Persons and Family Relations Law
HERMINIA BORJA-MANZANO v. JUDGE ROQUE R. SANCHEZ, MTC, Infanta,
Pangasinan
A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329. March 8, 2001, DAVIDE, JR., C.J.
Legal separation does not dissolve the marriage tie, much less authorize the
parties to remarry. This holds true all the more when the separation is merely de
facto.
Facts:
Complainant avers that she was the lawful wife David Manzano, having been
married to him in 1966. In 1993, however, her husband contracted another marriage
with one Luzviminda Payao before respondent Judge.
On the other hand, respondent Judge averred that when he o>ciated the
marriage between Manzano and Payao he did not know that Manzano was legally
married. However, in his later Manifestation, he maintained that the a>davits of both
David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao expressly stated that they were married to
Herminia Borja and Domingo Relos, respectively; they had been cohabiting as
husband and wife for seven years, and that since their respective marriages had
been marked by constant quarrels, they had both left their families and had never
cohabited or communicated with their spouses anymore. Hence, on the basis of those
a>davits, he agreed to solemnize the marriage in question in accordance with Article
34 of the Family Code.
Issue:
Whether or not the solemnization of a marriage between Manzano and Payao
who were both bound by a prior existing marriage is valid.
Ruling:
No. The fact that Manzano and Payao had been living apart from their
respective spouses for a long time already is immaterial. Article 63(1) of the Family
Code allows spouses who have obtained a decree of legal separation to live
separately from each other, but in such a case the marriage bonds are not severed.
Elsewise stated, legal separation does not dissolve the marriage tie, much less
authorize the parties to remarry. This holds true all the more when the separation is
merely de facto, as in the case at bar.
Neither can respondent Judge Sanchez take refuge on the Joint A>davit of
Manzano and Payao stating that they had been cohabiting as husband and wife for
seven years. Just like separation, free and voluntary cohabitation with another person
for at least Bve years does not severe the tie of a subsisting previous marriage.
Marital cohabitation for a long period of time between two individuals who are legally
capacitated to marry each other is merely a ground for exemption from marriage
license. It could not serve as a justiBcation for respondent Judge to solemnize a
subsequent marriage vitiated by the impediment of a prior existing marriage.
Void Marriages
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FEDERICO C. SUNTAY v. ISABEL COJUANGCO-SUNTAY and HON. GREGORIO S.
SAMPAGA, Presiding Judge, Branch 78, Regional Trial Court, Malolos,
Bulacan
G.R. No. 132524, December 29, 1998, MARTINEZ, J.
Children conceived of voidable marriages before the decree of annulment
shall be considered legitimate; and children conceived thereafter shall have the
same status, rights and obligations as acknowledged natural children, and are also
called natural children by legal $ction.
Facts:
Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay (son of petitioner Federico Suntay) and Isabel
Cojuangco-Suntay were married were the parents of Margarita Guadalupe, Isabel
Aguinaldo and Emilio Aguinaldo all surnamed Cojuangco Suntay. After 4 years, the
marriage soured so that in 1962, Isabel Cojuanco-Suntay Bled a criminal case against
her husband. In retaliation, Emilio Aguinaldo Bled before the CFI a complaint for legal
separation. TC declared in its dispositive portion the marriage null and void and of no
eDect as between the parties. The body of the decision however stated that the legal
basis for setting aside the marriage is paragraph 3, Article 85 of the New Civil Code.
In 1995, Isabel Aguinaldo Cojuangco Suntay Bled before the RTC a petition for
issuance in her favor of Letters of Administration of the Intestate Estate of her late
grandmother Cristina Aguinaldo Suntay in representation of her father, Emilio.
Petitioner moved to dismiss the same and argued that since CFI declared the
marriage of the respondent Isabel’s parents null and void, the latter is an illegitimate
child, and has no right nor interest in the estate of her paternal grandmother the
decedent.
Issue:
Whether or not the marriage between Emilio and Isabel is null and void as
stated in the dispositive part of the decision making the respondent an illegitimate
child.
Ruling:
No. Articles 80, 81, 82 and 83 of the New Civil Code classify what marriages
are void while Article 85 enumerates the causes for which a marriage may be
annulled. The fundamental distinction between void and voidable marriages is that
void marriage is deemed never to have taken place at all. Children born of such
marriages who are called natural children by legal Bction have the same status,
rights and obligations as acknowledged natural children under Article 89. On the
other hand, a voidable marriage, is considered valid and produces all its civil eDects,
until it is set aside by Bnal judgment of a competent court in an action for annulment.
Children conceived of voidable marriages before the decree of annulment shall be
considered legitimate; and children conceived thereafter shall have the same status,
rights and obligations as acknowledged natural children, and are also called natural
children by legal Bction.
Assuming that a doubt or uncertainty exists between the dispositive portion
and the body of the decision, eDort must be made to harmonize the whole body of
the decision in order to give eDect to the intention, purpose and judgment of the
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court. A reading of the pertinent portion of the decision of the CFI shows that the
marriage is voidable.
ENGRACE NINAL for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of the minors
BABYLINE NINAL, INGRID NINAL, ARCHIE NINAL & PEPITO NINAL, JR.,
petitioners, v. NORMA BAYADOG
G.R. No. 133778. March 14, 2000, YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any proper interested
party may attack a void marriage.
Facts:
Pepito Ninal was married to Teodulfa Bellones in 1974. Out of their marriage
were born herein petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her in 1985.
One year and 8 months thereafter, Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got
married without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an
a>davit stating that they had lived together as husband and wife for at least Bve
years and were thus exempt from securing a marriage license. In 1997, Pepito died in
a car accident. After their father’s death, petitioners Bled a petition for declaration of
nullity of the marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for
lack of a marriage license. Norma Bled a motion to dismiss on the ground that
petitioners have no cause of action since they are not among the persons who could
Ble an action for "annulment of marriage" under Article 47 of the Family Code.
Issue:
(1) Whether or not the second marriage is null and void ab initio
(2) Whether or not the heirs of a deceased person can Ble a petition for the
declaration of nullity of his marriage after his death
Ruling:
(1) Yes. At the time Pepito and Norma’s marriage, it cannot be said that they have lived
with each other as husband and wife for at least Bve years prior to their wedding day.
From the time Pepito’s Brst marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with
respondent, only about twenty months had elapsed. Even assuming that Pepito and
his Brst wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and respondent had
started living with each other that has already lasted for Bve years, the fact remains
that their Bve-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by
law. It should be in the nature of a perfect union that is valid under the law but
rendered imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract. Pepito had a
subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting with respondent. It is
immaterial that when they lived with each other, Pepito had already been separated
in fact from his lawful spouse. The subsistence of the marriage even where there was
actual severance of the Blial companionship between the spouses cannot make any
cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being one as "husband and
wife.”
(2) Yes. Voidable and void marriages are not identical. Void marriages can be questioned
even after the death of either party but voidable marriages can be assailed only
during the lifetime of the parties and not after death of either, in which case the
parties and their oDspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid. That
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is why the action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages
where the action prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but
any proper interested party may attack a void marriage.
LOLITA D. ENRICO v. HEIRS OF SPS. EULOGIO B. MEDINACELI AND TRINIDAD
CATLI-MEDINACELI, REPRESENTED BY VILMA M. ARTICULO
G.R. No. 173614, September 28, 2007, CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which took e ect on 15 March 2003
thereof makes it the sole right of the husband or the wife to $le a petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage.
Facts:
Eulogio and Trinidad were married in 1962. They begot seven children, herein
respondents. On 1 May 2004, Trinidad died. On 26 August 2004, Eulogio married the
petitioner. Six months later, or on 10 February 2005, Eulogio passed away. Thereafter,
respondents Bled with the RTC an action for declaration of nullity of marriage of
Eulogio and petitioner Lolita D. Enrico since the same was entered into without the
requisite marriage license. Article 34 FC, which exempts a man and a woman who
have been living together for at least Bve years without any legal impediment from
securing a marriage license, was not applicable to petitioner and Eulogio because
they could not have lived together under the circumstances required by said
provision.
In her Answer, petitioner maintained that she and Eulogio lived together as
husband and wife under one roof for 21 years openly and publicly; hence, they were
exempted from the requirement of a marriage license. She sought the dismissal of
the action on the ground that it is only the contracting parties while living who can
Ble an action for declaration of nullity of marriage.
Issue:
Whether or not the heirs of Eulogio can seek the declaration of the nullity of
his marriage after his death.
Ruling:
No. The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages as contained in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which took
eDect on 15 March 2003 applies in this case. Section 2(a) thereof makes it the sole
right of the husband or the wife to Ble a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of
void marriage.
While it is true that in Ninal case, no uncertain terms allowed therein
petitioners to Ble a petition for the declaration of nullity of their fathers marriage to
therein respondent after the death of their father, we cannot, however, apply its
ruling for the reason that the impugned marriage therein was solemnized prior to the
eDectivity of the Family Code. The Court in Ninal recognized that the applicable law
to determine the validity of the two marriages involved therein is the Civil Code,
which was the law in eDect at the time of their celebration. What we have before us
belongs to a diDerent milieu, i.e., the marriage sought to be declared void was
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entered into during the eDectivity of the Family Code. As can be gleaned from the
facts, petitioner’s marriage to Eulogio was celebrated in 2004.
OFELIA P. TY v. THE COURT OF APPEALS, and EDGARDO M. REYES
G.R. No. 127406, November 27, 2000, QUISUMBING, J.
When the second marriage of private respondent was entered into, the
prevailing rule was found in Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon. As to whether a judicial
declaration of nullity of a void marriage is necessary, the Civil Code contains no
express provision to that e ect. Therefore, we conclude that private respondent’s
second marriage to petitioner is valid.
Facts:
Private respondent married Villanueva in a civil ceremony in 1977. Then they
had a church wedding on the same year. However, in 1980, the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court of QC declared their marriage null and void ab initio for lack
of license and consent. However, even before the decree was issued nullifying his
marriage to Villanueva, private respondent wed Ty, herein petitioner, in 1979. In
1991, private respondent sought the nullity of his marriage to Ty alleging that at the
time he married petitioner, he was still married to Villanueva and the decree of nullity
of his marriage had not been issued. The decree of nullity of his marriage was
rendered only on August 4, 1980, while his civil marriage to petitioner took place on
April 4, 1979.
The RTC declared his marriage to herein petitioner null and void ab initio. CA
a>rmed. It ruled that a judicial declaration of nullity of the Brst marriage must Brst
be secured before a subsequent marriage could be validly contracted.
Issue:
Whether or not the decree of nullity of the Brst marriage is required before a
subsequent marriage can be entered into validly.
Ruling:
No. We must note that private respondents Brst and second marriages
contracted in 1977 and 1979, respectively, are governed by the provisions of the Civil
Code. The lower court and the CA cannot apply the provision of the FC. Both
marriages entered by private respondent were solemnized prior to the FC. As to
whether a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage is necessary, the Civil Code
contains no express provision to that eDect. Therefore, we conclude that private
respondent’s second marriage to petitioner is valid. The provisions of the Family Code
cannot be retroactively applied to the present case, for to do so would prejudice the
vested rights of petitioner and of her children.
DOROTHY B. TERRE v. ATTY. JORDAN TERRE
A.M. No. 2349 July 3, 1992, PER CURIAM
The prevailing case law of this Court holds that for purposes of determining
whether a person is legally free to contract a second marriage, a judicial declaration
that the $rst marriage was null and void ab initio is essential.
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Facts:
An administrative complaint was Bled by Dorothy against her husband for
gross immorality. She posited that the respondent made her believe that her prior
marriage to Bercenilla was null and void ab initio being incestuous (Dorothy and
Merlito being allegedly Brst cousins to each other), that she was still legally single
and free to marry him. She also alleged that the respondent contracted a second
marriage and lived with another woman other than complainant, while his prior
marriage with complainant remained subsisting.
In his answer, he sought to defend himself by claiming that he had believed in
good faith that his prior marriage with complainant Dorothy was null and void ab
initio and that no action for a judicial declaration of nullity was necessary.
Issue:
Whether or not a judicial declaration of nullity was necessary for purposes of
remarriage.
Ruling:
Yes. Respondent Jordan Terre, being a lawyer, knew or should have known that
such an argument ran counter to the prevailing case law of this Court which holds
that for purposes of determining whether a person is legally free to contract a second
marriage, a judicial declaration that the Brst marriage was null and void ab initio is
essential. Even if we were to assume, arguendo merely, that Jordan Terre held that
mistaken belief in good faith, the same result will follow. For if we are to hold Jordan
Terre to his own argument, his Brst marriage to complainant Dorothy Terre must be
deemed valid, with the result that his second marriage to Helina Malicdem must be
regarded as bigamous and criminal in character.
YASUO IWASAWA v. FELISA CUSTODIO GANGAN (A.K.A FELISA GANGAN
ARAMBULO, AND FELISA GANGAN IWASAWA) AND THE LOCAL CIVIL
REGISTRAR OF PASAY CITY
G.R. No. 204169, September 11, 2013, VILLARAMA, J.
A judicial declaration of nullity is required before a valid subsequent marriage
can be contracted; or else, what transpires is a bigamous marriage, which is void
from the beginning as provided in Article 35(4) of the Family Code of the Philippines.
Facts:
Yasuo Iwasawa and Felisa Gangan were married on November 28, 2002. It was
only in 2009 when Yasuo learned about his wife's previous marriage to Raymond
Arambulo upon Felisa's confession when she learned of Raymond's death. This
prompted Yasuo to Ble a petition for the declaration of his marriage to Felisa as null
and void on the ground that their marriage is a bigamous one, based on Article 35(4)
in relation to Article 41 of the FC. The RTC ruled that there was insu>cient evidence
to prove Felisa's prior existing valid marriage to another man. It was only Yasuo who
testiBed about said marriage who has no personal knowledge of Felisa's prior
marriage nor of Raymond's death. It also held that Yasuo's testimony about the NSO
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certiBcation is likewise unreliable since he is a stranger to the preparation of said
document.
Issue:
Whether or not the marriage between Yasuo and Felisa is null and void.
Ruling:
Yes. The Court has consistently held that a judicial declaration of nullity is
required before a valid subsequent marriage can be contracted; or else, what
transpires is a bigamous marriage, which is void from the beginning as provided in
Article 35(4) of the Family Code of the Philippines. In this case, Raymond died on July
14, 2009 and that it was only on said date that Felisa’s marriage with Raymond was
deemed to have been dissolved. The second marriage of Felisa to Yasuo is bigamous,
hence null and void, since the Brst marriage was still valid and subsisting when the
second marriage was contracted.
