Professional Safety - February 2019

Defining Loss
Control Terms

WILL A JURY
UNDERSTAND
YOU?

New Employees & Safety Culture
Automation for Construction
Cold Weather & Gas Detection
The Value of Effective Management Systems

ASSP.ORG FEBRUARY 2019

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CONTENTS
Features

Peer-Reviewed

28 37 41

Clearly Defining Loss NEW EMPLOYEES INTEGRATED &
Control Terms & SAFETY CULTURE AUTOMATED SYSTEMS
WILL A JURY A Social Cognitive for Safe Construction Sites
UNDERSTAND YOU? Theory Perspective
By Jun Wang and Saiedeh
By Dave Curry By Kevin O’Kelley Razavi

Confusion and miscommunica- For many workers, changing Human-in-the-loop cyber-phys-
tion are common when particu- jobs and learning new safety ical systems (HiLCPS), which
lar terms of art are the same as cultures is the new normal. are integrated and automated
or similar to terms within the Employees will quickly adopt systems, are introduced to con-
common vernacular. This prob- the safety culture of a new em- struction to improve situation-
lem becomes even more complex ployer. Social cognitive theory al awareness and proactively
when multiple speakers use the provides a framework for under- prevent incidents. This article
same terms but employ different standing how employees learn presents a preliminary imple-
meanings. For effective commu- to behave at their new place of mentation of a prototype of
nication to occur, a common un- employment. It also suggests the HiLCPS for struck-by-equipment
derstanding must exist for both mechanisms required to improve hazard in a controlled environ-
speaker and listener of what is an existing safety culture. This ment, aiming to contribute to the
meant by certain terms. Such an article discusses elements that development of such a system for
understanding is necessary re- impact learning and should be real job sites. The authors identi-
gardless of whether the listening addressed in any safety culture fy primary challenges associated
audience is a jury or members of improvement program. with HiLCPS implementations.
company management.

FEBRUARY 2019 ABOUT PROFESSIONAL SAFETY
VOL. 64, NO. 2
Professional Safety is a blind peer-reviewed journal published monthly by
COVER the American Society of Safety Professionals, the oldest professional safety
society. Professional Safety keeps the professional OSH specialist informed on
To achieve developments in the research and technology of incident prevention, industry
successful best practices and safety management techniques.
communication
between OSH Judgments made or opinions expressed in Professional Safety feature articles,
professionals news sections, letters to the editor, meeting reports or related journal content
and listeners, do not necessarily reflect the views of the editor, nor should they be considered
consensus is needed an expression of official policy by ASSP. They are published for the purpose of
on definitions of stimulating independent thought on matters of concern to the OSH profession
critical concepts. and its practitioners.
Photo Guy Cali/
Corbis/Getty Images Correspondence should be addressed to the editor. Editor reserves the right to
edit manuscripts and other submissions in order to improve clarity and style, and
for length.

2 PSJ PROFESSIONAL SAFETY FEBRUARY 2019 assp.org

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CONTENTS
Departments

6 President’s Message 24 Leading Thoughts EDITORIAL STAFF
The value of the OSH profession Employee disengagement Tina Angley, Editor
(847) 768-3438;
8 ASSP Connection 25 Best Practices [email protected]
Share ASSP with colleagues, Career Case study of an employee-driven
Center, make a business case for safety improvement process Sarah Astra, Associate Editor
attending Safety 2019 (847) 768-3414;
27 Checkpoints [email protected]
9 Reader Forum Gas detection in cold weather
Feedback about stretching Griffin White, Assistant Editor
programs 46 Worth Reading (847) 768-3468;
Book reviews, safety training, MSDs [email protected]
10 Safety Matters in pharmaceutical manufacturing
Fatigue research, mental health Publication Design Inc.
guide, traumatic injury prevention 48 Standards Insider Design Consultants
Analysis of the impact of a recent
16 PSJ Asks OSHRC decision on OSHA standards EDITORIAL REVIEW BOARD
Humanizing safety: Q&A with Frank G. D’Orsi, CSP, ARM, Chair
author Brad Deutser 50 Checkpoints
Expert witness fundamentals Frank J. Bruzzese, CSP, CIH, CPCU
18 Business Class
The value of effective management 51 Product Pulse Salvatore Caccavale, CHMM, CPEA
systems The latest safety innovations
David A. Dodge, P.E., CSP
22 Best Practices 54 Continuing Education
Three overlooked elements of a February, March and April events Cari M. Elofson, CHST
successful safety culture
56 By the Way E. Andrew Kapp, Ph.D., CSP, CHMM
All about allergies
Steve Minshall, CSP, CIH
Professional Safety copyright Professional Safety is available
©2019 by American Society of free online to ASSP members at Justin J. Molocznik, CSP, CHST
Safety Professionals. All rights www.assp.org/publications/
reserved. No copyright is claimed in professional-safety. Articles are SOCIETY OFFICERS
any works of the U.S. government also available via microform Rixio E. Medina, CSP, CPP
that may be published herein. and/or electronic databases President
For information on reprinting or from ProQuest, P.O. Box 1346,
reproducing articles published in Ann Arbor, MI 48106-1346 USA; Diana M. Stegall, CSP, CFPS,
Professional Safety, visit www.assp phone +1 (800) 521-0600. For ALCM, ARM, CPCU
.org/publications/professional-safety. specific format details, visit www.proquest President-Elect
.com.
PSJ (ISSN 0099 0027) is published Deborah R. Roy, M.P.H., R.N.,
monthly by the American Society of Safety POSTMASTER: Send address changes CSP, COHN-S, CET, FAAOHN
Professionals, 520 N. Northwest Highway, to Change of Address Dept., ASSP, 520 N. Senior Vice President
Park Ridge, IL 60068-2538 USA; phone (847) Northwest Highway, Park Ridge, IL 60068-
699-2929; [email protected]. 2538 USA. Christine M. Sullivan, CSP, ARM
Periodicals postage paid at Park Ridge, IL, Vice President, Finance
and at additional mailing offices.
Todd William Loushine, Ph.D.,
P.E., CSP, CIH
Vice President,
Professional Development

Jennifer M. McNelly
Chief Executive Officer

ADVERTISING REPRESENTATIVE
Michael Sanders
(847) 232-2038;
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4 PSJ PROFESSIONAL SAFETY FEBRUARY 2019 assp.org

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PRESIDENT’S MESSAGE

VALUE OF THE PROFESSION

Rixio Medina As a Society, we have identified 2) Importance of communication. We
four key strategic pillars: member must continuously strive to improve our
Connect With Rixio communities, education, standards and ability to collaborate effectively with stake-
value of the profession. While all are holders, colleagues, employers and employ-
Join Rixio on LinkedIn, follow focused on helping us, as OSH profes- ees to enhance worker safety and health.
him on Twitter or comment on sionals, improve our efforts to protect
his message at www.assp.org/ workers, ASSP’s focus on the value of the 3) Risk management and control.
news/presidents-message. profession aims specifically to increase ASSP has long supported the need for pro-
awareness and understanding of the busi- active risk management. The Society con-
Through our ness benefits of preventing occupational tinues to develop more resources to help us
advocacy fatalities, injuries and illnesses. expand our risk-related skills, knowledge
and abilities. By helping our organizations
initiatives, we are Communicating the Value prevent losses before they occur, we can
highlighting our of the OSH Profession clearly demonstrate the business value of a
unique ability as safe, healthy workplace.
OSH professionals Through our advocacy initiatives, we
are helping business leaders understand 4) Business and leadership. OSH profes-
to help our the return they receive on their critical in- sionals must be viewed as valued corporate
organizations vestments to eliminate the risks that cause partners who can develop and articulate
recognize the worker fatalities, injuries and illnesses. We business cases for protecting our employers’
performance are also highlighting our unique ability as internal and external assets, stakeholders
improvement OSH professionals to help our organizations and the community, then effectively execute
opportunities made recognize the performance improvement those plans. We must continue to find new
possible by a safe, opportunities made possible by a safe, ways to influence the actions of individuals
healthy workforce. healthy workforce. Through these efforts, we and work groups and identify opportunities
are helping more organizations understand to improve the output of systems so that we
the competitive business advantage they can achieve shared goals.
receive when they provide a safe workplace
that protects their workers from harm. You Can Contribute to Our Efforts
You can help ASSP make strides in achiev-
By engaging in ASSP’s vibrant profes-
sional community, increasing our knowl- ing its strategic goals, all of which elevate
edge through continuing education and the value of our profession. Whatever your
implementing best-practice standards, we interests, we have opportunities for you to
position ourselves to interact more effec- participate at all levels, from local to global.
tively with stakeholders, colleagues and
employees. This fosters mutual respect To learn about local and regional oppor-
and enables shared decision-making to tunities, please reach out to your chapter
enhance worker safety and health. and region leaders to learn about current
initiatives and activities. To share your
These activities also help us more ef- interest in volunteering at the Society level,
fectively articulate the business case for visit our Leadership Connection web page
safety, which in turn enables us to better (www.assp.org/lc), where you can also
contribute to our organizations’ efforts to learn more about our various committees
conserve assets and increase profitability. and member roles on those committees.
Through these outcomes, we grow our in-
fluence and increase our visibility within As safety professionals, we know that
our organizations, which better positions safety pays. Let’s continue to find effective
us for career growth. ways to communicate that message to the
business community and other stakehold-
Our Four Areas of Focus ers so they recognize our unique ability
In advocating for the OSH profession, to identify performance improvement
opportunities and contribute to organiza-
we believe these four ideas are key: tional success. PSJ
1) Evidence-based practices. We must
Rixio Medina, CSP, CPP
continue to make the case, both inside
and outside the profession, that research
and evidence drive problem-solving and
support the practical, risk-based solutions
we recommend.

6 PSJ PROFESSIONAL SAFETY FEBRUARY 2019 assp.org

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DMAIC CYCLE EXPECTATIONS

around these values and expectations, and the leader- Define: What will be covered? How good do we
ship roles, responsibilities and accountabilities from want to be? How will it be measured?
the board of directors to the frontline workers.
Scope, values and policy are defined along with
•Worker empowerment and engagement: How long- and short-term performance expectations
workers are valued and respected in the organiza- and measures.
tion; workers’ comfort and willingness to apply their
knowledge, skills and expertise in all decisions that Measure: What is the present state relative to our
impact them and the organization. expectations?

•Risk management: The overarching approach to Gather risk and performance data for systems,
ensure that all threats to the values and opportunities processes, exposures, controls, people and op-
to enhance these values are effectively and continual- erations.
ly assessed and managed.
Analyze: What are the reasons for the gaps be-
These core elements of the system must be robust, tween our expectations and present state?
valued and work in concert with each other to be effec-
tive. Each of the three elements depends on the others Analyses of reasons and causes, and prioritize
for their ultimate success. For example, without a strong risk and integrate into business decision-making
and consistent OSH value and appropriate leadership process.
decision-making, there is little chance that workers will
become engaged and, without the engagement of work- Improve: What actions will be taken to close the
ers, risk assessments will not be completely accurate, and gaps?
controls may not be effective or sustainable. The other
elements of the management system such as metrics and Actions to eliminate hazards and control risks,
measures, planning, communication, data and records and improve performance of processes and sys-
management, and auditing are supportive of the core. tem elements.
They serve to reinforce and validate the core’s effective-
ness. Working like runners in a relay race, the elements Control: Did we close the gaps or meet expec-
run their leg and hand off their result to the next ele- tations? Are initiatives or actions performing as
ment(s) that carry it forward. Being part of a continual expected and sustainable?
improvement race requires the elements to run the track
as a team repeatedly, getting a little better every lap. If not, then reassess (measure and analyze) and
work through the remainder of the cycle.
Management systems are designed to self-assess
their own health and drive continual improvement of One example of this connection is the necessity
the organization’s values and expectations. The self-as- that conformance validation processes (e.g., inspec-
sessment aspect of the system is similar to the ongoing tions, observations) be hardwired to the input and
maintenance of a vehicle. The functioning of elements output of risk assessment and operational control.
such as training, risk assessments and inspections The adage that an organization must “inspect what
create data (measure). This data must be analyzed to it expects” effectively describes the relationship be-
determine its value in evaluating the present state ver- tween expected risk and inspections or observations.
sus expectations and the system’s capacity to predict When unacceptable risks are identified in risk assess-
future issues (analyze). Similar to vehicle maintenance, ment, controls are typically applied to reduce risk.
the measure and analyze steps require a combination These controls must be validated on a regular basis,
of robust sensors and software interpreted by systems especially if they require the actions of those at risk
experts. These systems experts need the capacity and to keep them whole. Therefore, hazards or risks con-
authority to interpret the data on the system dash- trolled in the risk assessment process must correlate
board and to repair the system when necessary. Simi- well with the ones validated in the inspection or
lar to a vehicle, malfunctioning systems create risk; if observation process. This circuit loop is one of many
the risk is not controlled and the vehicle stays on the required in an effective management system.
road, an unwanted outcome is forthcoming.
For example, OSH risks in a work area, especial-
Elemental Relationships: The System Wiring ly those with high severity and low-order controls,
My friend and management systems mentor Brad should be the primary elements of review during
inspections and observations. Work area inspection
Russell always said that the elements of a management checklists often do not correlate directly with controls
system must “talk to one another.” I have yet to find a defined in the area’s risk assessment. This often leaves
better way to describe this expectation for the relation- area leadership focused on housekeeping and tripping
ship between system elements. Many of the management hazards while the high-severity risk controls go with-
system standards presently available do not thoroughly out regular validation. As a result, the inspection can
explain or define expectations for the elemental inter- be performed in conformance with the organization’s
connectivity necessary to make a system truly effective. protocols, checklists and training, yet not be effective
This interconnectivity is analogous to the wiring con- in the validation of the area’s most crucial controls.
necting the components within an electrical device. The This yields a conforming process that is not effective.
device can have perfect components, but if the wiring is
not right, the device will not function as expected. When risk assessment and validation activities are
hardwired together, inspections and observations be-
come a true test of the expected risk levels defined in
risk assessment. When gaps are identified during val-
idation, risk rankings must rise and the identifier on
the area’s risk radar (e.g., risk map) must move accord-
ingly. If this does not happen, management may be-
lieve that risks that do not result in injuries are under

assp.org FEBRUARY 2019 PROFESSIONAL SAFETY PSJ 19

BUSINESS CLASS

FIGURE 1

MANAGEMENT SYSTEM CONTINUAL IMPROVEMENT CYCLE

Define Measure

For example, vision, For example, risk assessments,
policy, scope, OSH performance data,
management system surveys, compliance status.
expectations.

Governance

Worker
empowerment
and engagement

Control Risk Analyze
management
For example, For example, OSH and
management management system root
system evaluation, issues, risk prioritization,
management system control determination
audit, assessments, or selection, business
inspections, decision-making.
observations.

Improve

For example, planning,
process change,
operational controls,
training, communication.

control, which is often not the case. Organizations that guidance for the creation of a strategic and compre-
aspire to have effective management systems should hensive approach to the management of OSH. While
apply a 90/10 rule to conformance validation activities: it can be argued that the elements of one consensus
90% of validation should identify the efficacy of exist- standard might be more robust than another, the basic
ing controls for known hazards and no more than 10% tenets of all management systems are essential to stra-
of findings should be associated with the discovery of tegic and proactive OSH management.
new or changed hazards. Inspection and observation
processes are too far downstream in the management While an organization may have an objective to
system to regularly identify new or changed OSH certify to an OSH management system standard, it
hazards. New or changed hazards found during con- should realize that certification does not always equate
formance validation activities indicate potential gaps to effectiveness. What does effectiveness really mean
in proactive system elements such as risk assessment, from a management systems perspective? A discussion
management of change, employee engagement, risk of management system effectiveness should start by
communication and audits. referencing the definition in the present management
system standards. For example, the ISO (2015; 2018)
Conforming vs. Effective Management Systems definition for management system effectiveness is the
Over the past 30 years, use of management systems “extent to which planned activities are realized and
planned results are achieved.” This definition focuses
has increased based on the creation of consensus stan- on performance to expectations. Is an organization’s
dards from organizations such as BSI, ISO and ANSI. approach effective if it achieves expectations that by
Whether they are designed to manage quality, OSH, design are insufficient, unrealistic or inappropriate? If
environment or energy, the foundational elements a management system is expected to be a predictive
and principles are all the same. Although consensus mechanism for OSH, then this definition may not be
standards represent tremendous value, the value of a robust enough to provide that capacity.
management system should not be thought of only in
the context of standard conformance and certification. I wish that I could lay claim to this quote: “Over-
These management system standards offer tremendous whelming performance to underwhelming expectations.”
I first heard it from a visionary CEO of a large corpora-

20 PSJ PROFESSIONAL SAFETY FEBRUARY 2019 assp.org

tion as he described the OSH goal-setting process in his •If your management team members do not see
organization. The quote perfectly sums up how organiza- the practical value in management systems, provide
tions and their staff can become content with goals that an opportunity for them to discuss how risks are
are easy to reach but add little value to the organization. created in their organization (similar to the example
If an organization does not define, measure and hold described in this article).
itself accountable to the effectiveness of a management
system in terms of its predictive capacity, then it may be •Assess the health of the core three: governance,
taking more credit for the system than it deserves. The worker engagement and empowerment, and risk
effectiveness of the system relies on the strength of each management. Significant gaps in these areas may re-
element and health of their interrelationship. A signifi- sult in a predictive blind spot in your OSH approach.
cant weakness in the relationship in one or more of these
elements (especially the core three noted) and the system •Continuity test the system wiring. If your ele-
will lose its horsepower. Unfortunately, this loss in horse- ments are not effectively communicating with each
power can be difficult to detect with the measures most other, your system is probably not operating at
organizations use to measure OSH performance. full capacity.

