fact that the blood type of the
child is a possible product of the mother and alleged father does not conclusively
prove that the child is born by such parents; but, if the blood type of the child is not
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the possible blood type when the blood of the mother and that of the alleged father
are crossmatched, then the child cannot possibly be that of the alleged father. Thus,
the Court holds that the result of the blood grouping tests involved in the case at bar,
are admissible and conclusive on the non-paternity of respondent Jao vis-a-vis
petitioner Janice. No evidence has been presented showing any defect in the testing
methods employed or failure to provide adequate safeguards for the proper conduct
of the tests. The result of such tests is to be accepted therefore as accurately
reMecting a scientiBc fact.
ARNEL L. AGUSTIN v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND MINOR MARTIN JOSE
PROLLAMANTE, REPRESENTED BY HIS MOTHER/GUARDIAN FE ANGELA
PROLLAMANTE
G.R. No. 162571, June 15, 2005, CORONA, J.
DNA testing is a valid means of determining paternity. In Ra erty v. Perkins,
the Supreme Court of Mississippi ruled that DNA test results showing paternity were
su cient to overthrow the presumption of legitimacy of a child born during the
course of a marriage.
Facts:
Respondents Fe Angela and her son Martin Prollamante sued Martin’s alleged
biological father, petitioner Arnel L. Agustin, for support and support pendente
lite before the RTC. In their complaint, respondents alleged that Arnel courted Fe,
after which they entered into an intimate relationship and impregnated Fe. Arnel,
however, denied having sired Martin. Fe and Martin, as a result moved for the
issuance of an order directing all the parties to submit themselves to DNA paternity
testing.
Issues:
Whether or not DNA testing is a valid means to prove paternity.
Ruling:
Yes. For too long, illegitimate children have been marginalized by fathers who
choose to deny their existence. The growing sophistication of DNA testing technology
Bnally provides a much needed equalizer for such ostracized and abandoned
progeny. The Court has long believed in the merits of DNA testing and have
repeatedly expressed as much in the past. This case comes at a perfect time when
DNA testing has Bnally evolved into a dependable and authoritative form of evidence
gathering. The Court therefore reiterated that DNA testing is a valid means of
determining paternity.
The case of Wilson v. Lumb shows that DNA testing is so commonly accepted
that, in some instances, ordering the procedure has become a ministerial act. The
Supreme Court of St. Lawrence County, New York pointed out that a determination of
paternity made by any other state, whether established through the parents
acknowledgment of paternity or through an administrative or judicial process, must
be accorded full faith and credit, if and only if such acknowledgment meets the
requirements set forth in section 452(a)(7) of the social security act.
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In Ra erty v. Perkins, the Supreme Court of Mississippi ruled that DNA test
results showing paternity were su>cient to overthrow the presumption of legitimacy
of a child born during the course of a marriage: The presumption of legitimacy having
been rebutted by the results of the blood test eliminating Perkins as Justin's father,
even considering the evidence in the light most favorable to Perkins, we Bnd that no
reasonable jury could Bnd that Easter is not Justin's father based upon the 99.94%
probability of paternity concluded by the DNA testing.
JOEY D. BRIONES v. MARICEL P. MIGUEL, FRANCISCA P. MIGUEL and LORETA
P. MIGUEL, G.R. No. 156343. October 18, 2004, PANGANIBAN, J.
An illegitimate child is under the sole parental authority of the mother. In the
exercise of that authority, she is entitled to keep the child in her company. The Court
will not deprive her of custody, absent any imperative cause showing her un$tness to
exercise such authority and care.
Facts:
Petitioner Joey D. Briones alleged that the minor Michael Kevin Pineda is his
illegitimate son with respondent Loreta P. Miguel and that he wanted to obtain
custody of his minor child. Respondent Miguel, however, prayed that the custody of
her minor child be given to her by reason of the minor’s illegitimacy.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner, as the natural father, may be denied the custody
and parental care of his own child.
Ruling:
Yes. Having been born outside a valid marriage, the minor is deemed an
illegitimate child of petitioner and Respondent Loreta. Article 176 of the Family Code
of the Philippines explicitly provides that illegitimate children shall use the surname
and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to
support in conformity with this Code. This is the rule regardless of whether the father
admits paternity.
The Bne distinctions among the various types of illegitimate children have
been eliminated in the Family Code. Now, there are only two classes of children --
legitimate (and those who, like the legally adopted, have the rights of legitimate
children) and illegitimate. All children conceived and born outside a valid marriage
are illegitimate, unless the law itself gives them legitimate status. Under Article 176
of the Family Code, all illegitimate children are generally placed under one category,
without any distinction between natural and spurious. The concept of natural child is
important only for purposes of legitimation. Without the subsequent marriage, a
natural child remains an illegitimate child.
Obviously, Michael is a natural (illegitimate, under the Family Code) child, as
there is nothing in the records showing that his parents were suDering from a legal
impediment to marry at the time of his birth. Both acknowledge that Michael is their
son. As earlier explained and pursuant to Article 176, parental authority over him
resides in his mother, Respondent Loreta, notwithstanding his father’s recognition of
him.
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CAMELO CABATANIA v. COURT OF APPEALS and CAMELO
REGODOS, respondents. [G.R. No. 124814. October 21, 2004, CORONA, J.
A high standard of proof is required to establish paternity and $liation. A
certi$cate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent
evidence of paternity when there is no showing that the putative father had a hand
in the preparation of said certi$cate.
Facts:
Florencia Regodos Bled a petition in behalf of her minor son for recognition
and support from petitioner Camelo Cabatania. Cabatania, however, denied the
alleged paternity and insisted that Florencia was already pregnant when they had
sex. The RTC gave more probative weight to the testimony of Florencia despite its
discovery that she misrepresented herself as a widow when, in reality, her husband
was alive.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner should be compelled to acknowledge private
respondent Camelo Regodos as his illegitimate son and to give support to the latter.
Ruling:
No. Time and again, this Court has ruled that a high standard of proof is
required to establish paternity and Bliation. An order for recognition and support may
create an unwholesome situation or may be an irritant to the family or the lives of the
parties so that it must be issued only if paternity or Bliation is established by clear
and convincing evidence.
The applicable provisions of the law are Articles 172 and 175 of the Civil Code.
Private respondent presented a copy of his birth and baptismal certiBcates, the
preparation of which was without the knowledge or consent of petitioner. A certiBcate
of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent evidence of
paternity when there is no showing that the putative father had a hand in the
preparation of said certiBcate. In the same vein, the Court ruled that, while a
baptismal certiBcate may be considered a public document, it can only serve as
evidence of the administration of the sacrament on the date speciBed but not the
veracity of the entries with respect to the child’s paternity. Thus, certiBcates issued
by the local civil registrar and baptismal certiBcates are per se inadmissible in
evidence as proof of Bliation and they cannot be admitted indirectly as circumstantial
evidence to prove the same.
