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Published by Bok Asis, 2019-12-03 09:36:32

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PROTECTION
OF ASSETS

SECURITY OFFICER OPERATIONS



PROTECTION
OF ASSETS

SECURITY OFFICER OPERATIONS

ASIS International | 1625 Prince Street | Alexandria, VA 22314 USA | www.asisonline.org

Copyright © 2011 by ASIS International

ISBN 978-1-934904-16-9

Protection of Assets is furnished with the understanding that the publisher is not engaged in
rendering legal, accounting, or other professional services. It is designed as a ready reference and
guide to the covered subjects. While every effort has been made to ensure accuracy of contents
herein, it is not an official publication and the publisher can assume no responsibility for errors or
omissions.

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or
transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or
otherwise without the prior written consent of the copyright owner.

Printed in the United States of America.

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

ASIS International (ASIS), the world’s leading society for security professionals, originally founded
in 1955 as the American Society for Industrial Security, acquired Protection of Assets in
December 2003. The acquisition of this work underscores the Society’s leadership role in
professional education. It is the sincere desire of ASIS and its editorial staff to continue to enhance
the value of this important reference.

Protection of Assets, which has been in existence since 1974, is recognized as the premier reference
for security professionals and the publisher wishes to acknowledge the two founding authors and
subsequent editors.

Timothy J. Walsh, CPP Richard J. Healy, CPP

Timothy L. Williams, CPP
Managing Editor

Editorial Associates
David G. Aggleton, CPP
Milton E. Moritz, CPP

Mike Hodge, J.D.
Sanford Sherizon, Ph.D., CISSP
Timothy J. Walsh, CPP, Editor Emeritus

As we move forward, confronted with issues that present a challenge to the security industry, our
mission is to ensure that Protection of Assets provides the strategic solutions necessary to help
professionals meet the demands of the 21st century and beyond. We also pledge to assemble a
group of subject matter experts who will enhance this manual as necessary to achieve our mission.

Michael E. Knoke, CPP
Managing Editor

Eva Giercuszkiewicz, MLS, Project Manager
Evangeline Pappas, Production Manager
Peter E. Ohlhausen, Technical Editor



PREFACE

OBJECTIVES OF PROTECTION OF ASSETS

This Protection of Assets (POA) reference work is provided for a single, basic reason: the previous
unavailability of such a comprehensive resource.

Although the availability of security literature is growing rapidly, with general and specialized
texts, it has not been possible—until now—for a business manager or protection professional to
find current, accurate, and practical treatment of the broad range of protection subjects, strategies,
and solutions in a single source.

The need for such a comprehensive resource is quite widespread according to the editors, writers,
and many professional colleagues whose advice has been sought in compiling this text. The
growing size and frequency of all forms of asset losses, coupled by the related increasing cost and
the complexity of countermeasures selection, demand a systematic and unified presentation of
protection doctrine in all relevant areas, as well as standards and specifications as they are issued.
Of course, it would be presumptuous to assume that any small group of authors could present
such material unaided. It is, therefore, a fundamental objective of Protection of Assets to draw upon
as large a qualified source base as can be developed. The writers, peer reviewers, and editors
attempt to distill from the available data, common or recurrent characteristics, trends and other
factors, which identify or signal valid protection strategies. The objective is to provide a source
document where information on any protection problem can be obtained.

Protection of Assets • Copyright © 2011 by ASIS International v

READERSHIP

Protection of Assets is intended for a wide readership: all protection professionals and business
managers with asset protection responsibility. The coherent discussion and pertinent reference
material in each subject area should help the reader conduct unique research that is effective and
organized. Of particular significance are the various forms, matrices, and checklists that give the
reader a practical start toward application of the security theory to his or her own situation. The
manual also serves as a central reference for students pursuing a program in security or asset
protection.

DIALOGUE

We hope that Protection of Assets becomes an important source of professional insight for those
who read it and that it stimulates serious dialogue between and among security professionals. Any
reader who is grappling with an unusual, novel, or difficult security problem and would appreciate
the opinions of others is encouraged to write a succinct statement describing the problem and
send it to us at ASIS [[email protected]]. At the reader’s request his identity will
not be disclosed, but the problem will be published with invitations for comment. Readers are also
encouraged to communicate agreement or disagreement with strategies or applications
recommended in the manual and to suggest alternatives. We reserve the right to publish or refrain
from publishing submitted material. The editors also solicit statements of reader opinion on
matters of asset protection policy in which a cross-sectional view would be helpful.

SUPPLEMENTAL TRAINING

Readers with supervisory or management responsibility for other security and asset protection
personnel may find the manuals to be a useful resource from which to assign required readings.
Such readings could be elements of a formal training syllabus and could be assigned as part of
related course sessions. Another approach would be to assign the manual chapters over a calendar
period, to be read in their natural, numerical sequence or in any other special sequence relevant to
the subscriber’s particular needs.

With all these objectives in mind, we present to you Protection of Assets, in the sincere belief it will
enhance your expertise in the security field.

Michael E. Knoke, CPP
Managing Editor
July 2011

vi Protection of Assets • Copyright © 2011 by ASIS International

CONTRIBUTORS

The success of this publication is directly related to the peer review process recognized by most
professions. Security professionals, members of academia and other subject matter experts were
involved in contributing current information, conducting research, reviewing submissions, and
providing constructive comments so that we are able to provide a publication that is recognized as
the “go to” reference for security professionals worldwide.

It is with sincere appreciation that I wish to thank the below named individuals who contributed to
Protection of Assets.

Teresa M. Abrahamsohn, CPP James P. Carino, Jr., CPP Richard H. Frank, CPP
Sean A. Ahrens, CPP Sue Carioti Kenneth M. Freeman, CPP
Marene N. Allison James S. Cawood, CPP, PCI, PSP Peter J. French, CPP
Randy I. Atlas, CPP Richard E. Chase, CPP Mary Lynn Garcia, CPP
George J. Barletta, CPP John C. Cholewa, III, CPP John W. Gehrlein, CPP
Mark H. Beaudry, CPP Tom M. Conley, CPP Eva Giercuszkiewicz, MLS
Regis W. Becker, CPP Geoffrey T. Craighead, CPP Gregory A. Gilbert, CPP
Brent Belcoff, CPP Michael A. Crane, J.D., CPP Frederick G. Giles, CPP
Howard J. Belfor, CPP Bruce A. Dean, CPP Timothy D. Giles, CPP, PSP
Adolfo M. Benages, CPP Fritz X. Delinski David H. Gilmore, CPP
Lawrence K. Berenson, CPP Edward P. De Lise, CPP Christopher Giusti, CPP
Alexander E. Berlonghi David A. Dobbins, PSP Brian D. Gouin, PSP
Raymond J. Bernard, PSP Clifford E. Dow, CPP Richard P. Grassie, CPP
Henri A. Berube Christina M. Duffey, CPP Benjamin P. Greer
Martin T. Biegelman, J.D. Brandon Dunlap Steven R. Harris
Daniel E. Bierman, CPP, PSP Cheryl D. Elliott, CPP, PCI Richard J. Heffernan, CPP
Patrick C. Bishop, CPP James W. Ellis, CPP, PSP Ronald D. Heil, CPP
Dennis R. Blass, CPP, PSP William R. Etheridge Chris A. Hertig, CPP
Keith C. Blowe, CPP Gregory Alan Ewing, CPP, PSP William T. Hill, CPP
Paul F. Boyarin, CPP, PCI Kenneth G. Fauth, CPP Ronald W. Hobbs, CPP
Tom Boyer Lawrence J. Fennelly Mark D. Hucker, CPP
Pete Brake, Jr., CPP Donald J. Fergus W. Geoffrey Hughes, PCI
Darryl R. Branham, CPP Eugene F. Ferraro, CPP, PCI John L. Hunepohl
Joseph P. Buckley, III James H. Fetzer, III, CPP Gregory L. Hurd, CPP
Lucien G. Canton, CPP Michael T. Flachs, CPP Gregory W. Jarpey, PSP