There is no question that the documentary evidence submitted by Yasuo are
all public documents. As public documents, they are admissible in evidence even
without further proof of their due execution and genuineness. Thus, the RTC erred
when it disregarded said documents on the sole ground that the petitioner did not
present the records custodian of the NSO who issued them to testify on their
authenticity and due execution since proof of authenticity and due execution was not
anymore necessary. Moreover, not only are said documents admissible, they deserve
to be given evidentiary weight because they constitute prima facie evidence of the
facts stated therein.
MINORU FUJIKI v. MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, SHINICHI MAEKARA, LOCAL
CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY, AND THE ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL
REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE
G.R. No. 196049, June 26, 2013, CARPIO, J.
When Section 2(a) states that "[a] petition for declaration of absolute nullity
of void marriage may be $led solely by the husband or the wife"—it refers to the
husband or the wife of the subsisting marriage.
Facts:
Maria Paz Galela Marinay was Brst married to Minoru Fujiki on January 24,
2004. Without her Brst marriage being dissolved, Marinay married Shinichi Maekara
on May 15, 2008. Marinay left Makeara when she allegedly suDered physical abuse
from him. She then started to contact Fujiki. In 2010, Marinay's marriage with
Makeara was declared void on the ground of bigamy by a family court in Japan. In
2011, Fujiki Bled a petition in the RTC for judicial recognition of foreign judgment. The
RTC dismissed the petition citing Secs. 2 and 4 of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC). It took the view that only "the husband or the wife," in this case either Maekara
or Marinay, can Ble the petition to declare their marriage void, and not Fujiki.
Issue:
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Whether or not a husband or wife of a prior marriage can Ble a petition to
recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or her
spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy.
Ruling:
Yes. The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition
to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the
parties is a citizen of a foreign country. Moreover, the Court held that the rule in A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC that only the husband or wife can Ble a declaration of nullity or
annulment of marriage "does not apply if the reason behind the petition is bigamy."
(See Juliano-Llave v. Republic, 646 SCRA 637, March 30, 2011)
When Section 2(a) states that "[a] petition for declaration of absolute nullity of
void marriage may be Bled solely by the husband or the wife"—it refers to the
husband or the wife of the subsisting marriage. Under Article 35(4) of the Family
Code, bigamous marriages are void from the beginning. Thus, the parties in a
bigamous marriage are neither the husband nor the wife under the law. The husband
or the wife of the prior subsisting marriage is the one who has the personality to Ble a
petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MERLINDA L. OLAYBAR
G.R. No. 189538, February 10, 2014, PERALTA, J.
In allowing the correction of the subject certi$cate of marriage by cancelling
the wife portion thereof, the trial court did not, in any way, declare the marriage void
as there was no marriage to speak of.
Facts:
When Merlinda Olaybar requested from the NSO a CertiBcate of No Marriage
(CENOMAR), she discovered that she was already married to a certain Ye Son Sune, a
Korean National, in 2002. She then Bled a petition for cancellation of entries in the
marriage contract especially the entries in the wife portion thereof. She impleaded
the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City, as well as her alleged husband, as parties to
the case. She denied having contracted said marriage and claimed that she did not
know the alleged husband; she did not appear before the solemnizing o>cer; and,
that the signature appearing in the marriage certiBcate is not hers. The RTC granted
her petition. Petitioner then contends that there was no clerical spelling,
typographical and other innocuous errors in the marriage contract for it to fall within
the provisions of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Also, it was asserted that the grant of
the cancellation of all the entries in the wife portion of the alleged marriage contract
is, in eDect, declaring the marriage void ab initio.
Issue:
Whether or not the cancellation of "all the entries in the wife portion of the
alleged marriage contract" is in eDect declaring the marriage void ab initio.
Ruling:
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No. Aside from the certiBcate of marriage, no such evidence was presented to
show the existence of marriage. Rather, Olaybar showed by overwhelming evidence
that no marriage was entered into and that she was not even aware of such
existence. The testimonial and documentary evidence clearly established that the
only “evidence” of marriage which is the marriage certiBcate was a forgery. While the
Court maintains that Rule 108 cannot be availed of to determine the validity of
marriage, the Court cannot nullify the proceedings before the trial court where all the
parties had been given the opportunity to contest the allegations of respondent; the
procedures were followed, and all the evidence of the parties had already been
admitted and examined. Olaybar indeed sought, not the nulliBcation of marriage as
there was no marriage to speak of, but the correction of the record of such marriage
to reMect the truth as set forth by the evidence. Otherwise stated, in allowing the
correction of the subject certiBcate of marriage by cancelling the wife portion thereof,
the trial court did not, in any way, declare the marriage void as there was no
marriage to speak of.
Psychological Incapacity
DIANA M. BARCELONA v. COURT OF APPEALS and TADEO R. BENGZON
G.R. No. 130087, September 24, 2003, Carpio, J.
The obvious e ect of the new Rules providing that expert opinion need not be
alleged in the petition is that there is also no need to allege the root cause of the
psychological incapacity.
Facts:
Tadeo Bengzon Bled a petition for annulment of marriage against Diana. It was
alleged that during their marriage, they had frequent quarrels due to their varied
upbringing. She withdrew to herself and eventually refused to speak to her husband
when she suDered several miscarriages. She even requested him to leave the
conjugal dwelling. The petition further alleged that Diana was psychologically
incapacitated at the time of the celebration of their marriage to comply with the
essential obligations of marriage and such incapacity subsists up to the present time.
Diana Bled a motion to dismiss the said petition on the ground that it failed to state a
cause of action. The petition is defective because it fails to allege the root cause of
the alleged psychological incapacity, that it existed from the celebration of the
marriage and that it is permanent or incurable. Further, it is devoid of any reference
of the grave nature of the illness to bring about the disability of Diana to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Lastly, it did not even state the marital obligations
which Diana allegedly failed to comply due to psychological incapacity.
Issue:
Whether or not the petition states a cause of action.
Ruling:
Yes. The petition states the legal right of Tadeo, the correlative obligation of
Diana, and the act or omission of Diana in violation of the legal right.
Section 2, paragraph (d) of the new Rules on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriage provides:
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(d) What to allege. A petition under Article 36 of the Family Code shall
speciBcally allege the complete facts showing that either or both parties were
psychologically incapacitated from complying with the essential marital
obligations of marriage at the time of the celebration of marriage even if such
incapacity becomes manifest only after its celebration.
The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are
indicative of psychological incapacity at the time of the celebration of the
marriage but expert opinion need not be alleged.
The petition states the ultimate facts on which Tadeo bases his claim in
accordance with Section 1, Rule 8 of the old Rules of Court. The obvious eDect of the
new Rules providing that expert opinion need not be alleged in the petition is that
there is also no need to allege the root cause of the psychological incapacity. Only
experts in the Belds of neurological and behavioral sciences are competent to
determine the root cause of psychological incapacity.
CHI MING TSOI v. COURT OF APPEALS and GINA LAO-TSOI
G.R. No. 119190, January 16, 1997, TORRES, JR., J.
One of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is "to
procreate children based on the universal principle that procreation of children
through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage." The senseless and
protracted refusal of one of the parties to ful$ll the above marital obligation is
equivalent to psychological incapacity.
Facts:
On May 22, 1988, Chi Ming Tsoi married Gina Lao-Tsoi. However, since their
marriage until their separation on March 15, 1989, there was no sexual contact
between them. Gina then Bled a complaint for the declaration of nullity of her
marriage with Chi Ming Tsoi on the ground of psychological incapacity. Gina claims
that Chi Ming Tsoi is impotent and a closet homosexual. According to Chi Ming Tsoi,
the fault lies with his wife since everytime he wants to have sexual intercourse with
his her, she always avoided him and whenever he caresses her private parts, she
always removed his hands. The RTC rendered a decision declaring the nullity of their
marriage. The CA a>rmed the said decision.
Issue:
Whether or not refusal to have sexual intercourse constitutes psychological
incapacity.
RULING:
Yes. One of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is "to
procreate children based on the universal principle that procreation of children
through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage." Constant non- fulBllment of
this obligation will Bnally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the marriage. In the
case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulBll the
above marital obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
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As stated by the CA, the admission that the husband is reluctant or unwilling
to perform the sexual act with his wife whom he professes to love very dearly, and
who has not posed any insurmountable resistance to his alleged approaches, is
indicative of a hopeless situation, and of a serious personality disorder that
constitutes psychological incapacity to discharge the basic marital covenants within
the contemplation of the Family Code.
DAVID B. DEDEL v. COURT OF APPEALS and SHARON L. CORPUZ-DEDEL
a.k.a. JANE IBRAHIM, REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 151867, January 29, 2004, YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
Respondent’s sexual in$delity or perversion and abandonment do not by
themselves constitute psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the
Family Code. Neither could her emotional immaturity and irresponsibility be equated
with psychological incapacity.
Facts:
David and Sharon Dedel were married in 1966. However, during the marriage,
Sharon turned out to be an irresponsible and immature wife and mother. She had
extra-marital aDairs with several men. Petitioner alleged that despite conBrmed in
the Manila Medical City for treatment, Sharon did not stop her illicit relationship with
Mustafa Ibrahim, whom she married and with whom she had two children. David then
Bled a petition seeking the declaration of nullity of his marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity. The RTC declared the civil and church marriages between
David and Sharon null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part
of the Sharon to perform the essential obligations of marriage. The CA reversed the
said decision dismissing the petition.
Issue:
Whether or not aberrant sexual behavior fall within the term "psychological
incapacity."
Ruling:
No. The di>culty in resolving the problem lies in the fact that a personality
disorder is a very complex and elusive phenomenon which deBes easy analysis and
deBnition. In this case, respondent’s sexual inBdelity can hardly qualify as being
mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that she could not have known the
obligations she was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given a valid
assumption thereof. It appears that respondent’s promiscuity did not exist prior to or
at the inception of the marriage.
Sharon's sexual inBdelity or perversion and abandonment do not by
themselves constitute psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the
Family Code. Neither could her emotional immaturity and irresponsibility be equated
with psychological incapacity. It must be shown that these acts are manifestations of
a disordered personality which make respondent completely unable to discharge the
essential obligations of the marital state, not merely due to her youth, immaturity16
or sexual promiscuity.
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MA. ARMIDA PEREZ-FERRARIS v. BRIX FERRARIS
G.R. No. 162368, July 17, 2006, YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
The "leaving-the-house" attitude whenever they quarreled, the violent
tendencies during epileptic attacks, the sexual in$delity, the abandonment and lack
of support, and his preference to spend more time with his band mates than his
family, are not rooted on some debilitating psychological condition but a mere refusal
or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
Facts:
Armida Perez-Ferraris was married to Brix Ferraris. She Bled a petition for
declaration of nullity of her marriage with Brix on the ground of his psychological
incapacity. The RTC denied her petition holding that suDering from epilepsy does not
amount to psychological incapacity and the evidence on record were insu>cient to
prove inBdelity. The CA a>rmed the said judgment where it held that the evidence on
record did not convincingly establish that Brix was suDering from psychological
incapacity or that his "defects" were incurable and already present at the inception of
the marriage.
Issue:
Whether or not Brix Ferraris is psychologically incapacitated to comply with
marital obligations.
Ruling:
No. The term "psychological incapacity" to be a ground for the nullity of
marriage under Article 36 of the FC, refers to a serious psychological illness a[icting
a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so
permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond one is about to assume. The Court Bnds that the alleged mixed
personality disorder of Brix, the "leaving-the-house" attitude whenever they
quarreled, the violent tendencies during epileptic attacks, the sexual inBdelity, the
abandonment and lack of support, and his preference to spend more time with his
band mates than his family, are not rooted on some debilitating psychological
condition but a mere refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of
marriage.
BRENDA B. MARCOS v. WILSON G. MARCOS
G.R. No. 136490, October 19, 2000, PANGANIBAN, J.
Psychological incapacity, as a ground for declaring the nullity of a marriage,
may be established by the totality of evidence presented. There is no requirement,
however, that the respondent should be examined by a physician or a psychologist
as a condition sine qua non for such declaration.
Facts:
The marriage between Wilson and Brenda Marcos was declared null and void
in a petition Bled by Brenda pursuant to Art. 36 of the FC. Wilson was declared
psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations mainly because of his
failure to Bnd work to support his family and his violent attitude towards Brenda and
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their children. However, the said decision was reversed by the CA ratiocinating that
Wilson was not subjected to any psychological or psychiatric evaluation. Expert
evidence by qualiBed psychiatrists and clinical psychologists is essential if only to
prove that the parties were or any one of them was mentally or psychically ill to be
truly incognitive of the marital obligations he or she was assuming, or as would make
him or her unable to assume them.
Issues:
Whether or not the totality of the evidence presented was enough to sustain a
Bnding that respondent was psychologically incapacitated.
Ruling:
No. The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated
by the Court in Santos v. Court of Appeals: "psychological incapacity must be
characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability." The
foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician examine the person to be
declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be "medically or
clinically identiBed." What is important is the presence of evidence that can
adequately establish the party's psychological condition. For indeed, if the totality of
evidence presented is enough to sustain a Bnding of psychological incapacity, then
actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to.
Although the Court is su>ciently convinced that Wilson failed to provide
material support to the family and may have resorted to physical abuse and
abandonment, the totality of his acts does not lead to a conclusion of psychological
incapacity on his part. There is absolutely no showing that his "defects" were already
present at the inception of the marriage or that they are incurable. Equally important,
there is no evidence showing that his condition is incurable, especially now that he is
gainfully employed as a taxi driver.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. COURT OF APPEALS and RORIDEL
OLAVIANO MOLINA
G.R. No. 108763, February 13, 1997, PANGANIBAN, J.
Mere showing of "irreconciliable di erences" and "con4icting personalities" in
no wise constitutes psychological incapacity.
Facts:
Roridel Molina Bled a petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to
Reynaldo Molina. Roridel alleged that after a year of marriage, Reynaldo showed
signs of "immaturity and irresponsibility" as a husband and a father since he
preferred to spend more time with his peers and friends on whom he squandered his
money; that he depended on his parents for aid and assistance; and was never
honest with his wife in regard to their Bnances, resulting in frequent quarrels between
them. She asserted that Reynaldo had thus shown that he was psychologically
incapable of complying with essential marital obligations and was a highly immature
and habitually quarrel some individual. Their marriage was declared void ab initio by
the RTC which decision was a>rmed by the CA.
