Working Toward Peace in Yemen (2d ed.)

Building on the Security Council Framework

Geneva International Centre for Justice



Working Toward Peace in Yemen:

Building on the Security Council Framework

Geneva International Centre for Justice (GICJ)
Christopher Gawronski
Second edition (revised and expanded)
March 2019



Working Toward Peace in Yemen

Table of Contents

Map of Yemen........................................................................................................................................... ii
INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................................................... 1
BACKGROUND.......................................................................................................................................... 2
DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONFLICT ................................................................................................ 4
IMPACTS OF THE CONFLICT .............................................................................................................. 8
LEGAL FRAMEWORK ......................................................................................................................... 12

Yemeni-led Solution....................................................................................................................... 12
Government Legitimacy ............................................................................................................... 13
Houthi Militia and the Threat to International Peace ....................................................... 15
MOVING FORWARD ............................................................................................................................ 18
Political Dissatisfaction – Support Yemeni Solution ......................................................... 18
Political Dissatisfaction – Support Government Efforts................................................... 18
Military Takeover – Cut Off Houthi Militia ............................................................................ 20
CONCLUSION ......................................................................................................................................... 22

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Working Toward Peace in Yemen (July 2015)

Map of Yemen

ii

Working Toward Peace in Yemen

INTRODUCTION

Yemen is a country in crisis. The unraveling of government services and a collapsing
economy have resulted in shortages of food, water, sanitation and medicine such that
a majority of Yemenis – tens of millions of people – now face destitution, famine, and
cholera. Yemen’s crisis has been precipitated and prolonged by the Houthi militia,
which staged a coup d’état in 2015 to satisfy its political ambitions. Yemen’s current
unprecedented humanitarian crisis is a direct result of this coup and the subsequent
war.

This report was developed
in an effort to stress the
need for the UN and
international community
to work toward peace in
Yemen. It builds on the
prior efforts of numerous
other individuals and
organizations who have
documented human rights
abuses and attempted to
raise awareness of the
© AP/Hani Mohammed humanitarian situation in
Yemen. However, we need to do more than document human rights violations and
alleviate the humanitarian impacts of war. The war must end.
Through a series of resolutions, the UN Security Council has created a legal framework
that empowers the international community to take the necessary actions that will
help end the conflict. The Council has called on member states to isolate the Houthi
militia and assist the legitimate government in pursuing a negotiated, Yemeni-led
political solution. Therefore, the UN needs to vigorously pursue all necessary actions
to counter Houthi aggression and become a true partner with the Yemeni government
in building a sustainable, political resolution to the conflict.
Geneva International Centre for Justice (GICJ) joins with others in calling attention to
the plight of the many victims of the humanitarian crisis and human rights violations.
Further, we call on the international community to utilize the power given to it by the
Security Council to end the war. Only through peace can there be any hope of ending
the suffering of Yemenis and achieving justice for the war’s many victims.

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Working Toward Peace in Yemen

BACKGROUND

Yemen is a country of over 28 million people located at the southern extreme of
Arabian Peninsula, at the mouth of the Red Sea, bordered by Oman and Saudi Arabia.
The population is very young, with an average age of less than 20 and nearly half of
its population under the age of 15. Yemen has an ancient history; it was a cradle of
ancient civilizations and home to wealthy trading empires.

Unfortunately, in modern times Yemen is one of the world’s poorest countries and is
the poorest among Arab countries. Partly in response to the economic condition of
the country, a peaceful uprising against the Yemeni government occurred in early
2011. Widespread protests occurred based on grievances related to corruption in the
government of the then-long-serving president, the late Mr. Ali Abdullah Saleh.
Unfortunately, the protests were used as an opportunity by the Houthi militia to
advance its own interests.

The Houthi militia is an outgrowth of the Houthi tribe, which became organized as
part of a revival of the historical Zaidi tradition of Islam in northern Yemen in the
1990s. Its initial leader, Hussein Al-Houthi, was a member of the Yemeni parliament
at the time but gradually became increasingly antagonistic toward the government
due to the heavy-handed political tactics of former Pres. Saleh. Al-Houthi left the
country and spent time in Iran, eventually returning to organize his tribe to fight
Saleh’s government. Al-Houthi initiated an anti-government insurgency leading to the
group’s first armed conflict with government forces in 2004 in which he was killed.1

Peaceful protest in 2011 Source: Wikimedia/Email4Mobile

1 Manuel Almeida, Profile: Who Are Yemen’s Houthis? (8 Oct. 2014),
https://english.alarabiya.net/en/perspective/profiles/2014/10/08/Profile-Who-are-Yemen-s-
Houthis-.html.

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Working Toward Peace in Yemen

Hussein’s brother Abdul-Malik Al-Houthi took over leadership, and the group, which
had become a militia, subsequently engaged in five more armed conflicts with the
Saleh government from 2005 until 2010 when a ceasefire was announced. When the
2011 protests erupted, the Houthi militia joined the protests and used them as an
opportunity to resume its military activities.

As protests escalated, government resistance increased and Pres. Saleh responded to
protesters with violence. However, international and domestic pressure eventually
forced Saleh to participate in Saudi-led talks sponsored by the Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC). The aim of the talks was to resolve the political situation through
regional efforts to avoid further escalation of violence and the potential for civil war.
The GCC initiative was strongly supported by the UN Security Council, which adopted
a resolution calling on all parties to sign and implement a settlement agreement as
soon as possible.2

Pres. Saleh resisted a negotiated resolution by backing out of several proposed deals
during 2011, which led to more violence as opposition groups pressed for him to give
up power. As dissatisfaction with Saleh’s refusal to accept an agreement grew,
political opposition factions, which had joined together into the Joint Meeting Parties
(JMP), created their own transition council. Finally, in late 2011, Saleh signed a
transition agreement, also accepted by the JMP, that called for a transfer of power and
a national dialogue process. Following a presidential election in February 2012, Saleh
officially relinquished his position on 25 February 2012 and former vice-president
Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi assumed the presidency. After 33 years in power, the Saleh
era was over and the process of developing a long-term political transition could
begin.

