NewsHawks 14 - 27 June 2024

NewsHawks The Big Debate Page 51 1ssue 179, 14 - 27 June 2024 The current government has failed to fulfil the expectations of South African citizens in term of providing their basic needs. The focus on examining coalition government as a new path to the South African public administration and governance is aligned to various analysis from experts in this field, which are observing the progressive decline of the ANC majority in key local, district and metropolitan municipalities in the period 2016-2018, and the rise of many oppositions’ political parties. According to Masina (2021) , coalitions are being formed to dethrone the ANC due to poor public service delivery, corruption, abuse of political power, and several socio-economic crises, including unstable electricity supply. In addition, in South Africa, there is a strong political competition. Political parties, mostly in opposition, have started to build up pre-election coalition with the objective of rebuilding national unity and cohesion, and engaging the country in the path of socio-economic transformation. Given the possibility of several coalitions emerging in the wake of the 2024 general election, the future of South Africa’s public administration and government appears to be uncertain. South Africa may see significant changes in the ensuing years, claims Rautenbach (2022) . Following the national and provincial elections in South Africa in 2024, coalition administrations may likely emerge in a number of the provinces as well as at the national level (Kotze, 2023). This would be a substantial change from the current situation, in which coalition administrations have only been established locally. Earlier, it was reported that South Africa’s coalition government and administration was nothing new. In the years following apartheid, the first wave of coalition administration and governance took place (Makgale, 2020). The second wave started after the 2016 local government elections in Johannesburg, Tshwane, Nelson Mandela Bay, and Ekurhuleni, which acted as a reflection of the ANC’s waning support because no candidate stood out as the election’s undisputed victory. In response to the results of the 2016 local government elections, the Democratic Alliance (DA) and the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) joined forces with a number of minor parties in order to overturn the ANC in the cities of Johannesburg, Tshwane, and Nelson Mandela Bay  (Makgale, 2020). A coalition partnership oversaw the administration of these metros and a few other towns. The African National Congress, however, has dominated South Africa’s political scene ever since the country’s transition to democracy in 1994. The ANC’s support and dominance have been confirmed by election results at the national, provincial, and municipal levels since 1994  (Levy, 2022). The nation is currently laying the groundwork for a new route in public administration and governance. In light of this uncertainty, South Africa is expected to draft a new policy outlining how public administration and governance will function. This policy will serve as the foundation for any coalition that might be formed in the event that no political party is able to win a majority in the country’s 2024 general election.  However, it is imperative to acknowledge that depending on the unique setting, objectives, and coalition participants, the policies that direct coalition administrative and governance might differ dramatically.  Organisations, governments, or other entities frequently establish coalitions to cooperate on a single project or tackle a common problem. Transparency, accountability, and productive collaboration among partners are guaranteed by the rules and governance frameworks established for a coalition (Kariuki et al., 2022) . The following must be taken into account when developing common policies and values that could direct coalition governance (Beukes, 2021): • Mission and Vision Statement of coalition partners: The coalition must articulate its mission, objectives, and desired results in a succinct statement that is published. It is also necessary to specify the membership requirements so that everyone who wants to join the coalition can, whether they are businesses, people, or governments. • Leadership Structure: It will be necessary to design a leadership structure to specify roles and responsibilities for coordination and decision-making. The coalition must establish policies for decision-making procedures, whether by majority vote, consensus, or some other means. It is necessary to create protocols for resolving disagreements and conflicts among coalition members. It will be necessary to prepare crisis and contingency plans for handling unforeseen difficulties or crises that could affect the coalition’s operations. • Legal and Regulatory Compliance: A code of conduct describing acceptable behaviour and moral standards for coalition members must be created in order to guarantee that the coalition functions in accordance with applicable laws and regulations. The success of any coalition would also be ensured by a commitment to openness and accountability in terms of decision-making and finances, as well as regular reporting to the appropriate structures. • Inclusivity and Diversity: To guarantee representation from all pertinent stakeholders, policies encouraging inclusivity, diversity, and equity within the coalition must be drafted. It is necessary to specify tactics for including external stakeholders, such as members of the community, governmental bodies, and other organizations, in the coalition’s activity. Accordingly, coalition partners will need to consider additional alternative policy options in order to ensure the stability and effectiveness of their formation and operation. It is significant to remember that a coalition’s precise policies and governance structure will rely on its goal, size, and member preferences. To maintain the coalition’s efficacy and relevance, these policies should be outlined in a formal governance instrument, such as a constitution or bylaws, and periodically reviewed and revised. Coalition governments have both advantages and disadvantages. They can promote inclusivity and stability but may also face challenges related to compromise policy consistency, and accountability.  The success of a coalition government largely depends on the ability of the participating parties to work together effectively and address these challenges. In addition, political coalitions in South Africa, like in many other countries, can offer several opportunities in the post-election period. The specific opportunities and benefits of political coalitions will depend on the context, the parties involve, and the issues at hand. Some potential opportunities that political coalitions can offer in the post-election period in South Africa include  (Manyana, 2023; Cheeseman, 2019) partnership, as well as concessions for the greater good of public service delivery. Successful coalition governance culture also permeates the rest of society, promoting a culture of conflict resolution, fostering a culture of compromise among varied societies, and protecting the interests of all communities and stakeholders. This indicates that coalition government will probably result in more peaceful civilisations. However, in light of the aforementioned, it is crucial to highlight that political coalitions also come with difficulties and potential negatives, such as the requirement for ongoing discussion and compromise, which can occasionally delay decision-making.  The willingness of the participating parties to work together and identify common ground is a key factor in the success of a political coalition, election governance and policies in South Africa, because the political landscape is defined by various parties and diverse interests. The coalition’s make-up and the difficulties the country is dealing with at the moment will determine the unique opportunities and results.  Manyana (2023)  suggests that South Africa look towards creating coalitions with ideological underpinnings. Even though a coalition administration can have certain benefits and chances with careful planning, there are many obstacles that could prevent any coalition from being successful after the general elections of 2024. Desai & Acton (2023) claims that extensive and transparent agreements, mechanisms offering incentives to enforce agreements, internal conflict management mechanisms, and the processes to manage ministerial drift are all necessary for stable coalition governance to be formed.  The following factors should also be taken into account when planning to form a stable and efficient coalition governance  (Kotze, 2023;  Manyana, 2023): • Electoral Dynamics: The dynamics of coalition politics in South Africa are subject to quick change, and this is especially true following each election. As new players enter the political scene and parties gain or lose seats, coalition makeup may change. • Minority Governments: In Former South Africa President and MK leader Jacob Zuma.

