NewsHawks 14 - 27 June 2024

Price US$1 Friday 14 - 27 June 2024 NEWS Scandal-prone Mnangagwa in yet another corruption case Story on Page 5 NEWS Feisty Ramathuba’s elevation spells trouble for Zim authorities WHAT’S Story on Page 20 INSIDE SPORT Zimbabwe's Lady Sables Edge Zambians Story on Page 66 ALSO INSIDE Mushayavanhu destroys ZiG notes worth millions Double Edition How the Zec corrupt deal was secretly cobbled up

OWEN GAGARE AS the fallout from the corrupt US$40 million Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (Zec) tender scandal widens, new details have emerged on how the deal was sewn up. Fresh information shows the deal is worth more than twice that amount, all things put together. The key players in the multimillion deal were Zec chairperson Priscilla Chigumba, chief electoral officer Utloile Silaigwana, chief procurement officer Robson Changachirere, businessmen Wicknell Chivayo, Moses Mpofu, Pedzai "Scott" Sakupwanya and Mike Chimombe, Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO) Director-General Isaac Moyo, Chief Secretary to Cabinet Martin Rushwaya, lawyer Everson Chatambudza, Ren-Form international sales executive Angus Carlaw and the company chief executive Thomas Michel du Sart. Chigumba, working with people in the Office of the President and Cabinet, and CIO partly initiated the deal. The Zec secretariat is headed by Silaigwana, the administrative and technical leader, as well as the accounting officer, who directly reports to the commission through Chigumba. Zec has other departments that report directly to Silaigwana: finance, legal services, office of the secretary to the commission, internal audit and procurement management unit. In this case, the most important section below Silaigwana was the procurement department headed by Changachirere. However, Chigumba is the overall boss. In the Office of the President and Cabinet, Chief Secretary Martin Rushwaya was key. At CIO, Moyo was central. Chivayo became the broker. The NewsHawks, which broke the story, has more details showing Zec worked closely with Chivayo, Chimombe and Mpofu despite its attempt to distance itself from them. Zec is now desperately trying to wriggle out through legal technicalities, saying it has no contract with Chivayo, Chimombe and Mpofu. Details show Chivayo, Mpofu, Chimombe and Sakupwanya were brokers and agents of the deal. They only signed a contract with RenForm, a South African integrated digital communication and printing company, the supplier, as a partner, not Zec. Zec also says the procurement process was followed to the letter and spirit. But facts show it was merely a formality. The tender was given well ahead of the formal process, which was rendered an academic exercise. The deal was sealed in February 2023 after Chigumba, accompanied by Chivayo and Mpofu, visited Ren-Form offices in Johannesburg located  at the corner of Booysens and Trump streets in Selby suburb. Yet the official procurement process which Zec refers to in its statements denying any wrongdoing only started in April, ending in June. This was after the first invoice was raised in February and payment the following month, March. In brief, this is what actually happened: Chivayo, who is close to Chigumba and Moyo, as well as President Emmerson Mnangagwa, secretly and corruptly secured a brokerage role in the tender between Zec and Ren-Form for the supply of election materials, including biometric voter registration kits and other things, by leveraging his close relationships and contacts with the high-profile officials. For Chivayo, everything was perfectly set while he was in a good position to get the deal.  He was close to Chigumba, Moyo, Rushwaya and, most importantly, Mnangagwa. Unable to contain his excitement, Chivayo now says Mnangagwa is firmly under his vicelike grip. State officials, the Zanu PF youth league and information department have reacted angrily to this claim. Because he does not have the technical knowledge or know-how on elections, electoral matters and material supplies, Chivayo invited Mpofu, who has an information technology background and has dealt with Zec many times before, to be part of the deal. Mpofu was involved in the 2018 elections and several others before going back to 2008. So his experience was valuable. After securing his position, Mpofu then brought in his friend, Chimombe, as they always hunt for tenders and work together. However, there was a problem: money. In terms of the agreement between Ren-Form and Chivayo and others, each party was going to bear its own costs and expenses, including travel, preparation and submission of proposals, and all commitments and representations. So enter gold baron Sakupwanya. Because Chivayo and others had no money to fund their deal, Sakupwanya was roped in as the funder. That is why Better Brands Security (Pvt) Ltd became the partner to Ren-Form, and signed the contract on 13 February 2023, 11 days after Chigumba, Chivayo and Mpofu had held Johannesburg meetings. Chivayo did not have a cent at the time, although he wants to make it appear as if he always had money. Prior to the Zec jackpot, Chivayo, who previously made money from state power utility Zesa tenders, was broke. So Sakupwanya provided US$200 000 to fund the project. Of this money, US$30 000, was used for flights for the delegation to meet Ren-Form in South Africa on 1 February 2023; US$80 000 for other costs and expenses and the US$90 000 balance to pay Chigumba's overseas tuition fees and upkeep bills for her children. In all this wheeling and dealing, Chigumba first held meetings with Chivayo, Mpofu and Chimombe, including at her home in Harare’s Greendale suburb. Eventually they travelled on 1 February 2023 to meet Ren-Form executives in Johannesburg to seal the deal. Chigumba travelled with her aid and child to Johannesburg, together with Chivayo and Mpofu, for a meeting the following day, 2 February 2023. Together with Chivayo and Mpofu, Chigumba stayed at the upmarket 5-star luxury DaVinci Hotel and Suites in Nelson Mandela Square, Sandton Mall. Chimombe did not attend the meeting as he was on the campaign trail for Zanu PF ahead of the 23/24 August 2023 general elections. Sakupwanya was also not there due to other business commitments. That is why on the photos currently circulating on social media — which provide critical and undeniable evidence to show Zec is wilfully lying that it does not have any dealings with the brokers — Chimombe and Sakupwanya are not there. There is only Chivayo and Mpofu on some photos and Chivayo, Mpofu and Carlaw on others. So on two critical accounts — whether it worked with Chivayo, Chimombe and Mpofu, and also if the procurement process and procedures were followed — Zec has been caught out lying. While it deceitfully denies links with them, Zec worked closely with Chivayo, Chimombe and Mpofu. The legal procurement process and all relevant procedures were not followed when the tender was given because a semblance of that only came after the  agreement had been signed as a mere formality. To ensure that everyone key was covered, one of Mnangagwa's children — a lady named Chido Mnangagwa — was also brought in. Chido is not prominent in public fora like her brothers, for instance Emmerson Jr and the twins, Sean and Collins, but she gave a brief interview to the South African Broadcasting Corporation during her father's inauguration in 2018, saying: "I'm very excited, we are so proud of our dad — he has done a great job." With his proximity to Mnangagwa and having brought in his daughter, Chivayo had the situation under control, also given his connections with Chigumba, Moyo and Rushwaya. So when he brought on board Mpofu, ChiPage 2 News NewsHawks Issue 179, 14 - 27 June 2024 Zec tender scandal: Telling the full story Ren-Form executives at their offices.

NewsHawks News Page 3 1ssue 179, 14 - 27 June 2024 mombe and Sakupwanya, the team was complete. With agreements signed and behind-thescenes arrangements in place, the jackpot had been hit. What remained was receiving the money and enjoying. Everything seemed okay until the money started coming. The arrangement was that Ren-Form raised market-based invoices and Better Brands and its partners then added their commissions, fees and mark-ups. Because Sakupwanya provided the initial funding, money was going to flow from Zimbabwe's government or Treasury's nostro account at CBZ Bank to Ren-Form through Standard Bank account number 002742659, Southdale branch. From there, Ren-Form would transfer within 48 hours 66% of the money to Better Brands Security (Pty)'s FNB account number 63039713524, Sandton branch. Realising the money would be effectively under Sakupwanya's control as the owner of Better Brands Security (Pty) Ltd, a newly South African-registered company constituted for that purpose, Chivayo went to Ren-Form and changed the contract and bank details. The signatories to the Ren-Form and Better Brands agreement were Du Sart for the supplier and Chatambudza for the partner. Although the contract says it cannot be changed unless agreed by all parties involved, Chivayo went ahead and changed it, inserting his own company, Intratrek Zimbabwe, as the partner and subsequently changing the bank accounts. This angered Mpofu and Chimombe, who tried to resolve the issue amicably in vain until the situation boiled and exploded. The NewsHawks has been sniffing around for the issue since before the elections in August last year, so when things spun out of control, it was there to break the story. Initially, Chivayo received the money just before the Easter holidays on 31 March and shared the proceeds. Details of this payment are contained in one of Chivayo's revealing audios. The US$1 million was split and distributed as follows: Sakupwanya (US$350 000); Chivayo (US$150 000); Mpofu (US$150 000), Chimombe (US$150 000); "Moms vaya" (Chigumba, US$100 000) and "DG" (CIO boss Moyo, US$100 000). This money was meant to ensure that the beneficiaries had good Easter holidays as bigger payments were subsequently coming. Sakupwanya got more than others as he was also recovering his US$200 000 initial outlay that funded the deal in the process. Effectively, he got US$150 000. After that, many other payments followed, ranging from US$2 million up to US$8 million. Rubber-stamping the tender Zec's credibility has plunged to a new low — hitting rock-bottom in the abyss of dishonour — as its officials scramble to contain the damaging fallout from the corrupt US$40 million tender scandal which has exploded with dramatic revelations and far-reaching consequences. In a belated, after-thought, reaction, Zec says it has no contract with and did not secure any materials through three local businessmen Chivayo, Mpofu and Chimombe linked to the tender. Zec also claims it  followed procedures prescribed by law and engaged all relevant stakeholders through the Special Procurement Oversight Committee (Spoc), which includes the Procurement Regulatory Authority of Zimbabwe (Praz), in sourcing electoral materials for the elections from South African supplier, Ren-Form CC. It also says it wrote to the ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Trade on 16 February 2023 seeking assistance to identify potential suppliers through embassies. Overall, Zec says it spent about US$21 million on items such as canvas tents, ballot paper, solar lights and indelible ink marking pens for the 2023 polls. "The total amount that was spent on importing material for the elections including some donations was US$21 148 867. This includes materials like solar lights, tents, ballot papers and display kits for V11 forms,” Zec  deputy chief elections officer  Simbarashe Tongai told the state-controlled weekly, The Sunday Mail. According to Tongai, as reported by The Sunday Mail, Zec wrote to the ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Trade on 16 February 2023 seeking assistance to identify potential suppliers through embassies. The ministry responded five days later, indicating the Zimbabwean embassy in South Africa had identified seven potential suppliers — Asset Protection Africa (Johannesburg); Uni Print (Durban); UV Equip (Midrand); Lithotech (Johannesburg); Forms Media Independent (Johannesburg); Novus Print (Cape Town); and RenForm CC, based in Johannesburg. After a vetting process, three companies were shortlisted. A team headed by Zec deputy chairperson Rodney Kiwa, which also included government printing experts from Printflow and Fidelity Printers, as well as a forensic scientist from police, subsequently travelled to South Africa between 16-21 April for a due diligence exercise. They also roped in embassy officials. Ren-Form emerged the "ideal supplier as it reportedly had the ability to provide all the required materials, unlike the two other shortlisted companies”. As per procedure, the contract for procurement of the ballot paper and ink was submitted to Spoc, which includes Praz, on 8 May. Four days later, on 12 May, Spoc approved the procurement. After the elaborate process, the official narrative says, the election management body then submitted papers to Praz on June 22 for approval, which was granted on June 27. Now as shown by documents and verification by The NewsHawks, the entire process described by Zec  happened after Ren-Form had already been secretly awarded the tender on 2 February 2023 after the meeting with Chigumba, Chivayo and Mpofu. Ren-Form signed its contract with Better Brands on 13 February 2023, after agreeing with Zec as well.  This is way before Zec started its official process, a mere formality. Going through the motions and its dire consequences  This practice is often referred to as going through the motions or rubber-stamping. It can be detrimental to fair and competitive bidding processes. As a result, it is essential to ensure that due process is followed genuinely, and bidding processes are transparent, fair, and merit-based to achieve the best outcomes. Following due process in tender bidding as a mere formality, after the decision has already been made, is a problematic practice that can lead to: *Lack of transparency and accountability; *Unfair competition and manipulation of other bidders; *Corruption and cronyism; *Inefficient allocation of resources; *Legal challenges and disputes; *Erosion of public trust in institutions; *Undermining of the integrity of the procurement process; *Potential for fraud and abuse of power *Waste of resources and time for unsuccessful bidders; and *Reinforcement of entrenched interests and cronyism. Cronyism: Buiness-political nexus Corrupt businessmen may use their proximity to power to secure tenders through various unethical means, including: *Cronyism: Exploiting personal relationships with government officials or politicians to influence decisions; *Lobbying: Using connections to lobby for favourable treatment or legislation; *Bribery: Offering bribes or kickbacks to officials in exchange for favourable treatment; *Insider information: Using access to confidential information to gain an unfair advantage in the tender process; *Revolving door policy: Hiring former government officials or politicians to leverage their connections openly or behind the scenes: *Political donations: Making large donations to political campaigns or parties in exchange for patronage; *Networking: Using social connections and exclusive clubs or organisations to build relationships with decision-makers; *False credentials: Exaggerating or misrepresenting their qualifications or experience to secure tenders; *Front companies: Creating shell companies or fake entities to bid on tenders and conceal their true interests. *Illegal campaign financing: Funneling money into political campaigns in exchange for political favors. *These corrupt practices undermine fair competition, perpetuate crony capitalism, and divert public resources away from essential services and legitimate businesses. Left to right: Wicknell Chivayo, Angus Carlaw and Moses Mpofu at Ren-Form. President Emmerson Mnangagwa's daughter Chido.

RUVIMBO MUCHENJE LOCAL businessmen Mike Chimombe and Moses Mpofu were detained for the second night after appearing at the Rotten Row magistrates' court in Harare for a bail application on a fraud charge. Mpofu (49) and Chimombe (43) are facing fraud charges amounting to more than US$7 million under the US$88 million Presidential Goats Scheme for getting money, but failing to deliver. While media reports initially said they had been paid US$40 million, the Zimbabwe Anti-Corruption Commission (Zacc), which also raised that figure, now says they got RTGS1.6 billion (more than US$7.7 million). The deal involved supplying more than 6 000 goats over a five-year period, but Mpofu and his colleague did not meet their side of the bargain, Zacc says. It says the accused lied that they had mobilised 32 500 goats when in fact they only had 3 713 goats in their holding sites. This led to cancellation of the deal with the ministry of Lands, Agriculture, Water, Fisheries and Rural Development. The accused only supplied a total of 4 208 goats valued at US$331 445 and went on to convert US$7 380 751 to their personal use, according to Zacc. However, Mpofu says the amount they were paid was RTGS1.6 billion, which at the time was equivalent to US$4 million. He also says Chimombe was not involved as a principal because he was an agent, together with four others. Resultantly, the two were arrested on Wednesday morning over the issue and appeared before Harare magistrate Marehwanazvo Gofa. The case was postponed to Thursday for bail application and ruling. However, the two were denied bail and detained for the second night. The National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) said: “Allegations are that the accused persons forged a Zimbabwe Revenue Authority (ZIMRA) Tax clearance certificate and a National Social Security Authority (NSSA) compliance certificate in the name of Blackdeck Private Limited and attached them in a bidding document which they submitted to the Ministry of Lands, Agriculture, Water, Fisheries and Rural Development for a tender for the supply and delivery of goats for the Presidential Goat Pass-on Scheme. They misrepresented that the company was in full compliance with ZIMRA and NSSA requirements.” The NPA says investigations indicated that the QR code and the reference on the NSSA compliance certificate were issued to a different company. “It was further established Blackdeck Private limited was deregistered from the NSSA system in January 2016,” it says. "Further investigations established that Blackdeck Private Limited was not issued with a ZIMRA tax clearance certificate for the year 2021 and that the QR code on the forged tax clearance certificate belonged to a different company. “Acting on the misrepresentation, the Ministry of Lands contracted Blackdeck Private Limited on the 3rd of November 2021.” The ministry transferred ZWL901 294 200 and ZWL698 705 800 on the 21st of April 2022 and the 29th of June 2022 respectively into their bank account, the NPA says. “The total amount was ZWL1.6 billion and was equivalent to USD7 712 197. Following delays in the delivery of the goats, the ministry officials made several engagements with the accused persons. The accused persons misrepresented that they had mobilised 32 500 goats across the provinces which were ready to be distributed to the beneficiaries. "However, a verification process revealed that the accused persons only had 3 713 goats in their holding sites. The ministry cancelled the contract on the 29th of August 2022, following the discovery. The accused persons only supplied a total of 4 208 goats valued at USD331 445 and went on to convert USD7 380 751 to their personal use. Nothing was recovered.” The two were remanded in custody to Friday for a further bail hearing. Page 4 News NewsHawks Issue 179, 14 - 27 June 2024 Mpofu, Chimombe remain in jail over US$88m Goatgate affair Businessmen Moses Mpofu and Mike Chimombe at the Magistrates Court.

NewsHawks News Page 5 1ssue 179, 14 - 27 June 2024 BRENNA MATENDERE BARELY before the Gold Mafia scandal has subsided, President Emmerson Mnangagwa’s association with dodgy characters is scaling new heights, with controversial tenderpreneur Wicknell Chivayo — a convicted criminal — linking him to underhand deals. In leaked audios that have left Zimbabweans bewildered, Chivayo made disclosures linking Mnangagwa to his deals amid the scandalous US$40 million Zec deal to supply election materials. In one of the audios, Chivayo reveals that he has Mnangagwa in his pockets. To cement this claim, Chivayo said Mnangagwa actually calls him “my son” and receives instructions from the head of state regarding business deals. In one of the recordings, Chivayo is heard boasting to his now estranged business partners, Moses Mpofu and Mike Chimombe, that he is untouchable because of his close proximity to Mnangagwa. Mpofu and Chimombe were partners with Chivayo in the stinking Zec tender deal until they fell out after the pair got unhappy with how the former convict was monopolising the spoils of the juicy tender. Chivayo got a windfall from the Zec deal worth over US$40 million to supply election material for the August 2023 polls. Chivayo, Mpofu and Chimombe, through Better Brands Security (Pvt) Ltd, entered into an agreement with Ren-Form CC on 13 February 2023 to participate in the election tenders. Working in cahoots with Ren-Form officials, Chivayo later amended the agreement to remove his business partners before grabbing 66% of the payment. “I have deals with the police, immigration and many more. Keep collecting, do not be greedy, just bring new work. There is no need to be greedy or trying aiming high,” Chivayo is heard boasting in the audio. “I am holding this thing in my hand. When (Mnangagwa) went to Italy, I walked him to his airplane where he proceeded to bid farewell and called me his son.” “I am inside the President’s circle. Take advantage of that, do not eat from where I would have worked or from what caused problems for us in the past.” Before the disclosures, Mnangagwa appeared shoulder to shoulder with Chivayo, receiving Kenyan President William Ruto at the Zimbabwe International Trade Fair in Bulawayo. A day before, Mnangagwa had also appeared with Chivayo touring the ZITF exhibition stands. During the Easter celebrations hosted by the Zion Christian Church in Mbungu, Mnangagwa again appeared with Chivayo on the podium, with social media posts suggesting they used the same presidential private jet to travel to the venue. When Mnangagwa officially commissioned a grain milling plant in Tynwald, Harare, co-run by his younger brother Patrick and another businessman from the Midlands, Douglas Kwande, Chivayo was also in his company, with bodyguards allowing him to be in close proximity to the head of state. Chivayo, born in 1982, has a controversial background. After leaving school, he is said to have begun working as a wages clerk at a local bus company in Harare at the age of 15. Later, he engaged in illegal forex deals at Harare’s Union Avenue Flea Market, whose road is now known as Kwame Nkrumah Avenue. Subsequently, Chivayo was arrested in 2004 and in 2005 he was convicted for money laundering involving R837 000 by the High Court. He was slapped with a five-year jail term, with two years suspended on condition of good behaviour. He served three years. In August 2018, Chivayo appeared at the Harare magistrates’ court facing four charges of fraud, money laundering and contravening the Exchange Control Act for receiving US$5 million from the state-owned Zimbabwe Power Company (ZPC) for a solar power plant project in Gwanda. He was charged together with his company Intratrek Zimbabwe and pleaded not guilty to the charges when he appeared before magistrate Elisha Singano. He was found not guilty in the high-profile case. In a turn of events, Chivayo approached the High Court and sued the ZPC for US$25 million for “breach and repudiation of contract” by making claims it had been prejudiced of that money. Justice Siyabonga Paul Msithu found for him in January last year and took a swipe at the ZPC for frustrating its contractor who was awarded a tender that was sanctioned by the country’s State Procurement Board. Apart from Chivayo, Mnangagwa has publicly hob-nobbed with other controversial characters. Two of Mnangagwa’s close allies were in 2021 named in a landmark investigation exposing international secret deals, tax evasions and hidden wealth, adding to the growing list of his associates involved in dodgy dealings. Last year, a four-episode Al Jazeera investigative series, Gold Mafia, exposed gold smuggling, money laundering and corruption, which revealed Mnangagwa’s association with dodgy characters implicated in financial crimes. The investigation showed that different gold smuggling syndicates looting gold and salting away proceeds to offshore accounts have one common thread — links to Mnangagwa. Main characters in the film, who sucked Mnangagwa into the vortex of action, include his own envoy and ambassador-at-large Uebert Angel, a selfstyled prophet who is a key interlocutor throughout the documentary. Other characters apart from Angel (Diplomatic Mafia), were Rikki Doolan (Diplomatic Mafia), Ewan Macmillan (Mr Gold), Kamlesh Pattni (Gold Dealer Brother Paul) and Alistair Mathias (Gold Trader — The Architect). Mnangagwa’s wife Auxillia, the Family Lady, and his gold baron Pedzai “Scott” Sakupwanya (New Mr Gold) kept the President firmly at the centre of action in the last episode. Main actors who exposed Mnangagwa: Corruption-prone President Mnangagwa caught up in yet another venality case

Page 6 News NewsHawks Issue 179, 14 - 27 June 2024 Alistair Mathias — The Architect “There is no president or head of state that either of us cannot get to on this continent. Next door Swaziland (Eswatini), the King (Mswati III) is a friend of mine. Zambia’s President (Hakainde Hichilema) is a close friend of my friend. DRC Congo, the President (Felix Tshisekedi) has invited me several times to come and build a refinery,” he says, adding: “Ghana’s President (Nana Addo Dankwa Akufo-Addo) is a good friend of mine.” “He was my lawyer. (South African President) Cyril Ramaphosa here, I know him. I know his kids. “In Zim, ED (President Emmerson Mnangagwa) is my partner. I can’t say it in public because he is sanctioned.” Kamlesh Pattni — Gold Dealer “This is his (Mnangagwa’s) number. I call him Tembo (elephant in Swahili),” Pattni says. At that point one of the Al Jazeera undercover reporters says: “You WhatsApp him? “I always give him how much we have done… Yeah, he has to be informed. I was just writing him a message here’,” he adds, showing the reporters WhatsApp messages he exchanged with Mnangagwa. One of the undercover reporters appears to be stunned and asks: “This is the President’s number. Direct to the President?” Pattni responds: “Yes directly . . . I have to inform him. He has to be informed. I’ve informed him what is happening in Tanzania, that we are putting up [a] gold coin factory in Bulawayo.” Pattni shows multiple photos of him with Mnangagwa, while offering to set up a meeting between the Chinese mafia (undercover Al Jazeera reporters) and the President. And then the bombshell drops as Pattni, who almost bankrupted Kenya in the 1990s through a gold scandal which cost the Kenyan Treasury US$600 million, reveals he makes payments to Mnangagwa as “appreciation” every two weeks through his younger brother to sustain the network. “This is like the norm of life. The incentives, the fees… the appreciation,” Pattni says. “Every two weeks, Swetang, my brother is there. Every fortnight, he is there at the State House (Harare). We always contribute our appreciation.” At this point one of the reporters asks: “To Mnangagwa?” And Pattni says: “To the King himself. When you work, you must always have the King with you. The President.” Ewan Macmillan - Mr Gold Macmillan claims Mnangagwa is his business partner and gets protection from him. “The good news is that whatever I told him (Mnangagwa), he did. You know that (asking Mathias)? . . . When I was getting hurt I said ‘you have got to stop it here, here, here and he did it, he did it. Within two weeks, he fixed everything. “You know (Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe governor John) Mangudya’s problem. I said to him (Mnangagwa), ‘Mangudya, I think he is dirty. You need to find him out. ED went and fixed him’.” However, Macmillan’s links to Mnangagwa come at a price. “You pay a guy money every month. You just get a partner and pay the guy so much money a month and he just sits back. He is happy, doesn’t care. That’s what happens,” he says. In Episode 2, Macmillan says: “I did 60 days in prison and my partner is . . . the President!.” Their relationship has not always been smooth. When Macmillan was arrested, Mnangagwa told him to shut his mouth. “He was my partner, my exact partner. He said to me, don’t open your mouth. Your life will get worse than it is,” Macmillan recalls. “I said f**k, are you kidding me.” Over the years, their ties broke but when they met at a dinner they quickly reconnected. “I walked in and he (Mnangagwa) said, ‘good to see you, my old friend’,” Macmillan says. “And I said ‘very good to see you and well done on your position’.” Macmillan and Emmerson Jr Macmillan has deep ties with the Mnangagwa family. These days he is close to the President’s son Emmerson Jr. “I can put you straight in touch with him, that’s no problem, he’s a friend of mine,” Macmillan says. The gold dealer narrates how he once rescued Emmerson Jr from debt through an expensive watch stolen from his father, the President, bragging about his fancy luxury watches. “I have the steel Daytona, I have the Submariner, I have the gold Submariner, I have two Presidents,” Macmillan says, referring to his catalogue of Rolex watches. Then came a shocker: “This is between us. I have Mnangagwa’s gold-studded President,” Macmillan said. “The son ran into debt and had to pay the debt off so he gave me the Rolex. I paid the debt off, and he said, ‘Please don’t tell my dad’, and I think, ‘F**k, man, you’re joking. I’ve got the dad’s watch’.” Then "Prophet" Angel also brings the First Lady into the fray. “Eh Mai. Mai Vangu. Murisei (My mom, how are you)?” Angel says. “Remember those people that want to move cash? They would want to know are we providing the planes or they provide the planes?” Auxillia responds: “You should ask father about this. How should I know? Let me get hold of him.” Angel continues: “I’ll see to it. I’ll see him at 6PM, and I will present to him. I will present it to him. Then you will discuss which plane he uses, his or their own. But, it is not a big deal? Sometimes he will be busy. We spoke about it. So I am just going to present it today.’ Auxillia interjects: “Aiwa enda unodzokorora futi. No, go and have that conversation again.” Unrelenting, Angel says: “But is it doable, it’s achievable? It won’t be difficult. But please don’t be annoyed with me, I could tell when you were annoyed.” With that it becomes clearer Mnangagwa is the centre of gravity in the operation. In 2021, two of Mnangagwa’s close allies were also named in a landmark investigation exposing international secret deals, tax evasions and hidden wealth, adding to the growing list of his associates involved in dodgy dealings. These were his then deputy chief secretary for Administration and Finance Martin Rushwaya who is now the Chief Secretary to the President and Cabinet to whom he is related. Mnangagwa’s close business ally Billy Rautenbach was the second one. The two were exposed in what was dubbed the Pandora Papers, an investigation conducted by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ) — an ensemble of 600 journalists from 150 media outlets in 117 countries. They went through more than 11.9 million documents leaked from 14 offshore financial services firms. ICIJ found that 35 heads of state and government and more than 300 politicians have set up offshore structures and trusts in tax havens from the British Virgin Islands, Panama, Seychelles, to Hong Kong and Belize. There were emails, memos, incorporation records, share certificates, compliance reports and complex diagrammes showing labyrinthine corporate structures. ICIJ reported that Rushwaya created Greatgem Corp in the Seychelles in 2010 with the help of a Moscow law firm. The company was accused of facilitating the Zimbabwean military’s secret diamond dealings and off-budget financing. Rautenbach, who was Mnangagwa’s ally even during the days of the Democratic Republic of Congo war in which they were both mentioned in reports as having looted diamonds from the country, was accused of hiding his wealth in an offshore family trust under the guise of it being payment to his wife for her contribution in building the family wealth. “In 2013, one of Zimbabwe’s richest men and arguably one of the most controversial business figures in Southern Africa, Muller Conrad 'Billy' Rautenbach, donated multimillion-dollar financial investments in his coal and ethanol businesses to his wife. This restructuring was explained by the need to 'compensate' her for her role in building the family’s wealth,” the AmaBungane Centre for Investigative Journalism report reads. Mnangagwa also seems to have an appetite for opaque deals from shady shelf companies and dodgy businesspersons, including British-registered Coven Energy Limited, which was awarded a US$1.3 billion deal to build Zimbabwe’s second fuel pipeline. It was then revealed that the company was incorporated on 25 August last year, with assets amounting to £100. Coven Energy’s name has been added to the list of foreign companies awarded massive projects with no traceable track record. Since Mnangagwa’s ascension in 2017, many of the companies that have signed mega-deals have either been connected to the President, his family or cronies in government. Nothing much has come out of the deals partly because of the questionable track record of the “investors” involved. During the start of his tenure, Mnangagwa claimed he had clinched US$11 billion worth of business commitments, the bulk of which were murky deals, spearheaded by dodgy characters. Tenderpreneur Wicknell Chivayo with President Emmerson Mnangagwa.

NewsHawks News Page 7 1ssue 179, 14 - 27 June 2024 Zec loot driving Chivayo crazy BRENNA MATENDERE SCANDAL-RIDDEN tenderpreneur Wicknell Chivayo's estranged business partners, Mike Chimombe and Moses Mpofu, say their flamboyant colleague is splurging money on cars and cash gifts from corruption proceeds of the US$40 million Zimbabwe Electoral Commission tender. Chivayo has spent US$3 million on cars and cash gifts. In a letter, dated 24 April 2024, complaining to Ren-Form’s executive Angus Carlaw about Chivayo's refusal to pay them and how he had fraudulently changed the contract to mainly “eat” alone, Chimombe and Mpofu said: "This money has driven him crazy and that’s why, if you check his social media, he is on a buying spree of cars, donating to different individuals across the country, yet he is failing to pay us what we agreed." After buying two cars in one week, Chivayo wrote on social media on 18 September 2023: "Last week on Tuesday after buying my SA pool car, the black MAYBACH GLS600, I came back to Harare on Thursday with some little change left and as a sign of loyalty to the brand I decided to buy yet another MAYBACH S580 @exquisitecars.” “I had carefully gone through and also asked my lawyer Adv Lewis Uriri who confirmed there was no law which restricted a citizen from owning 3 MAYBACH vehicles. Since the car was reasonably priced at just 400 thousand dollars, I didn't have much of a choice so I had to buy it. Please forgive me but I have every reason to celebrate without any fear and spoil myself because the political party and presidential candidate I voted for in recent elections win [sic] resoundingly. This means 5 more years of GOOD LIFE." When the money was paid after elections in August last year, Chivayo bought two Maybachs (German luxury car brand owned by and a part of Mercedes-Benz AG) in one week. He bought one in Johannesburg, South Africa, for R3.5 million and another in Harare for US$400 000 which he described as "little change". This means he now owns three Maybachs, something unusual in Zimbabwe and elsewhere, as part of a big fleet of luxury cars. Chivayo leads a champagne lifestyle in a sea of poverty. He has since spent US$3 million on cars and cash donations mainly to Zanu PF supporters and sympathisers. While some beneficiaries of the cars are enjoying driving the vehicles funded with corrupt money without compunction, some are now regretting it. Chivayo says he was celebrating President's Emmerson Mnangagwa's disputed victory, which he noted guaranteed him "good life" for another five years. In a revelation which has shocked the nation, Chivayo says Mnangagwa is firmly under his control and he can get anything he wants from him. The tenderpreneur’s business model is to secure tenders from the government through the patronage system. In one of the leaked audios, Chivayo sensationally bragged he was able to secure more government tenders as a result of his close proximity to President Mnangagwa and the government.