Conclusion •Management systems must be healthy to offer
Management systems can offer tremendous value to sound predictive data. Ensure that your organization
understands and measures true system effectiveness,
every organization and each function within an orga- not just conformance with expectations. PSJ
nization. OSH practitioners with a solid understanding
of how management systems function and dysfunction References
can add value to OSH and the business as a whole.
Problems found in OSH system health are typically ISO. (2015). Environmental management systems—Re-
not unique to OSH. This knowledge creates an oppor- quirements with guidance for use (ISO 14001:2015). Re-
tunity for the OSH practitioner to team up with peers trieved from www.iso.org/standard/60857.html
in other functions, talk the business language and add
business value. Start by assessing the condition of your ISO. (2018). Occupational health and safety manage-
management systems with the following: ment systems—Requirements with guidance for use (ISO
45001:2018). Retrieved from www.iso.org/standard/63787
.html

Susca, P.T. (2018, August). Using processes to prevent and
predict risk. Professional Safety, 63(8), 18-21.

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assp.org FEBRUARY 2019 PROFESSIONAL SAFETY PSJ 21

BEST PRACTICES

Three Overlooked Elements of a

SUCCESSFUL SAFETY CULTURE

By Wyatt Bradbury

Substantial discussion has taken place in professional circles surrounding the creation and maintenance of
safety cultures. Many of these conversations have resulted in insightful and innovative programs that engage
employees in the safety process and attempt to develop the seemingly ever-elusive safety culture.

However, three key elements are tion and the disempowerment of em- itics out of the investigation. It should
often not addressed in those discussions: ployees from participating in the safety also be noted that companies with a
defined roles and responsibilities, holistic process (Manuele, 2014). Manuele in- strong safety culture see employees
incident review, and the “pulse of safety” cludes the following in his conclusion driving the reporting and investigation
on a job. The specific programs or policies about ANSI/ASSP Z10, Section 3.0: process on their own. Because they have
surrounding these elements can be less “Leaders are responsible for establish- ownership of their system and culture,
tangible and emotionally gratifying than ing the conditions and the atmosphere these employees know how to recognize
the implementation of a visible safety that lead to their subordinates’ success- near-hit incidents, report those inci-
culture or rewriting the training program, es or failures.” dents to the appropriate party, and par-
but they are critical in the evaluation of a ticipate in the investigation process so
safety program. Employees can only function within that a full understanding can be gained
a system when they understand exactly and appropriate real-world alterations
1) Defined Roles & Responsibilities what that system requires them to do to can be made. These employees do not
It is difficult to perform duties when, ensure its function. Defining the roles, live in fear of blame games and witch
responsibilities and qualifications of the hunts, and instead seek to engage with
in some cases, those duties are not well employees at the outset and regularly investigations for the betterment of
defined or understood. When it comes reinforcing them are first steps toward themselves and their team.
to employee safety, if responsibilities building and maintaining a culture of
for safety functions are not clearly safety within an organization. Beyond the framework, however, is
defined along with expectations for the goal of the system. Manuele (2014)
productive work tasks, employees may 2) Holistic Incident Review Process makes the claim that many incident
tend to allow safety functions to fall Incidents are where the safety culture investigations find the “technical flaw
to the back burner. It should be made and individual failure” but fail to look
clear to the worker that s/he is equally undergoes the most stringent test pos- or take corrective actions beyond this
responsible for safety functions and sible. When the system fails to work as point, neglecting many other contrib-
productive output. designed and catastrophe occurs, the uting factors that could be mitigated or
response and nature of the investigation potentially removed. Solomon (2016)
ANSI/ASSP Z10.-2012 (R2017), Sec- determine whether the result is buy in calls this “looking beyond the first caus-
tion 3.1.3, discusses responsibility and for the suggested corrective actions or a al factor.” Manuele stresses that a com-
authority in relation to the implemen- desire by employees to cover their tracks. pany with a strong investigation process
tation of a safety management system. Incident investigations are designed and desire to protect its culture will also
While top management is responsible to collect facts, not find fault or blame look to the cultural, technical, organi-
for the program overall, one critical (Goetsch, 2015). When management zational and operational factors. Baker
component described is “defining roles, turns an investigation into a witch hunt (2018) echoes this sentiment by asking,
assigning responsibilities, establishing looking for a singular employee or be- “How many decisions are made without
accountability and delegating authority” havioral root cause, the truth may be changing the probability of the situation
(ANSI/ASSP, 2017) to ensure the suc- buried or mutilated out of self-preserva- occurring?”
cess of the system with the expectation tion. However, investigations conducted
that these roles and responsibilities are to gain a thorough understanding of the Companies with a strong safety culture
documented. Section 3.2 of the stan- events leading up to and surrounding the will have not only a consistent process
dard further provides an overview of incident result in an increased likelihood to handle reporting and employee buy
the minimum requirements that should of support and engagement in the pro- in, but also an approach that allows for
be established surrounding employee cess (Baker, 2018). dynamic situations to be evaluated as
participation. It states that employees they are so that the appropriate controls
should be provided the time and re- Goetsch (2015) makes it clear that a can be implemented. When investiga-
sources to assist in planning, implemen- consistent process or framework should tions work to improve the human in the
tation, evaluation, corrective action and be developed for all investigations. system, not blame them, and strengthen
preventive action of the OSH system ANSI/ASSP Z10 (2017), Section 6.2, the defenses of the system to protect the
(ANSI/ASSP, 2017). backs this need for procedure but allows human, it is evidence of a strong safety
for companies to define the conditions culture (Baker, 2018).
In a review of the BP Texas City re- for such investigations and reporting.
finery explosion in 2005, a key failure Although investigators may deviate 3) The “Pulse of Safety”
was unclear expectations surrounding from this framework as conditions lead A final item to evaluate is the nature
the behavior of management leading to them, employees can still depend on a
severe inconsistency in policy applica- baseline procedure to keep bias and pol- and depth of conversations taking place

22 PSJ PROFESSIONAL SAFETY FEBRUARY 2019 assp.org

in the facility surrounding safety. CRB When safety concepts are given the necessary and
Regional EHS Manager Rob Upleger appropriate time to be discussed, an increased
(R. Upleger, personal communication,
June 2018) has coined this as the “pulse likelihood exists that such conversations will become
of safety” on a job site. What is the tone normalized within the organization’s culture.
of safety-related conversations? When
do they occur? How do they occur? aspects of the situation and more on the indicators of the strength or weakness of
Who starts the conversations and what systematic issues contributing to the be- an organization’s culture. As the system,
parties are they between? If people are havioral shortfall (Zabriskie, 2018). When interactions and behaviors progressively
not discussing safety, then either it does safety on a site moves from a program mature, so too will the safety culture. PSJ
not matter to them or they are in an designed to control human behavior to
environment where they feel completely a place of evaluating the current systems References
secure from harm. in place and how humans can get in the
way of those systems, a strong and lasting ANSI/ASSP. (2017). Occupational health and
Solomon (2015) makes the point that culture is evident. safety management systems (ANSI/ASSP Z10-
the stories and messages communicated 2012 (R2017)). Park Ridge, IL: ASSP.
between employees offer insight into the Conclusion
priorities and items of importance. A Cultures can be difficult to understand Baker, A. (2018). HOP the new view: Un-
prime example is the daily start-up meet- derstanding the human in our system (lecture).
ing. Its name and form used are not im- and evaluate. However, when the system University of Alabama at Birmingham.
portant; the key is whether safety is given and norms that the culture aligns to are
lip service or “given prominence by inte- evaluated along with the interactions of Goetsch, D. (2014). The basics of occupational
grating it into discussions regarding daily humans with that system, it becomes easier safety (2nd ed.). Boston, MA: Pearson.
planning, production, targets, strategy, to decipher the key elements at play. In the
human resources and budgets” (Solomon). evaluation of a safety culture, it is critical Manuele, F. (2014). Advanced safety man-
When conversations surrounding the con- to look at the system, interactions with agement: Focusing on Z10 and serious injury
cepts of safety occur naturally during work, the system and behaviors resulting from prevention (2nd ed.). Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley
employees will begin to normalize safe those interactions. Defined roles, consis- & Sons Inc.
work practices into their behavior and hold tent, system-focused incident review and
each other accountable for their actions. an evaluation of the pulse of safety are key Solomon, B. (2015, August). Developing a ro-
bust safety culture. Professional Safety, 60(8), 50-52.
Along these same lines is the impor-
tance of maintaining these conversations Solomon, B. (2016, April). Don’t let safety
as an active and dynamic dialogue. culture collapse. Professional Safety, 61(4), 61.
Zabriskie (2018) notes that only occa-
sionally providing employees with feed- Zabriskie, K. (2018, June). Satisfying a de-
back is akin to asking them to use 1940s mand for dialogue. Professional Safety, 63(6), 28.
technology to complete their assigned
GILAXIA/E+/GETTY IMAGES administrative tasks and calculations. Wyatt Bradbury, ASP, is a commercial account manager for Grainger. He has worked in electrical
Zabriskie’s point is that informal, formal, safety, utility safety and as a consultant. Bradbury is currently pursing a Master’s of Engineering in
negative or positive feedback should Advanced Safety Engineering and Management from the University of Alabama at Birmingham and has
be consistently delivered to employees earned a B.S. from Columbia Southern University. Bradbury serves as the President-Elect and Membership
allowing them to evaluate their actions, Chair for ASSP’s National Capital Chapter and is on the planning committee for the Mid-Atlantic Con-
beliefs, attitudes and approaches in real struction Safety Conference.
time as they make decisions.

When safety concepts are given the
necessary and appropriate time to be
discussed, an increased likelihood exists
that such conversations will become nor-
malized within the organization’s culture.
As this happens, it will transform from
a dedicated discussion to an ongoing
dialogue. As leaders reinforce the impor-
tance of safety with specific and regular
feedback, employees will be able to in-
teract more effectively with the system in
place and take control of their weakness
or feel acknowledged for their strengths.
Complex work situations can quickly get
out of hand from a safety perspective.

When a relationship and procedure for
dialogue is in place between employees
and supervisors, it allows for conversation
to focus less on the emotional or personal

assp.org FEBRUARY 2019 PROFESSIONAL SAFETY PSJ 23

LEADING THOUGHTS

The Truth About

EMPLOYEE DISENGAGEMENT

By Brad Wolff

Most companies struggle with employee disengagement. It is costly for productivity, profitability
and stress. Gallup (2017) data show that two-thirds of U.S. workers are not engaged. American
companies have invested billions of dollars per year for many years to solve this problem.

Brad Wolff The result? The needle still has not moved. How much of said, “A manager’s task is to make the strengths of people
your experience has been similar? Could this data reveal a gen- effective and their weaknesses irrelevant.”
Brad Wolff special- eral misunderstanding of the true causes of disengagement?
izes in workforce 3) Meaning & Purpose in What We Do
and personal op- The Acme Corp. was suffering a 41% turnover rate. A Employees need a clear understanding of how their work
timization. He is a recent survey showed that 85% of its workforce was dis-
speaker and author engaged. The general attitude of apathy, complaining and impacts the mission and vision of the organization. Do not
of People Problems? cynicism permeated the culture. This was puzzling to leaders expect them to figure this out on their own. People are more
How to Create Peo- since they attempted multiple efforts to improve engage- motivated when they realize that their efforts truly matter.
ple Solutions for a ment. These were well planned and executed programs such
Competitive Advan- as team building exercises, social events and pay raises. All 4) Internal Drive for Progress or Development
tage. As the man- showed early enthusiasm and positive survey results that Employees are at their best when healthy tension (not
aging partner for generated optimism. Unfortunately, the magic always wore
Atlanta, GA-based off within a few weeks. In despair, Acme engaged a firm with too low, not too high) exists to meet clear, reasonable stan-
PeopleMax (www a very different philosophy from its other advisors. This firm dards. This means fair and consistent accountability and
.peoplemaximizers focused on helping executive leadership understand the root consequences based on performance, relative to agreed-up-
.com), Wolff special- causes and solutions. Within 9 months, disengagement im- on standards. Being too nice or lax harms engagement
izes in helping com- proved from 71% to 26%, and turnover dropped to 19%. because people inherently desire growth and realize that
panies maximize standards and consequences help them achieve this. Peo-
the potential and The door to solving this dilemma opened when Acme ple are motivated when they focus on asking: “What did I
results of their peo- management acknowledged that because the previous achieve today? What did I learn today? How did I grow?”
ple to make more solution attempts were ineffective, the current way of see-
money with less ing the problem must be flawed. This wisdom, humility What Does Not Work
stress. His passion is and openness paved the way to learning the true root Anything that does not authentically address the root
empowering people causes of employee disengagement. Once root causes are
to create the busi- clearly understood, the solutions usually become obvious. causes of disengagement is doomed to fail. If the message is
ness success they “look at this nice thing we just did for you,” rather than “this
desire, in a deep and Fixing Engagement Issues: What Works? is how we value you as a human being,” it is likely to fail.
lasting way. The first step is for leaders to take an honest, objective
Examples of “the nice thing we just did for you” include
view of the company culture (beliefs and behaviors that team building events, social mixers, company newsletters ANDRII YALANSKYI/ISTOCK/GETTY IMAGES PLUS
determine how people interact and do their work) that and upgraded office environments. Even the initial rush of
impacts and drives the way people think and behave. That pay raises and perks are followed by the “right back where
is why lasting change occurs when focusing at the culture we were” rebound effect. That is not to say companies
level rather than on specific individuals. Following are the should not do these things; these are nice add-ons after the
relevant human psychological needs that are the actual day-to-day essentials of human psychology are addressed.
root causes of people’s engagement level. Also presented
are examples of mind-sets and philosophies that effectively Conclusion
address these needs. Engagement will improve when man- It is understandable that we gravitate toward easy, quick-
agement’s actions align with people’s psychological needs.
fix solutions to our problems. Plenty of people make these
1) To Feel Valued & Understood suggestions and sell them to us. These solutions do not
Management earnestly listens to workers’ concerns, require us to identify our own personal contributions to
the problems that we would rather avoid. However, as with
opinions and ideas with the intent to understand and most things in life, there is no substitute for working at the
consider their merits before responding. This replaces the cause level and creating new habits of thinking and behav-
common responses of defending positions or punishing em- ior. If you are serious about creating the high engagement
ployees for expressing contrary viewpoints. Leaders are not level leading to more profits with greater ease and personal
required to agree with employees. What is important is the satisfaction, this is what it takes. Openly addressing per-
sincere effort to listen, understand and consider their input. sonal challenges that make you human will increase your
effectiveness and fulfillment in every area of your life. PSJ

2) To Express Our Gifts & Talents References
Management puts a focus on aligning roles and respon-
Gallup. (2017, Feb. 15). State of the American work-
sibilities with the gifts and talents of individuals. We all place. Retrieved from www.gallup.com/workplace/238085/
bring a substantially higher energy and engagement (and state-american-workplace-report-2017.aspx
productivity) when we do work that we like and are good
at. As legendary management consultant Peter Drucker This article was originally published in Article Weekly. Reprinted
with permission.

24 PSJ PROFESSIONAL SAFETY FEBRUARY 2019 assp.org

BEST PRACTICES

BUILDING A SAFER WAY

to Do Their Jobs

By Daniel J. Koeninger

In the Mid-Ohio region of Barrett Paving, a group of coworkers resolved to find a better way to accomplish a
routine task they all described as dangerous: changing the feed plate in a crusher. Their ingenuity followed a
close call in which the 200-lb plate fell onto one team member’s feet.

Thankfully, he was wearing steel- Putting Employees in Charge Barrett’s process turns
toed boots, without which he certainly In 2015, the company’s par- close calls into inno-
would have been injured. The employ- vations. Trever Burlile,
ees involved reported the close call on ent organization brought on a member of the team
the company’s website, discussed the board a new national leader that experienced the
incident at their next daily huddle and who was seriously focused on feed plate incident, is
then got to work devising a safer way to safety behavior. This leader credited with build-
change the plate. knew that doing the same

Once the new method was built and things we had been doing ing the apparatus
tested, these employees had a solution
that could be shared across the com- would not generate signifi- for a safer meth-
pany’s many quarry sites. The entire
organization learned from this incident cantly different results. The od of transfer-
thanks to another employee-built solu- company needed a process to ring the plate.
tion, the close-call process itself, which
is a product of a frontline employee con- manage its journey to zero.
tinuous improvement (CI) team during a
weeklong workshop. He brought in an outside cul-

What played out in the quarry in tural consulting team to help
Mid-Ohio and the improved approach
borne from it is exactly what the CI build accountability for ac-
team members had in mind when they
built the reporting process. Because of tions that deliver safe results.
the overall success of their work, they
were recognized at a celebration dinner The goal was to put frontline
in their honor. Senior management,
safety professionals and their region employees in charge of de-
managers all attended to thank them.
A movie was created and shown to veloping practical, valuable
them demonstrating the impact of their
process. We invited team members’ safety processes that include
spouses to join the celebration and see
what the efforts of their loved ones had clearly defined roles for ev-
produced. Positive recognition is a key
part of the company’s effort to reach eryone, all the way up to the
zero incidents.
president.
This is a good story, but it is just one
episode in a never-ending chronicle of It was a major shift for lead-
accomplishments, struggles, failures
and realizations that make up the com- ers (including me) who had
pany’s safety culture journey. In the
past 3 years, we have been on a mission always been the resident prob-
to change the way we manage safety.
We deployed a revolutionary method lem solvers, and the challenge Giving forward-thinking people
that felt uncomfortable and uncertain was made more difficult by the
at first but has proven effective. Giving
forward-thinking people on the front requirement to modify the role on the front line a platform to
line a platform to proactively and pro- of traditional safety profes-
gressively improve safety has impacted
everything the company does. As Paul sionals. They became resourc- proactively and progressively
Harvey would say, “Here’s the rest of es, not directors. We needed to improve safety has impacted
the story.” change how we thought about

safety entirely. We needed to everything the company does.
let the frontline employees

take control of their safety. We

needed them to tell us the best way to do safe work. Leaders needed to get more

their jobs and how we could help. involved in safety and stop relegating

The first thing we learned was that cul- safety responsibility to the safety pro-

ture change is a difficult task that is not fessionals. We leaders knew we did not

achieved quickly. We started our jour- have the answer. To determine the best

ney with an employee safety perception approach, we invited a small group of

survey, the results of which made us face frontline employees to prescribe a pro-

some unpleasant realities. It was clear to cess for greater safety involvement from

the frontline employees that leadership all levels of the company. That group

wanted them to be safe, but leaders rarely became CI Team 1.