Page 52 The Big Debate South Africa, certain coalition governments lack the absolute majority of seats in the legislature, making them minority governments. This can make it more difficult to pass legislation and run the government efficiently. • Economic and Social Challenges: High unemployment, inequality, and poverty are just a few of the many economic and social issues that South Africa is facing. Given the conflicting interests of the parties making up a coalition administration, it may be difficult for it to create and carry out policies that adequately address these problems. • Public Perception: Coalition governments’ stability may be impacted by how the public views them. Voters may regard a partnership as unstable or ineffectual, which could put the ruling parties in further trouble etc. Booysen (2021) claims that South Africa’s political alliances were beset by a number of difficulties. Successful coalition administrations in South Africa must place a high priority on good communication, make concessions, and see to it that transparent governance systems are put in place to solve these issues  (Joshua et al., 2022). To keep the government stable and successfully handle the urgent issues facing the nation, coalition partners must engage in continual discussion and negotiation. In several municipalities and provinces, but not at the national level, South Africa had a coalition government. It is important to highlight that coalition governments may encounter inherent challenges as a result of the range of parties involved. The ability of all parties to collaborate for the benefit of the nation and its people is essential to success. The success of any coalition government formed after the 2024 elections would also be heavily influenced by the unique political dynamics and setting of South Africa. Over time, coalition government dynamics may change. As a result, the formation of a coalition in South Africa following the 2024 general elections will be influenced by the election’s outcome, the distribution of seats in the legislature, and the political parties’ willingness to work together to achieve common goals. However, political party sizes and ideology can have an impact on the dynamics that result in a coalition government (Mokgonyana, 2023) as well as a number of other factors, such as: • Political landscape fragmentation: It becomes more difficult for any one party to win a majority of seats if there are numerous political parties with sizeable followings. • Voter preferences: Changes in support and voter preferences may prevent any party from winning a decisive majority. • Electoral system: The possibility of a coalition government might vary depending on the election system in use. Comparatively speaking, first-pastthe-post systems are less likely to produce coalition governments than proportional representation systems. • Party negotiations: In order to achieve common policy objectives or prevent a certain party from gaining power, political parties may bargain and create coalitions; and • Regional and ideological differences: Coalition-building may be more difficult in South Africa due to the country’s diversified political environment, which includes parties from various areas and ideologies. Therefore, it would be necessary to evaluate the political environment, polling results, and election outcomes closer to the actual date of the election in order to ascertain whether or not a coalition administration will be possible in the South African national elections of 2024. The outcome of the election and the possibility of coalition formation can be influenced by public opinion, party strategies, and unanticipated events. The solutions that could guarantee an effective new course in South African public administration and governance are explained in the part that follows. Potential Strategies Mokgonyana (2023)  claims that South Africa is currently experiencing a coalition government, and that the South African national election in 2024 is quite likely to witness a surge in coalitions due to the rise in varied viewpoints and interests, the need for moral and progressive leadership, and a desire for “change”. Before proposing tactics to ensure an efficient new path in South Africa’s public administration and government, a lesson from the appalling experience that weakened ANC support and redirected it to the emergence of opposition should be learned. There afe factors that weakened the ANC’s power as well as methods that coalition members should take into account for effective coalition administration and national governance. In case no party secures a majority in the upcoming general elections in 2024, there are causes that may have diminished voter support for the ANC as well as alternative solutions that can assure a successful new path in coalition administration and government in South Africa. It also reveals various factors that reduced its base of support. Since 1994, when apartheid came to an end, the ANC has controlled South African politics  (Makgale, 2020). The ANC’s election success in 2024, however, will be influenced by a complex interaction of these and other circumstances, as well as the political parties’ respective agendas, it is vital to highlight. Future electoral prospects for the ANC will be influenced by both internal and external forces because the political environment is fluid. In South Africa or any other nation, forging a new course in public administration and governance frequently entails tackling current issues, boosting effectiveness, increasing transparency, and encouraging innovation. Recognising that changing public administration and governance is a long-term, complex project is nevertheless crucial. Success frequently hinges on political will, the participation of civil society, and persistent attempts to overcome obstacles. Gumede (2023)  asserts that coalition governments are required to develop a coalition policy platform based on the shared contributions of all partners, essentially developing a new policy program that is not an individual party program but a collective coalition program. Coalition members, as well as the coalition itself, must openly and honestly communicate with their supporters on coalition policies and provide updates on their progress. In order to guarantee that the new course of action is in line with the changing demands of the people of South Africa, constant evaluation and strategy modification are essential. The administration and governance of new coalitions, if they are well-built or established, may be able to foster the growth of new leadership qualities among coalition members, facilitate the sharing of knowledge, expertise, materials, and opportunities for collaboration, and bring together a wide variety of individuals and organizations  (Manyana, 2023;  Cheeseman, 2019). By fostering a broader viewpoint and comprehension of the problem, diversity helps build coalitions. By targeting a larger population with a range of objectives and interests, it can also help in outreach. Thus, a potential fitting framework for a coalition government in South Africa is discussed in the following section. Potential Fitting Framework Beukes & de Visser (2021)  postulated that it is important to carefully evaluate the political environment, the parties involved, and the unique requirements and challenges of the country when developing a suitable framework for a coalition government in South Africa, or any other nation for that matter. Since there are multiple political parties in South Africa, coalition administrations have occasionally been formed at different levels of local government. In order to address issues of instability and promote coalition cooperation, this framework offers realistic and doable rules to political parties participating in coalition governance. It lays out principles and presents tools that can be applied in practical coalition management. They have to do with both the coalition’s creation and its administration or leadership. According to  (Vercesi, 2016)  , the state becomes unworkable when coalitions are unstable, which has a severe impact on service delivery. As a result, the country must provide a coalitions framework that political parties may use to build stable coalitions.  Components of the potential framework for a coalition government in South Africa are described with regard to discussions from Beukes & de Visser (2021) and Vercesi (2016): party in the alliance from dominating the others. 9) Long-Term Stability: Consider tools that can strengthen the coalition government’s stability, like fixed-term contracts and no-confidence vote thresholds, legislative strategy, independent audits, long-term vision, clear coalition agreement, effective leadership, policy compromises, shared decision-making, conflict resolution mechanisms, etc. To keep the coalition together and maintain stability, promote open communication and collaboration. 10) Electoral System: Due to South Africa’s proportional representation (PR) voting system, coalition administrations are more likely to form, and the political environment is frequently fragmented. Any framework must consider this system’s nuances. Think about implementing electoral reforms that support proportional representation and lessen the possibility of a hung parliament, as these measures can increase the stability of coalition governments. Any coalition government will need to be flexible, willing to make concessions, and dedicated to serving the nation’s interests. According to Beukes & de Visser (2021) and Vercesi (2016) , in order to prevent and settle coalition conflict, coalition formation must be used as often as possible. The coalition members can accomplish this by compromising and making concessions to one another to win each other’s cooperation. Therefore, transparency will have to be considered as a first step for the stability and success of any future alliance. In order to form a coalition, political parties must agree to differ on issues of national and regional importance and take local opinion into account during discussions. Additionally, political parties must hold internal consultations regarding coalition negotiations, develop a policy programme, and create shared policy positions. They must also seek the counsel of experts and negotiate personnel choices, such as hiring staff members or making purchases. Conclusion  This paper reviewed and examined literature aligned to coalition government in Africa. It focussed on a thinkable new path to public administration and governance at the national level in South Africa. Most literature reviewed and examined revealed that whether in Africa or in South Africa particularly, situations including financial mismanagement or poor public administration, toxic leadership or abuse of political power, corruption, political instability, or a failure to provide the population with basic services, lawlessness; and a plethora of political, economic, and social crises/crimes (load shedding or power blackouts, unemployment, bribery, poverty, etc.) are among the factors that are contributing to disruptive political or administrative power. Consequently, in South Africa, the number of African National Congress voters has substantially decreased since the past three elections in 2016, whether they were local or national, and opposition parties have greatly benefited from the disaffected voters of the nation’s liberation party. The ANC has lost strength as a result of political, social, and economic flaws. Most specialists in this field are forestalling and envisaging that South Africa’s public administration and government will eventually change path. One of the reasons for that projection is that the largest party in the country, the ANC, has suffered a sharp decline in popularity over the most recent elections in 2016. The ANC has faced allegations of corruption and poor leadership at various levels of government. As a result, the formation of coalition administrations both nationally and in some provinces is seen as an inevitable possibility for the forth coming national and provincial elections in South Africa in 2024. Considering that coalition administrations have only ever been established locally up until now, this would be a huge development. Therefore, because coalition government seems to be inevitable in South Africa, the risk of eventual crises, collapse, or fragilise coalition development remains unavoidable. Consequently, building a solid coalition will require efforts to minimise the risk of issues affecting most coalition development in Africa. Aspects such as politicking of ethnicity, personality conflicts, lack of effective dispute resolution, lack of policy congruence and compliance, lack of a culture of trust in the political system, ideological divergence, etc., could constitute a strong barrier to the formation of coalitions. In addition, political parties in Africa form coalitions before or after elections based on a perceived interest or political goal, such as to win an election and form a government or to establish a majority that can operate in parliament. Contrary to democratic advanced countries, which encourage negotiation and compromise policies through consensus-building, as well as compromise policies for the greater good of delivering public services and involving all partners and parties in governing in the interests of all constituencies of the partnership; African countries, including South Africa, continue to experience volatility and several breakups in coalition politics and coalition governments. However, if properly established or formed, new coalitions’ administrative and governing structures could support the growth of new leadership abilities among coalition members, facilitate the sharing of knowledge, expertise, materials, and opportunities for collaboration, and bring together a variety of individuals and organizations. Coalition-building and sustainability may be more difficult in South Africa due to the country’s diversified political environment, which includes parties from various areas and ideologies. Therefore, it is important to recognise that coalition success depends on everyone’s desire to cooperate for the sake of the nation and its people. The ANC’s electoral success in 2024 will be influenced by a complicated interaction of several circumstances as well as the political parties’ agendas. Future electoral prospects for the ANC will be influenced by both internal and external variables because the political environment is dynamic. Therefore, it is crucial to understand that changing public administration and governance is a difficult endeavour that may take time. Accordingly, the results of the 2024 general election and the willingness of coalition partners to implement policies that will secure and guarantee sustained efforts to overcome ethical challenges and ideological differences will determine a new path to transforming public administration and governance in South Africa. — Open Journal for Political Science. NewsHawks Issue 179, 14 - 27 June 2024