Page 8 News NewsHawks Issue 179, 14 - 27 June 2024 NATHAN GUMA THE reaction and silence by key players implicated in the massive Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (Zec) scandal shows arrogance, and how corruption is eating into state institutions under the Zanu PF government, an analyst says. Zec and its supplier Ren-Form issued statements denying any wrongdoing in the corrupt US$40 million tender scandal despite overwhelming evidence showing corruption. Some of the key actors in the deal like businessman Wicknell Chivayo and Zec chairperson Priscilla Chigumba have also denied involvement in corrupt activities, while some like Chief Secretary to Cabinet Martin Rushwaya and Central Intelligence Organisation director-general Isaac Moyo have kept quiet. Analysts say these postures reflect more of their arrogance rather than their rights to reply or remain silent. Skeletons have been tumbling out of the closet of the corrupt US$40 million Zec deal, that involves controversial tenderpreneur Chivayo and top government officials, close to President Emmerson Mnangagwa. Some of the corrupt transactions involve movement of money on behalf of Zec from Zimbabwe's Treasury to Better Brands and Ren-Form accounts in South Africa where it is distributed to beneficiaries so far identified by Chivayo as Mike Chimombe, Moses Mpofu, Pedzai "Scott" Sakupwanya, the owner of Better Brands, Chigumba and Moyo. In a leaked audio, Chivayo says US$1 million had been sent to Better Brands Security (Pty) in South Africa into an FNB Account No. 63039713525, Sandton branch, held by Better Brands Security (Pty) Ltd, a South African registered entity owned by gold baron Scott Sakupwanya. Chivayo says out of the US$1 million received, Sakupwanya was going to get US$350 000; himself US$150 000; Mpofu US$150 000; Chimombe US$150 000; "Moms vaya" (meaning Zec chairperson Chigumba) US$100 000; and "DG" (referring to the state security agency, Central Intelligence Organisation 'CIO' Director-General Issac Moyo) US$100 000. However, in the midst of the heat, the key players implicated have said nothing, with only Chivayo struggling to clear his name after a leaked audio in which he says Mnangagwa is certainly now under his vice-like grip and control, thus he can get anything from him that he wants. After a leak of the revealing audio, which The NewsHawks was availed weeks before its release, Chivayo claimed that it was a deep fake. “It has been brought to my attention that there are voice messages purportedly being attributed to me which are circulating on various social media platforms,” reads part of the statement he made on X. “I categorically refute, deny and dismiss with contempt, recording the voice messages in question. For the avoidance of any doubt I have never, at any material time, recorded the alleged voice messages, neither have I transmitted such to anyone.” Chivayo and his business partners have been telling their circles those are the kingpins of the deal. No one has denied this openly, except Chigumba who replied to The NewsHawks questions, through Zec deputy chair Rodney Kiwa, saying: “Your questions were forwarded to the Hon. Zec chairperson who in turn requested me, as Zec spokesperson, to appraise you with the commission’s position: ‘The commission does not breathe life to fiction’." President Mnangagwa has not said anything, and no investigations have been ordered by Parliament. More officials have been involved. For instance, to pull the deal off, the businessmen needed Zec officials to cooperate, and this meant that Zec chairperson Chigumba had to be roped in and she got involved, as part of the negotiators. The Office of the President and Cabinet was also involved through Chief Secretary Martin Rushwaya, who was the point man, and other bureaucratic functionaries. At Zec, the contact person was chief elections officer Utloile Silaigwana, although Chigumba handled the negotiations. For the deal to pass security checks, it had to be cleared by the CIO whose director- general is Moyo. Political analyst Rashweat Mukundu says the silence by the implicated people shows arrogance by government officials, reminiscent of the Gold Mafia documentary. “It is the same template as gold mafia, only that the Chivayo story has implications on Zec and security services integrity. Essentially these are now entities facilitating corruption. Not commenting or speaking about this does not make the situation better but shows the arrogance and how corruption has ravaged Zim under the Zanu PF leadership,” Mukundu told The NewsHawks. The investigation by Qatari news channel Al Jazeera showed how different gold smuggling syndicates looting gold and salting away proceeds to offshore accounts have been linked to Mnangagwa; including his envoy and ambassador-at-large Uebert Angel, a self-styled prophet who is a key interlocutor throughout the documentary, Rikki Doolan, Ewan Macmillan, Kamlesh Pattni and Alistair Mathias, all smuggling kingpins. Pattni, who almost bankrupted Kenya in the 1990s through a gold scandal which cost the Treasury US$600 million, reveals he makes payments to Mnangagwa as “appreciation” every two weeks through his young brother to enable him to smoothly carry out his gold and money laundering operations in Zimbabwe. Mnangagwa’s wife Auxillia, the First Lady, and his gold baron Sakupwanya were also implicated, with Auxillia discussing gold smuggling in the video. While other implicated people have been trying to clear their names, Mnangagwa has remained tight-lipped, raising concern on his willingness to stamp out graft. Political analyst Rashweat Mukundu told The NewsHawks that Mnangagwa’s silence did not proffer a solution to the suspense created by the ground-breaking findings over action on smugglers. “I think the President has spoken very loud and clear by his silence. It clearly indicates the levels of impunity and disregard for decency in this country, that when high-level corruption is talked about, the head of state is quiet,” he said. “So, for me, that is a finger that is being pointed to the people of Zimbabwe, the middle finger that there is nothing you can do. And it is the saddest part of this whole process that there is no leadership, because leadership should have come out to clearly say that there is something wrong and we need to address.” Priscilla Chigumba President Emmerson Mnangagwa with CIO director-general Isaac Moyo (right). Silence, reaction over Zec scam betrays arrogance

NewsHawks News Page 9 1ssue 179, 14 - 27 June 2024 Officials lie about corrupt tender ZEC credibility hits rock-bottom BRENNA MATENDERE THE Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (Zec)'s credibility has plunged to a new low — hitting rock-bottom in the abyss of dishonour — as its officials scramble to contain the damaging fallout from the corrupt US$40 million tender scandal which has exploded with dramatic revelations and far-reaching consequences. In a belated, after-thought, reaction, Zec says it has no contract with and did not secure any materials through three local businessmen Wicknell Chivayo, Moses Mpofu and Mike Chimombe linked to the tender. Zec also claims it  followed procedures prescribed by the law and engaged all relevant stakeholders through the Special Procurement Oversight Committee (Spoc), which includes the Procurement Regulatory Authority of Zimbabwe (Praz), in sourcing electoral materials for the elections from South African supplier RenForm CC. It also says it wrote to the ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Trade on 16 February 2023 seeking assistance to identify potential suppliers through embassies. Overally, Zec say it spent approximately US$21 million on items such as canvas tents, ballot papers, solar lights and indelible ink marking pens for the 2023 polls. "The total amount that was spent on importing material for the elections including some donations was US$21 148 867. This includes materials like solar lights, tents, ballot papers and display kits for V11 forms,” Zec  deputy chief elections officer  Simbarashe Tongai told the state-controlled weekly, The Sunday Mail. However, The NewsHawks, which broke the story, has more details showing that Zec dealt with Chivayo, Chimombe and Mpofu despite the electoral commission's attempt to distance itself from them. Zec is desperately trying to wriggle out through legal technicalities, for instance it says it has no contract with Chivayo, Chimombe and Mpofu, which is a half-truth but neither here nor there. In brief, this is what really happened: Chivayo, who is close to Zec chairperson Priscilla Chigumba and Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO) Director-General Isaac Moyo, as well as President Emmerson Mnangagwa, got the closed Zec tender by leveraging his relationships and connections with the high-profile officials. Chivayo says Mnangagwa is firmly under his vice-like grip. The Zanu PF youth league and information department have reacted angrily to this claim. Because he does not have the technical knowhow on election matters and material supplies, Chivayo invited Mpofu, who has an IT background and has dealt with Zec many times before, to be part of the closed tender. Mpofu then brought in his friend, Chimombe, as they always hunt for tenders and work together as shown by the US$88 million Presidential Goats Scheme scam. Then gold baron Pedzai "Scott" Sakupwanya was roped in as the funder. Chivayo did not have a cent to fund the deal. Prior to the Zec tender, Chivayo, who previously made money from state power utility Zesa tenders, was broke. One of Mnangagwa's children — a lady named Chido Mnangagwa — was also brought in. In all this wheeling and dealing, Chigumba held meetings with Chivayo, Mpofu and Chimombe, including at her Greendale home in Harare. They then eventually travelled together to meet Ren-Form executives in Johannesburg to seal the deal. The NewsHawks investigations show that Sakupwanya paid US$30 000 for the trip. Overall, Sakupwanya paid US$200 000 on the deal, of which US$90 000 went to pay Chigumba's overseas education fees and upkeep expenses for her child. Chigumba travelled with her aid and child to Johannesburg, together with Chivayo and Mpofu on 1 February 2023 for a meeting the following day, 2 February 2023. Together with Chivayo and Mpofu, they stayed at the upmarket 5-star luxury  DaVinci Hotel and Suites on Nelson Mandela Square, Sandton Mall. Chigumba, Chivayo and Mpofu met RenForm executives on 2 February 2023 in Johannesburg to finalise the deal. Chimombe did not attend the meeting as he was on the campaign trail for Zanu PF ahead of the 23/24 August 2023 general elections. Sakupwanya was also not there due to other business commitments. That is why on the photos currently circulating on social media — which provide critical and undeniable evidence to show Zec is wilfully lying — Chimombe and Sakupwanya are not there.  There is only Chivayo and Mpofu on some and Chivayo, Mpofu and Ren-Form international sales executive Angus Carlaw on others. There are also other photos with just RenForm officials. Chigumba is not appearing on the photos, but she attended the meeting. After Chigumba, Chivayo and Mpofu visited Ren-Form on 2 February 2023, an agreement was signed between Ren-Form and Better Brands Security (Pvt) Ltd, owned by Sakupwanya, the funder of the deal, on 13 February 2024. Apart from Better Brands Security (Pvt) Ltd, which is Zimbabwean registered, and located at 72 Cambridge Drive, Greendale, Harare, there

Page 10 News NewsHawks Issue 179, 14 - 27 June 2024 is also Better Brands Security (Pty) Ltd, which is South African registered for purposes of receiving funds through its FNB account held at the Sandton branch. While in Zimbabwe companies use "Pvt" Ltd, in South Africa they abbreviate "Pty" Ltd. Zec had its own agreement with Ren-Form well ahead of the official process — which was a mere formality — that subsequently followed later. According to Zec, as reported by The Sunday Mail, the electoral commission wrote to the ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Trade on 16 February 2023 seeking assistance to identify potential suppliers through embassies. The ministry responded five days later, indicating the Zimbabwean embassy in South Africa had identified seven potential suppliers — Asset Protection Africa (Johannesburg); Uni Print (Durban); UV Equip (Midrand); Lithotech (Johannesburg); Forms Media Independent (Johannesburg); Novus Print (Cape Town); and RenForm CC, based in Johannesburg. After a vetting process, three companies were shortlisted. A team headed by Zec deputy chairperson Rodney Kiwa, which also included government printing experts from Printflow and Fidelity Printers, as well as a forensic scientist from police, subsequently travelled to South Africa between April 16 and 21 for a due diligence exercise. They also roped in embassy officials. Ren-Form emerged the "ideal supplier as it reportedly had the ability to provide all the required materials, unlike the two other shortlisted companies". As per procedure, the contract for procurement of the ballot papers and ink was submitted to Spoc, which includes Praz, on 8 May. Four days later, on 12 May, Spoc approved the procurement. After the elaborate process, the official narrative says, the elections management body then submitted papers to Praz on 22 June for approval, which was granted on 27 June. As shown by documents and verification by The NewsHawks, the entire process as described by Zec happened after Ren-Form had already been secretly awarded the tender on 2 February 2023. Ren-Form signed its contract with Better Brands on 13 February 2023, after agreeing with Zec as well. This was way before Zec started its official process, a mere formality. Documents shows that the official process actually starts after the agreement has been signed behind the scenes. By the time, the official Zec delegation travels to South Africa for engagements on from 16 April through to final approvals on 27 June, the tender was already running and money flowing. In fact, the first payment had already come before the Easter holidays on 31 March 2024. This is confirmed in one of Chivayo's audio notes in which he talks about receiving US$1 million before Easter which should be split and distributed to key beneficiaries. As it says in its statement in a bid to hide behind technicalities, Zec does not have a contract with Chivayo, Chimombe and Mpofu because they were brokers or agents between the elections body and the supplier, Ren-Form. On payments, the Zimbabwean Treasury, with Zec's instruction as a party to the deal, paid Ren-Form through its Standard Bank account, Southdale branch, in Johannesburg, which in turn transferred part of the money to Better Brands under Chivayo's control. Chivayo actually started directly taking the cash from Ren-Form and distributing it himself, saying if he deposited the money into the Better Brands or Sakupwanya account that would raise eyebrows and attract money laundering and tax crime suspicions as it was new. This explains one of his audio notes to a WhatsApp group of business partners in March around Easter time, saying he had received US$1 million from Ren-Form which should be split and distributed as follows: Sakupwanya (US$350 000 — which included his US$200 000 initial outlay); Chivayo (US$150 000); Mpofu (US$150 000), Chimombe (US$150 000); "Moms vaya" (Chigumba, US$100 000) and "DG" (CIO boss Moyo, US$100 000).  Chivayo has denied the audios, claiming they are artificial intelligence (AI), but informed sources say it was him on the voice notes explaining how the money was going to be shared. There is evidence of WhatsApp to show that it is Chivayo, not a deepfake or anything generated by AI. Further payments followed after the US$1 million in March before the fight broke out over money. The first US$2 673 360 quotation was made on 20 February 2023, well before the merely academic official process and approvals. Some invoices and payments, for example the US$8 964 603.80, were fraudulently and criminally inflated by up to 235% to ensure maximum benefits to fund extravagant and flamboyant lifestyles, including buying cars for prominent individuals in society and cash donations. Later when greed kicked in and took charge, Chivayo removed Better Brands from the agreement with Ren-Form and put his own company Intratrek Zimbabwe to take full control of the funds. This led to a blazing argument and the bitter fallout with his partners, Mpofu, Chimombe and Sakupwanya. Chivayo took the lion's share first and later everything as he cut off Mpofu and Chimombe. Even the funder Sakupwanya was closed out of the deal later, although he was treated better. For instance, he was given an oak-white 2023 Rolls Royce Ghost in lieu of payment in April. Yet Zec, which has repeatedly failed to run free, fair and credible elections in Zimbabwe, putting the country's future at risk, chose to wilfully mislead and lie to the public on a big corruption matter in which taxpayers' funds are involved and the democratic will of the people was at stake. In a mendacious statement — loaded with half-truths, lies, deceit — Zec says: "We have noted with great concern social media posts and rumours circulating online, that are causing public alarm and despondency and we would like to put it on record that the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission has no contract nor did it procure any election material from or through individuals being mentioned in the reports. "All materials procured for the 2023 Harmonised Elections were obtained in line with procurement regulations and there was due diligence as all tender processes were subjected to oversight. "We challenge all those alleging that the Commission has a contract with the three individuals to come forward and present the same. "We want to also publicly declare that the actual amounts used for the procurement of all the election materials were far less than the figures being mischievously circulated on social media. "All election materials procured during the 2023 Harmonised Elections were delivered on time. "The commission has also checked with the supplier who categorically stated in writing that they did not have any contract with the same individuals for the supply of election materials during the 2023 Harmonised Elections. "Furthermore, there were no third parties between the Commission and all election material suppliers. "Any statements suggesting a contractual link between ZEC and these individuals for the supply of the 2023 Harmonised Elections materials are inaccurate, misleading and mischievous and therefore should be dismissed with the contempt it deserves. The Commission assures all its stakeholders that all procurements were above board. "Ms C. Ngandini Acting Chief Elections Officer Zimbabwe Electoral Commission." However, the truth, as shown here by The NewsHawks in this narrative, is that Zec had a deal with Chivayo who brought in Mpofu and Chimombe well before the official process to legitimise the corrupt tender award. Sakupwanya was later roped in.  So in the end, the tender deal had Zec, RenForm and Better Brands, which was carrying Chivayo, Chimombe, Mpofu and Sakupwanya. Chido Mnangagwa was also involved. Key officials around the deal included Chigumba, Moyo and Chief Secretary to Cabinet and President Martin Rushwaya, among others. Zec and Chivayo, among others, have denied the allegations amid overwhelming and undeniable evidence of corruption, deceit and lies. Wicknell Chivayo spoiled himself with US$500 000 brand new Mercedes Benz G 63 Brabus, on his birthday last year, 2023. (Picture via Facebook - Sir Wicknell) Zec chairperson Justice Priscilla Chigumba

NewsHawks News Page 11 1ssue 179, 14 - 27 June 2024 NATHAN GUMA KEY players in the murky US$40 million Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (Zec) elections deal, Wicknell Chivayo, Moses Mpofu and Mike Chimombe, are aware that their financial transactions border on money laundering, new information from a letter and leaked audios has revealed. Chivayo is currently at pains to cleanse himself in the corrupt deal, first broken by The NewsHawks, in which he would supply biometric voter registration kits and other voting materials. The deal was put together by Mpofu — previously involved in Zec tenders — Chimombe, a Zanu PF activist and empowerment lobbyist, Chivayo, a leading tenderpreneur, and gold baron Pedzai "Scott" Sakupwanya in February 2023. Chivayo and Sakupwanya are close to President Emmerson Mnangagwa. The first tender, worth US$40 million, was in two phases, with the first for about US$20 million, of which a balance would be paid later. In terms of the agreement signed between Better Brands Security (Pvt) Ltd and Ren-Form, obtained by The NewsHawks some months back, the advance payment was US$19 957 301 (about US$20 million). That was 50% of the contract value. This means the closed tender, which was selective or restricted, given to Chivayo and others without a competitive bidding process and transparency on account of time limits for the polls, patronage and corruption, was worth US$39 914 602 — about US$40 million. Invoices were inflated by up to 235% for rent-seeking purposes and paying the parties involved, rewards and bribes. The deal was approved by the Office of the President and Cabinet, drawing in Mnangagwa. In a leaked audio, Chivayo is heard instructing the key players, Chimombe and Mpofu, to avoid an offshore account that had been opened by Sakupwanya to avoid being charged under the Money Laundering Act. “South Africa has received the money and they said that they want to start off with payments of US$1 million with Better Brands, which is what we had signed a contract for. Then after the holiday, we had agreed to give them seven days so that they will not be affected by the Money Laundering Act. So I have been putting pressure so they can deposit US$1 million,” Chivayo said in the leaked audio.  He also explains how one of the payments was split around the Easter holidays. Chivayo says US$1 million had been sent to Better Brands Security (Pty) in South Africa. The US$1m sent from Treasury in Zimbabwe was deposited into an FNB Bank account No. 63039713525, Sandton branch, held by Better Brands Security (Pty) Ltd, a South African-registered entity. Better Brands Security (Pvt) Ltd is Zimbabwean registered, while Better Brands Security (Pty) Ltd is South African based. They are both subsidiaries of the Better Brands Group owned by Sakupwanya. Chivayo says out of the US$1 million received, Sakupwanya was going to get US$350 000; himself US$150 000; Mpofu US$150 000; Chimombe US$150 000; "Moms vaya" (meaning Zec chairperson Priscilla Chigumba) US$100 000; and "DG" (referring to the state security agency, Central Intelligence Organisation 'CIO' Director-General Issac Moyo) US$100 000. The letter by Chivayo’s partners Chimombe and Mpofu to Ren-Form executive Angus Carlaw complaining about Chivayo's actions warns that the transactions being done from Zimbabwe to South Africa may well be in breach of money laundering regulations, United States Office of Foreign Assets Control and South African laws, particularly the Financial Intelligence Centre Act. Chimombe and Mpofu say have been on a collision course with Chivayo over non-payment of dividends from the deal. “We are aware that as soon as funds are received into your Standard Bank account number 002742659 held at Southdale Branch, you will immediately transfer more than 66% of the money received to Wicknell Chivayo’s Intratrek bank accounts,” it reads. “This is clear violation of your participation in money laundering where you are overcharging the Government of Zimbabwe and sending the overcharged money to individual accounts. Please be advised that most of the individuals involved in the laundering are on the US Office of Foreign Control (OFAC) sanctions list. “Therefore, you are assisting sanctioned individuals to hide money, which is a very serious offense. It comes to light the Department of the US Treasury; you will be in serious trouble. The Reserve Bank of South Africa will sanction you if they become aware of your illicit activities.” The corrupt transactions involve movement of money on behalf of Zec from Zimbabwe's Treasury to Better Brands and Ren-Form accounts in South Africa where it is distributed to beneficiaries so far identified by Chivayo as Chimombe, Mpofu, Sakupwanya, the owner of Better Brands, Zec chairperson Chigumba and CIO Director-General Moyo. According to the letter, Chivayo has also been claiming to be paying top government officials and politicians from the corrupt tender. The massive scandal — first exposed by The NewsHawks — has rocked the government and nonstate actors involved. “Of interest, please note that Mr. Chivhayo is misleading you by claiming that he is giving top government officials money he is receiving. That is a total lie. Even the president of Zimbabwe is unaware that he is getting huge commissions using his name. “This money has driven him crazy and that’s why if you check his social media, he is on a buying spree of cars, donating to different individuals across the country yet he is failing to pay us what we agreed. We expect 25% of all monies paid to Wicknell Chivayo.” Kingpins of US$40m Zec scandal fear repercussions Moses Mpofu, Mike Chimombe and Wicknell Chivayo.

BRENNA MATENDERE THE Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) under new governor John Mushayavanhu has laid to waste millions' worth of the Zimbabwe Gold (ZiG) banknotes printed at a huge cost as they bore the signature of his predecessor John Mangudya which he did not want in circulation. When Mushayavanhu introduced ZiG on 5 April, trading at US$1: 13.56ZiG to the United States dollar, there was a bunch of banknotes of the new currency already printed under his predecessor Mangudya. That was done as part of preparations for the phasing out of the bond notes which had been introduced in 2016 before being  converted into local currency in 2019 —10 years after the Zimbabwe dollar had been abandoned at the height of the country's economic meltdown and hyperinflation. That came with the advent of a new Government of National Unity after the 2008 elections fiasco. The printed notes were worth millions, but had to be destroyed to remove those signed by Mangudya which Mushayavanhu did not want to mix with his own notes. That is the reason the new ZiG notes took almost a month to introduce as the RBZ had to print again from scratch, which was a huge, cumbersome process given that the money paper material had been imported through third parties. An RBZ official explained the process: "When Mushayavanhu came in, there were already ZiG banknotes that were printed in large quantities and signed by Mangudya. "Mushayavanhu was initially expected to replace Mangudya whose 10-year term at the RBZ was due to end on 30 April 2024. "However, in a notice President Emmerson Mnangagwa brought forward his appointment in an official gazette: (It is hereby notified that His Excellency the President has, in terms of section 14 of the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe Act (Chapter 22:15) appointed John Mushayavanhu as the Governor of the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe for a period of five years beginning on March 28, 2024, and ending on March 27, 2029').” As a result, Mushayavanhu started more than a month earlier to take charge of the ZiG process. RBZ officials say Mushayavanhu did not want the new currency to be associated with Mangudya in any way even though they were working together behind the scenes in a handover-takeover process, hence the already printed and signed notes had to be destroyed. "The ZiG notes that were signed by Mangudya and bore his signature had to be destroyed as Mushayavanhu wanted a clean break from the past and not to be associated with bond notes or any other currency version issued in the past. For better or worse, Mushayavanhu's attitude is that he is different from Mangudya and all his predecessors, which is why he says he will never print money, 'not under my watch'. "The amount of liquidity the market at the time was RTGS16.5 trillion (US$500 million). "The proportion of cash in market liquidity varies depending on the market, asset class, and economic conditions. "However, in stock markets cash typically accounts for a small percentage of overall liquidity, around 1%-5%. "The majority is made up of electronic trades, margin accounts, and other forms of non-cash liquidity. "In foreign exchange markets, the stock of cash is a much smaller component, around 1%-2%, as most transactions are settled electronically. "Cash can be a larger proportion in bond markets, say around 10%-20% due to the nature of fixed-income instruments. "In commodity markets, cash is largely  significant, making up to between 20%-30%, especially in physical commodity markets like gold or oil. "Cash is often a small percentage in the cryptocurrency markets; transactions are mostly settled electronically, but the exact proportion can vary depending on the specific market. "Keep in mind these are rough estimates, and the actual proportion of cash in market liquidity terms varies significantly depending on various factors such as market conditions, trading volumes, and regulatory requirements. "Now in this case, cash was about US$50 million in the market and 5% of that had been printed, probably US$5 million which means that the RBZ under Mushayavanhu destroyed or burnt banknotes worth that." Prior to that, Mnangagwa had hinted that the authorities would soon announce steps to halt the plunge of the Zimbabwe dollar, at the time the world’s worst performer against the United States dollar and other base currencies. “We shall soon be announcing the introduction of our structured currency,” Mnangagwa said at his first cabinet meeting of the year in February in the capital, Harare. "The nation’s fiscal and monetary heads were working on a raft of policy measures to arrest price increases, stabilise the currency and encourage savings." At the time, the Zimbabwe dollar was on a free-fall amid currency volatility and exchange rate-driven surging inflation. Subsequent to that, Finance minister Mthuli Ncube said: “What the President announced is what we may call necessary policy forward guidance, which means that the leader is announcing that Zimbabwe is on a path to further reforms on its currency and monetary system, which is a good thing for getting everyone geared up to realise that this is an important issue. “This is a quest for currency stability, but I’m still pleased that so far Zimbabwe has shown very strong growth." As a result, the RBZ had started printing ZiG notes in preparation for the introduction of the new currency, whose launch details were first reported by The NewsHawks. An RBZ official explained the process: "There was a liaison platform behind the scenes bringing together Mangudya and Mushayavanhu for a smooth transition. Mangudya started the process and hoped Mushayavanhu would continue from where he left, only to discover that his successor — coincidentally another John — was not interested in that. He wanted to draw a line and start afresh even though some ZiG notes had been printed. Mangudya had built some gold and cash reserves which he handed over to Mushayavanhu to ensure he started on stronger footing, but the issue of who signs the ZiG notes became a moot point. "Mangudya thought there was nothing wrong with him signing some of them and Mushayavanhu some, with the ones signed by the former subject to be phased out from circulation gradually, but the latter wanted them out of the market before they were even formally introduced. "That ensured Mushayavanhu launched ZiG without notes, forcing the country and market to wait for a month while they were being printed. This also implied that millions of dollars' worth of banknotes signed by Mangudya had to be burnt or destroyed at a huge cost." With effect from 5 April, banks were told to convert their Zimbabwe dollar balances into ZiG to "foster simplicity, certainty, and predictability in monetary and financial affairs". The process became complicated as ZiG notes only hit the market on 30 April. The new currency was to co-circulate with other foreign currencies in the economy, but ZiG was not available for 25 days as the printed notes had been withheld, destroyed and were being reprinted. Eventually, ZiG notes and coins were to be issued in denominations made up of ZiG 1, ZiG 2, ZiG 5, ZiG 10, Zig 20, ZiG 50, ZiG 100, and ZiG 200 distributed through normal banking channels. Coins were to be introduced in due course, but that was later abandoned. ZiG banknotes were announced in eight denominations: 1, 2, 5, 10, 20, 50, 100, and ZiG 200.  However, a later announcement said the 1, 2, and 5 ZiG notes would instead be issued in coin form.  ZiG began circulating on 30 April 2024. Officials say ZiG is backed by US$575 million worth of reserves: foreign currency, gold, and other precious metals. Page 12 News NewsHawks Issue 179, 14 - 27 June 2024 Mushayavanhu lays to waste  ZiG banknotes worth millions Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe governor John Mushayavanhu

RUVIMBO MUCHENJE THE commander of the United States Africa Command — US Africom — Marine Corps General Michael Langley says Zimbabwe and other people's claims that his force has a base in Zambia are “absolutely false”. In a digital Press briefing  from Gaborone, Botswana, where he was participating in the 2024 African Chiefs of Defence Conference on Thursday, Langley, responding to a question by Zimbabwean journalist Columbus Mavhunga, said: “That’s absolutely false. We have no bases in Zambia. We have no plans to put one there. So our approach is African-led and US-enabled, and so we work closely. We have a deepened partnership with Zambia.  There is no base. “We have increased security cooperation with them, but there is no footprint, there is no posture, there is no base. Within our security cooperation office, which is resident in the embassy, but there is no base. “There’s no plans for a base. And – but I would just say that we have a very deepened partnership and strong partnership with our Zambian friends and security construct.” Mavhunga had asked: “The Zimbabwean Government accuses you of militarising Zambia and setting up the US Africa Command and moving it from Stuttgart in Germany without express permission from Zambian lawmakers, SADC, or the African Union. What is your response to that?” Zambian citizens, opposition leaders and critics have of late been raising alarm over the issue, saying Africom now has a base in Zambia, while expressing fears that it would make Lusaka an arrowhead of growing US militarism and divide the region. Mnangagwa, angered by Zambian President Hakainde Hichilema and his government's unprecedented spearheading of the rejection of his disputed re-election last August through the Southern African Development Community polls observer mission, recently internationalised the fight by reporting Lusaka to Russian President Vladimir Putin. He said Zambia is an American client state, referring to the Africom issue. Mnangagwa suggested Lusaka is destabilising the region by hosting Africom and allowing American military consolidation in their country and region. To show that the issue was more about Zambia leading his fraudulent re-election, Mnangagwa did not mention Botswana in the process when it has well-known ties with the US military as shown by the US-organaised  African Chiefs of Defence Conference in Gaborone this week. The US and Botswana co-hosted the conference in the Tswana capital from 24-26 June. The event brought together military leaders from across Africa to exchange knowledge, encourage partnerships and foster collaboration toward addressing shared security and stability challenges. The chair of the Nato Military Committee, Admiral Rob Bauer, attended the meeting. Instead, Mnangagwa also mentioned Malawi to Putin from nowhere. Mnangagwa told Putin: “You see, the West has just begun consolidating its power in Zambia, our next neighbour. You know, there was a time when Zambia and Zimbabwe were one; it was called Northern and Southern Rhodesia. It was made one by the British, but they are now separate. And the Americans are consolidating their power in that country, both in terms of security and in terms of financial support to Zambia to make sure that we feel lonely.” His remarks in St Petersburg during the first week of June at the St Petersburg International Economic Forum sparked a reaction in Zambia. Zambian Foreign minister Mulambo Haimbe rejected Mnangagwa's claims, saying they constituted an unwarranted attack on his country's sovereignty. He said Sadc and the African Union must intervene to resolve the dispute. The issue has created serious discomfort as Zambia supported Zimbabwe's liberation at critical times in the 1960s and 1970s. It hosted many Zimbabwean struggle leaders, most prominently Zapu leader Joshua Nkomo and Zanu PF chair Herbert Chitepo assassinated there in 1975, among others. Mnangagwa himself grew up in Zambia and is practically Zambian to all intents and purposes.  But the issue of elections and Africom have deeply widened the gulf between neighbours on either side of the Zambezi. Zambia last year hosted Africom's annual Senior Enlisted Leader Conference from 10 to 13 September. This has provoked uproar in Zambia and the region. However, Langley said the hullabaloo is based on false information as the US has no base in Zambia and no plans to set one. NewsHawks News Page 13 1ssue 179, 14 - 27 June 2024 Zim claims on Africom "absolutely false" - US Botswana President Mokgweetsi Masisi opening the African Defence Chief Conference in Gaborone this week.

Page 14 News NewsHawks Issue 179, 14 - 27 June 2024 What Mnangagwa told Putin THANK you very much, Your Excellency President Putin. May I, on behalf of the people of Zimbabwe, the government, and indeed on my own behalf, extend my warmest regards to you. I am so happy that you were able to invite me to come here to meet you. This is an opportunity, Your Excellency, that I have been looking forward to, because Zimbabwe and the Russian Federation have excellent relations, and it is critically important that we make them more comprehensive and share the challenges that we are facing. Commonly, the challenges that you face are the same challenges that we face in Southern Africa, because we are one of the few countries in Southern Africa that is regarded as anti-West, and I feel so humbled that you have extended an invitation for me to come over here. This is an opportunity where we can share the challenges that we face both at the national level and at the international level, because we have relations with Western countries. But most importantly, it is an opportunity to consolidate them, to identify areas where we can pursue cooperation between our two countries and consolidate, and make them more comprehensive between ourselves. There is no need to shy away from each other. I think our pursuit in terms of international relations is the same. We were disregarded as an isolated island in Southern Africa, but I am anxious that we develop comprehensive relations with the Russian Federation, and I can assure you that I have that determination on my part. And much more so, you yourself, as the President, as well as the Russian Federation, have support in Zimbabwe. You see, we have received support, we received food allocations from yourselves last year, and we have received cooperation in the military and security sector. That alone, as you continue to do so, we continuously become isolated in our region. But we are determined to be ourselves, we are determined to be independent. We don’t care what other countries say about us, you know, under President Mugabe. And there was this Prime Minister in Britain, and the relations just ended there. And thereafter, most of the British and Americans, they have not looked upon us; they think that we are too inclined to the East. But we have no apologies at all. We feel we have better relations with the people who also respect us, not the persons who look down upon us. So we are very happy to be here. We are anxious to have more comprehensive and concentrated relations between ourselves. Yes, we are a very advanced country; but there is a lot that we can learn from you and there is a lot that will benefit from that relationship. And there is a lot that we can open for the Russian Federation to participate in our economy, especially in the mining sector and agriculture. There is a lot that we can afford for you to participate. And in that process, the West will run away. You see, the West has just begun consolidating its power in Zambia, our next neighbour. You know, there was a time when Zambia and Zimbabwe were one; it was called Northern and Southern Rhodesia. It was made one by the British, but they are now separate. And the Americans are consolidating their power in that country, both in terms of security and in terms of financial support to Zambia to make sure that we feel lonely. But that will not change us, because we have taken a course as a people that we feel we want to be independent and we will choose our friends ourselves. And besides, we are independent today because most of us in the leadership trained here during our war of liberation. We got our independence because we are supported by yourselves here, and we don’t forget that history, and you don’t forget about us. So, Mr President, I am happy to be here. If an opportunity avails later on — I mean, we will find time to chat and go into more detail as to which areas we must focus on in terms of supporting each other and in terms of where we feel we need external support, especially in the area of difference in security as well as food security. Those areas we need to be supported in — the mechanisation of agriculture and so on. We cannot go to the West; we have to come here because the West would want to see us down. They support our neighbours, Zambia and Malawi, very heavily. But in spite of that, Zimbabwe’s economic growth is the fastest growing economy in the region, in spite of us being isolated by the Americans. So, Your Excellency, I am very happy to be here. — Sourced from the Kremlin. President Emmerson Mnangagwa with Russian President Vladimir Putin.