2 S.C. Res. 2014, § 4 (2 Oct. 2011).

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Working Toward Peace in Yemen

DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONFLICT

After the transfer of power, a National Dialogue Conference was organized as
proposed in the transition agreement signed by Saleh and accepted by the JMP. The
Conference, supported by the GCC and UN Security Council, took place from 2013–
2014. The process formally included many opposition groups, including the Houthi
militia, and resulted in an agreement to restructure the country into a federal system
and decentralize power to new provincial governments.

© Reuters

Several groups, especially the Southern Movement and others from the former South
Yemen region, rejected the agreement. They believed the former South Yemen
governorates were not treated fairly. The southern groups announced their intent to
continue to advocate their cause through political channels. The Houthis also refused
to accept the final accord but did not engage constructively toward a political solution
with other opposition groups. In fact, while participating in the Conference the Houthi
militia continued to expand and solidify its military control over northern
governorates.
After the Conference, the government began implementation of the transition while
attempting to address the financial difficulties facing the country. When the Hadi
government tried to implement financial reforms that involved reducing popular fuel
subsidies, the Houthi militia seized on popular dissatisfaction and organized a large
protest against the government in August 2014. Although acting under the guise of
speaking for the public, many suspected the Houthi aim was political. Nevertheless,
the government allowed the protest to occur peacefully.3 A month after initiating the

3 Tens of Thousands of Yemeni Houthis Protest Against Fuel Reform, Government (18 Aug. 2014),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-protests/tens-of-thousands-of-yemeni-houthis-protest-
against-fuel-reform-government-idUSKBN0GI1O420140818.

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Working Toward Peace in Yemen

protest, the Houthi militia made common cause with former Pres. Saleh and,
supported by Yemeni soldiers loyal to Mr. Saleh,4 took control of Sana’a, the Yemeni
capital, on 21 September 2014.

The Houthi militia forced concessions from Pres. Hadi that included the promise of
appointing governmental advisors from the Houthis and Southern Movement.
Because of the forcible action taken by the Houthi militia and its supporter Mr. Saleh,
a Sanctions Committee of the Security Council slapped financial and travel sanctions
on Mr. Saleh and two Houthi leaders.5 Nevertheless, the Houthi militia continued to
make ever-increasing political demands on the government.

On 20 January 2015, the Houthi militia went further and stormed the presidential
palace, effectively confining Pres. Hadi to his residence and putting additional
pressure on Hadi’s government to implement political changes demanded by the
Houthis. Rather than continue with coerced political reforms, the president and prime
minister both resigned on 22 January. After other political factions, including the
prominent Southern Movement, refused to cooperate with the Houthis or endorse
their tactics,6 on 6 February 2015 the Houthi militia took the final step of its coup
d’état by dissolving parliament and forming its own “Revolutionary Committee” to
govern the country. This final action sparked protests in many parts of the country.7
The Houthi militia proceeded to take over all state institutions, including the central
bank. It also began controlling the media by taking over the television station and
newspapers in Sana’a, which it began to use to disseminate propaganda supporting
its cause.

After the coup, Pres. Hadi managed to escape to Aden to reconstitute the legitimate
government and oppose the Houthi take-over of the country. Pressing its military
advantage, the Houthi militia moved south in a bid to take over the entire country by
force. After taking control of major population centers, the Houthi militia arrived on
the outskirts of Aden in mid-March 2015. After fighting broke out at the Aden airport,
Pres. Hadi was forced to take refuge in Saudi Arabia and operate a government-in-
exile.

4 Although they became allies against the Hadi government, the Houthi militia later killed Saleh over
his apparent willingness to consider peace talks. Ali Abdullah Saleh, Yemen’s Former Leader, Killed in
Sanaa (4 Dec. 2017), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-42225574.
5 Press Release, U.N. Security Council, Security Council 2140 Sanctions Committee Designates Three
Individuals as Subject to Assets Freeze, Travel Ban (7 Nov. 2014)
(https://www.un.org/press/en/2014/sc11636.doc .htm). The sanctions committee was authorized to
list persons or entities that provided support for “acts that threaten the peace, security or stability of
Yemen.” S.C. Res. 2140, § 17 (26 Feb. 2014).
6 Yemen Talks Boycott Deepens Political Crisis (31 Jan. 2015),
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2015/01/yemen-talks-boycott-deepens-political-
crisis-150131112215738.html.
7 Thousands Protest Against Houthi Coup in Yemen (7 Feb. 2015),
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/02/thousands-protest-houthi-coup-yemen-
150207082035654.html. These protests followed on earlier protests resulting from Pres. Hadi’s
resignation under pressure of Houthi demands. Chris Johnston, Thousands March Against Houthi
Faction in Yemen (24 Jan. 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/24/houthi -yemen-
protesters-sanaa-president-hadi-resignation.

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Working Toward Peace in Yemen

Shortly before being forced to flee the country, Pres. Hadi appealed to the Security
Council on 21 March 2015 for help by “all available means.”8 In response to this
invitation for assistance, a coalition of countries led by Saudi Arabia and the UAE
(Arab Coalition) formed to assist the Hadi government in re-establishing control of
the country. Security Council resolutions have repeatedly condemned actions of the
Houthi militia against the government and established an embargo against the
Houthi-aligned forces (including the pro-Saleh forces).9

Aden after clashes between Houthi and opposition forces, 2015 © EPA

Since 2015, the Yemeni government-aligned forces (including the Arab Coalition)
have fought the Houthi-aligned forces to a relative stalemate. During this time, the UN
has sponsored several attempts at peace negotiations between the government and
the Houthi militia. The first talks in over two years were scheduled to take place in
early September 2018 in Geneva. The representatives of the Yemeni government
arrived in Geneva, but the Houthis never did. Initially, talks were postponed several
days as the Houthi representatives demanded different transportation and conditions
for their participation.10 After extensive efforts by UN Special Envoy Martin Griffiths
to arrange passage and special transportation for the Houthis, talks were called off
because the Houthi representatives refused to leave Yemen.