Issue:
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Whether or not "opposing and conMicting personalities" is equivalent to
psychological incapacity.
Ruling:
No. It appears to the Court to be more of a "di>culty," if not outright "refusal"
or "neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations. Mere showing of
"irreconciliable diDerences" and "conMicting personalities" in no wise constitutes
psychological incapacity. It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their
responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be shown
to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (nor physical) illness.
The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or
clinically identiBed, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) su>ciently proven by experts
and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that
the incapacity must be psychological — not physical. It must be proven to be existing
at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. It must also be shown to be
medically or clinically permanent or incurable. It must be grave enough to bring
about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. LOLITA QUINTERO-HAMANO
G.R. No. 149498, May 20, 2004, CORONA, J.
Although, as a rule, there was no need for an actual medical examination, it
would have greatly helped respondent’s case had she presented evidence that
medically or clinically identi$ed his illness.
Facts:
In 1988, Lolita Quintero-Hamano was married to Toshio Hamano. Eight years
later, Lolita Bled a complaint for declaration of nullity of their marriage pursuant to
Article 36 of the FC. As alleged, Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to assume
his marital responsibilities, which incapacity became manifest only after the
marriage. One month after their marriage, Toshio returned to Japan and promised to
return by Christmas to celebrate the holidays with his family. After sending money to
Lolita for two months, Toshio stopped giving Bnancial support. She wrote him several
times but he never responded. Sometime in 1991, she learned from her friends that
Toshio visited the Philippines but he did not bother to see her and their child. Their
marriage was declared null and void by the RTC. The CA a>rmed the said decision.
Issue:
Whether or not Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to perform his
marital obligations.
Ruling:
No. In Molina, the guidelines provided the root cause of the psychological
incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identiBed, (b) alleged in the complaint,
(c) su>ciently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. In this
case, the Court Bnds that the totality of evidence presented fell short of proving that
Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to assume his marital responsibilities. His
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act of abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible but it was never alleged nor
proven to be due to some kind of psychological illness. After Lolita testiBed on how
Toshio abandoned his family, no other evidence was presented showing that his
behavior was caused by a psychological disorder. Although, as a rule, there was no
need for an actual medical examination, it would have greatly helped respondent’s
case had she presented evidence that medically or clinically identiBed his illness. This
could have been done through an expert witness. This Lolita did not do.
The Court cannot presume psychological defect from the mere fact that Toshio
abandoned his family immediately after the celebration of the marriage. It is not
enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married
person; it is essential that he must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some
psychological, not physical, illness. There was no proof of a natal or supervening
disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality
structure that eDectively incapacitates a person from accepting and complying with
the obligations essential to marriage. (See Republic vs. CA, 268 SCRA 198, 1997)
LEOUEL SANTOS v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND JULIA
ROSARIO BEDIA-SANTOS
G.R. No. 112019, January 4, 1995, VITUG, J.
Psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical)
incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants
that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage
which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual
obligations to live together, observe love, respect and $delity and render help and
support.
Facts:
The marriage between Leouel and Julia took place on September 20, 1986. In
1988, Julia went to the US to work as a nurse. Having failed to get Julia to somehow
come home, Leouel Bled a complaint to have his marriage with Julia declared null and
void under Article 36 of the Family Code. Leouel argues that Julia's failure to return
home, or at the very least to communicate with him, for more than Bve years are
circumstances that clearly show her being psychologically incapacitated to enter into
married life. Leouel asserts that "a wife who does not care to inform her husband
about her whereabouts for a period of Bve years, more or less, is psychologically
incapacitated." The RTC and the CA both dismissed the complaint.
Issue:
Whether or not Julia is psychologically incapacitated to comply with her
marital obligations.
Ruling:
No. The factual settings in the this case, in no measure at all, can come close
to the standards required to decree a nullity of marriage.
Justice Sempio-Diy cites with approval the work of Dr. Gerardo Veloso who
opines that psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that
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the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage;
it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the
overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and it must be incurable
or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party
involved.
The use of the phrase "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Code
has not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as, likewise
mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low intelligence, immaturity,
and like circumstances. It should refer to no less than a mental (not physical)
incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants
that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage
which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual
obligations to live together, observe love, respect and Bdelity and render help and
support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to
conBne the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and signiBcance to the marriage. This psychological condition must exist at
the time the marriage is celebrated. The law does not evidently envision, upon the
other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This
conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which considers children
conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be
"legitimate."
JUANITA CARATING-SIAYNGCO v. MANUEL SIAYNGCO
G.R. NO. 158896, October 27, 2004, CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
Sexual in$delity, per se, however, does not constitute psychological incapacity
within the contemplation of the Family Code.
Facts:
Manuel Siayngco Bled a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage
with Juanita Siayngco on the ground of the latter's psychological incapacity. Manuel
alleged, among others, that his wife exhibited an over domineering and selBsh
attitude towards him, she incessantly complained about almost everything and
anyone connected with him like his elderly parents, the staD in his o>ce and
anything not of her liking like the physical arrangement, tables, chairs, wastebaskets
in his o>ce and with other trivial matters, she would yell and scream at him and
throw objects around the house within the hearing of their neighbors and she cared
even less about his professional advancement as she did not even give him moral
support and encouragement. In her answer, Juanita contended that it was respondent
Manuel who was remiss in his marital and family obligations and that she supported
Manuel in all his endeavors despite his philandering. The RTC dismissed Manuel's
petition. The CA reversed the RTC decision.
Issue:
Whether or not Juanita/Manuel is psychologically incapacitated to comply with
marital obligations.
Ruling:
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No. What emerges from the psychological report of Dr. Garcia as well as from
the testimonies of the parties and their witnesses is that the only essential marital
obligation which Manuel was not able to fulBll, if any, is the obligation of Bdelity.
Sexual inBdelity, per se, however, does not constitute psychological incapacity within
the contemplation of the Family Code. It must be shown that Manuel’s unfaithfulness
is a manifestation of a disordered personality which makes him completely unable to
discharge the essential obligations of the marital state and not merely due to his
ardent wish to have a child of his own Mesh and blood.
As to the allegation of psychological incapacity on the part of Juanita, Manuel
failed to prove that his wife’s lack of respect for him, her jealousies and obsession
with cleanliness, her outbursts and her controlling nature (especially with respect to
his salary), and her inability to endear herself to his parents are grave psychological
maladies that paralyze her from complying with the essential obligations of marriage.
Neither is there any showing that these "defects" were already present at the
inception of the marriage or that they are incurable. The record clearly shows that
the root cause of Juanita’s behavior is traceable – not from the inception of their
marriage as required by law – but from her experiences during the marriage, e.g., her
in-laws’ disapproval of her as they wanted their son to enter the priesthood, her
husband’s philandering, admitted no less by him, and her inability to conceive.
JAIME F. VILLALON v. MA. CORAZON N. VILLALON
G.R. No. 167206, November 18, 2005, YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
Sexual in$delity, by itself, is not su cient proof that petitioner is su ering
from psychological incapacity. It must be shown that the acts of unfaithfulness are
manifestations of a disordered personality which make petitioner completely unable
to discharge the essential obligations of marriage.
Facts:
Jaime Villalon Bled a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with
Corazon Villalon pursuant to Article 36 of the FC. He cited as one of the
manifestations of his psychological incapacity his desire for other women and a life
unchained from any spousal obligation. He admitted that on certain occasions before
his marriage, he had two girlfriends at the same time. He also saw other women even
when he became engaged to and, later on, married Corazon. Dr. Dayan was
presented to testify on his alleged psychological disorder of Narcissistic Histrionic
Personality Disorder with Casanova Complex. A person a[icted with this disorder
believes that he is entitled to gratify his emotional and sexual feelings and thus
engages in serial inBdelities. Likewise, a person with Casanova Complex exhibits
habitual adulterous behavior and goes from one relationship to another. When asked
about the womanizing ways of her husband, Corazon averred that she did not know
whether her husband's acts could be deemed womanizing since there were only two
instances of inBdelity which occurred 13 years apart. The RTC declared their marriage
null and void. The said decision was reversed by the CA dismissing the petition.
Issue:
Whether or not Jaime is psychologically incapacitated to fulBll his marital
obligations.
Ruling:
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No. Jaime failed to establish the incurability and gravity of his alleged
psychological disorder. While Dr. Dayan described the symptoms of one a[icted with
Narcissistic Histrionic Personality Disorder as self-centered, characterized by
grandiose ideation and lack of empathy in relating to others, and one with Casanova
Complex as a serial adulterer, the evidence on record betrays the presence of any of
these symptoms.
The Court is not convinced that petitioner is a serial or habitual adulterer, as
he wants the court to believe. As stated by Corazon, it cannot be said that two
instances of inBdelity which occurred 13 years apart could be deemed womanizing,
especially considering that these instances involved the same woman. This is not
consistent with the symptoms of a person suDering from Casanova Complex who,
according to Dr. Dayan, is one who jumps from one relationship to another. Sexual
inBdelity, by itself, is not su>cient proof that petitioner is suDering from
psychological incapacity. It must be shown that the acts of unfaithfulness are
manifestations of a disordered personality which make petitioner completely unable
to discharge the essential obligations of marriage.
LEONILO ANTONIO v. MARIE IVONNE F. REYES
G.R. No. 155800, March 10, 2006, TINGA, J.
Psychological incapacity pertains to the inability to understand the obligations
of marriage, as opposed to a mere inability to comply with them.
Facts:
Petitioner Leonilo Antonio Bled a petition to declare his marriage with
respondent Marie Ivonne Reyes be declared null and void on the ground of
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. Antonio claimed that
Reyes persistently lied about herself, the people around her, her occupation, income,
educational attainment and other events or things. Reyes allegedly concealed the
fact that she previously gave birth to an illegitimate son, which she represented to
Antonio as adopted child of the family. She fabricated stories, misrepresented herself
as a psychiatrist, claimed to be a singer or a free-lance voice talent and even
invented imaginary friends.
The Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila annulled the Catholic
marriage of the parties, which was upheld by the Roman Rota of the Vatican.
Thereafter, the trial court declared the marriage of the parties null and void. Despite
the rulings of the Catholic tribunals, the CA reversed the RTC’s judgment.
Issue:
Whether or not the marriage of the parties should be declared null and void
under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Ruling:
Yes. Psychological incapacity pertains to the inability to understand the
obligations of marriage, as opposed to a mere inability to comply with them. The
evidence to establish psychological incapacity must convince the court that the
parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such extent that the person
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could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not
have given valid assumption thereto.
Respondent had consistently lied about many material aspects as to her
character and personality. Respondent’s fantastic ability to invent and fabricate
stories and personalities enabled her to live in a world of make-believe. This made
her psychologically incapacitated as it rendered her incapable of giving meaning and
signiBcance to her marriage. It has been shown clearly from her actuations that
respondent has that propensity for telling lies about almost anything, be it her
occupation, her state of health, her singing abilities, her income, etc. In persistently
and constantly lying to petitioner, respondent undermined the basic tenets of
relationship between spouses that is based on love, trust and respect. As concluded
by the psychiatrist presented by petitioner, such repeated lying is abnormal and
pathological and amounts to psychological incapacity. The Court of Appeals clearly
erred when it failed to take into consideration the fact that the marriage of the
parties was annulled by the Catholic Church. Respondent’s psychological incapacity
was considered so grave that a restrictive clause was appended to the sentence of
nullity prohibiting respondent from contracting another marriage without the
Tribunal’s consent.
JORDAN CHAN PAZ v. JEANICE PAVON PAZ
G.R. No. 166579, February 18, 2010, CARPIO, J.
What the law requires to render a marriage void on the ground of
psychological incapacity is downright incapacity, not refusal or neglect or di culty,
much less ill will. The mere showing of irreconcilable di erences and con4icting
personalities does not constitute psychological incapacity.
Facts:
Jeanice Bled a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage against Jordan
under Article 36 of the Family Code. Jordan allegedly had a tendency to lie about his
whereabouts. He was alleged to be a Mama’s boy as he depended on his mother for
support and supplies of milk and diapers for their son. Jeanice also alleged that
Jordan resented their son and spent more time with his friends rather than help her
take care of their son. Psychologist Cristina Gates testiBed that Jordan was a[icted
with Borderline Personality Disorder.
The trial court granted the petition and declared the marriage null and void.
The trial court declared that Jordan’s psychological incapacity, which was speciBcally
identiBed as Borderline Personality Disorder, deprived him of the capacity to fully
understand his responsibilities under the marital bond. The CA dismissed Jordan’s
appeal and motion for reconsideration.
Issue:
Whether Jordan is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations.
Ruling:
No. The Court has declared that psychological incapacity must be
characterized by (a) gravity; (b) judicial antecedence; and (c) incurability. It must be
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conBned to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of
an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and signiBcance to the marriage.
Although there is no requirement that a party to be declared psychologically
incapacitated should be personally examined by a physician or a psychologist, there
is nevertheless a need to prove the psychological incapacity through independent
evidence adduced by the person alleging said disorder. In this case, the Court notes
that the report and testimony of Gates on Jordan’s psychological incapacity were
based exclusively on her interviews with Jeanice and the transcript of stenographic
notes of Jeanice’s testimony before the trial court. Consequently, Gates’ report and
testimony were hearsay evidence since she had no personal knowledge of the
alleged facts she was testifying on. Gates’ testimony should have thus been
dismissed for being unscientiBc and unreliable.
Moreover, contrary to the ruling of the trial court, Jordan’s alleged
psychological incapacity was not shown to be so grave and so permanent as to
deprive him of the awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial
bond. What the law requires to render a marriage void on the ground of
psychological incapacity is downright incapacity, not refusal or neglect or di>culty,
much less ill will. The mere showing of irreconcilable diDerences and conMicting
personalities does not constitute psychological incapacity.
JOCELYN M. SUAZO v. ANGELITO SUAZO and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 164493, March 10, 2010, BRION, J.
Habitual drunkenness, gambling and refusal to $nd a job, while indicative of
psychological incapacity, do not, by themselves, show psychological incapacity.
Facts:
Jocelyn Suazo and Angelito Suazo got married when they were 16 years old.
They lived with Angelito’s parents as they have no means to support themselves.