talked about safety in a meaningful way.
Our habit was to speak about production Huddles: Safety Assignments
and results, not about safety. Changing at Every Level

the culture had to start with leadership CI Team 1 used the platform of dai-

backing our intentions for incident-free ly preshift safety huddles to connect

performance with actions that support everyone in the organization to a pos-

assp.org FEBRUARY 2019 PROFESSIONAL SAFETY PSJ 25

BEST PRACTICES

itive, valuable safety process that was Shannon Jordan holds the daily
measurable and sustainable. The team preshift huddle with his team
transformed the company’s approach to
this safety fundamental from inconsis- before starting their night work
tent, poorly executed and unmotivating on I-75 in southwest Ohio.
information downloads to frequent,
interactive and value-added discussions. The continuous improvement team used the platform
The CI Team assigned activities relative
to huddles to every level of the organiza- of daily preshift safety huddles to connect everyone in
tion. It was quite interesting to see these
employees, plucked from field crews, in the organization to a positive, valuable safety process
a conference room telling the company
president he would be held accountable that was measurable and sustainable.
to a specific task within the process. In
fact, each component of the process is effort to increase the positive feedback on derstanding on our supervisors’ part to
tracked and measured for quality. Gone good behavior, and CI Team 2 followed react appropriately when these mistakes
are the days of a check-the-box approach the same formula used by CI Team 1 to are reported. A bad reaction will stop the
to daily huddles that gives no indication create a clear, measurable and positive progress in its tracks, so we train on the
of whether they are time well spent. process. We often hear “reward what you right way to handle these situations.
want more of.” CI Team 2 demonstrated
The first quality check is on the use of a that this is not just an expression. Once We continue to improve our culture
conversation starter, something that gets the team implemented its process and by providing the support needed to
people talking. According to the safety the new approach to safety conversations make Close Calls as widely accepted as
perception survey, recognition of good took hold, positive comments became huddles and Positive One-on-One Safe-
behavior was our top area for improve- widespread. We made sure that everyone ty Conversations by all employees. The
ment, so the CI Team made the second knew what good recognition looks like. next step is transferring that learning
requirement recognition of an observed It must be timely, sincere and specific. to the rest of the company. We need to
positive behavior from the prior shift. Saying “Good job yesterday” just doesn’t improve our communication system
Initially, the new daily huddles were cut it. Many times, these conversations so that everyone has timely access to
clumsy and not very effective. As all lev- consist of a sincere thanks for helping reports and resulting action, without
els of leadership began to attend and par- an employee do a job more safely. Such having to search for it.
ticipate in them, they improved. Teams examples are cultural indicators that we
became better units because, for the first operate as a family on the job, and fami- Continuing the Journey
time, they consistently recognized good lies work together to keep everyone safe. We have been on this journey for 3.5
behavior from teammates. They also lost
the fear of questioning anything that Close Calls Process years and have proof of safety culture
concerned them about their work tasks These two big successes allowed us to improvement. Leading indicators help
and the hazards they faced. us measure the presence of safety, rather
tackle a more difficult one, Close Calls, than focusing on the absence of incidents
It was exciting to hear frontline su- our moniker for near-hit incidents. (which is not a good indicator of true
pervisors tell stories of how a particular Started in spring 2018 and still gaining safety). Leaders throughout the organi-
crew member, who had previously never momentum, this process will take the zation are present and participative in
said a word at a huddle or even looked company to the next level in safety per- all the initiatives we have going. We have
anyone in the eye, asked a relevant formance. Allowing employees to make not hit zero yet, but we are encouraged
question about the day’s hazards. It was small mistakes, then learn from them by the progress thus far.
amazing when that same person came up reduces the probability that more seri-
with a suggestion about using a different ous incidents or injuries will occur. This The windup is that culture change
tool or approach to a task that made it requires a new level of caring and un- takes time, steady effort and recognition
safer. The music to my ears was hearing of the many positive things that employ-
people talk about how they changed their ees do every day. PSJ
behavior at home as a result of our efforts
and discussions at work. That is real evi- Daniel J. Koeninger is division manager for Barrett Paving’s Pavement Preservation Group operating
dence of significant culture change. It is in the northeast section of the U.S. He is also the company’s Corporate Safety Steering Team leader. He
truly rewarding to hear how spouses now has held various positions for Barrett in the greater Cincinnati area supporting the asphalt manufactur-
behave differently due to our emphasis ing and paving business there. Koeninger holds a B.S.C.E. from University of Kentucky.
on safety, now an undisputable company
value that employees carry home.

Positive One-on-One
Safety Conversations

We could see the change starting to
take hold by the time we rolled out our
second CI initiative, Positive One-on-
One Safety Conversations. This was an

26 PSJ PROFESSIONAL SAFETY FEBRUARY 2019 assp.org

CHECKPOINTS

The Dangers of

GAS DETECTION IN COLD WEATHER

By Analisa Harangozo

For people in North America, especially the northern regions, this time of year marks a shift in weather and
working conditions. When leaves start changing colors, people start to gather firewood and homeowners begin
winterizing because they know what the temperatures will soon be.

In some parts of North America, limit reading with a calibrated monitor. in workers being exposed to dangerously
temperatures can dip far below 0 °F. But a spark ignited gas vapors in the pip- toxic or oxygen-deficient atmospheres
Cold temperatures can be unpleasant ing and caused an explosion. Four of the and becoming ill. Flammable gases like
and inconvenient for people at the best five workers were hospitalized and the fire the ones in Wyoming can also result in
of times, but for natural gas employees, could not be extinguished until 1 p.m. deadly explosions if they are not detected
these temperatures can present a real or planned for.
danger for a long time. In some areas of While the workers did everything cor-
the world, cold temperatures can persist rectly given their work and equipment In general, if it is too cold to stand
for 6 to 8 months. Portable gas detectors readings, the conditions just were not outside and work for a long time, it is
have a lower operating temperature of right for their gas detection equipment. also too cold for the gas detection in-
-4 °F (-20 °C), which can be challenging Even though their equipment readings strument. Portable gas detectors can be
for natural gas employees who work out- suggested that it was okay to begin work- used at lower temperatures for intermit-
side in colder conditions. It is impossible ing, the atmosphere was too combustible tent periods but be mindful that at the
to accurately detect gas leaks or assess and explosive to consider welding there. -4 °F mark the instrument will become
air quality in weather conditions that are The temperature was below the rating of sluggish, and the display could become
below the equipment’s operational rat- their detection equipment by 9 °F, with a dim or go blank if frozen. Battery run
ing, and employees should be cautious in recorded temperature of -6 °F and a wind- time is also reduced, sometimes by as
those conditions. chill of -13 °F or lower. At temperatures much as 30% or 40%.
that low, the workers’ gear would not
Wyoming Natural Gas Explosion function, and they had no way of being Before the season gets really cold,
One North American natural gas field certain of the gas levels despite the levels start winterizing gas detection equip-
being far too high for safely welding. ment. Make sure the unit’s case and ex-
was the site of a cold weather tragedy on terior are intact, and dirty or damaged
Nov. 22, 2013. It was a cold morning in Gas Detection in Cold Weather filters are replaced. Always check the
Wyoming, and five natural gas employees Accurate gas detection readings in cold instrument battery before going out to
were performing their work as usual. At work and charge the battery in tempera-
10:15 a.m., the workers began welding re- weather can mean the difference between tures between 32 °F and 122 °F. Store
pairs on a condensate tank. They complet- life and death. Even under optimal condi- detectors in a humidified area when
ed a prejob safety analysis, got a signed tions, workers cannot rely on their sense not using them to prevent the aque-
work permit and took a lower explosive of smell or sight to detect gas hazards. In- ous electrolytes from drying out. If a
accurate gas detection readings can result sluggish instrument with a dim display
must be used, bump test it before each
Be aware of the limitations of equipment and the use to make sure it is responding. Keep
the instrument inside your coat and the
environment you are working in, especially when tubing near the collar around your nose
and mouth to keep it warm with body
working in cold weather. heat. When using monitors outside for
more than 20 minutes, let them stabilize
at the ambient temperature for 15 to 20
minutes before using, and zero the sen-
sors in fresh air.

Gas detection equipment can save lives
and reduce the risk of incidents on work
sites, but only when working in optimal
conditions. Be aware of the limitations of
equipment and the environment you are
working in, especially when working in
cold weather. PSJ

Analisa Harangozo is a marketing com-
munications manager for PK Safety. Operating
since 1947, PK Safety is a supplier of occupation-
al safety and personal protective equipment
and takes OSHA, ANSI, PPE and CSA work safety
equipment seriously.

assp.org FEBRUARY 2019 PROFESSIONAL SAFETY PSJ 27

PROFESSIONAL ISSUES
Peer-Reviewed

Clearly Defining
Loss Control Terms

WILL A JURY
UNDERSTAND YOU?

By Dave Curry

IIN TODAY’S LITIGIOUS SOCIETY, an OSH professional may be abstract concepts (e.g., beauty, truth, justice) are discussed. Nor-
called to testify in front of a jury, regardless of the merit of the mally, we make assumptions about such concepts that a general
case against the individual’s firm. Considering this, the individu- shared understanding of meaning exists, even if nuances of the
al must be able to communicate effectively with jury members. A concept may differ between the sender and receiver. However,
serious potential barrier is the language employed by the speaker problems arise when the nuances are the critical issue. For exam-
on the stand. While the OSH professional may know precisely ple, it has been suggested that most men only perceive basic col-
ors (e.g., black, white, red, orange, yellow, green, blue and violet),
what s/he is speaking about, such knowledge is valueless unless while women perceive a difference between indigo and iris.

it can be effectively conveyed to the jury members. The problem becomes even more acute when vernacular terms
are endowed with special meaning under certain circumstances
In linguistics, semantics is the science relating to the meaning within a subset of the population. This is frequently the case
when expert testimony is presented in front of a jury. Terms that
of (or arising from distinctions between) different words or sym- the jury members recognize from the common vernacular may
not have the same meaning with respect to understanding the
bols. Most of us probably assume that we are effective commu- issues before them (Figure 1).

nicators because we can generally convey information to others The source/sender has a message (the concept to be conveyed)
that is held in the mind of the testifying party. Encoding rep-
to our own degree of satisfaction. What we may not recognize is resents the words s/he uses to express that concept. The receivers
in such a case are the minds of the jury members. Encoding in-
that without bidirectional interaction with the recipients of our volves the speaker putting the concept in his/her mind into spo-
ken words (the channel). Decoding is the interpretation of the
messages, we have relatively little ability to judge whether the words used to convey the message by the minds of the receivers.
In this example, noise represents the degree loss in the transfer
meaning of our message has been accurately received by the lis- of the original concept during the encoding and decoding pro-
cess. The greater the overlap in the fields of experience between
tener (even if the words themselves were). the sender and receiver, the greater the likelihood that the mes-
sage conveyed will be that which was intended by the sender.
When speaking or writing using words or phrases with concrete,
Often, relatively little overlap exists between the field of expe-
accepted meanings, this is generally not a major hurdle. We have all rience of a speaker who is knowledgeable in a certain field and
that of members of the receiving audience who are not. This is
at one time or another seen a cat or a rock—we can point to such particularly true in cases where experts are testifying in front
of a jury. Were there great overlap between the two, the expert
objects and all agree that one is a small, furry creature frequently would likely be unnecessary, since the jury would already have
a sufficient grasp of the issues involved and, thus, not require an
kept as a pet, while the other is a firm, hard, lifeless object. Com- expert’s input.

municators rarely become confused in exchanges dealing with such Anyone testifying before a jury should be careful to use words
and concepts easily assimilable by members of that jury; how-
specific referents. The same is usually true of even more abstract ever, this can be difficult to accomplish in practice (particularly
if speakers on the opposing side are using the same terms but
concepts that have a mutually accepted meaning within a subset emphasizing different meanings). Further, the simplest terms are
often the most easily misconstrued or misinterpreted because of
of the general population that

KEY TAKEAWAYS shares common experience or
training. Difficulties may arise
•Confusion and miscommuni-
cation are common when par- when the definitions are specif-

ticular terms of art are the same ic, but not exclusive. Defining

as or similar to terms within the horse as “a quadruped animal

common vernacular. usually used for riding with a
saddle or pulling loads in an
•This problem becomes even
more complex when multiple agricultural setting” may seem
GUY CALI/CORBIS/GETTY IMAGES
speakers use the same terms but adequate, until one considers

employ different meanings. that the same definition might
•For effective communication to equally well apply to a camel or
occur, a common understanding water buffalo depending on the

must exist for both speaker and experience of the listener.

listener of what is meant by cer- An even greater problem

tain terms. begins to emerge when more

28 PSJ PROFESSIONAL SAFETY FEBRUARY 2019 assp.org

the assumption of a common understanding between sender and A test of statistical significance allows the analyst to es-
receiver. To use the example noted, if the expert says “purple,” timate how confident he or she can be that the results
the jury may assume that s/he means iris, indigo or some other deriving from a study based on a randomly selected
completely different shade. What if the difference between the sample are generalizable to the population from which
two is the crucial issue in the case? the sample has drawn. When examining statistical sig-
nificance in relation to the relationship between two
While the speaker may make certain that s/he is consistent variables, it also tells us about the risk of concluding
and precise in his/her word choice and use, certainly at least that there is in fact a relationship in the population
some listeners will interpret the meaning differently than does when there is no such relationship in the population. If
the speaker. Since the speaker on the stand does not receive feed- an analysis reveals a statistically significant finding, this
back from the jury (i.e., a two-way flow of communication does does not mean that the finding is intrinsically signifi-
not exist), the speaker will often be unable to discern whether cant or important. The word significant seems to imply
the precise meaning conveyed by his/her words has been effec- importance. However, statistical significance is solely
tively communicated to the jury members, whether the jury has concerned with the confidence researchers can have in
interpreted the speaker’s words with a more common use of the their findings. It does not mean that a statistically sig-
terms employed, or whether the jury has understood the speaker nificant finding is substantively significant.
at all. Therefore, it is necessary for the speaker to precisely define
the terms so that the jury understands what s/he is attempting to In short, the term significant when used by a researcher has
convey, and perhaps even regularly underscore these definitions more in common with the generally used term reliable; it may
during his/her presentation. represent little or no meaningful difference whatsoever. To em-
ploy a prosaic example, a researcher may determine that oranges
Consider an example. Often, when citing published scientific grown in Florida have a vitamin C content that is a microgram (a
research in a courtroom, one side or the other will say that “sig- millionth of a gram) higher than those grown in California. These
nificant” effects have been shown to exist with respect to a change results may be statistically significant, even though they have no
in design or treatment. Typically, such a statement suitably im- discernible effect on taste, color or nutritional value whatsoever.
presses jury members about the efficacy of the suggested change
to potentially prevent an incident or injury. Black’s Law Dictionary For an example that may occur in the courtroom environment,
(Garner, 2009) provides no definition of the term significant. Web- an expert may cite research showing that a significant difference
ster’s New World Dictionary (Webster’s hereafter) defines the term exists in reaction time for vehicle operators who are simultaneous-
as “having or expressing a meaning; full of meaning; important; ly speaking on a cell phone, then opine that the use of such a de-
momentous.” Interestingly, this definition has little in common vice at the time of an incident likely led to the incident. While the
with the meaning of the word significant when used in reference to first portion of this may be true, this significant increase in reac-
statistical analysis. According to Bryman (2012): tion time is generally on the order of 0.1 seconds (Strayer, Cooper,

FIGURE 1

COMMUNICATION MODEL

Sender’s field of experience Receiver’s field of experience

Source/sender Encoding Channel message Decoding Receiver

Feedback Noise
Response

assp.org FEBRUARY 2019 PROFESSIONAL SAFETY PSJ 29

Turrill, et al., 2013). At 40 mph, this is the time that it takes a ve- assessed by the driving population. This value is then modified
hicle to move approximately 6 ft, or that would allow a vehicle to based on other criteria. Indeed, the current edition of the Manu-
slow down an additional 1.3 mph by employing heavy braking. In al on Uniform Traffic Control Devices (MUTCD) requires that:
the real world, neither is likely to be causative of either an incident
or a substantial increase in the likelihood of injury. Speed zones (other than statutory speed limits) shall
only be established on the basis of an engineering
The remainder of this article will focus on a few terms regular- study that has been performed in accordance with
ly used in the testimony of experts and attorneys during product traffic engineering practices. The engineering study
liability litigation that are frequently confusing to or actively shall include an analysis of the current speed distribu-
misunderstood by jury members. The sources cited are illustra- tion of free-flowing vehicles. (FHWA, 2009)
tive rather than necessarily authoritative.
The same source also states that even after adjustments for
Negligence other considerations, “When a speed limit within a speed zone is
Webster’s defines the word negligence as “failure to use a posted, it should be within 5 mph of the 85th-percentile speed of
free-flowing traffic.”
reasonable amount of care when such failure results in injury
or damage to another.” Garner (2009) defines the term as “the Given the fact that prevailing vehicle speeds normally exceed
failure to exercise the standard of care that a reasonably prudent posted limits on roadways, it may be surprising to some that
person would have exercised in a similar situation.” The latter even the average speed of travel does not correspond to the low-
source also states that a reasonable person is one who “acts sen- est probability of incident. Research has repeatedly demonstrat-
sibly, does things without serious delay and takes proper but not ed that travel at the 85th percentile speed results in the lowest
excessive precautions.” Heuston (1977) says: likelihood of incident involvement.