The fact that Florencias husband is living and there is a valid subsisting
marriage between them gives rise to the presumption that a child born within that
marriage is legitimate even though the mother may have declared against its
legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. The presumption of
legitimacy does not only Mow out of a declaration in the statute but is based on the
broad principles of natural justice and the supposed virtue of the mother. The
presumption is grounded on the policy to protect innocent oDspring from the odium
of illegitimacy.
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GERARDO B. CONCEPCION, v. COURT OF APPEALS and MA. THERESA
ALMONTE, G.R. No. 123450, August 31, 2005, CORONA, J.
The child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have
declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.
Facts:
Gerardo Concepcion Bled a petition to have his marriage to Ma. Theresa
Almonte annulled on the ground of bigamy. He alleged that nine years before he
married Ma. Theresa, she had married one Mario Gopiao, which marriage was never
annulled. The RTC annulled Ma. Theresa’s marriage to Gerardo for being bigamous
and as a result declared Jose Gerardo as an illegitimate child. The custody of the child
was awarded to Ma. Theresa while Gerardo was granted visitation rights. Ma.
Theresa argued that there was nothing in the law granting visitation rights in favor of
the putative father of an illegitimate child. She further maintained that Jose Gerardo’s
surname should be changed from Concepcion to Almonte, her maiden name,
following the rule that an illegitimate child shall use the mother’s surname. When
brought to the appellate court, it held that Jose Gerardo was not the son of Ma.
Theresa by Gerardo but by Mario during her Brst marriage.
Issue:
Whether or not Jose Gerardo was the son of Mario during Ma. Theresa’s Brst
marriage.
Ruling:
Yes. Article 164 of the Family Code is clear. A child who is conceived or born
during the marriage of his parents is legitimate. As a guaranty in favor of the child
and to protect his status of legitimacy, Article 167 of the Family Code provides:
Article 167. The child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have
declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.
The law requires that every reasonable presumption be made in favor of
legitimacy. The presumption of legitimacy does not only Mow out of a declaration in
the statute but is based on the broad principles of natural justice and the supposed
virtue of the mother. It is grounded on the policy to protect the innocent oDspring
from the odium of illegitimacy. Impugning the legitimacy of a child is a strictly
personal right of the husband or, in exceptional cases, his heirs. Since the marriage
of Gerardo and Ma. Theresa was void from the very beginning; he never became her
husband and thus never acquired any right to impugn the legitimacy of her child.
Sexual union between spouses is assumed. Evidence su>cient to defeat the
assumption should be presented by him who asserts the contrary. There is no such
evidence here. Thus, the presumption of legitimacy in favor of Jose Gerardo, as the
issue of the marriage between Ma. Theresa and Mario, stands. As a legitimate child,
Jose Gerardo shall have the right to bear the surnames of his father Mario and mother
Ma. Theresa, in conformity with the provisions of the Civil Code on surnames. A
persons surname or family name identiBes the family to which he belongs and is
passed on from parent to child. Hence, Gerardo cannot impose his surname on Jose
Gerardo who is, in the eyes of the law, not related to him in any way.
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JINKIE CHRISTIE A. DE JESUS and JACQUELINE A. DE JESUS, represented by
their mother, CAROLINA A. DE JESUS v. THE ESTATE OF DECEDENT JUAN
GAMBOA DIZON, ANGELINA V. DIZON, CARLOS DIZON, FELIPE DIZON, JUAN
DIZON, JR. and MARYLIN DIZON and FORMS MEDIA CORP., QUAD
MANAGEMENT CORP., FILIPINAS PAPER SALES CO., INC. and AMITY
CONSTRUCTION & INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISES, INC.
G.R. No. 142877, October 2, 2001, VITUG, J.
There is perhaps no presumption of the law more $rmly established and
founded on sounder morality and more convincing reason than the presumption that
children born in wedlock are legitimate.
Facts:
Danilo de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus got married and it was during this
marriage that Jacqueline de Jesus and Jinkie Christie de Jesus, herein petitioners, were
born. In a notarized document, a certain Juan G. Dizon acknowledged Jacqueline and
Jinkie de Jesus as being his own illegitimate children by Carolina Aves de Jesus. When
Juan G. Dizon died intestate, petitioners Bled a complaint for Partition with Inventory
and Accounting of the Dizon estate with the RTC. Respondents sought the dismissal
of the case, arguing that the complaint would call for altering the status of petitioners
from being the legitimate children of the spouses Danilo de Jesus and Carolina de
Jesus to instead be the illegitimate children of Carolina de Jesus and deceased Juan
Dizon.
Issue:
Whether or not Jacqueline and Jinkie de Jesus is Juan G. Dizon’s own
illegitimate children.
Ruling:
No. A scrutiny of the records would show that petitioners were born during the
marriage of their parents. The certiBcates of live birth would also identify Danilo de
Jesus as being their father. There is perhaps no presumption of the law more Brmly
established and founded on sounder morality and more convincing reason than the
presumption that children born in wedlock are legitimate. This presumption indeed
becomes conclusive in the absence of proof that there is physical impossibility of
access between the spouses during the Brst 120 days of the 300 days which
immediately precedes the birth of the child due to (a) the physical incapacity of the
husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife; (b) the fact that the husband and
wife are living separately in such a way that sexual intercourse is not possible; or (c)
serious illness of the husband, which absolutely prevents sexual intercourse. Quite
remarkably, upon the expiration of the periods set forth in Article 170, and in proper
cases Article 171, of the Family Code (which took eDect on 03 August 1988), the
action to impugn the legitimacy of a child would no longer be legally feasible and the
status conferred by the presumption becomes Bxed and unassailable.
The presumption of legitimacy Bxes a civil status for the child born in wedlock,
and only the father, or in exceptional instances the latters heirs, can contest in an
appropriate action the legitimacy of a child born to his wife. Thus, it is only when the
legitimacy of a child has been successfully impugned that the paternity of the
husband can be rejected.
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MARIA ROSARIO DE SANTOS, v. HON. ADORACION G. ANGELES, JUDGE,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF CALOOCAN CITY, BRANCH 121 and CONCHITA
TALAG DE SANTOS
G.R. No. 105619, December 12, 1995, ROMERO, J.
Although natural children can be legitimized, and natural children by legal
$ction enjoy the rights of acknowledged natural children, this does not necessarily
lead to the conclusion that natural children by legal $ction can likewise be
legitimized.
Facts:
Dr. Antonio de Santos married SoBa Bona, which union was blessed with a
daughter, herein petitioner Maria Rosario de Santos. After some time, Antonio fell in
love and married Conchita Talag de Santos, herein private respondent in another
country. This union produced eleven children. Less than a month later, after the
death of Sophia, Antonio and private respondent contracted another marriage
celebrated under Philippine laws.