They stopped schooling and Jocelyn was forced to work. Angelito allegedly refused to
work and became an alcoholic and heavy gambler. Jocelyn alleged that Angelito beat
her, thus prompting Jocelyn to leave Angelito. Ten years after their separation,
Jocelyn Bled a petition to declare their marriage null and void under Article 36 of the
Family Code. The psychologist diagnosed Angelito with Anti-Social Personality
Disorder. The trial court granted the petition and declared the marriage null and
void. However, the CA reversed.
Issue:
Whether or not the marriage between Jocelyn and Angelito should be declared
null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Ruling:
No. Both the psychologist’s testimony and the psychological report did not
conclusively show the root cause, gravity and incurability of Angelito’s alleged
psychological condition. The psychologist, using meager information coming from
Jocelyn, a directly interested party, could not have secured a complete personality
proBle and could not have conclusively formed an objective opinion or diagnosis of
Angelito’s psychological condition.
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Jocelyn merely testiBed on Angelito’s habitual drunkenness, gambling, refusal
to seek employment and the physical beatings she received from him all of which
occurred after the marriage. Habitual drunkenness, gambling and refusal to Bnd a
job, while indicative of psychological incapacity, do not, by themselves, show
psychological incapacity. All these simply indicate di>culty, neglect or mere refusal
to perform marital obligations that, as the cited jurisprudence holds, cannot be
considered to be constitutive of psychological incapacity in the absence of proof that
these are manifestations of an incapacity rooted in some debilitating psychological
condition or illness.
MEYNARDO L. BELTRAN v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, et al.
G.R. No. 137567, June 20, 2000, BUENA, J.
The import of Article 40 of the Family Code is that for purposes of remarriage,
the only legally acceptable basis for declaring a previous marriage an absolute nullity
is a $nal judgment declaring such previous marriage void, whereas, for purposes of
other than remarriage, other evidence is acceptable.
Facts:
Meynardo Beltran Bled a petition for nullity of marriage against his wife
Charmaine Felix on the ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the
Family Code. Charmaine subsequently sued Meynardo and his paramour for
concubinage. Meynardo Bled a Motion to Defer Proceedings Including the Issuance of
the Warrant of Arrest in the criminal case. He contended that the pendency of the
civil case for declaration of nullity of his marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code
posed a prejudicial question to the determination of the criminal case. The said
motion was denied. Petitioner Bled a petition for certiorari before the RTC
questioning the denial of his motion to defer the proceedings in the concubinage
case. Said petition was likewise denied.
Issue:
Whether or not the Meynardo Beltran could be convicted of the crime of
concubinage despite the pendency of the civil case for declaration of nullity of
marriage.
Ruling:
Yes. The Court has held that the import of Article 40 of the Family Code is that
for purposes of remarriage, the only legally acceptable basis for declaring a previous
marriage an absolute nullity is a Bnal judgment declaring such previous marriage
void, whereas, for purposes of other than remarriage, other evidence is acceptable.
So that in a case for concubinage, the accused, like the herein petitioner need not
present a Bnal judgment declaring his marriage void for he can adduce evidence in
the criminal case of the nullity of his marriage other than proof of a Bnal judgment
declaring his marriage void.
With regard to petitioner's argument that he could be acquitted of the charge
of concubinage should his marriage be declared null and void, su>ce it to state that
even a subsequent pronouncement that his marriage is void from the beginning is
not a defense. In the case at bar, it must be held that parties to the marriage should
not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted
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to judgment of the competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so
declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration, the
presumption is that the marriage exists for all intents and purposes. Therefore, he
who cohabits with a woman not his wife before the judicial declaration of nullity of
the marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for concubinage.
ROBERTO DOMINGO v. COURT OF APPEALS and DELIA SOLEDAD AVERA
represented by her Attorney-in-Fact MOISES R. AVERA
G.R. No. 104818, September 17, 1993, ROMERO, J.
A declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required
either as a cause of action or a ground for defense.
Facts:
Private respondent Delia Soledad Domingo and petitioner Roberto Domingo
got married while the marriage of Roberto with one Emerlina dela Paz was still
subsisting. Hence, Emerlina sued Roberto for bigamy. Thereafter, Delia Bled a
petition for the declaration of nullity of her marriage with Roberto and separation of
property. Roberto Bled a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the marriage being
void ab initio, the petition for the declaration of its nullity is unnecessary. The trial
court denied the motion. Roberto then Bled a special civil action of certiorari and
mandamus, which was dismissed by the CA. Roberto contended that the judicial
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage can be maintained only if it is for the
purpose of remarriage.
Issue:
Whether or not a petition for judicial declaration of a void marriage is
necessary for the recovery and the separation of properties.
Ruling:
Yes. The Family Code has settled once and for all the conMicting jurisprudence
on the matter. A declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly
required either as a cause of action or a ground for defense. In fact, the requirement
for a declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage is also for the protection of the
spouse who, believing that his or her marriage is illegal and void, marries again. With
the judicial declaration of the nullity of his or her Brst marriage, the person who
marries again cannot be charged with bigamy.
Article 40 of the Family Code denotes that such Bnal judgment declaring the
previous marriage void need not be obtained only for purposes of remarriage.
Undoubtedly, one can conceive of other instances where a party might well invoke
the absolute nullity of a previous marriage for purposes other than remarriage, such
as in case of an action for liquidation, partition, distribution and separation of
property between the erstwhile spouses, as well as an action for the custody and
support of their common children and the delivery of the latters' presumptive
legitimes. In such cases, evidence needs must be adduced, testimonial or
documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a previous marriage
an absolute nullity. These need not be limited solely to an earlier Bnal judgment of a
court declaring such previous marriage void. Hence, in the instance where a party
who has previously contracted a marriage which remains subsisting desires to enter
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into another marriage which is legally unassailable, he is required by law to prove
that the previous one was an absolute nullity. But this he may do on the
basis solely of a Bnal judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
VINCENT PAUL G. MERCADO a.k.a. VINCENT G. MERCADO v. CONSUELO TAN
G.R. No. 137110, August 1, 2000, PANGANIBAN, J.
A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a
subsequent one can be legally contracted. One who enters into a subsequent
marriage without $rst obtaining such judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy.
Facts:
Vincent Mercado married Consuelo Tan while his marriage with Ma. Thelma
Oliva was still subsisting. Hence, Tan Bled a complaint for bigamy against Mercado.
Subsequently, Mercado Bled a petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against
Oliva. The petition was granted and the marriage between Mercado and Oliva was
declared null and void. Nevertheless, the RTC convicted Mercado of the crime of
bigamy.
Mercado contended that since his previous marriage had been declared null
and void, he cannot be convicted of the crime of bigamy as there was no Brst
marriage to speak of.
Issue:
Whether or not the element of previous legal marriage is present in order to
convict petitioner.
Ruling:
Yes. Article 40 of the Family Code expressly requires a judicial declaration of
nullity of the previous marriage before that person can marry again; otherwise, the
second marriage will also be void. It is now settled that the fact that the Brst
marriage is void from the beginning is not a defense in a bigamy charge. One who
enters into a subsequent marriage without Brst obtaining such judicial declaration is
guilty of bigamy. This principle applies even if the earlier union is characterized by
statute as void.
In the instant case, petitioner contracted a second marriage although there
was yet no judicial declaration of nullity of his Brst marriage. In fact, he instituted the
Petition to have the Brst marriage declared void only after complainant had Bled a
letter-complaint charging him with bigamy. By contracting a second marriage while
the Brst was still subsisting, he committed the acts punishable under Article 349 of
the Revised Penal Code. That he subsequently obtained a judicial declaration of the
nullity of the Brst marriage was immaterial. To repeat, the crime had already been
consummated by then.
LUCIO MORIGO y CACHO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 145226, February 06, 2004, QUISUMBING, J.
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The mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears no semblance to a
valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Such act alone,
without more, cannot be deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for which
petitioner might be held liable for bigamy unless he $rst secures a judicial
declaration of nullity before he contracts a subsequent marriage.
Facts:
Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete got married in the Philippines. When Barrete
returned to Canada to work, she Bled with the Ontario Court (General Division) a
petition for divorce against Morigo which was granted by the court. Consequently,
Morigo married Maria Jececha Lumbago in the Philippines. Morigo subsequently Bled
a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage with Barrete on the ground
that no marriage ceremony actually took place. Thereafter, Morigo was charged with
the crime of bigamy, and later convicted by the RTC. Pending appeal to the CA, the
trial court declared the marriage between Morigo and Barrete null and void. The CA
eventually a>rmed the conviction of Morigo.
Issue:
Whether or not the marriage between Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete is valid,
thereby warranting the conviction of Morigo of the crime of bigamy.
Ruling:
No. The Brst element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must
have been legally married. But in this case, legally speaking, the petitioner was
never married to Lucia Barrete. Thus, there is no Brst marriage to speak of. Under
the principle of retroactivity of a marriage being declared void ab initio, the two were
never married from the beginning. The contract of marriage is null; it bears no legal
eDect. Taking this argument to its logical conclusion, for legal purposes, petitioner
was not married to Lucia at the time he contracted the marriage with Maria Jececha.
The existence and the validity of the Brst marriage being an essential element of the
crime of bigamy, it is but logical that a conviction for said oDense cannot be
sustained where there is no Brst marriage to speak of. The petitioner, must, perforce
be acquitted of the instant charge.
In the instant case, no marriage ceremony at all was performed by a duly
authorized solemnizing o>cer. Petitioner and Lucia Barrete merely signed a marriage
contract on their own. The mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears no
semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Such
act alone, without more, cannot be deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid marriage
for which petitioner might be held liable for bigamy unless he Brst secures a judicial
declaration of nullity before he contracts a subsequent marriage.
ANTONIA ARMAS y CALISTERIO v. MARIETTA CALISTERIO
G.R. No. 136467, April 6, 2000, VITUG, J.
Under Article 83 of the New Civil Code, a subsequent marriage contracted
during the lifetime of the $rst spouse is illegal and void ab initio unless the prior
marriage is $rst annulled or dissolved. For the subsequent marriage referred to in the
three exceptional cases therein provided, to be held valid, the spouse present (not
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the absentee spouse) so contracting the later marriage must have done so in good
faith.
Facts:
Teodorico Calisterio died intestate and was survived by his wife, respondent
Marietta Calisterio. Teodorico was the second husband of Marietta who had
previously been married to James William Bounds. Teodorico and Marietta were
married eleven years after James had disappeared, without Marietta having secured a
court declaration that James was presumptively dead. Petitioner Antonia Armas, a
surviving sister of Teodorico, Bled a petition for the intestate proceedings of the
estate of Teodorico with the RTC. She claimed to be the sole surviving heir of
Teodorico, and that the marriage between the Teodorico and Marietta is bigamous
and thereby null and void. Marietta, who opposed the petition, stated that her Brst
marriage with James had been dissolved due to the latter's absence for more than
eleven years before she contracted her second marriage with Teodorico. The RTC
ruled in favor of Antonia. Marietta went to the CA contending that the trial court
erred in applying the provisions of the Family Code despite the fact that the
controversy arose when the New Civil Code was the law in force. The CA reversed
the decision of the RTC and declared the marriage between Marietta and Teodorico
valid.
Issue:
Whether or not the marriage between the deceased Teodorico and Marietta is
valid, despite the absence of a judicial declaration of presumptive death of Marietta’s
Brst husband, James.
Ruling:
Yes. The marriage between the deceased Teodorico and respondent Marietta
was solemnized on 08 May 1958. The law in force at that time was the Civil Code, not
the Family Code which took eDect only on 03 August 1988. Under Article 83 of the
New Civil Code, a subsequent marriage contracted during the lifetime of the Brst
spouse is illegal and void ab initio unless the prior marriage is Brst annulled or
dissolved. Paragraph (2) of the law gives exceptions from the above rule. For the
subsequent marriage referred to in the three exceptional cases therein provided, to
be held valid, the spouse present (not the absentee spouse) so contracting the later
marriage must have done so in good faith. Bad faith imports a dishonest purpose or
some moral obliquity and conscious doing of wrong – it partakes of the nature of
fraud, a breach of a known duty through some motive of interest or ill will. The Court
does not Bnd these circumstances to be here extant.
A judicial declaration of absence of the absentee spouse is not necessary as
long as the prescribed period of absence is met. It is equally noteworthy that the
marriage in these exceptional cases are, by the explicit mandate of Article 83, to be
deemed valid "until declared null and void by a competent court." It follows that the
burden of proof would be, in these cases, on the party assailing the second marriage.
In contrast, under the 1988 Family Code, in order that a subsequent bigamous
marriage may exceptionally be considered valid, the following conditions must
concur; viz.: (a) The prior spouse of the contracting party must have been absent for
four consecutive years, or two years where there is danger of death under the
circumstances stated in Article 391 of the Civil Code at the time of disappearance; (b)
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the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead;
and (c) there is, unlike the old rule, a judicial declaration of presumptive death of the
absentee for which purpose the spouse present can institute a summary proceeding
in court to ask for that declaration. The last condition is consistent and in
consonance with the requirement of judicial intervention in subsequent marriages as
so provided in Article 41, in relation to Article 40, of the Family Code.
EDUARDO P. MANUEL v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 165842, November 29, 2005, CALLEJO, SR., J.
Before the spouse present may contract a subsequent marriage, he or she
must institute summary proceedings for the declaration of the presumptive death of
the absentee spouse, without prejudice to the e ect of the reappearance of the
absentee spouse.
Facts:
Eduardo Manuel married Tina Gandalera while his marriage with Rubylus Gaa
was still subsisting. Thus, Gandalera sued Manuel for bigamy. Gandalera alleged
that she married Manuel based on the latter’s representation that he was single when
in fact he was not. Manuel, on the other hand, allegedly declared he was single in his
marriage contract with Gandalera because he believed in good faith that his Brst
marriage was invalid. He stated that he was merely forced to marry Gaa and that
after Gaa was imprisoned for estafa, he had not heard from her for more than 20
years. He thought that there was no more need to nullify his Brst marriage before
marrying Gandalera. The RTC convicted Manuel of the crime of bigamy, which the CA
a>rmed.
Issue:
Whether or not Eduardo Manuel should be convicted of bigamy considering
the absence of judicial declaration of presumptive death of Rubylus Gaa under Article
41 of the Family Code.