Fortunately, after significant work by Mr. Griffiths, the Houthis did participate in the
subsequent talks in Stockholm, Sweden in December 2018. These talks resulted in a
short agreement between the parties on three matters: the city of Hodeidah and
access to three ports along the Red Sea, a prisoner exchange, and the city of Ta’iz. The

8 Yemen on “the Edge of Civil War,” UN Warns as Tensions Escalate (22 Mar. 2015),
https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/yemen-on-the-edge-of-civil-war-un-warns-as-tensions-escalate-
1.3005007.
9 E.g., S.C. Res. 2216 (14 Apr. 2015); S.C. Res. 2201 (15 Feb. 2015).
10 Mina Aldroubi, Houthi Last-Minute Demands Delay Yemen Peace Talks in Geneva (6 Sep. 2018),
https://www.thenational.ae/world/mena/houthi-last-minute-demands-delay-yemen-peace-talks-in-
geneva-1.767669.

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Working Toward Peace in Yemen

agreement resulted in a cautiously optimistic report from the Special Envoy to the
Security Council, but he stressed that implementation of the agreement needed to be
swift and many other critical matters remain unresolved.11
Before Stockholm, the Houthis had used each peace-making effort as an opportunity
to solidify military power, gain territory, and ultimately push out the government and
take over the country by force. This latest effort has also suffered from Houthi
intransigence as the implementation of the Stockholm Agreement was significantly
delayed. Fortunately, in spite of the Houthi militia’s poor track record for cooperating
with the international community, there has been some progress in withdrawing
fighters from Hodeidah.12 This may be cause for cautious optimism.

Special Envoy Griffiths reporting to Security Council, Jan. 2019 Source: UN

11 Office of the Special Envoy for the Secretary-General for Yemen, Briefing of the Special Envoy for
Yemen to the Security Council (9 Jan. 2019), https://osesgy.unmissions.org/briefing-special-envoy-
yemen-security-council.
12 Yemen and Houthi Rebels Agree to Withdrawal Deal (17 Feb. 2019),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/feb/17/yemen-and-houthi-rebels-agree-to-withdrawal-
deal.

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Working Toward Peace in Yemen

IMPACTS OF THE CONFLICT

The unfortunate result of this protracted conflict has been a rapid deterioration of the
humanitarian situation in a country that was already the poorest in the Arab world.
The humanitarian crisis is so severe that, by the end of 2017, more than 60% of
Yemenis were food insecure and 16 million lacked safe drinking water. 13 A 2018

report sponsored by UN Development Programme indicates that almost 75% of the
population are surviving on the equivalent of less than $100 per month, including
21% who have no income and rely entirely on aid.14 Recently, Save the Children
determined that an additional one

million children are at risk of famine,
bringing the total at risk to over five
million. 15 Even with numbers like
these, it now seems that aid agencies

have underestimated the likelihood

of widespread famine due to an
unexpectedly sharp decline in the
local currency coupled with access

restrictions on food and
humanitarian supplies. A UN official
admitted the possibility that
“millions of people . . . may not
survive.”16 © AFP/Getty

In addition to the lack of food and clean water, the re-emergence of previously-
controlled diseases is wreaking havoc on the population as well as the health care
system. An outbreak of cholera, described by the World Health Organization (WHO)
as “one of the world’s largest cholera outbreaks,” has infected over one million people
since mid-2017.17 Diphtheria and other diseases were also on the rise through 2017.

A 2017 WHO report estimated that 62,000 people have been killed or injured in the
Yemen conflict.18 The 2018 report of a UN Group of Experts documented a much more
modest number of 16,706 but indicated that the number is likely much higher.19

13 Joint statement by WHO, UNICEF, and WFP, Yemen’s Families Cannot Withstand Another Day of War,
Let Alone Another 1000 (29 Dec 2017), http://www.who.int/en/news-room/detail/29-12-2017-who-
wfp-and-unicef-yemen-s-families-cannot-withstand-another-day-of-war-let-alone-another-nbsp-1-
000.
14 Tom Lambert & AFAR Consulting, Yemen Multi-Sector Early Recovery Assessment (2018),
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.
humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/files/yemen-multisector-earlyrecoveryassessment.pdf.
15 Toyin Owoseje, Yemen Crisis: Five Million Children at Risk of Starvation, Save the Children Warns (19
Sep. 2018), https://www.independent.co.uk /news/world/yemen-crisis-conflict-children-famine-
starvation-death-a8545666.html.
16 Hannah Summers, Scale of Yemen Famine Was 'Initially Underestimated' by Aid Agencies (16 Oct.
2018), https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2018/oct/16/enormity-yemen-famine-
initially-underestimated.
17 WHO Annual Report 2017: Yemen 34 (2018).
18 Id. at 10.
19 Group of Independent Eminent International and Regional Experts, U.N. High Commissioner for
Human Rights, Situation of Human Rights in Yemen, Including Violations and Abuses Since September
2014, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/39/43, ¶ 27 (17 Aug. 2018) [hereinafter Group of Experts Report].

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Working Toward Peace in Yemen

Unfortunately, this report was hampered by an inability of the Group of Experts to
access many areas under Houthi militia control. Extensive human rights abuses were
also documented by the Group of Experts, including violations by all parties to the
conflict. However, the lack of access resulted in a report focused more on violations
caused by the government’s allies and did not provide a full picture of violations
caused by the Houthis.