NewsHawks The Big Debate Page 53 1ssue 179, 14 - 27 June 2024 PAUL BARRETT/JONAH CHOINERE/ KIMBERLY E.J. CHAPELLE/LARA SCISCIO/ MICHEL ZONDO VISITORS to Lake Kariba – the world’s largest man-made lake, along the border between Zambia and Zimbabwe – come to enjoy the abundant wildlife, fine fishing or spectacular scenery. However, in 2017, our crew of palaeontologists came to Zimbabwe to hunt game of a different kind: dinosaurs. Many of our discoveries are still under study, but the team has just announced its  first new dinosaur, dubbed Musankwa sanyatiensis. At first sight, it’s unremarkable – just a few bones from a single hind leg. It was found with the thigh, shin and ankle bones still connected, but weathering out on the shore of Spurwing Island. However, once it was cleaned and back in the laboratory at the University of the Witwatersrand in South Africa, close comparisons with other Late Triassic (235-199 million years ago) dinosaurs from Africa and elsewhere revealed that it had several unique features that marked it out as a previously unknown species. Those features included the shapes and sizes of the areas where the muscles would have attached to the bones. Musankwa is only the fourth dinosaur to be named from Zimbabwe and the first named from the mid-Zambezi Basin (north Zimbabwe, southern Zambia) for 50 years. Although the material is incomplete, its close relatives were large, bipedal herbivores (plant-eating creatures that walked on two legs) with long necks, small, lightly built skulls, pillar-like hindlimbs, and sturdy tails.  Musankwa  would have looked very similar overall, and calculations (based on its limb bones) show it would have weighed a hefty 390kg – about the same as a horse. Lake Kariba expeditions Lake Kariba sits at the heart of a vast geological feature, the Mid-Zambezi Basin, which covers north-western Zimbabwe and extends into neighbouring Zambia. This deep, bowl-like structure is filled with thousands of metres of strikingly coloured, brick red mudstones and sandstones that were deposited by ancient river systems during the Late Triassic and Early Jurassic periods (235- 176 million years ago). In the 1970s, pioneering Zimbabwean palaeontologists Geoffrey Bond and Michael Raath discovered remains of an enormous dinosaur on one of the islands dotting the lake. But the remoteness of the region made further work difficult, and they did not return to build on their earlier success. As a result, the area was overlooked by other dinosaur scientists, even though there was clear potential for new discoveries to be made. A few years later, a small band of dedicated fossil sleuths led by Steve Edwards – a local safari camp manager – started making new discoveries of teeth and bones around the lake. News of these finds quickly filtered through the close-knit community of southern African palaeontologists, reaching the team at the University of the Witwatersrand, in Johannesburg. After discussions, a plan was hatched to visit the area in the hope of finding more complete material. In 2017-18, we were part of the joint team of Zimbabwean, South African and UK scientists that mounted two expeditions to Lake Kariba, using the houseboat Musankwa as our floating laboratory. The houseboat was essential to our trip: it allowed us to cover large distances, and transport our gear and finds. It also gave us somewhere safe to stay – camping was not permitted in Matusadona National Park due to the large populations of elephant, hippo and other game present. It was in honour of our houseboat and the Sanyati River, which empties into the lake nearby, that we named our new dinosaur find  Musankwa sanyatiensis. Ancient discoveries From the houseboat, we used small boats to reach shore and to navigate the sinuous inlets heading inland. Our days on Lake Kariba involved finding promising patches of bare rock along the shore and exploring these in the hope of finding bone. Fossil bone turned out to be common and we started adding many new locations to those reported historically. Although the lake shore is flat and the walking was easy, temperatures and humidity were always high (around 40°C), meaning even gentle strolls or attempts to dig involved working up a sweat. We also had to be on the alert for the local wildlife, which we encountered daily, so we often spent as much time looking up and around us as we did with eyes on the ground. Starting from the spots that Steve identified we quickly found new material, including the teeth, jaw bones and armour plates of a crocodile-like aquatic predator called a phytosaur (the first example of this group to be discovered in southern Africa). We also found lungfish teeth and dinosaur bones. Detailed geological study revealed that these fossils were deposited in an ancient freshwater swamp – a surprise as most other fossil localities in this part of the world were laid down in drier, more arid environments. Unknown histories Our newly discovered  Musankwa sanyatiensis  specimen, and others still being studied, highlight the potential of Zimbabwe for more new dinosaur discoveries. This helps to fill a major gap in our knowledge of African dinosaurs in general. Currently, we know relatively little of dinosaur history in this part of the world – the continent’s size is both a blessing and a curse for palaeontologists. However, we hope that this work will help to mark the start of a new chapter in understanding Zimbabwe’s deep past. Palaeontologist Tim Broderick, from the Zimbabwe Geological Survey and of Jeremy Prince and Associates, Groundwater Consultants, and Darlington Munyikwa, from the National Museums and Monuments of Zimbabwe, contributed to the research and this article. — The Conversation. *About the writers: Paul Barrett is individual merit researcher at the Natural History Museum in London. Jonah Choiniere is professor of dinosaur paleontology at the University of the Witwatersrand in South Africa. Kimberley E.J. Chapelle is assistant professor at the University of the Witwatersrand. Lara Sciscio is researcher and curator at Jurassica Museum in Switzerland. Michel Zondo is curator of palaeontology at the Natural History Museum of Zimbabwe and a palaeontology student at the University of the Witwatersrand. Zimbabwe’s new dinosaur discovery: inside the find

Page 54 Reframing Issues JEVANS NYABIAGE AS Zimbabwe  attempts to lift itself out of a punishing debt crisis, it is asking for "deep haircuts" from its creditors, including China, according to its finance minister, Professor Mthuli Ncube. But analysts say China is "not in the business of haircuts" and is unlikely to accept any reduction of the debt it is owed. Ncube is seeking help from creditors to address the US$19.2 billion that the country owes, of which US$13 billion is external debt and US$6.2 billion is domestic. Most of the debt was accrued during the era of late former president  Robert Mugabe - and most has remained unpaid for decades. Do you have questions about the biggest topics and trends from around the world? Get the answers with SCMP Knowledge, our new platform of curated content with explainers, FAQs, analyses and infographics brought to you by our award-winning team. "Zimbabwe is currently in debt distress due to the accumulation of external debt payment arrears amounting to US$6.7 billion," Ncube said. "The external debt overhang is weighing heavily on the country's development needs due to lack of access to international financial resources to finance Zimbabwe's economic recovery and priority projects." "We are looking for a lot of haircuts ... very deep haircuts and elimination of all penalties." According to Zimbabwe's debt registry, bilateral external debt stands at US$6.2 billion but US$4.7 billion of the amount is in arrears - about 76 per cent of the total bilateral debt. Harare owes US$4.1 billion to Paris Club creditors - an informal grouping of mainly Western creditor nations focused on sustainable debt-relief solutions. However most of that debt - about 98 per cent or US$4 billion - has been in default since Zimbabwe fell into financial hardship two decades ago. At that time, the nation was shut out of international financial markets, including the International Monetary Fund  (IMF) and the World Bank, following sanctions imposed on Mugabe's government by the US and other Western countries, largely in response to land seizures forced on white farmers - the fallout of which is still being felt today. Zimbabwe's biggest five Paris Club creditors are Germany, France, Britain, Japan and the US, accounting for US$3.1 billion or 75 per cent of the Paris Club debt. The country also owes non-Paris Club creditors, such as  China, US$2.1 billion, of which about a third is in arrears. Andrew Bvumbe, head of Zimbabwe's Public Debt Management Office, confirmed that the southern  African  nation owes China US$2 billion. "We are in discussions with all creditors," Ncube said in an interview on the sidelines of the African Development Bank annual meetings held in Kenyan capital Nairobi in May. As part of fixing its financial distress, Harare is planning to make far-reaching economic and governance reforms in the hope it will then be able to access international financial markets. To that end, in 2022, the country established a Structured Dialogue Platform for its arrears clearance, debt relief and resolution with creditors and development partners in order meet and talk through such reforms. The process to resolving the crisis is being championed by former Mozambican president Joaquim Chissano and African Development Bank president Akinwumi Adesina. But it suffered a blow in March when the US withdrew its support, accusing Zimbabwean President Emmerson  Mnangagwa's administration of being reluctant to make reforms. The US has since terminatChina 'not in the business of haircuts' as Zimbabwe asks for debt reduction President Emmerson Mnangagwa with his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping. NewsHawks Issue 179, 14 - 27 June 2024

Reframing Issues Page 55 ed previous sanctions against Zimbabwe and instead imposed new sanctions under the Global Magnitsky framework on 11 individuals and three entities, including  Mnangagwa  and his allies, who now face asset freezes and travel bans. America first implemented sanctions against Zimbabwe in 2001 in response to a controversial forced land seizure of farms under the direction of Robert Mugabe. Nearly 4,000 white commercial farmers in the country were evicted from their land, often violently, between the years 2000 and 2001. At the time, the US imposed targeted sanctions against selected Zimbabwean officials. More sanctions from the European Union followed in 2002, effectively cutting the country off from access to funds from international markets, including multilateral lenders such as the IMF and the World Bank. In a bid to rid itself of the long shadow of the Mugabe land seizures, Harare has since committed to implementing sweeping reforms, including a total US$3.5 billion in planned compensation for evicted farmers, with US$55 million allocated in the 2024 budget for this purpose. As lead negotiator in the debt dialogue process, Chissano said 80 per cent of the country's debt was in arrears. "Clearing arrears and solving the debt crisis is critical not only for Zimbabwe but also for the SADC [Southern African Development Community]," he said. He added that progress had been made in the reform agenda, such as the introduction of a new currency - the ZiG,  which was rolled out in May and is pegged to a specific exchange rate or currency basket and backed by a bundle of foreign exchange assets, including gold - and the planned compensation of former farmers, starting this June. However, he said the Zimbabwean government cannot implement the reforms alone and called on international partners to consider providing help. China, which previously criticised the US for its sanctions imposed on Zimbabwe, has said it is committed to helping Harare solve its debt troubles. "China firmly opposes any unilateral sanctions and  supports Zimbabwe in safeguarding its sovereignty and its right to development," Chinese ambassador to Zimbabwe Zhou Ding said. In April, Zimbabwean media reported that China had written-off an "unspecified" amount of interest-free loans taken on during Mugabe's presidency. "China attaches great importance to resolving Zimbabwe's debt issues," Zhou said at the time. "China would like to enhance communication with the Zimbabwean government to work out proper statements through friendly consultation. As a concrete measure, China has cancelled Zimbabwe's interest-free loans, which matured by the end of 2015." The ambassador did not disclose the amount of loans written off. But more recently, Bvumbe said there has not been any debt cancellation from China. "I checked with the embassy when it was reported," he said. "They didn't say anything about debt cancellation." The Asian economic giant is the biggest investor in the country's mining industry with Chinese companies having pumped more than US$1 billion into the acquisition of lithium ore sites in the recent past. The firms have spent millions of dollars to build lithium processing plants - turning Harare into a major source of the metal that is essential for making electric vehicle batteries amid the global transition to green energy. Zhou said the lithium mining industry is growing rapidly, offering Zimbabwe an opportunity to take up a position in the global new energy industry chain. "I believe that the Zimbabwean government will continue to make efforts to create a favourable business environment to make the mining sector bigger and stronger. And I hope that the Chinese companies will continue their investments in Zimbabwe's mining sector, based on Zimbabwe's needs and market principle," Zhou said. Besides lithium, Chinese companies have vast interests in tobacco farming and processing. As well as that, Chinese loans have built Hwange Power Station Unit 7 and 8, Kariba South Power Station, the Robert Gabriel Mugabe International Airport expansion project, and Victoria Falls Airport upgrading project, among others. But while Ncube may be asking for "haircuts" from Zimbabwe's creditors, Charlie Robertson, head of macro strategy at asset management firm FIM Partners, said it is unlikely China would be willing to shave anything off what it is owed. "China is always reluctant to accept a cut in debt it is owed, but is amenable to suspensions of interest and principal repayments," Robertson said. It is a sentiment echoed by sub-Saharan geoeconomic analyst Aly-Khan Satchu. "China will surely be supportive but is not in the business of haircuts and cancellations," Satchu said. "Zimbabwe has a valuable balance sheet, illiquid admittedly, but they too can negotiate a minerals-for-debt swap," Satchu said. He said the biggest challenge for the Mnangagwa government remains the negative spillover emanating from the Mugabe era. "The current regime has been unable to thread that needle until now," Satchu said. "It is clear that some kind of properly funded compensation programme could square that circle and then the government could enter into negotiations." Satchu said Zimbabwe is rich in the  minerals  that will power the new economy and opening up the mining sector in a transparent manner could be a quid pro quo for reaching a debt deal. This article originally appeared in the South China Morning Post (SCMP), the most authoritative voice reporting on China and Asia for more than a century. For more SCMP stories, please explore the  SCMP app  or visit the SCMP's Facebook and Twitter pages. Copyright © 2024 South China Morning Post Publishers Ltd. All rights reserved. — South China Morning Post. *About the writer: Kenyan journalist Jevans Nyabiage, based in Nairobi, is the South China Morning Post's first Africa correspondent. Finance Minister Mthuli Ncube has asked for help from creditors as he tries to address Zimbabwe's towering debt burden. Photo: AFP NewsHawks 1ssue 179, 14 - 27 June 2024