NewsHawks News Page 15 1ssue 179, 14 - 27 June 2024 NATHAN GUMA FORMER president of the Zimbabwe National Students Union (Zinasu) Allan Chipoyi has given the Judicial Service Commission (JSC) seven days to provide curriculum vitaes and scoresheets of interviews of the recently-appointed judges who came into office amid complaints that some of them did not pass the interviews, failed to pay debts and had corruption charges hanging over their heads. On 18 June, about 12 High Court judges were sworn in by Chief Justice Luke Malaba at a ceremony that was held at the Constitutional Court in Harare, among them Justice Garainesu Mawadze who is now Deputy Judge President of the High Court, deputising Justice Mary Zimba-Dube. The 10 new members of the High Court bench are Justice Faith Mushure, Justice Ngoni Nduna, Justice Regis Demure, Justice Phillipa Phillips, Justice Gibson Mandaza, Justice Joel Mambara, Justice Naison Chivayo, Justice Vivian Ndlovu, Justice Sijabuliso Siziba and Justice Mpokiseng Dube. Justice Maxwell Kaitano was appointed Administrative Court judge. Currently, the High Court has 68 judges, while the judiciary has more than 80 judges. However, Chipoyi, through his lawyers Kadzere, Hungwe & Matevere Legal Practitioners, has requested access to the scoresheets used during the process for assessment. “We write to you on the instructions of Allan Chipoyi who is an adult male Zimbabwean. We are instructed and accept as common cause that the Commission recently held public interviews of various members of the legal profession to fill 10 vacancies to the office of judge of the High Court,” reads the letter. “The public interviews drew a lot of interest from a vast number of Zimbabweans who followed same on social media and television. The interviews were broadcast live. Like all other citizens, our client followed with keen interest the said public interviews and despite a layman himself, he was able to formulate his own objective assessment of the performance of the candidates that were publicly interviewed.” Chipoyi said access to material used during the public interviews is crucial for accountability and transparency. “We believe the Judicial Service Commission did deliberate and grade each candidate’s performance in the interviews. We understand that 10 successful candidates have now been sworn into office as judges of the High Court,” it reads. “In the public interest and in order to promote public accountability, fairness, transparency and good governance of public institutions (the Judicial Service Commission included) we have been instructed to request that the Judicial Service Commission furnish us with the following: “The scoresheet/grading of all the persons publicly interviewed, the curriculum vitaes of all the persons publicly interviewed. We make the above request in terms of Section 62 (1) of the Constitution as read with section 7 (1) of the Freedom of Information Act [Chapter 10:33]. We look forward to hearing from you within the next seven working days and anticipate your co-operation in the interest of public accountability.” According to section 62 of the national constitution, every Zimbabwean or permanent resident, including juristic persons and the Zimbabwean media, has the right to access any information held by state or by any institution or agency of government at every level, in so far as the information is required of public accountability. Zimbabwe’s judiciary has been under scrutiny, with human rights defenders calling it out for being used as a tool in lawfare against the opposition, while cementing the ruling Zanu PF’s stay in power. Last year, the gifting of US$400 000 housing loans to judges raised eyebrows, underlining the executive’s keenness to extend favours to the judiciary, particularly during elections, as they play a key role in mediating disputes. While judges were extended US$400 000 loans each to buy property, the arrangement had initially been tailor made for Chief Justice Malaba and his deputy Elizabeth Gwaunza. The 2018 presidential election was adjudicated by the Constitutional Court which found for President Emmerson Mnangagwa after Chief Justice Malaba controversially threw out a challenge to the poll result by main opposition leader Nelson Chamisa. In 2020, through Constitutional Amendments No. 1 and 2, President Mnangagwa did all he could to ensure that Malaba retains office, despite having reached retirement age. Generally, judges are well looked after, and they get top-of-the-range luxury cars. President Emmerson Mnangagwa’s integrity is also facing a litmus test with him violating his constitutional obligation to establish a tribunal to investigate the suitability of Justice Webster Chinamora of the Harare High Court, to continue holding office following allegations of misconduct. Early last year, Advocate Thabani Mpofu filed a complaint against Chinamora after another attorney, Advocate Taona Nyamakura, lodged a complaint against the judge for alleged conflict of interest in a legal dispute between Zimbabwe’s Delta Beverages (Pvt) Ltd, Schweppes Zimbabwe Ltd and Blakey Plastics (Pty) Ltd, a South African company. While a panel set up by the JSC to review the complaint comprising judges Anne-Marie Gowora, Alfas Chitakunye and Custom Kachambwa concluded that Chinamora has a case to answer, the tribunal has not been instituted. JSC given ultimatum to disclose 10 judges interview scorecards Former Zimbabwe National Students Union president and University of Zimbabwe students representative council leader Allan Chipoyi

Page 16 News NewsHawks Issue 179, 14 - 27 June 2024 Tycoon evicted from mansion NATHAN GUMA THE High Court sheriff has evicted prominent local businessman Tendai Mashamhanda from his US$1.5 million upmarket Highlands home after Supreme Court judges ruled that he acquired the property fraudulently while it was under judicial attachment. A source told The NewsHawks that the eviction has been done, bringing an end to the long-running saga characterised by bitterness and fierce attacks on judges. “The sheriff and police went to Mashamhanda's home yesterday to evict him from the mansion,” the source said. Lawyers Gill, Godlonton and Gerrans wrote a letter on 19 June to the High Court Sheriff Services asking for assistance to evict Mashamhanda. The sheriff replied on 21 June, saying they will carry out the eviction on 25 June. Mashamhanda, son of the well-known business mogul Alex Mashamhanda of Mashwede Holdings, bought the property for US$230 000 from lawyer Pihwai Chiutsi and claims to have boosted its value through renovations, increasing it to more than US$1.5 million. However, the High Court ruled in November 2023 that the sale was fraudulent and ordered Mashamhanda to vacate the premises. He appealed to the Supreme Court in an attempt to stay the eviction. But Justice Chinembiri Bhunu dismissed the appeal, saying the applicant was unlawfully occupying the respondent’s property. Mashamhanda believes Bhunu and other judges are corrupt and compromised, calling for their resignations. “The applicant has been in unlawful and mala fide occupation of the respondent’s property for close to five years in circumstances where the law is heavily weighed against him as demonstrated elsewhere in this judgment,” Bhunu said. “I therefore hold that his prospects of success on appeal are pretty dim indeed. The equities and balance of convenience favour the respondent who in legal parlance should ordinarily be in possession and occupation of its property. “The applicant’s conduct in unlawfully occupying the respondent’s property in bad faith, to his exclusion for a period spanning five years without its consent is manifestly unjust and unconscionable. “Considering that the applicant has dismally failed to discharge the onus of proving that he has any reasonable excuse for clinging onto the respondent’s property without its consent, the application cannot succeed as his prospects of success on appeal are bound to fail. “Thus dismissal of the application will meet the justice of the case without turning it on its head. “In the final analysis, I hold that the applicant has failed to meet the requirements of the test for stay of execution set out in the Cohen case and other related precedent supra.” Mashamhanda has written several letters demanding the resignation of Deputy Chief Justice Elizabeth Gwaunza and Supreme Court judges Antonia Guvava and Bhunu, raising corruption allegations and claiming violations of the Judicial Service (Code of Ethics) Regulations, 2012. The case has hogged public attention due to the substantial value of the property and the ongoing legal battle, as well as allegations against the judges. Businessman Tendai Mashamhanda with football legend Thierry Henry

News Page 17 BRENNA MATENDERE SPEAKER of Parliament Jacob Mudenda has come under the spotlight after he blocked opposition CCC lawmaker Gladys Hlatywayo from rising on a point of national interest to ask about President Emmerson Mnangagwa's diplomatic gaffe in St Petersburg, Russia. During a meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin, Mnangagwa described neighbouring Zambia as an American client state – an accusation that has fueled tensions between Harare and Lusaka. Mnangagwa's impolitic remarks suggested Zambia and Malawi are satellite states of the United States. This exacerbated the discomfort between Lusaka and Harare after they collided after Zimbabwe’s fraudulent and disputed general elections last August. Zambia’s former vice-president Nevers Mumba led a Southern African Development Community (Sadc) observer mission which concluded that the polls were not free and fair. On Mnangagwa’s recent Russia gaffe, Hlatywayo rose to raise the issue of huge public interest in Parliament on a "point of national interest". In her contribution, Hlatywayo, who is in charge of the CCC's foreign affairs portfolio and was a member of the African Caribbean Pacific-European Union delegation until Mudenda removed her, said: "I rise on a point of national interest. Given that Zimbabwe is assuming the role of Sadc chair this August, I urge the executive arm of government from making comments that unsettle the country's neighbours. “This is in light of the widely published comments that Zambia and Malawi are posing a security threat to Zimbabwe through association with the United States." As Hlatywayo was still talking, there were some inaudible interjections. Mudenda jumped in: "Order, order! I think there was a point of order that side." With those remarks, Mudenda brought in Zanu PF Rushinga MP Tendai Nyabani: "Honourable members should distinguish what are national, regional and international issues. I thank you." Relieved, Mudenda, who is also Zanu PF's treasurer-general, then said: "Thank you very much, honourable Nyabani. Honourable Hlatywayo, the area of foreign affairs in terms of bilateral or regional relations is a matter of the executive to deal with at all times. "If there are any issues with the executive, enda ikoko (go there). Do not interrupt my ruling. It is unbecoming, honourable member. "I was saying this is a no-go area. Where you have issues that relate to bilateral or multilateral relations between or among states, those are dealt with at the level of the executive." Academic and publisher Ibbo Mandaza said Mudenda's actions are undermining Parliament and diminishing its stature. "Are we reducing the proverbial 'august House' into a complete farce, not to mention the background of the same having been depleted by recalls of dozens of parliamentarians in blatant disregard for the people’s votes and the consequent decimation of whatever remained of the formal opposition in Zimbabwe?" Mandaza queried.  Mudenda's actions are viewed by critics as incorrect because there is a parliamentary portfolio committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade which deals with issues such as Mnangagwa's St Petersburg diplomatic indiscretion. The committee deals with Zimbabwe’s relations with other countries, moreso neighbours, and trade matters. While Parliament faces hurdles in contributing to the formulation and execution of Zimbabwe's foreign policy, the constitution is clear: "All institutions and agencies of the state and government (in Zimbabwe) at every level are accountable to Parliament." In terms of section 116 of the constitution, the legislature consists of Parliament and the President. The President is part of the legislature in his capacity as head of state who holds the public seal and accordingly must assent to Bills passed by Parliament before they become law. The executive, particularly the President, is accountable to Parliament. While it is clear Parliament should be involved in foreign policy issues, the executive in Zimbabwe tends to promote de-parliamentarisation of that area, which is what Mudenda supports. With that mindset, Mudenda blocked Hlatywayo from raising a critical issue which concerns not just Zimbabweans or leaders in Lusaka and Harare but also the whole Sadc region. It is also an issue of democratic accountability; the executive - Mnangagwa in this specific case - accounts to Parliament, not to himself. Mudenda, who assisted CCC self-proclaimed secretary-general Sengezo Tshabangu to capture the opposition from Nelson Chamisa and render it readily in service of Zanu PF, last month rescinded opposition appointments of portfolio committees point-persons made in February. This was to help the pro-ruling party opposition CCC faction to remain in charge of those committees. The appointments were made by a pro-Chamisa CCC faction. In May, Mudenda and Zanu PF chief whip Pupurai Togarepi ganged up against opposition CCC Harare West MP Joana Mamombe after she asked when the legislature was going to reinstate recalled CCC MPs in line with the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) Committee on the Human Rights of Parliamentarians decision in March. Mudenda, who aided and abetted the capture of the CCC by Tshabangu, has been complicit in undermining democracy in Parliament, while acting as a gatekeeper for the executive. The legislative arm of the state is mandated by the constitution to exercise oversight on the executive, not to protect it from scrutiny and criticism. Zimbabwe is a constitutional democracy. It has three pillars of state, namely the executive, the legislature and the judiciary, which derive their existence and authority from the constitution. For the proper functioning of government, the three pillars of state, though respecting the principle of the separation of powers by maintaining their independence from one another, coordinate, interface and play complementary roles in national governance. The executive runs the administration of the state, makes policies and enforces laws. Parliament makes laws and the judiciary interprets laws, that is the constitution and statutes. That is how Zimbabwe should work as a constitutional democracy. Speaker Mudenda shields President from MPs scrutiny Speaker of Parliament Jacob Mudenda NewsHawks 1ssue 179, 14 - 27 June 2024

Page 18 News BRENNA MATENDERE ZIMBABWE’S security forces have been put on high alert to crush any potential dissent or demonstrations ahead of the Southern African Development Community (Sadc) summit. President Emmerson Mnangagwa is going all out to reverse the Sadc Election Observer Mission report which highlighted a high number of anomalies and condemned the 23-24 August 2023 elections. Desperate to reverse the report, Mnangagwa has gone out on a public relations scheme to impress the Sadc heads of state. Mnangagwa is refurbishing roads in Harare, building luxury villas and will host the visiting leaders at the new Parliament Building in Mount Hampden or at the newly renovated and renamed Meikles Hotel, now called the Hyatt Regency Harare/The Meikles. Given that Sadc leaders openly rejected Zanu PF's controversial election victory last year, Mnangagwa is doing this to ensure political legitimacy and survival, as well as camouflage the country’s economic and social problems through a facade. He is however worried the opposition protests can potentially harm his plans. In the eyes of Sadc, Mnangagwa was not legitimately elected given the damning report which is now an official record. The state is therefore using as an example Jameson Timba and 77 others who were arrested commemorating  Africa Youth Day at Timba’s private home and have been denied bail to would-be protesters. Timba, his son Ndapuwa and others were arrested gestapo-style on 16 June at Timba's home in Avondale and detained at Avondale Police station. Some were detained at Harare Central Police Station. Altogether, 78 people were arrested amid brutal attacks and injuries at Timba's home on  Downie Avenue in Avondale. The gathering was a private youth function over a braai to join South Africans in annual commemorations of 16 June — Youth Day — named after the historic 16 June 1976 Soweto Uprising. The date 16 June is a national public holiday in South Africa, celebrated as Youth Day. It has its origins in the 1976 uprisings which started in Soweto before spreading countrywide, sparked off by John Vorster's apartheid government's decision to use Afrikaans as a language of instruction in black schools. Commemorations of the day and the youths' heroics which captured the public imagination and world attention, while also changing the course of history in South Africa, has resonance in the region, including in Zimbabwe, and the Global South. The epic event is a historic and landmark act of resistance to brutal colonial and apartheid dominance. For joining and facilitating the commemorations and some discussions over a braai, Timba and 20 others, including his United States university-bound son, are now charged with promoting public violence, breaches of peace or bigotry under section 37 of the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act. Timba’s son was released on bail last week after the prosecutors agreed that he was arrested when he came to the house to present gifts to his father and was not part of the gathering. However, Timba and his son were not even part of the event. They had only offered a venue. Yet police arrested and beat them up, among others, Gestapo-style. The Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights is dealing with the issue. Lawyers were deployed to Avondale and Harare Central Police Station to attend to the detainees. They recorded statements and facilitated medical attention to traumatised victims of police brutality. Police initially denied the detainees medical attention. Sadc leaders received the controversial election observer mission report on Zimbabwe at an extraordinary summit of heads of state and government in Luanda, Angola, on 4 November 2023 despite Harare’s attempts to ensure that polls were  off the agenda. The summit appointed a sub-committee which included Angola, Namibia and Tanzania to handle the Zimbabwe situation, while delicate private talks were occurring within the regional grouping’s circles. Sadc leaders had initially convened five days earlier for a virtual summit before deciding to meet in person in Luanda to discuss the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Zimbabwe mainly. The summit came against a backdrop of resistance by Mnangagwa and Foreign Affairs minister Fredrick Shava to have Zimbabwe on the agenda and to be discussed at the meeting. Sadc chair Angolan President João Lourenço and Zambian President Hakainde Hichilema warded off Mnangagwa and Shava’s pressure to remove Zimbabwe from the agenda. Prior to the summit, the Sadc council of ministers and the troika of the organ on politics, defence and security had met virtually on 26 and 27 October respectively in Lusaka to discuss the same issues — the Democratic Republic of Congo and Zimbabwe. Sadc ministers stood firm behind their election observer mission led by former Zambian vice-president Nevers Mumba who was appointed by Hichilema. He was under attack from Zanu PF and government officials. They rejected the bile and insults directed at them by Zanu PF and government officials led by Zanu PF spokesperson Chris Mutsvangwa, who was War Veterans minister at the time, and Mnangagwa’s spokesperson George Charamba. Highly placed sources have informed The NewsHawks that security forces are vigilant and ready to crush any possible opposition demonstrations at formative stages. The revelations explain why armed riot police pounced on opposition Citizens' Coalition for Change (CCC) youths on Sunday and subjected them to intense torture after they had gathered at the private home of senior party official Jameson Timba in Avondale to commemorate Day of the African Child. Timba, a former minister of state and current chief administrator of the CCC, was also arrested. He appeared alongside 77 others before Harare magistrate Ruth Moyo who repeatedly remanded them in custody during bail application hearings until their freedom was effectively denied on 27 June. In order to manage opposition supporters who wanted to demonstrate at court during the delivery of the bail application ruling, Timba and the other 77 were not allowed to come to come to court. The ruling was delivered virtually. When the opposition activists appeared at the magistrates’ court in Harare, some of them had visible scars of torture while one of them had a broken limb. An intelligence source said after the pronouncement by opposition politician Nelson Chamisa that the Southern African Development Community must still address the August 2023 election dispute that saw Mnangagwa controversially win by a wafer-thin margin to claim a second term, the security forces had been activated to be on high alert to quell possible protests by his supporters ahead of the Sadc summit. At the Sadc summit, Mnangagwa is expected to assume the rotational position of chairperson of the regional bloc. “The heavy-handedness with which police treated the youths after arresting them was both designed as a show of power and a message to any would-be protesters ahead of the Sadc summit. The security forces are acting on assumptions that Chamisa's supporters want to take to the streets ahead of the Sadc summit and that gathering at Timba’s house was regarded as a planning meeting for demonstrations. That is why it was treated in that brutal way,” said the source. “Otherwise the CCC at this stage, after its complete capture, is no longer regarded as a threat at all, especially now that we are no longer in election time.” Added the source: “The real issue is that there are fears Chamisa supporters want to demonstrate to pressure Sadc leaders to address their legitimacy complaint against President Mnangagwa. The strategy is therefore to cut these plans at their formative stages and round up the ring leaders.” The source said the charge laid against the opposition activists was also telling. When they appeared in court for initial remand, the activists were charged for participating in an illegal gathering with intent to promote public violence and disorderly conduct. The Zanu PF government has since Independence in 1980 been accused of applying authoritarian political repression, arrests and detentions, abductions, torture, beatings and killings of opposition activists, when cornered. History has shown that the Zanu PF regime  resorts to brutal crackdowns whenever its stranglehold on power is challenged. CCC members have been arrested, abducted and some killed in recent months. Zanu PF has a long record of violence, brutality and murder. The international community has always condemned the crackdowns, with calls for the government to respect human rights, democratic principles, and the rule of law. The situation remains polarised amid fears of further repression and violence if the opposition tries to protest or express its simmering discontent in public. Security forces primed to crush dissenters ahead of Sadc summit NewsHawks Issue 179, 14 - 27 June 2024

News Page 19 BRENNA MATENDERE ZIMBABWEAN President Emmerson Mnangagwa has threatened a crackdown on dissent and opposition forces ahead of the annual Southern African Development Community (Sadc) summit in August which will tackle the regional body's poll observer mission reports, including the local one which rejected his fraudulent and disputed retention in office in last year's flawed elections. This comes as former opposition minister and senator Jameson Timba and 78 others are detained for holding a private meeting on 16 June to discuss youth issues over a braai. In many Sadc countries which uphold constitutional rights and democracy, if not all, this is hardly an offence. Freedom of assembly, including other fundamental civil and political liberties such the right to assembly and expression, is constitutionally guaranteed, but reluctantly upheld in practice, sometimes trampled upon. Zimbabwe, an authoritarian repressive state, has a long history of human rights violations, including violent suppression, intimidation, terror, maimings, enforced disappearances, and killings. Timba is a veteran opposition activist who worked with the late opposition MDC-T leader Morgan Tsvangirai and his successor Nelson Chamisa. The Sadc election observer mission rejected the outcome of Zimbabwe's elections, saying they did not comply with the country’s constitutional and legal requirements. It also said the polls failed to meet the Sadc principles and guidelines governing democratic elections. Special meetings were subsequently held in Zambia and Angola where the report was adopted and endorsed. The situation led to a major diplomatic fallout between Mnangagwa and Zambian President Hakainde Hichilema, who is the chair of the Sadc troika of the organ on politics, defence and security which oversees elections in the region. The head of the election observer mission to Zimbabwe former Zambian Vice-President Nevers Mumba was subjected to vicious attacks by Zanu PF and Harare leaders, much to the chagrin of Sadc leaders. However, Zambia resisted the intimidation and attacks, standing firm. Mnangagwa then recently internationalised the fight by reporting Zambia to Russian President Vladimir Putin, saying the neighbouring country is an American client state, raising the issue of the United States African Command (Africom) which opened an office in Lusaka. Mnangagwa claims that Zambia is destabilising the region by hosting Africom, a charge reacted by Zambian Foreign minister Mulambo Haimbe has rejected, saying Sadc and the African Union must intervene to resolve the dispute. The issue has created serious discomfort as Zambia supported Zimbabwe's liberation at critical times. It hosted many Zimbabwean struggle leaders, most prominently Zapu leader Joshua Nkomo and Zanu PF chair Herbert Chitepo assassinated there in 1975. Mnangagwa himself grew up in Zambia and is Zambian to all intents and purposes. But the issue of elections and Africom have widened the gulf between neighbours on either side of the Zambezi. Zambia last year hosted Africom annual Senior Enlisted Leader Conference from 10-13 September. This has raised uproar in Zambia as the country’s citizens, opposition leaders and critics say Lusaka must not host Africom as it is divisive in the region. However, the head of Africom denied on Thursday claims by Zimbabwean government officials and some Zambians that Washington is setting up a military base in the neighboring country and wants to move its operations there from Germany. At an online press briefing, General Michael Langley, head of Africom, rejected Harare’s claims that the US is establishing a base in neighbouring Zambia. “That's absolutely false,” Langley said from an African Chiefs of Defence Conference in Botswana. “We have no bases in Zambia. We have no plans to put one there.” Defence leaders from dozens of African nations met in Gaborone, Botswana, as part of the 2024 African Chiefs of Defence Conference. The US and Botswana co-hosted the conference in the Tswana capital from 24-26 June. The event brought together military leaders from across Africa to exchange knowledge, encourage partnerships and foster collaboration toward addressing shared security and stability challenges. "[In] every country, there are layered threats ... especially across the Sahel," said Langley. "Every country has their different type challenges [and] drivers of instability. That's ... what's going to be tabled for discussions." The chair of the Nato Military Committee Admiral Rob Bauer attended the meeting. Mnangagwa is pulling out all the stops to impress Sadc leaders when he holds the Sadc summit on 16- 17 August in Harare and assumes the annual chairmanship. In 26 March, cabinet considered and adopted an update report on preparations Sadc summit, presented by the Vice President Constantino Chiwenga as chairperson of the inter-ministerial task force on the preparations. The summit was expected to be hosted at the New Parliament Building in the New City in Mt. Hampden, but there have also been somw mentions of Hyatt Regency Harare The Meikles and the Harare International Conference Centre which is undergoing renovations. Government is also refurbishing roads in and around Harare and constructing some villas for the summit. So Mnangagwa does not want dissenters and the opposition to rain on his parade in Harare during the summit in which he seeks to showcase what his government thinks is progress. As a result, Mnangagwa says he will not brook any form of mischief, warning "hatidi mhesva mukono" (Shona for we don't want mischief). Speaking at the decision-making administrative organ of Zanu PF politburo meeting on Wednesday in Harare, Mnangagwa said any attempts to challenge his rule with be ruthlessly crushed. “I am fully aware that certain unruly elements, in collaboration with our detractors, have activated their perennial tendencies of seeking to disturb our security, peace and prevailing tranquil environment," he said. “They must be warned that my Government will not brook any form of mischief, under whatever pretext. The law will take its course without fear or favour. Hatidi mhesva mukono." Rallying his troops, Mnangagwa also urged war veterans to close ranks and act as a formidable force against real or perceived enemies. He says war veterans leaders must resolve their problems and reunite as they are a strategic force to the ruling party and country. The Zimbabwe Liberation War Veterans Association is deeply divided and has failed to hold its elective congress twice. “Let us remain vigilant and on guard against various forms of infiltration by the enemy. We must never betray our revolution, or dishonour the ultimate sacrifice paid by the many sons and daughters of the soil. who fought for our freedom and independence," he said. “We are a constitution-based party with a rich liberation war history, sound ideology as well as clear rules and procedures. The adherence to the correct line of the party is the mark of true revolutionaries. Yielding to our individual or clique preferences is counter-revolutionary. There is no room for pseudo-revolutionaries in Zanu PF." He added: “Let us stay the course and accelerate the modernisation and industrialisation for the growth of the economy of our beloved motherland, Zimbabwe. "Going forward, a conducive social and economic environment, where every Zimbabwean contributes to national development, should be nurtured." Mnangagwa sought to rally the party's Soviet-style politburo to provide leadership at critical junctures like now. “As the politburo, we have the weighty responsibility to fully, critically and pro-actively apply ourselves to matters that concern our revolutionary mass party and our beloved motherland, Zimbabwe," he said. “Our collective expertise, experience and backgrounds must be pooled together, continually for the good of our party, our people and our nation. The party is supreme and above our personal interests, ambitions and differences. The pre-occupation of our meetings must reflect these realities towards deepening our unity, respect for each other’s diverse views and overall intra-party democratic practices and traditions. “This should always be informed by the party constitution, and the correct line of the party. We must be leaders who exhibit integrity and principle at all times. “As the leadership, we must unite the party around our vision, principles, values and ideology. Zanu PF is a party that is organised and anchored on its grassroots structures.” After the politburo meeting, Zanu PF held its a Central Committee gathering yesterday, while the National Consultative Assembly is due to convene today. Mnangagwa threatens crackdown on opposition to thwart protests NewsHawks 1ssue 179, 14 - 27 June 2024

Page 20 News NewsHawks Issue 179, 14 - 27 June 2024 NATHAN GUMA THE election of South Africa’s member of the executive council for Health in Limpopo province, Phophi Ramathuba, as the new premier of the region is a wake-up call for Zimbabwe to take responsibility, attend to public amenities and not shift socio-economic burdens to neighbouring countries, political analyst Rashweat Mukundu says. Dr Ramathuba shot into the limelight after taking a swipe at President Emmerson Mnangagwa’s governance failures. She complained that the Zimbabwean authorities were burdening South Africa’s health delivery system. On 14 June, Ramathuba was elected the first female premier of Limpopo after her party, the African National Congress (ANC), won a majority of the seats in the provincial legislature. In 2022, Ramathuba was the centre of attention after she highlighted that Mnangagwa’s governance failures were straining her country’s health delivery system, whose resources are insufficient to cater for undocumented foreigners. Zimbabweans have been flocking to South Africa for better healthcare services following the deterioration of this country’s health sector, with Limpopo province being the nearest port of call. In August 2022, while on a tour of Bela Bela Hospital in Limpopo, Ramathuba had an outburst at a Zimbabwean patient who had been involved in an accident in Harare, but had crossed the border for a surgical operation. Upon learning that she was a Shona-speaking patient, Ramathuba seethed with anger, accusing her of being one of the Zimbabweans who were burdening South Africa’s public hospitals due to Mnangagwa’s governance failures. Reacting to her election as the premier of Limpopo, analyst Mukundu told The NewsHawks that Ramathuba’s election is a wake-up call for the Zimbabwean government to prioritise the revamping of social amenities. “I think Ramathuba will remain loyal on her previous views that political failures in Zimbabwe are causing a social crisis in South Africa with Limpopo having to deal with an influx of Zimbabweans seeking economic opportunities and medical help thereby causing pressure on the South African health systems especially provinces closer to the Zimbabwean border,” Mukundu said. “So I do not foresee her changing that stance. And she may actually come out to be hardened, especially post this election that ANC has not done so well. So, South Africans have voted essentially on local issues. They have not looked at global political issues, and they have not looked at ideological issues.” Mukundu said her position is also complicated as South Africans have been mainly voting for improved public service and better access to social amenities.   “South Africans have voted with their stomachs, and their feet in terms of infrastructure, they have voted with their concerns on public service and, for me, what we may see from the new premier is a more hardened stance on Zimbabweans because the ANC has to demonstrate a new approach,” he said. “It has to demonstrate a new capacity to deliver and this means that there will be closer scrutiny to resource allocation, and that may in a way affect Zimbabweans seeking assistance in South Africa. What we will likely see I think is a hardened position by the premier, but equally a hardened position by South Africans who again will not be governing alone, but are now part of this coalition.” Mukundu said Ramathuba’s election is also bad news for the Zanu PF government, which has been getting support from the ANC despite heavy flaws. “What this also means is that the ANC cannot also push its own fraternal relations to protect Zanu PF from criticism. So we are likely to see a Ramathuba that is likely to be galvanised and willing to go more on the offensive because the ANC is on the back foot and it has to demonstrate that it has the capacity to deliver,” he said. “So, this does not bond well for Zimbabweans. But most importantly, I think it is a message to our leaders in Zimbabwe that they need to focus on the wellbeing of their own people rather than delegating Zimbabweans to neighbouring countries like Zambia, South Africa and Botswana as we have seen. It means that our government must focus on public service, health and other economic issues that benefit its own citizens.” More officials in South Africa’s Limpopo province have been expressing concern over the effect of Zimbabwe’s political failure on the country, with  mayor of Musina Municipality Nkhanedzeni Godfrey Mawela, last year complaining that the town has seen little benefit despite it being a major trading point, with illegal immigrants putting pressure on amenities. The town is also a major trading point for Zimbabwean informal traders. “As a municipality we can say that we are strategically located, but currently given the illegal activity, we are not benefitting anything. Actually, we see it as a burden because the flow of foreign nationals is a burden to the municipality,” Mawela said in an interview with the South African Broadcasting Corporation. “They (migrants) do spend money on this side. What we are talking about as a burden is that we budget money here for the local people. But when these illegal foreign nationals come without our knowledge, they use the same infrastructure and the budget that we would have set aside for our almost 100 000 people.” He said the town’s health facilities have also been largely filled by foreign nationals seeking medication in the border town.   “We are a municipality that is struggling with water and a number of service delivery issues. So the uncontrolled flow of foreign nationals becomes a burden. We are happy that the government, even the President himself, is taking this thing seriously to consider giving support to the municipality, to give service to our people including the foreign nationals,” he said. “We have a hospital here. If you go to Musina Hospital, they will tell you they receive foreign nationals almost every now and then. Actually the hospital is home to foreign nationals who are coming here now and again. Look, they are using the medication and everything that is meant for our people here. It ends up servicing foreign nationals who are coming illegally. We want the national government to be coming to help us solve the situation.” Feisty Ramathuba’s appointment spells trouble for Zim authorities Phophi Ramathuba