Fortunately, a few human rights organizations, including local groups on the ground
in Yemen, have been able to report on human rights violations by the Houthi militia
in areas of Houthi control. During and after its takeover of Sana’a, the Houthi militia
has occupied schools, using them for barracks, and are suspected of targeting
hospitals and killing civilians.20 According to Human Rights Watch, the Houthi militia
makes extensive use of child soldiers,21 a source of great concern for the international
community as demonstrated by the numerous recommendations made on the matter
during Yemen’s UPR review in January 2019. 22 They have also used land mines
resulting in civilian casualties, including at least 18 dead and 39 injured in Ta’izz

governorate between May
2015 and April 2016. 23 The
Rasd Coalition, working in a
portion of the country,
documented 679 civilian
deaths and 847 injuries
caused by the Houthi militia
and allies, along with 1,193
cases of civilians subjected to
human rights abuses
primarily consisting of
abduction, disappearance, and
© Reuters torture in just the first half of
2018.24

The Houthi militia has a history of hiding its actions and silencing criticism of its
activities. For example, one protest in Sana’a against the Houthi takeover of the
government was suppressed by the militia with arrests of protesters after firing live
rounds into the crowd. 25 The Houthi militia has interfered with attempts by

20 Yemen: Civilian toll of Fighting in Capital (18 Nov. 2014),
https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/11/18/yemen-civilian-toll-fighting-capital.
21 Yemen: Houthis Send Children into Battle (12 May 2015),
https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/05/12/yemen-houthis-send-children-battle.
22 Human Rights Council, Draft Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: Yemen,
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/WG.6/32/L.6 (25 Jan. 2019).
23 Yemen: Houthi Landmines Claim Civilian Victims (8 Sep. 2016),
https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/09/08/yemen-houthi-landmines-claim-civilian-victims.
24 Yemeni Coalition for Monitoring Human Rights Violations, Civilians; Endless Sufferings: Human Rights
Situation in Yemen tbls. 6, 9 (2d ed. 2018).
25 Thousands Protest Against Houthi Coup in Yemen (7 Feb. 2015),
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/02/thousands-protest-houthi-coup-yemen-
150207082035654.html.

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Working Toward Peace in Yemen
organizations to document the human rights situation in areas under its control.26
This even included refusing access to critical sites for the Group of Experts created by
the UN Human Rights Council.27 According to the Group of Experts, the Houthi militia
has been particularly harsh in punishing critics and controlling the press. The Houthis
“have carried out intimidation, arbitrary detention, ill-treatment and torture of vocal
critics” and “have blocked news websites, censored television channels and banned
newspapers from publication.”28 At the time of their report, the Group of Experts
indicated at least 23 journalists were being detained by the Houthi militia, including
several whose whereabouts were unknown. The Rasd Coalition documented 155
human rights violations by Houthis targeted against media workers and 49 against
human rights activists in 2017.29 In the first half of 2018, the number stood at 52 for
both groups combined.30

Source: Times Headline

The Houthi militia’s outright control of the media is a violation of press freedom and
helps to hide the extent to which they perpetrate other human rights violations. This
may have also contributed to the Group of Experts’ inability to fully examine Houthi
activities and its resulting report focusing more on the actions of other parties.
Mistreatment of religious minorities is another example of systematic human rights
violations by the Houthi militia. These are people who have done nothing against the
Houthis but are targeted simply for their beliefs and the practice of their beliefs.
According to the Group of Experts report, the Houthis have targeted the Baha’i in
particular by labeling them as evil and against Islam, disbanding all Baha’i assemblies,

26 Yemen: Houthis Ban Rights Advocate’s Travel (12 Mar. 2016),
https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/03/12/yemen-houthis-ban-rights-advocates-travel.
27 Group of Experts Report, supra note 19, ¶ 74.
28 Id. ¶ 85.
29 Yemeni Coalition for Monitoring Human Rights Violations, Human Rights Situation in Yemen tbl. 15
(2018).
30 Yemeni Coalition for Monitoring Human Rights Violations, supra note 24, tbl. 6. Because of a change
in how victims were categorized, the 2017 and 2018 figures may not be directly comparable.

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Working Toward Peace in Yemen
detaining individuals on the basis of their faith (including some for over two years),
and even sentencing one person to death after a closed hearing that the person was
not allowed to attend. 31
The severity of the humanitarian crisis and the extent of the human rights violations
require urgent action. Although the scale of the problem is massive, with many
complicating factors, the next section will explain the legal framework that is already
in place to guide the international community in responding to the crisis. Hopefully,
examining and understanding that framework will help lead to more coordinated and
focused action by the international community.

31 Group of Experts Report, supra note 19, ¶ 77.

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Working Toward Peace in Yemen

LEGAL FRAMEWORK

As previously stated, the key to ending the crisis in Yemen is to end the war. This
requires recognizing and addressing the war’s main causes. These are the political
divisions within Yemen that originally contributed to civic strife and the Houthi
militia that escalated that strife into a civil war in pursuit of its own political
ambitions. Therefore, peace efforts in Yemen must both address the pre-existing
political divisions and actively isolate to the Houthi militia as the main perpetrators
of armed conflict that prevent the political issues from being effectively addressed.
Fortunately, the UN Security Council has understood the situation and empowered
the international community to respond appropriately.

The Security Council framework includes three clear positions regarding important
elements of the conflict. The positions are summarized in the following points and
further described below.

• The ultimate outcome must be decided by Yemenis – and decision-
making should be by peaceful means.

• There is one legitimate government of Yemen – the Houthi militia
takeover of governmental institutions is illegitimate and internationally
condemned.

• The Houthi militia is perpetuating a situation that constitutes a threat
to international peace and security – the international community must
not provide any financial or military support to the Houthi militia or its allies.

Yemeni-led Solution

From its very first resolution on the matter, the Security Council has stressed the

importance of a “Yemeni-led process of political transition.”32 This is a recognition of
the requirement under the UN Charter that the United Nations may not intervene in
the domestic affairs of a member country such as governance structure and political
leadership decisions. However, a domestic process must not jeopardize international
peace and security,

otherwise the
Security Council is
empowered to
intervene to the

extent necessary to
restore and protect
international
peace and security.