Protection of Assets • Copyright © 2011 by ASIS International vii

Sheila D. Johnson, CPP, PSP Gerald A. O’Farrell, CPP Shari Shovlin
Thomas R. Jost Peter E. Ohlhausen Marc Siegel, Ph.D.
Diane Horn Kaloustian Leonard Ong, CPP Dennis Smith, CPP
Cathy M. Kimble, CPP Harm J. Oosten, CPP Stan Stahl, Ph.D.
R. Michael Kirchner, CPP S. Steven Oplinger Paul J. Steiner, Jr., CPP
Glen W. Kitteringham, CPP Denis A. O’Sullivan, CPP Pamela M. Stewart, PCI
Michael E. Knoke, CPP Jaime P. Owens, CPP Dan E. Taylor, Sr., CPP
Terrence J. Korpal Gerard P. Panaro, J.D. Lynn A. Thackery, CPP, PSP
James M. Kuehn, CPP James F. Pastor, Ph.D. Mark L. Theisen, CPP
David Lam, CPP David G. Patterson, CPP, PSP Dave N. Tyson, CPP
Robert F. Leahy, CPP, PSP John T. Perkins, CPP Darleen Urbanek
Robert E. Lee Karl S. Perman Karim Vellani, CPP
Todd P. Letcher Kevin E. Peterson, CPP Barry J. Walker, CPP
Cynthia Long Charlie R. A. Pierce Michael W. Wanik, CPP
Emblez Longoria, CPP, PSP Patrick K. Quinn, CPP Roger D. Warwick, CPP
Richard E. Maier, CPP Roy A. Rahn, CPP Fritz Weidner
Loye A. Manning, CPP, PSP John D. Rankin, CPP Richard C. Werth, CPP
Robert L. Martin, CPP William G. Rauen, CPP Allan R. Wick, CPP, PSP
Roger B. Maslen, CPP David L. Ray, LL.B. Anthony S. Wilcox, CPP
Judith G. Matheny, CPP Joseph L. Rector, CPP, PCI, PSP Donald S. Williams, CPP
Edward F. McDonough, Jr., CPP Ty L. Richmond, CPP Reginald J. Williams, CPP
Richard A. Michau, CPP Lisa M. Ruth Richard F. Williams, CPP
Bonnie S. Michelman, CPP Jeffrey J. Ryder, Jr., CPP, PSP Timothy L. Williams, CPP
Owen J. Monaghan, CPP Mark A. Sanna, CPP Coleman L. Wolf, CPP
Patrick M. Murphy, CPP, PSP Stephen Saravara, III, J.D., CPP Richard P. Wright, CPP
Carla Naude, CPP Charles A. Sennewald, CPP Richard Y. Yamamoto, CPP
James W. Nelson Dennis Shepp, CPP, PCI Scott S. Young, CPP
Robert L. Oatman, CPP

viii Protection of Assets • Copyright © 2011 by ASIS International

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PREFACE

CONTRIBUTORS

Chapter 1. UNDERSTANDING SECURITY OFFICER OPERATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

1.1 Security Officer Utilization. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.2 Public Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.3 Number of Officers Required . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.4 Basic Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

1.4.1 Access Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.4.2 Patrol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.4.3 Escort . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.4.4 Inspection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.4.5 Monitoring . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.4.6 Emergency Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.4.7 Dealing with Disturbed People . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.4.8 Special Assignments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.5 Officer Qualifications. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.5.1 Private Security Officer Selection, Training, and Licensing Guidelines . . . . . . . . . 9
1.5.2 Private Security Officer Selection and Training Guideline. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.5.3 Canadian General Standards Board CAN/CGSB-133.1-99 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.5.4 Personal Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.6 Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1.7 Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1.7.1 Policy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1.8 Uniforms and Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1.9 Organizational Structure. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1.9.1 Vertical Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
1.9.2 Shamrock Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
1.9.3 Network Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1.10 Proprietary Versus Contract Officers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1.11 Legal Concerns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
1.11.1 Security Officer as Peace Officer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
1.11.2 Insurance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Chapter 2. SCHEDULING AND MANAGING THE SECURITY OFFICER FORCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

2.1 Personnel Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.1.1 Location or Combination of Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.1.2 Necessary Human Being . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.1.3 Training and Competency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

Protection of Assets • Copyright © 2011 by ASIS International ix

2.2 Salaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.3 Scheduling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

2.3.1 Post Hours . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.3.2 Post Schedule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.3.3 Security Officer Schedule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.3.4 Rotating Shifts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.3.5 Time Off . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.3.6 Computerized or Automated Scheduling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.3.7 Work Site Requirements. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.3.8 Personnel Database . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.3.9 Schedules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.3.10 Proprietary Force. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2.3.11 Contract Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2.3.12 Maximizing the Straight Time Schedule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2.4 General Orders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
2.5 Post Orders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
2.6 Supervision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
2.6.1 Evaluations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.7 Security Officer Reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
2.7.1 Security Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
2.7.2 Database Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
2.7.3 Manual Log Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
2.8 Management Use of Reports and Logs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
2.8.1 Data Capture and Trend Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
2.8.2 Failure to Use Reports and Logs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

Chapter 3. ENHANCING SECURITY OFFICER JOB PERFORMANCE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

3.1 Vigilant Performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
3.2 Studies of Similar Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

3.2.1 Behavioral Theories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
3.3 Analysis of Personality Traits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
3.4 Work Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50

3.4.1 Mechanical Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
3.4.2 Physical Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
3.5 Human Environment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
3.5.1 Big Five Model of Personality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
3.6 Personal Communication, Training, and Supervision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
3.6.1 Changes in the Work Environment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
3.6.2 Interaction with Other Employees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
3.6.3 Enhancing Observation Capabilities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
3.6.4 Testing and Post-Testing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
3.6.5 Analyzing Job Performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60

x Protection of Assets • Copyright © 2011 by ASIS International

3.6.6 Serious Misconduct . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
3.6.7 Misdirected Punishment and Rewards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
3.6.8 Offsetting the Effects of Task Simplification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61

Chapter 4. TRAINING THE SECURITY OFFICER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63

4.1 History of Security Officer Training. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
4.1.1 Apprenticeships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64

4.2 Key Training Concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
4.2.1 Learning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
4.2.2 Retention and Transfer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
4.2.3 Socialization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
4.2.4 Education, Training, and Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67

4.3 Benefits of Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
4.3.1 Improved Job Performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
4.3.2 Ease of Supervision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
4.3.3 Procedure Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
4.3.4 Staff Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
4.3.5 Reduced Turnover . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
4.3.6 Legal Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71

4.4 Identifying Training Needs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
4.5 Training Program Assessment and Design. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73

4.5.1 Behavioral Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
4.5.2 Designing the Instruction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
4.5.3 Training Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
4.6 Training Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
4.6.1 Lectures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
4.6.2 Case Studies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
4.6.3 Job Aids . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
4.6.4 Distance Learning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
4.6.5 On-the-Job Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
4.6.6 Mentoring . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
4.7 The Training Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
4.8 Obstacles to Providing Training. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
4.8.1 Budgetary Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
4.8.2 Scheduling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
4.8.3 Lack of Management Expertise in Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
4.8.4 Stereotypes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
4.8.5 Ego . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
4.9 Training Strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
4.9.1 Off-Duty Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
4.9.2 Tuition Reimbursement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
4.9.3 Recognition Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
4.9.4 Integrated Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85

Protection of Assets • Copyright © 2011 by ASIS International xi

4.9.5 Video Collaborations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
4.9.6 Selling Security Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
4.9.7 Supervisory Training. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
4.9.8 Internships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
4.9.9 Formal and Informal Training Efforts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
4.9.10 Government and Private Studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
4.9.11 Training Guidelines and Standards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
4.10 Roles of Security Officers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
4.10.1 Management Representative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
4.10.2 Intelligence Agent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
4.10.3 Enforcement/Compliance Agent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
4.10.4 Legal Consultant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
4.10.5 Physical Security or Crime Prevention Specialist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
4.11 Future Trends in Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
4.11.1 Shifting Roles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
4.11.2 Government Oversight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
4.11.3 Self-Regulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
4.11.4 Training Delivery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103

Chapter 5. SELECTING AND ADMINISTERING THE SECURITY SERVICES CONTRACT . . . . . . . 107

5.1 Client Responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
5.1.1 Request for Proposal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
5.1.2 Scope of Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
5.1.3 General and Special Orders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
5.1.4 Bidders’ List . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113

5.2 Agency Responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
5.2.1 Operating Agreement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
5.2.2 Bidders’ Conference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115

5.3 Bid Evaluation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
5.3.1 Criteria. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
5.3.2 Sample Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
5.3.3 Incentive Pricing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122

5.4 Contract Award . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
5.4.1 Legal Considerations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123

5.5 Administration of the Operating Agreement. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124

APPENDIX

Appendix A: Sample Scope of Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
Appendix B: Sample General and Special Orders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
Appendix C: Sample Operating Agreement for Security Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133

xii Protection of Assets • Copyright © 2011 by ASIS International

REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145

INDEX. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151

TABLE OF FIGURES

1-1 Criteria Covered in ASIS Private Security Officer Selection and Training Guideline . . . . 10
2-1 Post Activity Flow Schedule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2-2 Preliminary Post Hour Estimate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2-3 Complete Schedule of Security Officer Post Hours. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2-4 Proprietary Security Officer Force Shift Schedule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2-5 Security Officer Schedule Days-Off Recapitulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3-1 Checklist for Analyzing Performance Failures: Sleeping on Post . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3-2 Physical Demand Analysis for Security Officer Position . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
3-3 Three Basic Principles of Communication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
3-4 Job Instruction and Learner Recall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
3-5 Test/Post-Test Routine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
5-1 Measures of Contract Security Agency Suitability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
5-2 Contract Security Service Straight Time and Billing Rates in Wage Step . . . . . . . . . 118
5-3 Contract Security Overtime, Training, and Short-Term Supplemental Service Rates . . 119
5-4 Contract Security Service Annualized Equipment Cost . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
5-5 Contract Security Fringe Benefit Costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
5-6 Contract Security Bid Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
5-7 Contract Security Service Adjusted Base Rates (16,000+ Hours) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122

Protection of Assets • Copyright © 2011 by ASIS International xiii



CHAPTER 1

UNDERSTANDING
SECURITY OFFICER OPERATIONS

In the early days of private security operations, security personnel were known as watchmen.
Later, they began to be called guards. Today, the preferred term is security officer or protection
officer. In some setting the term may be loss prevention officer. Perhaps the most visible element
of the private security sector, the uniformed security officer operation has evolved into a
multibillion-dollar, worldwide industry. Although the general public may still tend to view security
officers solely as guards, proprietary and contract officers in uniform or civilian clothing actually
perform a wide variety of duties.