The reasonable man connotes a person whose notions This relationship was first demonstrated by Solomon (1964)
and standards of behavior and responsibility corre- and is colloquially referred to as the Solomon curve. The rela-
spond with those generally obtained among ordinary tionship has been repeatedly confirmed by other researchers as
people in our society at the present time, who seldom well (Cirello, 1968; Eggert, 2016; Muchuruza & Mussa, 2005).
allows his emotions to overbear his reason and whose West and Dunn (1971) also obtained similar results regarding
habits are moderate and whose disposition is equable. crash likelihood, although their results indicate that crash likeli-
He is not necessarily the same as the average man—a hood as a function of vehicle speed is not significantly different
term which implies an amalgamation of counter-bal- within a 15-mph range around the average travel speed on the
ancing extremes. roadways involved in their testing.

The sum of these statements is that an assertion of negligence There are various theories regarding why a higher average
must be based on the normal behavior of the members of the speed is related to a lower incidence of crashes, but no complete
subject population. If such is the case, then declaring a normal consensus. It may simply represent the fact that travel at the
behavior to be somehow negligent is inherently unsupportable. 85th percentile speed or above requires a higher degree of driver
attention/concentration than does simply flowing with the pack
Such an assertion, however, is common in the courtroom. (i.e., less potential for driver distraction away from the vehicle
Let’s examine the issue of speed in roadway collisions. A set of operation task itself).
studies conducted by Federal Highway Administration (FHWA)
involved testing at more than 150 locations in multiple states to Over the years, the driving public has been inundated with
examine actual driver compliance with statutory speed limits statistics such as the fact that speeding is associated with more
(Tignor & Warren, 1990). The results indicate that more than than one-third of all fatal crashes. On the surface, this statistic
70% of motorists exceed the posted speed limits in urban areas, is true, but practically begs for further examination. As noted,
with some sites having compliance rates as low as 3%. Less than considerably more than half of the vehicles on a roadway are
10% of the sites tested had compliance rates greater than 50%. typically traveling above the speed limit (i.e., speeding.) As such,
The report authors conclude that “most speed zones are posted it would be unsurprising if at least one-third of all vehicles were
8 to 12 mph below the prevailing travel speed and 15 mph or doing so at the time of a fatal crash. Indeed, if the majority of
more below the maximum safe speed.” Another study focusing vehicles are traveling above the speed limit at any given time (a
exclusively on highway speeds in Arizona concludes that, for the likely probability based on the preceding discussion), this means
56 locations surveyed, speed limit compliance rates ranged from that the minority, which are traveling at or below the speed limit,
30% to 55% depending on the speed limits in place at those loca- must therefore be associated with two-thirds of all fatal crashes.
tions (Skszek, 2004). In short, traveling above the posted speed In short, this means that traveling at or below the speed limit
limit represents normal, not extraordinary, behavior on the part results in twice as high a likelihood of being involved in a fatal
of vehicle operators. crash as does traveling faster. This type of data hardly supports
the conclusion that the normal driver is somehow necessarily
According to FHWA, all states and most local agencies are negligent or even acting unsafely in the case of an incident due
required by law to use the 85th percentile speed of free-flowing to simply traveling above the speed limit.
traffic (i.e., the speed below which 85% of the traffic is traveling
under unconstrained conditions) as the primary factor in es- Safe(ty)
tablishing speed limits. For a normally distributed variable, one Garner (2009) defines the word safe as “not exposed to dan-
standard deviation in either direction from the mean is consid-
ered the normal range and corresponds to the range between the ger; not causing danger” and cites as an example “driving at a
15th and 85th percentiles. The basic intent of speed zoning is to safe limit of speed.” Garner’s (2009) definition and example are
identify a safe and reasonable limit for a given road section, and internally inconsistent with each other. The mere fact that one
the 85th percentile speed reflects the maximum safe speed as is traveling at a particular speed does not render one free from
danger. Consider the potential for being injured or killed if one

30 PSJ PROFESSIONAL SAFETY FEBRUARY 2019 assp.org

elects to bring one’s vehicle to a complete stop in the middle of acceptable and that all products must be risk-free to be considered
a roadway. Arguably, based on the amount of kinetic and poten- safe. It is (and has been for many years) widely recognized within
tial energy involved in the vehicle, a speed of 0 mph under this the professional safety community that a completely safe product
definition would arguably be the safest speed based on Garner’s does not exist and that a state of zero risk is inherently unattain-
(2009) definition. Such a position is logically unsupportable. able. As such, this contention by opposing attorneys is unsup-
National Safety Council’s (NSC) Accident Prevention Manual portable. The safety of a product represents a continuum, and the
provides a more rational definition of the word safe as “a condi- mere fact that a safer alternative may be available does not render
tion of relative freedom from danger” (Hagan, Montgomery & a different incarnation of a product to be unsafe.
O’Reilly, 2015). The same source defines safety as “The control of
recognized hazards to attain an acceptable level of risk.” The situation is analogous to that of relative height. The mere
fact that we all agree that former NBA player Shaquille O’Neal
ANSI B11.0-2015 defines the term acceptable risk as “a risk at 7-ft 1-in. is tall does not somehow render Michael Jordan at
level achieved after risk reduction measures have been applied. 6-ft 6-in. to be, by definition, short. One is simply taller than
It is a risk level that is accepted for a given task (hazardous situa- the other, and both considerably exceed the average height of an
tion) or hazard.” ANSI’s (2015) notes on this topic state: American male (5-ft 9-in.). Likewise, the fact that if all buildings
were to be built underground, one could neither fall off the roof
The expression acceptable risk usually, but not always, or out the window does not render multistory or above-ground
refers to the level at which further technologically, structures inherently unsafe.
functionally and financially feasible risk reduction
measures or additional expenditure of resources will This fact is explicitly recognized in both the engineering and
not result in significant reduction in risk. The deci- professional safety communities. Brauer (2006) says:
sion to accept (tolerate) a risk is influenced by many
factors including the culture, technological and eco- What is accepted as safe is neither constant nor abso-
nomic feasibility of installing additional risk reduction lute. Each person and society establishes what level of
measures, the degree of protection achieved through safety and health is acceptable. Not everyone agrees
the use of additional risk reduction measures, and the on whether things are safe enough. People would like
regulatory requirements or best industry practice. to be free from risks. However, every activity has some
risk. The level of risk that society finds acceptable is a
ANSI (2015) notes that “the user and supplier may have dif- moral issue, not just a technical, economic, political
ferent level(s) of acceptable risk.” Clearly, the engineering and or legal one. Society participates in deciding what risk
safety community do not agree with Garner’s (2009) extreme is acceptable and at what price. The standards are
interpretation of safe. not constant. They change over time, may vary by
location, and are also affected by who is paying for
Few would contend that such mundane products as beds, bath- the risk reduction. . . . There is a region of uncertainty
tubs, blankets or stairs are inherently unsafe, even though the use between that which is acceptably safe and that which
of these products routinely kills people around the world each is unacceptably dangerous. Engineers face a dilemma
year. According to NSC (2016), the following number of Ameri- in dealing with this middle region because they can-
cans were killed in 2013 for each of these example products: not depend on their own intuition to decide what is
safe enough. To achieve acceptably safe products and
•drowning and submersion while in or falling into bathtub: 464; environments, engineers must be able to recognize
•fall involving bed, chair or other furniture: 1,170; hazards and apply current standards of society found
•accidental suffocation and strangulation in bed: 903; in laws, regulations, judicial interpretation and public
•falls down stairs: 2,233. expectation. There is a trend toward lowering levels
For each of these products, technically feasible alternatives are of acceptable risk, requiring engineers to anticipate
available at little or no cost. The authors can find no reported in- tighter standards than exist at the time they design
stances of someone drowning in a shower stall. Most individuals something. There will never be a final answer to the
do not inherently need to sit or sleep on an elevated surface. The question “How safe is safe enough?”
need for sheets and blankets can be eliminated by simply turning
up the thermostat by 1 or 2 degrees. Single story buildings or el- All product design represents a series of trade-offs between
evators could be mandated. In all these cases, the alternatives are various alternatives with different strengths and weaknesses rel-
arguably safer under Garner’s (2009) definition, but the public ative to each other. A viable absolute best alternative rarely exists
has elected not to embrace them because there is general consen- across all of the variables that must be considered in the design
sus that these products have acceptable/tolerable risk levels. of a product, nor is continuous risk reduction the only criterion
Another example is smaller versus larger vehicles. Most mem- of importance. Even when risk reduction is determined neces-
bers of the general public can intuitively determine which vehi- sary, ANSI B11.0 specifically notes the following:
cle would fare better in a head-on collision between a large old
SUV and a new Smart car. The current prices of the two vehicles Not all potential risk reduction measures are practica-
are comparable or in favor of the larger vehicle. If safety were the ble [emphasis added]. Many factors determine if the
only concern, no one would purchase a Smart car and everyone risk reduction measure is practicable. It is necessary
would be driving 1990’s-era Suburbans. Such is demonstrably [emphasis added] to evaluate the application of the
not the case. Obviously, both the manufacturers and purchasers risk reduction measure against the following factors:
of the Smart car find the risk acceptable to themselves in light of
other considerations. •regulatory obligations;
In a litigation environment, it is often contended that a product •effectiveness;
is either safe or unsafe (i.e., that safety is somehow a dichotomous, •usability;
either/or variable). It is often contended that no level of risk is •durability and maintainability;
•ergonomic impact;

assp.org FEBRUARY 2019 PROFESSIONAL SAFETY PSJ 31

While the OSH professional may know

precisely what s/he is speaking about, such

knowledge is valueless unless it can be

effectively conveyed to the jury members.

•economic feasibility; In the real world, a product must be not only buildable but GUY CALI/CORBIS/GETTY IMAGES
•introduction of new hazards; also functional, usable and accomplish its intended purpose. It
•productivity; would be a wonderful world indeed if all potential solutions to a
•machine performance; problem were equally feasible, but such is not normally the case.
•technological feasibility. The mere existence of an ineffective method of reducing risk
does not suggest that it should be incorporated into a product
Of note: both economic and technological feasibility are any more than an outboard motor should be attached to a refrig-
mentioned in this list. Cost must always be weighed against the erator simply because one is available. A solution to a problem
return on investment derived from increasing the safety of a that cannot be relied on or that introduces new or greater risks is
product. It makes little sense to significantly raise the cost of a not truly a solution.
product to gain a minimal increase in potential safety, although
the opposite is frequently argued in court. An increase in safety As noted, determining the acceptable risk level is often difficult
is only of value if it is necessary to raise the product safety to in the abstract. One reasonable approach is to evaluate the question
the acceptable level. To use an extreme example, operating a car in terms of relative risk in comparison with some familiar product
wearing both a scuba suit and a crash helmet may marginally that is considered generally and acceptably (although not neces-
improve your safety in the event that your vehicle somehow ends sarily absolutely) safe. For this purpose, we will use motor vehicles
up at the bottom of a river, but few of us elect to do so. The vehi- and National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA,
cle is already acceptably safe. 2016) data for 2015. Some of the following numbers are approxi-
mations due to the relative coarseness of the underlying data.
Many attorneys are reluctant to make such an argument before
members of a jury, but, if presented properly, doing so may not •total vehicle miles traveled: 3,095,373,000,000;
be perceived negatively by them. The most important element •fatal incidents: 32,166;
of such a presentation is making it apparent that the engineer or •injury incidents: 1,715,000;
manufacturer is not being miserly or callous in making such a •registered vehicles: 281,312,446;
comparison. Consumers (including members of the jury) con- •licensed operators: 218,084,465;
tinually make such decisions themselves during their daily lives. •odds of a fatal incident per mile: 1 in 96 million;
Like the example of the Suburban versus the Smart car, it is easy •odds of injury incident per mile: 1 in 1.8 million;
for consumers to read available published data to determine the •odds of fatal incident per operator: 1 in 6,780;
safest type of vehicle in the event of a collision. The fact that this •odds of injury incident per operator: 1 in 127;
type of vehicle is not the only type of vehicle that they purchase •odds of fatal incident per hour of operation (assumed average
is prima facie evidence that safety is not the only criterion they speed of 30 mph): 1 in 3.2 million;
use in making a selection. Consumers tend to select a vehicle •odds of fatal incident per hour of operation (assumed average
that they determine is acceptably safe, then increase the relative speed of 25 mph): 1 in 3.85 million;
weighting of other considerations in their choice. The same is •odds of injury incident per hour of operation (assumed aver-
true of both engineers and manufacturers. age speed of 30 mph): 1 in 60,163;
•odds of injury incident per hour of operation (assumed aver-
Likewise, technical feasibility must also be a driving factor in age speed of 25 mph): 1 in 72,195.
the evaluation of alternative designs. Webster’s defines the word An alternative method of evaluating risk is in terms of relative
feasible as “capable of being done or carried out; practicable; pos- risk of injury across multiple types of products per hour of expo-
sible.” Garner (2009) does not define the term at all. Webster’s sure. Such an approach is illustrated as follows (product and the
definition is inadequate for use in either a court of law or an number of hospital-treated injuries per million hours of use):
engineering design studio because it ignores the critical issues •electric hedge trimmer: 104;
of viability and usability. Based on Webster’s definition alone, a •scaffolding: 65;
submarine equipped with screen doors rather than watertight •axe: 21;
hatches would be feasible in that it could be done or carried out. •bicycle: 20;
The fact that such a vessel would not survive its maiden voyage •automobile: 13.9 to 16.6;
appears to be immaterial based on Webster’s definition. •stepladder/household ladder: 10;
•car jack: 9;
•hammer or mallet: 7;
•gas lawnmower: 6;
•handsaw: 6;
•stove pot: 4;
•bathtub: 3;
•wheelbarrow: 2 (Hayward, 1996; NHTSA, 2016).
As noted, in the courtroom, juries are frequently presented
with no comparative injury frequency information, being left
to rely on their own knowledge of a product (or lack thereof) to

32 PSJ PROFESSIONAL SAFETY FEBRUARY 2019 assp.org

assess its relative safety. Such a situation can be disastrous for the definitions is the recognition that risk is a function of both a haz-
defense. For members of the general public, the normal method ard and the likelihood and the consequences of encountering it.
of assessing the potential risk of a product is based primarily on
their familiarity with the product, the perceived complexity of Garner (2009) defines hazard as “Danger or peril; esp., a
a product and any experience (whether personal or otherwise) contributing factor to a peril.” ANSI/ASSP Z690.1-2011 defines
that they have or have heard about regarding potential incidents the same term as “Source of potential harm,” while ANSI B11.0
with the product. A familiar example of this is commercial air- defines it as “a potential source of harm.” It is noteworthy that
craft. Most people who are afraid of flying focus on stories of the legal source cited describes a hazard as necessarily dangerous
commercial aircraft disasters without regard to how infrequently or perilous, while the two engineering standards simply refer
such incidents occur. One has a far higher likelihood of perish- to it as potentially harmful, and do not automatically consider
ing in a crash traveling to or from the airport in one’s own auto- its mere existence to represent a dangerous condition per se.
mobile than while traveling in the aircraft. Hagan, Montgomery and O’Reilly (2015) take a more middle-
of-the-road position, simply defining it as “a term applied to the
Prior personal experience with a product or practice, on the individual or combined assessments of ‘probability of loss’ and
other hand, can operate in a much more complex fashion when potential amount of loss.” This definition makes no assertion
evaluating safety. Two examples will serve to illustrate this: either that a hazard must be controlled or that hazards, if not
controlled, are necessarily unacceptably dangerous in and of
1) Imagine two workers (a novice and a highly experienced themselves. This decision can only be made after an assessment
journeyman) confronted with the need to travel 15 minutes back of both the level of risk and the potential means of mitigating it.
and forth across the workplace to lock and tag out an electrical
circuit prior to working on it. Which worker is more likely to ANSI/ASSP Z690.2-2011 states, “All activities of an organi-
decide that the effort of doing so is not warranted because his zation involve risk. Organizations manage risk by identifying it,
level of expertise compensates for the obvious risk and allows analyzing it and then evaluating whether the risk should be mod-
the worker to wire the circuit hot? ified by risk treatment in order to satisfy their risk criteria.” It is
noteworthy that the standard does not state that all risks must be
2) Consider two drivers, one a 16-year-old boy who has just eliminated or even addressed, rather that they must be evaluated,
obtained his license within the past few months, the other a then a determination must be made about whether they should
35-year-old man with a wife and children. Which driver is more be addressed. The process of evaluating the risks associated with
likely to elect to perform a risky maneuver in his vehicle to a product or practice is known as risk assessment. Techniques for
amuse his friends? accomplishing this are covered in ANSI/ASSP Z690.3-2011. All
these techniques involve three main steps: risk identification, risk
The probability of a person electing to be exposed to the stated assessment and risk evaluation. Risk identification is the process of
risk is likely different in each case. In both examples, the deci- finding, recognizing and recording risks. Risk assessment involves
sion is largely determined by the perceived hazardousness of the determining the consequences and their probabilities for identi-
activity, the benefit to be derived in exposing oneself to it and the fied risk events, considering the presence and effectiveness of any
subjectively assessed skill level of the individual in dealing with existing controls. Risk evaluation involves comparing estimated
the hazard. In the first example, the journeyman may accurately levels of risk with risk criteria defined when the context was estab-
perceive himself to have a greater level of skill and competence lished, to determine the significance of the level and type of risk.
than the novice, and thus may assess the risk to be sufficiently These steps almost always involve at least some subjective evalua-
low in comparison with the benefit to be derived that he elects tion on the part of both the manufacturer and user.
to perform the task hot. The hazard remains the same in both
cases, only the perceived likelihood of suffering consequences is According to ANSI/ASSP Z690.2:
assessed differently between the two individuals. In the second
example, the more experienced operator likely will more accu- A common approach is to divide risks into three bands:
rately assess his competence to perform the risky maneuver and a) an upper band where the level of risk is regard-
may also assess that he has more to lose and less to gain in the
accomplishment of the maneuver. It is likely that he will choose ed as intolerable whatever benefits the activity may
not to undertake the risky maneuver. bring, and risk treatment is essential whatever its cost;