After the death of Antonio, private respondent went to court asking for the
issuance of letters of administration in her favor in connection with the settlement of
her late husband's estate. After six years, petitioner Santos decided to intervene. She
argued that private respondent's children were illegitimate. The RTC declared private
respondent's ten children legitimated and thereupon instituted and declared them,
along with petitioner and private respondent, as the heirs of Antonio de Santos.
Petitioner sought reconsideration but this was denied. Hence, she Bled the instant
petition contending that since only natural children can be legitimized, the trial court
mistakenly declared as legitimated her half brothers and sisters.
Issue:
Whether or not natural children by legal Bction can be legitimized.
Ruling:
No. Article 269 itself clearly limits the privilege of legitimation to natural
children as deBned thereunder. There was, therefore, from the outset, an intent to
exclude children conceived or born out of illicit relations from the purview of the law.
Another point to be considered is that although natural children can be
legitimized, and natural children by legal Bction enjoy the rights of acknowledged
natural children, this does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that natural children
by legal Bction can likewise be legitimized. As has been pointed out, much more is
involved here than the mere privilege to be legitimized. The rights of other children,
like the petitioner in the case at bench, may be adversely aDected as her
testamentary share may well be reduced in the event that her ten surviving half
siblings should be placed on par with her, when each of them is rightfully entitled to
only half of her share.
Finally, attention must be drawn to the fact that this case has been decided
under the provisions of the Civil Code, not the Family Code which now recognizes
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only two classes of children: legitimate and illegitimate. "Natural children by legal
Bction" are nothing if not pure Bction.
JOHN PAUL E. FERNANDEZ, ET AL. v. THE COURT OF APPEALS and CARLITO
S. FERNANDEZ, G.R. No. 108366, February 16, 1994 PUNO, J.
While baptismal certi$cates may be considered public documents, they can
only serve as evidence of the administration of the sacraments on the dates so
speci$ed. They are not necessarily competent evidence of the veracity of entries
therein with respect to the child's paternity.
Facts:
Petitioners Bled an action for recognition and support against private
respondent Carlito. Violeta, the mother of the two petitioners pointed Carlito as the
father of her two sons. She averred they were married in civil rites and discovered
that the marriage license which they used was spurious. To bolster their case,
petitioners presented the following documentary evidence: their certiBcates of live
birth, identifying respondent Carlito as their father; the baptismal certiBcate of
petitioner Claro which also states that his father is respondent Carlito; photographs of
Carlito taken during the baptism of petitioner Claro; and pictures of respondent
Carlito and Claro taken at the home of Violeta Esguerra. Respondent Carlito,
however, denied Violeta's allegations that he sired the two petitioners. Based on the
evidence adduced by the parties, the trial court ruled in favor of petitioners. On
appeal, the CA found that the "proof relied upon by the RTC is inadequate to prove
the private respondent's paternity and Bliation of petitioners."
Issue:
Whether or not proof relied upon by the RTC is inadequate to prove the private
respondent's paternity and Bliation of petitioners.
Ruling:
Yes. Firstly, petitioners cannot rely on the photographs showing the presence
of the private respondent in the baptism of petitioner Claro. These photographs are
far from proofs that private respondent is the father of petitioner Claro. As explained
by the private respondent, he was in the baptism as one of the sponsors of petitioner
Claro. His testimony was corroborated by Rodante Pagtakhan.
Secondly, the pictures taken in the house of Violeta showing private
respondent showering aDection to Claro fall short of the evidence required to prove
paternity.
Thirdly, the baptismal certiBcates of petitioner Claro naming private
respondent as his father has scant evidentiary value. There is no showing that private
respondent participated in its preparation. In Macandang vs. Court of Appeals, 100
SCRA 73 (1980), we ruled that while baptismal certiBcates may be considered public
documents, they can only serve as evidence of the administration of the sacraments
on the dates so speciBed. They are not necessarily competent evidence of the
veracity of entries therein with respect to the child's paternity.
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Fourth, the certiBcates of live of the petitioners identifying private respondent
as their father are not also competent evidence on the issue of their paternity. Again,
the records do no show that private respondent had a hand in the preparation of said
certiBcates.
GRACE M. GRANDE v. PATRICIO T. ANTONIO
G.R. No. 206248, February 18, 2014, VELASCO, JR., J.
Art. 176 gives illegitimate children the right to decide if they want to use the
surname of their father or not. It is not the father (herein respondent) or the mother
(herein petitioner) who is granted by law the right to dictate the surname of their
illegitimate children.
Facts:
Petitioner Grace Grande and respondent Patricio Antonio for a period of time
lived together as husband and wife, although Antonio was at that time already
married to someone else. Out of this illicit relationship, two sons were born. The
children were not expressly recognized by respondent as his own in the Record of
Births of the children in the Civil Registry. Respondent soon Bled a petition for judicial
approval of recognition of the Bliation of the two children with Prayer to take Parental
Authority, Parental Physical Custody, and Correction/Change of Surname of Minors
before the RTC. Petitioner on the other hand, speculated that Article 176 of the Family
Code as amended by Republic Act No. (RA) 9255, may not be invoked by a father to
compel the use by his illegitimate children of his surname without the consent of
their mother.
Issue:
Whether or not the father has a right to compel the use of his surname by his
illegitimate children upon his recognition of their Bliation.
Ruling:
No. Central to the core issue is the application of Art. 176 of the Family Code.
It is clear that the general rule is that an illegitimate child shall use the surname of
his or her mother. The exception provided by RA 9255 is, in case his or her Bliation is
expressly recognized by the father through the record of birth appearing in the civil
register or when an admission in a public document or private handwritten
instrument is made by the father. In such a situation, the illegitimate child may use
the surname of the father.
Parental authority over minor children is lodged by Art. 176 on the mother;
hence, respondent’s prayer has no legal mooring. Since parental authority is given to
the mother, then custody over the minor children also goes to the mother, unless she
is shown to be unBt. Art. 176 gives illegitimate children the right to decide if they
want to use the surname of their father or not. It is not the father (herein respondent)
or the mother (herein petitioner) who is granted by law the right to dictate the
surname of their illegitimate children.
On its face, Art. 176, as amended, is free from ambiguity. And where there is
no ambiguity, one must abide by its words. The use of the word "may" in the
provision readily shows that an acknowledged illegitimate child is under no
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compulsion to use the surname of his illegitimate father. The word "may" is
permissive and operates to confer discretion upon the illegitimate children.
IN RE: PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME AND/OR
CORRECTION/CANCELLATION OF ENTRY IN CIVIL REGISTRY OF JULIAN LIN
CARULASAN WANG also known as JULIAN LIN WANG, to be
amended/corrected as JULIAN LIN WANG,
JULIAN LIN WANG, duly represented by his mother ANNA LISA WANG v.