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, led to unprecedented public and media scrutiny of
airport security personnel. A finer appreciation of the duties and responsibilities of security
officers resulted, and it is likely that regulatory agencies will set more stringent requirements for
those personnel over time. Already we are seeing the regulatory dynamic changing as California
and Ontario now regulate both proprietary and contract officers. This is a marked departure from
the tradition in both North America and Europe where only contract officers were subject to
licensing and training requirements. In addition, some jurisdictions regulate other types of
protective personnel, such as door supervisors, repossession agents, and locksmiths. This trend
may escalate as governments attempt to generate revenue through licensing fees. As security
responsibilities have grown, so has the need for higher-quality security personnel.

Protection officers are also providing a more diverse array of services for their employers and
clients. There is a shift toward more highly trained personnel offering a greater return on
investment. By leveraging technology, smaller numbers of personnel can perform more job tasks,
some of which are not strictly within the rubric of security. Contemporary protection staffs are
being asked to assist in communications, customer service, transportation, and other functions.

Protection of Assets • Copyright © 2011 by ASIS International 1

UNDERSTANDING SECURITY OFFICER OPERATIONS
1.1 Security Officer Utilization

Additional growth is taking place in regions experiencing civil unrest and warfare. As companies
move into new areas for energy exploration, they often face armed adversaries. Heavily armed
security forces have been used to meet this threat.

The number of security officers is rising. After September 11, 2001, security staffs in the United
States increased by 13 percent, totaling more than 1 million jobs in 2002 (Bureau of Labor
Statistics, 2007). By 2008, the number had risen to 1.1 million, about 55 percent of whom were
employed by contract agencies (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2011). About six out of seven worked
full-time. Many of the rest were moonlighting law enforcement officers.

1.1 SECURITY OFFICER UTILIZATION

Security officers are best used as part of a complete protection plan, not as a stand-alone
resource. The security plan is based on an understanding of the risks it is designed to control
and officers are but one strategy. Because they are expensive, their use should be evaluated
periodically. Other protection resources, such as hardware and electronics, should also be
considered. Security professionals can most effectively convince management of the need
for security by quantifying and prioritizing the loss potential with a strategic plan that applies
to the entire organization.

The U.S. Department of Labor forecast that employment of security officers would grow by
14 percent between 2008 and 2018, which is faster than the average for all occupations.
About 152,000 new jobs were expected to be created in that period because increased
concern about crime, vandalism, and terrorism heightens the demand for security (Bureau of
Labor Statistics, 2011).

In Canada, employment growth for the security industry is above average. Just as in the
United States, researchers expect a strong need for security officers, based in part on 9/11
(Job Futures, 2007). However, even before the 9/11 attacks, the security officer and private
investigator occupations grew at five times the rate of growth for all Canadian industries
from 1991 to 2001 (Sanders, 2005).

Protection officers are also being used in more environments than ever before. In some cases
they are replacing public police or soldiers. Security officers may patrol downtown areas or
military installations; monitor heavily populated areas like stadiums, shopping centers, or
large apartment complexes; or transport prisoners or detainees.

2 Protection of Assets • Copyright © 2011 by ASIS International

UNDERSTANDING SECURITY OFFICER OPERATIONS
1.2 Public Relations

1.2 PUBLIC RELATIONS

Security officers play a public relations role when they perform their protection duties and
represent an employer. They are often the first contact a visitor, customer, vendor, or
employee has with an organization. The way they deal with people has a marked effect on
the initial impression made by the organization. Security officers can also help form and
maintain good relationships between the security department (in-house or contract) and
others in the organization. By being involved in a security awareness program, officers can
impact the attitude of employees to report or decrease security risks. Courtesy and efficiency
are essential. Some people are antagonistic toward anyone in an enforcement position.
However, well-trained officers who are courteous, act with restraint, and use good judgment
can overcome such resistance.

Security personnel must convey to employees that certain rules must be followed, but they
must also treat employees in a fair and understanding manner. Officious or careless security
officers may harm the protection program. On the other hand, if an employee refuses to
cooperate with an officer who has performed his or her duty properly, the uncooperative
employee should be referred to a supervisor for disciplinary action.

1.3 NUMBER OF OFFICERS REQUIRED

The number of officers required for a facility is determined by several factors, including the
following:

x physical complexity and size of the facility
x number of employees
x nature of work
x number of entrances (and hours they are open)
x value and amount of assets being protected
x number of patrols needed
x number of escorts and special assignments needed

Assuming that security officers work 40 hours a week, each post that is staffed 24 hours a day,
seven days a week, requires a minimum of 4.2 officers. However, to compensate for sick,
vacation, and holiday leave, each post requires 4.5 officers. Organizations that provide longer
vacations to senior personnel or who have greater training requirements may require as
many as five full-time officers per post.

Protection of Assets • Copyright © 2011 by ASIS International 3

UNDERSTANDING SECURITY OFFICER OPERATIONS
1.4 Basic Functions

The supervisory force is usually supplemented with clerical, communication, training, and
supply support personnel. The number of support personnel required depends on the size
and complexity of the security force.

1.4 BASIC FUNCTIONS

Whether developing a proprietary or contract security organization, it is necessary first to
identify the tasks that the security force will be required to perform.

The basic functions of a security officer force include the following:

x control of entrances and movement of pedestrian and vehicle traffic
x patrol of buildings and perimeters
x escort of material and personnel
x inspection of security and fire exposures
x monitoring of assets from a central control facility
x emergency response
x dealing with disturbed people
x special assignments

These functions are explained below.

1.4.1 ACCESS CONTROL

A primary function of the security officer is access control, which is the regulation of
movement into, out of, and within a designated building or area. Controls are placed on
people, forms of transportation, and materials (Fay, 2002, p. 161). Typical security officer
instructions concerning access control include the following:

x Ensure that all employees are who they say they are and are wearing visible badges at all
times within the facility.

x Provide all visitors with special passes. Regulate their access through an established
authorization permit process.

x Identify and report any person in the facility without proper identification. Some people
may be detained temporarily.

x Report individuals who attempt to bring alcoholic beverages or other contraband into
the facility or who appear to be under the influence of alcohol or controlled substances.

4 Protection of Assets • Copyright © 2011 by ASIS International

UNDERSTANDING SECURITY OFFICER OPERATIONS
1.4 Basic Functions

x Identify and question individuals who remove property to ensure that they have a
property removal pass or are otherwise authorized to remove the property.

x Monitor materials entering and leaving the facility.
x Monitor vehicles entering and leaving the facility. Those vehicles may include

watercraft, aircraft, and land-based vehicles (such as trains, buses, heavy equipment,
cars, motorbikes, and trucks).

1.4.2 PATROL

Officers on patrol observe a wide variety of people, assets, and locations. They report hazards
and deficiencies in the protection program so that changes can be made.

Patrols are generally divided into two categories—foot patrols and vehicular patrols. Either
way, the officer should patrol the assigned area systematically, frequently backtracking and
taking unexpected routes. The officer should try to observe people and locations on the
assigned route without being noticed.

The officer must also have an intimate knowledge of the patrol area and be aware of
shortcuts, dead ends, construction work, and any other factors that might affect response.
Knowledge of the hazards and legitimate activities in the area is also required.

Observation is a prime task for the officer on patrol. The officer should carefully regard all
aspects of the environment. When anything out of the ordinary occurs, the officer should
evaluate the situation and take the necessary steps. Particular care should be taken when
monitoring individuals.

On patrol, officers commonly look for the following, among other conditions:

x unsecure doors, windows, or other openings
x suspicious persons, vehicles, or circumstances
x disorder or unusual activity—anyone under the influence of alcohol or other

substances, unusual groups of people, disorderly individuals, or quarrels
x hazardous conditions, such as water or other fluid leaks, fire hazards, and malfunc-

tioning equipment
x equipment operating at the wrong time
x problems with fire-fighting equipment
x violations of company security or safety policies

Protection of Assets • Copyright © 2011 by ASIS International 5

UNDERSTANDING SECURITY OFFICER OPERATIONS
1.4 Basic Functions

1.4.3 ESCORT

Security personnel should not be required to escort visitors and customers on company
property. Doing so takes officers away from their protection tasks. Whoever invited a visitor
should be responsible for escorting him or her at the site.

However, it is reasonable for security officers to escort people carrying large sums of money
or special information or property. Officers should also provide escorts when requested for
employee safety—such as walking an employee to the parking lot at night. Officers may also
escort those who need assistance due to an illness or physical disability. Such assignments
usually require little time but may require the officer to be particularly alert.

1.4.4 INSPECTION

Inspection may be performed along with other assignments, such as patrol. Officers may also
conduct special inspections for fire hazards; unlocked doors, safes, and windows; and other
security and safety concerns. In many locations, security personnel, due to their 24-hour
presence, are expected to monitor mechanical equipment and inspect fire-extinguishing
equipment.