News Page 21 BRENNA MATENDERE ZAMBIA has urged the Southern African Development Community (Sadc) and the African Union (AU) to intervene and resolve its diplomatic tiff with Zimbabwe after President Emmerson Mnangagwa's recent remarks in a meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin in which he insinuated that Lusaka has become a regional security threat on account of its association with the United States. Mnangagwa said Zambia is destabilising the region by collaborating with the United States on security matters, further straining relations between Zimbabwe and Zambia. “They support our neighbours Zambia and Malawi very heavily. Americans are consolidating their power in that country, Zambia, both in terms of security and in terms of financial support to Zambia, to make sure we feel lonely,” stated Mnangagwa. Newly-appointed Zambian Foreign minister Mulambo Haimbe reacted robustly in that country's Parliament in Lusaka to Mnangagwa’s statement during his recent visit to Russia for the St Petersburg International Economic Forum, saying the remarks constitute an “unwarranted attack on Zambia’s sovereignty". Haimbe, a former Justice minister, said Sadc and the AU must intervene. “The statements made by President Mnangagwa are not only baseless but also damaging to the spirit of unity and mutual respect that underpins our regional cooperation. We call upon (Southern African Development Community) Sadc and the (African Union) AU to address this matter decisively and conclusively to preserve the integrity of our regional partnerships.” Mnangagwa, through his remarks to Putin, sparked controversy. The neighbouring countries have enjoyed cordial relations since time immemorial. Zimbabwe and Zambia were one country from 1953 to 1963 under the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Zambia supported Zimbabwe's liberation struggle on top of that. In addition, Zambia has also been lobbying and calling for the lifting of targeted Western sanctions on Mnangagwa, his wife Auxillia and others under the US embargo. Besides, Mnangagwa grew up in Zambia and is equally Zambian to all intents and purposes. This also came in the context of a parliamentary debate on the controversial establishment of a United States Africa Command (Africom) office in Lusaka. Zambian MPs showed concern over the matter, saying the  divisive Africom manoeuvre  might explain the discomfort of some Sadc countries. Some MPs and other Zambians are opposed to Africom having an office in Zambia, saying it might create problems in the region. Africom says its mission, with its partners, is to counter "transnational threats and malign actors, strengthen security forces, and respond to crises" in order to advance US national interests and promote regional security, stability, and prosperity. In reply to the MPs' concerns and criticism, Haimbe said: “The Africom office is aimed at strengthening our security infrastructure and fostering greater cooperation in combating transnational threats. It should not be viewed as a security risk but rather as a testament to our commitment to regional peace and stability.” While the Africom issue has always created heated debate in Africa, Mnangagwa's gripe is not necessarily Africom — which on its own is an important issue — but that President Hakainde Hichilema used his influence as chair of the Sadc troika of the organ on politics, defence and security, through the regional bloc's election observer mission to Harare, to reject Zimbabwe's fraudulent and disputed 2023 general elections. That also included rejection of Mnangagwa's own re-election, compounding his legitimacy question. Sadc adopted its election observer report rejecting Mnangagwa's re-election through special meetings in Zambia and Angola, saying Zimbabwe's poll outcome failed to meet its own internal constitutional and legal benchmarks, as well as the Sadc principles and guidelines governing democratic elections. That left Mnangagwa seething with anger and he is fighting Zambia behind the scenes over that. Mnangagwa internationalised the fight by reporting Zambia to Putin, trying to manipulate the US and Russia geopolitical turf war in southern Africa for his own political ends, not even Zimbabwe's national interest. The US embassy in Harare dismissed the claims Mnangagwa made to Putin. The US charge d’affaires in Harare, Elaine French, said in a statement that contrary to Mnangagwa’s claims, her country was providing the biggest bilateral assistance to Zimbabwe compared to other countries. She said her country had given more than US$5 billion aid to Harare since Independence in 1980. “The United States has been and will continue to be a reliable partner with the people of Zimbabwe.  Our more than $5 billion in health, humanitarian, and development assistance since Zimbabwe’s independence has rehabilitated health clinics, provided lifesaving medications, and now has helped families make ends meet during this devastating drought. “The United States is not running away.  It is making good on its commitment to support the health and prosperity of Zimbabwe’s 16 million people,” French said in a statement. According to the diplomat, Washington provided US$11 million in food security aid to Zimbabwe in January this year as more than six million people faced hunger due to drought induced by the El Niño phenomenon. In an interview with NewsHub in Bulawayo, Effort Ncube, an international relations and political analyst, described President Mnangagwa’s statements in Russia as an unnecessary diplomatic blunder. According to Ncube, Mnangagwa’s “gaffe” had compromised his impartiality as the incoming Sadc chair. Zimbabwe will take over the annual chairmanship from Zambia in August. “That is going to undermine the already difficult relations between Zimbabwe and Zambia," Ncube said. Relations between Harare and Lusaka became particularly frosty after Zimbabwe’s 2023 general elections which were condemned by the Sadc election observer mission. The mission was chaired by former Zambian vice-president Nevers Mumba who was recommended to the post by that country's President andoutgoing Sadc chair Hakainde Hichilema. Zambia has publicly announced that it is engaging Harare over Mnangagwa’s remarks to Putin. Zambia has publicly opposed the ongoing invasion of Ukraine by Russia, in line with US policy, at a time countries like Zimbabwe have backed Putin. President bombshell explodes on his face President Emmerson Mnangagwa (left) and Zambian President Hakainde Hichilema. NewsHawks 1ssue 179, 14 - 27 June 2024

Page 22 News NewsHawks Issue 179, 14 - 27 June 2024 NATHAN GUMA PRESIDENT Emmerson Mnangagwa says Zimbabwe is now ready to join the Brics grouping as it has a stable currency, but economic analysts argue that the country is yet to meet the basic fundamentals of a stable economy. Brics — short for Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa  — has evolved from a group promoting investments into a geopolitical bloc positioning itself as a counterweight to North America and the European Union. It now also includes Iran, Egypt, Ethiopia and the United Arab Emirates. Zimbabwe, which has been isolated due to a poor human rights record, has been using every opportunity to re-engage, and is eyeing admission to the Brics bloc. Mnangagwa has been pinning hopes of admission to the Brics grouping on the Zimbabwe Gold currency, introduced in April by the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) — replacing the Zimbabwe dollar which was continually shedding value against the United States dollar. “I have discussed this with my dear brother, President Putin, that I think we are now ready to join because we now have a solid currency in Zimbabwe. And our economy is now based on solid fundamentals of economics. So we now know that we fulfill the requirements to qualify to join the Brics,” Mnangagwa told Russian media Sputnik Africa on the sidelines of the St Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF2024) on 8 June. “When we apply, the Brics will interrogate our economy and the basis of the approach of which we are applying.  We are suffering from the fluctuations of an incurred currency. So one time, you know, the inflation could fly in our face. We decided that we need a currency, a solid currency based on our gold reserves. And, that is what we have done. So our currency is now called ZIG, which is Zimbabwe Gold.” While Mnangagwa said Zimbabwe is ready, economic analyst Professor Gift Mugano said Zimbabwe is yet to meet the fundamentals of a stable economy, with the new currency not yet fully available on the market. “I would like to say that Zimbabwe has a right to join any trading bloc because that gives us an opportunity to have a bigger market to sell its commodities. But the question is do we have the right fundamentals in place to participate in the Brics? The answer is no,” Mugano told The NewsHawks.   “The argument which was just put forward by the President is focusing on the currency issue only. But even on that, we still have challenges. The ZiG was just launched one month ago and it has not made much traction. That is the honest truth.” “Then of course the value of the ZiG is not there in the market. Banks are finding it difficult to access foreign currency. So ZiG is still fragile and it is not a strong currency. That is the reality on the ground. But now, what I would want the country to look at, particularly the government to look at, is not just a current issue. It is a capacity issue, over and above the currency.” Mugano also said Zimbabwe has been down in terms of production, which has seen a fall in exports. “We have a drought of production, serious challenges in terms of production. We can't feed ourselves. We are importing virtually everything. So what are we going to be exporting to the Brics?” he asked.   “The Brics with Russia, Brazil. Brazil dominates the world markets in terms of commodities, agrarian commodities. So if we are opening ourselves for Brazil, are we ready for that competition? We used to suspect that South Africa imported chickens from Brazil and repackaged it, and at some point we banned the import of chicken to protect our poultry industry.” “Now, if we are going to join the Brics, we are opening ourselves again for the competition directly, head-on with the Brazilians. Do we have the capacity to compete with them?” Economist Dr Prosper Chitambara said there is still a lot of work to be done to ensure macro-economic stability, which is fundamental for the country to join Brics. “Yes, the last month we have seen the inflation rate has actually come down quite significantly. But what we need to do is to sustain a low and stable inflation rate of below 10% for at least six months to 12 months,” Chitambara said. “If we are able to sustain a low and stable inflationary environment, definitely that will result in a restoration of confidence, not just in the local currency but even in the economy in general because high inflation erodes economic confidence.” “So I think there is still a lot of work that needs to be done and also to ensure that the economy grows, to ensure that the economy achieves sustained and inclusive growth for some time, that will also be very critical.” Chitambara said Zimbabwe needs to build and continue to enhance productive capacity to attract more investment as well as more capital inflows. “Currently our foreign direct investment inflows still remain very subdued,” he said. “So we need to upscale investments in other productive sectors, such as healthcare, social protection, because the number of Zimbabweans living in extreme poverty is still on the high side.” “One of the biggest labour market challenges we are facing is the prevalence of informal employment. In fact, about 87% of total employment in Zimbabwe is actually informal. We need to build our reserves to at least three to six months import cover. If we consider three months import cover, it means we need at least about US$2.1 billion in terms of reserves.” A civil society organisation, the Centre for Natural Resource Governance (CNRG), says Zimbabwe should have a clear plan before joining the Brics bloc as it is likely to create a natural resource curse.  “So far, Brics nations have been extractivist in their relationship with Zimbabwe, particularly China. They have taken full advantage of the absence of a patriotic government in Zimbabwe to negotiate shady deals that have no practical value to the country,” CNRG executive director Farai Maguwu said. “China, Russia and SA have been depleting Zimbabwe's non-renewable resources in partnership with the country's corrupt elites. Marange diamonds, lithium mining, coal mining and several Chinese small-scale mining projects have caused a national outcry due to environmental crimes, poor human rights record and abuse of workers’ rights.” “Is China the problem? Yes, partly. But the Zimbabwe government is the main problem because they tolerate and protect the Chinese whilst violating the law and treating Zimbabweans like second-class citizens in their own country.” Shaky economy could hamper Mnangagwa's Brics ambition Professor Gift Mugano

NewsHawks News Page 23 1ssue 179, 14 - 27 June 2024 NATHAN GUMA POLITICAL analysts say the relaunch of the Youth Service of Zimbabwe (YSZ), formerly the National Youth Service (NYS), shows how the ruling Zanu PF party is desperate to consolidate power through violence ahead of the 2028 general elections. Late last month, President Emmerson Mnangagwa launched the YSZ in Uzumba-Maramba-Pfungwe, which is set to train 10 000 youths drawn from the country’s 10 provinces, amid indications that he is plotting to extend his second and final term of office beyond the constitutionally mandated 2028. The YSZ is a reincarnation of the Zanu PF youth militia  introduced in 2000 by the late political commissar  Border Gezi  and faced rounds of international criticism amid accusations of gross human rights violations committed on behalf of the ruling Zanu PF. Nicknamed the "Green Bombers", the youths were notorious for their political thuggery. National Youth Service shock troopers were unpopular for human rights violations including rape, torture, harassment and intimidation of opponents of then president Robert Mugabe. Its revival has raised eyebrows, raising fears that it may be used as a political weapon by President Emmerson Mnangagwa, who has been seeking to extend his tenure via the backdoor, amid growing tension and factional infighting within Zanu PF. University of Zimbabwe-based political scientist Professor Eldred Masunungure said the re-launched youth service is worrisome as it is likely to stray from its mandate and be used as a political tool by Zanu PF. “While the idea and policy of national youth training is a noble one and is practised in many countries, including the most developed and mature democracies, it is the manner in which it was deployed in Zimbabwe from 2001 that sends shivers down the spines of many innocent and peace-loving Zimbabweans, especially those who are neither members nor supporters of the ruling Zanu PF,” Masunungure told The NewsHawks.   “In short, it is the partisan politicisation of the programme and its abuse as a party militia for malevolent purposes that was of deep concern to many and its re-introduction re-ignites that fear and trauma, especially in places where the militia was most active.” Masunungure said while the programme is being rolled out to promote and nurture patriotism, discipline and hard work, there is little doubt that it will be used primarily as an instrument of power consolidation at both the presidential and party levels. “This most likely will include mobilisation of the membership and indeed the population as a whole to rally around the ambition to either engineer a third term or extend the current term to 2030. As such, many are justified in being apprehensive about the intentions of the resuscitated programme,” he said. Political analyst Rashweat Mukundu said nothing positive has come out of the youth service, as it has been tainted by partisan Zanu PF interests. “Essentially, it is a Zanu PF youth service,” Mukundu said. “It is politicisation, indoctrination and use of the same youth as the cannon fodder in violence and politically motivated violence, intimidation of opposition and related issues. So we have youths who have gone to the national programme and they have come out worse in terms of their appreciation of social values.” “They essentially are Zanu PF youths who are controlled to carry out violence. So the concept of national youth service is good, but it must speak to what national service is. And the national service is not being part of a political structure and being an appendage of Zanu PF as we have seen.” Mukundu said the militia is a wastage of national resources at a time when the country is facing a blighting drought that is set to see over 60% of the population in extreme hunger by March 2025. “It is likely to worsen our political situation, as we see these young men and women being deployed to beat up and harass the opposition. If there is to be a national youth service, it must be a national programme that is imbued or built upon national values for service and depoliticised,” Mukundu said. “It does not necessarily have to be political indoctrination and being made to go out and beat up and harass those who don't agree with Zanu PF.” New statistics have already shown an increase in human rights abuses in April, with the main perpetrators being Zanu PF, a trend that is likely to increase after the re-introduction of the youth service. A human rights watchdog, the Zimbabwe Peace Project (ZPP), in its monthly monitoring report for April, said that it has documented 145 human rights violations including harassment and intimidation, violations against equality and non-discrimination, abduction, arbitrary eviction, extra-judicial killing, unlawful detention, theft and assault. Mashonaland West recorded the largest number of human rights violations (29 violations), up from 17 in March. The ZPP documented 27 violations in Manicaland province, 20 in Mashonaland East, 16 in Masvingo, 15 in Midlands, 14 in Harare province and 13 in Mashonaland Central, while Bulawayo and Matabeleland South provinces each recorded four violations while Matabeleland North recorded three human rights violations. According to the report, 69.41% of the perpetrators were affiliated with the ruling Zanu PF, while 8.53% were traditional leaders. The ZRP accounted for 7.94% of the perpetrators while members of the defence forces and municipal officers accounted for 5.29% and 2.94% respectively. Members affiliated with the opposition Citizens' Coalition for Change (CCC) constituted 1.47% of the perpetrators while 4.41% were not affiliated with any group or institution. On the gender divide, male victims constituted 52.11% of which 0.17% were persons with disabilities. A total of 47.88% of the victims were females, with 0.11% of them having a disability. Ordinary citizens constituted the majority of victims amounting to 93.3%, while informal traders were 3.56%. Other victims were members of the opposition CCC at 2.88%, artisanal miners 0.24% and Zanu PF 0.02%. Youth Service of Zimbabwe shows Zanu PF party's desperation to consolidate power. Alarm bells over relaunch of Green Bomber militia

Page 24 News Criminal charges against President Mnangagwa legitimacy challenger Musengezi quashed ZANU PF activist Sybeth Musengezi is now a free man after a Harare magistrate acquitted him of fraud. Musengezi was accused of misrepresenting his residential address to Zanu PF for personal gain. He denied the charge, insisting that Zanu PF suffered no prejudice as a result of the alleged fraud. The presiding magistrate, Dennis Mangosi, concurred and upheld his application for discharge at the close of the state's case. The magistrate said circumstances under which he became a member of Zanu PF were not issues of a criminal nature at all. He said even the state assisted Musengezi with its evidence, which did not strengthen the case against him. "These witnesses conceded that the cell sheets were unreliable sources of information. "Thus, at the close of the state's case, it is already clear that the state have failed to make out even a prima facie case that there was any misrepresentation made by the accused. "Thus, at least one of the essential elements for the crime of fraud is missing. "There is absolutely no evidence whatsoever that the accused provided the information about his address to Zanu PF. "None of the state witnesses were present when the alleged misrepresentation took place and none of them even stated to whom the alleged misrepresentation was made," said the magistrate. The magistrate also noted that in its outline, the state alleged that the person to whom Musengezi made the misrepresentation was one Allan Chisuko. "However, none of the witnesses even stated that to be the case (which in any event would be inadmissible hearsay evidence) and Mr Chisuko, himself, was never called as a witness despite the investigating officer confirming that he was interviewed by the police. "Thus, an essential element of the offence was not proven, even on a prima facie basis, and therefore acquittal must follow. "In fact, contrary to the state outline, all of the evidence tendered by the state actually demonstrates that it is highly likely that the accused's defence is true, and that he did not provide the addresses in question. "The state's case rests entirely on the Zanu PF cell and branch sheets and on an assumption, which assumption is not backed by any evidence whatsoever, that it must have been the accused who provided the information contained therein. "However, that assumption is contradicted by the evidence before the court. "None of the state witnesses could give firsthand evidence about how any of the information contained in the Zanu PF cell and branch sheets had been collected as none were present. "Therefore, none of the state witnesses could dispute the defence's contention that the Zanu PF cell and branch sheet information is collected in a chaotic and haphazard manner, whereby information is routinely collected about people not in the presence," said the magistrate. Mangosi said even more catastrophically for the state's case, the Zanu PF cell and branch sheets were proven to be full of errors relating to other members. "Additionally, it is also common cause that the accused person was eligible to become a member of Zanu PF at the branch in question because: "It is common cause he was working in that area in question at the time. "It is common cause the Zanu PF constitution allows someone to become a member in the area where they work, not only in the area where they reside. "This was admitted by all of the relevant witnesses, and this court already made such a finding in its bail ruling." Mangosi also said the fact that Musengezi was eligible to be a Zanu PF member at that branch is relevant for reasons tha he would not have had any motive to provide a false address to Zanu PF in order to become a member, if he could just as easily have provided a correct address and would still have been eligible. "Since the accused could easily have provided a correct address (and still would have been eligible), his explanation that he did not provide the incorrect addresses and that they are merely an error in Zanu PF's records becomes highly plausible. "If the accused was eligible anyway to be a member of that branch of Zanu PF, then there can be no prejudice suffered because of an incorrect address appearing in the records since the correct address would have had him in the exact same branch of Zanu PF. "The state totally failed to prove any prejudice to the complainant. "Thus, another essential element of the offence was not established. "Thus, it is respectfully submitted that as at the close of the state case, the state had not led evidence that would justify the placement of the accused on his defence and the court is obliged in terms of section 198(3) of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act, to return a verdict of not guilty at this stage," he ruled. Musengezi was being charged with fraud after he allegedly misrepresented his residential address to his political party, Zanu PF. This was alleged to have happened in 2012. His arrest came at a time he had mounted a case against President Emmerson Mnangagwa, who he alleged was an illegitimate leader. Musengezi launched the Mnangagwa legitimacy challenge in 2021, arguing that he illegally took advantage of a military coup to that removed  the then president Robert Mugabe in November 2017. The activist said Mnangagwa was ushered into office following an unlawful special session of the central committee, which was convened by unknown people, including Patrick Chinamsa and Obert Mpofu in violation of the party’s constitution. He accused the parties of taking advantage of the unfolding Operation Restore Legacy to topple Mugabe. His lawyers said the police charges were an attempt to strip him of his Zanu PF membership and therefore his locus standi — one’s right, ability, or capacity to bring legal proceedings in a court of law. They also argued that the allegations were not criminal charges and were fabricated to punish Musengezi for challenging Mnangagwa’s legitimacy. “We consider the charges to be an abusive process and an appalling example of a police force that allows itself to be used by Zanu PF to silence dissenting voices, within Zanu PF itself,” said his lawyers. “The issue raised in the fraud charges, regarding the address used on the forms by which Mr Musengezi became a member of Zanu PF, are not issues of a criminal nature at all. They are, in fact, issues for determination before the court in the civil case that Mr Musengezi has against the president challenging the president’s legitimacy as the leader of Zanu PF.” Police said Musengezi’s claim that he lived at 4513 Hatcliffe Extension was an “unlawful misrepresentation” which “prejudiced Zanu PF to reputation and to good administration.”  The house allegedly belongs to one Allen Chisuko. — STAFF WRITER. Zanu PF activist Sybeth Musengezi NewsHawks Issue 179, 14 - 27 June 2024

NewsHawks News Page 25 1ssue 179, 14 - 27 June 2024 Manhize villagers demand justice BRENNA MATENDERE FOLLOWING the eruption of demonstrations by Manhize villagers against the Chinese-owned Dinson Iron and Steel Company (Disco), there are growing calls for the firm to urgently put together social safety nets for the desperate community that is now reeling under abject poverty after losing their farmland without compensation. On 14 June, local villagers in Manhize blocked Dinson Iron and Steel Company trucks from accessing the plant in protest against degrading treatment including arbitrary acquisition of their farmland without compensation, the resultant hunger and immense dust pollution. The Centre for Research and Development (CRD), a civic society group that works to promote  human rights, democracy and good governance, said the company must provide social safety nets to safeguard the community. During the demonstration, a woman identified as Mary Tsiko (58), said their protest was caused by biting hunger after Disco grabbed their ancestral land and the situation is also exposing them to diseases due to dust pollution. “Children are not going to school because our source of livelihood, which is land, has been taken away by the company. Many people are sick because of the dust that comes from the company operations. Our protest is to pressure the company to address our concerns,” Tsiko said. According to CRD, villagers in the Mushenjere area, who are settled at Inhoek Farm in Mvuma, have been displaced from land they have occupied for over 40 years. This has stoked growing concerns over the weaknesses in the land tenure system that have resulted in the mass evictions. Communities in Chivhu and Mvuma, particularly those relocated to pave way for the establishment of Disco’s US$1.5 billion steel plant, say their lives have deteriorated despite the project being hyped up as a game changer in the nation’s economy, raising fears of another resource curse case. Disco, a local subsidiary of Chinese firm Tsingshan, has been touted as Africa’s largest integrated steel plant, but displacements have plunged victims into abject poverty, amid indications of serious food insecurity. Since 2021, more than 100 families from Manhize’s Mushenjere Village have lost their land to Disco’s operations, with the villagers, once self-sufficient, now unable to produce enough food, according to CRD. “The conditions of living on the land outlined in their permits rest solely at the discretion of the minister of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement,” the CRD said. “Thus the minister ‘may for any public purpose reverse this permit at any time and under such conditions as he thinks fit on payment of the holder of such compensation the minister may decide.” In an interview with The NewsHawks,  Mupfumi said to urgently alleviate the plight of desperate villagers, the company must provide cushions in cash and food hampers. “Dinson has an obligation to meet the food basket for each family pegged at CCZ [Consumer Council of Zimbabwe] poverty datum line of at least US$500 backdated to 2021 when they started dispossessing farming land until a new area of relocation has been adequately prepared,” Mupfumi said. “Forced relocations is an international crime and the government has a responsibility to protect the rights of people affected by the Dinson mining establishment." “Dinson is creating conditions unbearable for farmers. People already relocated by Dinson are living in abject poverty without food, education and health facilities, drinking water and cracking houses. These families didn't receive compensation for loss of production on their land.” Mupfumi said the latest demonstration symbolises desperate attempts by vulnerable groups affected by mining activities to be heard in an environment lacking government protection. “Mining has been dominated by opacity, policy inconsistencies and flagrant violation of human rights by both government and mining entities,” he said. “It is shocking that the government rushed to allow Dinson to start mining without Environmental Impact Assessment, no relocation plan amid degrading treatment of locals in violation of the constitution and international law.” “Local inhabitants have lost four seasons of farming after Dinson arbitrarily took their land. Dinson has not shown commitment to compensate locals for loss of production and livelihoods. New area of relocation has not been prepared, leaving people facing abject poverty.” The company has been accused of being insincere in providing food to the villagers as per its promise. On 23 January this year, Dinson delivered a paltry two kilogrammmes of flour, 10kgs of mealie-meal, two litres of cooking oil, two kilogrammes of laundry soap and 500 grammes of salt worth US$14 to villagers in Mushenjere. This was seen by villagers as an attempt to test their resolve in demanding compensation. In March, permit holders were also given US$200 each, but only ahead of a visit by First Lady Auxillia Mnangagwa. After Disco commenced operations in 2021, it built houses for 14 families who were relocated to nearby Rusununguko Farm in 2022, leaving more families, including the 32, living on state land. Locals believe the company has been trying to push the villagers away since then. The CRD said the uncertainty has been worsened by the government’s failure to repeal repressive land tenure law. “The government exploited colonial and unjust mining law aided by an unsecured multiple land tenure system to grant Dinson exclusive mining rights over farming land in Manhize. Despite Zimbabwe adopting a progressive constitution in 2013 that recognises fundamental human rights and freedoms of citizens, the government has maintained regressive laws such as the Communal Lands Act 20:04 formerly Tribal Trust Lands and the 1965 Mines and Minerals Act.” “These laws do not respect the rights of traditional communities where land has been prospected for mining or set aside for any public purpose. At the same time, the permit and lease land tenure system applicable to agricultural landholders vest all powers in the state.” At least 1 170 hectares of farmland have been taken from plotholders by Disco in Mushenjere Village, leaving farmers without a source of livelihood since 2021. Disco has erected a wall to enclose farmland and grazing pasture, further shutting out families from Mushenjere Village. The loss of grazing land to Disco has brought to farmers and forced them to sell their cattle at giveaway prices. A total of 138 families from Kwaedza Village are also facing a similar predicament as Disco has already set land survey pegs in their village. The villagers are mainly from the poor and densely populated communal areas of Rukovere, Mahusvu, Msasa, Unyetu villages of Chikomba district in Mashonaland East province. In 1984, they were allocated land on farms purchased by the state under the “minda mirefu” land reform programme that was initiated by the government soon after Independence in 1980.

Page 26 News BRENNA MATENDERE TRADITIONAL leaders in the Chirumanhzu area of the Midlands province have written to Local Government minister Daniel Garwe, accusing the Midlands provincial chiefs’ council (PCC) of unfairly selecting a family that does not belong to the royal family tree to provide a substantive chief. Manoeuvres to have a substantive chief who does not hail from the royal family tree come after Tourism minister Barbara Rwodzi was caught up in the Chirumhanzu chieftainship wrangle. Chief Chirumhanzu, born Gerald Mudzengi, died on 5 February 2019. His son, Gerald Mudzengi, was accordingly made acting chief to serve in a temporary capacity until a substantive chief was installed. At a meeting held on Thursday last week, the provincial chiefs’ council conducted a process that the traditional leaders are now challenging. In a letter to Garwe dated 6 June, the traditional leaders wrote: “We are grieved by the process followed by the Midlands Provincial Chiefs Council Representatives who visited Chirumhanzu Clan today (6 June 2024) to select a candidate for Substantive Chief Chirumhanzu. We are requesting the Honourable Minister to help with correcting the unjust and unfair process used in the proceedings which resulted in a biased and seemingly predetermined outcome by the PCC.” In outlining the grounds for petitioning Garwe, the traditional leaders said there are two houses eligible for the Chirumanzu chieftainship selection, namely the Nherere house and the Mutizirapi house, the heirs to the Chief Chirumhanzu throne. However, the PCC adopted the Nherera house and the Simba house which is a historical distortion used previously to disadvantage the Nherera house during the colonial era. The traditional leaders said the PCC refused to hear the full context of the history of the Chirumhanzu chieftainship to address this historical imbalance favouring only one side of the two houses. “The Provincial Chiefs Council did not provide equal opportunities for speaking to the two sides (Nherera and Mutizirapi) but instead allowed only one side (Simba) and no full members of Mutizirapi which favoured the Simba sub-house . Nherera is the son of Mhepo while Simba is the grandson, so this distortion was allowed in order to favour the Simba people which also disadvantages the other members of Mutizirapi,” they wrote. “The Provincial Chiefs Council deliberately allowed disproportionate representatives of both houses and then used the majority views when the Simba sub-house was over-represented, with unvetted members again skewing the outcome.” “The Provincial Chiefs Council used a Rotational system assuming that chieftainship was rotating on equal basis between the two Houses, which is incorrect as there was never any consistent rotation but in fact the other House (Mutizirapi) ruled two times more than Nherera House but the PCC refuse to entertain that important historical fact, again apparently giving an unfair advantage to the Simba sub-house. “We therefore request the Honourable Minister to help correct this injustice and restore order in Chirimhanzu Chieftainship,” reads the petition. It was signed by the Nherere house leader, traditional leaders Alois Rutunga, Chiminyamakono, Rutunga, Zinyoro, Chigegwe, Chipfuwamiti and Chiweshe. According to the family tree of the Chirumhanzu chieftainship, the Chigegwe family is supposed to take the helm, after missing out in 2005 to the Chiweshe family under controversial circumstances. This is contained in minutes of the Chirumhanzu chieftainship royal families' dare (community consultative discussion) meeting held on 4 November 2022. Part of the minutes read: “The chairperson, Mr. Jumo, advised the meeting that when selecting members for Headmen posts, try to respect the family tree. He reiterated the sequence of selection after the Acting period, as indicated under the process, with Chieftainship slotted for Chigegwe Sub-house going to Mudzengi, Chapanya’s eldest son, Mudzengi Dominic, who was present and consented that a younger person, act in his capacity. He nominated Julius Chimbi Chigegwe. In Nherera House from Chigegwe, chieftainship will go straight to Chimunye as a way of completing the first Phase of chieftainship.” As part of the vision of the Chirumanzu chieftainship, the meeting agreed to: “Ensure unity among Chirumhanzu people and smooth succession of the Chirumhanzu Dynasty per Chisungo to ensure orderly transition, allocation of Headmanship, new chiefs and a Paramount Chief as done in the District within Chirumhanzu equitably. Changes as agreed by the Dynasty would include land distribution to benefit VaMhanzu and positions for families that are not in line for chieftaincy; “An economically, socially, culturally, spiritually developed Chirumhanzu whose people enjoy a good standard of living and live in harmony with each other and with their relatives including Chiefs such as Hama, Nhema, Mapiravana, etc; and “To regain control over allocation and use of resources within Chirumhanzu that VaMhanzu are entitled to, their inheritance, while ensuring ‘greatest happiness for the greatest number’, and take stock of current distribution and ownership of land, natural resources with the view to equitably sharing, benefiting and enabling access to the utilisation of the resources by all Chirumhanzu people through a Chirumhanzu Chieftaincy Dynasty Trust (CCDT).” Before the PCC meeting, Minister Rwodzi was accused of stalling the process and working with Chirumhanzu district development committee coordinator Fortunate Chimedza to block the Chigegwe family and instead push for the installment of Tawanda Chipangura, elder brother of the minister. The NewsHawks gathered that Rwodzi had been in constant touch with Chimedza and Tawanda, her elder brother, over the chieftaincy issue. Evidence gathered shows that a senior member of the Rwodzi family, who is brother of the late minister’s husband and acts as the secretary-general of the Chirumhanzu Chiefs' Trust, Aaron Rwodzi, is allegedly involved in the controversial manoeuvres. Minister Rwodzi and DCC Chimedza refuted these findings when contacted by The NewsHawks. “I have no clue what with you are saying. I never interfere with chieftainship as a matter of principle,” said Rwodzi. When pressed further to clarify if she has not been in touch with Chimedza and Tawanda Chipangura as shown by WhatsApp messages obtained during the investigation, Rwodzi did not respond. Chimedza said he is a principled public official who is ranked as one of the two best in the country and therefore cannot dabble in chieftainship issues. “It is all lies from Satan. I am not involved in any such scheme. I have never been unprofessional in all my life. I have only been a DA in Chirumhanzu for the past three years. How can I influence something that happened five years ago?” he queried. The late Chief Chirumhanzu Chirumhanzu elders petition govt over chieftainship row NewsHawks Issue 179, 14 - 27 June 2024