Risk b) a middle band (or “gray” area) where costs and
The word risk has been used occasionally in the preceding benefits are taken into account and opportunities bal-
anced against potential consequences;
discussion, as it often is in the litigation arena. Garner (2009)
defines risk as “The uncertainty of a result, happening or loss; the c) a lower band where the level of risk is regarded
chance of injury, damage or loss; esp., the existence and extent as negligible, or so small that no risk treatment mea-
of the possibility of harm.” This is not unlike the way the word sures are needed.
is typically used by both engineering and safety professionals.
Brauer (2006) defines risk as “a measure of both the likelihood The as low as reasonably practicable or ALARP cri-
and the consequences of all hazards of an activity or condition. teria system used in safety applications follows this
It is a subjective evaluation of relative failure potential. It is the approach, where, in the middle band, there is a sliding
chance of injury, damage or loss.” scale for low risks where costs and benefits can be di-
rectly compared, whereas for high risks the potential
ANSI B11.0 defines the term as “The combination of the prob- for harm must be reduced, until the cost of further
ability of occurrence of harm and the severity of that harm,” while reduction is entirely disproportionate to the safety
DiBerardinis (1998) maintains that risk is “the possibility of an benefit gained.
undesirable occurrence. The only justification for taking a particu-
lar risk is that the reward clearly exceeds the penalty if the associ- The last sentence is particularly noteworthy in that it specifically
ated accident takes place.” A common element to almost all these acknowledges that costs must be weighed against the benefits to
be derived. If the likelihood of an event is sufficiently low, it may
be that no further reduction in risk is warranted, no matter what

assp.org FEBRUARY 2019 PROFESSIONAL SAFETY PSJ 33

In many cases, attorneys make reference to “the” risk reduction
hierarchy, which is then expressed as design, guard, warn.
In reality, many different hierarchies exist.

the potential for injury. For example, doubling the price of a prod- reduction methodologies, when employed, must be evaluated in
uct to reduce the probability of a risk from one in a billion to one conjunction with other criteria and real-world constraints, not
in two billion may not be warranted, no matter the level of poten- predefined hierarchies.
tial injury to the user may be. Further, costs in such an evaluation
cannot always be equated to simple monetary factors. Other issues Foreseeability
such as technical feasibility, viability, and the likelihood of engen- Garner (2009) defines foreseeable as “the quality of being rea-
dering risks of other types of hazards or increasing risk elsewhere
also must be included in the evaluation. sonably anticipatable,” while Webster’s defines it as “of an action
or event, that it was predictable or should be anticipated.” Garner
Even once risk analysis determines that a risk should be ad- defines reasonable as “fair, proper, or moderate under the cir-
dressed, how that should be accomplished remains to be deter- cumstances,” while Webster’s defines it as “a standard for what
mined. This is not necessarily a straightforward decision. ANSI/ is fair and appropriate under usual and ordinary circumstances;
ASSP Z690.2-2011 explicitly states: that which is according to reason; the way a rational and just
person would have acted.” Under tort law, manufacturers are re-
Selecting the most appropriate risk treatment option sponsible for designing their products in anticipation of normal
involves balancing the costs and efforts of implemen- and “reasonably foreseeable misuse.” ANSI B11.0 defines reason-
tation against the benefits derived, with regard to le- ably foreseeable misuse as “the use of a machine in a way not in-
gal, regulatory, and other requirements such as social tended by the supplier or user, but which may result from readily
responsibility and the protection of the natural envi- predictable human behavior.” A note from the same source says:
ronment. Decisions should also take into account risks
which can warrant risk treatment that is not justifi- For example, a risk assessment should address the follow-
able on economic grounds, e.g. severe (high negative ing human factors (not intended as an all-inclusive list).
consequence) but rare (low likelihood) risks.
•inappropriate actions as a result of mistakes, errors
In many cases, attorneys make reference to “the” risk reduc- and poor judgment, excluding deliberate abuse of the
tion hierarchy, which is then expressed as design, guard, warn. machine;
In reality, many different hierarchies exist. Barnett and Brickman
(1985) identify 45 different published safety hierarchies, some •inappropriate actions or reactions taken in re-
of which differ significantly in terms of the number, order, types sponse to unusual circumstances such as
and descriptions of hazard-control methods advocated. The
authors conclude that “there is no such thing as the safety hier- equipment malfunction;
archy; there are many hierarchies.” Further, it is incorrect to as- •the tendency to take the “path of least resistance”
sume that such a hierarchy must be followed in addressing risks in carrying out a task; and
until all are eliminated or minimized. Hall, Young, Frantz, et al. •misreading, misinterpreting or forgetting information.
(2011), provide a masterful response to such an assertion:
ANSI B11.0 does not define the associated terms error, mis-
Safety hierarchies do not distinguish between “ac- take or poor judgment, although Garner (2009) does address the
ceptable” and “unacceptable” risk. In fact, they do not first two. Error is defined as “an assertion or belief that does not
consider risk at all. They provide no guidance as to conform to objective reality; a belief that what is false is true or
when additional efforts to reduce risk are no longer that what is true is false,” while mistake is defined as “an error,
necessary or appropriate (i.e., when one has reached a misconception, or misunderstanding; an erroneous belief.”
level that is deemed “acceptable”).
While potentially laudable in theory, many aspects of these
Determining the extent to which risks need to be definitions are lacking when examined considering simple prac-
mitigated or eliminated involves value judgments ticality. The equipment manufacturer is not equipped with a
that fall outside the domain of safety hierarchies. The means of foreseeing the future, nor is it capable of anticipating
mere presence of a risk does not, in itself, require that all the potential ways a product might be misused. The ways
it be eliminated or reduced. In fact, we as a society a product may be misused are theoretically infinite. Might
regularly and willingly accept and seek out many risks someone elect to use a spray can as a hammer? Might one elect
in return for various practical benefits (e.g., increases to drive on the opposing side of the roadway? Might one elect
in efficiency, capability, quality, enjoyment, comfort, to fire bottle rockets by holding them between one’s buttocks?
satisfaction, etc.). We also accept some degree of risk Might someone elect to drop a shopping cart from an upper
to the extent that the costs of reducing it (in terms of floor of a building onto passersby on the ground below? Perusal
time, effort, resources, esteem, social standing, etc.) of the Internet shows that all these events have occurred. This
are viewed as disproportionate to the benefits gained does not mean that the product manufacturer is responsible for
by a reduction in the risk. Such value judgments (bal- ensuring that its products cannot be misused in such ways. The
ancing these benefits and costs) can change over time manufacturer can only make a judgment about what is and is
and across situations, further complicating the appli- not reasonable based on both an assumption of rational behavior
cation of safety hierarchies. on the part of the product users and an assessment of the prob-
ability of such events occurring in the real world. Producers and
The authors point out that, in many cases, some degree of risk manufacturers can and should attempt to design their products
may be a desirable quality in and of itself. It is self-evident that where possible to reduce the risk of actions or incidents that
advertising such activities as riding the “world’s lowest, slowest are likely to occur on an ongoing basis. Such a position is both
roller coaster,” downhill skiing on “breathtakingly flat slopes,” or reasonable and proper. Holding the manufacturer liable for ab-
viewing auto races consisting of motionless vehicles would likely errant, intentionally risk-taking or unlawful behavior on the part
have little or no appeal to the general public, although each of of product users is not.
these events would be markedly safer than the alternatives. Risk
One potential test for such behavior lies not in the simple fact
of its occurrence, but in its overall rationality. Such an evalua-

34 PSJ PROFESSIONAL SAFETY FEBRUARY 2019 assp.org

tion, however, requires a working definition of the concept of ra- may be, under the assumption that the greater skill level of the
tionality. Such a definition can be adapted from Garner’s (2009) operator compensates for the increased risk (i.e., the probability
definition of rational choice theory: “The theory that behavioral of a negative consequence decreases, although the cost of such a
choices, including the choice to engage in criminal activity, consequence remains the same).
are based on purposeful decisions that the potential benefits
outweigh the risks.” In short, a decision is rational if its poten- The greater the degree of benign experience using a product
tial benefits outweigh its potential risks. Such a definition is in in an unsafe fashion, the more likely that such behavior will be
accordance with Garner’s definitions of irrational (“not guided repeated. A familiar example of this is driver speed choice. If a
by reason or by a fair consideration of the facts”) and reasonable driver occasionally travels at a speed higher than that allowed by
(“fair, proper, or moderate under the circumstances”). law without being ticketed for speeding, the driver’s propensity
for such behavior increases over time. The longer the driver goes
To use a prosaic example, the simple fact that a vehicle is un- without being cited, the more frequent the speeding behavior
likely to traverse a stretch of road at 3:00 a.m. does not make a becomes (i.e., the driver’s subjective assessment of the perceived
pedestrian’s choice to not look both ways before crossing either likelihood of encountering a negative consequence drops, so
rational or reasonable; the risks far outweigh the potential ben- his/her willingness to engage in the behavior increases provid-
efit of eliminating the effort of looking. Conversely, the fact that ed s/he experiences a positive benefit). Once caught and cited,
one is fleeing from a collapsing building and must reach the oth- what normally follows is a much closer adherence to the speed
er side of the street as rapidly as possible to avoid falling debris limit due to reevaluation of the probability of encountering the
may make the same decision both rational and reasonable. The negative consequence. The driver’s probability assessment con-
situation alters the relative benefit in the latter case. tinues to evolve over time if s/he is not again cited for speeding,
normally followed by a resumption of prior speeding behavior in
Simple expediency does not render a product user’s high accordance with his/her current assessment of the potential for
levels of risk-taking either rational or reasonable; the potential suffering negative consequences.
benefit is unlikely to outweigh the risk in such cases. It must be
recognized, however, that much like the discussion of formal risk The incorporation of additional safety features into a device
assessment of a product, the perceived levels of risk and benefit may have positive or negative effects on overall safety over time.
by the product user are assessed subjectively. What may seem to If users of a device were comfortable with the prior level of safety
be a reasonable risk will likely differ from one person to another. on the device, they may elect to use the increased safety margin
One person may judge it reasonable to bet money at even odds engendered by the new features to return themselves to their prior
that the Chicago Cubs will win the World Series in any given level of acceptable risk. One example of this would be the cable
year. Such a decision on the part of the individual is neither cars in San Francisco, CA, which for safety reasons travel at a max-
right nor wrong by any objective criteria but is unlikely to be imum of 9.5 mph. When riding the cars, one often sees passengers
felt reasonable or even rational by most of the baseball-viewing attempting to board or leave the cars while they are in motion.
public (apologies to Cubs fans). The reasonableness of a course Conversely, one rarely sees passengers on buses, which travel in
of action in a court of law is, of course, within the provenance of accordance with higher local speed limits, attempting to disem-
the jury. Likewise, the reasonableness of the protective measures bark from them while in motion even if the doors remain open.
employed on a product is within the provenance of the manufac- The higher potential speed of travel acts to increase the perceived
turer, owner and user, hopefully based on prior experience and a risk of such an action, thus discouraging the unsafe behavior.
thorough risk assessment.
Other examples of this are windshield wipers and headlights on
A key point to recognize is that the perceived reasonableness automobiles. At first blush, most would categorize these devices as
of a course of action may change or evolve over time as a func- safety features, but are they? Research indicates that driving in rain
tion of various factors such as product familiarity, level of exper- results in more than a 100% increase in collision rates and a 70%
tise, experience or even the addition of safety features. Examples increase in injury incidents compared to nonrainy driving (An-
of such changes are detailed in the following paragraphs. drey, Mills & Vandermolen, 2003; Torbjorn & Kecklund, 2001).
A similar increase in incident rates accompanies night driving
Assessments of product safety and the perceived risk level asso- (Doherty, Andrey & MacGregor, 1998). This poses an interesting
ciated with a product tend to be directly related to the perceived question: regardless of whether the addition of headlights and
hazardousness of a product. A familiar product whose benefits, wipers make driving under such inclement conditions safer, would
risks and operations are well-known by the user will normally be we not be safer yet if vehicles were not equipped with such equip-
judged as less hazardous than one whose hazards are unknown. ment and we simply did not operate vehicles under those condi-
Unfamiliar products are generally not pushed near the edges of tions? Can equipment that encourages engaging in an inherently
their performance envelope or the edge of safe operation, while less safe activity be considered safety equipment?
familiar products may be (i.e., users of unfamiliar products tend to
stay well within the limits of safety for that product). As the level The preceding paragraphs highlight the fact that the perceived
of familiarity with a product increases, the subjective level of per- reasonableness of an action may evolve over time and is not sub-
ceived risk in using that product closer to its safety margins drops; ject to control by the product manufacturer. Nor can the reason-
users push the envelope progressively more over time. ableness of the action always be determined in such simple terms
as right or wrong. The determination of the reasonableness of an
Expertise in product use (which may or may not be the same action is solely under the control of the individual performing
as familiarity with a product) also has a profound effect on the action. Placing the burden for injury on the manufacturer
risk-taking behavior. Neophytes in a field of endeavor tend to of a piece of equipment in some cases may be akin to blaming a
follow rules and instructions to a greater degree than those who casino for a gambler’s decision to bet his life’s savings on a given
have wittingly or unwittingly traveled well beyond the limits of number on a roulette wheel. The fact that the gambler’s action
those rules in the past. The previous example of working on elec- resulted in a negative consequence for the person reflects the
trical circuits demonstrates this well. The higher the level of ex- person’s own judgment of the payout value versus the potential
pertise, the lower the perceived risk of taking a particular action

assp.org FEBRUARY 2019 PROFESSIONAL SAFETY PSJ 35

Dave Curry, CSP,

CHFP, is the chief

scientist of Solution

Engineering Group,

where he leads the

human factors and

likelihood of the ball landing in that slot on the wheel. The fact ANSI/ASSP. (2011). Vocabulary for risk safety consulting
that the gambler may have won when making the same bet in management (U.S. adoption of ISO Guide practice. He is the
the past does not change the absolute level of risk when he bets 73:2009) (ANSI/ASSP Z690.1-2011). Des author of more than
again. Even making a safe bet (e.g., betting on both red and Plaines, IL: ASSP. 50 technical papers
black) does not remove the potential for the ball to land on zero dealing with issues
or double-zero, resulting in a loss for the gambler. Barnett, L.B. & Brickman, D. (1985). Safety hi- relating to applied
erarchy. Safety Brief 3(2). Niles, IL: Triodyne Inc. human performance,
In the case of the manufacturer of a product or a piece of safety and incident
machinery, it may be reasonable to expect the manufacturer to Brauer, R.L. (2006). Safety and health for investigation. He
try to mitigate the effects of honest mistakes or even potentially engineers (2nd ed.). Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley holds graduate de-
genuine carelessness on the part of an operator. It is not, how- & Sons. grees in experimental,
ever, reasonable to impose on the manufacturer the costs of bad human factors and
judgment or intentional risk-taking on the part of the product Bryman, A. (2012). Social research meth- cognitive/perceptual
user. Returning to the casino example, if a passerby trips and ods (4th ed.). Oxford, England: Oxford Uni- psychology, industrial
his chips go flying and land on the table as he walks past it, it is versity Press. engineering and busi-
reasonable to expect the casino to not consider this a purposeful ness. He holds sev-
bet. It is not, however, reasonable to expect the casino to refund Cirillo, J.A. (1968). Interstate system acci- eral patents and has
a gambler’s money on an intentional wager when the outcome is dent research: Study II, interim report II. Pub- served as a member
simply not as the gambler had hoped. It is even less reasonable to lic Roads, 35(3), 71-75. of national standards
expect the roulette wheel manufacturer to refund the gambler’s development commit-
money under the theory that the wheel was somehow defective DiBerardinis, L.J. (Ed.). (1998). Handbook tees for various orga-
or presented an unreasonable risk. The gambler himself has al- of occupational safety and health (2nd ed.). nizations. Curry is a
ready determined the risk in such cases is both acceptable and New York, NY: Wiley-Interscience. professional member
reasonable in his own eyes, or he would not have placed the bet. of ASSP’s Three Rivers
Doherty, S.T., Andrey, J.C. & MacGregor, C. Chapter.
Conclusion (1998). The situational risks of young drivers:
To achieve successful communication between safety profes- The influence of passengers, time of day and
day of week on accident rates. Accident Analy-
sionals and members of their listening audience, consensus is sis and Prevention, 30(1), 45-52.
needed on definitions of four critical concepts, negligence, safety,
risk and foreseeability, along with several related terms. Such an Eggert, J. (2016). Solomon Curve 2020: Relating
understanding is necessary regardless of whether the listening microscopic risk models with accident statistics.
audience is a jury evaluating the merits of a case or members of
company management to which the speaker is presenting. The Presentation at IEEE 19th International Confer-
lack of such a consensus results in the members of the listening
audience each potentially evaluating the relative merits of the ence on Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITSC), Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.
material presented based on individual interpretations and wide-
ly varying criteria. Note that the terms discussed here are repre- Federal Highway Administration (FHWA). (2009). Manual on uniform
sentative of potential misunderstandings, not all-inclusive.
traffic control devices for streets and highways, 2009 edition. Washington,
The questions that remain, however, are how to reach a meet-
ing of the minds between speaker and listener on the meaning of DC: U.S. Department of Transportation, Author.
terms, and how to maintain continuity and coherence regarding
the terms throughout a presentation or trial testimony. This is Garner, B.A. (Ed.). (2009). Black’s law dictionary (9th ed.). St. Paul, MN: West.
particularly difficult when the opposing side of the debate is
doing its best to advance alternative definitions or even confuse Hagan, P., Montgomery, J.F. & O’Reilly, J.T. (2015). Accident prevention
the listeners by using the same terms with different meanings
(whether implied or expressly stated). Perhaps the best way to manual for business and industry: Engineering and technology (14th ed.).
address this issue is to explain and attempt to reach common
agreement on the meaning of each term prior to exposing the Itasca, IL: National Safety Council.
audience/jury to it, and to frequently reiterate that meaning
during the presentation, testimony or cross-examination. Reach- Hall, S.M., Young, S.L., Frantz, J.P., et al. (2011). Clarifying the hier-
ing such a common understanding is paramount, else the speak-
er may be left in the position of being completely correct yet archical approach to hazard control. In W. Karwowski and G. Salvendy
having lost the argument in the listeners’ minds. PSJ
(Eds.), Advances in Human Factors, Ergonomics and Safety in Manufactur-
References
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ANSI/ASSP. (2011). Risk assessment techniques (U.S. adoption of ISO/ England: Sweet & Maxwell.
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Traffic safety facts 2015: A compilation of motor vehicle crash data from

the Fatality Analysis Reporting System and the General Estimates System

(Report No. DOT HS 812 384). Washington, DC: U.S. Department of

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IL: Author.