1.4.5 MONITORING

Increasingly, security monitoring is conducted from centralized security control centers. A
typical security control center may contain the controls for systems that operate closed-
circuit television (CCTV), access control, fire alarm controls, elevator, building lighting,
duress alarms, and emergency call stations. These centralized control centers may be
responsible for a single location or may monitor sites across an entire country. Control
center security personnel must be comfortable with electronic systems, computers, and a
sometimes high-stress environment.

1.4.6 EMERGENCY RESPONSE

Security personnel have a responsibility to be prepared for emergencies that could occur at
their particular site. It falls to security officers to direct, coordinate, and carry out the
responses established by security management. Emergencies that security officers might
have to respond to include the following:

x fire alarms, both legitimate and nuisance
x bomb threats (via telephone or mail)
x bombings
x suspicious packages

6 Protection of Assets • Copyright © 2011 by ASIS International

UNDERSTANDING SECURITY OFFICER OPERATIONS
1.4 Basic Functions

x hazardous material (hazmat) releases, inside or outside a building
x medical emergencies
x mechanical and other equipment failures
x elevator entrapments
x extreme weather, such as floods, tornadoes, ice storms, wind, and heat
x terrorist actions
x other criminal actions, including hostage taking, gunfire, or bombings
x building collapses
x building evacuations, both partial and full

1.4.7 DEALING WITH DISTURBED PEOPLE

This section addresses situations involving persons who are mentally ill, under the influence
of alcohol or illegal substances, temporarily unable to control themselves due to physical or
emotional trauma, or otherwise behaving in an irrational manner that could result in injury
to themselves or others.

Dealing with disturbed people requires sensitivity. The goal is to prevent harm from the
person’s acts and to control the person with a minimum of injury, discomfort, or embarrass-
ment. The first objective is the immediate concern of responding security personnel, but the
second may be overlooked in the course of the response.

After the apparent danger passes, witnesses will reflect on how the disturbed person was
handled. If it appears that the disturbed person was treated poorly or inconsiderately, people
will criticize the security officer’s behavior, forgetting the risks present at the time of the
incident.

The problem can be further complicated if the disturbed person and the responding security
personnel are of different sexes or ages. A reluctance to make physical contact under these
circumstances may result in an unacceptable delay by the security forces. As in all tactical
scenarios, handling the situation requires skillful improvisation by security personnel. Still,
security officers should be trained in employer policies on these situations, especially
regarding the use of physical force. Though not all policies require a written procedure, in
cases like these where specific guidelines are required, it is highly recommended to have one
in place.

Protection of Assets • Copyright © 2011 by ASIS International 7

UNDERSTANDING SECURITY OFFICER OPERATIONS
1.5 Officer Qualifications

The most important consideration is bringing the person into custody and eliminating the
immediate danger. Other considerations include the following:

x the legal liability of the participating security forces and the enterprise if injury or other
harm results

x the legal liability of the security forces and the enterprise if the disturbed person is not
restrained and then injures others

x employee/community/public/media relations, as they may be affected by the conduct
of security officers

Undue concern with legal liability may result in action that is too little, too late. Adequate
insurance coverage should already have been provided, and it should protect both the enter-
prise and the security personnel. Such coverage should be reviewed with the insurance
department. Even for self-insureds or those who retain the risk, economic concerns should
not exclusively determine the response.

The publication of the policy will, in part, remedy the liability and public relations problems.
Although the conduct of security personnel still remains critical in any given situation, the
existence of the policy is evidence to others that serious thought has been given to the
subject.

1.4.8 SPECIAL ASSIGNMENTS

In many facilities, the security force is on duty around the clock, and the officers may be the
only personnel available for special assignments. They may be needed to act as messengers,
communications coordinators, or drivers, for example. However, diverting officers from
security tasks to miscellaneous services erodes the facility protection program.

1.5 OFFICER QUALIFICATIONS

In some organizations, the qualifications for employment as a security officer are so low that
essentially any applicant can be hired. In other organizations, the duties of the position are
complex or highly sensitive and the qualifications extremely high. Government regulations
on security officers vary across jurisdictions and may pertain only to particular industries.

Every organization with assets to protect is responsible for setting the qualifications of an
effective security officer. The qualifications should be based on the duties in the job descrip-
tion. The initial interview should be conducted by a human resource specialist.

8 Protection of Assets • Copyright © 2011 by ASIS International

UNDERSTANDING SECURITY OFFICER OPERATIONS
1.5 Officer Qualifications

1.5.1 PRIVATE SECURITY OFFICER SELECTION, TRAINING, AND LICENSING GUIDELINES

The Private Security Officer Selection, Training, and Licensing Guidelines document was
developed by the Private Sector Liaison Committee (PSLC) of the International Association of
Chiefs of Police (IACP). The PSLC includes members from the National Sheriffs’ Association,
the National Association of Security Companies, and ASIS International.

The guidelines provide the following minimum criteria for private security officers (Private
Sector Liaison Committee, 2002):

x If they will work unarmed, they must be at least 18 years of age.

x If they will work armed, they must be at least 21 years of age and comply with U.S.
Public Law 104-208 Section 658 (known as the Lautenberg amendment), which forbids
anyone convicted of domestic violence (felony or misdemeanor) from possessing a fire-
arm or ammunition.

x They must possess a valid state driver’s license (if applicable).

x They must not have

— been convicted or pled guilty or nolo contendere to a felony in any jurisdiction,

— been convicted or pled guilty or nolo contendere to a misdemeanor involving moral
turpitude, acts of dishonesty, or acts against governmental authority, including the use
or possession of a controlled substance within a seven-year period,

— been convicted or pled guilty or nolo contendere to any crime in any jurisdiction
involving the sale, delivery, or manufacture of a controlled substance, or

— been declared by any court to be incompetent by reason of mental disease or
defect (unless the declaration has been removed or expunged).

x For a state criminal record check and an FBI criminal history check before permanent
employment as a private security officer, they must submit

— two sets of fingerprints,

— two passport photographs,

— their name, address, date of birth, social security number, and citizenship status, and

— a statement of conviction of crimes.

These actions must be taken before arming any private security officer.

x They must furnish information about all prior employment. The employer should make
a reasonable effort to verify the last seven years of employment history and check three
personal references.

x They must pass a recognized preemployment drug-screening test.

Protection of Assets • Copyright © 2011 by ASIS International 9

UNDERSTANDING SECURITY OFFICER OPERATIONS
1.5 Officer Qualifications

The guidelines also suggest the following applicant criteria for non-regulated security officer
employment:

x high school education or equivalent
x military discharge records (DD 214)
x mental and physical capacity to perform the duties for which they are being employed
x for armed applicants, successful completion of a relevant psychological evaluation to

verify that they are suited for the duties for which they are being considered

The guidelines note that U.S. federal law mandates that candidates for employment must be
citizens or possess legal alien status prior to employment.

1.5.2 PRIVATE SECURITY OFFICER SELECTION AND TRAINING GUIDELINE

In 2001, ASIS International recognized the need for increasing standards for private security
officers. Hence, the Private Security Officer Selection and Training Guideline was developed.
The guideline offers U.S. national minimum criteria for the selection and training of all
security officers, both contract and proprietary. The guideline provides minimum criteria in
three categories. (See Figure 1-1.)

State Regulation of Employment Training
Private Security Screening Criteria Criteria

Regulatory body with oversight General requirements Training (hours and testing)
and enforcement Citizenship Training topics
Personal information Annual training
State fees to support the Social security number Pre-assignment firearms training
enforcement process Education Post-assignment firearms
Criminal history requirements
Regulatory body or company Employment verification Annual firearms training
registration Registrations/licenses and
certifications
Insurance Fingerprints and drug screening
Photographs
Individual security officer license Credit check
Physical ability
Private security officer
registration

Background investigations

Pre-assignment, post-
assignment, and annual training

Armed security officer training

FIGURE 1-1
Criteria Covered in ASIS Private Security Officer Selection and Training Guideline

10 Protection of Assets • Copyright © 2011 by ASIS International

UNDERSTANDING SECURITY OFFICER OPERATIONS
1.5 Officer Qualifications

1.5.3 CANADIAN GENERAL STANDARDS BOARD CAN/CGSB-133.1-99

In Canada, the Canadian General Standards Board has promulgated CAN/CGSB-133.1-2008,
Security Officers and Security Officer Supervisors, which is a minimum criteria standard that
organizations must meet in order to supply guard services to the government of Canada.
Using that standard, individual provinces manage the licensing of security guards.

In 2003 and 2004, several provinces began to review their own, existing legislation, much of
which is decades old and not reflective of the 21st century security industry. Future legislation
is likely to mandate training and standards for all security personnel, not just contract
officers.

1.5.4 PERSONAL ATTRIBUTES

The essential personal attributes for a private security officer are as follows:

x good character
x proper behavior and ability to handle people
x neat appearance
x knowledge of the job
x education
x ethics

Character

An officer should be honest, courageous, alert, well-disciplined, and loyal. Because officers
are the custodians of company and employee property, the need for honesty is obvious.
Security department regulations should state—in writing—that all officers are required to be
scrupulously honest. Failure to prevent damage to or theft of property, acceptance of bribes
or gratuities, or permitting the violation of company rules should be cause for discipline,
including dismissal.

Because an element of danger is always involved in a protection operation, an officer who
lacks courage is of little value. Officers must display courage in incidents of physical danger
and during emergencies. Courage is also required to report fully and accurately all violations
of company rules and to enforce protection policies on company property.