NewsHawks News Page 27 1ssue 179, 14 - 27 June 2024 Human Rights Commission crippled by under-funding BULAWAYO senator Kucaca Phulu has bemoaned the underfunding of the Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission (ZHRC) which has hampered the Chapter 12 institution from carrying out its mandate. Phulu raised the concern during the question-and-answer session in the Senate where he pleaded with the government to support the ZHRC. “Certainly, I also want to end by making a submission that this human rights commission is a commission which needs our support. Ever since its formation, if memory serves me right, it is one of the commissions which has received the least support in terms of resources to do their work,” said Phulu. Between 2019 and 2023, the ZHRC reported cases of human rights violation in the form of arbitrary arrest and detention, restrictions and freedom of expression and assembly and alleged torture. Through its website, hotline and mobile legal clinics, the ZHRC conducted public outreach and accepted complaints of violations from the public for investigation. Phulu said these reports need to be documented and tracked so as to formulate policies that would aid the commission’s operations. “Obviously, over the next few years, as we track these reports, because they will become useful when we are able to compare and produce graphs to determine whether these cases are actually going down or they are going up, I am sure that in two or three years’ time, as we receive these reports on an annual basis, we will be able to tell whether this government is putting in place programmes that are ensuring that there is a reduction in the violation of human rights,” Phulu said. Just over a month before the 2023 election, the government enacted the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Amendment Act, 2022 which then failed to meet the requirements of legality, proportionality and necessity in relation to the imposition by the authorities of penalties such as the loss of citizenship and the death penalty against people simply for peacefully exercising their rights. This worsened the risk of arbitrary detention against those who expressed dissenting views, and it contained overly broad provisions that criminalised participation in meetings. “The report also highlights the problem of arbitrary arrests and detentions.  These practices are a violation to the right to liberty and security of the person. They are threats to the rule of law in our country.  The report states that between 2010 and 2013, there were 456 cases of arbitrary arrests and detentions reported to the Human Rights Commission.  This is a significant number and highlights the need for urgent action to address this issue,” Phulu said. Sunningdale MP Maureen Kademaunga was arrested for allegedly participating in electoral violence during the campaign period ahead of the watershed elections of 23-24 August 2023 and was released without charge the following day. In 2022, several violations of human rights were recorded ranging from threats, torture, killings and detentions. A CCC supporter, Mboneni Ncube, was speared to death at the party’s rally in Kwekwe. According to The Global Economy data from 2007-2022, Zimbabwe, among other countries, was reported to have less protection of human rights and the rule of law. Zimbabwe was ranked 29 out of 200 countries with 8.1 index points out of an average of 6.5. The United States Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labour for 2023 showed a significant increase in human rights abuses in Zimbabwe with most cases aligned to the period prior to the elections. The report states that the government also harassed non-governmental-organisations and specific persons it believed would expose abuses by government personnel or oppose official policies. — STAFF WRITER. Senator Kucaca Phulu

Page 28 News Corruption hinders women from accessing farming land PATIENCE MATONO A CIVIL society organisation, Zimbabwe Women Against Corruption Trust (ZWACT), has identified bribery, nepotism and favouritism as the main factors hindering women from accessing land, amid growing calls for access to safe and secure land tenure for displaced women. Earlier this year, the government evicted people settled on state land, leaving hundreds of families homeless, particularly in Masvingo and Manicaland provinces. For instance, in February, the Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights (ZLHR) represented 327 villagers from the Mahachi area ilof Chipinge district in Manicaland province, who were facing eviction amid accusations of illegal settlement. Up to 80 of villagers from Munyokowere Village, in ward 5 of Chipinge Rural District Council under Chief Mutema were also accused of illegally settling in the area. ZWACT said most of the victims have been women, with its survey showing that only 2% of the women are landowners in Manicaland and Masvingo provinces, leaving the rest vulnerable. “We noticed that women are disproportionately affected because of their roles in the family. The major challenge we noticed is that of poor access to information and less knowledge about their rights which makes them more vulnerable to corruption,” said Sandra Matendere, ZWACT executive director. “There are some traditional leaders who use discriminatory approach to women in need of land. Some women narrated how they were requested to produce their husband’s identity documents before land is allocated to them in Zimbabwe.” Findings by a 2024 report titled "Gendered Impact of Corruption and Internal Displacements on Women's Access to Land Rights, Water and Sanitation, Food Security, and Reproductive Health Rights in Zimbabwe", by ZWACT has ranked favouritism as the main hindrance to access to land. With a 34% score, favouritism emerged prominently as the most common form of corruption which involves showing preferential treatment or giving unfair advantages to some individuals or groups based on personal relationships rather than based on real need for land. “This leads to inefficiencies and incompetencies in decision-making processes,” according to the report. Nepotism, a practice in which individuals in positions of power or authority show preferential treatment to their family members or friends, has also been identified as a major contributor with a 24% score. Bribery scored 24%, showing how public officials and traditional leaders are offered items of value such as money, livestock, gifts, or favours, in exchange for giving land to the landless. “Women lamented being poor and unwilling to give such bribes and that explains why some of them do not have land,” it reads. “In the event that they had the money, they indicated that they would pay the bribes since that is the norm countrywide. In addition, 6% of the respondents accused public officials of demanding sexual favours in exchange for land.” Sexual corruption had a 6% score while other factors had a 7% contribution. According to the report, all of the victims who participated in the survey were accused of having settled illegally on the land, despite the land having been distributed to them by the authorities. “Traditional leaders who had allocated them the land had done so in the names of their husbands who also did not have papers as proof of either legal occupancy or ownership,” it reads. “As proof that their stay in the different areas where they were being evicted from was well known as accepted, they could do the following: Participated in all elections; included in the population census; there were Zanu PF party structures in their communities; registered for agricultural inputs. It came as a shock to them when they were being evicted from areas where they stayed for many years.” The report said that women had been given the land by their traditional leaders, 33% having been allocated by chiefs, while a further 33% were allocated by village heads with the full knowledge of the ruling Zanu PF. “Regardless of the illegal nature of the resettlement and the suffering they endured, there were no sanctions against the traditional leaders and the ruling Zanu PF political party officials who allocated them the land in question,” it reads. NewsHawks Issue 179, 14 - 27 June 2024

NewsHawks News Page 29 1ssue 179, 14 - 27 June 2024 Government pays lip service to transparency VERNA NYAMUCHENGWE FORMER Finance minister Tendai Biti has poured cold water on deputy Finance minister Kudakwashe Mnangagwa’s call for transparency and accountability on the capital markets. Biti criticised the government’s half-hearted approach to tackling corruption. According to Transparency International, Zimbabwe scored 24 points out of 100 on the 2023 Corruption Perceptions Index from the previous year’s score 23 points. The southern African nation is ranked 157 out of 180 countries indicating high level of perceived public sector corruption. Biti said the government has been reluctant to ensure the total elimination of corruption within the economy, citing mining in particular.   He was responding to remarks made by Mnangagwa during the official opening of the inaugural Capital Markerts Conference held in Nyanga this week. “That is the most hypocritical statement coming from someone who is right in the middle of opaqueness in Zimbabwe,” Biti said. “They are presiding over massive opaqueness in diamonds, in gold, in lithium, in platinum. “This is one of the most corrupt countries in Africa and it is the last country that is standing to speak on corruption and transparency.” The deputy Finance minister told delegates attending the conference that accountability and transparency are critical in attracting investments into the country. “Internationally, demand for transparency, trust and accountability are on the rise, and since we are part of the global capital flows, these are our responsibility too, if we are to be a relevant and credible player, in the drive to secure greater inbound investment,” Mnangagwa said. In April, civil society and local communities at the Chiadzwa diamond fields demanded transparency in the disbursement of royalties by the government and mining companies. The 2021-25 National Development Strategy (NDS) identifies high levels of corruption as well as low citizen participation in democratic and governance processes as major factors behind the poor quality delivery of public services. Transparency International estimated that from 2000 to 2020, Zimbabwe lost approximately US$32 billion through illicit financial flows (IFFs) with illegal external outflows linked to tax evasion, money laundering and other financial crimes including corruption. The Mutapa Investment Fund has been identified as directly involved in opacity by unconstitutionally conducting its transactions and activities. “The Mutapa Fund is directly involved is the most opaque process where shares have been transferred to an opaque fund without valuation, where filings are made permanent without public disclosure and parliamentary role,” Biti. Last year, President Emmerson Mnangagwa controversially promulgated Statutory Instrument 156 of 2023 which changed the name of the Sovereign Wealth Fund of Zimbabwe to Mutapa Investment Fund (MIF). No official reasons have been given for the renaming of the fund. State enterprises or parastatals now commandeered to be under the MIF include Defold Mine, Zupco, Kuvimba, Silo Investments (Grain Marketing Board commercial arm), the National Oil Company of Zimbabwe, the Cold Storage Commission, Petrotrade, POSB, NetOne Cellular, the National Railways of Zimbabwe Holdings and NRZ Ltd, TelOne, Arda Seeds, Zimbabwe Power Company, Powertel, Allied Timbers, Telecel Zimbabwe, Air Zimbabwe, Industrial Development Corporation, Cottco, AFC Limited and Hwange Colliery. Critics said the effect of putting all the companies under one roof is to create a behemoth whose operations and transactions are not subject to public procurement laws, parliamentary oversight or disclosure to the public. This, they said, undermines constitutional principles of good governance, transparency and accountability. The fund’s managers and employees are “sworn to secrecy”, further making it opaque and vulnerable to corruption, while blocking access to information. The fund will be able to transfer and externalise forex without foreign exchange controls. Former Finance minister Tendai Biti.

Page 30 News NewsHawks Issue 179, 14 - 27 June 2024 Legal Insights Judgment No. CCZ 07-24 Const. Application No. CCZ 51/23 REPORTABLE (07) ALISTAIR MICHAEL FLETCHER v (1) MINISTER OF LANDS, AGRICULTURE, FISHERIES, WATER AND RURAL RESETTLEMENT (2) REGISTRAR OF DEEDS (3) ROBERT NJANJI CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF ZIMBABWE MAKARAU JCC, HLATSHWAYO JCC, PATEL JCC HARARE, 27 FEBRUARY 2024 & 11 JUNE 2024 T. Mpofu with G. R. J. Sithole and B. Masamvu for the applicant L.T. Muradzikwa for the first respondent No appearance for the second and third respondents. PATEL JCC: This is an unopposed application for leave to appeal to the Constitutional Court, made in terms of rule 32 of the Constitutional Court Rules, 2016 (the Rules), against the decision of the Supreme Court (the court a quo) in Judgment No. SCB 03-24.  The court a quo allowed, with costs, the first respondent’s appeal against the decision of the High Court in HB 102-23.  It further set aside that judgment and substituted it with an order upholding the first respondent’s preliminary point on jurisdiction and declining jurisdiction to hear the matter. The background The applicant is Alistair Michael Fletcher. The first and second respondents have been cited in their official capacities as the authorities responsible for the management and administration of matters involving land and water resources and the registration, management, and maintenance of land rights. The applicant holds title to an immovable property known as Umguza Agricultural Lots of Umvutcha and Reigate (the land), under title deed No. 3188/83 (the land). The government acquired the land and published a notice to that effect in the Gazette Extraordinary on 25 August 2000, under General Notice No. 405 of 2000.  Thereafter, the first respondent placed two caveats, Nos. 77/2019 and 844/2000 respectively, on the title deed. Additionally, the third respondent also placed a third caveat, identified as No. XN 26/2017, on the same land. The applicant was dissatisfied with the endorsement of the caveats and subsequently filed an application in the High Court seeking the upliftment of the caveats. In his founding affidavit, he averred that under Case No. HC 2291/08 the High Court had prohibited the first respondent and other parties from interfering with the land and had further nullified Land acquisition and the rule of law in Zimbabwe 

NewsHawks News Page 31 1ssue 179, 14 - 27 June 2024 caveat No. 844/2000 which had been placed by the first respondent. The applicant further claimed that the third respondent had acted with malice by unlawfully placing a caveat on the applicant’s land, without any prior dealings with the applicant.  He asserted that the placement of the caveat on the land was in violation of his constitutional right to enjoy property rights. The applicant further contended that the continued existence of the caveats on the land was causing undue prejudice, as he was unable to transfer title in the land without the approval of the first and third respondents. The applicant then prayed for an order uplifting the said caveats with costs. The application in the High Court was opposed by the first respondent who raised three points in limine. The first two points related to the improper citation of the first respondent by the applicant. The third point in limine related to the jurisdiction of the High Court to hear the application. It was contended that the High Court did not have jurisdiction to determine the matter. The first respondent averred that the former 1980 Constitution prohibited any person having an interest in any land, listed in General Notices published in the Gazette or Gazette Extraordinary before 8 July 2005, from challenging any of the acquisitions in any court.  He further noted that the above position was confirmed in sections 72(3) and (4) of the current 2013 Constitution of Zimbabwe. In addition, the first respondent submitted that, as the applicant’s properties under title deed No. 3188/83 had been acquired and listed in the Gazette Extraordinary on 25 August 2000, his right to institute any claim or action over the land had been overtaken by operation of law.  The first respondent prayed that the application for the upliftment of the caveats be dismissed on that basis. At the hearing of the application, the High Court found that the third respondent had erroneously caused caveat No. XN 26/2017 to be endorsed on title deed No. 3188/83.  The third respondent consequently conceded that the caveat be cancelled. (I should note in passing that the third respondent has not filed any opposing papers in the instant application). On the question of its jurisdiction, the High Court held that the applicant was not challenging the acquisition of the land but, rather, the endorsement of caveats on the title deed of his land.  The High Court was of the view that the application before it was premised on the order under HC 2291/08 declaring that the land held under title deed No. 3188/83 was not subject to acquisition or resettlement. Therefore, it was held that the applicant had the legal right to seek the cancellation of unlawfully endorsed caveats on his land. The High Court further determined that it lacked authority to modify, alter or declare null and void any order emanating from a judge of parallel jurisdiction.  Accordingly, the court held that the caveats Nos. 844/2000 and 77/2019 were not supported by law since the order issued in HC 2219/08 established that the land held under title deed No. 3188/83 was not subject to acquisition or resettlement, and that order was still extant and binding. The court also concluded that the land in question could not be vested in the State as doing so would contradict the order issued under HC 2219/08.  Consequently, the High Court held that the first respondent had no interest in the land. The court accordingly granted the application to uplift the caveats, with costs against the first respondent. The first and second respondents were aggrieved by the decision of the High Court and noted an appeal to the Supreme Court on the following grounds: “1. The court a quo erred and grossly misdirected itself on a point of law by dismissing the appellants (sic) preliminary point that this (sic) court had no jurisdiction to adjudicate this matter at all as the farm was listed under schedule 7 of the Constitution hence its title vests in the State. 2. The court a quo misdirected itself by cancelling the caveats which had been endorsed on the 1st respondent’s title deed No. 3188/83 under caveats 844/2000, XN caveat 26/2017 and caveat 77/2019/ The effect of the cancellation would have reversed the acquisition of the appellants (sic) land from the state which cannot be done by a court of law.” At the hearing of the appeal, it was argued on behalf of the first respondent that the High Court had no jurisdiction to determine the application for the upliftment of the caveats. The first respondent claimed that the land in dispute was gazetted in 2000 and 2008 and listed under  Schedule 7 of the 1980 Constitution and hence it was State land in terms of section 16B of that Constitution.  The first respondent also submitted that the removal of the caveats by the High Court was akin to the reversal of the acquisition of the land. In addition, the first respondent submitted that the gazetting and acquisition of the land was not challenged by the applicant when those events occurred.  It also averred that the High Court’s order under HC 2291/08 was a brutum fulmen because it was contrary to the Court’s decision in the case of Commercial Farmers Union v The Minister of Agriculture, Land and Rural Resettlement & Ors 2010 (2) ZLR 576. For the applicant, it was submitted that s 16B of the 1980 Constitution only pertained to land acquired for agricultural purposes.  Therefore, the acquisition of non-agricultural land could be legally challenged. Moreover, it was argued that the disputed land had been previously declared as part of Bulawayo City Council land and the latter could not be considered agricultural land. Based on these submissions, it was submitted that the acquisition of the applicant’s land was effected in error. The court a quo held that the only issue for determination was whether or not the High Court had the necessary jurisdiction to deal with the matter.  The court held that, following the acquisition and gazetting of the applicant’s land in 2000 and 2008, the land was acquired by the State and the applicant ceased to be its lawful owner. The court thus held that any dispute relating to the acquisition of the land had to be settled through the provisions of section 16B of the former Constitution. The court a quo further held that section 16B had ousted the jurisdiction of the courts to enquire into the legality or otherwise of the acquisition of land in terms of section 16B(2)(a) of the former  Constitution. Consequently, the applicant had no legal cause or justification to either be aggrieved by the caveats placed over the land that had been acquired by the State or to approach the courts for the cancellation of such caveats. The court also held that the applicant had waived his right to lay claim to the land or request the cancellation of the caveats once the land was officially gazetted. Hence, it was concluded that the High Court lacked the jurisdiction to hear the application for the upliftment of the caveats imposed on the land. Furthermore, the court a quo held that after the interpretation of section 16B of the former Constitution by the Court in the cases of Campbell & Anor v The Minister of National Security Responsible for Land Reform and Resettlement & Anor SC 49-07 and Commercial Farmers Union v The Minister of Agriculture, Land and Rural Resettlement & Ors 2010 (2) ZLR 576, the judgment under HC 2219/08 handed down in January 2009 was rendered a brutum fulmen.  The applicant could not, therefore, rely on it as an extant judgment defining his rights over the land as the court’s jurisdiction had been expressly ousted by the above-cited cases. The court a quo was also of the view that the High Court erred by failing to consider the provisions of section 16B(5) of the former Constitution which stated that any error whatsoever contained in any notice itemized in Schedule 7 did not invalidate the vesting of title in the State.  Hence, it was held that once the land was itemized under Schedule 7 “title to the land automatically vested in the State with the result that it became State land by operation of the law” and, therefore, its acquisition was validated regardless of any errors or withdrawals in the acquisition process. Moreover, the court a quo rejected the applicant’s argument that the land could not be acquired because, in terms of Statutory Instrument 212 of 1992, it had been declared as part of Bulawayo City Council land. It was held that section 16B of the former Constitution and the subsequent promulgation of the Land Acquisition Act [Chapter 20:10] prevailed over that statutory instrument. In conclusion, the court a quo held that section 72(3) and (4) of the current Constitution further confirmed that the court’s jurisdiction to deal with challenges related to the acquisition of land was ousted.  In the result, the High Court lacked the necessary jurisdiction to determine the matter that was before it. The appeal was allowed on that basis. Having been aggrieved by the decision of the court a quo, the applicant has filed the present application for leave to appeal. The applicant argues that there is a constitutional issue that arose regarding the interpretation and application of section 16B of the former Constitution.  This is demonstrated by the fact that the court a quo allowed the appeal after considering and determining that issue.  In addition, the applicant argues in support of his application that it has good prospects of success.  In terms of the applicant's draft notice of appeal, the land in dispute is urban land that was declared as part of the City of Bulawayo through S.I. 212 of 1999. Therefore, it is not subject to acquisition through laws that govern the acquisition of agricultural land for resettlement purposes. The applicant also avers that he successfully challenged the acquisition of his land under HC 2291/08 on the basis that urban land could not be acquired on the basis of section 16B of the former Constitution.  He notes that the first respondent actually acknowledged the existence of this order  through a letter dated 4 April 2017, wherein it requested further time to have the unlawful occupiers of the land evicted from it. In addition, the applicant maintains that the High Court correctly held that section 16B(3) of the former Constitution and section 72(3) of the current Constitution did not oust the jurisdiction of the courts to determine applications for the removal of unlawfully placed caveats over land not subject to acquisition for resettlement purposes.  It is the applicant’s further contention that the court a quo wrongly interpreted and applied section 16B where it did not apply.  He avers that the decision of the court a quo violated his rights to the use of the land as he was deprived of such use on the basis of the wrong legal provisions. Lastly, the applicant submits that this matter is of public importance as the issue of the application of section 16B(3) to urban land zoned for residential development needs to be determined by this Court. In response, the first and second respondents have filed a notice, dated 8 January 2024, stating that they will abide by the decision of this Court.  I will revert to this aspect later in this judgment. Having regard to the foregoing, the applicant seeks the following relief: “1. The application for leave to appeal against judgment/order of the Supreme Court in case number SCB 49/23 be and is hereby granted. 2. The applicant shall file his notice of appeal within ten (10) days of the date of this order. 3. There shall be no order as to costs.” The appeal that the applicant intends to file is based on the following single ground: “That the court a quo erred in law and misdirected itself when it held that the High Court, by operation of section 16B (3) of the former constitution of Zimbabwe, now section 72 of Constitution of Zimbabwe, 2013, lacked the jurisdiction to determine an application for the removal of caveats that had been placed over urban farmland designated urban land by presidential proclamation by virtue of Statutory Instrument 212 of 1999.  Thus, the order of the court a quo violates appellants (sic) right to use, hold, transfer and not to be compulsorily deprived of his property as enshrined in section 71 (2) - (3) and his right to  equal protection of the law as enshrined in section 56 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe, 2013.” If granted leave, the applicant seeks the following relief on appeal: “1. That the appeal succeeds with no order as to costs. 2. That the whole judgment of the court a quo is set aside and substituted with the Following: ‘The appeal is hereby dismissed with costs.’ ” Submissions by counsel In response to an enquiry from the Court as to why the respondents did not oppose the application, Mr Muradzikwa submits that they did so because the first respondent believes that he would not suffer any prejudice, even if the application were to be granted.  On the basis that the respondents would abide by the decision of the Court, counsel was instructed not to oppose the application. Mr Mpofu, for the applicant, submits that there is a constitutional issue which has to be determined by this Court as the decision of the court a quo squarely revolved around the interpretation of section 16B of the former Constitution.  He also argues that the appeal to the court a quo was predicated on grounds that raised a constitutional issue, thus cementing the fact that the court a quo determined a constitutional issue. In motivating the prospects of success in the intended appeal, Mr. Mpofu submits that the applicant successfully challenged the acquisition of his land under HC 2291/08 on the basis that urban land could not be acquired under s16B of the former Constitution.  He notes (as I have already indicated earlier) that the first respondent acknowledged the existence of this order through a letter dated 4 April 2017. Counsel further contends that by holding that the High Court had no jurisdiction to hear the application for the upliftment of the caveats, the court a quo abdicated its duty to determine whether the acquisition of the land had been carried out in terms of the law.  He adds that the court erroneously held that the disputed land became agricultural land when it was gazetted as it had already been declared urban land by S.I. 212 of 1999. Furthermore, the court misdirected itself when it held that S.I. 212 of 1999 was subservient to section 16B of the former Constitution.  This was because the two pieces of legislation spoke to two different things, that is, urban land and

Page 32 News NewsHawks Issue 179, 14 - 27 June 2024 agricultural land respectively. In addition, Mr. Mpofu submits that the court a quo disregarded authorities to the effect that section 16B of the former Constitution did not take away the right to challenge illegal acquisitions of land.  In particular, he relies on the case of Campbell & Anor v The Minister of National Security Responsible for Land Reform and Resettlement & Anor SC 49-07, in which it was held that the acquisition of land effected contrary to the provisions of section 16B was null and void. Mr Mpofu also argues that the decision of the court a quo was at variance with the decision in Kondonis v The Minister of Lands Rural Settlement & Ors SC 72-11, which decision was followed by a different bench of the Supreme Court in Toro v Vodage Investments (Pvt) Ltd & Ors SC 15-17.  In light of these authorities, the decision of the court a quo was prima facie wrong. Moreover, counsel submits that it is in the public interest that the correct interpretation of section 16B of the former Constitution be determined by this Court. Requirements for leave to appeal The requirements to be satisfied in an application for leave to appeal were recently spelt out in Chombo v National Prosecuting Authority & Anor CCZ 8-22, at pp 6-7, wherein it was held that: “The law that governs applications for leave to appeal to this Court is settled and appears in a line of cases that remain undisturbed since the adoption of the Constitution.  A judge or court determining such an application must be satisfied that the matter raised in the intended appeal is a constitutional matter that has been clearly and concisely set out. This is so because this Court, being a specialised court, only enjoys jurisdiction in constitutional matters. Further, the judge or court must be satisfied that the constitutional matter enjoys prospects of success on appeal. This in turn serves to reserve the jurisdiction of this Court only to deserving cases. (See Cold Chain (Pvt) Ltd t/a Sea Harvest v Makoni 2017 (1) ZLR 14 (CC), Muza v Saruchera CCZ 5/19, Bonnview Estate (Pvt) Ltd v Zimbabwe Platinum Mine (Private) Limited & Ministry of Lands and Rural Resettlement CCZ 6/19, Mbatha v National Foods CCZ6/21 and Konjana v Nduna CCZ 9/21). Applications for leave to appeal to this Court are made in terms of rule 32 of the Constitutional Court Rules, 2016. I note in passing that rule 32 does not, as does its counterpart rule 21(8) which deals with applications for direct access to this Court, set out the factors to be considered as being in the interests of justice. Therefore, in assessing whether or not it is in the interests of justice to grant an application for leave to appeal, the practice of this Court has been guided by the past decisions of this Court as set out in the authorities referred to above. Regarding prospects of success, the practice has been to look for more than an arguable case. Prospects of success are established if on appeal, this Court is likely to reverse the finding of the lower court or to materially change the order a quo.” (my emphasis). The case of Bere v Judicial Service Commission & Ors CCZ 10-22, at pp 5-6, also sets out the factors that must be established in an application for leave to appeal: “Applications for leave to appeal to this Court are governed by rule 32 of the Rules. The requirements to be satisfied by an applicant seeking leave to appeal are now firmly established in the jurisprudence of the Court. They are as follows: • The constitutional matter raised in the decision to be appealed against and any other connected issues must be clearly and concisely set out. • The applicant must intend to apply for leave to appeal against the decision of the subordinate court on a constitutional matter. • The applicant must demonstrate prospects of success on appeal. • The intended appeal must be in the interests of justice which are a paramount consideration.” The above-cited authorities accentuate the main considerations in an application for leave to appeal, to wit, whether or not the court a quo determined a constitutional issue and whether there are prospects of success in the intended appeal. Whether the court a quo determined a constitutional issue. The prerequisite that a constitutional matter exists for resolution by this Court is a foundational basis for an applicant seeking permission to appeal.  This is because, when adjudicating a constitutional appeal, this Court is only able to consider the constitutional matter that has been deliberated upon and determined by a lower court, viz. “a matter in which there is an issue involving the interpretation, protection or enforcement of [the] Constitution”, as specifically defined in section 332 of the Constitution. The jurisdiction of the Court cannot be invoked or triggered in the absence of a constitutional issue.  The nature of this specialised jurisdiction was highlighted in Lytton Investments (Pvt) Ltd v Standard Chartered Bank Zimbabwe Ltd and Anor CCZ 11-18, at p 9, where it was emphasised that: “The Court is a specialised institution, specifically constituted as a constitutional court with the narrow jurisdiction of hearing and determining constitutional matters only.  It is the supreme guardian of the Constitution and uses the text of the Constitution as its yardstick to assure its true narrative force. It uses constitutional review predominantly, albeit not exclusively, in the exercise of its jurisdiction.” (my emphasis). Furthermore, it is imperative to note that there is ordinarily no right of appeal from the decision of a subordinate court to this Court on a non-constitutional matter.  This was aptly underscored in Mudyavanhu v Saruchera & Ors 2019 (1) ZLR 434 (CC), at 438B, wherein it was held that: “A person has a right to appeal against a decision of a subordinate court on a constitutional matter only. A decision of a subordinate court on a non-constitutional issue is unappealable because the Court has no jurisdiction to review such a decision. The purpose of the procedure of an application for leave to appeal provided for in rule 32(2) of the Rules is to show that the Court has jurisdiction as provided for in the Constitution to hear and determine the appeal. In other words, the purpose of the procedure is to ensure that the applicant has a right of appeal to the Court against the decision of the subordinate court.” (my emphasis) Additionally, it is crucial to elaborate what is meant by a constitutional issue. In the case of Cold Chain (Pvt) Limited T/A Sea Harvest v Makoni 2017 (1) ZLR 14 (CC), at pages 16 & 17, the Court defined a constitutional matter as follows: “Under section 332 of the Constitution a constitutional matter is one in which there is an issue involving the interpretation, protection or enforcement of the Constitution.  Absence of an issue raised in the proceedings in the subordinate court requiring the interpretation, protection or enforcement of a provision of the Constitution in its hearing and determination would invariably be sufficient evidence of the fact that no constitutional matter arose in the subordinate court. ........ The principles to be applied in the determination of the question whether the Supreme Court determined a constitutional matter are clear. It is not one of those principles that the court against whose judgment leave to appeal is sought should have referred to a provision of the Constitution. There ought to have been a need for the subordinate court to interpret, protect or enforce the Constitution in the resolution of the issue or issues raised by the parties.  The constitutional question must have been properly raised in the court below. Thus, the issue must be presented before the court of first instance and raised again at or at least be passed upon by the Supreme Court, if one was taken.” (my emphasis) In casu, it is necessary to establish the existence of a constitutional matter not only before the court a quo, being the Supreme Court, but also before the court of origin, which is the High Court, wherein one traces and locates the genesis of the dispute between the parties.  This is the general position adopted by this Court in Ismail v St John’s College CCZ 19-19, at page 9. See also Bere’s case (supra), at pages 13- 14. Upon scrutinising the papers submitted by the applicant from the High Court to the court a quo, it becomes evident that the dispute regarding the land in question has consistently centred on the interpretation of section 16B of the former Constitution. The High Court, relying on its assessment of the facts before it, determined that it had the necessary jurisdiction to hear the applicant's plea for the upliftment of the caveats. This was primarily because section 16B of the Constitution only applied to challenges against the acquisition of land by the State and therefore did not restrict the applicant from challenging the endorsement of caveats on the land that he occupied. In turn, the decision of the court a quo also revolved around the interpretation of section 16B of the former Constitution, as read with section 72(3) and (4) of the current Constitution. The court found that the High Court lacked the necessary jurisdiction to hear the application for upliftment of the caveats as the jurisdiction of all courts to determine challenges regarding the acquisition of land by the State had been expressly ousted by the said section 16B. This interpretation accorded by the court a quo to the meaning and import of section 16B effectively determined and extinguished the dispute between the parties. In the Cold Chain case (supra), at page 17, in considering the necessary linkage between theconstitutional issue raised and the disposition of the case at hand, the Court observed as follows: “For an applicant to succeed in an application of this nature, he or she must show that the constitutional issue raised in the court a quo is one which the determination by the court was necessary for the disposition of the dispute between the parties.  In other words, the decision on the constitutional matter must have been so inextricably linked to the disposition of the controversy between the parties that the success or failure of the relief sought was dependent on it.” (my emphasis) In light of the foregoing, I am of the view that there was an unavoidable constitutional issue before the court a quo relating to the interpretation and enforcement of the provisions of the former Constitution. The determination of this issue had a direct and inescapable impact upon the disposition of the dispute between the parties and the consequent success or failure of the relief sought by the applicant. Accordingly, I am amply satisfied that this Court has the requisite jurisdiction to entertain and preside over the appeal that the applicant intends to file, if he is granted leave to do so. The test for prospects of success on appeal. In an application for leave to appeal, the applicant is required to demonstrate that the intended appeal carries prospects of success.  In Essop v S [2016] ZASCA 114, the court defined prospects of success as follows: “What the test for reasonable prospects of success postulates is a dispassionate decision, based on the facts and the law that a court of appeal could reasonably arrive at a conclusion different to that of the trial court.  In order to succeed, therefore, the appellant must convince this court on proper grounds that he has prospects of success on appeal and that those prospects are not remote, but have a realistic chance of succeeding.  More is required to be established than that there is a mere possibility of success, that the case is arguable on appeal or that the case cannotbe categorised as hopeless.  There must, in other words, be a sound, rational basis for the conclusion that there are prospects of success on appeal.” Thus, in assessing the prospects of success, this Court has to be satisfied that the applicant has more than an arguable case on appeal and that he or she has established a prima facie case and not a mere possibility of success. See also S v Dinha CCZ 11–20, at page 6.To put it differently, the applicant must demonstrate reasonable prospects that this Court is likely to reverse the findings of the lower court or materially alter the judgment a quo if leave to appeal is granted. See Cold Chain (Pvt) Ltd t/a Sea Harvest v Makoni 2017 (1) ZLR 14 (CC), at 15G-16E; Chombo v National Prosecuting Authority & Anor CCZ 8-22, at pp 7-8. In evaluating the prospects of success in casu, there are two inter-related issues that call for consideration. The first is the correct interpretation to be ascribed to section 16B(2) of the former Constitution. The second is the extent to which the jurisdiction of the courts has been ousted by section 16B(3) of the same Constitution. Interpretation and application of section 16B. The critical question that arises for determination in this matter is whether or not the applicant’s land was properly acquired by the State in terms of section 16B of the former Constitution – as read with section 72 of the current Constitution. The basis upon which the court a quo held that the High Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the application for upliftment of the caveats was that the applicant had no legal cause for bringing such an application inasmuch as the land now vested in the State. This was after the land was acquired and gazetted on 25 August 2000 under G.N. No. 405 of 2000. However, it is evident that the court a quo improperly disregarded a crucial intervening event and its legal ramifications, to wit, the fact that the land was proclaimed as urban land in 1999 before it was gazetted in the year 2000. This conversion of its status was effected by S.I. 212 of  1999 which operated to alter the boundaries of the Bulawayo City Council area by the addition of the land in question, together with other pieces of land, to that council area. The fact that the applicant’s land was regarded as non-agricultural is evinced by a letter from the Provincial Planning Officer, dated 23 November 2016, which reaffirmed that the land was included within the boundaries of the Bulawayo City Council by S.I. 212 of 1999. There is also on record a letter from the Bulawayo City Council itself objecting to the acquisition of certain lots of land on the basis that they had been designated for residential purposes. The question that arises is whether the applicant’s land was properly acquired by the first respondent in terms of section 16B(2) of the former Constitution. That provision declares as follows: “(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Chapter— (a) all agricultural land (i) that was identified on or before the 8th July, 2005, in the Gazette or the Gazette Extraordinary under the proviso to section 5(1) of the Land Acquisition Act [Chapter 20:10], and which is itemised in Schedule 7, being agricultural land required for resettlement purposes; or (ii) … (iii) … is acquired by and vested in the