LUKE BATSIRAI TAMBORINYOKA MEMORY is a site of struggle. In Zimbabwe’s tenuous political story, 27 June is infamous for the bloody violence in the contrived run-off poll of 27 June 2008 in which Zanu PF used massive violence in its quest to reverse Morgan Tsvangirai’s first-round poll victory on the historic election of 29 March the same year. Since then, 27 June has become a figurative expression of the demon of state-sanctioned violence in the country. On 22 June of the same year, just five days before the blood-soaked run-off poll in 2008, President Morgan Tsvangirai had pulled out of the violent charade, saying he could not sacrifice the people for power. The democracy icon famously stated that he was a cultured African and would not dare walk to State House on top of dead bodies and graves. The rest, as they say, is history. The contrived run-off plebiscite was later dismissed by the Southern African Development Community (Sadc) and the African Union (AU) as a sham, leading to the formation of the inclusive government in February 2009, which government brought the much-needed fillip to the people of Zimbabwe. Since that bloody event of June 2008, the month of June has become ominously etched as a blot on Zimbabwe’s national psyche. As I write, and in line with their violent streak in the month of June, the regime has brutally attacked and needlessly arrested Jameson Timba and 77 innocent youths. They are currently languishing in prison after being denied bail. For almost a decade, Timba and I worked together as key lieutenants and advisers to both President Morgan Tsvangirai and President Nelson Chamisa. I know Jameson Zvidzai Timba very well and criminal activity of any sort has never been his vocation. But this being the month of June, the demon of violence has to grip this regime and it has to mete it out against innocent citizens. And by the way, dear reader, 26 June 2024 marked exactly two years to the day since that portentous Sunday afternoon when we held a public memorial for my late colleague and former workmate, Alex Tawanda Magaisa, at the City Sports Centre in Harare. Alex succumbed to epidemiological violence in the form of a heart attack in the United Kingdom where he was a law lecturer at the University of Kent. I was one of the people who were asked to speak at that memorial ceremony. With a bleeding heart, I obliged and glumly and tearfully gave my own testimony to the sorrowful multitude that came to bid him farewell. Alex was a talented son of Zimbabwe who was so gifted with a purposeful, deep and rich prose of analytical prowess that he served the nation through his weekly column, the Big Saturday Read. May your dear soul rest in eternal peace, Musaigwa. But today, I want to remind Zimbabweans of the other dark side of 27 June as a wicked political moment: a historically sordid day that grossly interfered with the high-pitched chorus for change in Zimbabwe towards the 2018 elections. Indeed, in many respects, 27 June is a black day that will go down into the annals of history as a dark patch in the country’s strident march to democracy and freedom. Today, I republish Morgan Tsvangirai’s 27 June 2016 memo to the people of Zimbabwe. It was an epic public disclosure on a continent where the ailments of national leaders are a top secret. It was the statement in which he went public for the very first time about his condition with cancer of the colon that eventually felled him. Of course, it will always remain a matter of conjecture whether this condition was natural or contrived by a regime so adept at getting rid of political opponents. On my part, I had privately haggled for quite some time with Dr Tsvangirai on when he could make this disclosure to the people of Zimbabwe. He had told me he would ruminate over the matter before making his decision. The intricate details on this and his relationship with Mugabe during the era of the inclusive government as well as his fears, hopes and frustrations, including some details which might shock readers, are all contained in my still to be published book, Service and Sacrifice. Suffice to say on 27 June 2016, while on a medical trip to South Africa, President Tsvangirai called me over the phone to tell me he had finally made a decision to go public on his health condition. He then asked me to draft a short message on his behalf to the people of this country. We exchanged drafts over the phone before I finally released the following statement on his behalf that very day. The disclosure of his medical condition marked a seismic chapter in the country’s history, culminating in the death of Zimbabwe’s democracy icon on 14 February 2018. The late Tsvangirai braved his ailment. He looked the beast of death right in the retina of the eye until his death. His diagnosis with cancer of the colon spawned big political decisions, including the appointment of two more vice-presidents, which decision the regime would later seize to infiltrate and destroy the party through captured state institutions in a desperate bid to decimate the people’s project. For me, Dr Tsvangirai’s terse 27 June memo, republished below, will always remain a poignant epistle in the momentous story of this country’s democratic struggle. The memo also adds to the blemish and taint that is carried by the date of 27 June in Zimbabwe’s political story: President Morgan Tsvangirai speaks on his health On the 8th of May 2016, my Zimbabwean doctors referred me to South Africa where a further diagnosis revealed that I am suffering from cancer of the colon. Following the diagnosis last month, I underwent a successful operation in the same month. However, a diagnosis of cancer is the first of several medical procedures that include treatment through chemotherapy, which treatment I began this week. As a leader and a public figure, I have taken a decision to make public my condition. It is my firm belief that the health of national leaders, including politicians, should not be a subject of national speculation and uncertainty. I want to thank my wife Elizabeth for her love and caring, my family, MDC members and the broader Zimbabwean society for their prayers and support on this journey. This health condition is unfortunate but can be faced by anyone. I intend to confront this development with the determination to overcome it. In the meantime, let us remain focused in confronting the national crisis we face. God bless you all. Morgan Richard Tsvangirai Conclusion Dear reader, the only way we can defend and protect Dr Morgan Tsvangirai’s legacy is to remain focused. We must continue to fight this corrupt and murderous regime until democracy is achieved in Zimbabwe. So many have sold out and so many continue to sell out in this inexorable march towards a new Zimbabwe. But we will certainly get there. And only then can Morgan Tsvangirai, the legend, truly rest in peace. Rest in power, Pakuru. *About the writer: Luke Tamborinyoka is a citizen from Domboshava. He is the former spokesperson to the late pro-democracy icon Morgan Tsvangirai. He is a journalist and a political scientist by profession. You can interact with Tamborinyoka on his Facebook page or on the X handle @luke_tambo Page 56 Regional News The late former Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai NewsHawks Issue 179, 14 - 27 June 2024 Morgan Tsvangirai’s June 27 epistle to the people of Zim

Regional News Page 57 ALAN DIXON MALAWI'S increasingly unpredictable rainfall and higher than usual temperatures are causing problems for smallholder farmers. Soil erosion has increased, causing soil fertility and water availability to decline.  Crops often fail. Farmers are already struggling financially. Many farm only one crop: maize. They can’t easily afford chemical fertilisers that would boost the soil’s fertility and sustain yields. Agriculture accounts for  just over 25% of Malawi’s gross domestic product. About 80% of the population depend on smallholder farming for their survival. We are soil fertility and sustainable development specialists. Together with sustainable agriculture and environmental researcher Augustine Talababie Phiri, we set out to discover how we could use different combinations of plants to improve soil fertility so that farmers wouldn’t need expensive fertilisers. We conducted trials on farms in northern Malawi where we tested a combination of different crops grown together. We then measured changes to the soil fertility in each field over a two year period. Our research found  that growing maize with cowpea and pigeon pea in raised “deep beds” led to much greater soil fertility. What we researched Traditional farming techniques involve tilling the soil each year and then planting and cultivating one crop on narrow ridges. However, these ridges are extremely vulnerable to soil erosion. We looked into the results of combining intercropping with deep bed farming. Intercropping means growing two or more crops side by side, instead of just one. Deep bed farming is a new practice developed in Malawi where a farmer digs with a pickaxe all the way through the hard layer of soil near the surface. This hard layer – the compacted soil hardpan – prevents plant roots from growing well, and usually stunts the growth of the crop. Breaking it up allows the crop roots more room to grow. The other part of deep bed farming involves planting seedlings on piles of soil 30cm higher than ground level. The farmer then digs a ditch next to these beds to catch and hold rainwater, and keep the soil moist for months. We worked with a Malawi non-governmental organisation,  Tiyeni, which has been training farmers in sustainable and climate-smart agriculture since 2004. Tiyeni had found that the maize yield from deep beds was much higher than maize grown the normal way. We decided to work with smallholder farmers in Msongwe, near the city of Mzuzu, to see if intercropping peas with maize in deep beds would give even better results. Our experimental design compared agricultural plots across two growing seasons, one after another. We tried growing different combinations of maize in traditional cultivation ridges (ordinarily sown in lines) and in deep beds, both on its own and intercropped with cowpea or pigeon pea. We then analysed the amount of nitrates in the soil – one of the most important nutrients to help plants grow. We also analysed the amount of phosphates (or phosphorous, another important nutrient) in the soil and measured the amount of maize that was grown. Inexpensive climate-smart solutions Our research found that intercropping improves the soil a lot. Legumes such as beans or peas take nitrogen from the atmosphere and turn it into ammonium and nitrate in the soil. This is a natural fertiliser. It improves soil health and supports better growth for other crops, like maize, that are planted alongside legumes. When cereal-legume intercropping is combined with deep bed farming, the results are even better. We found that: Soil is more fertile:  The nitrogen-fixing ability of pigeon pea and cowpea enriched the soil even more than ordinary fertilisers did. In the test areas with deep bed farming, the soil fertility improved even more and remained very fertile across the two growing seasons. Crops produce more:  Intercropping with legumes showed higher crop yields compared to the fields where only maize was grown. Again, these effects were higher in the deep bed farming fields across the two growing seasons. Why this matters This new method of farming improves the quality of the soil and its ability to grow more crops. Farmers can reduce their dependence on chemical fertilisers, which are often expensive and out of reach. This makes farming more sustainable and cost-effective. Higher yields of maize, cowpea and pigeon pea mean a greater quantity and diversity of nutritious food can be produced on the same amount of land. Because farmers don’t have to buy fertilisers, their profits are greater and it costs less to grow more crops to sell. Farmers used these profits for many different things, from paying school fees to investing in business enterprises. Deep bed farming reduces soil erosion and  compaction. When soil is compacted, or pressed together too tightly, it does not retain water. This is important in Malawi, which has suffered a number of El Niño droughts. The natural nitrogen-fixing process of legumes also reduces the environmental impacts of farming. In short, combining deep bed farming with legume intercropping can enhance the benefits already being achieved by both systems independently. As climate change continues to negatively affect agriculture worldwide, innovative approaches like these will be essential in creating more resilient and productive agricultural systems. (Augustine Talababi Phiri  was the lead author of the research that this article is based on.) — The Conversation. *About the writer: Alan Dixon is professor of sustainable development at the University of Worcester in Britain. Malawi farming experiment shows how simple changes can boost yields Smallholder farmers in northern Malawi, preparing deep beds to plant with peas and maize. Courtesy Alan Dixon NewsHawks 1ssue 179, 14 - 27 June 2024