Ruling:
Yes. The reason why bigamy is considered a felony is to preserve and ensure
the juridical tie of marriage established by law. The phrase “or before the absent
spouse had been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in
the proper proceedings” was incorporated in the Revised Penal Code because the
drafters of the law were of the impression that in consonance with the civil law which
provides for the presumption of death after an absence of a number of years, the
judicial declaration of presumed death like annulment of marriage should be a
justiBcation for bigamy. It was the burden of the petitioner to prove his defense that
when he married the private complainant in 1996, he was of the well-grounded belief
that his Brst wife was already dead, as he had not heard from her for more than 20
years since 1975. He should have adduced in evidence a decision of a competent
court declaring the presumptive death of his Brst wife as required by Article 349 of
the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Article 41 of the Family Code.
With the eDectivity of the Family Code, the period of seven years under the
Brst paragraph of Article 390 of the Civil Code was reduced to four consecutive years.
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Thus, before the spouse present may contract a subsequent marriage, he or she
must institute summary proceedings for the declaration of the presumptive death of
the absentee spouse, without prejudice to the eDect of the reappearance of the
absentee spouse.
IMELDA MARBELLA-BOBIS v. ISAGANI D. BOBIS
G.R. No. 138509, July 31, 2000, YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
A decision in the civil case is not essential to the determination of the criminal
charge. It is not a prejudicial question.
Facts:
Respondent Isagani Bobis got married three times. The Brst was with one
Maria Dulce B. Javier, the second was with petitioner Imelda Marbella-Bobis, and the
third was with a certain Julia Sally Hernandez. An Information for bigamy was Bled
against Isagani. Subsequently, Isagani Bled a civil action for the judicial declaration
of absolute nullity of his Brst marriage on the ground that it was celebrated without a
marriage license. Invoking the pending civil case for nullity of the Brst marriage as a
prejudicial question to the criminal case for bigamy, Isagani Bled a motion to suspend
the proceedings in the criminal case, which the lower court granted. Imelda moved
for reconsideration, but the same was denied.
Issue:
Whether or not the subsequent Bling of a civil action for declaration of nullity
of a previous marriage constitutes a prejudicial question to a criminal case for
bigamy.
Ruling:
No. Article 40 of the Family Code, which was eDective at the time of
celebration of the second marriage, requires a prior judicial declaration of nullity of a
previous marriage before a party may remarry. The clear implication of this is that it
is not for the parties, particularly the accused, to determine the validity or invalidity
of the marriage. Whether or not the Brst marriage was void for lack of a license is a
matter of defense because there is still no judicial declaration of its nullity at the time
the second marriage was contracted. It should be remembered that bigamy can
successfully be prosecuted provided all its elements concur two of which are a
previous marriage and a subsequent marriage which would have been valid had it
not been for the existence at the material time of the Brst marriage.
In the light of Article 40 of the Family Code, respondent, without Brst having
obtained the judicial declaration of nullity of the Brst marriage, cannot be said to
have validly entered into the second marriage. Per current jurisprudence, a marriage
though void still needs a judicial declaration of such fact before any party can marry
again; otherwise the second marriage will also be void. The reason is that, without a
judicial declaration of its nullity, the Brst marriage is presumed to be subsisting. In
the case at bar, respondent was for all legal intents and purposes regarded as a
married man at the time he contracted his second marriage with petitioner. Against
this legal backdrop, any decision in the civil action for nullity would not erase the fact
that respondent entered into a second marriage during the subsistence of a Brst
marriage. Thus, a decision in the civil case is not essential to the determination of
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the criminal charge. It is, therefore, not a prejudicial question. As stated above,
respondent cannot be permitted to use his own malfeasance to defeat the criminal
action against him.
SUSAN NICDAO CARIÑO v. SUSAN YEE CARIÑO
G.R. No. 132529, February 2, 2001, YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
Under Article 40 of the Family Code, for purposes of remarriage, there must
$rst be a prior judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void,
before a party can enter into a second marriage, otherwise, the second marriage
would also be void.
Facts:
The late SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño contracted two marriages during his lifetime.
The Brst was with petitioner Susan Nicdao Cariño, and the second was with
respondent Susan Yee Cariño. SPO4 Cariño passed away under the care of
respondent, who spent for his medical and burial expenses. Both petitioner and
respondent Bled claims for monetary beneBts and Bnancial assistance pertaining to
the deceased from various government agencies. Respondent Bled a case for
collection of sum of money against petitioner praying that petitioner be ordered to
return to her at least one-half of the P146,000.00 “death beneBts” which petitioner
received from various government agencies. Respondent admitted that her marriage
to the deceased took place during the subsistence of, and without Brst obtaining a
judicial declaration of nullity of the marriage between petitioner and the deceased.
She, however, claimed to be in good faith since she had no knowledge of the
previous marriage. To bolster her action for collection of sum of money, respondent
contended that the marriage of petitioner and the deceased is void ab initio because
the same was solemnized without the required marriage license. The trial court ruled
in favor of respondent, which the CA a>rmed.
Issue:
Whether or not the marriage between SPO4 Santiago Cariño and petitioner
Susan Nicdao Cariño is valid, thereby entitling her to the entire subject death
beneBts.
Ruling:
No. Under the Civil Code, which was the law in force when the marriage of
petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased was solemnized in 1969, a valid marriage
license is a requisite of marriage, and the absence thereof, subject to certain
exceptions, renders the marriage void ab initio. The records reveal that the marriage
contract of petitioner and the deceased bears no marriage license number and, as
certiBed by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their o>ce has no
record of such marriage license. It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the marriage
between petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased, having been solemnized without
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the necessary marriage license, and not being one of the marriages exempt from the
marriage license requirement, is undoubtedly void ab initio.
Under Article 40 of the Family Code, for purposes of remarriage, there must
Brst be a prior judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void,
before a party can enter into a second marriage, otherwise, the second marriage
would also be void. Accordingly, the declaration in the instant case of nullity of the
previous marriage of the deceased and petitioner Susan Nicdao does not validate the
second marriage of the deceased with respondent Susan Yee. The fact remains that
their marriage was solemnized without Brst obtaining a judicial decree declaring the
marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased void. Hence, the marriage of
respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is, likewise, void ab initio.
Considering that the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is a
bigamous marriage, having been solemnized during the subsistence of a previous
marriage then presumed to be valid (between petitioner and the deceased), the
application of Article 148 of the Family Code is therefore in order. The disputed
P146,000.00 from MBAI [AFP Mutual BeneBt Association, Inc.], NAPOLCOM,
Commutation, Pag-ibig, and PCCUI, are clearly renumerations, incentives and beneBts
from governmental agencies earned by the deceased as a police o>cer. Unless
respondent Susan Yee presents proof to the contrary, it could not be said that she
contributed money, property or industry in the acquisition of these monetary
beneBts. Hence, they are not owned in common by respondent and the deceased,
but belong to the deceased alone and respondent has no right whatsoever to claim
the same.
As to the property regime of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased, Article
147 of the Family Code governs. Even if the disputed “death beneBts” were earned
by the deceased alone as a government employee, Article 147 creates a co-
ownership in respect thereto, entitling the petitioner to share one-half thereof. As
there is no allegation of bad faith in the present case, both parties of the Brst
marriage are presumed to be in good faith. Thus, one-half of the subject “death
beneBts” under scrutiny shall go to the petitioner as her share in the property
regime, and the other half pertaining to the deceased shall pass by, intestate
succession, to his legal heirs, namely, his children with Susan Nicdao.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. GLORIA BERMUDEZ-LORINO
G.R. No. 160258, January 19, 2005, GARCIA, J.
In Summary Judicial Proceedings under the Family Code, there is no
reglementary period within which to perfect an appeal, precisely because judgments
rendered thereunder, by express provision of Section 247 of the Family Code, are
immediately $nal and executory.
Facts:
Nine years after she left her husband due to the latter’s violent character,
Gloria Bled a veriBed petition for the declaration of the presumptive death of his
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absent spouse with the RTC under the rules on Summary Judicial Proceedings in the
Family Law provided for in the Family Code. The RTC granted the petition and
declared Francisco presumptively dead pursuant to Article 41 of the Family Code.
Despite the judgment being immediately Bnal and executory under Article 247 of the
Family Code, the OSG Bled a Notice of Appeal. The RTC elevated the records to the
CA. The CA, treating the case as an ordinary appealed case, denied the appeal and
a>rmed the appealed RTC decision. Without Bling any motion for reconsideration,
petitioner Republic Bled a petition for review for certiorari under Rule 45, maintaining
that the petition raises a pure question of law that does not require prior Bling of a
motion for reconsideration.
Issue:
Whether or not the judgment declaring Francisco presumptively dead is Bnal
and executory, and therefore, not appealable.
Ruling:
Yes. In Summary Judicial Proceedings under the Family Code, there is no
reglementary period within which to perfect an appeal, precisely because judgments
rendered thereunder, by express provision of Section 247, Family Code, are
immediately Bnal and executory. It was erroneous, therefore, on the part of the RTC
to give due course to the Republic’s appeal and order the transmittal of the entire
records of the case to the Court of Appeals.
An appellate court acquires no jurisdiction to review a judgment which, by
express provision of law, is immediately Bnal and executory. The right to appeal is not
a natural right nor is it a part of due process, for it is merely a statutory privilege.
Since, by express mandate of Article 247 of the Family Code, all judgments rendered
in summary judicial proceedings in Family Law are immediately Bnal and executory,
the right to appeal was not granted to any of the parties therein. The Republic of the
Philippines, as oppositor in the petition for declaration of presumptive death, should
not be treated diDerently. It had no right to appeal the RTC decision of November 7,
2001. The Court of Appeals committed grave reversible error when it failed to
dismiss the erroneous appeal of the Republic on ground of lack of jurisdiction
because, by express provision of law, the judgment was not appealable.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
(TENTH DIVISION) and ALAN B. ALEGRO
G.R. No. 159614, December 9, 2005, CALLEJO, SR., J.
The spouse present is burdened to prove that his spouse has been absent and
that he has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead before the
present spouse may contract a subsequent marriage.
Facts:
Alan Alegro Bled a petition for the declaration of presumptive death of his
wife, Rosalia (Lea) Julaton. Alan stated when he arrived home from work one day,
Lea was nowhere to be found. Alan thought that Lea merely went to her parents’
house but when he went there, Lea was not there. He sought the help of his friends,
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Lea’s friends, and the barangay captain, to locate his wife but to no avail. He even
went to Manila to look for her, but he also failed. Alan then decided to report Lea’s
disappearance to the local police station and to the NBI. The RTC granted the
petition and declared Lea presumptively dead. The CA a>rmed the RTC Decision.
The OSG contended that Alan failed to prove that he had a well-founded belief that
Lea was already dead since Alan did not exert reasonable and diligent eDorts to
locate his wife.
Issue:
Whether or not Alan had a well-founded belief that Lea was already dead and
thus, Lea should be declared presumptively dead.
Ruling:
No. Under Article 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines, the spouse present
is burdened to prove that his spouse has been absent and that he has a well-founded
belief that the absent spouse is already dead before the present spouse may contract
a subsequent marriage. The belief of the present spouse must be the result of proper
and honest to goodness inquiries and eDorts to ascertain the whereabouts of the
absent spouse and whether the absent spouse is still alive or is already dead.
Whether or not the spouse present acted on a well-founded belief of death of the
absent spouse depends upon the inquiries to be drawn from a great many
circumstances occurring before and after the disappearance of the absent spouse
and the nature and extent of the inquiries made by present spouse.
In this case, the respondent failed to present a witness other
than Barangay Captain Juan Magat. The respondent even failed to present Janeth
Bautista or Nelson Abaenza or any other person from whom he allegedly made
inquiries about Lea to corroborate his testimony. On the other hand, the respondent
admitted that when he returned to the house of his parents-in-law, his father-in-law
told him that Lea had just been there but that she left without notice. The
respondent declared that Lea left their abode after he chided her for coming home
late and for being always out of their house, and told her that it would be better for
her to go home to her parents if she enjoyed the life of a single person. Lea, thus,
left their conjugal abode and never returned. Neither did she communicate with the
respondent after leaving the conjugal abode because of her resentment to the
chastisement she received from him barely a month after their marriage. What is so
worrisome is that, the respondent failed to make inquiries from his parents-in-law
regarding Lea’s whereabouts before Bling his petition in the RTC. It could have
enhanced the credibility of the respondent had he made inquiries from his parents-in-
law about Lea’s whereabouts considering that Lea’s father was the owner of Radio
DYMS. The respondent did report and seek the help of the local police authorities
and the NBI to locate Lea, but it was only an afterthought. He did so only after the
OSG Bled its notice to dismiss his petition in the RTC.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MARIA FE ESPINOSA CANTOR
G.R. No. 184621, December 10, 2013, BRION, J.
Article 41 of the Family Code, compared to the old provision of the Civil Code
which it superseded, imposes a stricter standard. It requires a "well-founded belief"
that the absentee is already dead before a petition for declaration of presumptive
death can be granted.
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Facts:
Jerry Cantor, the husband of respondent Maria Fe Cantor, left their conjugal
home after having a violent quarrel about respondent’s inability to reach "sexual
climax" and Jerry’s expression of animosity toward the respondent’s father. More
than four years from the time of Jerry’s disappearance, the respondent Bled before
the RTC a petition for her husband’s declaration of presumptive death under Article
41 of the Family Code. She stated that she had a well-founded belief that Jerry was
already dead. She allegedly exerted eDorts to look for her husband by inquiring from
her in-laws, neighbors and friends of Jerry’s whereabouts, but to no avail. She further
alleged that she checks the patients’ directory whenever she went to a hospital
hoping to Bnd Jerry. The RTC granted the petition and declared Jerry presumptively
dead. The CA a>rmed.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent had a well-founded belief that Jerry is already
dead.
Ruling:
No. Before a judicial declaration of presumptive death can be obtained, it
must be shown that the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and
the present spouse had a well-founded belief that the prior spouse was already dead.
Article 41 of the Family Code, compared to the old provision of the Civil Code which it
superseded, imposes a stricter standard. It requires a "well-founded belief" that
the absentee is already dead before a petition for declaration of presumptive death
can be granted. To be able to comply with this requirement, the present spouse must
prove that his/her belief was the result of diligent and reasonable eDorts and inquiries
to locate the absent spouse and that based on these eDorts and inquiries, he/she
believes that under the circumstances, the absent spouse is already dead. It requires
exertion of active eDort (not a mere passive one).