NewsHawks News Page 33 1ssue 179, 14 - 27 June 2024 State with full title therein with effect from the appointed day or, in the case of land referred to in subparagraph (iii), with effect from the date it is identified in the manner specified in that paragraph; …” (my emphasis) In my view, the meaning and import of this provision are unambiguously clear. It expressly applies only to agricultural land which may be acquired by and vested in the State as provided for in the section. It does not apply to urban land. Put differently, urban land may not be acquired by the State in terms of this provision. Our case law is replete with myriad authorities to that effect. I highlight them below, in chronological order.  In Kondonis v Minister of Lands and Rural Settlement & Ors SC 72/11, the Supreme Court ordered that “The acquisition of applicant’s land, being a certain piece of land situate in the District of Salisbury, … is outside the provisions of the law, more particularly sections 16B(2) (a) and 16A of the Constitution of Zimbabwe and therefore invalid and is accordingly set aside.” The definition of what constitutes “agricultural land” was succinctly captured in Vodage Investments (Pvt) Ltd v Toro & Ors 2015 (1) ZLR 509 (H), at 510G, as being “land used or suitable for agriculture, but does not include communal land or land within the boundaries of an urban local authority or within a township.” The position that the acquisition of land by the State under the provisions of section 16B is limited to agricultural land only was reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in Toro v Vodage Investments (Pvt) Ltd & Ors SC 15-17, at p 2. It was observed that “the land in dispute … is now urban land which cannot be allocated for agricultural purposes.” Again, in Carthorse (Pvt) Ltd v Minister of Lands & Registrar of Deeds HH 442-20, the court found that “The property was not rural land. It was peri-urban. And by the time of the listing in the Government Gazette in May 2003, the property was no longer such agricultural land as the Government could require for resettlement purposes. It had completely changed character in terms of land use.” In the same vein, in Bowers & Anor v Minister of Lands, Agriculture, Fisheries, Water and Rural Resettlement & Ors HH 72-23, it was reiterated that “Government cannot expropriate land which is not agricultural land under the guise of the land reform programme.” Having regard to the ordinary grammatical meaning of section 16B(2), as expatiated by the foregoing case authorities, it is reasonably clear that in order for the State to acquire land it must be agricultural land. In this regard, I am of the opinion that the full bench of the Court will doubtless  endorse that position when it sits to determine the main matter on appeal. I am further inclined to conclude that the Court will also accept that land does not become agricultural land simply because it is itemised and included in Schedule 7 to the former Constitution. Where there is an obvious conflict between section 16B(2) and Schedule 7, it is the former that must prevail. This approach is amply fortified by taking into account the language of section 16A, which records the forcible dispossession of agricultural land by the former regime. Consequently, both sections 16A and 16B are concerned with and focused upon the repossession of agricultural land to be acquired without compensation for the land itself. In this context, if urban land were to be listed and acquired by the State, the historical values and rationale underlying sections16A and 16B would be eroded and entirely negated. Reverting to the present case, I take the view, which view I believe will also be taken by this Court on appeal, that S.I. 212 0f 1999 fundamentally altered the character of the land in question. It operated to create and establish a different legal order in respect of that land. In other words, section 16B(2) and S.I. 212 of 1999 appertain to and deal with completely different things, viz. agricultural land on the one hand and urban land on the other. I accordingly conclude that the land in dispute was not lawfully acquired by the State, purporting to act as it did, in terms of s 16B(2) of the former Constitution. For the sake of completeness, it seems apposite and necessary to clarify the position on rights to agricultural land under section 72 of the current Constitution. It provides as follows, in its relevant portions: “(1) In this section – ‘agricultural land’ means land used or suitable for agriculture, that is to say for horticulture, viticulture, forestry or aquaculture or for any purpose of husbandry, including game …. but does not include Communal Land or land within the boundaries of an urban local authority or within a township established under a law relating to town and country planning or as defined in a law relating to land survey; …. (2) Where agricultural land, or any right or interest in such land, is required for a public purpose, including ….; the land, right or interest may be compulsorily acquired by the State by notice published in the Gazette identifying the land, right or interest, whereupon the land, right or interest vests in the State with full title with effect from the date of publication of the notice. (3) Where agricultural land, or any right or interest in such land, is compulsorily acquired for a purpose referred to in subsection (2) – …. (4) All agricultural land which— (a) was itemised in Schedule 7 to the former Constitution; or (b) before the effective date, was identified in terms of section 16B(2) (a)(ii) or (iii) of the former Constitution; continues to be vested in the State, and no compensation is payable in respect of its acquisition except for improvements effected on it before its acquisition.” (my emphasis) Again, the meaning and import of section 72 of the present Constitution are crystal clear, being exactly the same as that of its precursor, section 16B of the former Constitution. The entire process of compulsory acquisition, whether by notice published in the Gazette or by way of itemisation in the erstwhile Schedule 7, and its attendant vesting of the land acquired in the State, is strictly confined to agricultural land. And for the absolute avoidance of any possible doubt, “agricultural land” is defined as “land used or suitable for agriculture”, viz. for horticulture, viticulture, forestry or aquaculture or for any purpose of husbandry, including game, and it explicitly excludes Communal Land or land within the boundaries of an urban local authority or within a township. All of the foregoing leads to the same conclusion in respect of the present section 72 as the one that I have drawn earlier as regards the compulsory acquisition of land under the former section 16B(2), to wit, urban land cannot be lawfully acquired and vested in the State in terms of section 72. Ouster of jurisdiction On the critical question of jurisdiction, the court a quo concluded that the High Courtlacked the requisite jur isdiction to entertain the applicant’s case. In so doing, the court relied on several judgments of the Court pertaining to the interpretation of section 16B(3) of the former Constitution, namely, Campbell & Anor v Minister of National Security responsible for Land Reform and Resettlement & Anor 2008 (1) ZLR 17, Commercial Farmers Union v Minister of Agriculture, Land and Rural Resettlement and Ors 2010 (2) ZLR 576, and TBIC Investments (Pvt) Ltd & Ors v Minister of Lands and Rural Development & Ors 2018 (1) ZLR. In the Campbell case in particular, at 43F-44B, it was held as follows: “By the clear and unambiguous language of section 16B (3) of the Constitution the Legislature, in proper exercise of its powers, has ousted the jurisdiction of courts of law from any of the cases in which a challenge to the acquisition of agricultural land secured in terms of section 16B(2)(a) of the Constitution could have been sought. The right to protection of law for the enforcement of the right to fair compensation in case of breach by the acquiring authority of the obligation to pay compensation has not been taken away. The ouster provision is limited, in effect, to providing protection from judicial process to the acquisition of agricultural land identified in a notice published in the Gazette in terms of section 16B (2) (a). An acquisition of the land referred to in section 16B (2)(a) would be a lawful acquisition. By a fundamental law the Legislature has unquestionably said that such an acquisition shall not be challenged in any court of law. There cannot be any clearer language by which the jurisdiction of the courts is excluded.” (my emphasis) It is immediately apparent that in the above judgment, as well as in the judgments that followed, the Court was specifically dealing with the acquisition of agricultural land and not urban land set aside for residential development or for any other non-agricultural purpose. It was emphasised that the ouster provision was confined to agricultural land in particular. Thus, where non-agricultural land is purportedly acquired utilising section 16B (2) of the former Constitution and section 72 of the current constitution, the courts invariably retain jurisdiction to determine valid challenges to any such unlawful acquisition. Having regard to the authorities referred to above, I am of the  considered opinion that the court a quo undoubtedly erred in holding that the High Court did not have the requisite jurisdiction to investigate the constitutional validity of the acquisition of the land in casu. Given my earlier conclusion that the acquisition of that land by the first respondent was invalid, it follows that this acquisition is susceptible to being challenged in any court of competent jurisdiction. I am amply fortified in this approach by the decision of the Court in the Campbell case (supra), at 44E-H: “Section 16B(3) of the Constitution has not however taken away for the future the right of access to the remedy of judicial review in a case where the expropriation is, on the face of the record, not in terms of section 16B(2)(a). This is because the principle behind section 16B(3) and section 16B(2)(a) is that the acquisition must be on the authority of law. The question whether an expropriation is in terms of section 16B(2)(a) of the Constitution and therefore an within the meaning of that law is a jurisdictional question to be determined by the exercise of judicial power. The duty of a court of law is to uphold the Constitution and the law of the land. If the purported acquisition is, on the face of the record, not in accordance with the terms of section 16B(2)(a) of the Constitution a court is under a duty to uphold the Constitution and declare it null and void. By no device can the Legislature withdraw from the determination by a court of justice the question whether the state of facts, on the existence of which it provided that the acquisition of agricultural land must depend, existed in a particular case as required by the provisions of section 16B(2)(a) of the Constitution.” (my emphasis) To conclude this aspect of the matter, it is axiomatic that the courts cannot decline jurisdiction whenever it becomes necessary to determine questions relating to the legality of State conduct. To do so would be tantamount to the abdication of judicial authority that is vested in the courts by constitutional imprimatur. In my view, s 16B(3) of the former Constitution does not take away the principle of legality or the right of judicial review where the acquisition of land by the State is not in accordance with the Constitution. In short, the court a quo fell into grave error in holding that the High Court lacked the jurisdiction necessary to adjudicate and determine the matter in casu. The interests of justice In considering the interests of justice in this matter, it seems necessary to ventilate two inter-related issues. The first is the existence of conflicting positions on the applicable law. The second relates to the public interest in the definitive disposition of this matter. In Chikafu v Dodhill (Pvt) Ltd & Ors SC 28-09, leave to appeal was granted on the basis of divergent positions adopted by the courts on the applicable law. Similarly, in Vela v AuditorGeneral & Anor CCZ 01- 23, it was held that it is in the interests of justice to grant leave to appeal in order to clarify the law. In casu, the court a quo has taken an approach that is contrary to that taken by this Court in the Campbell case (supra) as well as the Kondonis case (supra). The decision a quo relates to a critical constitutional question: Can the State purport to act in terms of section 16B of the former Constitution where it is evidently unlawful to do so? The determination a quo has set a precedent for all cases where urban land is acquired following its listing in Schedule 7. The court a quo failed to conduct a proper inquiry into the meaning and scope of section 16B and has thereby created a binding precedent giving rise to confusion as to what the law should be. This, in my view, necessitates a definitive determination by this Court in order to clarify and settle the law on the constitutional question that has arisen. Turning to the second issue, I fully agree with counsel for the applicant that there is a paramount public interest in the eventual outcome of this matter. The correct interpretation of s16B of the former Constitution, as well as section 72 of the current Constitution, is very much alive.  The import of the order granted in the Kondonis case (supra) is abundantly clear: The State cannot acquire urban land under section 16B(2). The evidence in casu shows that residential properties have been constructed on the land in question. Moreover, the Bulawayo City Council, an undoubtedly interested party, was not heard in the disposition of this case. In these circumstances, the correct interpretation of the law is essential and unavoidable. It is unquestionably necessary for this Court to provide a definitive answer to the question as to whether land designated as urban land can lawfully be acquired by the State in accordance with section 16B of the former Constitution, as well as section 72 of the current Constitution. Accordingly, in my considered opinion, it is clearly in the interests of justice to grant leave to appeal in this matter. Disposition In conclusion, it appears to me that the court a quo fundamentally misconstrued and consequently misapplied the law governing the compulsory acquisition of agricultural land, and that it did so both substantively and procedurally. In the event, I take the view that its judgment is likely to be materially altered or overturned on appeal before the full bench of this Court. My conclusion is premised on the fact that the matter at hand pertains to a constitutional issue which, in my assessment, has reasonable prospects of success on appeal. Given the great likelihood of success, it is in the interests of justice to grant leave to appeal in this case. Accordingly, it is ordered that the application for leave to appeal against the judgment of the Supreme Court in Case No. SCB 49/23 be and is hereby granted, with no order as to costs. MAKARAU JCC: I agree. HLATSHWAYO JCC: I agree. Masamvu & Da Silva-Gustavo Law Chambers, applicant’s legal practitioners Civil Division of the Attorney General’s Office, 1st respondent’s legal practitioners.

Page 34 NewsHawks Issue 179, 14 - 27 June 2024 International Investigative Stories BRITAIN’S Conservative Party received a £50,000 (around $64,500) donation in 2020 from a small accounting firm that reporters have linked to Doug Barrowman, a high-profile businessman whose wife is a Conservative member of the House of Lords. The company that made the October 2020 contribution, Pulse Accounting Ltd., was owned at the time by one of Barrowman’s business associates, and was previously owned by an offshore trust company directed by two of Barrowman’s employees. Both Pulse Accounting and the trust company were dissolved earlier this year, after reporters first sent inquiries on the setup to Barrowman. Ahead of a general election set for early July, transparency campaigners in the U.K. have been sounding the alarm about the flow of untraceable money into the country’s politics. As an Isle of Man resident, Barrowman would not have been permitted to donate to British political parties unless he had registered as an overseas voter. Barrowman and his wife Baroness Michelle Mone, the founder of a lingerie brand who was made a member of the House of Lords in 2015, have been at the center of a major scandal for the Conservatives after a National Crime Agency investigation was launched in May 2021 into contracts worth 203 million British pounds (over $250 million) that the Conservative government awarded to PPE Medpro, a company secretly owned at the time by Barrowman, to provide personal protective equipment (PPE) during the Covid-19 pandemic. The deals were made after an introduction from Mone to government ministers helped fast-track the company’s bids, according to a parliamentary report. It later emerged some of the equipment that PPE Medpro provided to the government was unusable. (Britain’s Department of Health and Social Care is separately suing the company for compensation. The company has said it will vigorously defend itself against the claim.) After numerous denials of involvement in the company, the couple last year admitted that Barrowman was its ultimate owner and that the firm had earned around 60 million pounds ($76 million) in profit from the deals. However, they denied any wrongdoing and said they had just used their business acumen and contacts to assist the British government at a time when PPE was in high demand. The donation from Pulse Accounting was made several months after the PPE deals were signed. As a so-called “micro-company,” Pulse was not required to file detailed public accounts, but its balance sheet for the year ending on July 30, 2021, shows that the company had six employees at the time and 57,081 pounds on its balance sheet. Gavin Millar, a barrister and expert in elections law, called for the Electoral Commission to investigate whether the contribution was lawful. “The donation is very large for a company like this with no substantial assets,” he told OCCRP, adding that the company had “no history of political donations.” “There are grounds to investigate whether this was really the money of Mr Barrowman … not least of all the fact that a lucrative government contract had just been handed to his PPE Medpro company.” In order to donate to political parties, British companies must “carry on business in the UK,” according to electoral rules. “But even if this requirement is met it must give its own money, not the money of a hidden, impermissible donor,” Millar added. Barrowman did not respond to questions sent to his representatives by reporters. A spokesman for the Conservative Party did not respond directly to questions on the Pulse Accounting donation, but said the party was “funded by membership, fundraising and donations.” “All reportable donations are International InvestigativeStories Businessman Doug Barrowman (right) with his wife Baroness Michelle Mone (left). Credit: WENN Rights Ltd/Alamy Stock Photo UK Tories received donation from company linked to Conservative Baroness’s scandal-hit husband

NewsHawks Page 35 1ssue 179, 14 - 27 June 2024 properly and transparently declared to the Electoral Commission, published by them, and comply fully with the law,” the spokesman added. Links to Barrowman While the origins of the Pulse Accounting contribution could not be confirmed, a number of signs point back to Barrowman, including overlaps between Pulse Accounting’s owners and a company that describes itself as part of Knox group of companies, which Barrowman founded and chairs. At the time of the donation, Pulse Accounting was listed in the U.K.’s business registry, known as Companies House, as being owned by a tax adviser named Daniel Clay through another company. Clay and Barrowman have a history of working together: the pair were co-owners of another accounting firm, Clay Knox (UK) Limited, which was described on its website as part of the Knox group. According to Companies House records, Clay bought Pulse in July 2019. But financial records seen by OCCRP show that an offshore trust company called Perree (PTC) Limited actually paid 100,000 pounds ($146,000 at the time) three years before that, in 2016, to buy a controlling interest in Pulse Accounting’s parent company. Perree is based in the British Virgin Islands, an offshore jurisdiction with corporate secrecy laws that allow its ultimate owner to remain hidden. But there is strong evidence from U.K. court documents linking it to Barrowman. Perree was listed as the trustee of a London property among assets belonging to Barrowman and Mone that were frozen in a December 2023 court order obtained by the Crown Prosecution Service. That order also restricts Perree, along with a slew of other firms and individuals, from dealing with the identified assets unless agreed upon with the authorities. Perree was dissolved in March 2024, but until then its directors were Voirrey Coole and Rebecca Duke, both employees of Knox House Trust Limited, one of Barrowman’s Knox group of companies. The trust was also registered in Companies House to the same address as the Knox group’s headquarters in the Isle of Man. Perree also has a connection to PPE Medpro, the Barrowman company at the center of the pandemic scandal. According to filings in the U.K.’s business registry, the trust entered a loan arrangement with PPE Medpro in May 2022 which would give it control over all the assets of the company if the debt was not repaid. A former insider at Pulse Accounting confirmed to reporters that a controlling interest in the firm was initially sold to Perree, not Clay, and that it was understood at the time that Perree was part of Barrowman’s group of companies. The insider, who spoke on condition of anonymity, also showed reporters evidence that Pulse’s filings to the U.K. Companies House after the sale had not been accurate. Although Barrowman himself has never been listed as an owner of Pulse Accounting, two employees of Barrowman’s Knox group have been listed in U.K. corporate records as Persons with Significant Control over its parent company, Pulse Umbrella Group Limited. Clay, Coole, and Duke did not respond to requests to comment. Shortly after reporters first reached out to Clay and Barrowman about their findings on Pulse Accounting, an application was made to strike the company from the U.K. register, and in June it was officially dissolved. A final link between Pulse Accounting and Barrowman’s businesses appears in the firm’s paperwork. Reporters found that accounts filed by Pulse Accounting in September 2020 inexplicably bear the name of a Scottish arm of his Knox Group – “Carnegie Knox (Scotland) Limited.” Proxies as ‘Normal Practice’ Barrowman has a record of appointing proxies to head companies he ultimately controls. In a BBC interview last December about the PPE Medpro deal, he was pressed about why his name did not appear in the company’s filings, even though he admitted to being its ultimate beneficial owner. “In terms of my appointments, they’re all handled by the people in my family office. That’s just normal practice and it’s been that way forever,” he said, without further explanation. Barrowman has also previously used his companies to make donations to the Conservative Party. In response to reporting from The Times in 2023, he told the newspaper he had given more than 170,000 pounds ($223,000) to the Conservatives between 2017 and 2019 through another U.K. company in the Knox group, Lancaster Knox. Those donations also included three cash payments of 50,000 pounds each. Through a spokesperson, Barrowman told the Times that “such donations were vetted and approved in an open manner by the Conservative Party in compliance with its own rules on accepting donations.” When reached for comment, a spokesperson for Britain’s Electoral Commission — an independent agency overseeing the country’s elections — said the Lancaster Knox donations were reported as having been made by a company that carried out business in the U.K. and were not subject to extra checks or investigation. The Electoral Commission has, however, called for outlawing contributions from companies that exceed the profits the company has made in the U.K. “We’ve seen for some time that public confidence in the transparency of party and campaigner finance is declining,” the spokesperson told OCCRP. “We continue to recommend to the UK Government that it introduces laws to help protect parties from those who seek to evade the law, and give voters more confidence in the process by requiring more checks on the identity of donors,” the spokesperson added. Britain’s Conservative government has instead drawn ire for ignoring recommendations to close loopholes in the U.K.’s electoral system and bringing in new legislation that critics say potentially makes it easier to funnel money from questionable sources into British parties. When approached about the findings, Labour Party chair Anneliese Dodds said Prime Minister Rishi Sunak had questions to answer over the donation from Pulse Accounting. “It’s clear the Tories will take cash from absolutely anyone with very few questions asked. Labour will clean up politics and turn the page on 14 years of Tory sleaze.” — Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project. International Investigative Stories Doug Barrowman and Michelle Mone during the BBC interview. Credit: YouTube screenshot from @EveningStandard

Page 36 NewsHawks Issue 179, 14 - 27 June 2024 WHEN people are fed up with corrupt and incompetent  leaders, who visit upon them leadership, governance and policy failures which wreck their lives to rubble with devastating consequences, they rise up in protest, demanding change, fresh ideas and accountability. This usually happens when basic needs are neglected and social service delivery fails. People may revolt when their fundamental needs like food, water, shelter, transport and security are thwarted or denied. Long-standing injustices, marginalisation and unequal distribution of resources can fuel widespread discontent. Besides, corruption and abuse of power prevail stoke discontent, unrest and demonstrations. Leaders' brazen corruption, nepotism, cronyism, tribalism and abuse of authority can erode trust and spark outrage. Suppression of freedom and human rights, particularly civil and political liberties, censorship and oppression often galvanise public resistance and protests. There are severe economic conditions, such as unemployment and poverty, that lead to frustration and and sometimes uprisings. Systematic authoritarian political repression also usually provoke public disaffection and strife. In addition, social and cultural grievances, for instance marginalisation, cultural erasure, and social injustices, usually create a groundswell of agitation and explosion of anger. Zimbabwe has been nursing such centrifugal forces for a long time. Throughout history these sorts of issues and factors have led to revolutions, protests, and social movements that have transformed societies and toppled leaders. The people's voice, when united, persistent and determined, is always a powerful force for change. Kenya is just but one example of what can happen when long-suffering people's patience, tolerance and resilience are overtaxed and overstretched by their leaders. Demand for change in Africa is growing, driven by various factors such as the youth bulge: Africa's large youth population seeks opportunities, jobs, and better governance. Africa has the world’s largest youth population. By 2030, 75% of the African population will be under the age of 35. The number of young Africans aged 15-24 is projected to reach 500 million in 2080. While population dynamics vary across the continent, most sub-Saharan countries have a median age below 19. Niger is the youngest country in the world with a median age of 14.5, while South Africa, Seychelles, Tunisia and Algeria have median ages above 27. These demographics are a potential force for growth. However, the potential of Africa’s demographic dividend has been overshadowed by concerns among governments and international donors about the relationship between large youth populations, unemployment rates and political instability. Many countries with large youth populations and high rates of youth unemployment and under-employment remain peaceful. But the dominant policy narrative is that unemployed youth pose a threat to stability. Further, the role of youth in popular protest — such as in Sudan in 2019 and Kenya a few daya ago, as well as Zimbabwe occasionally — has created high expectations about their role in countering autocratic governments and contributing to democracy. Political scientists and sociologists like studying and understanding the interaction between youth and autocratic regimes — especially as elected autocracies in Africa. Electoral autocracy regimes thrive on authoritarian strategies: manipulation of elections and repression of the opposition, independent media and civil society. These regimes are aware of their large youth populations and the role of young people. In Uganda, there is  Bobi Wine, Julius Malema and Mmusi Maimane in South Africa (which is an electoral democracy),  Diane Rwigara in Rwanda, Duma Boko in Botswana, Tundu Lissu in Tanzania and  Daniel Chapo in Mozambique from the ruling party. Chapo (47) was recently in Zimbabwe to meet President Emmerson Mnangagwa. Disparities in wealth and access to resources fuel demands for economic reform, particularly in societies like South Africa where inequality is scandalous. Access to information and connectivity fuels demands for modernisation and innovation, leading to change.  The emergence of social justice movements has been key. These demands are driving protests, movements, and calls for reform across Africa, pushing leaders to address the continent's challenges and create opportunities for the youth and the population at large. The NewsHawks is published on different content platforms by the NewsHawks Digital Media which is owned by Centre for Public Interest Journalism No. 100 Nelson Mandela Avenue Beverly Court, 6th floor Harare, Zimbabwe Trustees/Directors: Beatrice Mtetwa, Raphael Khumalo, Professor Wallace Chuma, Teldah Mawarire, Doug Coltart EDITORIAL STAFF: Managing Editor: Dumisani Muleya Assistant Editor: Brezh Malaba News Editor: Owen Gagare Reporters: Brenna Matendere, Ruvimbo Muchenje, Enock Muchinjo, Jonathan Mbiriyamveka, Nathan Guma Email: [email protected] Sub Editor: Mollen Chamisa Business Development Officer: Nyasha Kahondo Cell: +263 71 937 1739 [email protected] Subscriptions & Distribution: +263 71 937 1739 Reaffirming the fundamental importance of freedom of expression and me- dia freedom as the cornerstone of democracy and as a means of upholding human rights and liberties in the constitution; our mission is to hold power in its various forms and manifestations to account by exposing abuse of power and office, betrayals of public trust and corruption to ensure good governance and accountability in the public interest. CARTOON Voluntary Media Council of Zimbabwe The NewsHawks newspaper subscribes to the Code of Conduct that promotes truthful, accurate, fair and balanced news reporting. If we do not meet these standards, register your complaint with the Voluntary Media Council of Zimbabwe at No.: 34, Colenbrander Rd, Milton Park, Harare. Telephone: 024-2778096 or 024-2778006, 24Hr Complaints Line: 0772 125 659 Email: [email protected] or [email protected] WhatsApp: 0772 125 658, Twitter: @vmcz Website: www.vmcz.co.zw, Facebook: vmcz Zimbabwe Editorial & Opinion ZIMBABWE has become a mafia state and the evidence is staggering. By perennially rigging elections and entrenching corruption, the ruling elites have crafted an organised criminal enterprise to loot public resources and consolidate their ironclad grip on power. There is no better description of authoritarian kleptocracy. Political power in today's Zimbabwe is in the hands of elements who are driven by the twin motives of grabbing money by all means necessary and retaining their slots on the feeding trough. The looting of precious minerals and the hijacking of public procurement tenders have reached catastrophic levels. Many are describing the country as a crime scene; but the situation is far worse than that. It is no longer a mere law enforcement matter but a dire threat to national survival. The tendering system — which by law is meant to be fair, competitive and transparent — has been manipulated by shady cliques for self-enrichment. Some have argued that corruption has always existed, implying that there is nothing new under the sun. They conveniently ignore the fact that although corruption is indeed a longstanding scourge, the sheer magnitude and brazenness of what we are witnessing these days are astonishing. A new report by SwissAid, a development group based in Switzerland, shows that gold worth US$31 billion was smuggled out of Africa in 2022 alone. The top three sources of this loot were Mali, Ghana and Zimbabwe. In recent weeks, The NewsHawks has exposed corrupt tenders running into tens of millions of US dollars at the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission. Nobody really expects the culprits to be brought to justice — for the obvious reason that some high-level officials are benefitting from these murky deals. Journalists and whistleblowers are exposing corruption daily, but no action is taken by the authorities. Anyone who speaks out against the theft of public resources is labelled an enemy of the state. When the military dramatically toppled long-time ruler Robert Mugabe in November 2017, the commanders claimed they were "only targeting criminals" around the dictator. Major-General Sibusiso Moyo memorably went on state television and denied that a coup d'etat was underway. “We wish to make it abundantly clear that this is not a military takeover,” he announced on state television. “We are only targeting criminals around [Mugabe] who are committing crimes that are causing social and economic suffering in the country in order to bring them to justice.” Zimbabwe loses billions of dollars annually to illicit financial flows. The destinations of most of the looted money are typically offshore accounts in tax havens or countries with less stringent financial regulations. Corruption in Zimbabwe is fuelled by weak governance structures, lack of transparency and accountability and a culture of impunity where wrongdoers are not held accountable. Public resources are being diverted for personal gain rather than being used for public services or development projects. The political opposition has been dismantled through subterfuge, rendering Parliament incapable of providing an institutional barrier to the corrupt exercise of Zanu PF power. The mafiacracy is in charge. Mafia state takes root Dumisani Muleya Hawk Eye Kenya's timeless moment of truth

Business MATTERS NewsHawks CURRENCIES LAST CHANGE %CHANGE USD/JPY 109.29 +0.38 +0.35 GBP/USD 1.38 -0.014 -0.997 USD/CAD 1.229 +0.001 +0.07 USD/CHF 0.913 +0.005 +0.53 AUD/USD 0.771 -0.006 -0.76 COMMODITIES LAST CHANGE %CHANGE *OIL 63.47 -1.54 -2.37 *GOLD 1,769.5 +1.2 +0.068 *SILVER 25.94 -0.145 -0.56 *PLATINUM 1,201.6 +4 +0.33 MARKETS *COPPER 4.458 -0.029 -0.65 BERNARD MPOFU STREET wisdom dictates that if you cannot beat them, join them! That’s the dilemma which most formal apparel retailers now face, to compete against cheap imported clothing from as far as China or Turkey. Not to mention the boot sales and second-hand clothing that have flooded the market. New Edgars CEO Sevious Mushosho has this less envious job cut out for him. When he addressed an analyst briefing during the presentation of the company’s year-end financials, many anticipated to hear his grand plan to turn a new leaf on the yesteryear fashion giant, whose fortunes had a taken a dip. Since 1946, Edgars — previously a unit of South Africa’s Edcon — had grown to be a household name for the once clearly distinct Zimbabwean middle and upper classes. That all changed over the last decade. Backed by his management team, Mushosho — who was clad in a designer suit which we were later told is part of the new Edgars merchandise — admitted how the Victoria Falls Exchange-listed company had lost ground to competition. For the flagship Edgars chain, four things are important: offering quality merchandise, exclusivity in supplying trusted and trendy in-house labels, selling genuine international brands like Polo and in-store ambience. This will help the company claw back the market share it aspires to. In his nearly 20-minute long presentation titled “Rebuilding the walls”, Mushosho said the group will soon unleash an ace to take on lowly-priced second-hand clothing in the country. He is confident that the re-launched Express chain stores will be a game-changer. Time will tell. “The larger share of Zimbabwe’s clothing market is serviced by the informal sector – flea markets, Chinese shops, runners, car boot markets and all other types of boutiques,” read one of Mushosho’s slides projected in one of the conference rooms at a local country club. “This section mainly offers cheap imports from places like China, Tanzania, United Kingdom and Bangladesh. There are several shortcomings faced by players in this space, mainly around quality issues, size curves and in the case of second-hand clothing potential health risk concerns. “In 2021-22 as Edgars, I must say we dropped the ball. Effectively we were not selling the quality we should have been selling and what happened was that the formal sector—the boutiques, the runners, they took advantage of that. They started going to Turkey and selling garments totally different from what we were selling. They created value for the customer so it became a huge competition to us. But the game changed in 2023 because now we are now competition to them.” This year, Mushosho added, Edgars plans to roll out 10 Express chain stores across the country and pricing will be key. The group is looking for an average basket size cap of US$10 and plans to open a wide network of stores covering growth points, towns and cities (downtown). As part of the group’s broad strategy, the stores, he added will be brick ’n mortar, mobile stores, online store and store within a store. He said Edgars will also procure some of its footwear from merchandisers as it takes on smaller players. Mushosho, who takes over from Tjeludo Ndlovu, also personified a new wave of leadership renewal led by relatively young female executives. Ndlovu had been with the group for 11 years, having joined in 2012 as group accountant. She has led the group successfully since 2020 at the peak of the Covid-19 pandemic, but the group had lately been facing headwinds, prompting majority shareholder Sub-Sahara Capital Group (SSCG) to effect changes to shore up the struggling apparel retailer. Her second-in-command, Happiness Vundla, who served as chief financial officer, was also pushed out. Mushosho, a former executive of SSCG, was appointed to the Edgars board after SSCG bought the majority stake from South Africa’s Edcon in 2019. Resurgent Edgars seeks to counter ‘cheap imports’ as competition bites