Page 58 Regional News World News ROGER SOUTHALL A NUMBER of theories are being touted in South Africa about why and how former president Jacob Zuma retains his appeal as a leader. And why the party he formed –  uMkhonto we Sizwe  – to contest the recent elections managed to get  14.58% of the vote  in the national elections and  45.35%  in the provincial elections in KwaZulu-Natal to become the largest party in that province. This just over five months after its launch. But all the conjecture and explanations need to be treated with extreme caution: this is because nobody knows. Based on my five decades immersed in South African politics as a sociologist, I would argue that there is no easy explanation for the uMkhonto we Sizwe Party’s unexpected success or Zuma’s enduring popular appeal. There was similar dissonance 14 years ago when Zuma defeated the then African National Congress (ANC) president, Thabo Mbeki, at a watershed party conference  in December 2007.  I analysed  what one senior leader called the “Zuma tsunami” and how the event was being interpreted by the media, academics and thinking politicians themselves. I identified eight often contradictory and sometimes overlapping explanations of the phenomenon. At the time, the lack of consensus amounted to total confusion. And a fear that South Africa was confronting an abyss. Similar levels of apprehension accompany commentary on the role being played by Zuma and his uMkhonto weSizwe Party (MK Party) today. This requires deciphering. My initial survey of the media suggests five ways in which this is being interpreted. Zuma as South Africa’s Donald Trump The first theme running through much analysis is what we might term “Jacob Zuma as Donald Trump”, the former US president who is prepared to cause political mayhem to keep himself out of jail. This suggests that, fearing the end of the road after constantly appealing adverse court decisions to avoid prosecution for corruption, Zuma has played an ace in a deadly game of poker with the ANC. Whereas Trump has captured the machinery and followership of the Republican Party from within, Zuma claims MK Party is essentially the true ANC which has been betrayed by those who ejected him from the presidency in 2018. Trump claims the 2020 election in the United States was rigged by Joe Biden and shadowy “deep state” political elites. Zuma depicts the Electoral Commission of South Africa as having fixed the 2024 election  in favour of the ANC to keep President Cyril Ramaphosa in power. Trump threatens that his being sent to jail following his recent conviction as a felon would lead to a popular uprising. Zuma warns obliquely that any attempt to prevent MK Party from assuming power in KwaZulu-Natal would lead to violence. All this and much more,  as parallels between Trump and Zuma are reiterated. For added spice, Trump’s personal antagonism to Biden is matched by Zuma’s anger with Ramaphosa for displacing him. Ethnicity A second major theme running through much analysis is that MK Party’s unexpectedly strong performance can be explained by Zuma’s appeal to Zulu “nationalism”, or “ethnicity”. This territory is a conceptual swamp. Zuma’s popularity and MK Party’s strong performance in KwaZulu-Natal indicate that they have successfully appealed to aspects of Zulu culture, history and exceptionalism to get support from ordinary people in the province. Just as the late Mangosuthu Buthelezi and the Inkatha Freedom Party did before them. But there are always pitfalls in any reference to ethnicity. Key among these is the problem of who has “ethnicity” and who does not. An implicit suggestion often being that Africans have it, and white people do not. As with other terms which are often bandied about to explain the popularity of political individuals feared by liberal elites, notably “populism” and “charisma”, using it too loosely exhausts its explanatory power. In short, if we want to use “ethnicity” as an explanation for Zuma’s popularity in KwaZulu-Natal, we need to explain why he appeals to some Zulus and not others. Equally, we need to explain why Zuma remains popular among segments of the electorate across the nation, far beyond the boundaries of KwaZulu-Natal. This can hardly be ascribed to “ethnicity”. Coalition of the aggrieved The third suggestion sees uMkhonto weSizwe’s rise as the product of a “coalition of the aggrieved”: those who have felt sidelined by the Ramaphosa government’s policies. When Zuma was elected party leader, the trade union federation Cosatu and the South African Communist Party, driven by their opposition to Mbeki’s “neo-liberal” economic policies, joined hands with aspirant entrepreneurial elites who felt that they had been excluded from the fruits of  black economic empowerment. In the 2024 election, Zuma’s coalition of support is said to have drawn heavily from those who were fingered as involved in corruption by the Zondo Commission, which probed  state capture. They may have lost state contracts or fear prosecution. Contracts Hence follows a closely related fourth proposition. This is the notion that just as Zuma used his position as president to loot the state, shadowy players behind the MK Party back it to secure control over the provincial machinery. This, so it can allocate contracts and political goods in their favour. At the head of the queue are the mafias which have gained prominence in key sectors of the provincial economy, notably in transport and construction. Hence MK Party likely gaining support from lobbyists for the coal industry. And its  advocacy of South Africa’s further embrace of nuclear power. If pursued, these would offer multiple opportunities for the dishing out of subsidiary contracts to those close to the seats of power. An attack on the constitution Finally, fifthly, there is the notion that Zuma’s and uMkhonto weSizwe’s policy platforms embody an attack on the constitution and constitutionalism. I observed in my analysis of the “Zuma tsunami” that Zuma’s ascendancy had opened Pandora’s box. It gave rise to a style and content of politics which was not merely vulgar and disrespectful of ANC traditions, but explicitly dangerous to democracy. It appealed to a social conservatism which was hostile to the values of the constitution. Linked to this is a notion of Zuma himself as politically unprincipled and cynically disposed to exploit his popular appeal for personal ends. Nadine Gordimer, the South African writer who won the Nobel prize for literature in 1991, informed us that when she saw Zuma performing, she was reminded of Hitler in the beerhall. The urgency What follows from all this is that there is no easy single explanation of Zuma’s political renaissance and the appearance of the uMkhonto weSizwe Party as a potential spoiler and powerful player in South African politics. It is going to take time and careful analysis to understand it, to dissect it, and to unravel its significance. Many will agree that Zuma and his party constitute a clear and present danger to South African democracy. However, at the same time, we must seek to understand why Zuma and his party have attracted as much support as they have. Today, much interpretation of Trump’s popularity relies on notions of alienation, his exploitation of the fears and hopes of decent, ordinary, albeit socially conservative, people who have been left behind by the rapidly changing nature of America’s capitalist economy. Likewise, understanding Zuma’s enduring popular appeal requires probing why he gathers so much support from poor and unemployed South Africans. This despite the convincing evidence accumulated by the commission of inquiry into state capture that he presided over an era of unprecedented looting of the South African state which was contrary to their material interests. That there is no easy explanation for uMkhonto weSizwe’s unexpected success underlines the urgency of trying harder to understand it. — The Conversation. *About the writer: Roger Southall is professor of sociology at the University of the Witwatersrand in South Africa. South Africans have five theories about why Zuma’s still popular Former South African President and uMkhonto weSizwe leader Jacob Zuma dances at a party rally. Michele Spatari / AFP via Getty Images NewsHawks Issue 179, 14 - 27 June 2024