Yemen National Dialogue Conference, 2014 © Reuters On Yemen, the
Security Council
has provided
explicit support for
regional efforts to

32 S.C. Res. 2014, § 4 (2 Oct. 2011).

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Working Toward Peace in Yemen

aid the Yemeni government in developing a lasting political solution to the crisis.33
Following the transition of power from Pres. Saleh to Pres. Hadi in 2012, the Security
Council supported the National Dialogue Conference as a means achieve “peaceful
change and meaningful political, economic and social reform” that “meets the
legitimate demands and aspirations of the Yemeni people.”34 At this early point, the
Security Council also called upon all the parties in Yemen to “reject the use of violence
to achieve political goals.”35

Although the Security Council authorized intervention after determining the
existence of a threat to international peace and security in 2014 (see below), it has
continued to support the sovereign independence of Yemen and stress the need for a
Yemeni-led political transition.36

Government Legitimacy

The Security Council has been unwavering in its attitude that the legitimate
government of Yemen is one selected through a political process and not one imposed
by force of arms. In this case, the government led by Pres. Hadi was established
through a negotiated political process in the form of the National Dialogue
Conference. Although several parties disagreed with the outcome of the Conference,
they primarily voiced their objections through peaceful means. By contrast, the
Houthi militia used its military force to progressively seize power and enforce on the
country its own political interests to the exclusion of others. As a result, the Security
Council has consistently refused to accept the Houthi militia as a legitimate authority
within Yemen.

At the beginning of the political crisis, the Security Council recognized then-President
Saleh as the legitimate head of government even while calling for him to negotiate a
peaceful transition of power. The Council recognized a presidential decree issued in
September 2011 as “designed to find a political agreement acceptable to all parties,”
and noted a commitment by the president to sign a regionally-negotiated political
transition agreement. The Council then called on the president to implement the
commitment to “achieve a peaceful political transition of power.” Following the
transition of power in 2012, the Security Council supported “the efforts of President .
. . Hadi and the Government of National Unity to move the transition process
forward.”37 After the outbreak of widespread armed conflict, the Council reaffirmed
its support “for the legitimacy of the President of Yemen, Abdo Rabbo Hamsour
Hadi” 38 even after Pres. Hadi had been forced to flee the country and set up a
government in exile. This shows how the Security Council has consistently recognized
as legitimate the Yemeni governments that assume power through political processes.

33 S.C. Res. 2140 (26 Feb. 2014); S.C. Res. 2051 (12 Jun. 2012); S.C. Res. 2014 (21 Oct. 2011).
34 S.C. Res. 2051, pmbl. (12 June 2012).
35 Id. § 2.
36 S.C. Res. 2402, pmbl., § 1 (26 Feb. 2018); S.C. Res. 2216, § 13 (14 Apr. 2015).
37 S.C. Res. 2051, § 4 (12 Jun. 2012).
38 S.C. Res. 2216, pmbl. (14 Apr. 2015).

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Working Toward Peace in Yemen

On the other hand,
the Security Council
has refused to

recognize as
legitimate any party
in Yemen that has
established control

through the use of
force. This is in line
with several other
Security Council

actions in recent
decades, which
appear to show a
Houthi militia outside the presidential palace in Sana’a © AFP/Mohammed Huwais trend toward

rejecting the
legitimacy of a group that uses armed force to establish power, or one that attempts
to stay in power contrary to the outcome of a political process. For example, a Council
action in 1992 recognized an interim government constituted by a negotiated
settlement as the legitimate Liberian government, rather than the group of opposition

leaders who controlled most of the country but who had initiated an armed revolt
rather than attempting a peaceful political process.39 In 1997, the Council condemned
and rejected the legitimacy of a military junta that overthrew the democratically
elected government of Sierra Leone and supported regional efforts to restore the

elected government. 40 In 2011, the Council rejected the legitimacy of a sitting
president attempting to stay in power in Côte d’Ivoire following a questionable
election process by noting recognition of the opponent candidate as the winner by
regional groups and “the rest of the international community.”41 In each of these

cases, the Security Council also commended the efforts of the Economic Community
of West African States (ECOWAS), a regional organization, to develop negotiated
political solutions to these crises.

Yemen appears to be another example of this trend. The Security Council deplored the
Houthi militia’s takeover of government institutions by military force and demanded
the Houthis release Yemeni government officials, including Pres. Hadi and his
ministers.42 After the Houthis refused to stand down, the Security Council confirmed
its characterization of the Houthi takeover as illegitimate when it demanded the
Houthi militia withdraw from the capital and “cease all actions that are exclusively
within the authority of the legitimate Government of Yemen.”43 In addition, even
though Hadi’s government had lost control of much of the country’s territory by early
2015, the Security Council still recognized Hadi’s request for assistance as coming
from the “President of Yemen.”44 In addition, the Council has continuously supported

39 S.C. Res. 788, pmbl. (19 Nov. 1992) (referring to a letter from the Foreign Minister of Liberia to the
Security Council President).
40 S.C. Res. 1132 (8 Oct. 1997).
41 S.C. Res. 1975, § 1 (30 Mar. 2011).
42 S.C. Res. 2201, pmbl., § 7(c) (15 Feb. 2015).
43 S.C. Res. 2216, § 1(b), (d) (14 Apr. 2015).
44 Id. at pmbl.

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Working Toward Peace in Yemen

the efforts of the GCC, a regional organization, to negotiate a peaceful political solution
to the crisis.