Page 38 NewsHawks Issue 179, 14 - 27 June 2024 Companies & Markets BERNARD MPOFU ZIMBABWE’S economy has largely stagnated over the last 20 years as the country’s ballooning debt continues to choke the southern African nation, a new report by the African Development Bank (AfDB) has shown. Official figures show that despite making token payments over the past few years, Zimbabwe’s total debt stock has soared to US$18 billion as of December 2023. The country went into arrears at the turn of the millennium. Early this year, the Finance ministry resumed negotiations with creditors and the international community as Treasury seeks to resolve Zimbabwe’s nagging debt overhang. With the country remaining in debt distress while borrowing is limited, public debt has continued to increase, driven by external arrears and legacy debt. “The economy has experienced only minimal structural transformation in the last two decades, with structural change impeded by crippling public debt accumulation estimated at 87% of GDP in 2023,” the AfDB says in its continental economic outlook for 2024 published recently. “The services sector has remained the major contributor to GDP over the last decade, averaging over 50% since 2010 and reaching 55% in 2023. Persistent socio-economic pressures led to human capital flight of an estimated 3 million mostly skilled workers. Labour shifted from higher value-added sectors, such as agriculture, industry, and high-productivity services, to lower value-added sectors, including wholesale and retail trade.” Zimbabwe’s labour productivity growth, the report states, remains depressed and ranked very low among 17 lower middle-income countries in Africa. “Prerequisites for Zimbabwe’s structural transformation are debt restructuring and clearance of arrears to create fiscal space for investment, attract foreign direct investment, and unlock access to global financing opportunities,” the report reads. “Since 2022, the country has engaged with the international development community and has agreed to implement economic and governance reforms that would unlock arrears clearance. Zimbabwe’s main creditors, including multilateral and bilateral donors, which account for 76% of its debt, have a key role in accelerating agreed reforms and arrears clearance.” Structural transformation of the economy refers to a process of change in the underlying structure of a country's economy, moving away from traditional or old industries and towards new, more modern and dynamic sectors. This transformation aims to diversify the economy, increase productivity and competitiveness, reduce dependence on a single industry or resource and promote sustainable economic growth and development. Experts say structural transformation includes moving from an agrarian to an industrial economy; shifting from a reliance on natural resources to knowledge-based industries; transitioning from a manufacturing-based economy to a service-based economy and embracing digitalisation and the fourth industrial revolution. The goal is to create a more resilient, inclusive and innovative economy, driving economic growth and improving living standards. Zimbabwe economy has stagnated for 20 years: AfDB Finance minister Mthuli Ncube

NewsHawks Companies & Markets Page 39 1ssue 179, 14 - 27 June 2024 NATHAN GUMA ZIMBABWE’S insatiable borrowing appetite has been identified as a key driver of unsustainable debt amid a notable increase in resource-backed loans and quasi-fiscal activities between 2010 to 2023. This has heightened calls for governance reforms. The country’s debt has been soaring, reaching US$18.03 billion in 2022, with external debt constituting 70.9% (US$12.8 billion) while domestic debt is 28.7% (US$5.2 billion). With no budgetary support from traditional lenders such as international financial institutions due to non-payment of arrears, Zimbabwe has been mainly relying on grants, bilateral loans, particularly from China, and domestic resources to finance its key capital projects. However, a report by an international civic society grouping, the African Sovereign Debt Justice Network (AfSDJN), has shown that Zimbabwe’s indebtedness has been worsening, with the country borrowing using resources as collateral. This has raised the risks of the country losing its valuable resources should there be a default in repayments of the debts. “The AfSDJN calls upon the Zimbabwean government to curb its borrowing appetite and adopt responsible borrowing practices in order to arrive at a sustainable debt stock. International re-engagement remains important and can be achieved through a strong commitment to the proposed economic, governance, and land-related reforms,” reads the report. In December 2023, Zimbabwe was reported to be using the proceeds of its platinum exports to settle a US$400 million loan from the African Export-Import Bank (Afreximbank). The government had signed the US$400 million loan for budget support and the financing of trade-related infrastructure in February 2023, which carries a 10.2% interest rate and matures in six years, with the borrowing cost increasing to 12.2% in the event of default. The government has also sourced more resource-backed loans. In 2019, the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe secured a US$500 million loan from the African Export-Import Bank in a bid to stabilise the country’s currency market. Platinum production was offered as collateral for the US$500 million loan facility. The loan was litigated on the grounds that it had been awarded without parliamentary approval. “While the courts did not order the loan’s cancellation, as originally sought in that case, by a consent order between the government and the plaintiffs in that case, the court ordered the publication of the loan terms which had not been disclosed to the public,” reads the report.   “These RBLs, which constitute a form of contingent debt, are dangerous as they exert dire socio-economic impacts by fuelling corruption and unsustainable resource extraction, with little to nothing to show in developmental terms.” In 2011, the government had also sought a US$98 million resource-backed loan in the construction of the National Defence College. The loan was leveraged by diamonds from Marange. AfSDJN also said Zimbabwe’s position has been worsened by quasi-fiscal activities. “The World Bank has also advised the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe to cease all quasi-fiscal operations and unbudgeted expenditures. The World Bank recently advised the RBZ to transfer US$3.6 billion of its total external liabilities to the Treasury as soon as possible, since it had only transferred US$1.8 billion,” reads the report. “In 2022, renowned American economist Steve Hanke argued that the central bank's quasi-fiscal actions, which had added to the country's debt of more than $20 billion, were primarily responsible for the currency distortion observed in both the official and alternative FX markets.” More loans, but at what cost? While Zimbabwe has had years of blocked prospects of future funding, this has not stopped the country from trying to outsource new loans from new creditors. According to the report, the government is negotiating a US$100 million loan from the United Kingdom’s Broughton Capital. Treasury is also speaking to Dinosaur Merchant Bank, another lower-tier UK investment bank, for another US$125 million. In early 2023, South African banks ABSA and Standard Bank announced that they were to raise US$193 million for the construction of hospitals and clinics in Zimbabwe. This loan is expected to start coming through in 2024, with US$105 million to be disbursed. The loans will be used to pay UK-based infrastructure company NMS, which has already built two clinics in Cowdray Park in Bulawayo and Stoneridge in Harare. The two projects were paid for by the government under an initial US$25 million phase of the project. “The contraction of more loans by a country already in debt distress and experiencing debt overhang only perpetuates an unhealthy debt cycle. A closer analysis of the country’s 2023 Public Debt Report shows that the primary drivers of public debt in Zimbabwe are arrears and penalties on already existing debts,” it reads. “In the context of the existing 12.2% penalty rate imposed by the French COFACE, and the 10.5% penalty rate levied by the European Investment Bank, the government’s insatiable appetite for more debt is clearly a sign of irresponsible and reckless borrowing tendencies. These are the highest penalty rates faced by Zimbabwe by bilateral creditors and multilateral creditors, respectively.” Insatiable borrowing plunges Zim into further debt distress The Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe

Page 40 Zim must address corruption  to reduce vulnerabilities: IMF NewsHawks Issue 179, 14 - 27 June 2024 Companies & Markets NATHAN GUMA THE International Monetary Fund (IMF) says rampant corruption poses risks to Zimbabwe's macro-economic performance and must be urgently addressed. It says the country needs structural reforms to improve the business climate, strengthen economic governance, and to alleviate corruption vulnerabilities. This follows the recent IMF Staff Article IV Consultation mission to Zimbabwe led by Wojciech Maliszewski from 18 to 27 June. Zimbabwe’s economic governance, the IMF says, has significant weaknesses and corruption jeopardises the  macro-economic situation. Addressing these weaknesses remains key for promoting sustained and inclusive growth, it says. In a statement, the IMF says: “Despite headwinds, Zimbabwe’s economy continues showing resilience. Growth is expected to decelerate to about 2 percent in 2024 (from 5.3 percent in 2023), as the country faces a devastating El Niño-induced drought. Higher import bills are also worsening the balance-of-payments outlook. But growth is expected to recover strongly in 2025 to about 6 percent, supported by a rebound in agriculture and ongoing capital projects in manufacturing. “Against this background, the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) introduced in April 2024 a new currency—the Zimbabwe Gold (ZiG). The ZiG official exchange rate has so far remained stable, ending a bout of macroeconomic instability in the first 3 months of the year (when the Zimbabwean dollar depreciated by about 260 percent). Assuming that macro-stabilization is sustained, cumulative inflation in the remainder of the year is projected at about 7 percent." The IMF adds: “The mission welcomes improvement in monetary policy discipline and recommends further refinements to the policy framework. Price stability would be best achieved by stabilising the ZiG nominal exchange rate against a suitable basket of currencies (accounting for the dominant role of the USD in the economy). This could be in turn accomplished by controlling base money growth: for now through unremunerated Non-Negotiable Certificates of Deposits (NNCDs), but over time through indirect (interest-rate-based) monetary instruments to increase the attractiveness of the new currency.  The exchange rate should be determined in a deeper market to provide relevant information in the decision regarding the monetary policy stance, which would require identifying and removing any remaining impediments to the functioning of the FX market to promote price discovery." The IMF says the fiscal financing must be managed in a sustainable manner. “Closing the fiscal financing gap is essential to sustainably stabilise the currency. The transfer of past debt obligations related to the RBZ’s quasi-fiscal operations (QFOs) to the Treasury represented an important step to strengthen financial discipline. "The mission also welcomes enhanced coordination between the RBZ and the Ministry of Finance, Economic Development and Investment Promotion (MoFEDIP) on macro-policies and liquidity management. However, the mission assessed that the cost of servicing the QFO-related debt and T-bills (including about 8 percent of GDP issued last year), combined with weaker-than-expected revenues (despite strong efforts to raise them through policy measures) and drought-related spending, opened a sizeable financing gap in the 2024 budget. "The financing gap would need to be closed in a way that does not undermine the monetary policy stance. The mission is encouraged that the work to identify such measures is ongoing and stands ready to provide support to the authorities as needed." The IMF says the Mutapa Investment Fund will be key to economic stabilisation, but must be clearly defined, transparent and accountable. “Strengthened governance framework for the newly constituted Mutapa Investment Fund will be key for the stabilisation effort. Steps to this end should include ensuring that the fund’s mandate is clearly defined and aligned with the National Development Strategy; enhancing its transparency and ensuring full integration in the budget process (Mutapa’s annual operating budget, capital investment, asset sales, and borrowing plans should be subject to approval by the MoFEDIP — financial management of public entities is already regulated by the Public Finance Management Act); and adhering to highest standards of corporate accountability," it says. “The mission discussed structural reforms aimed at improving the business climate, strengthening economic governance, and reducing corruption vulnerabilities. Zimbabwe’s economic governance has significant weaknesses and corruption poses risks to macroeconomic performance. Addressing these weaknesses remain key for promoting sustained and inclusive growth." On debt resolution, the IMF says international re-engagement remains the best option. “International re-engagement remains critical for debt resolution and arrears clearance, which would open the door for access to external financing. The authorities' re-engagement efforts, through the Structured Dialogue Platform, are key for attaining debt sustainability and gaining access to concessional financial support. In this context, the mission encourages the authorities to continue adhering to high standards of public debt transparency, including through the inclusion and appropriate treatment of recently issued debt in its public and publicly-guaranteed debt statistics." “The IMF maintains an active engagement with Zimbabwe and continues to provide policy advice and extensive technical assistance in the areas of revenue mobilisation, expenditure control, financial supervision, debt management, economic governance and anti-corruption, and macroeconomic statistics. "However, the IMF is currently precluded from providing financial support to Zimbabwe due to its unsustainable debt situation — based on the IMF’s Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA) — and official external arrears. "An IMF financial arrangement would require a clear path to comprehensive restructuring of Zimbabwe’s external debt, including the clearance of arrears and a reform plan that is consistent with durably restoring macro-economic stability; enhancing inclusive growth; lowering poverty; and strengthening economic governance." The IMF staff held meetings with minister of Finance, Economic Development and Investment Promotion Professor Mthuli Ncube; deputy minister of Finance, Economic Development and Investment Promotion, David Mnangagwa; and permanent secretary George Guvamatanga; Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe governor John Mushayavanhu; Martin Rushwaya, Chief Secretary to the President and Cabinet; other senior government and RBZ officials; members of Parliament; and representatives of the private sector, civil society, and Zimbabwe’s development partners.

Page 41 The man who brought South Africa affordable uncapped broadband FORMER Mweb chief executive Rudi Jansen was an Internet innovator who launched South Africa’s first affordable uncapped broadband and pioneered free and open peering. Mweb rocked the South African broadband market on 22 March 2010 when it launched uncapped ADSL starting at R219 per month. At the time, Telkom’s ADSL service dominated the broadband market, and Internet service providers (ISPs) sold data by the gigabyte (GB). For nearly a decade after ADSL was launched in 2002, the price of ADSL data remained largely unchanged at around R70 to R80 per GB. The high data prices stifled innovation and held back the country’s streaming, e-commerce, and other online industries. For example, an iPhone update would take up half your monthly cap. You could also not do Microsoft Windows or Office updates without incurring high costs. Netflix had started its incredible growth in the United States, but capped Internet hampered similar services in South Africa. “Metered Internet has kept growth back and the writing was on the wall,” Jansen said at the time. However, with the high cost of international bandwidth, it was inconceivable that an Internet service provider could launch uncapped broadband. Things changed after Jansen and his team at Mweb realised there was a better solution than buying a set product from Telkom and selling it to subscribers. They built their own national and international network and partnered with Seacom for affordable international bandwidth. There was also a local challenge in South Africa because big telecommunications operators were very protective of their networks and did not want to peer with Mweb. “Nobody wanted to open up as they thought their own growth would stop, and they charged a fortune for transit between networks,” Jansen said. They solved the problem by routing their traffic via Europe and passing their network traffic over the free peering links there. Locally, Mweb peered for free with whoever it could. “The plan was that the other networks would realise that it cost them more to accept our international traffic than simply peering locally and then start peering locally,” Jansen said. Mweb started off by peering with whoever they could, big or small. That upset the big guys, and they started losing revenue early on. “The more smaller players peered with each other, the better the entire South African Internet experience got,” he said. “Some bigger players were quick to react, and some bigger ones took a long, long time, but in the end, they all came around. Today, we have a more open peering regime.” Peering was a big win for the industry. An international peering expert even used Mweb as a case study on how to change the peering landscape. The combination of all of these factors enabled Mweb to launch South Africa’s first affordable uncapped broadband service. The solution was so revolutionary that many industry players and competing ISPs thought Mweb had lost the plot. Jansen was told that uncapped ADSL was not sustainable and would never work. A few competing ISPs even thought it was just a marketing stunt. However, the product enjoyed tremendous success, and Mweb showed exceptional growth because of the innovation. Other Internet service providers were forced to copy Mweb and launch their own uncapped broadband products. Jansen changed the way people used the Internet in South Africa. It made gaming more enjoyable, and online streaming became a real possibility. Facebook usage picked up, content consumption in general increased, and people even started shopping a lot more online. “Anyone who thinks you can go back to a capped world is completely misguided. You can never go back. You can never offer an inferior service,” Jansen said. Jansen passed away in September 2021, leaving a legacy as an Internet pioneer who brought affordable, uncapped broadband and free and open peering to South Africa. — MyBroadband. Former Mweb chief executive Rudi Jansen NewsHawks 1ssue 179, 14 - 27 June 2024 Companies & Markets

Page 42 Companies & Markets DOUGLAS MAPURANGA REGULATORY sandboxes have been used by governments around the world to allow approved fintech firms — which use specialised technological innovations to provide financial products and services — to perform time-bounded experiments with new technologies in regulated environments. The first regulatory sandbox was created in November 2015 by the United Kingdom’s Financial Conduct Authority. Since then, over 50 central banks have implemented the concept in their jurisdictions, according to the Bank for International Settlements. Zimbabwe’s fintech regulatory sandbox was established in March 2021 by the National Fintech Steering Committee (NFSC) and is regulated by the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ). Its intended responsibilities include testing, enabling innovation, promoting collaboration among participants, monitoring financial technology developments in the country, and supporting innovators in researching. Experts have argued that regulatory sandboxes can confer several advantages, including encouraging innovation while allowing policymakers to monitor emerging risks.  In addition, startup fintech firms typically lack sufficient regulatory expertise, which can become a significant barrier for potential innovators. The sandbox offers both the innovator and the regulator a platform to identify gray areas that could hinder new solutions and test new technology efficiently. The RBZ has sought to encourage innovation in Zimbabwe’s financial services sector by introducing a regulatory sandbox that allows fintechs to be deployed and tested in live environments without compromising the safety of participants and the financial services market. The bank hopes to foster collaboration between the financial services sector and fintech companies, monitor the development of disruptive technologies, and, in response, implement appropriate safeguards to manage risks and the chances of technology failures that could potentially harm the financial services market. It is anticipated that the new framework will reduce the time to market for approved solutions, and development costs while ensuring consumer protection from bad actors. The RBZ and relevant government ministries established the NFSC in 2019 to aid the RBZ in managing local fintech innovations. The NFSC is responsible for policy formulation and creating an enabling environment that “promotes financial technology innovation and entrepreneurship.”  Members of the NFSC include representatives of government ministries, regulators, and the revenue authority. Among the goals of the NFSC is to develop regulatory interventions, including platforms such as innovation hubs, accelerators, and the fintech regulatory sandbox. The growth of fintech in Zimbabwe has been immense and can be attributed to digital payments driven by mobile network operators. In a 2018 monetary policy statement, the RBZ reported that 95% of all payment transactions in the country were processed digitally—that is, through internet or mobile banking.  Another notable factor has been the RBZ’s push for interoperability of payment systems across different banks and mobile networks. Accordingly, Zimswitch, the country’s sole national electronic funds switch and clearinghouse, has operationalized a system of interoperability, growing from six banks on the platform in 1994 to over 24 participants in 2021.  The phenomenal growth of fintech aside, the economic environment has presented some challenges to doing business in the country. For example, Zimbabwe’s annual inflation rate rose from 3% in 2010 to 557 percent in 2021 before dropping to 98.5% in 2021.7  The official exchange rate of the country’s currency to US dollars depreciated from 108.67 to 1 in December 2021 to approximately 670 to 1 in December 2022. The erosion in purchasing power has caused strife among suppliers and consumers of products and services. As such, a lack of early-stage financing severely constrains fintech companies operating in the country. In its 2020 report, Financial Sector Deepening Africa noted that fintech startup ideas failed to take off without significant self-financing or the financial support of family and friends. Despite the challenging economic environment that has affected Zimbabwe intermittently since 2007 and the global financial crisis of 2008, fintech companies in the country have grown into an alternative to traditional banking. A high mobile connection penetration rate, cash shortages, and initiatives by the RBZ through its National Financial Inclusion Strategy (NFIS) have resulted in the rapid adoption of fintech solutions. This paper aims to determine whether commonly held views regarding fintech regulatory sandboxes are true or false for Zimbabwe’s local financial services market. This paper discusses the results of a survey conducted in January 2022 by the author—with mixed responses. For example, some participants indicated that they foresaw possible positive improvements in cybersecurity awareness, product development time, and the monitoring of fintech developments in the country. However, there were some reservations regarding the skills capacity of the RBZ to manage the scheme and the protection of intellectual property. The Banker Regulatory sandboxes for fintechs NewsHawks Issue 179, 14 - 27 June 2024

Companies & Markets News Analysis Page 43 BRENNA MATENDERE UNIVERSITY of Zimbabwe political scientist Professor Eldred Masunungure has said the former leader of the opposition Citizens' Coalition for Change (CCC), Nelson Chamisa, is whistling in the wind by calling on Sadc to address Zimbabwe’s 2023 election dispute and governance crisis before the nation can start preparing for 2028. Other political analysts who spoke to The NewsHawks expressed the same sentiments. In his latest pronouncements, Chamisa claims he has engaged different stakeholders within the Southern African Development Community, even at the heads of state level and dispatched delegations to various capitals in the region and the continent to brief leaders about the election dispute in Zimbabwe, the political stalemate, and his proposed way forward. He added there can be no talk of 2028 elections or a viable and stable future for Zimbabwe without resolving the August 2023 plebiscite dispute. However, Masunungure said the best one can say about Chamisa’s demand is that he is “whistling in the wind”. “Or, perhaps he has not adequately understood Zanu PF’s hippo-skinned character. The party is inherently obstinate and will push through its agenda. Presently, it is pre-occupied with the intricate factional dynamics inside itself and won’t be bothered by noises from outside, especially from someone it has written off politically,” he said. “In any case, Chamisa has to re-enter the political ring for him to have a proper locus standi, including in respect of his ardent and other sympathisers many of whom regard him as having abruptly and insensitively jettisoned them after faithfully voting for him in August 2023.” Masunungure asserted that Chamisa is however justified in discrediting th3 Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (Zec). “I get the sense that Chamisa no longer invests any confidence in the elections as a process and in Zec as an electoral institution. I think he is justified, if that is his perspective, and it is shared by a critical mass of Zimbabweans,” he said. Stephen Chan, professor of world politics at London University’s School of Oriental and African Studies, concurred with Prof Masunungure’s assertions. “There is very little chance of the 2023 elections being reviewed or the results changed. Sadc has decided to accept the results, despite misgivings in the Sadc observers' report,” Chan said. “The Mnangagwa extension to 2030 may be part of an internal Zanu PF agreement in which Mnangagwa does not stand for a further full term, so the extra years are a sort of consolation prize.” Political analyst Rashweat Mukundu bemoaned the lack of concerted efforts by President Mnangagwa to address concerns of the opposition to normalise the social-economic space. “Yes, there are legal remedies, but sometimes when you are leading a politically polarised society in Zimbabwe, you also reach out politically and say, let's discuss these issues, which is something that President Mnangagwa has unfortunately failed to do,” Mukundu said. “Rather, he has maintained a posture that Zimbabwe is a winner-take-all. Yet we know that the challenges that Zimbabwe faces need every political hand on deck. We need to normalise politics in order to normalise the social-economic space.” “So for me, I think this has been Chamisa’s consistent message. And it probably informs his view that going for the 2028 elections without resolving the outstanding issues from 2018 to 2023 will simply produce the same result of a disputed outcome, the same result of polarity, the same result of economic failure that we are seeing in Zimbabwe.” Added Mukundu:“ Chamisa is looking at this matter as a normalisation of the politics, whilst possibly Mnangagwa is looking at this from a political power grip and a continuity of Zanu PF, which is not necessarily the reformation of politics that Chamisa is looking at. So that's my take on this narrative.” Political analyst Vivid Gwede said Chamisa’s view about the 2028 election is different from that of the Mnangagwa camp's view. “Chamisa’s message is that the next election should not be held under the same dispute-generating circumstances as before, while the Mnangagwa camp wants to postpone them. The latter's bid will be tested when the actual process of amending the constitution gets into motion. As I have said before, it is a huge gamble. This is because it does not align with some interests within the ruling party itself and many players outside it,” Gwede said. Commenting on Mnangagwa’s extended stay in power beyond his 2028 term limit, Masunungure said he is likely to settle for the 2030 agenda. “To the extent that I am following this saga, the President has two substitutable ambitions; a third term expiring in 2033; and a two-year extension expiring in 2030. The former is a herculean task and if he were to succeed, he would do so on the ruins of his party after it has exploded," he said. “My inkling is he will abandon the dream midway. The 2030 ambition is quite feasible and will represent soft landing for both him and his adversaries who might not be as viciously opposed to 2030 as they would be to 2033. “In short, I think ED will climb down and be satisfied with 2030 whereby he can witness his Vision 2030 from State House rather than from the terraces. Parliamentarians will also be on board as that arrangement will extend their political life for another two years and will therefore merrily accede to a constitutional amendment to that effect,” he said. Nelson Chamisa's hope for Sadc rescue is unrealistic: Analysts Former CCC leader Nelson Chamidsa NewsHawks 1ssue 179, 14 - 27 June 2024

Page 44 Address by South African President Cyril Ramaphosa on the occasion of the presidential inauguration, Union Buildings, Tshwane Your Majesties, Kings and Queens, Your Excellencies, Heads of State and Government, Former President Thabo Mbeki and Mrs Mbeki, Former President Kgalema Motlanthe and Mrs Motlanthe, All former Heads of State and Government, Distinguished representatives of respective countries and of international organisations, Speaker of the National Assembly, Chairperson of the National Council of Provinces, The Chief Justice of the Republic, Premiers, MECs and Mayors, Members of Parliament, Leaders of political parties, Religious and traditional leaders, Ambassadors and High Commissioners, Veterans of our struggle, Distinguished Guests, Fellow South Africans, Today, we gather under this vast Highveld sky at the seat of our government, the Union Buildings, to witness before all South Africans and our honoured guests from various countries on our beloved continent and from far afield a fundamental rite of our democracy. In our brilliant diversity, we gather to affirm our solemn conviction that this country belongs to all who live in it, as articulated in the Freedom Charter almost seventy years ago. We gather here, as people born of the same soil across our nine provinces that make up a unitary South Africa, determined that by our deeds we shall heal the divisions of our past, and overcome the ongoing inequalities and hardships of the present. We declare for all to know that neither discord nor dissent shall cause us to cast aside that which calls us to build a united, free, just, equal and prosperous nation. On this day, we assert by solemn oath the will of the people of this land. We affirm our unwavering fidelity to the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, which is based on the enduring vision and values of the Freedom Charter. As the leadership of this diverse nation, we have a sacred duty to unite the people of South Africa. We affirm that history has placed on our shoulders the responsibility to transform our country into a non-racial and non-sexist society. We affirm our determination to build a more equal and caring society. We affirm our resolute quest to build a growing and inclusive economy that offers opportunities and livelihoods to all people. We rededicate ourselves to the task of democratic renewal and social and economic transformation so that no one is left behind. And so, as we enter another era in the life of our nation, the resilience of our democracy has once more been tested and the people have spoken loudly that they choose peace and democracy over violent, undemocratic and unconstitutional methods. In their multitude, in voices that are many and diverse, the people of South Africa have voted and made known their wishes, their concerns and their expectations. We accept and respect the results of the elections and we once again say the people have spoken. Their will shall be done without any doubt or question. The voters of South Africa did not give any single party the full mandate to govern our country alone. They have directed us to work together to address their plight and realise their aspirations. They have expressed their appreciation of the progress in many areas of their lives over the past 30 years of democracy. They have also been unequivocal in expressing their disappointment and disapproval of our performance in some of the areas in which we have failed them. They want a transformed, growing and inclusive economy that creates jobs for millions of job seekers and offer business opportunities to all entrepreneurs in our nation – women and men, young and old. The people have been clear about what they want. They want a South Africa in which all may find shelter in our democratic Constitution and may find protection in our courts. They have described a country in which all may rise above the circumstances of their birth, nurtured by loving families, aided by a caring state and empowered by initiative, will and hard work. Through their votes they have made clear that they want the basic necessities of a life that is comfortable, happy, healthy and secure. Through their votes they asserted that they want enough food to eat. Water that is clean. Affordable electricity that is available at all times. They want decent homes that keep out the wind, the rain and the cold. They want well-maintained roads and street lights that work. The people of South Africa have asked no more than to be properly cared for when they are sick, they want the young to be taught well, for the elderly to be cared for, and for those without work to work. The people of South Africa have spoken about the land they want to farm, about the businesses they want to run, about the things and products they want to make, about the skills they want to learn. They have spoken of their desire to be safe in their homes, on the street, in their cities, in their villages and on their farms. The people have demanded an end to the theft of public funds and the capture of the state. Above all, the people of South Africa have stressed that they are impatient with political bickering and the endless blame game among politicians and political parties. They want us to put their needs and aspirations first and they want us to work together for the sake of our country. Today I stand before you as your humble servant to say we have heard you. As the President of the Republic, I will work with everyone to reach out and work with every political party and sector that is willing to contribute to finding solutions to the challenges our country faces as we transition to a new decade of freedom. Thirty years have passed since we turned our back on racial tyranny and embraced an open and democratic society. We have made great strides in building a new society that is founded on strong democratic institutions and universal freedoms. We have built a transformed public service, an independent judiciary, a competitive electoral system, a sophisticated economy, a vibrant and free media, and a roRamaphosa  inauguration  speech: The  people have now spoken  The Big Debate NewsHawks Issue 179, 14 - 27 June 2024

The Big Debate Page 45 bust civil society. And yet despite this progress, our society remains deeply unequal and highly polarised. There are toxic cleavages and an incipient social fragmentation that can easily turn into instability. The lines drawn by our history, between black and white, between man and woman, between suburbs and townships, between urban and rural, between the wealthy and the poor, remain etched in our landscape. In places, these lines may have faded, but they have not disappeared. We are citizens of one country and yet we occupy different worlds, separated by high walls and great distances. We are divided between those who have jobs and those who do not work; between those who have the means to build and enjoy a comfortable life and those who do not. And so today is no ordinary day. It is a moment of fundamental consequence in the life of our nation. It is a moment when we must choose to either move forward together or risk losing all we have built. In this moment we must choose to move forward; to close the distances between South Africans and to build a more equal society; to translate the promise of our Constitution and the vision of the Freedom Charter into a reality for all. This moment requires extraordinary courage and leadership. It requires a common mission to safeguard national unity, peace, stability, inclusive economic growth, non-racialism and non-sexism. Through the ballots that they have cast, the people of South Africa have made plain their expectation that the leaders of our country should work together. They have directed their representatives to put aside animosity and dissent, to abandon narrow interests, and to pursue together only that which benefits the nation. As leaders, as political parties, we are called upon to work in partnership towards a growing economy, better jobs, safer communities and a government that works for its people. From across the political spectrum, parties have answered that call. Understanding that no party can govern alone and make laws alone, these parties have agreed to work in partnership, to employ their talents for the good of the country and the progress of its people. Together, they have resolved to establish a government of national unity to pursue a common programme of fundamental and lasting change. The formation of a government of national unity is a moment of profound significance. It is the beginning of a new era. As the leaders of this country came together in a government of national unity 30 years ago to forge a common future and build a united nation, the parties in the government of national unity of today have agreed to work together to address the most pressing challenges before our nation. The parties have adopted a Statement of Intent, in which they have committed to pursue rapid, inclusive and sustainable economic growth; to create a more just society by tackling poverty; to safeguard the rights of workers; to stabilise government and to build state capacity. The parties have made a commitment to invest in South Africa’s people through quality education and health care; to address crime and corruption; to strengthen social cohesion and build a united nation; and, to pursue a foreign policy based on human rights, solidarity and peace. As South Africans, we must each do what we can to achieve this mission. We will invite all parties, civil society, labour, business and other formations to a National Dialogue on the critical challenges facing the nation. We will seek, as we have done at so many important moments in our history, to forge a social compact to realise the aspirations of our National Development Plan. As individuals, as families, as communities and in our many formations, let us draw on our every strength to turn our dream for a better South African into reality. Even as we are united in our diversity, we are a people of deep and abiding faith. We pray for our nation, for our spirits to be lifted, and for our fortunes to be restored. We owe this noble mission our courage. We must be brave and we must be bold. This is a new tide that heralds progress, transformation and deep, fundamental change. We look to this rising tide with optimism and hope. We must reject every attempt to divide or distract us, to sow doubt or cynicism, or to turn us against one another. Those who seek to stand in our way, those who seek to inflame tensions, will not succeed, because South Africans are resolute. Those who seek to undermine our institutions will fail, because democracy lives in the hearts of our people and never be dislodged. Nothing will distract us from serving the people and advancing their interests. Now is the time to move forward. Together, we will do more and better. Now is the time to assemble all our capabilities and to direct all our energies to answer the call of the people of South Africa. We dare not linger, we dare not rest, until we have created jobs for those who need them; until there is enough food on every table; until every person in every town, city, village and farm receives the basic services they need for a decent life. We dare not rest until the women of South Africa are free from the social, cultural and economic constraints that hold back their progress. We cannot rest until criminals are off our streets and the drugs are out of our communities; until men no longer perpetrate violence against women and children; until those who steal from the people are held to account. We dare not rest while our communities are ravaged by flood, fire and drought. Together, we will confront the threat of a rapidly warming planet. We will accept our responsibility to respond to climate change in a manner that is ambitious, just and inclusive. We do this for the sake of this generation and all those that will follow. We will build a government that is capable and honest. Together, we will work to promote multilateralism for a fairer, more equal, more just and more compassionate world, founded on solidarity and universal human rights. We will join hands with our brothers and sisters across our beloved continent Africa to find peace, to achieve stability, to advance development. Through the African Continental Free Trade Area, through the construction of roads, and rail lines, factories and power stations, Africa will embark on a new age of production and commerce. Today, I make a solemn commitment to be a President for all South Africans; to defend our Constitution and protect our democracy; to work with all those who share the dream of a better life for all; to care for the poor and the vulnerable, and to support all those who are in need; and to make our country stronger, more resilient, more equal and united. This is the dream that the poet Sandile Dikeni describes in his work ‘Love Poem for my Country’: My country is for health and wealth See the blue of the sea And beneath the jewels of fish Deep under the bowels of soil Hear the golden voice of a miner’s praise for my country My country is for unity Feel the millions See their passion Their hands are joined together And there is hope in their eyes On this day, our hands are joined together. We are united. We are full of hope. May God bless South Africa and protect its people. Nkosi Sikelel’ iAfrika. Morena boloka setjhaba sa heso.  God seën Suid-Afrika.  Mudzimu fhatutshedza Afurika. Hosi katekisa Afrika. I thank you. South Africa's Cyril Ramaphosa was sworn in for second full term as president. NewsHawks 1ssue 179, 14 - 27 June 2024