CEBU CITY CIVIL REGISTRAR, duly represented by the Registrar OSCAR B.
MOLO
G.R. No. 159966, March 30, 2005, TINGA, J.
Middle names serve to identify the maternal lineage or $liation of a person as
well as further distinguish him from others who may have the same given name and
surname as he has.
Facts:
Julian Lin Carulasan Wang was born in Cebu City to parents Anna Lisa Wang
and Sing-Foe Wang who were then not yet married to each other. When his parents
subsequently got married, they executed a deed of legitimation of their son so that
the child’s name was changed from Julian Lin Carulasan to Julian Lin Carulasan Wang.
Petitioner, however sought to drop his middle name and have his registered
name changed from Julian Lin Carulasan Wang to Julian Lin Wang because he may be
discriminated against in Singapore. The RTC ruled that under Article 174 of the Family
Code, legitimate children have the right to bear the surnames of the father and the
mother, and there is no reason why this right should now be taken from petitioner
Julian, considering that he is still a minor. The trial court added that when petitioner
Julian reaches the age of majority, he could then decide whether he will change his
name by dropping his middle name.
Issue:
Whether or not the law allows one to drop the middle name from his
registered name.
Ruling:
No. Middle names serve to identify the maternal lineage or Bliation of a person
as well as further distinguish him from others who may have the same given name
and surname as he has. Our laws on the use of surnames state that legitimate and
legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the father. The Family Code
gives legitimate children the right to bear the surnames of the father and the
mother, while illegitimate children shall use the surname of their mother, unless their
father recognizes their Bliation, in which case they may bear the fathers surname.
Accordingly, the registration in the civil registry of the birth of such individuals
requires that the middle name be indicated in the certiBcate. The registered name of
a legitimate, legitimated and recognized illegitimate child thus contains a given or
proper name, a middle name, and a surname.
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In the case at bar, the only reason advanced by petitioner for the dropping his
middle name is convenience. However, how such change of name would make his
integration into Singaporean society easier and convenient is not clearly established.
That the continued use of his middle name would cause confusion and di>culty does
not constitute proper and reasonable cause to drop it from his registered complete
name.
WILLIAM LIYAO, JR. v. JUANITA TANHOTI-LIYAO, PEARL MARGARET L. TAN,
TITA ROSE L. TAN AND LINDA CHRISTINA LIYAO
G.R. No. 138961, March 7, 2002, DE LEON, JR., J.
It is settled that the legitimacy of the child can be impugned only in a direct
action brought for that purpose, by the proper parties and within the period limited
by law.
Facts:
William Liyao, Jr., represented by his mother Corazon, Bled an action for
compulsory recognition as the illegitimate (spurious) child of the late William Liyao
against herein respondents before the RTC. Petitioner Liyao, jr. insisted that his
mother, Corazon, had been living separately for ten (10) years from her husband,
Ramon Yulo, at the time that she cohabited with the late William Liyao and it was
physically impossible for her to have sexual relations with Ramon Yulo when
petitioner was conceived and born.
Respondents, on the other hand, stated that their parents, William Liyao and
Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao, were legally married and that Corazon Garcia is still married to
Ramon Yulo and was not legally separated from her husband.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner may impugn his own legitimacy to be able to claim
from the estate of his supposed father, William Liyao.
Ruling:
No. Impugning the legitimacy of the child is a strictly personal right of the
husband, or in exceptional cases, his heirs for the simple reason that he is the one
directly confronted with the scandal and ridicule which the inBdelity of his wife
produces and he should be the one to decide whether to conceal that inBdelity or
expose it in view of the moral and economic interest involved. It is only in exceptional
cases that his heirs are allowed to contest such legitimacy. Outside of these cases,
none - even his heirs - can impugn legitimacy; that would amount o an insult to his
memory.
It is therefor clear that the present petition initiated by Corazon G. Garcia as
guardian ad litem of the then minor, herein petitioner, to compel recognition by
respondents of petitioner William Liyao, Jr, as the illegitimate son of the late William
Liyao cannot prosper. It is settled that a child born within a valid marriage is
presumed legitimate even though the mother may have declared against its
legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. We cannot allow petitioner
to maintain his present petition and subvert the clear mandate of the law that only
the husband, or in exceptional circumstances, his heirs, could impugn the legitimacy
135 | P a g e
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of a child born in a valid and subsisting marriage. The child himself cannot choose his
own Bliation.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. TRINIDAD R.A. CAPOTE
G.R. No. 157043, February 2, 2007, CORONA, J.
Illegitimate child whose $liation is not recognized by the father bears only a
given name and his mother’ surname, and does not have a middle name. The name
of the unrecognized illegitimate child therefore identi$es him as such.
Facts:
Respondent Trinidad Capote Bled a petition for change of name of her ward
from Giovanni N. Gallamaso to Giovanni Nadores. Respondent Capote claimed that
Giovanni Gallamaso is the illegitimate natural child of Corazon P. Nadores and
Diosdado Gallamaso and was born prior to the eDectivity of the New Family Code and
as such, his mother used the surname of the natural father despite the absence of
marriage between them. The father, Diosdado Gallamaso, from the time Giovanni
was born and up to the present, failed to take up his responsibilities to him on
matters of Bnancial, physical, emotional and spiritual concerns. Giovanni is now fully
aware of how he stands with his father and he desires to have his surname changed
to that of his mother’s surname.
Issue:
Whether or not the minor Giovanni is entitled to have his surname changed to
that of his mother’s surname.
Ruling:
Yes. An illegitimate child whose Bliation is not recognized by the father bears
only a given name and his mother’ surname, and does not have a middle name. The
name of the unrecognized illegitimate child therefore identiBes him as such. It is only
when the illegitimate child is legitimated by the subsequent marriage of his parents
or acknowledged by the father in a public document or private handwritten
instrument that he bears both his mother’s surname as his middle name and his
father’s surname as his surname, reMecting his status as a legitimated child or an
acknowledged child.
The law and facts obtaining here favor Giovanni’s petition. Giovanni availed of
the proper remedy, a petition for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of
Court, and complied with all the procedural requirements. After hearing, the trial
court found (and the appellate court a>rmed) that the evidence presented during the
hearing of Giovanni’s petition su>ciently established that, under Art. 176 of the Civil
Code, Giovanni is entitled to change his name as he was never recognized by his
father while his mother has always recognized him as her child. A change of name
will erase the impression that he was ever recognized by his father. It is also to his
best interest as it will facilitate his mother’s intended petition to have him join her in
the United States. This Court will not stand in the way of the reuniBcation of mother
and son.
NARCISO SALAS v. ANNABELLE MATUSALEM
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Persons and Family Relations Law
G.R. No. 180284, September 11, 2013, VILLARAMA, JR., J.