Continued alertness is essential and might mean the difference between life and death.
Duties such as patrol tend to become monotonous over time because of their routine nature.
However, the purpose of such routine responsibilities is to protect personnel and the facility,

Protection of Assets • Copyright © 2011 by ASIS International 11

UNDERSTANDING SECURITY OFFICER OPERATIONS
1.5 Officer Qualifications

a task that may involve danger. Officers must be constantly alert for their own protection as
well as the protection of company property and employees.

Prompt obedience and proper execution of all orders given by superiors is always necessary.
Regulations usually specify that an officer must never leave his post until relieved or ordered
to do so and that the officer must not allow personal opinions to influence job performance.

The officer must be loyal to the job and company, and all decisions must be based on what is
best for the organization. The officer must also be discerning with confidential information.
Because the officer often works alone and unobserved, strength of character is an important
qualification.

Behavior

The security officer is usually the first contact a visitor or employee has with the
organization. The manner in which the officer functions greatly affects that person’s
perception of the company. Three important factors relate to behavior: courtesy, restraint,
and interest. Security officers must display the best behavior at all times—especially when
they are uniformed in distinctive attire—because they must retain the respect of others.

Courtesy is the expression of consideration for others—it eliminates friction and makes
personal associations pleasant. By demonstrating consideration for others, the officer can
obtain the cooperation of others, which is essential. Whether answering questions, giving
directions, or enforcing rules or traffic regulations, officers must be courteous.

Restraint must be stressed in the officer training program. Officers should act without haste
or undue emotion, avoid abusive language, avoid arguing, and avoid force if at all possible. A
calm, dignified behavior engenders respect and is more effective. While on duty, tolerance
for the opinions of others must always be shown.

An officer must also have an interest in the job. Without interest and satisfaction, he or she
may develop a poor attitude toward the public and employees.

Appearance

Good personal appearance is essential for an overall good impression. If visitors gain a good
impression of the organization, employees in the facility will have more respect for the
officers and for the security organization. This, in turn, boosts the morale of the security
organization as a whole. An individual officer can influence—either favorably or
unfavorably—the opinions of many people. Whether in a uniform or plainclothes, officers
should appear neat and well-groomed.

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UNDERSTANDING SECURITY OFFICER OPERATIONS
1.5 Officer Qualifications

Knowledge of the Job

Learning is an ongoing process for the security officer. Requirements or rules and locations
of areas or personnel requiring protection change frequently. It is vital that the officer be
thoroughly familiar with the facility and have complete knowledge of the organization to be
able to perform the public relations aspect of the job—giving information to employees and
outsiders. The officer must also be familiar with federal, state, and local laws, company rules
and regulations, criminal procedures, safety, fire protection, emergency plans, and first aid.

Education

The education level of security force personnel has changed notably since earlier reports
criticized the level of education and the low competency of people employed as officers in
the private sector.

Many organizations are retaining larger portions of risks formerly insured commercially, and
there is increased emphasis on quality performance with concomitant emphasis on
adequate qualification. Better-educated candidates are available in the employment pool.
The academic community has responded to the continued rapid growth in private security
as well. Security-related certificate and degree programs are currently available throughout
the United States, Canada, and other countries. Many graduates from these courses take
entry-level employment in security while preparing for a higher position.

Ethics

A security officer may have all other personal attributes listed, but without ethics the package
is incomplete. The International Foundation for Protection Officers (2010) promulgates a
code of ethics, which states that a protection officer shall do the following:

x Respond to the employer’s professional needs.
x Exhibit exemplary conduct.
x Protect confidential information.
x Maintain a safe and secure workplace.
x Dress to create professionalism.
x Enforce all lawful rules and regulations.
x Encourage liaison with public officers.
x Develop good rapport within the profession.
x Strive to attain professional standards.
x Encourage high standards of officer ethics.

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UNDERSTANDING SECURITY OFFICER OPERATIONS
1.6 Training

1.6 TRAINING

Officers’ duties determine their required training. Traditional duties include patrol, pilferage
control, control of entrances and exits, and prevention of sabotage or other hostile acts
against the facility. Training is discussed in depth later in this book.

1.7 WEAPONS

Many states have legislation requiring that armed officers be licensed by the state and
mandate minimum qualifying standards for the issuance of licenses or permits to carry
firearms. The cost of such training and the time required to meet the training criteria lead
many organizations to opt for unarmed officers. In Canada, armed security officers are a
rarity—with only cash-in-transit officers carrying weapons.

One of the greatest liabilities an organization faces involves issuing deadly weapons to
security officers. Liability is obvious when the weapons are issued to proprietary officers.
Some assets protection managers think that when a contract security vendor is used and the
outsourcing contract is properly drawn, most of the liability is shifted to the vendor.
However, legal actions usually involve anyone remotely associated with a situation. Payment
for the vendor services indicates an acceptance of the vendor’s management style and
practices; thus, crucial policies and protocols should be prescribed by the organization that
employs the vendor.

The decision on whether to arm an officer should be based on the existence of one or both of
the following conditions:

x There is a greater danger to life safety without the weapon.
x The officer may reasonably be expected to use fatal force.

If officers are armed, the management of the facility assumes several responsibilities:

x proper training of the officers to be armed
x selection of the appropriate firearms and ammunition
x proper maintenance of the firearms by a qualified gunsmith
x maintenance of records of the foregoing actions
x an adequate level of liability insurance

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UNDERSTANDING SECURITY OFFICER OPERATIONS
1.7 Weapons

Officers must be thoroughly proficient in the use of arms before carrying them. Training
includes proper handling of firearms and live range firing for qualification. The live range
firing should be conducted using the weapon carried by the officer, and the records should
include the serial number of the weapon. Each weapon has its own firing characteristics, and
the officer should be able to testify to complete familiarity with the weapon in a firing
situation. It is equally important that officers be trained to use the firearm in situations
potentially encountered at the facility. Weapon retention must also be part of the training.
Refresher training must be provided periodically.

If officers are permitted to carry privately owned firearms on duty, standards for the type of
firearms and ammunition must be set and enforced. An alternative is to prohibit carrying
privately owned weapons. Employer-owned firearms and ammunition should be issued at
the start of a tour of duty and collected at the close of the tour of duty.

The insurance carrier must be advised that security officers are carrying firearms. If a
contract security agency provides armed security officers to protect the facility, all the above
considerations must be included in the contract for the service.

Firearms may be appropriate when large amounts of cash are regularly handled and robbery
is a risk. In that case, armed security officers are a greater deterrent than unarmed officers,
and the deterrence of robbery attempts will reduce the general life-safety risk. However, one
must also consider the risk of a gun battle to bystanders.

The strategic value of issuing weapons is that potential assailants may be dissuaded from
attacking a target if they know they will face armed resistance. However, it is essential that
the quality and quantity of defensive weapons be an obstacle to the potential assailants.

For example, one or two security officers armed with handguns may not deter robbery
attempts if the target is attractive enough and no other countermeasures are used.
Combining armed security officers with other countermeasures, such as vehicle control,
fence and boundary security, and hardened locations could create a stronger deterrent.
Similarly, shoulder weapons at hardened or defensible positions along the attack access
route may be a more formidable deterrent than handguns.

Firearms might also be justified when a single security officer is assigned to a post or escort
duty in a locale where felonious attacks have happened or are anticipated. Examples of such
locations are remote gate posts and high-crime areas that require exterior patrol. An
alternative may be to avoid the use of security officers and substitute other countermeasures,
such as remote surveillance or intrusion alarms.

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UNDERSTANDING SECURITY OFFICER OPERATIONS
1.7 Weapons

1.7.1 POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

Aside from security officer competency, other matters should be considered with respect to
the use of deadly weapons. They include the following:

x conditions when weapons may be issued
x specific people who get a weapon
x type of weapon and ammunition issued
x quality and reliability of the weapon at time of issue
x repair and maintenance of the weapon by a qualified armorer
x accountability for the specific weapon and its ammunition
x specified training with the weapon
x conditions when weapons may be used
x safety precautions surrounding the issuance and carrying of weapons
x return or surrender of the weapon when not required for authorized use
x secure storage for weapons when they are not issued and in use (weapons unloaded,

separated from ammunition, and locked away in an approved storage container)
x accurate records of each of the preceding points
Weapons that are in large supply, that are in an area prone to theft by terrorists or other
adversaries, or that are extremely dangerous (automatic weapons) need additional controls.
Storage in a reinforced building, intrusion detection, armed patrols, dual access, etc. should
be considered as part of a defense-in-depth protective system. Applicable government
standards and insurance carrier requirements should be exceeded in these instances.
The use of weapons that are not considered lethal, such as impact weapons, electronic
devices, and aerosols, should also be covered in policy statements. Such statements put the
enterprise on record as to the propriety of weapons use and form the basis of the weapons
training program.

16 Protection of Assets • Copyright © 2011 by ASIS International

UNDERSTANDING SECURITY OFFICER OPERATIONS
1.8 Uniforms and Equipment

1.8 UNIFORMS AND EQUIPMENT

Most organizations supply security officers with uniforms and equipment. Doing so ensures
that the uniforms are, in fact, uniform in appearance and properly fitted to each officer.
Complete seasonal uniforms, including inclement weather clothing, are usually issued. Con-
sideration must be given to the type of duty performed and the laundry or dry cleaning cycle
when determining the number of uniforms issued.