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ment of Transportation.

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Bureau of Public Roads.

Strayer, D.L., Cooper, J.M., Turrill, J., et al. (2013, June). Measuring cog-

nitive distraction in the automobile. Washington, DC: AAA Foundation

for Traffic Safety.

Tignor, S.C. & Warren, D. (1990). Driver speed behavior on U.S. streets

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Torbjorn, A. & Kecklund, G. (2001). Age, gender and early morning

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limits. Traffic Engineering, 41(10), 52-55.

36 PSJ PROFESSIONAL SAFETY FEBRUARY 2019 assp.org

SAFETY CULTURE
Peer-Reviewed

NEW EMPLOYEES
& SAFETY CULTURE

A Social Cognitive
Theory Perspective

By Kevin O’Kelley the newcomer is a threat, either to themselves, their territory
or their possessions, then take instant action. Knowing this,
AA QUICK INTERNET SEARCH FOR “NEW WORKPLACE” turns the outnumbered and solitary human will typically behave
up articles with titles such as, “How to Fit Into a New Job and submissively, particularly when on another’s home turf. If the
Adapt to Company Culture,” “Dos and Don’ts for Adjusting to newcomer wants to be welcomed, he would need to immediate-
Your New Job” and “Workplace Culture Shock: Adjusting to ly convince the group that he is not a threat and wants to join
a New Company Culture.” There are no articles titled, “How their group. This might mean, for example, handing over his
to Change Your New Company’s Culture to Fit Your Desires,” weapons, offering to share possessions or signifying kinship
or “Why Should You Change? Make Your New Workplace in some way. A longer stay (e.g., over the winter) would entail
Change, Instead!” It is axiomatic that the new employee is the stranger learning and adopting multiple social norms,
expected to conform to the company, rather than the other such as respecting group hierarchy (pecking order), food- and
way around. In fact, the typical job interview process revolves work-sharing habits, and mating customs. Every new employee
around explaining the company’s mission and culture to the is like that lone hunter-gatherer, in a tight-knit clan of strang-
applicant, then determining whether the applicant is a good fit ers, hoping to stay for the winter.
for that culture.
Starting a new job is often extremely stressful. Sapolsky Psychologists, anthropologists, human resources experts
(2005) writes that the manner in which strangers interact is in- and social scientists from various fields of study have examined
fluenced by hardwired physiological adaptations shaped by hu-
man evolution. For the first couple of hundred-thousand years
of human existence, we all lived in small bands and we remain
comfortable dealing only with those we have known our entire
lives. Seeing a stranger invokes physiological changes that trig-
ger alarm. Social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) sug-
gests that a cohesive and stable group of individuals will view
nonmembers as inferior in some dimensions. The group has a
social identity while the individual does not. This motivates the
nonmember to strive to become a member of the group.
Consider the example of a tribe of ice-age hunter-gatherers
meeting a stranger. They must immediately decide whether

SQUAREDPIXELS/ISTOCK/GETTY IMAGES KEY TAKEAWAYS

•For many workers, changing jobs and learning new safety cultures

is the new normal. Employees will quickly adopt the safety culture
of a new employer.

•Social cognitive theory provides a framework for understanding

how employees learn to behave at their new place of employment.
It also suggests the mechanisms required to improve an existing
safety culture.

•Elements that impact learning and which should therefore be

deliberately addressed in any safety culture improvement program
include observational learning, modeling, agency and outcome
expectations.

assp.org FEBRUARY 2019 PROFESSIONAL SAFETY PSJ 37

cultural assimilation, and many theories and models exist to tions of others, and will both consciously and unconsciously
describe the process. In the narrow case here of an employee conform his/her behavior to theirs. If the crew eats lunch at
joining a new workforce and “learning the ropes,” the social noon, so will s/he. If they dress in business casual rather than
cognitive theory developed by Bandura (1977; 1986; 1989; 2001) blue jeans, so will s/he. This is not to suggest that a person will
offers the best model for understanding the process. change his/her character, but will change actions, behavior.
When it comes to safety issues, s/he will tend to adopt those
Earlier theories of learning relied heavily on models devel- practices s/he sees others at the new workplace following. S/he
oped by behaviorist scientists. The behaviorist doctrine es- will likely not wear a hard hat if no one else does.
poused by B.F. Skinner and others was that of the conditioned
response. A broad summary of operant conditioning theory Safety in the workplace provides an excellent example of
is beyond the scope of this article, but it boils down to the the shortcoming of the operant conditioning model of human
concept that an act that is rewarded tends to be repeated and learning. There is sometimes an immediate reinforcer to an
an act that is not rewarded (or is punished) tends to die out. unsafe act. If you, a newly trained welder, touch hot metal with
A key component of operant conditioning learning theory is your bare hands, you get burned right away and you learn not
that “learning is a function of change in behavior” and these to do that again. Operant conditioning explains that particular
changes are the result of an individual’s response to events behavioral modification quite nicely. However, the commission
(Modgil & Modgil, 1987). According to Skinner, without a of a safe act usually does not result in immediate reinforcement.
change in behavior, no learning has really occurred. This If you wear gloves when handling all metal, you do not get
stimulus-response model, while useful for understanding unhurt. There is no reinforcer for that behavior. So how do you
some human and animal behavior, is inadequate in explain- decide whether to wear your leather gloves? You make a cogni-
ing the broad range of human learning and development. tive decision, and do it based on what you see of the behavior of
Bandura recognized that a human does not need to suffer the others and observing the consequences of those behaviors. In
consequences (or reap the rewards) of an action him/herself to other words, you adopt the safety culture of your environment.
learn the behavior. We can also observe the consequences for
a different human and learn in that manner. Triadic Reciprocal Causation
Bandura (1986) postulates that “Learning occurs in a social
Social Learning Theory
Social learning theory was the first break from the behaviorist context, with a dynamic and reciprocal interaction of the per-
son, environment, and behavior.” As depicted in Figure 1, the
theories of human learning that dominated early 20th century influences go both ways between the three elements of what
psychology research. In a seminal work on the subject, Miller Bandura refers to as triadic reciprocal causation.
and Dollard (1941) proposed that if humans were motivated to
perform a certain behavior, they would observe others doing it The person-behavior reciprocal causation interaction re-
and then imitate them. They termed this social learning theory. flects the obvious fact that a person’s nature affects his/her
Humans do not learn behavior simply by being told how to be- behavior. But the reciprocal is also true: a person’s actions will
have or conditioned how to behave, but more typically by observ- influence his/her thoughts and reactions. The person-environ-
ing the actions of others and the consequences of those actions. If ment interaction reciprocity illustrates the fact that the social
I see someone touch a hot stove, then shriek and stick his finger environment in which a person exists will affect his/her na-
in his mouth, I do not need to touch the stove myself. A great ture and activate emotional and cognitive responses through
deal of human learning occurs this way, through social interac- modeling and social persuasion, and the person’s human
tion. Miller and Dollard conclude that there are four factors that nature will in turn have some impact on his/her social envi-
contribute to observational learning: drives, cues, responses and ronment, perhaps due to the person’s size, race, intelligence,
rewards. In other words, if Suzie is cued by seeing that Johnny social status or aggressiveness. The third leg of the triad, the
gets a slice of pie as a reward for eating all the lima beans on his behavior-environment segment, represents the fact that be-
plate, then Suzie (if she likes pie) will have the drive to imitate havior affects the environment and is, in turn, altered by the
that behavior, knows the appropriate action and will imitate very conditions it creates.
Johnny in hopes of the same reward.
Every new employee is on that same merry-go-round.
Social Cognitive Theory His/her personality, life experiences and prior work environ-
Bandura (1989) expands on this concept by realizing that not ment all will influence the person’s behavior at a new work-
place. It goes without saying that the person’s actions will have
only is Suzie imitating Johnny’s behavior, she is also thinking an impact on the environment in which s/he works. But the
about imitating that behavior before doing so. Thus, social work environment also affects him/her. Was the person’s action
learning theory morphs to social cognitive theory. Bandura approved of or not? Was s/he successful in meeting objectives?
posits that the important learning occurs before action is taken. What feedback did s/he receive? Do coworkers do it the same
Suzie decided that she liked pie more than she disliked lima way? What did s/he learn about the work s/he just did? Will
beans. She then decided to eat the beans. Alternatively, Suzie s/he do the same thing tomorrow or do something differently?
could have learned the lesson (eating beans equals getting pie)
and decided not to change her behavior. The lesson is learned Observational Learning
whether or not behavior changes. If Johnny gets pie for eating We learn “normal” behavior at a workplace through obser-
his beans tonight, Suzie can do the same, or not, whichever she
chooses. Further, Suzie may predict that if she eats all her vege- vation of others. Observational learning can take many forms,
tables tomorrow night, she will also get pie then. including the acquisition of new manual skills, the adoption
of new judgment standards and even new cognitive capabili-
A new employee is highly motivated to be accepted by his/her ties. While observational learning (sometimes called vicarious
peers and colleagues. S/he will be a keen observer of the ac- learning) may be inherent in the human animal, certain funda-
mental attributes must exist for it to occur. According to Ban-

38 PSJ PROFESSIONAL SAFETY FEBRUARY 2019 assp.org

dura (1986), in the absence of any one of these four elements, FIGURE 1
learning will not take place:
TRIADIC RECIPROCAL CAUSATION
1) Attention. The new employee’s attention must be focused
on the behavior s/he is expected to learn. In many job environ- Person
ments, the new person is mentored by a more experienced em-
ployee and is personally shown tasks in a one-on-one setting. Behavior Environment
This is an ideal method of ensuring single-minded focus on
skill acquisition. norms. We are even free to act against our own best interests.
Individuals are “self-developing, self-regulating, self-reflecting
2) Retention. Obviously, the new employee must retain the and proactive” (Bandura, 1986). We are not bound to duplicate
information about how a task is performed. Depending on the the actions we have been taught to reproduce. It is a mistake to
complexity of the assignment, this may take multiple repetitions. assume that a new employee will mindlessly copy the actions of
his/her model.
3) Reproduction. The employee must be able to reproduce
the action. A new forklift driver will not be able to immediately The list of reasons we deviate from established procedures
reproduce the actions of a seasoned operator. And, equally ob- is endless: Self-interest, fatigue, forgetfulness, complacency.
viously, a person cannot learn to perform a task if the person is Errare humanum est (to err is human). All of us have made
physically incapable of it. mistakes. It seems to be a common learning modality. Yet, it is
possible to reduce the opportunity for some mistakes by em-
4) Motivation. Obviously, the employee must be motivated ploying effective modeling to drive the new employee’s agency
to learn the job. If an employee gives you 2 weeks’ notice of in the right direction.
their intent to quit, that is not a good time to begin training the
person on a new task. Alternatively, offering a new employee an Outcome Expectancies
increase in pay once a certain task has been mastered will moti- People will expect a certain outcome as the result of a certain
vate the person. People are far more likely to duplicate modeled
behavior if it results in valued outcomes. action, based on observation of the modeled behavior and its
consequences. Bandura (1986) refers to this as vicarious rein-
Modeling forcement (“I saw Johnny eat his lima beans, then I saw him get
In a series of well-known experiments conducted in the a slice of pie”). The inherent problem with safety and outcome
expectancy is that serious workplace incidents are relatively
1960s, Bandura exposed children to Bobo, a life-size inflatable infrequent. An unsafe act usually does not result in an imme-
doll. If a child saw a person hitting and punching the doll and diate adverse consequence. Often, a secondary safety measure
was then left alone with it, the child was far more likely to act will prevent an incident. Or, possibly, an adverse consequence
aggressively toward the doll than were children who had not may be delayed with no evident relationship between action
seen such behavior. No verbal instructions were given, no re- and consequence.
ward was offered. The mere observation of modeled behavior
was sufficient to influence the children’s actions. Continuing Safety rules (and OSHA regulations) tend to focus on pre-
research on the subject of modeling suggests that this replica- venting the infrequent but serious incidents or mitigating
tion of observed behavior is facilitated by greater commonality their consequences. This fact often results in a safety culture
between the model and the learner. That is, the more closely the that ignores infrequently realized hazards for the sake of
subject (the new employee in our case) identifies with the model efficiency. Consider the following example. In the U.S., all
(e.g., age, sex, ethnicity), the more likely the observed behavior tractors manufactured since 1976 (with some exceptions) are
will be emulated. equipped with rollover protection systems (ROPS). The use
of a ROPS virtually eliminates fatalities from tractor rollover
Who will the new employee model his/her behavior after? If incidents (Reynolds & Groves, 2000). Yet, tractor owners and
left to chance, it might be the loudest or most aggressive em- operators are reluctant to use ROPS and only infrequently in-
ployee, the most attractive or the one the employee knows from stall them on older model tractors. Why? In many agricultur-
a previous job. It is vital that new employees not be tossed into al settings, a safety culture exists that militates against ROPS
the work pool to sink or swim, choosing their model randomly. usage. After all, tractor rollovers are extremely rare. Most
If an organization wishes to develop a new employee in a cer- people will never roll a tractor in their lives. Therefore, virtu-
tain direction, the role model assigned to orient him/her must ally all labor expended to solve a rarely encountered problem
be deliberately chosen, not left to chance. A mentor who knows
the ropes and personifies the company’s desired culture is vital.
“As the twig is bent, so grows the tree,” and you only have one
chance to bend the twig of a new employee in the direction you
want the person to grow.

Agency
Human beings at work are not rats in a Skinner Box, hap-

less victims of operant conditioning. We have agency, which
Bandura (1989) defines as “the capacity to exercise control over
one’s own thought processes, motivation and action.” While
we have reflexes (e.g., we pull our hand quickly away from a
hot stove), we are, for the most part, free agents with the ability
to determine our actions ourselves. We can decide to behave
one way or another, regardless of the behaviors we have seen
modeled, the rules we are expected to follow and cultural

assp.org FEBRUARY 2019 PROFESSIONAL SAFETY PSJ 39

Kevin O’Kelley is

Assistant Vice Pres-

ident for Research

Compliance at Univer-

sity of South Dakota,

a role that includes

is wasted labor and farmers have no time to waste (Myers, event occurs but that something good ac- oversight of EHS
2009). A new employee on a farm where the ROPS is never tually happens. Supervisors typically lack programs. Previous-
used will be unlikely to buck the trend and employ it. the resources or the ability to implement ly, he worked in the
such a program. This effort must be sup- electrochemical and
These aspects of social cognitive theory (i.e., social confor- ported by management for the long term. chemical manufac-
mity, reciprocal causation, observational learning, modeling, turing industries as a
agency, outcome expectancies) come into play with every new •Agency. An employer and worker must production manager
employee. S/he is virtually helpless before the onslaught of pres-
sures to adopt existing workplace cultural norms, including have a mutual understanding that an and an environmen-
those of safety. Hiring a person based on his/her past record of
safety at a previous employer is not a good indicator of how that employee is not a robot. The employee is tal, safety and health
employee will act in a new workplace. A much better predictor
of the safety performance of a new employee is the safety per- capable of doing the job right or doing it manager. O’Kelley
formance of existing employees. wrong. Safely working employees are not is currently working
“just doing their job” and therefore unde- toward a Ph.D. in
Conclusion serving of any reward beyond their pay- Human Factors Psy-
It is of little use to hand a new employee a safety handbook, check. Praise employees for doing their chology and holds a
jobs if they are doing so safely. B.S. in Environmental
train the person on the rules, then turn him/her loose and ex- Studies from San Jose
pect that the employee has learned and will now follow those New employee onboarding is an im- State University. He
written rules. This will not happen, nor will the person learn portant task. The manager’s job is not is a member of ASSP’s
much during safety meetings. Social cognitive theory explains
that new employees will duplicate behaviors they see performed done when a candidate is selected for Great Plains Chapter.
by others that are followed by a reward. The reward may be
the mere reduction in energy expended to accomplish a task, hire and turned over to a supervisor to be
or it might be an “attaboy” for getting a job done quickly. Hir-
ing a new employee with a strong safety record is not enough. trained. For the first few weeks (even the first day), the new em-
New employees will have less impact on the workplace than
the workplace has on them. That is fine if we understand how ployee must be immersed in the desired safety culture. Be sure
humans learn and know what we want to teach them. Select
employees who retain the flexibility to adapt and learn, then to not only include the expectations of the individual’s work
immerse them in a social environment that exhibits the safety
culture you want. performance but take the time to show him/her where safety

If a company desires to improve the overall safety culture of showers and eyewashes are located and do so on the first day.
the workplace, it is critical that they understand three things:
people are social learners; safety culture is a social structure; Show him/her the emergency exits, fire alarm and fire extin-
and cultural change will take time and effort. Fortunately,
social cognitive theory provides a sound methodology to incre- guishers before showing the person to his/her desk (or lathe).
mentally change a workplace safety culture.
Changes in safety cultures take time, but they are not impos-
•Observational learning. Do not rely on written policies
and procedures or safety meetings to train a new employee on sible. Too often, desired cultural changes are aimed at short-
safety practices. These must be demonstrated in actual prac-
tice. The new employee must be absolutely focused on learn- term immediate results, loudly espoused by remote managers
ing how to perform a task safely, without other distractors.
The new employee must personally observe a task being per- and executives, but ignored among the rank and file because
formed a sufficient number of times to retain the knowledge
of how to duplicate it properly. The employee must demon- supervisors must focus on the immediate job before them. It
strate the physical capability of performing the task and must
be highly motivated to do it correctly. Ideally, this calls for a is the role of management to develop, implement and sustain
mentor-mentee relationship.
long-term programs. Improving a safety culture is not impos-
•Modeling. Even in a homogenous culture a spectrum of safe
work behaviors will exist, just based on human differences. sible, it is just difficult. An understanding that people learn
Carefully select from whom you want a new employee to learn.
Selecting the employee who has just resigned is not a good plan. socially by observing the actions (and consequences of those
Instead, use the employee who most closely embodies the safety
culture you wish to see emulated. The model (trainer) should be actions) of those around them is essential to planning and im-
an individual with whom the new employee identifies, that is, a
fellow worker rather than a supervisor. plementing a cultural change. Bandura showed us how humans

•Outcome expectations. Proper behavior should not be re- learn: Don’t tell them, show them. PSJ
warded merely by the absence of an injury, but by immediate
rewards (e.g., cash, T-shirts, verbal praise, promotion to next References
level, pizza). It almost does not matter what form the reward
takes, so long as it is immediate and consistent. The outcome Bandura, A. (1977). Social learning theory. New York, NY: General
of a safely conducted action must be not merely that no adverse Learning Press.