In the case at bar, the respondent’s "well-founded belief" was anchored on her
alleged "earnest eDorts" to locate Jerry. These eDorts, however, fell short of the
"stringent standard" and degree of diligence required by jurisprudence. The
respondent did not actively look for her missing husband. She did not report Jerry’s
absence to the police nor did she seek the aid of the authorities to look for him. She
did not present as witnesses Jerry’s relatives or their neighbors and friends, who can
corroborate her eDorts to locate Jerry. There was no other corroborative evidence to
support the respondent’s claim that she conducted a diligent search.
In sum, the Court is of the view that the respondent merely engaged in a
"passive search" where she relied on uncorroborated inquiries from her in-laws,
neighbors and friends. She failed to conduct a diligent search because her alleged
eDorts are insu>cient to form a well-founded belief that her husband was already
dead.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. GREGORIO NOLASCO
G.R. No. 94053, March 17, 1993, FELICIANO, J.
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The Family Code prescribes as "well founded belief" that the absentee
is already dead before a petition for declaration of presumptive death can be
granted.
Facts:
Respondent Gregorio Nolasco, a seaman, met Janet Monica Parker in a bar in
England during one of his ship's port calls. The two became sweethearts and
eventually got married in the Philippines. Nolasco obtained another employment
contract as a seaman and left Parker with his parents. After Parker gave birth to their
son, she left the Philippines. Nolasco allegedly exerted eDorts to look for her in
England, but to no avail. He, however, admitted that he did not report Parker’s
disappearance to the Philippine government authorities. Nolasco Bled a petition for
the declaration of presumptive death of Parker, invoking Article 41 of the Family
Code. The RTC granted the petition, which the CA a>rmed.
Issue:
Whether or not Nolasco has a well-founded belief that his wife is already dead.
Ruling:
No. When Article 41 is compared with the old provision of the Civil Code,
which it superseded, the following crucial diDerences emerge. Under Article 41, the
time required for the presumption to arise has been shortened to four (4) years;
however, there is need for a judicial declaration of presumptive death to enable the
spouse present to remarry. Also, Article 41 of the Family Code imposes a stricter
standard than the Civil Code: Article 83 of the Civil Code merely requires either that
there be no news that such absentee is still alive; or the absentee is generally
considered to be dead and believed to be so by the spouse present, or is presumed
dead under Article 390 and 391 of the Civil Code. The Family Code, upon the other
hand, prescribes as "well founded belief" that the absentee is already dead before a
petition for declaration of presumptive death can be granted.
In the case at bar, the Court considers that the investigation allegedly
conducted by respondent in his attempt to ascertain Janet Monica Parker's
whereabouts is too sketchy to form the basis of a reasonable or well-founded belief
that she was already dead. When he arrived in San Jose, Antique after learning of
Janet Monica's departure, instead of seeking the help of local authorities or of the
British Embassy, he secured another seaman's contract and went to London, a vast
city of many millions of inhabitants, to look for her there. The Court also views
respondent's claim that Janet Monica declined to give any information as to her
personal background even after she had married respondent too convenient an
excuse to justify his failure to locate her. The same can be said of the loss of the
alleged letters respondent had sent to his wife which respondent claims were all
returned to him. Neither can this Court give much credence to respondent's bare
assertion that he had inquired from their friends of her whereabouts, considering that
respondent did not identify those friends in his testimony. In Bne, respondent failed
to establish that he had the well-founded belief required by law that his absent wife
was already dead that would sustain the issuance of a court order declaring Janet
Monica Parker presumptively dead.
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Voidable Marriages
AURORA A. ANAYA v. FERNANDO O. PALAROAN
G.R. No. L-27930 November 26, 1970, JBL Reyes, J.
Non-disclosure of a husband's pre-marital relationship with another woman is
not one of the enumerated circumstances that would constitute a ground for
annulment; and it is further excluded by the last paragraph of the article, providing
that "no other misrepresentation or deceit as to ... chastity" shall give ground for an
action to annul a marriage.
Facts:
Palaroan Bled for an action for annulment of his marriage with Anaya on the
ground that his consent was obtained through force and intimidation. The CFI of
Manila dismissed his complaint upholding their marriage. Anaya also Bled for
annulment of marriage on the ground that Palaroan had divulged to Anaya that
months prior to their marriage, he had a pre-marital relationship with a close relative
of his which Anaya considered a fact that wrecked their marriage thus she averres
that there was fraud in the contracting of their marriage. The court considered
Anaya’s allegation of fraud as insu>cient thus they dismissed her claim.
Issue:
Whether or not non-disclosure of a pre-marital relationship is a ground for
annulment of marriage.
Ruling:
No. Non-disclosure of pre-marital relationships is not a ground for annulment.
Non-disclosure of a husband's pre-marital relationship with another woman is not one
of the enumerated circumstances that would constitute a ground for annulment; and
it is further excluded by the last paragraph of the article, providing that "no other
misrepresentation or deceit as to ... chastity" shall give ground for an action to annul
a marriage. While a woman may detest such non-disclosure of premarital lewdness or
feel having been thereby cheated into giving her consent to the marriage,
nevertheless the law does not assuage her grief after her consent was solemnly
given, for upon marriage she entered into an institution in which society, and not
herself alone, is interested. The lawmaker's intent being plain, the Court's duty is to
give eDect to the same, whether it agrees with the rule or not.
FERNANDO AQUINO v. CONCHITA DELIZO
G.R. No. L-15853 July 27, 1960, GUTIERREZ DAVID, J.
According to medical authorities, even on the 5th month of pregnancy, the
enlargement of a woman's abdomen is still below the umbilicus, that is to say, the
enlargement is limited to the lower part of the abdomen so that it is hardly
noticeable and may, if noticed, be attributed only to fat formation on the lower part
of the abdomen.
Facts:
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Delizo, at the date of her marriage to Aquino, concealed the fact that shewas
pregnant by another man that four months after their marriage, she gave birth to a
child which she claims that the child was conceived out of lawful wedlock between
her and Aquino. The trial court dismissed the complaint for Aquino did not show any
birth certiBcate to show the child was born within 180 days after the marriage
between the parties. Later on Aquino presented evidence to show proof tho the
child’s birth but still his petition was denied. The CA denied Aquino’s appeal on the
theory that it was not impossible for the parties to have sex during their engagement
so that the child could be their own and Bnding it absurd for Aquino not to notice or
suspect that Delizo was pregnant when he married her. In a motion for
reconsideration Bled by Aquino, Delizo and her counsel did not Ble an answer thus
the motion for reconsideration was denied.
Issue:
Whether or not the dismissal of Aquino’s complaint is correct.
Ruling:
No. The dismissal is not correct. Under the new Civil Code, concealment by
the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was pregnant by a man
other than her husband constitutes fraud and is ground for annulment of marriage.
Here the defendant wife was alleged to be only more than four months pregnant at
the time of her marriage to plaintiD. At that stage, we are not prepared to say that
her pregnancy was readily apparent, especially since she was "naturally plump" or fat
as alleged by plaintiD. According to medical authorities, even on the 5th month of
pregnancy, the enlargement of a woman's abdomen is still below the umbilicus, that
is to say, the enlargement is limited to the lower part of the abdomen so that it is
hardly noticeable and may, if noticed, be attributed only to fat formation on the lower
part of the abdomen. It is only on the 6th month of pregnancy that the enlargement
of the woman's abdomen reaches a height above the umbilicus, making the
roundness of the abdomen more general and apparent.
Furthermore, The Court of Appeals should not have denied the motion praying
for new trial simply because defendant failed to Ble her answer thereto. Such failure
of the defendant cannot be taken as evidence of collusion, especially since a
provincial Bscal has been ordered of represent the Government precisely to prevent
such collusion.
JOEL JIMENEZ v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. L-12790 August 31, 1960, PADILLA, J.
The lone testimony of the husband that his wife is physically incapable of
sexual intercourse is insu cient to tear as under the ties that have bound them
together as husband and wife.
Facts:
Jimenez is praying for a decree to annul his marriage with Canizares on the
ground that the o>ce of her vagina was to small to allow the penetration of the penis
for copulation which he states existed at the time of marriage and continues to exist.
Canizares did not Ble an answer when she was summoned. Canizares did not respond
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as well to subsequent calls to her by the court thus the MTC entered a decree
annulling the marriage between Jimenez and Canizares.
Issue:
Whether or not amarriage may be annulled on the strength only of the lone
testimony of the husband.
Ruling:
No. It is not enough proof. The law speciBcally enumerates the legal grounds
that must be proved to exist by indubitable evidence, to annul a marriage. In the
case at bar, the annulment of the marriage in question was decreed upon the sole
testimony of the husband who was expected to give testimony tending or aiming at
securing the annulment of his marriage he sought and seeks. Whether the wife is
really impotent cannot be deemed to have been satisfactorily established, becase
from the commencement of the proceedings until the entry of the decree she had
abstained from taking part therein. Although her refusal to be examined or failure to
appear in court show indiDerence on her part, yet from such attitude the presumption
arising out of the suppression of evidence could not arise or be inferred because
women of this country are by nature coy, bashful and shy and would not submit to a
physical examination unless compelled to by competent authority. This the Court may
do without doing violence to and infringing in this case is not self-incrimination. She is
not charged with any oDense. She is not being compelled to be a witness against
herself. "Impotency being an abnormal condition should not be presumed. The
presumption is in favor of potency." The lone testimony of the husband that his wife
is physically incapable of sexual intercourse is insu>cient to tear asunder the ties
that have bound them together as husband and wife.
Legal Separation
JOSE DE OCAMPO v. SERAFINA FLORENCIANO
G.R. No. L-13553 February 23, 1960, BENGZON, J.
Collusion in divorce or legal separation means the agreement between
husband and wife for one of them to commit, or to appear to commit, or to be
represented in court as having committed, a matrimonial o ense, or to suppress
evidence of a valid defense, for the purpose of enabling the other to obtain a divorce.
Facts:
After years of marriage, Ocampo discovered on several occasions that his wife
was maintaining illicit aDairs with a Jose Arcalas when Ocampo sent her to study
beauty culture in Manila. When she Bnished her course, she left Ocampo and that he
even caught her with an aDair with another man by the name of Nelson Orzame.
Ocampo Bled for legal separation. She did not made any answer to the RTC and
admits having such sexual relation so when the case was appealed to the CA, the CA
construed such confession a confession of judgment thus they did not decree the
legal separation.
Issue:
Whether or not there was collusion between Ocampo and Floreniano.
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Ruling:
No. In this case, there would be collusion if the parties had arranged to make
it appear that a matrimonial oDense had been committed although it was not, or if
the parties had connived to bring about a legal separation even in the absence of
grounds therefor.
Here, the oDense of adultery had really taking place, according to the
evidence. The defendant could not have falsely told the adulterous acts to the Fiscal,
because her story might send her to jail the moment her husband requests the Fiscal
to prosecute. She could not have practiced deception at such a personal risk.
In this connection, it has been held that collusion may not be inferred from the
mere fact that the guilty party confesses to the oDense and thus enables the other
party to procure evidence necessary to prove it. And proof that the defendant desires
the divorce and makes no defense, is not by itself collusion.
BENJAMIN BUGAYONG v. LEONILA GINEZ
G.R. No. L-10033 December 28, 1956, FELIX, J.
Single voluntary act of marital intercourse between the parties ordinarily is
su cient to constitute condonation, and where the parties live in the same house, it
is presumed that they live on terms of matrimonial cohabitation.
Facts:
Bugayong is married to Ginez. They lived together with their sisters in Manila.
After some time, Ginez left the dwelling and informed her husbnad that she will be
staying with her mother in Pangasinan from which she moved to Dagupan to study in
a local college there. Bugayong began receiving letters from his sister in law and
from other unknown writers stating that Ginez was performing acts of inBdelity.
Bugayong went to Pangasinan to meet with his wife and when they met, they stayed
in the house of Bugayong’s cousin for 2 nights and 1 day as husband and day.
Bugayong tried to verify the truth of Ginez’ alleged inBdelity to which Ginez
responded by merely packing her bags and leaving to which he took as a
conBrmation for the acts. He could not Bnd Ginez anymore. Bugayong Bled with the
CFI of Pangasinan a complaint for legal separation to which Ginez answered denying
the averments of the complaint. She set up the posive defense that her acts were
condoned by Bugayong.
Issue:
Whether or not there was condonation in the part of Bugayong.
Ruling:
Yes. A detailed examination of the testimony of the plaintiD-husband,
especially those portions quoted above, clearly shows that there was a condonation
on the part of the husband for the supposed "acts of rank inBdelity amounting to
adultery" committed by defendant-wife. Admitting for the sake of argument that the
inBdelities amounting to adultery were committed by the defendant, a reconciliation
was eDected between her and the plaintiD. The act of the latter in persuading her to
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come along with him, and the fact that she went with him and consented to be
brought to the house of his cousin Pedro Bugayong and together they slept there as
husband and wife for one day and one night, and the further fact that in the second
night they again slept together in their house likewise as husband and wife — all
these facts have no other meaning in the opinion of this court than that a
reconciliation between them was eDected and that there was a condonation of the
wife by the husband. The reconciliation occurred almost ten months after he came to
know of the acts of inBdelity amounting to adultery.
It has been held that condonation is implied from sexual intercourse after
knowledge of the other inBdelity. such acts necessary implied forgiveness. It is
entirely consonant with reason and justice that if the wife freely consents to sexual
intercourse after she has full knowledge of the husband's guilt, her consent should
operate as a pardon of his wrong.
ELISEA LAPERAL v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. L-18008 October 30, 1962, BARRERA, J.
The wife, even after the legal separation has been decreed, shall continue
using her name and surname employed before the legal separation. This is so
because her married status is una ected by the separation, there being no
severance of the vinculum.
Facts:
Elisea was legally separated from his former husband Enrique. She desired to
use her maiden name Elisea Laperal on the ground that she had long been separated
from Enrique so she Bled an action with the court to which at Brst was denied with
respect to Article 372 of the Civil Code but later granted by the court treating the
action as a change of name which the City Attorney of Baguio opposed to.
Issue:
Whether or not Elisea is allowed to use her maiden name since she is legally
separated from her husband.
Ruling:
No. According to Article 372 of the Civil Code, the wife, even after the legal
separation has been decreed, shall continue using her name and surname employed
before the legal separation. This is so because her married status is unaDected by
the separation, there being no severance of the vinculum. It seems to be the policy of
the law that the wife should continue to use the name indicative of her unchanged
status for the beneBt of all concerned.