NewsHawks Regional News Page 59 1ssue 179, 14 - 27 June 2024 JOB MWAURA Nationwide demonstrations  have erupted in Kenya over a controversial tax bill. The Finance Bill 2024, initially presented to parliament in May, has sparked discontent with an increase in an array of taxes and levies for Kenyans. The  mass protests, initially organised in the capital city, Nairobi, have spread across the country. Demonstrations have taken place in almost every city and major town. Digital media and activism expert Job Mwaura shares his insights into how the protests were mobilised on online, and then onto the streets. How are Kenyans using the digital space in this movement? This is a powerful moment for digital activism. The protests have seen significant participation from young Kenyans who are using digital media to organise and voice their opposition. A great number of those driving the protests are Generation Z (often referred to as Gen Z) – individuals born roughly between the late 1990s and early 2010s and  characterised by  digital prowess and social consciousness. They have created this organic, grassroots movement which has used platforms, like social media, to mobilise and coordinate efforts quickly. Through my work  I’ve documented how essential digital media has been in political participation in Kenya in the past decade, particularly among the marginalised communities such as the young people and and women. In the current protests, we are seeing just how innovative activists can be when using digital media. The digital tools and strategies employed today are taking activism to an entirely new level. They showcase a sophistication and reach that would’ve been hard to imagine. They have deployed a number of old, and new, strategies. Among the new has been Artifical Intelligence (AI) which has been used to create images, songs and videos that amplify the movement’s messages and reach a wider audience. AI was also used to help educate wider audiences on the bill. Developers, for instance,  created specialised GPT  (Generative Pre-trained Transformer) models designed to answer questions on the finance bill. Platforms, like Tiktok and X are being used to share videos of people explaining the finance bill in various Kenyan dialects. Hashtags – such as #OccupyParliament and #RejectFinanceBill2024 – trended on social media platforms for several days, further highlighting the power of digital activism in mobilising support and maintaining the momentum of the protests. And then there has been very successful crowdfunding through digital platforms. This has enabled supporters to  send money for transportation, allowing more people to join the protests in Nairobi’s central business district. Another has been the use of hacking of government websites, disrupting services and drawing attention to their cause. Personal information, such as the phone numbers of political leaders, were leaked to allow protesters to spam them with SMS and WhatsApp messages. This forced the office of the data protection commissioner to  issue a statement warning them to stop. Activists have also  created a website featuring a “wall of shame” that lists politicians who support the Finance Bill. This helped the protestors increase pressure on parliamentarians to potentially change their stance. Some constituents are taking steps to recall their MPs. What stands out for you? That these protests are organic and that young people are playing a pivotal role. They have long felt  dejected  and  neglected by the government. This widespread sense of disenfranchisement among them was a ticking time bomb, and it has finally exploded into fervent activism. Unlike  previous protests, these demonstrations emerged spontaneously from the grassroots. This shift underscores a significant transition in Kenyan politics. We are witnessing a shift from ethnic-based mobilisation  to issue-based activism. People aren’t coming together based on their tribe. They are uniting to fight for specific issues that affect their daily lives, such as economic policies, government accountability and social justice. This new form of activism reflects a growing political maturity among Kenyans, who are prioritising shared concerns over ethnic divisions. It sets a new precedent for addressing social and political issues in the country. What has also stood out is how digital activism has driven nationwide physical protests. Young people have moved off their screens and onto the streets, forcing leaders to listen and even make amendments to the finance bill  before it was passed. This shows how online efforts can translate into real-world changes. It demonstrates the power and effectiveness of digital activism in shaping political discourse and policy. Digital activism provides a powerful platform for diverse voices to be heard, catalysing change. It’s enabled fast mobilisation of support, bridged gaps between diverse groups, and it has brought attention to pressing issues in real-time. For many years, digital media activism has been labelled as “slacktivism,” a term that refers to minimal effort activities like liking, sharing, or commenting online that are perceived as having little real-world impact. However, these recent events show that political leaders can succumb to online pressure. They demonstrate that even small changes initiated online can lead to substantial outcomes. Are there any drawbacks in this using the digital space for activism? Digital media is vulnerable to government censorship and interference. During recent protests in Kenya, there were  suspected signs  of the internet being slowed down, resulting in increased buffering, lags in downloading files, and disruptions to services on certain Apps. Despite these challenges, the impact of digital activism cannot be understated. It has revolutionised how people mobilise, communicate, and advocate for change. — The Conversation. *About the writer: Job Mwaura is a post-doctoral researcher at the Wits Centre for Journalism, University of the Witwatersrand in South Africa. Kenya protests: Gen Z shows the power of digital activism - driving change from screens to the streets

Page 60 Regional News World News NewsHawks Issue 179, 14 - 27 June 2024 PETER FABRICIUS KENYAN President William Ruto is taking some ribbing in the media. About a year ago he was publicly lamenting how demeaning it was that African leaders all had to go off to foreign countries to attend their summits with Africa. The African Union (AU) and regional economic community heads should be enough to represent the continent, he said. Last week he was apparently quite happy to traipse off to Seoul though. He attended the first South Korea-Africa Summit with some 24 other African heads of state and government, representatives of 23 other African nations, and AU Commission Chairperson Moussa Faki Mahamat. Earlier this year Ruto attended the first Italy-Africa summit — in Italy. The Seoul summit induced a sense of déjà vu for other reasons besides the familiar complaint Ruto raised. It was clear that South Korea had initiated the event, and appeared to have a well-thought-out strategy for it. President Yoon Suk Yeol  pledged  $14-billion in export credits to South Korean firms to enter African markets and made a further $10-billion pledge in official development assistance to Africa by 2030. He clarified what his country wanted out of the relationship — cooperation on developing Africa’s critical minerals, which his country needs to make electric vehicles and other advanced technologies. Also, African support in Seoul’s efforts to rein in its aggressive northern neighbour, particularly to try to persuade it to curb its nuclear weapons and missile development programmes. Yoon urged African countries to take firmer steps in an international pressure campaign against Pyongyang. The latter recently accelerated its tests of nuclear-capable weapons systems and flew hundreds of balloons to drop tonnes of trash and manure on South Korea as relations between the two worsened. In return, his country would continue working to ensure peace and security in Africa in line with the South Korean Navy Cheonghae Unit’s operations on Somali waters, and the United Nations (UN) peacekeeper force Hanbit Unit’s reconstruction assistance in South Sudan. His appeals were evidently heard as his and the African countries  announced they would start high-level talks aimed at improving cooperation over minerals. Africa is a major source of nickel, cobalt, graphite and lithium — crucial for technology industries such as semiconductors, batteries and electric vehicles. These are major export items for South Korea. And in the joint declaration, South Korea and the African nations reaffirmed their commitment to fully implementing UN Security Council resolutions against North Korea. They highlighted the “importance of the efforts of the international community to achieve a complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula”. Mineral needs For Seoul, as for other industrialised countries, Africa has clearly become more important recently, and the need for critical minerals has become sharper. Not only because of the increasing global pressure to accelerate de-carbonisation to curb global warming, but because the world has become tenser over the past two years, access to critical and strategic minerals has become more urgent. South Korea has hitherto accessed most of those through China, which has been doing its best to corner the market on them. But as China shifts further from the Western camp and closer to Russia, which is getting weapons and ammunition from North Korea to attack Ukraine, Seoul clearly seeks more direct and secure access to those critical minerals. Africa’s critical minerals lay the ground for mutually beneficial partnerships with industrialised nations. And so it signed deals to that effect with both Tanzania and Madagascar,  according  to its industry ministry, which said these were among 47 agreements signed on the margins of the summit with 23 African countries. In exchange, Seoul agreed to make concessional loans totalling $2.5-billion to Tanzania over five years while Ethiopia signed a $1-billion financing deal with Seoul over four years for infrastructure, science and technology, health and urban development. Broader Africa absence  But if several such countries came to the summit prepared, some commentators have lamented the fact that Africa as a whole didn’t. This is a familiar refrain from such summits. What potential was thereby squandered? It’s been suggested that collectively the Africans could have arrived with at least a position that required South Korea to commit to the principles of the AU’s mining vision. This focuses on strategies to ensure mining delivers more to host African countries, including beneficiation (adding value) to African critical and other minerals, and other spinoffs for host countries, such as local jobs. In addition, African Development Bank Group President Akinwumi Adesina said: “I wish to request that [South] Korea solidify this [South] Korea-Africa Summit by agreeing to rechannel SDRs [Special Drawing Rights] to the African Development Bank”. These SDRs marked “a new way to scale up development financing”. However, this wasn’t presented explicitly as an AU or even an African demand. In addition to more traditional partners, new industrial or industrialising countries such as Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and now South Korea are showing increased interest in summiteering with Africa. In response, in 2023 the AU drafted an African Partnership Strategy and Policy Framework stipulating how the continent should manage relationships with countries and with multinational bodies. For a continent-to-country summit — e.g. with South Korea — it proposes that Africa be represented by the AU leadership rather than by each country. It also laments the failure to articulate “Africa’s positions and expectations from partnership summits” and proposes that the AU adopt an action plan for each summit. That framework hasn’t yet been adopted, but will be considered by the AU’s Executive Council on 17 and 18 July in Ghana. One would hope, though, that it would be debated in the broadest sense because the underlying principles aren’t axiomatic. The continent doesn’t inherently speak with one voice on every or even many issues. So much could be lost by trying to straitjacket it into collective policies towards all partners or even denying individual national leaders the opportunity to travel abroad and meet the likes of Yoon and conclude national agreements. This is not an indignity if leaders choose to do it — as Ruto ironically demonstrated by his presence in Seoul last week. — ISS. *About the writer:Peter Fabricius is a consultant at the Institute for Security Studies in Pretoria. Kenyan President William Ruto First Korea-Africa Summit proves to be another missed opportunity for African nations African delegates arrived in Seoul without a collective plan. But did they need one?