As a result, the government currently headed by Pres. Hadi, as the only governmental
authority within Yemen established through a political process, is the government
recognized as legitimate by the international community and therefore supported by
the Security Council. This is not to say that the government cannot change.
Governments are expected to change according to a country’s internal constitutional
and political processes, with the UN and international community subsequently
recognizing such changes. However, the Security Council’s trend toward rejecting
governments established by force should highlight, especially for the various political
groups that do not support the government of Pres. Hadi, the importance of pressing
for change through political rather than military means.

Houthi Militia and the Threat to International Peace

The Security Council’s rejection of the legitimacy of Houthi authority is a result of its
gradual determination that the Houthi militia and its allies have been the creators and
perpetuators of a situation that threatens international peace and security. Although
there had been sporadic fighting involving various groups in Yemen since the 2011
transition of power, the country remained relatively stable. During the years leading
up to and including the National Dialogue Conference, the UN Security Council
monitored the Yemen situation but limited itself to statements of encouragement for
the ongoing political processes and condemnations of the occasional bouts of armed
fighting between groups.

However, after conclusion of the Dialogue process in early 2014, the intensity of
fighting escalated dramatically. This prompted the Security Council to take the major
step in Resolution 2140 of determining, according to its Article VII powers under the
UN Charter, that the situation in Yemen constituted a threat to international peace
and security in February 2014.45 In general, this determination opens the door to the
legal use of coercive measures, including armed force, by the international community
in accordance with the directives of the Security Council.

At first, the Security Council was cautious in assigning responsibility for the security
situation to any particular group. Resolution 2140 established a travel ban and freeze
on financial assets to be applied to designated individuals and entities. However, the
Council did not make specific designations directly. Rather, the Council created a
Sanctions Committee to review information and designate any individual or entity it
found to be “engaging in or providing support for acts that threaten the peace, security
or stability of Yemen.”46

45 S.C. Res. 2140, pmbl. (26 Feb. 2014).
46 S.C. Res. 2140, § 17 (26 Feb. 2014).

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Working Toward Peace in Yemen

UN Security Council © AFP

Up to this point, the Security Council had only called out Al-Qaida as a perpetrator of
violence; not surprising since Al-Qaida has been targeted by the Council for a number
of years and was already the subject of a separate sanctions regime. Instead, the
Council had always called on all groups generally to avoid violence and engage in a
peaceful political process. This changed later in 2014, as the Houthis began taking
control of areas around the capital city of Sana’a, when the Council expressed its
concern about continuing fighting and called out the Houthi militia for the first time.
In a presidential statement in August 2014, the Council expressed “grave concern
about the deterioration of the security situation in Yemen in light of the action taken
by the Houthis…and those who support them, to undermine the political transition
and the security of Yemen.”47 The statement identified a list of specific actions of the
Houthi militia, including instituting checkpoints around Sana’a, which it characterized
as “supplant[ing] the authority of the state.” The statement also specifically
condemned “the actions of Houthi forces…who overran Amran including the Yemeni
Army Brigade headquarters….”

The Security Council’s caution in blaming certain parties ended when the Houthi
militia took control of the capital in September. At that point, the Sanctions Committee
took action based on the designation criteria in Resolution 2140 and determined that
two Houthi leaders and the Houthi-allied former president Saleh were “engaging in or
providing support for acts that threaten the peace, security or stability of Yemen.” As
a result, these men became the first individuals subjected to international sanctions
by the Committee on 7 November 2014.48

47 S.C. Pres. Statement 2014/18 (29 Aug. 2014). Council,
48 Sanctions List Materials: 2140 Sanctions List, U.N. Security
https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/2140/materials (last visited 1 Feb. 2019).

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Working Toward Peace in Yemen
When the Houthi militia dissolved parliament and took over state institutions and the
media in February 2015, the Security Council deplored the Houthi actions. It called on
all parties, including the Houthi militia, to follow the negotiated transition process,
and it demanded the Houthis in particular “refrain from further unilateral actions that
could undermine the political transition and the security of Yemen.”49 However, the
Houthi militia ignored the Security Council directives and proceeded with a military
campaign to completely take over the country.
In March, the Houthi militia engaged government forces in Aden, the temporary
capital where Pres. Hadi had re-established the government. This prompted an appeal
to the Security Council from Pres. Hadi seeking international assistance. The Security
Council responded by reiterating its condemnation of Houthi actions and adding an
international arms embargo against the sanctioned Houthi leaders and anyone acting
for their benefit. In addition, the Council specifically added another Houthi leader plus
former president Saleh’s son to the sanction list.50
Through this series of actions, the Security Council and its Sanctions Committee have
clearly identified the Houthi militia as the primary actor perpetuating war and
instability in Yemen. No other group in Yemen has been condemned for so many
specific acts and its leaders and allies targeted with international sanctions.
In summary, the international legal framework established by the UN Security Council
requires:

• Yemenis to decide ultimate outcome,
• Support of the legitimate government in resolving the conflict, and
• Cutting off all resources to the Houthi militia and its allies.
Because the Security Council has acted under its Chapter VII powers, the international
community is both obligated and empowered to take any actions in line with this
framework to bring the conflict to an end.

49 S.C. Res. 2201, § 7(d) (15 Feb. 2015).
50 S.C. Res. 2216, §§ 3, 14, annex (14 Apr. 2015).

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Working Toward Peace in Yemen

MOVING FORWARD

As an international community, it is our responsibility to do more in Yemen than just
document human rights violations and send aid to alleviate the humanitarian impacts
of war. We need to end the war.

The key to moving forward in ending the war is to understand and address its primary
causes. Based on the information presented in the preceding sections, it is evident
that there were two main causes that led to the conflict. One cause was the political
dissatisfaction that gave rise to the 2011 protests. The other was the military takeover
of the government, and then the country, by the Houthi militia. The international
community can address these causes by acting in accord with the clear framework
established by the UN Security Council.

Political Dissatisfaction – Support Yemeni Solution

First, to address the issue of political dissatisfaction, the framework directs the
international community to ensure any process is Yemeni-led and supports the efforts
of the Yemeni government. A Yemeni-led process will be more likely to lead to lasting
agreement. Political solutions imposed on a country from outside are almost certainly
destined for failure.