There seems to be no dispute that in the institution of these proceedings, the
procedure prescribed in Rule 103 of the Rules of Court for change of name has been
observed. But from the petition quoted in full at the beginning of these opinion, the
only reason relied upon for the change of name is the fact that petitioner is legally
separated from her husband and has, in fact, ceased to live with him for many years.
It is doubtful, to say the least, whether Rule 103 which refers to change of name in
general, may prevail over the speciBc provisions of Article 372 of the New Civil Code
with regards to married women legally separated from their husbands. Even,
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however, applying Rule 103 to this case, the fact of legal separation alone — which is
the only basis for the petition at bar — is, in our opinion, not a su>cient ground to
justify a change of the name of herein petitioner, for to hold otherwise would be to
provide an easy circumvention of the mandatory provisions of Article 372.
ONG ENG KIAM a.k.a. WILLIAM ONG v. LUCITA G. ONG
G.R. No. 153206 October 23, 2006, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
The abandonment referred to by the Family Code is abandonment without
justi$able cause for more than one year.
Facts:
After 3 years of marriage Williamn and Lucita would almost quarrel every day
to where William began to physically assault Lucita in diDerent ways for petty
reasons. William also committed physical violence to his children. He also said
oDensive and insulting language to her. William denied the allegations. The RTC ruled
in favor of Lucita Bnding the acts of William detrimental to their marriage. The CA
a>rmed the RTC’s decision Bnding the testimonies of Dr. Elinzano, the doctor who
treated Lucita’s wounds and Linda, Lucita’s sister to be proven true.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC and CA is correct in decreeing a legal separation.
Ruling:
Yes. The claim of William that a decree of legal separation would taint his
reputation and label him as a wife-beater and child-abuser also does not elicit
sympathy from this Court. If there would be such a smear on his reputation then it
would not be because of Lucita’s decision to seek relief from the courts, but because
he gave Lucita reason to go to court in the Brst place.
Also without merit is the argument of William that since Lucita has abandoned
the family, a decree of legal separation should not be granted, following Art. 56, par.
(4) of the Family Code which provides that legal separation shall be denied when both
parties have given ground for legal separation. The abandonment referred to by the
Family Code is abandonment without justiBable cause for more than one year. As it
was established that Lucita left William due to his abusive conduct, such does not
constitute abandonment contemplated by the said provision.
As a Bnal note, we reiterate that our Constitution is committed to the policy of
strengthening the family as a basic social institution. The Constitution itself however
does not establish the parameters of state protection to marriage and the family, as
it remains the province of the legislature to deBne all legal aspects of marriage and
prescribe the strategy and the modalities to protect it and put into operation the
constitutional provisions that protect the same. With the enactment of the Family
Code, this has been accomplished as it deBnes marriage and the family, spells out
the corresponding legal eDects, imposes the limitations that aDect married and
family life, as well as prescribes the grounds for declaration of nullity and those for
legal separation. As Lucita has adequately proven the presence of a ground for legal
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separation, the Court has no reason but to a>rm the Bndings of the RTC and the CA,
and grant her the relief she is entitled to under the law.
Rights and Obligations between Husband and Wife
MARIANO B. ARROYO v. DOLORES C. VASQUEZ DE ARROYO
G.R. No. L-17014 August 11, 1921, STREET, J.
Mere austerity of temper, petulance of manners, rudeness of language, a
want of civil attention and accommodation, even occasional sallies of passion, if they
do not threaten bodily harm, do not amount to legal cruelty
Facts:
Mariano and Dolores lived together as husband and wife in Iloilo with a few
short intervals of separation. There came a time when Dolores went away to be
separated from Mariano on the ground that she was cruelly treated by Mariano.
Mariano opted for her to return home to resume their married life but Dolores wanted
to be legally separated from him. The trial court ruled in favor Dolores ruling that it
was Mariano’s ill treatment that caused Dolores to leave.
Issue:
Whether or not the Dolores may choose not to cohabit with respect to
Mariano’s cruelty towards Dolores.
Ruling:
No. Dolores must cohabit. The evidence shows that the wife is a[icted with a
disposition of jealousy towards her husband in an aggravated degree; and to his
cause are chieMy traceable without a doubt the many miseries that have attended
their married life. The tales of cruelty on the part of the husband towards the wife,
which are the basis of the cross-action, are in our opinion no more than highly colored
versions of personal wrangles in which the spouses have allowed themselves from
time to time to become involved and would have little signiBcance apart from the
morbid condition exhibited by the wife.
Cruelty has been deBned as what merely wounds the mental feelings is in few
cases to be admitted where they are not accompanied with bodily injury, either
actual or menaced. Mere austerity of temper, petulance of manners, rudeness of
language, a want of civil attention and accommodation, even occasional sallies of
passion, if they do not threaten bodily harm, do not amount to legal cruelty: they are
high moral oDenses in the marriage-state undoubtedly, not innocent surely in any
state of life, but still they are not that cruelty against which the law can relieve.
Under such misconduct of either of the parties, for it may exist on the one side as
well as on the other, the suDering party must bear in some degree the consequences
of an injudicious connection; must subdue by decent resistance or by prudent
conciliation; and if this cannot be done, both must suDer in silence. .
Mariano B. Arroyo, has done nothing to forfeit his right to the marital society
of his wife and that she is under an obligation, both moral and legal, to return to the
common home and cohabit with him.
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ELOISA GOITIA DE LA CAMARA v. JOSE CAMPOS RUEDA
G.R. No. 11263 November 2, 1916, TRENT, J.
The spouses must be faithful to, assist, and support each other. The husband
must live with and protect his wife. The wife must obey and live with her husband
and follow him when he changes his domicile or residence, except when he removes
to a foreign country.
Facts:
Eloisa and Jose were married and after a month, Eloisa left to return to her
parents. It was alleged in Eloisa’s complaint that Jose had her do unchaste and
lascivious acts on his genitals and other obscene demands to which Eloisa did not
agree to thus Jose treated him harshly. Jose even did not comply with the marital
duties of a husband. Eloisa thus Bled for an action of support against her husband.
Issue:
Whether or not Eloisa can compel her husband to support her outside the
conjugal home.
Ruling:
Yes. She may claim for support. The obligation on the part of the husband to
support his wife is created merely in the act of marriage. The law provides that the
husband, who is obliged to support the wife, may fulBll the obligation either by
paying her a Bxed pension or by maintaining her in his own home at his option.
However, this option given by law is not absolute. The law will not permit the
husband to evade or terminate his obligation to support his wife if the wife is driven
away from the conjugal home because of his wrongful acts. In the case at bar, the
wife was forced to leave the conjugal abode because of the lewd designs and
physical assault of the husband, she can therefore claim support from the husband
for separate maintenance even outside the conjugal home.
The spouses must be faithful to, assist, and support each other. The husband
must live with and protect his wife. The wife must obey and live with her husband
and follow him when he changes his domicile or residence, except when he removes
to a foreign country. But the husband who is obliged to support his wife may, at his
option, do so by paying her a Bxed pension or by receiving and maintaining her in his
own home.
ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO v. ERLINDA I. BILDNER and SYLVIA K. ILUSORIO,
JOHN DOE and JANE DOE
POTENCIANO ILUSORIO, MA. ERLINDA I. BILDNER, and SYLVIA ILUSORIO
v. COURT OF APPEALS and ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO
G.R. No. 139789 and G.R. No. 139808 May 12, 2000, PARDO, J.
No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband to live with
his wife. Coverture cannot be enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus
carried out by sheri s or by any other mesne process. That is a matter beyond
judicial authority and is best left to the man and woman’s free choice.
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Facts:
Erlinda and Potenciano were once married but were separated for undisclosed
reasons. When Potenciano returned from the US, he stayed with Erlinda in Antipolo
where their children claimed that Erlinda gave Potenciano an overdose of his
antidepressant drug which caused Potenciano’s health to deteriorate. Erlinda Bled
with the RTC for guardianship over Potenciano due to his failing health. After a
meeting in Baguio, Potenciano did not return to Antipolo and lived in Makati thus
Erlinda Bled for a petition for habeas corpus to have the custody of Potenciano. She
alleged that the other respondents refused her demands to see and visit her husband
and prohibit Potenciano from returning to Antipolo.
Issue:
Whether or not spouses can furnish a writ of habeas corpus to compel one
another to live with each other.
Ruling:
No. The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire
into all manner of involuntary restraint, and to relieve a person therefrom if such
restraint is illegal. To justify the grant of the petition, the restraint of liberty must be
an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action. The illegal restraint of
liberty must be actual and eDective, not merely nominal or moral.
The evidence shows that there was no actual and eDective detention or
deprivation of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio’s liberty that would justify the issuance of
the writ. The fact that lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio is about 86 years of age, or under
medication does not necessarily render him mentally incapacitated. Soundness of
mind does not hinge on age or medical condition but on the capacity of the individual
to discern his actions.
No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband to live with
his wife. Coverture cannot be enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus
carried out by sheriDs or by any other mesne process. That is a matter beyond
judicial authority and is best left to the man and woman’s free choice.
ARTURO PELAYO v. MARCELO LAURON, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-4089 January 12, 1909, TORRES, J.
If every obligation consists in giving, doing or not doing something and
spouses are mutually bound to support each other, there can be no question but
that, when either of them by reason of illness should be in need of medical
assistance, the other is under the unavoidable obligation to furnish the necessary
services of a physician in order that health may be restored.
Facts:
Pelayo Bled a complaint against Lauron and Abella when they refused to pay
him for services he rendered in the birth of their daughter-in-law’s child. They
claimed in their answer the she died after the childbirth and that she lived with her
husband independently of them and that they are not bound to pay for their
daughter-in-law’s expenses. The trial court ruled in favor of Lauron and Abella.
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Issue:
Whether or not Lauron and Abella should be liable for the expenses of the
operation.
Ruling:
No. If every obligation consists in giving, doing or not doing something and
spouses are mutually bound to support each other, there can be no question but that,
when either of them by reason of illness should be in need of medical assistance, the
other is under the unavoidable obligation to furnish the necessary services of a
physician in order that health may be restored, and he or she may be freed from the
sickness by which life is jeopardized; the party bound to furnish such support is
therefore liable for all expenses, including the fees of the medical expert for his
professional services.
In the face of the above legal precepts it is unquestionable that the person
bound to pay the fees due to the plaintiD for the professional services that he
rendered to the daughter-in-law of the defendants during her childbirth, is the
husband of the patient and not her father and mother- in-law, the defendants herein.
The fact that it was not the husband who called the plaintiD and requested his
assistance for his wife is no bar to the fulBllment of the said obligation, as the
defendants, in view of the imminent danger, to which the life of the patient was at
that moment exposed, considered that medical assistance was urgently needed, and
the obligation of the husband to furnish his wife in the indispensable services of a
physician at such critical moments is specially established by the law, as has been
seen, and compliance therewith is unavoidable; therefore, the plaintiD, who believes
that he is entitled to recover his fees, must direct his action against the husband who
is under obligation to furnish medical assistance to his lawful wife in such an
emergency.
Property Relations
MOISES JOCSON v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, AGUSTINA JOCSON-VASQUEZ,
ERNESTO VASQUEZ
G.R. No. L-55322 February 16, 1989, MEDILEA, J.
All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the
wife.
Facts:
The petitioner and respondent are the surviving oDsprings of the spouses
Emilio Jocson and Alejandra Poblete. Poblete died before emilio without her estate
being settled. Emilio died shortly. Emilio executed three documents in his lifetime
which conveyed by sale to Agustina, one of the respondents, majority of his property
including 1/3 share in the estate of Agustina. The petitoner, Moises, assailed the
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documents and prayed for their nullity. and the properties be partioned between him
and Agustina. The RTC ruled in favor of Moises in which the CA reversed the decision.
Issue:
Whether or not the subject property is part of Emilio and Alejandra’s conjugal
property.
Ruling:
No. The property is not part of their conjugal property. It is thus clear that
before Moises Jocson may validly invoke the presumption under Article 160 he must
Brst present proof that the disputed properties were acquired during the marriage of
Emilio Jocson and Alejandra Poblete. The certiBcates of title, however, upon which
petitioner rests his claim is insu>cient. The fact that the properties were registered in
the name of "Emilio Jocson, married to Alejandra Poblete" is no proof that the
properties were acquired during the spouses' coverture. Acquisition of title and
registration thereof are two diDerent acts. It is well settled that registration does not
confer title but merely conBrms one already existing (See Torela vs. Torela, supra). It
may be that the properties under dispute were acquired by Emilio Jocson when he
was still a bachelor but were registered only after his marriage to Alejandra Poblete,
which explains why he was described in the certiBcates of title as married to the
latter.
Contrary to petitioner's position, the certiBcates of title show, on their face,
that the properties were exclusively Emilio Jocson's, the registered owner. There
being no showing also that the camarin and the two ricemills, which are the subject
of Exhibit 4, were conjugal properties of the spouses Emilio Jocson and Alejandra
Poblete, they should be considered, likewise, as the exclusive properties of Emilio
Jocson, the burden of proof being on petitioner.
ANTONIO A. S. VALDEZ v. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 102, QUEZON
CITY, and CONSUELO M. GOMEZ-VALDEZ
G.R. No. 122749 July 31, 1996, VITUG, J.
When the common-law spouses su er from a legal impediment to marry or
when they do not live exclusively with each other (as husband and wife), only the
property acquired by both of them through their actual joint contribution of money,
property or industry shall be owned in common and in proportion to their respective
contributions. Such contributions and corresponding shares, however, are prima facie
presumed to be equal.
Facts:
Antonio Valez Bled for a petition for declaration of nullity of their marriage on
the ground of psychological incapacity. The trial court granted the petition directing
them to start proceedings on the liquidation of their common properties as deBned
by Article 147 of the Family Code and to comply with Articles 50, 51 and 52. Consuelo
asserted that the Family Code contains no provisions on the procedure for the
liquidation of property in unions without marriage. The RTC clariBed that suich
provision applies.
Issue:
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Persons and Family Relations Law
Whether or not Article 147 of the Family Code applies to the case at bar.
Ruling:
Yes. In a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations
of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed by the provisions of
Article 147 or Article 148, such as the case may be, of the Family Code.