NewsHawks Regional News Page 61 1ssue 179, 14 - 27 June 2024 Kenya protesters call for President Ruto’s removal after tax bill dropped Demonstrations continue across Kenya despite the government’s dramatic U-turn on legislation that would have raised taxes. POLICE in Kenya’s capital, Nairobi, have fired tear gas and rubber bullets to disperse demonstrators who rallied in another day of protests sparked by a controversial bill that would have raised taxes on essential goods. Hundreds of people on Thursday took to the streets to call for President William Ruto’s removal, a day after he caved into young protesters’ demands to withdraw the deeply unpopular tax hike bill. As protesters headed to Nairobi’s central business district, soldiers were deployed and police in anti-riot gear blocked access along roads leading to Ruto’s office at State House and Parliament of Kenya. Turnout by demonstrators was lower than in previous days after mass protests turned violent, killing more than 20 people, according to human rights groups. The Kenya National Commission for Human Rights (KNCHR) said on social media on Thursday that it had received credible reports of live fire being used against “civilians protesting across the country, resulting in some deaths”. It did not specify where the alleged incidents took place. Hundreds of protesters also rallied in the port city of Mombasa and the opposition bastion of Kisumu, where some blocked roads and lit fires, TV footage showed. Protests were also reported in Kisii and Migori. Seven people – two women and five men – sustained gunshot wounds in Homa Bay Town in western Kenya, Citizen TV news reported. The outlet said they were shot by police while protesting and then rushed to Homa Bay County Teaching and Referral Hospital. Protesters demand ‘Ruto must go!’ The youth-led protests kicked off last week and caught the authorities off-guard. Ruto’s government ricocheted between taking a tough line on the unrest and calling for dialogue. On Wednesday, the president declined to sign the tax changes into law and withdrew the bill. “The people have spoken,” he said, adding that he would seek “engagement with the young people of our nation”. But protesters said they would still rally in memory of those killed in the demonstrations, criticising Ruto’s dramatic reversal as a case of too little, too late. Al Jazeera’s Zein Basravi, reporting from the protests in Nairobi, said there was an “ebb and flow” on Thursday on the streets, with flare-ups of tension between police and protesters followed by relative calm. Young protesters in the capital said they would stop when the president steps down while chants of “Ruto must go, Ruto must go!” could be heard throughout the day. “They want a change in the presidential leadership, and they want Parliament absent of what they describe as corrupt parliamentarians who do not have their interests at heart,” Basravi said. Kasmuel McOure, a Kenyan youth leader and award-winning pianist, told Al Jazeera that Ruto is running a country that has very heavily disgruntled youth”. “Kenya has been declared a military state. And I know nobody’s talking about that enough. But the army has been given free rein,” he said, adding he would continue protesting until the president “listens to the people of Kenya”. — AlJazeera A police officer walks near a gas cloud at a demonstration in Kenya’s capital, Nairobi. [Monicah Mwangi/Reuters]

Page 62 World News NewsHawks Issue 179, 14 - 27 June 2024 AMID international outcry, an apparent coup attempt in Bolivia has subsided, with President Luis Arce asserting his authority over the country’s military. Earlier, on Wednesday afternoon, troops led by army general commander Juan Jose Zuniga had stormed the presidential palace and taken up positions in the square outside. News reports indicated a tank slammed the palace doors. But within hours, Zuniga urged the soldiers to withdraw, after leaders from around the world blasted the army’s actions as illegal. President Arce hailed the withdrawal as a victory for Bolivia’s democracy and addressed the country’s citizens in the aftermath, some of whom had taken to the streets in protest of the alleged coup attempt. “Many thanks to the Bolivian people,” said Arce. “Long live democracy.” Dramatic footage on Bolivian television showed Arce facing down Zuniga and a group of soldiers in a palace hallway on Wednesday. “I am your captain, and I order you to withdraw your soldiers, and I will not allow this insubordination,” Arce said. The news agency Reuters reported that Zuniga was ultimately arrested. Why did the alleged coup occur? Since taking office in 2020, President Arce has led an embattled government, fending off pressure from both the left and the right. Under his leadership, right-wing forces in provinces like Santa Cruz have led deadly strikes against measures they believe are designed to keep them from power. Just last year, a prominent opposition leader, Luis Fernando Camacho, was arrested for his alleged role in 2019’s political arrest. And on the left, President Arce faces pushback from his former political mentor, ex-President Evo Morales, who has declared his intention to replace Arce in the 2025 presidential race. Adding to the political turmoil has been nationwide fuel shortages and a financial crisis that has seen its currency reserves crater. “The president of the country is in a bit of a problem, in the sense that he’s got low approval ratings. The last one in March, he was at 38 percent. The economy’s not doing well at all. And he’s also involved in a protracted battle with Evo Morales, the ex-president of the country,” explained Al Jazeera correspondent John Holman. “So this is a difficult time for President Luis Arce.” Zuniga was Arce’s hand-picked leader for Bolivia’s military. But as he entered the presidential palace on Wednesday, Zuniga cited the malaise in the country as a motivation. “The three chiefs of the armed forces have come to express our dismay. There will be a new cabinet of ministers. Surely things will change, but our country cannot continue like this any longer,” Zuniga told a local TV station. “Stop destroying, stop impoverishing our country, stop humiliating our army.” The general added that he would continue to recognise Arce as the commander-in-chief “for now”. But he explained that his aim was to “restore democracy” and “free political prisoners”. Local media reports indicated that Arce had stripped Zuniga of his role atop the country’s military earlier in the week, fuelling tensions between the two leaders. Domestic condemnation But as armed soldiers and armoured vehicles filled the Plaza Murillo in the centre of the capital La Paz, the backlash came swiftly. The country’s largest labour union announced an indefinite strike in defence of Arce’s government. Videos circulating on social media appear to show crowds of people chasing away pro-coup forces. Former President Morales also denounced the military’s actions, calling for criminal prosecution against Zuniga and anyone who helped him. “We will not allow the armed forces to violate democracy and intimidate people,” he said. Even the right-wing leader who replaced Morales, former President Jeanine Anez, rejected the military’s advances. “Total repudiation of the military mobilisation in the Plaza Murillo, attempting to destroy the constitutional order,” she wrote on the social media platform X, adding that Arce “must leave through the vote in 2025”. From the presidential palace, Arce broadcast a video presenting a united front, standing alongside all his ministers. He pledged to “confront any attempt that threatens our democracy”. “To the Bolivian people and the entire international community, our country today is facing an attempted coup d’etat,” Arce said in the video. “The Bolivian people are called today. We need the Bolivian people to organise and mobilise against the coup d’etat in favour of democracy. We cannot allow once again coup attempts to take Bolivian lives.” A history of coups Wednesday’s scenes brought alarm to the Andean nation, where ex-President Morales has long maintained he was removed from office in a 2019 coup after he ran for a fourth term in office. Bolivia has had a long history of political unrest since it gained independence in 1825. Kathryn Ledebur of the Andean Information Network said of all the South American nations, Bolivia is considered the one that has experienced the most coups. “But it enjoyed a very long period of democracy until the 2019 coup,” she explained in an interview with Al Jazeera. “I think it’s very important to remember that Bolivia had an illegal government with the support of the military and a coup in 2019.” That, she said, has fed scepticism among the public towards the armed forces, something reflected on the streets of La Paz on Wednesday. “The military has a bad reputation,” Ledebur said. While she acknowledged some military officers were charged with crimes, the institution itself “didn’t receive significant legal consequences or any sort of punishment or restructuring after this very anti-democratic activity in 2019 and 2020”. Wednesday’s actions, however, send a strong signal about the continued threat that the military may pose, Ledebur added. “It’s a very very clear sign that the army is not firmly entrenched in democracy, nor the rest of the armed forces.” Photos from The Associated Press showed soldiers clearing away journalists near the presidential palace during the alleged coup. Ultimately, President Arce replaced General Zuniga with Jose Wilson Sanchez, who ordered all mobilised troops to return to their barracks. “No one wants the images we’re seeing in the streets,” Wilson Sanchez said. The public prosecutor’s office said it will open a criminal investigation into those behind the failed attempt against the government. International appeals for peace As images of the alleged coup started to circulate across the globe, world leaders from countries like Brazil, Mexico and Colombia expressed alarm and denounced what they considered an attack on democracy. “We express the strongest condemnation of the attempted coup d’etat in Bolivia,” said Mexican President Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador, a popular leftwing leader. Honduran President Xiomara Castro, meanwhile, called the mobilisation a “criminal coup d’etat”. Gabriel Boric, the president of the neighbouring country of Chile, issued his own statement: “We cannot tolerate any breach of the legitimate constitutional order in Bolivia or anywhere else.” But the condemnation stretched well beyond Latin America. A White House spokesperson said the United States “urges calm and restraint”. European Union foreign policy chief Josep Borrell said his organisation “expresses its solidarity with the Bolivian government and people”. The Organization of American States (OAS) – an international group comprised of 32 member states – also weighed in with an appeal to the military. “We condemned the events in Bolivia. The army must submit itself to the legitimately elected civil power,” OAS leader Luis Almagro said while the turmoil unfolded. Holman, the Al Jazeera correspondent, warned that the outpouring of support did not mean that President Arce’s troubles were over. As General Zuniga was arrested, Holman explained that the military leader made unverified allegations that this apparent coup was organised by Arce himself to boost his dismal approval ratings. “For now, stability of a sort returns,” Holman said. “It’s a really difficult, combustible situation right now in a country that has become deeply divided and polarised. The fact that whatever happened this afternoon has ended isn’t going to take away the explosive nature from the country.” — AlJazeera Bolivian president thanks people after facing down failed coup attempt An armoured vehicle and military police form outside the government palace at Plaza Murillo in La Paz, Bolivia.