Many organizations have adopted the approach of making officers recognizable without
appearing authoritarian. This is accomplished by having officers wear casual attire, such as
plainclothes with shoulder or pocket patches.

Company policy should address whether uniforms should be worn off duty, including travel
to and from work. A policy allowing the uniform to be worn only when on duty precludes
adverse publicity should an officer become involved in an incident on his or her own time. As
for equipment, an officer assigned to control access at a lobby desk may only need minimal
equipment, whereas an officer on roving patrol might require a flashlight, a means of
communication, a weapon, and a notebook.

1.9 ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

Organizational structure is the formal pattern of interactions and coordination designed by
management to link the tasks of individuals and groups in achieving organizational goals
(Bartol & Martin, 1998).

Originally, most security forces were patterned after military or police organizations. Some
forces today are led by a security chief as the senior officer, followed by the ranks of captain,
lieutenant, sergeant, and officer. The current trend is to abandon the military or paramilitary
model and organize along supervisory lines used by businesses. It is more common to find
the entry-level position designated as security officer and the first level above as supervisor.
Higher levels are identified by conventional management titles, such as assistant manager,
manager, director, etc.

The efficiency of the security force depends on the adequacy and skill of its supervisors.
Security managers may also give specific supervisors operational responsibility by delegating
authority in order to see how they handle responsible decision making and security force
oversight. Unless officers are properly trained and closely supervised, they may not provide
the protection required.

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UNDERSTANDING SECURITY OFFICER OPERATIONS
1.9 Organizational Structure

Security officer supervisors are selected on the basis of their knowledge of the job and
demonstrated administrative and leadership abilities. When selecting a candidate for a
supervisory position, it is important to ensure they have the base skills required to be able to
meet the expected performance levels of the higher level position. They also need to be given
special training so they can keep current with new developments and methods. Some
organizations prefer to rotate the assignments of supervisors to prevent cliques and ensure
familiarity with all phases of security officer duties. The two reasons for testing the security
operations program are to identify residual risks and identify necessary changes within the
organization. Several models of structuring a security operation are described below.

1.9.1 VERTICAL MODEL

In the vertical model, also known as the hierarchical model, authority comes from the top or
senior manager and flows down through a series of managers and supervisors until it stops
with the front-line staff. The most effective managerial style for supervisors is to
acknowledge credit for good performance and be objective when noting deficiencies. They
must also be able to administer disciplinary action as a corrective measure, not just a
punishment. Managers and supervisors need to maintain high personal standards in their
own performance, to set an example and to motivate their subordinates. The art of
delegation includes giving responsibility with commensurate authority and holding the
employee fully accountable for use of that authority. The number of organizational levels
varies. The organization chart can be seen as a series of pyramids connected to and within
other pyramids in the organization.

1.9.2 SHAMROCK MODEL

This model is based on the three-leafed shamrock (Dalton, 1995, p. 134):

The first leaf represents a small core of professionals, managers and skilled technicians. Their
skill sets have been identified as being absolutely critical to the organization. This small
group is apt to interact in a more collegial manner in a traditional boss–subordinate
relationship. The organization is flat and information flows freely between the participants.
Considerably larger than the first, the second leaf consists of third-party suppliers who have
been chosen for their expertise and ability to provide quality service. Such contractors may
often employ former members of the organization. The third leaf consists of part-time and
temporary workers who are employed as needed. Commonly known as the flexible work
force, these are employees who require minimal support and draw a greater identity from
their profession than from the company. This is not to say they lack loyalty and commitment
to the company when on the payroll.

This model is not perfect. Vetting of third-party employees is still required, and it is still
necessary to ensure that temporary and part-time workers are properly trained, qualified,
and available.

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UNDERSTANDING SECURITY OFFICER OPERATIONS
1.10 Proprietary Versus Contract Officers

1.9.3 NETWORK MODEL

Also called the flattened, horizontal, or open model, the network model, can be compared to
a computer network. Employees are connected not just to their immediate supervisor and to
those whom they themselves supervise, but also to many others in the organization. In
addition, the security department is networked to other departments. In the network model,
the emphasis is not on vertical or horizontal reporting relationships but instead on people
coming together for particular tasks and then disbanding or regrouping as needed. Although
the network model may not be the best fit for front-line staff with static positions and
responsibilities, it provides flexibility for one-time needs and for security management to
leverage their skills for the greater good of the organization.

1.10 PROPRIETARY VERSUS CONTRACT OFFICERS

Organizations may use proprietary officers, contract officers, or a mix. Arguments can be
offered for any configuration. In the 1990s, the trend toward staff reductions and outsourcing
seemed to favor the contract method. For example, General Motors converted its large
proprietary security force to a contract operation. Historically this pattern has been common
when budgets are tight. Another configuration is a hybrid security force wherein proprietary
supervisors oversee contract front-line officers. In this case, the relationship is known as
principal-agent.

Contract security firm representatives usually reduce costs to sell their service. This can be
misleading, and on occasion contract service adopted on a low-bid basis proves
disappointing. Often, the level of service is lowered to compensate for the lower price. To
avoid this, it is the responsibility of the organization requesting the security service to
develop detailed bid specifications that clearly spell out the requirements, including wages,
benefits, and performance expectations. This way one can avoid low-bid, poor-performance
results after the contract has been awarded.

Ensuring satisfactory performance can be a problem for the enterprise electing to contract
for security officers. With performance specifications, it is easier to hold a contract security
company to a standard of quality. Regulating the security activity not only requires licensing
of the controlled business but also licensing or registering security employees.

Before assuming that a proprietary security force is the way to go, security management
should conduct an analysis of the operational and cost advantages of in-house versus
contract security. Tasks normally handled by the contractor, such as a recruitment program,
application processing and personnel screening, training, benefit administration, discipline,
and open post coverage would have to be handled within the proprietary security group.
Other concerns, such as general liability, workers’ compensation, and labor relations must
also be taken into consideration.

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UNDERSTANDING SECURITY OFFICER OPERATIONS
1.11 Legal Concerns

1.11 LEGAL CONCERNS

1.11.1 SECURITY OFFICER AS PEACE OFFICER

Security executives are divided in their opinions on peace officer status for security officers.
Opponents point out the serious consequences of a status that may give the security officer
police authority outside the facility, thus exposing the employer to extended liability.

Some jobs, however—such as traffic handling on public streets or parking enforcement—
may require deputization. When officers are deputized, it is customary and prudent to limit
the scope of their authority to the actual security officer duties. Security managers should be
familiar with state civil statutory law regarding labor. A local police chief might have the
authority to mobilize all police officers, including security officers with peace officer status.
That act could reduce the guard force at a time of public emergency.

1.11.2 INSURANCE

Most organizations recognize their probable liability for all actions of officers on duty. How-
ever, they cannot protect the officer from being separately sued or charged criminally. There-
fore, officers remain primarily liable for their own conduct. Experience has shown, neverthe-
less, that plaintiffs in such cases perceive the employer to have deep pockets and will seek, by
any available theory of liability, to make the employer a principal defendant.

Most enterprises do not carry special liability insurance for officers because they are covered
by the provisions of a commercial liability policy. In instances where officers are deputized, a
limited added coverage is usually provided through the indemnity bond required for protec-
tion by the local government. This, however, protects the public only. If a claim were made
on the bond, the employing company might be subject to a suit by the bonding company for
the amount paid out, if it would be liable in a civil suit for damages caused by the officer’s
actions.

When employing a contract security organization, the existence and adequacy of the
insurance coverage provided by the company for the employees who are deployed should be
verified. The insurance requirements of the client should also be included in the agreement
between the contract security organization and the employing enterprise. It is not necessary
to apply a condition where the contractor firm is an insurer.

Whether the client company wants to be designated as an additional named insured
depends on the policy language, which varies among carriers. At a minimum, the client
should have valid and current certificates of insurance—issued by the contract agency’s
insurance carrier—that show the agreed limits of coverage accompanied by the carrier’s
undertaking to notify the client of any change in or cancellation of coverage.

20 Protection of Assets • Copyright © 2011 by ASIS International

UNDERSTANDING SECURITY OFFICER OPERATIONS
1.11 Legal Concerns

In sum, security personnel are a vital component of most asset protection programs. Their
selection, training, and management have a tremendous impact on the level of protection
they can offer. Organizations today require more-committed, better-trained, and better-
qualified individuals for security positions than they did in the past. Security personnel
should be supervised by asset protection management and not placed as the sub-operation
of another department.

Protection of Assets • Copyright © 2011 by ASIS International 21



CHAPTER 2

SCHEDULING AND MANAGING
THE SECURITY OFFICER FORCE

Despite efficiency gains due to technology and, in some settings, a shrinking of the security force,
security officers still represent the largest segment of security sector employees and are the largest
cost element in the majority of security operating budgets.

The deployment of security officer personnel must be guided by rational and objective business
criteria, including a thorough assessment of the protection needs of organizational assets. Once
the need has been established, the next important task is to ensure that security officers are
scheduled and assigned cost-effectively.