Bandura, A. (1986). Social foundations of thought and action: A so-
cial cognitive theory. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Bandura, A. (1989). Human agency in social cognitive theory.
American Psychologist, 44(9), 1175-1184.

Bandura, A. (2001). Social cognitive theory: An agentic perspective.
Annual Review of Psychology, 52, 1-26.

Miller, N.E. & Dollard, J. (1941). Social learning and imitation. New
Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Modgil, S. & Modgil, C. (Eds). (1987). B.F. Skinner: Consensus and
controversy. New York, NY: Falmer Press.

Myers, J. (2009, Jan. 5). Preventing death and injury in tractor over-
turns with roll-over protective structures. NIOSH Science Blog. Re-
trieved from https://blogs.cdc.gov/niosh-science-blog/2009/01/05/rops

Reynolds, S. & Groves, W. (2000). Effectiveness of roll-over protec-
tive structures in reducing farm tractor fatalities. American Journal of
Preventive Medicine, 18(4 Suppl), 63-69.

Sapolsky, R. (2005). Monkeyluv and other essays on our lives as ani-
mals. New York, NY: Scribner.

Tajfel, H. & Turner, J.C. (1979). An integrative theory of intergroup
conflict. In W.G. Austin & S. Worchel (Eds.), The social psychology of
intergroup relations (pp. 33-37). Monterey, CA: Brooks Cole.

40 PSJ PROFESSIONAL SAFETY FEBRUARY 2019 assp.org

TECHNOLOGY
Peer-Reviewed

INTEGRATED
& AUTOMATED
SYSTEMS

for Safe Construction Sites

By Jun Wang and Saiedeh RazaviNICOLASMCCOMBER/E+/GETTY IMAGES sirable consequences in construction. Moreover, technologies
play an important role in the process of controlling risk factors
CCONSTRUCTION IS AMONG THE MOST HAZARDOUS INDUSTRIES and offer new ways to keep workers safe in smart construction
due to its unique nature such as dynamics and complexity environments (Cheng & Teizer, 2013).
(Awolusi, Song & Marks, 2017). According to U.S. Bureau of
Labor Statistics (BLS, 2017) data, construction had the highest Of note, among the identified causes/factors, unsafe worker
number of fatal work injuries among all investigated industry behaviors are considered the most significant contributing
sectors (e.g., transportation, manufacturing, agriculture) for factor to occupational incidents in construction (more than
years 2012 to 2016. 75% of construction injuries) (Tixier, Hallowell, Albert, et
al., 2014). A major challenge is worker compliance with safe
Construction Safety & Risk Factors behaviors and safety procedures (Jitwasinkul, Hadikusumo &
Workplace fatalities have a tremendous impact on families, Memon, 2016). For example, something as simple as jumping
a few feet to a lower level versus using stairs could lead to in-
workplaces and communities. To prevent construction site in- jury. Thus, having solutions to monitor worker behaviors and
cidents, researchers have made extensive efforts to identify root providing insight to timely correct unsafe behaviors can help
causes and contributory factors of construction incidents. Sev- to promote a safety culture across job sites and help workers
eral categories of causes/factors of incidents have been obtained take ownership of that culture (Blair, 2013; Seo, Han, Lee,
and summarized, including unsafe equipment, job site condi- et al., 2015). Extensive studies focusing on worker behaviors
tions, human factors and originating influences (e.g., construc- have been conducted to provide insight for construction safety
tion design, management, safety education and training) (Gibb, enhancement, such as modeling construction worker behav-
Lingard, Behm, et al., 2014). Accordingly, countermeasures can iors (Ben-Alon & Sacks, 2017) and using various technologies
be implemented to control the identified factors to avoid unde- such as wearable sensors and computer vision (Han & Lee,
2013). Despite the importance of investigating worker behav-
KEY TAKEAWAYS iors for safety management, modeling of worker behaviors is
challenging due to the complex physiological, psychological
•Construction leads all industries in total worker fatal injuries in the and behavioral aspects of human beings (Munir, Stankovic,
Liang, et al., 2013).
U.S. Unsafe human behavior is considered a significant contributing
factor to occupational incidents in construction. Existing studies mainly emphasize one specific aspect of
safety enhancement, such as monitoring risk factors or identi-
•Technologies enable various innovative applications to enhance fying worker behaviors. However, to effectively prevent safety
hazards in smart construction environments, a systematic
construction safety in a smart manner. Human-in-the-loop cy- and automated method is needed that integrates not only the
ber-physical systems (HiLCPS), which are integrated and automated noted aspects but also decision-making and timely actuations
systems, are introduced to construction to improve situational and feedback for preventive actions into one system. Consid-
awareness and proactively prevent incidents. ering the main causes/factors of incidents, the job site dynam-
ics, and the human-related impacts and interactions in the
•Struck-by-equipment hazard is one of the leading causes of fatal process of safety monitoring and hazard prevention can help
eliminate worker errors and prevent incidents through more
injuries. This article presents a preliminary implementation of a reliable decision-making. The outcomes of existing studies
prototype of HiLCPS for struck-by-equipment hazard in a controlled provide valuable insight into developing such systematic and
environment, aiming to contribute to the development of HiLCPS automated systems.
for real job sites. Full development and implementation of HiLCPS in
construction is the continuation of this study.

•Accordingly, the authors identify three primary challenges asso-

ciated with HiLCPS implementations: 1) seamless integration of the
three domains of HiLCPS; 2) understanding and modeling of human
behaviors and validation of human behavior-involved systems; and
3) development of reliable performance evaluation metrics.

assp.org FEBRUARY 2019 PROFESSIONAL SAFETY PSJ 41

Human-in-the-Loop Cyber-Physical Systems 2) monitoring and measurement of the situational awareness of
The main step to achieve automation and integration for safer humans for decision-making; and 3) fast response time to the
early detected failures (Bhrugubanda, 2015).
job sites is providing the means to integrate all the aforemen-
tioned aspects involved in construction and technologies. Cy- Objectives
ber-physical systems (CPS), a term referring to a new generation As noted, the primary objective of this study is to recommend
of systems, are coengineered interacting networks of physical and
computational components. CPS are the integration of computa- applying HiLCPS in construction for safer sites. The HiLCPS
tion, networking and physical processes, and have been proposed aims to fully reflect aspects associated with safety hazards and
and offered as an effective solution to meet the requirements for to proactively reduce human errors and avoid incidents through
integration and automation (Esfahan, Du, Anumba, et al., 2017; enhanced situational awareness and decision-making. This arti-
Yuan, Anumba & Parfitt, 2016). The CPS approach is expected cle aims to achieve the following objectives:
to bring advances in a wide range of fields including healthcare,
emergency response, traffic flow management and construction, •build the framework of HiLCPS with a high level of integra-
as well as in many other areas just being envisioned. tion and automation for safer construction sites;

For example, load cells, switch sensors, an accelerometer and a •define the scope and contents of the cyber world and the
displacement sensor were used to acquire data of a scaffold system physical world, respectively;
in an experimental environment, a virtual model of the scaffold
system was developed, an Android mobile app was developed •define the roles of humans in the framework.
for human-machine interaction and, accordingly, the app was Finally, the article reports a piece of sample work that contrib-
automatically activated with alarms if a risk of scaffold failure utes to realizing the HiLCPS for situational awareness enhance-
was identified (Yuan, Anumba & Parfitt, 2016). Using CPS allows ment by taking struck-by-equipment hazard as an example.
dynamics and changes in the physical world to be captured and
reflected in the cyber world; also, changes and decisions in the HiLCPS Framework for Construction Safety Enhancement
cyber world can be communicated to sensors or actuators in the Figure 1 presents the HiLCPS framework. The following sec-
physical world for further actions. This bidirectional communica-
tion and coordination between physical and cyber worlds enable tions detail the three major components: cyber world, physical
dynamic situations on construction sites to be continuously and world and human interactions with them. The HiLCPS frame-
timely monitored and analyzed, and potential hazards to be pro- work fully considers the interactions among human, physical
actively identified and prevented through decision-making. world and cyber world, and achieves high automation and
integration. HiLCPS are inherently complex systems, as human
As noted, human-related factors play an essential role in the behaviors and decision-making are difficult to model, particu-
occurrence of construction incidents. Therefore, integrating larly with the inherent complexities of job sites and their high
human factors as a part of a CPS instead of placing them outside level of dynamics and uncertainty.
the system aids fully monitoring safety risk factors and achieving
high integration and automation. However, such integrated, au- Physical World
tomated and comprehensive systems have not been investigated Various technologies are used on sites and entities to track
for construction safety. To reinforce CPS considering human fac-
tors, human-in-the-loop cyber-physical systems (HiLCPS) have and collect data on aspects associated with safety hazards from
been proposed (i.e., CPS operate in concert with humans). In the physical environment. These aspects include: 1) worker be-
HiLCPS, which are a category of CPS, humans are in the middle haviors; 2) equipment motions, states and operations; 3) job site
of the feedback loop between the cyber and the physical worlds of conditions and environmental changes; 4) construction plans,
the system (Cuckov, Rudd & Daly, 2017). A human, a cyber world schedules, operations and progress; and 5) states of other safety
and a physical world compose a basic HiLCPS (Schirner, Erdog- elements (e.g., temporal structures on sites). For example, im-
mus, Chowdhury, et al., 2013). HiLCPS either operate on humans age-based technologies and body-sensor networks can be used
or are built to augment humans’ interactions with physical envi- to monitor workers’ behaviors. The collected data reflecting the
ronments (Cuckov, Rudd & Daly). Thus, modeling construction physical world are transferred via the communication network
safety problems as HiLCPS is a promising approach to compre- to the cyber world for processing. It should be noted that con-
hensively investigating safety hazards with causal factors and to struction entities’ motions are directly monitored in the physical
improving situational awareness of workers. world of HiLCPS, which is one representative case of HiLCPS
(i.e., HiLCPS operate on humans) (Cuckov, Rudd & Daly, 2017).
Studies have explored applications of HiLCPS in multiple
fields, such as healthcare for functionally locked-in individuals, Cyber World
automobile systems and energy management (Munir, Stankov- To timely identify workers’ unsafe behaviors and proactively
ic, Liang, et al., 2013). For example, HiLCPS are expected to
facilitate functionally locked-in individuals to build interac- prevent hazards, various safety-related models are embedded in
tions with the cyber-physical environment and restore funda- the cyber world to analyze the data collected from the physical
mental autonomy (e.g., self-feeding, mobility, communication) world. The embedded models include: 1) human behavior mod-
in their daily life to contribute to a sense of self-fulfillment eling models; 2) unsafe human behavior identification models;
and a productive life (Schirner, Erdogmus, Chowdhury, et al., 3) hazard (e.g., fall, struck-by, electrocution) identification
2013). These outcomes shed light on further investigation and models; 4) safety risk analysis and prediction models; 5) safety
development of HiLCPS for safety management in the smart planning and optimization models; 6) kinematics prediction
construction context. In summary, the HiLCPS approach offers models; and 7) decision models. Combined with the data anal-
benefits in many aspects including: 1) integration of cloud and ysis models, virtual models dynamically reflecting the physical
sensor networks for timely observation, analysis and control; world also can be developed. In Figure 1, taking struck-by-
equipment hazard as an example, four categories of models (i.e.,
real-time hazard identification, multi-level risk analysis, safety
planning, optimization for hazard prevention) suggested for

42 PSJ PROFESSIONAL SAFETY FEBRUARY 2019 assp.org

FIGURE 1

FRAMEWORK OF HiLCPS FOR SAFER CONSTRUCTION SITES

identifying and preventing struck-by-equipment hazards inte- is the frequent generation of false alarms (Wang & Razavi,
grated into the cyber world are also presented. 2016). False alarms will cause interruptions to work and re-
duce productivity. Participants would ignore alarms and even
Human Interactions With Physical World disable alarm systems if false alarms are frequently generated.
Even in environments where systems are highly automated, Therefore, a sample representation of HiLCPS focusing on
struck-by-equipment hazard identification with reduced false
humans play some role. Humans interact with the physical alarms is presented, which contributes to the full development
world and the interactions are augmented through HiLCPS, of HiLCPS for safer job sites in the next step of this study.
which is the other representative case of HiLCPS (Cuckov,
Rudd & Daly, 2017; Schirner, Erdogmus, Chowdhury, et al., Overview of the Prototype
2013). Decisions and instructions obtained from the cyber HiLCPS provide a fast, effective way for proactive and timely
world are transferred to humans (e.g., equipment operators,
workers on foot, site managers) through triggering actuators or struck-by-equipment hazard prevention. In the physical world,
presenting updated information (e.g., commands, instructions) motions (position, velocity and orientation) of workers on foot
on graphical user interfaces. Humans receive the updated in- and equipment are monitored, collected and transmitted to the
formation and, accordingly, apply actions to respond. The taken cyber world. The cyber world includes a model to process the
actions will directly affect the physical world (e.g., modify received data for struck-by-equipment hazard identification.
crane lift paths). As a result, the updated physical world is con- The included model can not only identify struck-by-equipment
tinuously monitored and data are collected and transmitted to hazards but also reduce the generation of false alarms (see
the cyber world, repeating the loop of HiLCPS. Wang & Razavi, 2016, for more details about the included mod-
el for false alarm reduction). The model is used and presented
A Prototype of HiLCPS: here to illustrate the cyber world of HiLCPS for construction
Struck-by-Equipment Hazard Identification safety enhancement. Instructions, decisions and updated
information are timely communicated to site workers (e.g.,
In construction, struck-by-equipment hazard (i.e., workers workers on foot, equipment operators, managers) so that they
on foot struck by equipment or equipment struck by equip- can implement corrective actions accordingly (i.e., interactions
ment) is one of the leading causes of fatal injuries. However, between site workers and physical world are enhanced).
a major limitation of existing proximity-detection methods

assp.org FEBRUARY 2019 PROFESSIONAL SAFETY PSJ 43

FIGURE 2

FRAMEWORK OF INTEGRATED INS-GPS-RASPBERRY PI
SYSTEM & EXAMPLE TRAJECTORIES

FIGURE 2A FIGURE 2B

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Note. Figure 2a adapted from “An Integrated INS-GPS-Raspberry Pi System Using the Time-Sphere Model for Real-Time Identification of Struck-by-Equip-
ment Hazard,” by J. Wang, S. Du & S. Razavi, Proceedings of the 33rd International Symposium on Automation and Robotics in Construction (ISARC), 2016.
Figure 2b image ©2018 Google. Used with permission.

Preliminary Implementation of the Prototype GPS-aided INS was embedded in a Raspberry Pi and the col-
A preliminary implementation of a sample representation lected data were wirelessly sent to the cyber world using ZigBee
(the wireless language to connect devices). Different scenarios
of HiLCPS for struck-by-equipment hazard is described. A de- were designed and conducted in the experiment and entities’
veloped system (Wang, Du & Razavi, 2016) integrating inertial motion trajectories were collected. For example, two collected
navigation system (INS), GPS, Raspberry Pi, ZigBee, and the trajectories uploaded to Google Earth are shown in Figure 2b.
hazard identification and false alarm reduction model is used
and described here, with the conducted controlled field exper- •Interactions between human and physical world: LED lights
iment. Raspberry Pi is a low cost, credit-card sized, low-power (actuators) were embedded in each Raspberry Pi. If a hazardous
computer with the ability to interact with the outside world. proximity was identified, lights were triggered and flashing to
It is a flexible machine that has been used in a wide array of alarm involved workers. Consequently, corrective actions were
digital maker projects. Sensing and controlling of the physical applied by workers to change entities’ motions to avoid contact
world using computer programs can be run on a Raspberry Pi. collisions. In this experiment, the driver braked without chang-
The functions of Raspberry Pi in the INS-GPS-Raspberry Pi ing moving directions when an alarm was received. At the
system are described here. The adopted INS is a navigation aid same time, entities’ updated motions were tracked and sent to
that integrates accelerometers, gyroscopes and magnetome- the cyber world for the analysis of another loop. In the next step
ters to get a moving object’s position, orientation and velocity of this work, other means such as display screen in equipment,
over time. Note that the INS-GPS-Raspberry Pi system is only automatic maneuver system, and behavior modification system
a preliminary and exploratory work on HiLCPS to enhance can be explored and developed to assist workers and further
construction safety. The framework of the integrated system is enhance the interactions between construction workers and
shown in Figure 2a and described as follows. physical world.

•Cyber world: The model noted (Wang & Razavi, 2016) is em- The conducted experiment demonstrated the effectiveness
bedded in a Raspberry Pi, which is the central data processing of the model in identifying struck-by-equipment hazards with
unit to identify struck-by-equipment hazards and reduce false reduced false alarms and showed the promise of the system for
alarms. Human reaction and execution time are also consid- real-world deployments. Entities’ motions were tracked and
ered in the embedded model for decision-making. monitored, and human interactions with the physical world
were enhanced to prevent hazards. In addition to the hazard
•Physical world: The controlled field experiment was con- identification model, more safety models can be included in
ducted in a parking lot. A GPS-aided INS was used to collect the cyber world to further eradicate and minimize safety risks.
entities’ motions (position, velocity and orientation). The

44 PSJ PROFESSIONAL SAFETY FEBRUARY 2019 assp.org

Continuous and full development of the HiLCPS prototype for Ben-Alon, L. & Sacks, R. (2017). Simulating the behavior of trade crews
safety implementations on real construction sites is the next in construction using agents and building information modeling. Automa-
step of the work presented in this article. tion in Construction, 74, 12-27.