Well, according to George Munetsi, Josh Makawa is the greatest! STYLE TRAVEL BOOKS ARTS MOTORING Porsche just got angrier Being a Fashion Model Life&Style Page 63 Issue 179, 14 - 27 June 2024 Josh Makawa JONATHAN MBIRIYAMVEKA CHOOSING the best radio presenter of all time, in any country, is really a matter of opinion. George Munetsi, the top Zimbabwean radio personality, is entitled to one. And he says the late Josh Makawa was the best presenter ever to emerge from Zimbabwe and Africa! South Africa-based Munetsi, of GITARadio, made his feelings known via his X account after a fan had nudged him to list his top five DJs from this country. “Bra Georgie, please give me your list of top 5 radio presenters of all time,” the fan asked. And in response, George reacted: “Josh Makawa, John Matinde (both Zimbabwe), SA Chilly M, Dineo Ranaka, Mark Gilman (I know you said 5 but can’t leave out Ian F).” Another follower quizzed: “What about Tich 'The Midas Touch' Mataz, bra George? And Peter Johns (both Zimbabweans). It’s unfortunate I wasn't old enough to listen to radio when Josh Makawa and John Matinde were at their prime, but for me, Peter Johns had the ‘A’ game!” And George replied: “Everybody's got their top 5. Thanks for your top 2 In Josh, you missed out on the best radio presenter to come out of Zimbabwe (if not Africa).” Another fan then commented: “What makes one a good presenter Bra G?” “Knowledge of target audience, prep every link, tight interaction between presenter, music and imaging, avoiding the beaten track low hanging fruit interview questions, listening to interview guest, good back timing, pre-listening to everything that is going to play in a sweep . . .” George said. For the old school fans, Makawa is credited with pioneering what became a widely used template across Zimbabwe and beyond. To the mature folk of Zimbabwe, Munetsi had the voice and the charisma. His knowledge of music was simply out of the ordinary. Affectionately known as Makawa Power, Josh rocked radio and was futuristic in his presentation, flawlessly you might add. A good number of second-generation radio presenters took a leaf from Makawa Power, and in their own right created names for themselves. Between 1980 and 1990, every Zimbabwean in their teens or older knew who Josh Makawa was. According to music critic Professor Fred Zindi, to his contemporaries back then, Josh was “worshipped” by almost every teenager in Zimbabwe. “Makawa was a real celebrity, a household name during his heyday. To give you an idea of how popular he was, it used to take him three to four hours trying to cross First Street from Nelson Mandela Avenue to Robert Mugabe Road in Harare because of the young people who would stop to greet him and wanted a handshake,” said Zindi. “He later became a household name on Radio Three and inspired a whole generation of club and radio disc jockeys who imitated his style.” Munetsi was also a man of many talents in the creative industry. He ventured into acting and featured as a police officer in Tuxedo Warrior, a film featuring South African actor, Kenny Gamble. In 1983, he was the compere at reggae star Jimmy Cliff’s show at Rufaro Stadium. During his time, Josh had a prominent profile and commanded a huge degree of public fascination and influence in day-to-day media. “In simple terms, he was a man of great popular appeal, prominent on our television and radio. He was easily recognised by the general public. With Zimbabwe’s independence in 1980, we as young people then, gravitated towards the new kid on the block, Radio 3,” Zindi added. “Josh Makawa, who was into what was known as ‘funk’ music, represented the finest in radio for me – impeccable show, great music, dry wit and a voice designed by the gods. “But he was not alone. The Radio 3 generation was spoilt for choice for close to two decades – John Matinde, Hilton Mambo, Admire Taderera, Peter Johns, Kudzi Marudza, Kelvin Sifelani, Fungai ‘The Voice’ Marange, Eunice Goto, Simon Parkinson, Ian Sigola, Hosea 'Hitman' Singende, Joe 'Muzukuru' Hussein, Mike 'Big Sam' Mhundwa and Comfort Mbofana all shared the list of the amazing talent that was found in Zimbabwe.” He said Josh was celebrated as Zimbabwe’s top DJ from 1980 until the late 1990s. “He knew it and took advantage of his fame to go into other businesses,” he said. At the age of 25, Munetsi had become a household name in Zimbabwe. He received endorsements from corporate institutions where he was responsible for many television and radio advertisements. In 1986, Makawa started his own businesses such as Leroy Marketing. Leroy Marketing (named after his son, Leroy). The company traded in stationery, grain and vehicle spares. He also established Josh and Cathy store which was situated on Kwame Nkrumah Avenue where he sold fashion clothes and imported music records. In addition, he had a transport business, Ship On Haulage, with his lorries ferrying farm produce from Zimbabwe to Zambia and Malawi. He was also a co-partner in In-Flight Entertainment which provided entertainment on Air Zimbabwe flights. As a result of his fame and well-built body, he had also become a fashion model and a film actor before the age of 30.

Page 64 People & Places Kenya protests in pictures NewsHawks Issue 179, 14 - 27 June 2024

Dear Gianni Infantino, I KNEW a new era had arrived at Fifa when you accepted to grace the occasion of a spirited final push, that famous Harare bash disguised as Phillip Chiyangwa’s birthday party, where the long overdue ouster of African football strongman Issa Hayatou was sealed amid the merrymaking. There was collective discontent and shared belief across the continent that Hayatou just had to go, after nearly three decades at the helm of the Confederation of African Football (Caf). So much that the man who was challenging the seemingly indomitable lion of Cameroon in that watershed election seven years ago, Madagascar’s Ahmad, was feted at the Harare banquet hosted by the wily and increasingly influential Zimbabwe Football Association (Zifa) boss Chiyangwa. Because of that, Mr Fifa President, you earned great admiration all round due to the principled manner with which you had chosen to bite the bullet for the greater good, in doing so risking being accused of bias against the incumbent, a vice-president of yours for that. What we saw in that 2017 Caf election was a divergence from the way of doings things at organisations like Fifa. Your refusal to be fitted into the normal operational straitjacket was indeed admirable. But all this didn’t surprise most of us who interacted with you on your trip here seven years ago, for apart from your tremendous charisma, you oozed the qualities and characteristics of a modern leader, one who is not afraid to defy bureaucratic impediments for the sake of progress. And true to yourself, under your leadership, my country Zimbabwe’s 17-month suspension from international football was lifted in July 2023 in defiance of the bureaucracy that usually stands in the way of countries banned by Fifa in circumstances as ours. Under your administration, Fifa came to the reasonable conclusion that the foremost condition for readmission and in Zimbabwe’s case, reinstatement of the fired national FA president, was no longer feasible in view of an unresolved court case against the sacked Felton Kamambo.  Eight months earlier we had seen the same happening to Kenya, who had been banned alongside Zimbabwe back in February 2022 under similar charges of disbanding the country’s football federation. The under-trial Nick Mwendwa, president of Kenya’s FA, didn’t immediately return to office when Fifa brought back the East African country from the wilderness in November 2022. This astute decision-making must be commended. It bears the hallmark of younger, modern and savvy leaders. But there is a stark irony though, Gianni. That after all these greats efforts have been made, showing the world that red-tapes can be overcome, that a new generation of leaders is a critical component in today’s world, you then dragged Zimbabwe backwards by a very long time, long as Issa Hayatou’s divisive stranglehold on African football. How our country’s Fifa-appointed Normalisation Committee is hellbent on failing the nation is bewildering, and I’m sure this is not exactly what you had in mind when you ditched the rigidity of rule-books in your noble effort to to restore Zimbabwean football to life. The stubbornness and arrogance of the NC, flatly refusing to listen to the good advice of a great many well-meaning followers of Zimbabwean football, smacks of a hangover from a distant past in our nation’s footballing history. A past where the head of this Zifa interim body belongs and ought to have stayed. July marks the end of the horrendous oneyear tenure of these men and women in the NC who have found it fashionable to defy all logic in their handling of an entire national sport. Elections for new full-time office holders at Zifa won’t take place anytime soon, meaning a continuation of a temporary committee to run our affairs. As the appointing authority, and given your contempt for inflexible leadership — the kind that you gave us — I’m confident you will have the long-suffering Zimbabwe fan in your mind when it's time to decide.   Yours In Sport, Enock Muchinjo. Sport Page 65 Letter to Fifa President: I’m sure this is not what you had in mind Fifa president Gianni Infantino NewsHawks 1ssue 179, 14 - 27 June 2024

IN a closely contested encounter, Zimbabwe’s Women’s National Rugby Team, the Lady Sables, secured a thrilling 26-25 victory over Zambia in a test match played in Lusaka on Saturday. The triumph marks a significant feat as Zimbabwe managed to reverse their previous defeat against Zambia in Harare. Interim head coach Lissy Wasarirevu was pleased with the team's performance. "I am happy with the win; the match was quite tough. Hats off to Zambia; they’re a formidable side. I am pleased to note the substantial improvement from the girls and how we played as a cohesive unit, both defensively and in attack. We’ve been working hard at camp, and it’s gratifying to see that hard work beginning to pay off. However, we still have a lot of improvements to make tactically and in general,” Wasarirevu said. Zimbabwe's tries came from Kudzai Wasili, who scored two, Rufaro Tagarira with one, and Trish Moko who added another one. Tarren Munodaani was did well with the conversions. Zambian coach John Chibamba said. “It was a hard-fought match, and I commend my team for their resilience. Zimbabwe played very well, and their tries came from well-executed plays. We will analyse our performance and come back stronger. Credit to Zimbabwe for their spirited performance and deserved victory." The ZRU Women’s chairperson Regina Mwanandiwa shared her delight with the team's display of skill and determination. "It was an absolute pleasure to see the girls perform so well. In the end, it was a tight match, but the ladies managed to hold it together for a famous win. On the administrative side, I'm grateful to the team that organized everything, making this trip a possibility. As you can imagine, it's never easy to prepare for such encounters due to the financial pressures involved in ensuring flawless travel and arrangements,” she said. Mwanandiwa also called upon the corporate sector to partner with the Zimbabwe Rugby Union to support development of the sport and encourage more girls to participate. “We are grateful for the support received from our various stakeholders and continue to call on the corporate world to partner with us in ensuring the growth of the game,” she said. Meanwhile, attention now shifts to the Under 18 Junior Sables set to travel to Johannesburg, South Africa, for the Craven Week tournament, which kicks off this coming weekend. With the senior team's victory serving as inspiration, hopes are high for another strong performance from Zimbabwe’s team full of young rugby talent. — STAFF WRITER. NEWS $60 Covid tariff for visitors & tourists CULTURE Community radio regulations under review @NewsHawksLive TheNewsHawks www.thenewshawks.com Thursday 1 October 2020 WHAT’S INSIDE ALSO INSIDE Finance Ministy wipes out $3.2 Billion depositors funds Zim's latest land cStory on Page 3 Story on Page 8 Chamisa reacout to Khupe Unofficial president calls for emergeFriday 14 - 27 June 2024 ALSO INSIDE Letter to Fifa President: I’m sure this is not what you had in mind Sports Zim Lady Sables Edge Zambians The Lady Sables