DUMISANI MULEYA SOUTH African President Cyril Ramaphosa delivered a compelling and instructive speech during his inauguration in Pretoria, pregnant with meaning and lessons for many leaders in Africa and around the world. It was particularly pointed and relevant to Zimbabwean President Emmerson Mnangagwa, a close neighbour just north of the Limpopo, as he came to power through a military coup in November 2017 and has been repeatedly accused of stealing elections in 2018 and 2023. His re-election was actually rejected by the South African Development Community (Sadc) election observer mission and governments in an unprecedented move in the region. Ironically, Ramaphosa pussyfooted around the issue, which remains on the table for Sadc leaders who meet in Harare in August. Mnangagwa, who is fighting with Zambian President Hakainde Hichilema over the issue, intends to railroad Sadc leaders to sanitise, whitewash or reverse the report when he takes over as annual chair of the regional bloc. Yet Mnangagwa is bidding to extend his stay in power by two more years to 2030, beyond his constitutional term limit which restricts him to 2028. This is coming hardly a year after his second term, showing his gargantuan appetite for power. Zimbabwe has a long history of violent, fraudulent and stolen elections throughout its post-colonial political trajectory. Addressing heads of state and government, former presidents, royalty, diplomats, international community and organisations representatives and South Africans from different walks of life at the Union Buildings in Pretoria, Ramaphosa said: "And so, as we enter another era in the life of our nation, the resilience of our democracy has once more been tested and the people have spoken loudly that they choose peace and democracy over violent, undemocratic and unconstitutional methods. "In their multitude, in voices that are many and diverse, the people of South Africa have voted and made known their wishes, their concerns and their expectations. "We accept and respect the results of the elections and we once again say the people have spoken. Their will shall be done without any doubt or question. "The voters of South Africa did not give any single party the full mandate to govern our country alone. "They have directed us to work together to address their plight and realise their aspirations. "They have expressed their appreciation of the progress in many areas of their lives over the past 30 years of democracy. "They have also been unequivocal in expressing their disappointment and disapproval of our performance in some of the areas in which we have failed them. "They want a transformed, growing and inclusive economy that creates jobs for millions of job-seekers and offer business opportunities to all entrepreneurs in our nation – women and men, young and old. "The people have been clear about what they want." Apart from the dramatic irony to Mnangagwa, Ramaphosa's speech was also critical for Zimbabweans who have been robbed at elections many times and their popular will thwarted through violence, terror, fraud, manipulation and brazen theft. Zanu PF, which has long collapsed into state institutions for rescue and lost popular support, and its leaders remain in power largely due to their liberation struggle legacy and eroding social base, abuse of the state machinery, illegalities, manipulation, vote-buying, fraud and violence, among many other democratic aberrations and depredations. Zimbabwe's post-colonial story is to a large extent a story of violent, rigged and disputed elections dating back to 1980, the country’s Independence. African leaders across the length and breadth of the vast mineral-rich, yet poor continent usually refuse to accept electoral decline of their parties or their candidatures; they reject election outcomes that they do not want, manipulate polls and engage in brazen fraud to stay in power against the people's will — even if it means going down with the country. Ramaphosa's speech was critical as it reflected on those issues, pivoting the people's will even though the governing ANC lost its majority, plunging to 40% from its commanding heights of popular support averaging above 60%. The elections put South Africa and in the process Ramaphosa's own democratic credentials to test. Instead of angrily rejecting the results and making excuses for his party's decline in support, the South African President, widely criticised for being a hestitant and indecisive leader, accepted and embraced the outcome, seizing the opportunity to form a new Government of National Unity (GNU) which seeks to fix the broken country and economy. Even though it is struggling with many problems, South Africa relatively remains a silver lining in Africa's dark cloud of misrule, corruption and incompetence. Although some South African opposition parties like EFF and MK, as well as analysts, say the GNU arrangement amounts to regression to the apartheid paradigm due to the DA's involvement and its leverage, Ramaphosa says the new government is largely a product of the collective will of the people who gave no party a majority to govern alone. In other words, it is not the ANC and its leader's fault, but the will of the people. That is not entirely true, yet partly correct. The DA is the second-largest party in South Africa after the ANC, hence its big say in the new arrangement. While the MK and EFF have some genuine issues, including complaints of irregularities yet to be tested in the courts of law, Ramaphosa says those sulking and refusPage 46 The Big Debate President Emmerson Mnangagwa with Zambian President Hakainde Hichilema. Lessons in democracy for Zim from SA contentious elections NewsHawks Issue 179, 14 - 27 June 2024

The Big Debate Page 47 ing to join hands with others on an array of self-serving conditionalities are motivated by personal power ambitions and toxic agendas polarising the nation. Although the big question remains whether the ANC will recover from its "strategic retreat" — defeat for some — Ramaphosa seems to have chosen stability of the nation over volatile ideological affinities which may have been populist and popular, but left the country in a state of flux. He did not want to gamble with fickle former comrades, harbouring personal vendettas, who might have used the opportunity to overthrow him, especially the MK which had demanded he should not be part of the new government. The ANC decline, which has caused anxiety in South Africa, regionally and internationally, especially in the global south, may be a setback which forced it into a Faustian bargain — a deal with the Devil motif, meaning an arrangement in which one loses their values, principles and soul for anything earthly or materially they ever wanted — but it also offers a huge opportunity for regrouping and renewal, moreso under a new leader after Ramaphosa. If the ANC eventually reunites with its offshoots, the EFF and MK, for instance, after Ramaphosa, it stands a great chance of bouncing back at a political cost, given its still strong social base and appeal across society — it won seven out of nine provinces, some with shrinking margins below 50%. Recovery is still within the ANC’s grasp and reach, depending on what it does or does not do between now and the next elections, especially concerning urgent leadership and structural renewal, as well as realignment and reconfiguration of its core mission and direction. When Ramaphosa goes in 2027 during its next conference, that is if he survives until then, that becomes a glorious opportunity to regroup and renew. The collapse and death of the ANC — Africa's oldest liberation movement and leading light on many aspects compared to other African ruling parties — will leave South Africa on tenterhooks, facing an uncertain trajectory which may or may not herald a new and better era or future. Many in the region, across Africa and internationally, particularly in the global south who care about the subaltern, are not ready for the demise of Tambo and Mandela's party. This is also because of South Africa's illustrious liberation struggle and its geopolitical position, key to economic and strategic imperatives for developing countries, which behoves it to play a progressive role on international organisations like the African Union, United Nations and alternative power blocs like BRICS, a critical counter-Western global hegemony platform. The alternatives as currently configured on the South African political landscape. DA, MK or EFF, for example, do not inspire confidence even to those who badly want change, hence the hung parliament and the GNU, coalition as it were. Yet if the ANC continues with its self-destructive infighting and fragmentation, as well as failure to address urgent social and economic problems facing the restive nation amid corruption and ineptitude, it risks dying and permanent consignment to the political scrapyard of history like Unip in Zambia and Kanu in Kenya. Liberation movements do die, but some keep on going as they are doing in Tanzania, Botswana, Angola, Namibia and Mozambique. Others have survived after the ANC-like experience. The National Liberation Front (FLN) of Algeria is a party worth studying in that regard not only because it is the oldest political organisation in the country, but also due to the extraordinary capacity, will and determination it has shown to survive. FLN has now risen again to the political forefront in Algeria following a relatively long hiatus between 1988 and 2000. After being forced into coalitions, it won most seats in the 2021 parliamentary polls. FLN is an important example because it was the nationalist movement during Algeria's liberation struggle like the ANC, Zanu PF, Frelimo, Swapo, MPLA and others. Zanu PF, despite its violent nature and thieving of elections, is also worth studying because some of the reasons it has so far survived are to be found in different histories, factors and explanations. History, context, background and circumstances do matter. Violence and electoral theft alone cannot explain why Zanu PF has so far survived in power. Other than its strong underlying currency on critical issues and the much-needed calming effect and national cohesion, Ramaphosa's speech, which could have been much better if openly addressed feared DA and capital domination in the new government — real or perceived — struck the right chord on elections, their outcomes and impact, in Africa. African leaders are not alone in stealing elections or rejecting outcomes they do not want. Election rigging and rejection of results are not unique to Africa, but a global phenomenon. Here are some examples from around the world. In the United States, which purports to be the world's doyen of democracy — never mind India being demographically the biggest democracy on earth — disputes over election results have occurred, most notably in the 2000 presidential election (George W. Bush vs Al Gore) and 2020 presidential election (Donald Trump vs Joe Biden). Gore was the Democratic candidate for president of the United States in the 2000 election, in which he lost the electoral college vote 266–271 to Republican nominee George W. Bush despite winning the popular vote by 543 895 votes. After a gruelling 36-day Florida recount battle, Gore finally conceded the presidency to Bush on 13 December 2000. The Trump episode in 2021 is even more dramatic. Seething with anger, former US president Trump’s supporters stormed and breached Capitol Hill in January 2021, stoked by his defiant speech claiming the election had been stolen from him. Tens of thousands of his supporters braved bone-chilling temperatures to hear him speak at the Ellipse below the White House, after which many subsequently marched to Capitol Hill and stormed up the steps, bulldozing police, as some of the lawmakers’ office buildings were evacuated. Washington DC’s mayor had to issue a city-wide curfew, from nightfall through the next morning. “If you don’t fight like hell, you’re not going to have a country anymore,” Trump had thundered to the crowd, urging them to head to the Capitol to invade the citadel of power and symbol of American democracy. By nightfall four people were dead, and offices throughout the Capitol were trashed by the angry rampage, with lawmakers forced to barricade themselves in the House debating chamber or sheltering in their offices. In Russia, opposition leaders have always accused President Vladimir Putin's government of rigging elections unabatedly. Russian oligarch Alexander Lebedev — part owner of Russia’s Novaya Gazeta and proprietor of four United Kingdom newspapers, the London Evening Standard, the Independent, Independent on Sunday and i-newspaper, was in 2009 controversially barred by the courts from running for mayor of the Black Sea resort city of Sochi which hosted the 2014 Winter Olympics. In reaction, Lebedev said the decision to bar him for allegedly receiving donations (only US$20) from minors was “insane”, before likening the Sochi polls to fraudulent elections in Zimbabwe. As if that was not enough, Communist party candidate Yuri Dzaganiya told British journalist Luke Harding at the time: “These aren’t real elections; it’s the appointment of a Kremlin candidate with a little bit of (sham) local voting. “Our billboards get taken down in the dead of night. We can’t even distribute materials. I don’t appear on state TV. I have never been to Zimbabwe, but the comparison isn’t far from the truth!” This is contained in a book, Mafia State, by Luke Harding, a former British Guardian foreign correspondent in Moscow. Expelled from Russia in 2011 for his hard-hitting coverage of the Kremlin, Harding wrote the interesting book recounting his spine-chilling experiences under Putin’s authoritarian regime. The fact that Zimbabwe is used as an example of election-rigging in a far-flung and autocratic state like Russia really shows how it is now a key reference point on electoral fraud or a case study on stolen elections. The late former president Robert Mugabe and Zanu PF became notorious the world over for rigging elections amid violence and brazen electoral theft. What is really amazing about Zanu PF is no longer that it rigs elections, but the scale of the theft, brazenness and impunity. Across the Americas down south, Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro's government has also been accused of election fraud and voter suppression, leading to international condemnation. Voter suppression on a massive scale, illegalities and blatant fraud in last year's elections kept Mnangagwa in power. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan's party in Turkey has also been accused of election irregularities, including in the 2018 presidential election. Corruption scandals and voting widespread irregularities have marred previous elections in Brazil. Mexican polls have also been characterised by allegations of election fraud and vote-buying. Philippines President Rodrigo Duterte and his allies have faced charges of election fraud and manipulation. Even Ukraine, now at war with Russia, has witnessed election disputes and allegations of theft. Belarus strongman Alexander Lukashenko's government has consistently been accused of blatant election rigging and suppressing of opposition. In Asia, Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen's government has faced similar allegations. These examples illustrate that election rigging and rejection of results are matters of global prevalence and concerns, undermining democratic integrity and public trust. Ramaphosa's speech came in that context and against that backdrop. Many African leaders have historically struggled with accepting election results when they lose or face defeat. Some of those include Mugabe who refused to accept defeat to the late founding opposition MDC-T leader Morgan Tsvangirai in the first round of polling in 2008 and a subsequent almost certainly engineered run-off, storming back to office through a smash-and-grab strategy amid a violent and brutal army-spearheaded campaign. Former Ivorian president Laurent Gbagbo refused to step down after losing in 2010. President Alassane Ouattara defeated Gbagbo and was recognised as the winner by citizens, election observers, the international community, the African Union, and Economic Community of West African States. However, Gbagbo refused to step down, despite mounting international pressure amid a civil conflict and violence. Gbagbo was later arrested amd charged with war crimes and crimes against humanity at the International Criminal Court. Yahya Jammeh of The Gambia initially refused to accept defeat by Adama Barrow in 2016 until he was pressured to do so through local, regional and international uproar. North of the Zambezi, former Zambian president Edgar Lungu had to be pressured to concede defeat to Hichilema in 2021. Conceding defeat is not something candidates in African elections have traditionally been very good at. In a macho political culture that sees losing at the ballot box as a weakness, removal from the feeding trough, a shame and exposure to prosecution or retribution, refusal to accept undesirable results often leads to protracted battles in court, on the streets or in the worst cases civil conflict and military crackdown. However, some leaders in Africa have graciously accepted defeat, for instance Nigerian president Goodluck Jonathan in 2015 magnanimously threw in the towel before Muhammadu Buhari after the latter's stunning victory. By so doing, he joined a growing list of African leaders for whom humbly admitting the game is up has now become a source of pride as Ramaphosa's speech shows. South Africa, given its volatile situation, is lucky to avoid that fate, particularly given current circumstances and agitation. Yet election disputes are still rampant in Africa, especially in Zimbabwe. This has led to controversies, post-election violence and unrest, political instability and tensions, refusal to step down, fraud or voter intimidation to hang onto power, suppression of opposition and dissenting voices, brazen undermining of democratic institutions and processes, international condemnation and sanctions. In the end, disputed polls, as the case of Zimbabwe shows, breed chronic lack of political legitimacy, protracted crises and national gridlock, leading to stagnation and collapse in certain instances. This trend deeply undermines democratic consolidation and perpetuates authoritarianism in Africa, as Zimbabwe shows. In the regard, South Africa has instructively shown the way and Ramaphosa's speech reflects that, a feather in Africa's cap. NewsHawks 1ssue 179, 14 - 27 June 2024

Page 48 The Big Debate NewsHawks Issue 179, 14 - 27 June 2024 South Africa’s recent election sends clear message to Zanu PF and Zim BRIAN RAFTOPOULOS Despite the ANC losing its majority, the ruling party did not resort to violence or electoral irregularities to re-assert its dominance. This is in stark contrast to the violent and much-disputed electoral history of Zanu-PF. THE 2024 elections saw the ANC lose its parliamentary majority for the first time in the post-apartheid era. The vote for the liberation party declined from 57.5% in 2019 to 40.2% in 2024, leading to a fall in the number of National Assembly seats from 230 in 2019 to 159 in 2024. In second place in the elections was the Democratic Alliance with 21.8% of the vote, and we saw the strong emergence of uMkhonto Wesizwe, the newly formed party of the former leader of the ANC, Jacob Zuma, which emerged with 14.6% voter support. The decline in support for the ANC and strong support for Zuma’s new party and other smaller opposition parties were, arguably, the result of a combination of the cumulative effect of deepening poverty and inequality in South Africa since 1994, the lack of service delivery by the state, and the articulation of these genuine grievances into historically constructed and contested ethnic and racial identities “in the form of ethno-nationalism, apartheid nostalgia and the romanticisation of the darker moments of the anti-apartheid struggle”. The major outcome of this election is that the ANC has negotiated a Government of National Unity (GNU) under the leadership of Cyril Ramaphosa and the ANC. The GNU is faced with the complex challenges of dealing with the apartheid legacies of poverty, inequality and complex ethnic and racial constructions of national belonging. Implications for Zimbabwe      The Zimbabwe Exemption Permit (ZEP) For Zimbabwean migrants in South Africa and their families back home, the ZEP issues have been a major concern for several years. The upsurge in xenophobic narratives in some political parties in the recent past has exacerbated the sense of fear, insecurity and anxiety among migrants in South Africa. While the immigration issue was in the top five agenda items in the manifestos of all the parties in the recent elections, it is unclear how the GNU will move on the ZEP issue. This is because of a combination of the potential differences among the GNU parties on immigration, the ongoing legal challenges to the unlawful termination of the ZEP, the administrative incapacity of the state in the implementation of the policy, and the lack of clarity of the recent  government White Paper  on Immigration issued by the Department of Home Affairs (DHA). In a  strong critique of the paper, the Southern African Liaison Office, a South African NGO, laid out some of its weaknesses: “The DHA goes to great lengths to build a case that the proposition to overhaul the current system is in line with international trends, but the DHA has been selective in building its case on practice and not ‘best’ practice. Additionally, the White paper lacks insight into the socio-economic conditions and political drivers that have played a role in promoting anti-immigrant sentiment, coupled with the spread of migration misinformation published and promoted by public officials, and political and social movement leaders. It is clear that the White Paper adopts some of the narratives as a basis for the proposals, which re-surface similar language and tone.” Sanctions While there are likely to be differences in the GNU over the sanctions issue and Zimbabwe, this is unlikely to change the SA government’s position in support of the removal of the remaining sanctions on the Emmerson Mnangagwa regime. Given the continued support of SADC and the AU for the government of Zimbabwe on this question, it will be very difficult for the GNU to shift the current SA position on this matter. Moreover, in a move closer to the EU’s sanctions position on Zimbabwe, the US government has also recently moved towards targeted sanctions. In March 2024 the US Department of the Treasury announced that President Joe Biden signed an  Executive Order “terminating the national emergency with respect to Zimbabwe and revoking the Executive Orders that have authorised Zimbabwe-specific sanctions. As a result, the economic sanctions administered by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) pursuant to the Zimbabwe sanctions are no longer in effect.” The  statement also noted  that the US was moving toward “a clear and targeted approach to hold egregious human rights offenders and corrupt actors accountable” according to the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act. Given the strained relations between the US and South Africa, particularly relating to the latter’s strong position on Palestine and its “ability to act as a normative superpower, exceeding even the great powers in its capacity to shape the global moral discourse”, in the context of the changing power relations in global politics, the potential move by the US towards a more transactional relationship with the authoritarian Mnangagwa regime should not come as a surprise. The US has a long history of such relationships.   The state of the opposition In much of the political sphere in South Africa, there is an increasing concern about the divided and confusing state of the political opposition in Zimbabwe. There is little doubt that the long-term strategy of the state to systematically dismantle the main opposition party in the country has had dire effects on the capacity and structures of opposition politics. However, the persistent fractures and leadership transitional challenges in the MDC since the mid-2000s, and the more recent turmoil in the Nelson Chamisa-led CCC, have cast serious doubts on the future of opposition politics in Zimbabwe. Chamisa’s concentration on the importance of his personal leadership, the party’s lack of structures and his politics of “strategic ambiguity”, have contributed to the disarticulation of opposition politics. While historically the ANC has had a problematic relationship with Zanu-PF, it has had even more challenges with opposition politics in Zimbabwe. Thus, the current state of the opposition has facilitated its narrative of legitimising the post-coup regime in Zimbabwe. In addition, Chamisa’s  continued call for SADC  to “peacefully resolve the issues around the irregular and disputed election” of 2023, is unlikely to lead to any further substantive regional involvement.   Elements of hope There are two hopeful outcomes of the South African elections. First, despite the ANC losing a majority vote in the National Assembly, the ruling party did not resort to violence or electoral irregularities to re-assert its dominance. Instead, it respected the vote of the citizenry, the Constitution and the electoral institution put in place after 1994. This is in stark contrast to the violent and much-disputed electoral history of Zanu-PF and its party/state. Second, considering the voting outcome, the ANC has begun the process of setting up a Government of National Unity without the intervention of SADC and is calling for a renewed politics of non-racism and reconciliation. It is still too early to gauge whether this process can be sustained, given the major cleavages in South African society. But it could send a different message from the polarised and retributive politics of Zimbabwe’s ruling party. — Daily Maverick. *About the writer: Professor Brian Raftopoulos is senior research fellow at the Nelson Mandela School of Public Governance, University of Cape Town, South Africa.

NewsHawks The Big Debate Page 49 1ssue 179, 14 - 27 June 2024 Introduction COALITION administrations frequently occur in democracies and under all election systems. One of the key reasons that parties join coalition governments is to share power or to advocate about policy change or policy reform. Additionally, a national catastrophe can force political parties to form an alliance.  This occurs whenever there is a disagreement of some kind, a crisis involving the constitution or the succession, or a dramatic upheaval in politics. As a result, the parties decide to work together as a coalition and establish official agreements to divide administrative authority or accountability. This paper  analyses the literature on coalition governments and scenarios that foreshadow a coalition government in South Africa’s upcoming 2024 elections. It suggests a framework that could facilitate to form a coalition government that may lead to the best interests of the country if no party wins the majority in the parliament. A coalition government is a system of administration in which two or more political parties work together to establish a government  (Longley, 2023). In various countries around the world, peculiar conditions can warrant the creation of any kind of political alliance. In several European countries, coalition governments are typical (Longley, 2023). However, the main goals of forming a political or government coalition are to secure a majority for the government, establish a strong opposition to the government, and, during elections, to increase turnout. But one of the main issues that political parties frequently encounter while creating or committing to a coalition is competing policy viewpoints, and the relative influence of coalition parties is vitally dependent on institutional structure. Institutions, in particular, allow for the reliable implementation of agreements because policy must be a compromise reached by all governing parties (Martin & Vanberg, 2020). According to  World Animal Net (2017), prior to forming a coalition, it is vital to consider research and risk assessments (benefits and downsides) into account. One must evaluate whether working with the coalition is the best course of action in order to address institutional crises or instability that could represent a serious risk to the country’s administration. Political parties consequently consent to defend common ideologies and tactics in order to build coalitions. Longley (2023) asserts that the creation of a coalition government happens when no party wins a majority of seats in the legislature under a proportional representation electoral system. It can occur in an electoral system as well, albeit it occurs more frequently in proportional systems. The main causes of coalition governments are proportional voting processes, a thirst for power, and times of national emergency. As a result, coalitions may be helpful if they foster communication and consensus-building, offer a wider spectrum of representation, and encourage compromise as a method of resolving conflicts (Longley, 2023). A coalition may also be viewed negatively because it could dissolve at any time, which would make its mission impossible. Additionally, a coalition could break key election promises, leading voters to question the legitimacy of elections. In South Africa, there is a growing wave of coalition in local government, and it is predictable that the national elections of 2024 may lead to the formation of a national government coalition  (Gumede, 2023;  Joshua, 2022; Masina, 2021). This is because the ANC, the nation’s main party, has seen a significant decline in support over the past three elections in 2016, whether they were local or national (Makgale, 2020). The disillusioned ANC voters have been extremely beneficial to opposition parties. In light of a potential coalition government at the national level, this study examines an alternative path for South African public administration and governance. Background  Before analysing the creation of coalition in South Africa, it is crucial to realise that coalition governments have been established in numerous regions of the world in response to policy change or reform. Between policy change and policy reform, declares the OECD (2013) , there are subtle differences. The literature commonly conflates the two concepts. As opposed to policy reform, which often refers to a large change in policy, policy change describes (minor) tweaks made to established frameworks or the establishment of brandnew, innovative policies  (OECD, 2013). In other words, policy reform refers to the process of making existing systems more effective and ensuring that they can respond to future changes in an equitable and efficient manner, whereas policy change may or may not be prompted by reform as an intentional policy intervention. The distinct political past history and political culture of each nation, however, has affected or is changing the way elections are conducted. As a result, some countries are more likely than others to have a coalition administration that successfully furthers the national goal. Coalition governments are most frequently formed on the African continent as a result of national crises, sharing of power, and proportional voting systems. As a result, the general African experience to date indicates that coalition politics is unlikely to be the political road forward until there is a significant change in attitudes, which is unlikely in civilisations where maintaining power is still regarded as the key to amassing riches  (Walter, 2006). Political parties in Africa form coalitions before or after elections for a variety of reasons, including a perceived interest or political goal, such as to win an election and form a government or to establish a majority that can operate in parliament. Contrary to other continents, Africa has witnessed instability and a number of coalition administrations breaking up  (Masina, 2021)  . The dissolution and wave of instability are not immune to the new coalition governance experience in South Africa. According to  Walter (2006)  , the need to ease inherited ethno-regional tensions had an effect on the establishment of the first wave of coalitions, which appeared just before or soon after independence in nations like Congo-Kinshasa (DRC), Uganda, Nigeria, and Zimbabwe. A second wave of coalitions appeared once multipartyism started to flourish once more in the early 1990s. These coalitions were always going to be fragile, and their vulnerability ultimately led to their instability and dissolution.  Masina (2021)  emphasised that countries like Kenya, Malawi, and South Africa have experienced instabilities in the formation of political coalitions due to post-election Coalition government is a new path to public administration IFP leader Velenkosini Hlabisa, ANC President Cyril Ramaphosa and DA leader John Steenhuisen.

violence and instability, contestation and contested elections results, lack of ideological affinity, lack of ideological convergence, etc. In addition, a few of the elements that contributed to the breakdown of coalitions in Africa include ethnic politics, personality conflicts, a lack of effective institutions for resolving disputes, a lack of a culture of trust in the political system, ideological dissonance, and a persistent fear of power-sharing reminiscent of the one-party political culture  (Masina 2021; Walter, 2006). During the post-apartheid era in South Africa, the coalition government wave first started to take hold. According to  Makgale (2020)  , coalition politics were used to dominate the City of Cape Town for 20 years under the leadership of Helen Zille and Kwa-Zulu-Natal. The 2016 local elections also marked a turning point in South African politics as a distinct political coalition wave could be visible. The political landscape of South Africa saw a significant upheaval thanks to the African National Congress (ANC), which has had complete electoral dominance and control since 1994 (Makgale, 2020). The national ruling party has lost support in the majority of major cities, including Nelson Mandela Bay, Johannesburg, and Tshwane. Opposition parties joined forces to oust the ANC in the three most crucial municipalities. In a similar vein, the coalition seized power in these important South African cities, including Ekurhuleni, the ANC’s longtime stronghold. Sadly, it was also recognised that most administrative coalitions between competing political factions were undergoing bouts of instability and disruption. Levy (2022) claims that during the metro coalition administrations’ unstable and conflict-ridden rule, governance and service provision were weakened. Because there are no laws governing coalitions in South Africa, these organisations frequently change their leadership. This suggests that the coalition government forming in South Africa is not fundamentally different from what has happened or is presently happening in other African countries (lack of agreement on values and strategies or on policies and protocols). Theories of coalitions  Since the ANC majority is dwindling, many South Africans think that a coalition government at the national level may be feasible following the 2024 elections. A major force in South African politics since the country’s democratization in 1994, according to  Levy (2022) , is the African National Congress. Election outcomes since 1994 at the national, provincial, and municipal levels have validated the ANC’s support and domination. The largest cities of Johannesburg, Tshwane, Nelson Mandela Bay, and Ekurhuleni all saw a decline in ANC support during the 2016 local government elections. Therefore, currently, it seems like coalitions cannot be avoided as dissatisfied ANC supporters are transferring their interest in backing opposition parties, as many analysts forecast about a progressive collapse of the ANC at below 50% in the general elections of 2024. For instance, the Democratic Alliance (DA) and the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) formed a coalition with other smaller parties to overthrow the ANC in major cities like Johannesburg, Tshwane, and Nelson Mandela Bay Metros because of the results of the 2016 local government elections (Kotze, 2023). As was previously mentioned, most African nations only allow national politicians to form coalition governments, and the agreements between political parties are not made public, which many analysts believe is the root of conflict between coalition members (Walter, 2006; Levy, 2022). In order to avoid instability and disagreement among coalition participants, this argues that a controlled structure should be created to oversee coalitions in South Africa. As a result, coalition theories should serve as a guidance for coalition participants when forging alliances to avert instability and war. Several theories are being discussed on the formation of administrative and governmental coalitions, according to Makgale (2020) and many other authors cited below. These theories include the Office-seeking theory, the Policy Approach or Policy-oriented theory, Collaborative governance and power sharing theory, Representation and Inclusivity theory, Stability and Consensus theory, Checks and Balances theory, Negotiation and Compromise theory, Instability and Gridlock theory, Accountability theory, Policy Compromise theory, Minor Party Influence theory, Election Outcomes theory, Universalism theory, and the Efficient theory. Not all these notions are covered in this essay. There are supporters and opponents of coalition governments, which are formed when many political parties work together to form a government. The arguments for and against coalition governments frequently center on the advantages and disadvantages of such arrangements. Depending on the particular political environment, the objectives of the parties involved, and the preferences of the electorate, support or resistance to coalition governments can vary. It is crucial to remember that depending on the legal and political system in existence, the effects of coalition administrations can vary greatly from one nation to the next. In light of the theories discussed above, a new direction in public administration and governance to be led by the likely coalition government of South Africa in the years following 2024 could have both benefits and drawbacks, and the effect of such a coalition on the nation will vary depending on the particular context in which coalition partners will operate. It is important to remember that theories and models are not a complete representation of what will occur on the ground, but rather are intended to help coalition members form and guide their actions. Khatun (2021)  describes a new path to public administration and governance as an innovative approach of driving public administration. It involves administrative reform built on ideas to improve efficiency, effectiveness, and general performance of public services, as well as of transparency and close attention on incentive structures. In South Africa, a new path to public administration and governance seems to be inevitable in the coming 2024 national elections. Opinions predicting a new path to public administration and governance suggest different perspectives. Some views consider coalition administration and governance as a move to a fresh and innovative approach to how governments and public organizations are expected to function, which implies a departure from traditional or outdated methods to a commitment to adopting innovative approaches and modern mechanismto drive public administration  (UNDP, 2015). In addition, a focus on making government more responsive to the needs and expectations of its citizens (to improve efficiency and service delivery) and direct citizen engagement through participatory decision-making processes are being forecasted as a possible new path to public administration and governance in South Africa. Masina (2021)  supported a view that 2024 national elections could be a turning point in the political history of South Africa if all political parties, with the incumbent ANC included, fail to attain 50 plus1% of the votes. Consequently, the formation of political coalitions could be an inevitable option, which might generate new direction to the South African public administration and governance. Leaders to be forming political coalitions may need to be adaptive and open to change, able to navigate a rapidly evolving political, economic, and social landscape (new path). Most importantly, coalition at the national level could lead to a new path to public administration and governance in terms of the following  (Gumede, 2023; Joshua, 2022) : • Policy Shifts: The outcome of the election may lead to shifts in policy direction. The winning party or coalition might prioritize different issues, economic strategies, social programs, and foreign relations. • Economic and Fiscal Policies: A new government may implement changes to economic and fiscal policies, which could impact areas such as taxation, public spending, job creation, and economic development. • Social and Welfare Programs: A change in leadership might result in adjustments to social programs, healthcare, education, and welfare policies. The focus on poverty alleviation and social inclusion could be redefined. • Governance Reforms: The election outcome may lead to discussions and reforms related to the structure of government, decentralization, and the efficiency and effectiveness of public administration. Considering the above description, the 2024 national elections could shape a new path to public administration and governance in a country like South Africa. Therefore, the forth coming elections in South Africa, like in many other democratic countries, could play a crucial role in determining the direction of public administration and governance. Rationale for new path Majority of South African Black community are experiencing a situation of extreme poverty, joblessness, and inequality (Francis & Webster, 2019. Page 50 The Big Debate EFF leader Julius Malema NewsHawks Issue 179, 14 - 27 June 2024