A certi$cate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not
competent evidence of paternity when there is no showing that the putative father
had a hand in the preparation of the certi$cate.
Facts:
Respondent Annabelle Matusalem Bled a complaint for Support/Damages
against petitioner Narciso Salas. Respondent Matusalem claimed that petitioner is the
father of her son. Petitioner Salas, however, denied paternity of the child Christian
Paulo. The RTC rendered its decision in favor of respondent. On appeal, the CA
a>rmed the trial court’s ruling that respondent satisfactorily established the
illegitimate Bliation of her son Christian Paulo. Respondent presented the CertiBcate
of Live Birth of Christian Paulo Salas in which the name of petitioner appears as his
father but which is not signed by him.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial and appellate courts erred in ruling that respondent’s
evidence su>ciently proved that her son Christian Paulo is the illegitimate child of
petitioner.
Ruling:
Yes. A certiBcate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not
competent evidence of paternity when there is no showing that the putative father
had a hand in the preparation of the certiBcate. Thus, if the father did not sign in the
birth certiBcate, the placing of his name by the mother, doctor, registrar, or other
person is incompetent evidence of paternity. Neither can such birth certiBcate be
taken as a recognition in a public instrument and it has no probative value to
establish Bliation to the alleged father.
As to the Baptismal CertiBcate of Christian Paulo Salas also indicating
petitioner as the father, we have ruled that while baptismal certiBcates may be
considered public documents, they can only serve as evidence of the administration
of the sacraments on the dates so speciBed. They are not necessarily competent
evidence of the veracity of entries therein with respect to the child’s paternity.
Pictures taken of the mother and her child together with the alleged father are
inconclusive evidence to prove paternity. As to the handwritten notes of petitioner
and respondent showing their exchange of aDectionate words and romantic trysts,
these, too, are not su>cient to establish Christian Paulo’s Bliation to petitioner as
they were not signed by petitioner and contained no statement of admission by
petitioner that he is the father of said child. Thus, even if these notes were authentic,
they do not qualify under Article 172 (2) vis-à- vis Article 175 of the Family Code
which admits as competent evidence of illegitimate Bliation an admission of Bliation
in a private handwritten instrument signed by the parent concerned.
MAURICIO SAYSON, ROSARIO SAYSON-MALONDA, BASILISA SAYSON-LIRIO,
REMEDIOS SAYSON-REYES and JUANA C. BAUTISTA v. THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS, DELIA SAYSON, assisted by her husband, CIRILO CEDO,
JR., EDMUNDO SAYSON AND DORIBEL SAYSON
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Persons and Family Relations Law
G.R. Nos. 89224-25, January 23, 1992, CRUZ, J.
Doribel's birth certi$cate is a formidable piece of evidence. It is one of the
prescribed means of recognition under Article 265 of the Civil Code and Article 172 of
the Family Code.
Facts:
When spouses Teodoro and Isabel Bautista died, their properties were left in
the possession of Private respondents Delia, Edmundo, and Doribel, all surnamed
Sayson, who claimed to be their children. Petitioners, however, Bled a complaint for
partition and accounting of the intestate estate of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson. The
petitioners, in addition, argued that Doribel is not the legitimate daughter of Teodoro
and Isabel but was in fact born to one Edita Abila, who manifested in a petition for
guardianship of the child that she was her natural mother. The action was resisted by
private respondents.
Issue:
Whether or not Doribel is the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and Isabel.
Ruling:
Yes. Doribel's birth certiBcate is a formidable piece of evidence. It is one of the
prescribed means of recognition under Article 265 of the Civil Code and Article 172 of
the Family Code. It is true, as the petitioners stress, that the birth certiBcate oDers
only prima facie evidence of Bliation and may be refuted by contrary evidence.
However, such evidence is lacking in the case at bar.
Mauricio's testimony that he was present when Doribel was born to Edita Abila
was understandbly suspect, coming as it did from an interested party. The a>davit of
Abila denying her earlier statement in the petition for the guardianship of Doribel is
of course hearsay, let alone the fact that it was never oDered in evidence in the lower
courts. Even without it, however, the birth certiBcate must be upheld in line
with Legaspi v. Court of Appeals, where we ruled that "the evidentiary nature of
public documents must be sustained in the absence of strong, complete and
conclusive proof of its falsity or nullity."
Another reason why the petitioners' challenge must fail is the impropriety of
the present proceedings for that purpose. Doribel's legitimacy cannot be questioned
in a complaint for partition and accounting but in a direct action seasonably Bled by
the proper party.
CORITO OCAMPO TAYAG v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and EMILIE DAYRIT
CUYUGAN
G.R. No. 95229, June 9, 1992, REGALADO, J.
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Article 285 of the Civil Code provides that the action for the recognition of
natural children may be brought only during the lifetime of the presumed parents,
except in the following cases: (1) If the father or mother died during the minority of
the child, in which case the latter may $le the action before the expiration of four
years from the attainment of his majority.
Facts:
Private respondent Emilie Cuyugan, in her capacity as mother and legal
guardian of minor Chad D. Cuyugan Bled a complaint denominated "Claim for
Inheritance" against herein petitioner, the administrator of the estate of the late Atty.
Ricardo Ocampo. Petitioner submitted that Article 175 of the Family Code applies in
which case the complaint should have been Bled during the lifetime of the putative
father, failing which the same must be dismissed on the ground of prescription.
Private respondent, however, insisted that Article 285 of the Civil Code is controlling
and, since the alleged parent died during the minority of the child, the action for
Bliation may be Bled within four years from the attainment of majority of the minor
child.
Issue:
Whether or not Article 285 of the Civil Code applies in this case.
Ruling:
Yes. Article 285 of the Civil Code provides that the action for the recognition of
natural children may be brought only during the lifetime of the presumed parents,
except in the following cases: (1) If the father or mother died during the minority of
the child, in which case the latter may Ble the action before the expiration of four
years from the attainment of his majority.
Accordingly, Article 175 of the Family Code Bnds no proper application to the
instant case since it will ineluctably aDect adversely a right of private respondent
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and, consequentially, of the mind child she represents, both of which have been
vested with the Bling of the complaint in court. The trial court is therefore, correct in
applying the provisions of Article 285 of the Civil Code and in holding that private
respondent's cause of action has not yet prescribed.
Adoption
HERBERT CANG v. COURT OF APPEALS and Spouses RONALD V. CLAVANO
and
MARIA CLARA CLAVANO
G.R. No. 105308, September 25, 1998, ROMERO, J.
In cases where the father opposes the adoption primarily because his consent
thereto was not sought, the matter of whether he had abandoned his child becomes
a proper issue for determination.