In this regard, the regional members of the international community played a role
early on in helping Yemenis to develop their own solution to the issue of political
dissatisfaction. The GCC in particular was at the forefront of trying to create an
environment where various parties within Yemen can participate in restructuring its
political process and governance arrangements. The GCC helped Yemenis achieve the
transfer of power from Saleh to Hadi and supported the efforts of the National
Dialogue Conference, which was part of the power transition agreed by the parties.

Since the onset of all-out civil war, the UN has been involved in several efforts
involving the use of “good offices,” shuttle diplomacy, and sponsorship of talks in
neutral venues organized by a special envoy from the UN Secretary-General. As
previously mentioned, a series of talks were held from 2015–2016, and another set of
talks was unsuccessfully attempted in 2018. Since the UN only served as a convener
and facilitator, these efforts also satisfied the requirement to ensure any solution is
developed and led by Yemenis.

Political Dissatisfaction – Support Government Efforts

As part of being Yemeni-led, the international community must support the Yemeni
government in developing and implementing the political process. Here, the Security
Council is deferring to the sovereignty and independence of Yemen. Since the current
government is the only one that has, at some time, held legitimacy both internally and
externally, the international community would be interfering in Yemen’s internal
affairs if it chose to recognize a different government.

Here again, efforts of the international community generally followed the framework,
at least initially. Early on, GCC and UN efforts both provided support to the Yemeni
government in developing processes and negotiating difficult issues with other

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Working Toward Peace in Yemen

parties within Yemen. Unfortunately, some later international actions strayed from
the framework with the result of undermining the Yemeni government’s efforts to
craft a peaceful political resolution.

The UN Human Rights Council (HRC) initially pointed to the Security Council direction
and helped highlight the responsibility of the Houthi militia. In the two years after the
Sanctions Committee designation in November 2014, the HRC voted to continue
providing technical assistance to Yemen and noted in its resolutions how Security
Council Resolution 2216 “contains specific concerns and places particular demands
on…Houthi militias….”51 This was a helpful reinforcement of the Security Council
framework. Unfortunately, HRC resolutions in 2017 and 2018 dropped this language
and no longer refer to the Houthis by name.52

In 2015, the Government of Yemen established a National Commission of Inquiry to
investigate human rights abuses. This commission was to be supported with technical
assistance from the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights at the
request of the HRC. The National Commission faced a difficult task of documenting
and reporting human rights violations in the midst of an armed conflict, including
those caused by the parties fighting the government. Unsurprisingly, the Houthi
militia refused to cooperate. After starting its work, statements from the High
Commissioner’s office indicated a lack of confidence in the Commission.53 In addition,
there seemed to be some dispute between the National Commission and the High
Commissioner’s office as to the proper role of the latter in providing assistance.
Regardless of any shortcomings of the Commission, this pronouncement provided
encouragement for the Houthis to continue refusing to cooperate with the
Commission’s work, thus undermining the government’s efforts.

Subsequently, the High Commissioner’s office conveyed the report of a Group of
Experts to the HRC in September 2018.54 This report provided an assessment of the
human rights situation in Yemen separate from the National Commission. The Group
of Experts mentioned in its report the significant limitation it had in terms of time to
conduct its work (one year) and lack of access to necessary people, locations and
information. Nevertheless, the report documented numerous human rights violations
committed by all parties to the conflict.

Unfortunately, the report was unbalanced. The Group of Experts devoted significant
space to detailing, for example, access barriers for humanitarian relief created by the
government and its allies, while providing no such detail for the Houthi militia even
though it also prevented access for humanitarian relief. Similar detail was provided

51 Human Rights Council, Technical Assistance and Capacity-Building for Yemen in the Field of Human
Rights, § 5, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/33/16 (29 Sep. 2016); Human Rights Council, Technical Assistance
and Capacity-Building for Yemen in the Field of Human Rights, § 5, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/30/18 (2 Oct.
2015).
52 Human Rights Council, Technical Assistance and Capacity-Building for Yemen in the Field of Human
Rights, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/39/21 (28 Sep. 2018); Human Rights Council, Human Rights Situation in
Yemen, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/39/16 (28 Sep. 2018); Human Rights Council, Human Rights, Technical
Assistance and Capacity-Building in Yemen, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/36/31 (29 Sep. 2017).
53 Tom Miles, Yemeni Rights Inquiry Not Up to the Job (28 Sep. 2016),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-un-idUSKCN11Y2L2.
54 Group of Experts Report, supra note 19.

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Working Toward Peace in Yemen

in terms of listing individual actions of government allies that resulted in civilian
casualties, while civilian deaths at the hands of the Houthi militia tended to be
grouped by category or general location. Interestingly, the Group of Experts noted its
inability to access key locations and facilities under Houthi control, especially
detention facilities, where human rights violations are highly likely to occur.
Therefore, the reported violations are likely to significantly underreport those
committed by the Houthi militia. This lack of data from Houthi facilities and the
disparity in presenting the findings gave the report an apparent bias in favor of the
Houthis.

It should be stressed that all human rights violations should be documented and
appropriately reported regardless of the perpetrator. A government should be
subjected to the same scrutiny as a non-state actor such as a rebel militia. However,
fair and time-sensitive reporting of results is critical. Where reporting brings with it
a high risk of emboldening the perpetrator of an armed conflict to continue the
conflict, then the reporting becomes counter-productive by perpetuating the very
situation that causes the violations. Such was likely the case here. Because the Group
of Experts report failed to thoroughly examine the terrorist acts and human rights
record of the Houthi militia and released its draft report only one week before
scheduled peace talks in Geneva, the report emboldened the Houthis to refuse to
participate in the September 2018 talks.