2.1 PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS

In this step, the security manager determines how many posts and officers are required to
protect the assets of the facility. Post orders are based on standard operating procedures
(SOPs), which should be site-specific. The SOPs are a compendium of procedures for the
security group to follow in day-to-day operations. They may also include emergency
response procedures. By specifying organizational expectations, SOPs help managers
determine post requirements.

A security officer post is any location or combination of activities for which a trained human
being is necessary. That definition includes three key concepts:

x a location or combination of activities
x necessary human being
x training and competence to accomplish the required activities

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SCHEDULING AND MANAGING THE SECURITY OFFICER FORCE
2.1 Personnel Requirements

2.1.1 LOCATION OR COMBINATION OF ACTIVITIES

The location or combination of activities may be a stationary (fixed) post or a roving security
officer patrol (patrol post). This location may feature desirable or undesirable activities that
require the presence of a security officer. Alternatively, the location may be a predetermined
spot, such as an employee, visitor, or contractor checkpoint or a central control facility.

2.1.2 NECESSARY HUMAN BEING

The necessary human being concept means that the particular characteristics and reactions
required at the post require human capabilities. Each post is likely to demand a combination
of cognitive (knowledge), psychomotor (physical), and affective (attitudinal) skills. A human
being is needed if the post requires the ability to

x discriminate among events, persons, circumstances, or physical objects based on
complex and varying criteria;

x conduct rational dialogue with people face-to-face and discern next actions based on
such communication;

x use physical force or the threat of physical force to restrain one or more persons;
x exercise judgment to determine a logical course of mental or physical activity in

response to circumstances that may vary randomly; and
x provide reports detailing their activities on an ongoing basis.

The requirements above are for qualities at the post. If they are applied at a location other
than the proposed post, staffing may not be required at the post. For example, a “person-
trap” with interlocking or revolving doors might be used to control entry or exit at an access
point. Using CCTV, audio transceivers, card readers, and other technology, access control
might be completely automated with a human response required only in case of a problem.
Where personal recognition for access-control purposes is required, under low-density
queuing, a remote operator could control three or four access points.

2.1.3 TRAINING AND COMPETENCY

Training and competency imply the possession of the necessary skills and knowledge to
accomplish an assigned task. Without post-specific training, security officer effectiveness is
reduced and raises a question of the actual need for the post. When potential or actual losses
require a post, proper training must be developed to ensure that the assigned security officer
is effective. Competency refers to an individual’s ability, skills, and qualifications to perform
the necessary duties. In addition to the mental ability to complete administrative tasks and
make judgments, the security officer must also have the physical ability to observe, listen,
report, and function in emergencies.

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SCHEDULING AND MANAGING THE SECURITY OFFICER FORCE
2.2 Salaries

As was detailed earlier, one can find numerous guidelines on the selection and general
training of security officers. In addition, job-specific and site-specific criteria for physical and
mental abilities should be included as screening criteria for prospective proprietary and
contract security officers. In an effective screening process, the physical and mental
requirements are part of the job description.

2.2 SALARIES

There is a growing realization that security officer salaries need to be commensurate with the
responsibility of their position. Security personnel are often the backbone of an
organization’s protection program and are responsible for the security and safety of people,
physical assets, and information. The demands of the occupation have never been higher.
They deserve salaries that allow them to concentrate on their jobs and not worry about
meeting basic needs. They often work too many hours in a day, too many shifts without a day
off, or hours at a second job.

Security personnel require education, training, and experience. Paying a fair salary will go a
long way toward allowing them to obtain all three, leading to a win-win situation for the
employee and employer. Better salaries also lead to lower turnover and hence to lower
turnover costs (McNally, 2004, p. 17). Turnover costs—due to advertising, interview time,
background checks, hiring, new employee processing, and training—generally run to 25
percent or more of the employee’s annual salary. Additional costs are associated with lost
productivity until the new employee is up to speed, the expense of covering terminated
employees’ hours, and a decline in customer satisfaction. High turnover also weakens a
security operation’s performance.

2.3 SCHEDULING

2.3.1 POST HOURS

Once the need for a post is established, the next step is to determine when it should function.
A post may be used to control access and to monitor employees entering and exiting the
workplace during regular working hours, and it may be closed at other hours. Alternatively,
the post may be staffed only at high traffic periods or when needs arise.

In determining what post hours are necessary, the security manager should discuss and
analyze security requirements with the primary management clients affected by the post.
Doing so ensures that operating needs and requirements are understood. It is also helpful to

Protection of Assets • Copyright © 2011 by ASIS International 25

SCHEDULING AND MANAGING THE SECURITY OFFICER FORCE
2.3 Scheduling

chart the level of activity at the post throughout a 24-hour, seven-day period. If movement is
heavy for brief periods and light or nonexistent for longer periods, the post will be more cost-
effective if open only during the peak periods. Some level of off-peak activity may have to be
transferred to another post in order to satisfy operating requirements. The same technique
should be followed for posts that control vehicular movement, transfer of property, and
other activities. Figure 2-1 indicates a simple technique for documenting activity.

Hours: 2400 0300 0600 0900 1200 1500 1800 2100 2400
Event: A B C D E F G

Legend:

A—night shift meal period

B—truck gate opens
C—day shift enters/night shift leaves
D—day shift meal period
E—day shift leaves/afternoon shift enters
F—afternoon shift meal period
G—afternoon shift leaves/night shift enters

FIGURE 2-1
Post Activity Flow Schedule

2.3.2 POST SCHEDULE

The schedule lists the number of hours in each shift when the post is staffed. If a post opens
or closes at an hour other than the start or end of the guard shift, a notation of the actual
clock hour should be made to facilitate the next stages of schedule development. Figure 2-2
shows how a preliminary schedule of post hours can be developed.

Post Days 0700–1500 Afternoons 1500–2300 Nights 2300–0700
Command 8 hours (7 days) 8 hours (7 days) 8 hours (7 days)
Truck gate 8 hours (M–F) 4 hours (till 1900 M–F) Closed (7 days)
Pedestrian gate 8 hours (+2 O/T, M–F) 8 hours (M–F) Closes 2300 (7 days)
Warehouse 8 hours (M–F) Closes 1500 (7 days) Closed (7 days)
Patrol 8 hours (7 days) 8 hours (7 days) 8 hours (7 days)

FIGURE 2-2
Preliminary Post Hour Estimate

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SCHEDULING AND MANAGING THE SECURITY OFFICER FORCE
2.3 Scheduling

2.3.3 SECURITY OFFICER SCHEDULE

Next, the actual security officer schedule must be developed. Two techniques are useful for
this. The first is appropriate for use with contract security officer services and indicates
whether a particular post requires a full-time or part-time security officer. It is a restatement
of the security officer hours required, by shift and by post. (See Figure 2-3.)

Post Sun. Mon. Tues. Wed. Thurs. Fri. Sat. Total

Day Shift (0700–1500) 8 88888 8 56
Command — 88888 — 40
Truck gate — 10 10 10 10 10 — 50
Pedestrian gate — 88888 — 40
Warehouse 8 88888 8 56
Patrol 16 42 42 42 42 42 16 242
Total Hours
88888 8 56
Afternoon Shift (1500–2300) 8 44444 — 20
Command — 88888 — 40
Truck gate — ————— —0
Pedestrian gate — 88888 8 56
Warehouse 8 28 28 28 28 28 16 172
Patrol 16
Total hours 88888 8 56
————— —0
Night Shift (2300–0700) 8 ————— —0
Command — ————— —0
Truck gate — 88888 8 56
Pedestrian gate — 16 16 16 16 16 16 112
Warehouse 8 86 86 86 86 86 48 526
Patrol 16
Total hours

Grand total 48

FIGURE 2-3
Complete Schedule of Security Officer Post Hours

The second technique is useful when managing a proprietary security force. The typical
North American work week is 40 hours of straight time over five consecutive days. For
positions covered by fair labor standards and by wage and hour laws—including most
security officer positions—work that exceeds 40 hours or five days requires premium pay.

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SCHEDULING AND MANAGING THE SECURITY OFFICER FORCE
2.3 Scheduling

The same is true under the usual collective bargaining agreement, often for jobs not covered
by statute. It is important to establish a work schedule that does not unnecessarily involve
premium or overtime pay. However, managers must also take into consideration scheduling
vacation time and other replacement time, which may require overtime hours.

In the method illustrated in Figure 2-4, a numeral—rather than a name—represents any one
officer assigned over a conventional workweek. This technique shows post coverage and
quickly reveals errors, such as split days off, scheduling of more than five days, and back-to-
back shift assignments. It also indicates the minimum number of officers necessary to
achieve proper staffing for the force. This requirement is represented by the highest numeral
indicated in the schedule.

Post Sun. Mon. Tues. Wed. Thurs. Fri. Sat.

Day Shift (0700–1500) 111112 2
Command —3 2 2 2 3 —
Truck gate —4 4 4 4 4 —
Pedestrian gate —5 5 5 5 5 —
Warehouse 663336 6
Patrol ———— 6 — —
Supernumerary*
8
Afternoon Shift (1500–2300) —

Command 777778 —
10
Truck gate** — 10 8 8 8 10 —

Pedestrian Gate —9 9 9 9 9 12

Warehouse —————— —

Patrol** 10 10 8 8 8 10 13

Supernumerary* — — 10 — — —

Night Shift (2300–0700)

Command 11 11 11 11 11 12
Truck gate ——————
Pedestrian gate ——————
Warehouse ——————
Patrol 13 13 12 12 12 13
Supernumerary* ——————

* The last officer for each shift is available on one day for which no need is scheduled. This is less expensive than using
overtime to cover the post on the other four days.