Facts:
Keith, Charmaine, and Joseph Anthony are the natural children of Herbert
Cang and Anna Marie Clavano. Later due to the extramarital aDairs of Herbert, Anna
Bled a petition for legal separation which was granted. The decree of legal
separation conferred Anna the custody of the children. Meanwhile, Ronald V. Clavano
and Maria Clara Diago Clavano, respectively the brother and sister-in-law of Anna
Marie, Bled a petition for adoption the three children before the Branch 14 of RTC
Cebu City. This petition was accompanied by an a>davit of consent executed by
Anna. The a>davit further alleged that Herbert had long forfeited his parental rights
over their children.
Herbert, upon knowing the institution of such petition for adoption, went home
to the Philippines and interposed his opposition to the adoption claiming that the
petition was defective since it lacks his consent. He also moved for the reacquisition
of his custody over his children and the same was later granted by Branch 19 of RTC
Cebu City. Later, the RTC Branch 14, issued a decree granting the petition for
adoption and in doing so, the RTC ruled that Herbert has abandoned his children and
such abandonment is a ground for dispensing with his consent to the adoption. On
appeal, the CA a>rmed the decree of adoption. Motion for reconsideration Bled by
Herbert was likewise denied. Hence this appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the petition for adoption was defective for lack of Herbert’s
consent.
Ruling:
Yes. Based on Article 188 of the Family Code, the written consent of the
natural parent to the adoption is a requisite for its validity. Nevertheless, the
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requirement of written consent can be dispensed with if the parent has abandoned
the child or that such parent is "insane or hopelessly intemperate." However, in cases
where the father opposes the adoption primarily because his consent thereto was not
sought, the matter of whether he had abandoned his child becomes a proper issue
for determination. The issue of abandonment by the oppositor natural parent is a
preliminary issue that an adoption court must Brst confront. In reference to
abandonment of a child by his parent, the act of abandonment imports "any conduct
of the parent which evinces a settled purpose to forego all parental duties and
relinquish all parental claims to the child." It means "neglect or refusal to perform the
natural and legal obligations of care and support which parents owe their children."
In the instant case, records disclose that petitioner's conduct did not manifest
a settled purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims over
his children as to, constitute abandonment. Physical estrangement alone, without
$nancial and moral desertion, is not tantamount to abandonment.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS OF
MINOR ANGELIE ANNE C. CERVANTES, NELSON L. CERVANTES and ZENAIDA
CARREON CERVANTES v. GINA CARREON FAJARDO and CONRADO FAJARDO
G.R. No. 79955, January 27, 1989, PADILLA, J. (Resolution)
A decree of adoption has the e ect, among others, of dissolving the authority
vested in natural parents over the adopted child.
Facts:
Angelie Anne Fajardo, the child of Conrado Fajardo and Gina Carreon out of
their common law marriage, was oDered for adoption to Zenaida Carreon-Cervantes
and Nelson Cervantes. A>davit of Consent to the adoption of the child was also
executed by Gina Carreon. Later, Spouses Cervantes Bled a petition for adoption
before the RTC of Rizal which granted the petition making Angelie Anne Cervantes
the child of the spouses Cervantes.
Later, the spouses Cervantes received a letter from the biological parents of
Angelie demanding a sum of money to which they never heeded. The biological
parents threatened to get back the child in case of non-payment. True to their word,
Gina Carreon took the child and brought her to her residence. Demand to return the
child were also unheeded. This prompted spouses Cervantes to Ble a petition for a
writ of Habeas Corpus before the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not Gina Carreon is entitled to the custody of the child.
Ruling:
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Persons and Family Relations Law
No. The provision that no mother shall be separated from a child under Bve (5)
years of age, will not apply where the Court Bnds compelling reasons to rule
otherwise. In all controversies regarding the custody of minors, the foremost
consideration is the moral, physical and social welfare of the child concerned, taking
into account the resources and moral as well as social standing of the contending
parents. It is undisputed that respondent Conrado Fajardo is legally married to a
woman other than respondent Gina Carreon, and his relationship with the latter is a
common-law husband and wife relationship. His open cohabitation with co-
respondent Gina Carreon will not accord the minor that desirable atmosphere where
she can grow and develop into an upright and moral-minded person.
Besides, the minor has been legally adopted by petitioners with the full
knowledge and consent of respondents. A decree of adoption has the eDect, among
others, of dissolving the authority vested in natural parents over the adopted child,
except where the adopting parent is the spouse of the natural parent of the adopted,
in which case, parental authority over the adopted shall be exercised jointly by both
spouses. The adopting parents have the right to the care and custody of the adopted
child and exercise parental authority and responsibility over him.
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA
G.R. No. 148311, March 31, 2005, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.
It is a settled rule that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, should
be liberally construed to carry out the bene$cent purposes of adoption.
Facts:
Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia is the biological child of Honorato B. Catindig
and Gemma Astorga Garcia out of wed-lock. Due to the demise of Gemma, Honorato
Bled a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child and prayed that Stephanie’s
middle name Astorga be changed to "Garcia," her mother’s surname, and that her
surname "Garcia" be changed to "Catindig," his surname. The trial court granted the
petition and pronounced Stephanie as the child of Honorato and shall be known as
Stephanie Nathy Catindig. Later, Honorato Bled a motion for clariBcation and/or
reconsideration praying that Stephanie should be allowed to use the surname of her
natural mother as her middle name. The trial court, however, denied the same
holding that there is no law or jurisprudence allowing an adopted child to use the
surname of his biological mother as his middle name. Hence, this present petition.
Issue:
Whether or not an illegitimate child may use the surname of her mother as
her middle name when she is subsequently adopted by her natural father.
Ruling:
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Persons and Family Relations Law
Yes. Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it follows that
Stephanie is entitled to all the rights provided by law to a legitimate child without
discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the surname of her father and
her mother. This is consistent with the intention of the members of the Civil Code and
Family Law Committees. Additionally, as aptly stated by both parties, Stephanie’s
continued use of her mother’s surname (Garcia) as her middle name will maintain her
maternal lineage. Furthermore, to allow Stephanie to use her mother’s surname as
her middle name will not only sustain her continued loving relationship with her
mother but will also eliminate the stigma of her illegitimacy.
Furthermore, it is a settled rule that adoption statutes, being humane and
salutary, should be liberally construed to carry out the beneBcent purposes of
adoption. The interests and welfare of the adopted child are of primary and
paramount consideration, hence, every reasonable intendment should be sustained
to promote and fulBll these noble and compassionate objectives of the law.
ISABELITA S. LAHOM v. JOSE MELVIN SIBULO (previously referred to as "DR.
MELVIN S. LAHOM")
G.R. No. 143989, July 14, 2003, VITUG, J.
The jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the time
of the commencement of the action.
Facts:
In an order granting the petition for adoption Bled by spouses Dr. Diosdado
Lahom and Isabelita Lahom, Jose Melvin Sibulo became the child of spouses Lahom.