The manner in which the UN has engaged with the Houthi militia also presents
concerns. Al-Qaida as a group has been named in Security Council resolutions on
Yemen, and is the subject of extensive international sanctions, but it has not been
brought into negotiations, nor has it been visited by UN representatives. The Houthi
militia is in the same position of being named in Security Council resolutions on
Yemen, plus it apparently has perpetrated even more human rights violations in
Yemen than Al-Qaida. Yet, the Houthis are directly engaged in international talks and
visited by UN officials.

Although it is crucial to find a peaceful end to the conflict in Yemen as soon as possible,
it is hard to avoid the impression that these types of actions lend an appearance of
international legitimacy to the Houthi militia. It is important to consider the
possibility that approaches that lend legitimacy to the Houthi militia and its cause
might be counter-productive. Perhaps giving closer attention to the issue of the
military takeover of Yemen, discussed below, would achieve the desired results while
not lending an air of legitimacy to the group that perpetrated the takeover.

Military Takeover – Cut Off Houthi Militia

The second issue to address is the military takeover of Yemen and the ongoing threat
to international peace and security it entails. Here, the Security Council framework
directs the international community to isolate the Houthi militia by cutting off its
access to money and weapons and restricting the ability of its top leaders to leave the
country. These directives reflect the determination by the Security Council and its
Sanctions Committee that the Houthi militia is perpetuating war and instability in
Yemen. No other group has been condemned for so many specific acts or its leaders
and allies targeted with international sanctions, not even Al-Qaida, which is regularly
mentioned in Security Council resolutions on Yemen.

20

Working Toward Peace in Yemen
The Houthi militia cannot maintain its control of territory and government
institutions without outside military assistance. Therefore, starving that group of its
means to fight will ultimately force it to turn to other – less violent – means of
addressing its grievances with the government. Iran’s ongoing support of the Houthi
militia with military supplies is, therefore, particularly concerning. 55 Aside from
being a clear contravention of the Security Council-declared arms embargo, this
continuing supply of arms allows the Houthis to continue fighting the government and
flouting Security Council directives. Member states, especially those who are
members of the HRC, need to engage with Iran in a positive way to encourage that
country to end its support of the Houthis and thereby bring an end to the war that is
causing such destruction, death, and violation of human rights.

© Reuters

55 Carole Landry, Iran Arming Yemen's Huthi Rebels Since 2009: UN Report (30 Apr. 2015),
https://www.yahoo.com/news/iran-arming-yemens-huthi-rebels-since-2009-un-202936346.html;
Yara Bayoumy & Mohammed Ghobari, Iranian Support Seen Crucial for Yemen's Houthis (15 Dec. 2014),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-houthis-iran-insight/iranian-support-seen-crucial-for-
yemens-houthis-idUSKBN0JT17A20141215.

21

Working Toward Peace in Yemen

CONCLUSION

The long and short of the Yemen situation is this: All UN and international actions
should be measured against whether they help end the conflict. Ending the conflict is
the only way to stop the resulting human rights violations and end the humanitarian
crisis.
The UN must return to the framework established by the Security Council resolutions
to work toward peace and support the government of Yemen in creating a dialogue
that addresses the root causes of this conflict. Without addressing the main causes of
the current situation, such as was attempted during the National Dialogue, there will
ultimately be no peace and likely no end to the human rights violations resulting from
the ongoing conflict.
It should be noted that properly conducted investigation and documentation of
human rights violations are critical to ensure justice for victims in any conflict. The
Yemen conflict is no exception, and the international community has an important
role to play in ensuring the credible investigation of such violations. However, it is
important to keep the conduct and reporting of human rights violations in context
with the ultimate goal of international involvement in the Yemen situation: ending the
conflict. Documenting and reporting of human rights violations will not, in itself, end
the conflict that is the cause of the violations. Worse yet, reporting that does not give
due regard to political or diplomatic efforts may antagonize or embolden the parties
and exacerbate the conflict, thus having the counter-productive result of leading to
yet more human rights violations. The international community must be cautious to
avoid such unintended results as it seeks to uncover human rights violations in this
and other conflicts.
Ultimately it is up to Yemenis to decide on the best resolution for their country.
However, it is important for the international community to take action against
parties who add obstacles to the situation and thwart the directives of the Security
Council. The UN and international community should put forward their utmost effort
to support the Yemeni government and create an environment that is truly productive
for working toward peace and achieving justice for the people of Yemen.

22

Geneva International Centre for Justice

Independent, non-profit, non-governmental organization

GICJ is an independent, non-profit, non-governmental organization dedicated to the
promotion and reinforcement of commitments to the principles and norms of human
rights. GICJ is headquartered in Geneva, Switzerland and is governed by the Swiss Civil
Code and its statutes. Basing its work on the rules and principles of International Law,
International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law, GICJ observes
and documents human rights violations and seeks justice for victims through all legal
means available.

Mission

GICJ’s mission is to improve lives by tackling violations and all forms of violence and
degrading or inhumane treatment through the strengthening of respect for human
rights; reinforcing the independence of lawyers and judiciaries; consolidating the
principles of equity and non-discrimination; ensuring that rule of law is upheld;
promoting a culture of awareness on human rights; and combating impunity.

Work

GICJ has been tackling issues of justice and accountability since it was established.
GICJ maintains a partnership with various NGOs, lawyers and a vast civil society
network around the world. Through these channels, GICJ is able to receive
documentation and evidence of human rights violations and abuses as they occur in
several countries. GICJ continues to bring this information to the attention of relevant
UN bodies in order to gain justice for all victims.

Working Toward Peace in Yemen

Geneva International Centre for Justice

Postal address: www.gicj.org
P.O. Box GICJ 598, Vernier [email protected]
CH 1214 Geneva +41 227881971
Switzerland facebook.com/GIC4J
Geneva4Justice
Office address:
The Ecumenical Centre
150 Route de Ferney
CH 1211 Geneva
Switzerland

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