Article 147 applies when a man and a woman, suDering no illegal impediment
to marry each other, so exclusively live together as husband and wife under a void
marriage or without the beneBt of marriage. Under this property regime, property
acquired by both spouses through their work and industry shall be governed by the
rules on equal co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie
presumed to have been obtained through their joint eDorts. A party who did not
participate in the acquisition of the property shall be considered as having
contributed thereto jointly if said party's "eDorts consisted in the care and
maintenance of the family household." Unlike the conjugal partnership of gains, the
fruits of the couple's separate property are not included in the co-ownership.
When the common-law spouses suDer from a legal impediment to marry or
when they do not live exclusively with each other (as husband and wife), only the
property acquired by both of them through their actual joint contribution of money,
property or industry shall be owned in common and in proportion to their respective
contributions. Such contributions and corresponding shares, however, are prima facie
presumed to be equal. The share of any party who is married to another shall accrue
to the absolute community or conjugal partnership, as the case may be, if so existing
under a valid marriage. If the party who has acted in bad faith is not validly married
to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner already heretofore
expressed.
BENIGNO TODA, JR v. COURT OF APPEALS and ROSE MARIE TUASON-TODA
ROSE MARIE TUASON-TODA v. BENIGNO TODA, JR.
G.R. Nos. 78583-4 and G.R. Nos.78696-7 March 26,1990, REGALADO, J.
The separation of property is not e ected by the mere execution of the
contract or agreement of the parties, but by the decree of the court approving the
same. It, therefore, becomes e ective on y upon judicial approval, without which it is
void.
Facts:
Benigno and Rose Marie Toda were married until the alleged inBdelity of
Benigno which promted Romse Marie to Ble for the termination of their marriage for
alleged mismanagement and dissipation of conjugal funds against Bengigno. The
parties agreed to Ble a joint petition for judicial approval of conjugal partnership on
April 1, 1981. This petition was signed by the both of them on March 30, 1981
embodied with a compromise agreement in the separation of their properties. Such
agreement was approved in June 9, 1981.
Issue:
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Persons and Family Relations Law
Whether or not the CA is correct in stating that the compromise agreement is
eDective only on June 9, 1981.
Ruling:
Yes. The CA is correct in holding that the compromise agreement became
eDective only on June 9, 1981, the date when it was approved by the trial court, and
not on March 30,1981 when it was signed by the parties. Under Article 190 of the
Civil Code, "(i)n the absence of an express declaration in the marriage settlements,
the separation of property between spouses during the marriage shall not take place
save in virtue of a judicial order." Hence, the separation of property is not eDected by
the mere execution of the contract or agreement of the parties, but by the decree of
the court approving the same. It, therefore, becomes eDective on y upon judicial
approval, without which it is void. Furthermore, Article 192 of said Code explicitly
provides that the conjugal partnership is dissolved only upon the issuance of a
decree of separation of property.
Consequently, the conjugal partnership of Benigno and Rose Marie should be
considered dissolved only on June 9, 1981 when the trial court approved their joint
petition for voluntary dissolution of their conjugal partnership. Conformably thereto,
the cash dividends declared on July 1, 1981 and July 25,1981 in the amount of
P2,191.62 and P40,196.12, respectively, should pertain to Rose Marie; and that
declared on April 2,5, 1981 in the amount of P37,126.30 ought to be paid to Benigno,
pursuant to Paragraph 4 (c) of the compromise agreement which awards to Benigno
the conjugal assets not otherwise speciBcally assigned to Rose Marie.
SPOUSES RICKY WONG and ANITA CHAN, LEONARDO JOSON, JUANITO
SANTOS, EMERITO SICAT and CONRADO LAGMAN v. HON. INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT and
ROMARICO HENSON
G.R. No. 70082 August 19, 1991, FERNAN, C.J.
The presumption of the conjugal nature of the properties subsists in the
absence of clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence to overcome said presumption
Facts:
Romarico and Katrina Henson were married spouses and had 3 children. Even
during their marriage, the spouses had been most of the time living separately.
Romarico bought a parcel of land from his father using money he borrowed from an
o>cemate. Katrina entered an agreement with Anita Chan where the latter consigned
to Katrina pieces of jewelry. Katrina failed to return the same thus Anita demanded
for payment of the value jewelry thus Katrina issued a check but was dishonored.
Anita Chan and Wong Bled action for collection of the sum of money against Katrina
and her husband Romarico. The trial court ruled in favor of the Wongs where a writ of
execution was issued attaching 4 lots in Angeles City in the name of Romarico
married to Katrina. Such lots were sold to Juanito Santos and Leonardo Josn. Romarico
Bled an action for annulment of the decision which was meritorious.
Issue:
Whether or not the properties are exclusively owned by Romancio.
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Persons and Family Relations Law
Ruling:
No. The properties are not owned exclusively by Romarico. The presumption of
the conjugal nature of the properties subsists in the absence of clear, satisfactory
and convincing evidence to overcome said presumption or to prove that the
properties are exclusively owned by Romarico. While there is proof that Romarico
acquired the properties with money he had borrowed from an o>cemate, it is unclear
where he obtained the money to repay the loan. If he paid it out of his salaries, then
the money is part of the conjugal assets and not exclusively his. Proof on this matter
is of paramount importance considering that in the determination of the nature of a
property acquired by a person during covertrue, the controlling factor is the source of
the money utilized in the purchase.
The conjugal nature of the properties notwithstanding, Katrina's indebtedness
may not be paid for with them her obligation not having been shown by the
petitioners to be one of the charges against the conjugal partnership. In addition to
the fact that her rights over the properties are merely inchoate prior to the liquidation
of the conjugal partnership, the consent of her husband and her authority to incur
such indebtedness had not been alleged in the complaint and proven at the trial.
Furthermore, under the Civil Code (before the eDectivity of the Family Code on
August 3, 1988), a wife may bind the conjugal partnership only when she purchases
things necessary for the support of the family or when she borrows money for the
purpose of purchasing things necessary for the support of the family if the husband
fails to deliver the proper sum; when the administration of the conjugal partnership
is transferred to the wife by the courts or by the husband and when the wife gives
moderate donations for charity. Having failed to establish that any of these
circumstances occurred, the Wongs may not bind the conjugal assets to answer for
Katrina's personal obligation to them.
ERLINDA A. AGAPAY v. CARLINA (CORNELIA) V. PALANG and HERMINIA P.
DELA CRUZ
GR NO. 116668, July 28, 1997, ROMERO, J.
The property acquired by one spouse while living in an illicit relationship with
another still belongs to the conjugal partnership or community property of his/her
valid and legal spouse.
Facts:
Miguel Palang married his Brst wife Carlina in 1949. Their marriage was
described by the frequent absence and separation of Miguel and Carlina due to
Miguel’s leaving abroad. In 1972, Miguel returned to the Philippines for good but did
not choose to leave with his wife and daughter Herminia. In July 1973, then 63 years
old Miguel contracted his second marriage with 19 years old Erlinda Agapay. In May
1973 or two months prior to their marriage Miguel and Erlinda jointly purchased a
parcel of agricultural land located at San Felipe, Binalonan, Pangasinan.
Upon the death of Miguel in 1981. Carlina and Herminia Bled a case to recover
the ownership and possession of the Agricultural land in Pangasinan. To counter,
Erlinda defended claiming that it was her sole property, having bought the same with
her own money with facts however providing that she only has a sari-sari store as her
source if income.
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Persons and Family Relations Law
Issue:
Whether or not the property acquired during the illicit cohabitation or
subsequent void marriage (Erlinda and Miguel) belongs to conjugal property of the
Brst and valid marriage (Carlina and Miguel)
Ruling:
Yes. Under Article 148, only the properties acquired by both of the parties
through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned
by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. It must be
stressed that actual contribution is required by this provision, in contrast to Article
147 which states that eDorts in the care and maintenance of the family and
household, are regarded as contributions to the acquisition of common property by
one who has no salary or income or work or industry. If the actual contribution of the
party is not proved, there will be no co-ownership and no presumption of equal
shares.
In the case at bar, Erlinda tried to establish by her testimony that she is
engaged in the business of buy and sell and had a sari-sari store but failed to
persuade us that she actually contributed money to buy the subject riceland. Worth
noting is the fact that on the date of conveyance, May 17, 1973, petitioner was only
around twenty years of age and Miguel Palang was already sixty-four and a pensioner
of the U.S. Government. Considering her youthfulness, it is unrealistic to conclude
that in 1973 she contributed P3,750.00 as her share in the purchase price of subject
property, there being no proof of the same.
Erlinda claims that the riceland was bought two months before Miguel and
Erlinda actually cohabited. In the nature of an afterthought, said added assertion was
intended to exclude their case from the operation of Article 148 of the Family Code.
Proof of the precise date when they commenced their adulterous cohabitation not
having been adduced, we cannot state deBnitively that the riceland was purchased
even before they started living together. In any case, even assuming that the subject
property was bought before cohabitation, the rules of co-ownership would still apply
and proof of actual contribution would still be essential.
Since Erlinda failed to prove that she contributed money to the purchase price
of the riceland in Binalonan, Pangasinan, we Bnd no basis to justify her co-ownership
with Miguel over the same. Consequently, the riceland should, as correctly held by
the Court of Appeals, revert to the conjugal partnership property of the deceased
Miguel and private respondent Carlina Palang.
SPOUSES ONESIFORO AND ROSARIO ALINAS v. SPOUSES VICTOR and ELENA
ALINAS, GR NO. 158040, APRIL 14, 2008, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
In Heirs of Aguilar-Reyes, the husband's sale of conjugal property without the
consent of the wife was annulled but the spouses were ordered to refund the
purchase price to the buyers.
Facts:
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Persons and Family Relations Law
Spouses Onesiforo and Rosario Alinas owns a land property in which Onesiforo
sold to respondent spouses Victor and Elena Alinas without Rosario’s consent.
Onesiforo's signature appears in an Absolute Deed of Sale dated March 10, 1989,
selling Lot 896-B-9-B to respondent spouses. The records show a notarized document
and captioned Agreement whereby petitioner Onesiforo acknowledged that his
brother Victor used his own money to redeem Lot 896-B-9-B from the SSS and, thus,
Victor became the owner of said lot. In the same Agreeement, petitioner Onesiforo
waived whatever rights, claims, and interests he or his heirs, successors and assigns
have or may have over the subject property. On March 15, 1993, by virtue of said
documents, TCT No. 17394 covering Lot 896-B-9-B was issued in the name of
respondent spouses.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the sale is valid notwithstanding the absence of Rosario’s
(wife) consent.
Ruling:
No. Although petitioners were married before the enactment of the Family
Code on August 3, 1988, the sale in question occurred in 1989. Thus, their property
relations are governed by Chapter IV on Conjugal Partnership of Gains of the Family
Code. Hence, pursuant to Article 124 of the Family Code and jurisprudence, the sale
of petitioners' conjugal property made by petitioner Onesiforo alone is void in its
entirety.
However, in consonance with the salutary principle of non-enrichment at
another’s expense, the Court agrees with the CA that petitioners spouses should
reimburse respondent spouses the redemption price paid for Lot 896-B-9-B in the
amount of P111,110.09 with legal interest from the time of Bling of the complaint.
AYALA INVESTMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORP. and ABELARDO MAGSAJO v.
COURT OF APPEALS and SPOUSES ALFREDO & ENCARNACION CHING
G.R. NO. 118305, February 12, 1998, MARTINEZ, J.
When there is no showing that the execution of an indemnity agreement by
the husband redounded to the bene$t of his family, the undertaking is not a conjugal
debt but an obligation personal to him.
Facts:
Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM) obtained a P50, 300, 000.00 loan from
petitioner Ayala Investment and Development Corporation (AIDC). As added security
for the credit line extended to PBM, respondent Alfredo Ching, Executive Vice
President of PBM, executed security agreements making himself jointly and severally
answerable with PBMs indebtedness to AIDC. PBM failed to pay the loan. Thus, AIDC
Bled a case for sum of money against PBM and respondent-husband Alfredo Ching. As
a result the conjugal property of spouses Ching was sought to answer.
Issue:
Whether or not the conjugal property is liable for the husband’s obligation as a
surety of PBM.
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Persons and Family Relations Law
Ruling:
No. The evidence of Ayala Investment indubitably show that co-respondent
Alfredo Ching signed as surety for the P50M loan contracted on behalf of PBM. Ayala
should have adduced evidence to prove that Alfredo Chings acting as surety
redounded to the beneBt of the conjugal partnership.
In all our decisions involving accommodation contracts of the husband, we
underscored the requirement that: there must be the requisite showing of some
advantage which clearly accrued to the welfare of the spouses or beneBts to his
family or that such obligations are productive of some beneBt to the family.
Unfortunately, the petition did not present any proof to show: (a) Whether or not the
corporate existence of PBM was prolonged and for how many months or years; and/or
(b) Whether or not the PBM was saved by the loan and its shares of stock
appreciated, if so, how much and how substantial was the holdings of the Ching
family.
Ayala Investment (AIDC) insist that the corporate debt in question falls under
the exception laid down in said Article 122 (par. one). We do not agree. The loan
procured from AIDC was for the sole advancement and beneBt of Philippine Blooming
Mills and not for the beneBt of the conjugal partnership of Ching. Appellee-husband
derives salaries, dividends beneBts from Philippine Blooming Mills (the debtor
corporation), only because said husband is an employee of said PBM. These salaries
and beneBts, are not the beneBts contemplated by Articles 121 and 122 of the Family
Code. The beneBts contemplated by the exception in Article 122 (Family Code) is that
beneBt derived directly from the use of the loan. In the case at bar, the loan is a
corporate loan extended to PBM and used by PBM itself, not by petitioner-appellee-
husband Ching or his family. The alleged beneBt, if any, continuously harped by
respondents-appellants, are not only incidental but also speculative.
WILLEM BEUMER v. AVELINA AMORES
G.R. No. 195670, December 3, 2012, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
A foreigner husband cannot claim reimbursement from the amount he
contributed from the purchase of a private land they acquired during the marriage
upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership for it violates the constitution.
Facts:
Willem Beumer a Dutch national and Avelina Amores a Filipina were married in
1980. During their marriage they acquired properties. This Includes several house
and lot in which instruments and deeds were named before her wife acknowledging
the incapacity of Willem to acquire private lands. When their marriage was dissolved
on the ground of psychological incapacity of Willem Beumer, in a similar vein, the
latter upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership claims for the reimbursement
of the amount of money he contributed for the acquisition of the land. The RTC and
CA denied Willem’s claim on the ground of the constitutional prohibition.
Issue:
Whether or not Willem may claim reimbursement?
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