Later, however, Mrs. Lahom, Bled a petition to rescind the decree of adoption before
the RTC on the grounds of strained relationship and utter disregard of Jose Melvin
Sibulo of the needs and feelings of Mrs. Lahom who was then sick. However before
the institution of the case, RA 8552 (Domestic Adoption Act) took eDect and such law
deleted the right of the adopter to rescind a decree of adoption. The RTC dismissed
the petition holding that by virtue of RA 8552, petitions lack of cause of action. Hence
this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the adoption, decreed on 05 May 1972, may still be revoked or
rescinded by an adopter after the eDectivity of R.A. No. 8552.
Ruling:
No. It was months after the eDectivity of R.A. No. 8552 that herein petitioner
Bled an action to revoke the decree of adoption granted in 1975. By then, the new
law, had already abrogated and repealed the right of an adopter under the Civil Code
and the Family Code to rescind a decree of adoption. The Court should now hold that
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the action for rescission of the adoption decree, having been initiated by petitioner
after R.A. No. 8552 had come into force, no longer could be pursued.
MACARIO TAMARGO et al. v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS et al.
G.R. No. 85044, June 3, 1992, FELICIANO, J.
Retroactive e ect may not be given to the decree of adoption so as to impose
a liability upon the adopting parents accruing at a time when adopting parents had
no actual or physically custody over the adopted child.
Facts:
Due to a shooting incident that led to the death of Jennifer Tamargo, a civil
case for damages was Bled by Macario Tamargo and spouses Celso and Aurelia
Tamargo, the adopting parent and natural parents of Jennifer Tamargo, respectively,
against spouses Victor and Clara Bundoc, natural parents of Adelberto Bundoc, a
minor. Prior to the incident, there is pending petition to adopt Adelberto Bundoc Bled
by spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura before the RTC of Ilocos Sur. The said petition
was granted after Adelberto had shot and killed Jennifer. In their Answer, the spouses
Bundoc contended that due to the approval of the petition for adoption, parental
authority over Adelberto has already shifted to the spouses Rapisura, hence they the
indispensable party to the case. The RTC dismissed the petition holding that Spouses
Bundoc is not the indispensable party. Motion for reconsideration was likewise denied
due to failure to Ble it within the reglementary period and failure to observe the 3-day
notice rule. The Tamargos then elevated the case to the CA via petition
for mandamus and certiorari however the same was also dismissed. Hence this
petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the eDects of adoption, insofar as parental authority is
concerned may be given retroactive eDect so as to make the adopting parents the
indispensable parties in a damage case Bled against their adopted child, for acts
committed by the latter, when actual custody was yet lodged with the biological
parents.
Ruling:
No. The shooting of Jennifer by Adelberto with an air riMe occured when
parental authority was still lodged in respondent Bundoc spouses, the natural parents
of the minor Adelberto. It would thus follow that the natural parents who had then
actual custody of the minor Adelberto, are the indispensable parties to the suit for
damages. The Court does not believe that parental authority is properly regarded as
having been retroactively transferred to and vested in the adopting parents, the
Rapisura spouses, at the time the air riMe shooting happened. Retroactive eDect may
not be given to the decree of adoption so as to impose a liability upon the adopting
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parents accruing at a time when adopting parents had no actual or physically
custody over the adopted child. Retroactive aDect may perhaps be given to the
granting of the petition for adoption where such is essential to permit the accrual of
some beneBt or advantage in favor of the adopted child. In the instant case,
however, to hold that parental authority had been retroactively lodged in the
Rapisura spouses so as to burden them with liability for a tortious act that they could
not have foreseen and which they could not have prevented (since they were at the
time in the United States and had no physical custody over the child Adelberto)
would be unfair and unconscionable. Such a result, moreover, would be inconsistent
with the philosophical and policy basis underlying the doctrine of vicarious liability.
Put a little diDerently, no presumption of parental dereliction on the part of the
adopting parents, the Rapisura spouses, could have arisen since Adelberto was not in
fact subject to their control at the time the tort was committed.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. COURT OF APPEALS and ZENAIDA C.
BOBILES
G.R. No. 92326, January 24, 1992, REGALADO, J.
Adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, hold the interests and welfare
of the child to be of paramount consideration.
Facts:
Zenaida Corteza Bobiles Bled a petition to adopt Jason Condat before the RTC.
Petitioner contended that the petition for adoption should be dismissed for it was
Bled solely by private respondent without joining her husband, in violation of Article
185 of the Family Code which requires joint adoption by the spouses. It argued that
the Family Code must be applied retroactively to the petition Bled by Mrs. Bobiles, as
the latter did not acquire a vested right to adopt Jason Condat by the mere Bling of
her petition for adoption.
Issue:
Whether or not the petition for adoption should be dismissed.
Ruling:
No. A petition cannot be dismissed by reason of failure to comply with a law
which was not yet in force and eDect at the time. As long as the petition for adoption
was su>cient in form and substance in accordance with the law in governance at the
time it was Bled, the court acquires jurisdiction and retains it until it fully disposes of
the case.
In the case at bar, the rights concomitant to and conferred by the decree of
adoption will be for the best interests of the child. His adoption is with the consent of
his natural parents. The representative of the Department of Social Welfare and
Development unqualiBedly recommended the approval of the petition for
adoption and the trial court dispensed with the trial custody for several
commendatory reasons, especially since the child had been living with the adopting
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parents since infancy. Further, the said petition was with the sworn written consent
of the children of the adopters.
Adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, hold the interests and welfare
of the child to be of paramount consideration. They are designed to provide homes,
parental care and education for unfortunate, needy or orphaned children and give
them the protection of society and family in the person of the adopted, as well as to
allow childless couples or persons to experience the joys of parenthood and give
them legally a child in the person of the adopted for the manifestation of their natural
parental instincts.
Support
EDWARD V. LACSON v. MAOWEE DABAN LACSON and MAONAA DABAN
LACSON, represented by their mother and guardian ad-litem, LEA DABAN
LACSON
G.R. No. 150644, August 28, 2006, GARCIA, J.
Asking one to comply with his obligation to support owing to the urgency of
the situation is no less a demand because it came by way of a request or a plea.
Facts:
Edward V. Lacson and Lea Daban Lacson are the parents of Maowee Daban
Lacson and Maonaa Daban Lacson. For unknown reason, Edward left their conjugal
home thereby leaving Leah to fend for their children. For a period of 18 years, Leah
and her children transferred from one dwelling place to another not their own.
Records reveal that in a note dated December 10, 1975, Edward promise to give
support to his daughters however, aside from occasional giving of some amount,
Edward failed to fulBll his promise.