** Officer works four hours (till 1900) on the truck gate post and four hours (1900–2300) on patrol, M–F.

FIGURE 2-4
Proprietary Security Officer Force Shift Schedule
Note: Each numeral in a cell represents a particular officer.

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SCHEDULING AND MANAGING THE SECURITY OFFICER FORCE
2.3 Scheduling

2.3.4 ROTATING SHIFTS

In many facilities, the security force rotates over all three traditional shifts in some
systematic way. This means each officer, at preset intervals, must move from day to
afternoon to night shift or to an intermediate relief shift. When the actual change occurs
between shifts, it is important that the individual officer have sufficient time off for rest
before returning to work. This means several days off, preferably three or more consecutive
days (Miller, 2010, p. 22). Officers who are not adequately rested may be inattentive, fall
asleep, have accidents, or experience losses in cognition.

2.3.5 TIME OFF

Figure 2-4 shows—by the absence of a numeral—which days an individual officer is off duty.
To check that days off are consecutive, a days-off chart (as in Figure 2-5) should be appended
to the basic officer schedule.

The sample schedules are based on eight-hour shifts, but 12-hour shifts are also common.

Officer Days Off Officer Days Off
1 F,S 8 S,M
2 S, M 9 S,S
3 S,S 10 W, T
4 S,S 11 F,S
5 S,S 12 S, M
6 T, W 13
7 F, S T, W, T

FIGURE 2-5
Security Officer Schedule Days-Off Recapitulation

Based on Figure 2-4

2.3.6 COMPUTERIZED OR AUTOMATED SCHEDULING

Most scheduling software for police or private security organizations will work for scheduling
a security force. The programs are usually modular. The basic unit may provide the ability to
schedule personnel to posts. Additional modules may provide time and attendance record-
ing or payroll administration. For the contract security company, other features might
include client billing or job cost control. The programs provide reports, charts, and graphs,
and the data can usually be exported to other programs. Security features include levels of
access authorization, ranging from read-only capability to authority to change information
in data fields. To produce the best schedule, the programs analyze work requirements and
cross-reference the database of available personnel.

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SCHEDULING AND MANAGING THE SECURITY OFFICER FORCE
2.3 Scheduling

Some programs automatically report the arrival and departure of the officer at the post. The
officer simply telephones into the system and inputs the site number, officer identification
number, and individual password. Using caller ID and a list of associated post numbers, the
system rejects any call from a telephone other than at the post.

2.3.7 WORK SITE REQUIREMENTS

A detailed analysis of post and time requirements must be performed, regardless of whether
the scheduling is done manually or with software. Requirements include the following:

x identification of each post by type—such as fixed, vehicular, or foot location—and post
number

x start and stop times for each shift of operation, by day
x number of officers required for each shift and each day
x any special personnel requirements listed by shift if applicable
x names of any personnel who are not assigned to the post

2.3.8 PERSONNEL DATABASE

The personnel database includes a profile of each employee, including the following
information:

x name, address, and telephone numbers
x employee number
x shift and overtime preferences
x maximum number of hours the employee is allowed to work
x availability of the employee (particularly important for a part-time officer)
x special training, certification, and qualifications ( a “skills inventory”)
x vacation allowance and specific days requested
x scheduled training days
x posts from which the officer is excluded
x other considerations, such as physical limitations

2.3.9 SCHEDULES

Combining site work requirements with personal information, the programs can generate
schedules to optimize the use of available personnel. Overtime can be avoided, and when an
additional officer is needed, the programs can consider the travel time from the potential
officer’s home to the site, the officer’s scheduled hours, and the overtime policy.

30 Protection of Assets • Copyright © 2011 by ASIS International

SCHEDULING AND MANAGING THE SECURITY OFFICER FORCE
2.3 Scheduling

2.3.10 PROPRIETARY FORCE

For a proprietary security officer, factors other than post hours and shift time must be
considered. The number of paid holidays required for each security officer must be
calculated into the work schedule. Because some collective bargaining agreements set forth
refusal options about working a regular holiday, it is important to pay attention to agreement
language.

In addition, sick time should be factored into any schedule. If the information is available,
calculating the average sick time taken by the security officer force over a two-year period
provides a basis for estimating sick days in future years. It is important to note the actual
distribution of sick days, as more time off is generally taken during the winter months.

Other absences will also occur—for jury duty, family illnesses, or emergencies. With a
proprietary force, these unscheduled absences are usually covered by overtime. For small
security officer forces, this can be an expensive event. In addition to overtime pay, other
costs include fatigue, impaired morale, and degraded alertness. These costs may be too high
to justify the apparent economy of a tight basic schedule.

2.3.11 CONTRACT FORCE

The client and the agency usually agree to the basic schedule when a contract guard force is
in place. The agreement sets forth the total number of officer hours required in a given week.
It then becomes the responsibility of the agency to provide individual officers at the required
posts to cover scheduled hours. Even though the staffing problem moves from client to
agency, the solution to scheduling conflicts, time off, and related concerns may not be any
easier. Theoretically, the agency has a broad personnel base from which it can draw
additional officers when necessary. The additional officers typically come from other client
assignments to fill vacancies caused by unscheduled absences of personnel at a client
location.

In practice, the replacement may never have been assigned before to the particular client
location. Such a guard cannot become familiar with post requirements in one or two hours,
and an inexperienced officer may cause more harm than good.

If the agency is required to supply relief officers from those regularly assigned to the facility,
overtime will help achieve the desired result. For large client accounts, the guard agency
might periodically assign personnel from other client positions for occasional relief work.
That approach allows them to gain experience with the facility.

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SCHEDULING AND MANAGING THE SECURITY OFFICER FORCE
2.3 Scheduling

2.3.12 MAXIMIZING THE STRAIGHT TIME SCHEDULE

Planned overlapping of shifts is one way to schedule additional personnel at peak periods
without overtime. If a typical eight-hour shift includes a meal period of either 30 minutes or
one hour, that has the same effect as extending the officers’ presence at the facility by the
same amount of time. A shift from 0700 to 1500—if it includes a meal period of one hour—
will run from 0700 to 1600. If the second shift is normally scheduled from 1500 to 2300, the
period between 1500 and 1600 would see all personnel from the day shift and the afternoon
shift on duty together because the one-hour meal would extend the first shift’s duty.
This overlap is useful to cover peak events such as plant shift changes or office breaks. But
the meal breaks mean that the officers take time away from their duties. Meal periods can be
treated as unpaid depending on company policy or bargaining agreements, if any.
Planning meal periods can be particularly difficult if the force is small or consists entirely of
fixed posts. Solutions include creative use of patrol officers, temporary closing of fixed posts,
and assigning a security supervisor to cover posts during meal breaks. However, if a
proprietary force is working under a collective bargaining contract, then regular use of a
supervisor to do an officer’s work may lead to a grievance.
Officers should log their meal periods just as they report their other activities. If an incident
occurs, the log may allow verification of whether an officer was on a meal break or should
have been at the post.

32 Protection of Assets • Copyright © 2011 by ASIS International

SCHEDULING AND MANAGING THE SECURITY OFFICER FORCE
2.4 General Orders

2.4 GENERAL ORDERS

General orders have been adopted by various control forces throughout history. Military
police, municipal police departments, state police agencies, and contract security firms have
all used some form of general orders. General orders may be thought of as canons or bodies
of principles for protection officers.

Some commonly used general orders are as follows:

x Familiarity, fraternization, and unnecessary conversation with persons while on duty
is prohibited. A professional is objective and does not show favoritism to any particular
person. Further, a protection officer on post or patrol must be vigilant. Hanging out with
one’s friends does not promote vigilance.

x Officers will maintain a military bearing. They will wear their uniforms neatly. They will
extol professionalism in their dress and deportment. This primarily applies to
uniformed forces; however, plainclothes officers (such as retail loss prevention agents,
doormen, and personal protection specialists) must still carry themselves with a
professional bearing. They must be customer-friendly as appropriate to their present
duties, but they must also project themselves as knowledgeable, precise, and
committed.

x Smoking on duty is prohibited, as is eating on duty. Both smoking and eating should be
done within the confines of a private, secluded place such as a lunch room, break area,
or ready room.

x All statements to the media will be made by the designated media spokesperson or
public information officer (PIO). Protection officers are not to make statements.
Instead, protection officers must know the workings of an organization; they must be
intimately familiar with the organizational structure; and they must be supportive of
that structure. Media relations professionals must craft their statements carefully; if they
do not, panic may ensue during emergencies, reputations may be ruined, or
investigations may be sabotaged.

x Security officers must enforce regulations diplomatically. They must respect others
and not be uncivil or make unnecessary use of authority. They must not abuse their
position; rather, they must understand that they are both enforcement/compliance
agents of the property management and representatives of management.

x Officers shall not wear the employer’s uniform or use the employer’s equipment
without authorization. This is an important consideration as officers are representatives
of their employers and clients. Operationally this becomes an issue when officers work for
a second employer or stop in public places going to and from work.

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