In 1995, Leah instituted an action for support in behalf of her daughter before
the RTC of Iloilo City demanding the amount of the support her daughters should
have received. The RTC ruled in favor of the plaintiD sisters and ordered Edward to
pay them the amount equivalent to 216-month worth of support in arrears. On
appeal, the CA a>rmed the decision of the RTC. The motion for reconsideration Bled
by Edward was likewise dismissed. Hence this appeal. Before the SC, Edward
contended that the demand required by law was never complied with by Leah thus
the award of support in arrears is not proper.
Issue:
Whether or not the mother of the petitioner failed to make a demand for
support as required by law.
Ruling:
No. The requisite demand for support appears to have been made sometime
in 1975. It may be that Lea made no extrajudicial demand in the sense of a formal
146 | P a g e
Persons and Family Relations Law
written demand in terms and in the imperious tenor commonly used by legal
advocates in a demand letter. Nonetheless, what would pass as a demand was,
however, deBnitely made. Asking one to comply with his obligation to support owing
to the urgency of the situation is no less a demand because it came by way of a
request or a plea.
Edward’s insistence on requiring a formal demand from his wife is truly
pointless, in the face of his acknowledgment of and commitment to comply with such
obligation through a note in his own handwriting. Said note stating that he will
"sustain his two daughters Maowee and Maonaa" also stated "as requested by their
mother" thus practically conBrming the fact of such demand having been made by
mother. The trial court thus correctly ruled that Edward’s obligation to pay support in
arrears should commence from 1976.
Parental Authority
NERISSA Z. PEREZ v. THE COURT OF APPEALS (Ninth Division) and RAY C.
PEREZ,
G.R. No. 118870, March 29, 1996, ROMERO, J.
The laws clearly mandate that a child under seven years of age shall not be
separated from his mother unless the court $nds compelling reasons to order
otherwise.
Facts:
Ray Perez II (Ray Junior or RJ) is the only child of Spouses Ray and Nerissa
Perez and was born after successive miscarriage suDered by Nerissa. Nerissa is a
resident alien of United States while Ray only had tourist visa. The spouses and the
child later went home to the Philippines for a vacation however after the lapse of
such period, Ray decided to stay together with RJ to take care of his sick mother but
has promised to follow Nerissa. However, this never happened. Later the relationship
of the spouses went sour. Despite church mediation, reconciliation has failed.
Subsequently, Nerissa Bled a petition for habeas corpus asking Ray to surrender the
custody of their son to her.
The RTC ruled in favor of Nerissa holding that no child under seven years of
age shall be separated from the mother. However on appeal, the CA reversed the RTC
decision holding that granting custody to the boy's father would be for the child's
best interest and welfare. Nerissa Bled a motion for reconsideration but the same was
denied. Hence this appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the custody of the child should be given to Nerissa.
Ruling:
147 | P a g e
Persons and Family Relations Law
Yes. When the parents of the child are separated, Article 213 of the Family
Code is the applicable law. The laws clearly mandate that a child under seven years
of age shall not be separated from his mother unless the court Bnds compelling
reasons to order otherwise. The use of the word "shall" in Article 213 of the Family
Code and Rule 99, section 6 of the Revised Rules of Court connotes a mandatory
character. The general rule that a child under seven years of age shall not be
separated from his mother Bnds its raison d'être in the basic need of a child for his
mother's loving care. Only the most compelling of reasons shall justify the court's
awarding the custody of such a child to someone other than his mother, such as her
unBtness to exercise sole parental authority.
DAISIE T. DAVID v. COURT OF APPEALS, RAMON R. VILLAR
G.R. No. 111180, November 16, 1995, MENDOZA, J.
While it is true that the determination of the right to the custody of minor
children is relevant in cases where the parents, who are married to each other, are
for some reason separated from each other, it does not follow, however, that it
cannot arise in any other situation.
Facts:
Ramon R. Villar, a married man, had three children with Daisie T. David out of
their amorous relationship namely; Christopher J, Christine and Cathy Mae. Such
relationship became known to the legal wife and family of Villar. Later, the legal
family of Villar accepted the children. During one of Villar’s family vacation, they
invited Christopher J., then six years of age, with Daisie’s permission. However after
such vacation, Villar refused to give back the child. This prompted Daisie to Ble a
petition for habeas corpus.
The RTC ruled in favor of Daisie and ruled that she has the rightful custody
over Christopher J. However on appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC. The
CA ruled that the petition for habeas corpus is not proper and that the question of
custody and the question of custody should be brought in a case singularly Bled for
the purpose. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not a petition for a writ of habeas corpus is proper to recover the
custody of a child.
Ruling:
Yes. Rule 102, §1 of the Rules of Court provides that "the writ of habeas
corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal conBnement or detention by which any
person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is
withheld from the person entitled thereto."
148 | P a g e
Persons and Family Relations Law
While it is true that the determination of the right to the custody of minor
children is relevant in cases where the parents, who are married to each other, are
for some reason separated from each other, it does not follow, however, that it
cannot arise in any other situation. In the case at bar, Christopher J. is an illegitimate
child since at the time of his conception, his father, Ramon R. Villar, was married to
another woman other than the child's mother. As such, pursuant to Art. 176 of the
Family Code, Christopher J. is under the parental authority of his mother, who, as a
consequence of such authority, is entitled to have custody of him. Since, admittedly,
petitioner has been deprived of her rightful custody of her child by private
respondent, she is entitled to issuance of the writ of habeas corpus.
Rule 1021 §1 makes no distinction between the case of a mother who is
separated from her husband and is entitled to the custody of her child and that of a
mother of an illegitimate child who, by law, is vested with sole parental authority, but
is deprived of her rightful custody of her child.
REYNALDO ESPIRITU and GUILLERMA LAYUG v. COURT OF APPEALS and
TERESITA MASAUDING
G.R. No. 115640, March 15, 1995, MELO, J.
The task of choosing the parent to whom custody shall be awarded is not a
ministerial function to be determined by a simple determination of the age of a minor
child. Whether a child is under or over seven years of age, the paramount criterion
must always be the child's interests.
Facts:
While Teresita Masauding was still in a subsisting marriage, she maintained a
common law relationship with Reynaldo Espiritu which begot two children, Rosalind
and Reginald. Later the Espiritu and Masauding got married. The marriage went sour
and Teresita left their conjugal home and went to California. Due to his assignment
abroad, Reynaldo has to leave his children with his sister, Guillerma Layug.
Later, Teresita went back to the Philippines and Bled a petition for habeas
corpus against Reynaldo and Guillerma to gain custody over the children. The petition
was, however, dismissed thus conferring upon Reynaldo the sole parental authority
over the children subject to the visitation rights granted to Teresita. On appeal, the
CA reversed the RTC decision and gave Teresita the custody of the children. The CA
relied on the presumption that the custody of a child below seven years of age will be
lodged to the mother. Hence this appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not custody of the children should be given to Reynaldo.
Ruling:
149 | P a g e
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