Challenges of Applying HiLCPS for Construction Safety Bhrugubanda, M. (2015). A review on applications of cyber physical
HiLCPS present great promise to improve construction safe- systems. International Journal of Innovative Science, Engineering and Tech-
nology, 2(6), 728-730.
ty in a smart manner but also involve various challenges. The
authors identify three major challenges: Blair, E.H. (2013, November). Building safety culture: Three practical
strategies. Professional Safety, 58(11), 59-65.
•Seamless integration of the three HiLCPS domains (i.e.,
cyber, physical and human-related aspects) is essential for the Cheng, T. & Teizer, J. (2013). Real-time resource location data col-
effectiveness of HiLCPS in the real world and the key for its lection and visualization technology for construction safety and activity
supreme advantages compared to other safety applications. monitoring applications. Automation in Construction, 34, 3-15.
However, challenges arise when expertise across domains is
integrated into one system. Cuckov, F., Rudd, G. & Daly, L. (2017). Framework for model-based
design and verification of human-in-the-loop cyber-physical systems.
•Human is an essential component of HiLCPS for enhancing Proceedings of the 10th IEEE International Conference on Software Testing,
construction safety. Worker behaviors are monitored and an- Verification and Validation Workshops (ICSTW) (pp. 401-402).
alyzed for safety analysis; construction workers and managers
must respond to alarms and apply corrective or notified actions Esfahan, N.R., Du, S., Anumba, C., et al. (2017). Smart tracking of
to proactively prevent hazards. Understanding and accurately highway construction projects. Proceedings of the ASCE International
modeling human behaviors enables more effective development Workshop on Computing in Civil Engineering (IWCCE) (pp. 187-195).
and implementation of HiLCPS in construction. However,
modeling human behaviors is extremely challenging due to the Gibb, A., Lingard, H., Behm, M., et al. (2014). Construction accident
complex physiological, psychological and behavioral aspects of causality: Learning from different countries and differing consequences.
humans. As a result, validation of human-behavior-involved Construction Management and Economics, 32(5), 446-459.
systems is also challenging.
Han, S. & Lee, S. (2013). A vision-based motion capture and recogni-
•As HiLCPS are composed of individual high-complexity tion framework for behavior-based safety management. Automation in
systems, development of reliable performance evaluation met- Construction, 35, 131-141.
rics is another challenge; particularly, scalability and robust-
ness are two principal aspects that must be considered in the Jitwasinkul, B., Hadikusumo, B.H.W. & Memon, A.Q. (2016). A Bayes-
performance evaluation. Accordingly, new optimization strate- ian Belief Network model of organizational factors for improving safe
gies for further development of HiLCPS can be investigated. work behaviors in Thai construction industry. Safety Science, 82, 264-273.

Also note that the widespread deployment of HiLCPS and Liu, Y., Peng, Y., Wang, B., et al. (2017). Review on cyber-physical sys-
realization of their full benefits in construction are long-term tems. IEEE/CAA Journal of Automatica Sinica, 4(1), 27-40.
goals that require progress in multiple perspectives such as
cybersecurity, software and hardware technologies, and policy. Munir, S., Stankovic, J.A., Liang, C.J.M., et al. (2013). Cyber physical
For example, the research on CPS software technology is still system challenges for human-in-the-loop control. Proceedings of the 8th
in the infancy stage, and mature software architecture is not International Workshop on Feedback Computing, San Jose, CA.
available yet (Liu, Peng, Wang, et al., 2017). The achievement
of the goals must simultaneously embrace all levels of the Schirner, G., Erdogmus, D., Chowdhury, K., et al. (2013). The future of
CPS/HiLCPS architecture, from the physical world and its asso- human-in-the-loop cyber-physical systems. Computer, 46(1), 36-45.
ciated sensors and actuators, through computation, networking
and control, to the overall user functionality. Seo, J., Han, S., Lee, S., et al. (2015). Computer vision techniques for
construction safety and health monitoring. Advanced Engineering Infor-
Conclusion matics, 29(2), 239-251.
A systematic and automated system that integrates safety
Tixier, A.J.-P., Hallowell, M.R., Albert, A., et al. (2014). Psychological
risk factors monitoring, safety analysis models, bidirectional antecedents of risk-taking behavior in construction. Journal of Construc-
communication and augmented human-system interactions is tion Engineering and Management, 140(11).
needed to reduce human errors and enhance decision-making
for construction safety improvement. Therefore, the concept of U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). (2017). Census of fatal occupa-
HiLCPS is applied to construction for safety improvement. This tional injuries, 2012-2016. Retrieved from www.bls.gov/iif/oshcfoi1.htm
article outlines the cyber and physical worlds and the interac-
tions between human and the physical world to achieve integra- Wang, J. & Razavi, S. (2016). Two 4-D models effective in reducing false
tion and automation for situational awareness enhancement. A alarms for struck-by-equipment hazard prevention. Journal of Computing
piece of preliminary work is presented to illustrate the HiLCPS in Civil Engineering, 30(6).
framework for safer sites. The HiLCPS framework can be ap-
plied to different safety hazards and situations (e.g., potential Wang, J., Du, S. & Razavi, S. (2016). An integrated INS-GPS-Raspber-
hazards caused by workers’ unsafe behaviors) on construction ry Pi system using the time-sphere model for real-time identification of
sites, providing an automated and integrated solution to devel- struck-by-equipment hazard. Proceedings of the 33rd International Sympo-
op safer construction job sites. PSJ sium on Automation and Robotics in Construction (ISARC).

References Yuan, X., Anumba, C.J. & Parfitt, M.K. (2016). Cyber-physical systems
for temporary structure monitoring. Automation in Construction, 66, 1-14.
Awolusi, I., Song, S. & Marks, E. (2017, October). Forklift safety: Sens-
ing the dangers with technology. Professional Safety, 62(10), 36-39. Jun Wang, Ph.D., is an assistant professor in the Department of Civil and
Environmental Engineering at Mississippi State University. Wang’s research
focuses include smart construction and systems, safety risk analysis, human
factors in construction and resilient infrastructure systems. Wang holds a
Ph.D. in Civil Engineering from McMaster University, Canada, and an M.Sc. and
B.Sc. from Dalian University of Technology, China.

Saiedeh Razavi, Ph.D., is an associate professor in the Department of Civ-
il Engineering at McMaster University, the director of McMaster Institute for
Transportation and Logistics and the inaugural chair in heavy construction.
Her multidisciplinary background includes leading national and international
multidisciplinary team-based projects in sensing and data acquisition, sensor
technologies, data analytics, data fusion and their applications in transporta-
tion, construction and other systems. Razavi holds a B.Sc. in Computer Engi-
neering from Sharif University of Technology, an M.Sc. in Artificial Intelligence
from Iran University of Science and Technology, and a Ph.D. in Civil Engineer-
ing from University of Waterloo.

assp.org FEBRUARY 2019 PROFESSIONAL SAFETY PSJ 45

WORTH READING

LEADING PEOPLE SAFELY

How to Win on the Business Battlefield

By James T. Schultz and Brian L. Fielkow, 2016, Minneapolis, MN: North Loop Books.

The main subject of Leading People about the quality of what was to come. 7POSTMAN/E+/GETTY IMAGES PLUS
Safety: How to Win on the Business Bat- Nonetheless, I kept an open mind and by
tlefield, naturally, is safety. Yet, this is not the time I was done reading chapter four, Preventing
a technical manual nor is it only useful I was convinced this book is brilliant. The Musculoskeletal
to safety professionals. The intended au- narrative is succinct, direct, clear, under- Disorders in
dience of this book is leaders of any size standable, relatable, grounded and real. Pharmaceutical
business or industry seeking to improve Manufacturing
organizational safety culture. The font size is optimal and book chap-
ters are short. Each chapter is a digestible By Kent Hatcher and Deepesh Desai,
This book is versatile and written to nugget of information for anyone limited 2018, Ann Arbor, MI: Humantech.
satisfy the reading level of a wide range by time or other competing priorities.
of individuals. Despite the intended au- Kent Hatcher and Deepesh Desai’s
dience, anyone who is a member of an Two suggested improvements for a fu- e-book, Preventing Musculoskeletal Dis-
organization could benefit from reading ture edition include adding an index for orders in Pharmaceutical Manufacturing
this book. quick referencing and associating chapters describes five steps that companies with
in part one and part two. Chapters in part effective and sustainable ergonomics
Schultz and Fielkow wrote a versatile one describe scenarios, while chapters in improvement processes take to achieve
pseudo-manual consisting of two parts: 1) part two describe how to overcome chal- a reduction in musculoskeletal disorder
principles for creating a world-class safety lenges. By associating a common situation (MSD) risk.
culture, and 2) how to build a world-class with how to resolve it, a reader may find it
safety culture. The first part addresses the easier to address an organizational safety When applied to controlling MSDs,
unfortunately all too common situations challenge. ergonomic design implementation can
that negatively influence safety culture identify and reduce or eliminate the root
and may provide an opportunity to iden- I could not help but think of how this causes of these injuries through the setup
tify a less than desirable environment: In book could be used. Besides a business and design of tools, workstations, equip-
other words, validation that something leader picking up a copy at an airport or ment and the workplace. The authors
is not right within an organization. The finding it in a recommended book list, I present questions to help identify indica-
second part addresses how to overcome see other uses. For example, an organi- tors where an ergonomic improvement
the aforementioned organizational safety zation could address one chapter a week process is needed, such as where muscu-
challenges. among its staff and discuss whether it loskeletal injuries have occurred in the
relates or does not relate to the company past (processes, workstations or tasks),
The first nine pages of the book include in an effort to improve the health of an the body part injured and injury severity.
21 glowing comments from various indi- organization’s safety culture.
viduals. As I was reading through them, The five-step process includes:
I wondered why it would be necessary to Anna M. Aragon, Ph.D., D.H.Ed., M.S., 1) determining need;
include these testimonials. I was skeptical M.A.Ed., CSP, CHES, REHS/RS 2) establishing an improvement process;
APO, AE 3) gaining leadership commitment;
4) launching and sustaining im-
ASSP Update provements;
5) tracking progress.
The Safety Training Ninja The e-book acknowledges the set of
challenges that accompanies the imple-
By Regina McMichael, 2018, Park Ridge, IL: ASSP. mentation of changes to operations and
equipment for ergonomics. Although it
In ASSP’s latest publication, Regina McMichael focuses on mainly discusses ergonomics in pharma-
helping safety professionals improve the development of ceutical manufacturing, the e-book pres-
training programs by making presentations engaging, educa- ents best practices and tools that can be
tional and fun. The Safety Training Ninja covers the ADDIE effective in all workplaces.
(analysis, design, development, implementation, evaluation) Download the free e-book at https://
instructional system design cycle and how it can make a bit.ly/2APw9no.
successful trainer. The book encourages safety professionals
to 1) avoid lectures and instead use tools from the guide to
make training easier and more exciting, 2) develop learning
objectives that meet a company’s safety needs, and 3) ensure
that training bridges knowledge gaps.

“Even the best training program is tough to love when it’s an all-day event. Creative use of
activities, breaks and interactions are some of the ways to make full-day training valuable.” Sto-
ries, tips and tricks are presented in each chapter, as well as job aids and checklists. McMichael
also provides information about incorporating technology such as e-learning and presentation
software into a training program, and offers tips for revising older safety training programs.

To order, visit www.assp.org or call ASSP Customer Service at (847) 699-2929.

46 PSJ PROFESSIONAL SAFETY FEBRUARY 2019 assp.org

THE RADIUM GIRLS:
The Dark Story of America’s Shining Women

By Kate Moore, 2017, Naperville, IL: Sourcebooks Inc.

Kate Moore, author of The Radium Girls: years of experience had not prepared them
The Dark Story of America’s Shining Wom- for these unusual abnormalities.
en, has done a commendable job of docu-
menting the various facts and the ultimate As the physical conditions of these la-
ramifications when ignorance and arro- dies continued to deteriorate and as ques-
gance prevail in the workplace. In chrono- tions arose about their ill health possibly
logical order and in a diary-like format she being work related, the Radium Luminous
details the course of events surrounding Material Corp. and others began their
groups of young ladies in their late teens campaigns of denial, which included the
and early 20s, as they labor in the art of collaboration of other medical profession-
applying a self-illuminating, radium-based als to deny a correlation between the phys-
paint to the numerals on watches, clocks ical demise of the workers and the work
and various gauges for military equipment. they performed. Burdened with mounting
medical and dental bills, the ladies began
This fact-based documentary begins asking the companies for some type of
in 1917 as it recounts the delight of nu- financial assistance, which fell on deaf ears.
merous young women who are fortunate
enough to gain full-time employment at As the radium began to devastate the
the Radium Luminous Material Corp. in bodies of more and more young ladies and
Newark, NJ. The workplace was consid- as deaths began to occur, agencies such as
ered a studio rather than a factory and the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the Industrial
provided better-than-average wages, as Hygiene Division and others began inves-
well as accommodated the luxury of open- tigating some of the claims. However, it
ly conversing with other workers as long was not until 1927 when Raymond Berry, a
as each individual’s daily production did young lawyer, took on the challenge of rep-
not suffer. As each women’s level of proficiency and productivity resenting several of the workers that justice
increased, she became more valuable to the company, which would begin to prevail for the “radium girls.” The Illinois Industri-
resulted in wage increases; however, as the women soon learned, al Commission ruled in favor of the workers and monetary awards
their achievements came with unbelievable consequences. were granted. Moore indicates that the dial-painter case ultimately
led to the establishment of OSHA.
Their employment brought various rewards as the girls and wom- I feel this book encapsulates just how far the field of safety
en delighted in the ability to purchase trendy clothes and, during and health has progressed since the early 1900s and that without
evening socialization, received admiration from peers because their such historical reminders, we may fall prey to repeating some of
hair and clothing seemed to sparkle in the night: a direct result of the same mistakes. I personally found the ignorance associated
the radium powder that permeated the air within the studios. Some with understanding radium and the hazards of exposure as well
of the young ladies delighted in the whimsical novelty of painting as the absence of applicable safety and health standards to be
their fingernails or even their teeth with the paint. quite understandable; however, the arrogance demonstrated by
the various companies, members of upper management and
Radium was introduced to the world, circa 1898, by Marie and members of the medical community was unpardonable.
Pierre Curie. A complete understanding of the hazards of expo- Robert D. LaMarsh, M.B.A., M.S.
sure or the physiological effects on the human body obviously may Wood River, IL
not have been fully realized or publicized. According to the author,
at that time radium was viewed as a “wonder element” with news- Workers at the Radium Luminous Material Corp. were instructed
papers and magazines promoting a variety of consumer products to use a lip-pointing technique to create a fine point on the brush
containing trace amounts of radium. Some of these products in- to reduce material waste and increase productivity. As a result, the
cluded alleged health-promoting tonics or elixirs. workers ingested radium hundreds of times a day.

At the Radium Luminous Material Corp., and similar com-
panies, the standard process for applying the paint consisted of
a procedure called lip-pointing. To achieve a fine point on the
brush, the ladies would put the brush to their lips or in their
mouth, thus drawing the hairs of the brush to a desired point. The
brush was then dipped into the paint and applied to the work-
piece. This lip-pointing procedure occurred hundreds, if not thou-
sands, of times per day and per worker.

The ramifications of the daily exposure and, in a sense, consump-
tion of radium did not take long to appear as various symptoms af-
fecting workers’ health, which initially resulted in various degrees of
discomfort or outright pain. As the women discussed the concerns
with dentists or doctors, the medical professionals displayed a sense
of disbelief and to some degree wonderment as prior training and

assp.org FEBRUARY 2019 PROFESSIONAL SAFETY PSJ 47

STANDARDS INSIDER

OSHRC DECISION

Casts Doubt on Hundreds of OSHA Standards

By Gary Visscher and Adele L. Abrams

A recent decision by Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission (OSHRC), Kiewit
Power Constructors Co., is both 1) a trip into administrative procedure and history that only
an OSHA nerd could appreciate, and 2) a far-reaching decision that casts doubt on the legal
status of many safety and health standards that OSHA has been enforcing since 1972.

Gary Visscher Kiewit Power was cited in 2011 for not having heart. However, the dissenting opinion in Kiewit Power
“quick drenching” eye/body wash facilities for its em- noted that OSHA’s initial position in section 1910.5(e),
Gary Visscher is Of ployees at a construction work site in Tennessee, in which was repealed by the Sept. 9, 1971, notice, was
Counsel with the Law violation of 29 CFR 1926.50(g). The only issue in the contradicted by the provisions in section 1910.5(c)(2).]
Office of Adele L. case by the time it reached OSHRC was whether the
Abrams P.C. He teaches cited standard had been validly adopted by OSHA. Although there were several subsequent codification
environmental and changes [including the 1993 “reinventing government”
occupational health The standard is one of the hundreds that OSHA ad- initiative, which combined all construction-applicable
policy at University of opted under section 6(a) of the OSH Act. Section 6(a) standards into a separate volume (Part 1926)], the is-
Maryland Baltimore allowed the Secretary of Labor, during the first 2 years sue in Kiewit Power, as OSHRC viewed it, was OSHA’s
County. Prior to this, after the effective date of the OSH Act, to “promulgate action in September 1971 that applied the WHA stan-
Visscher served as pres- as an occupational safety and health standard any na- dards (including the quick drenching standard) to all
idential appointee on tional consensus standard, and any established federal employers covered by the OSH Act.
OSHRC and U.S. Chem- standard, unless he determines that the promulgation of
ical Safety Board. He such a standard would not result in improved safety or OSHRC decided, 2 to 1 (Commissioner Attwood
served as Deputy Assis- health for specifically designated employees.” dissenting), that the authority given to OSHA in
tant Secretary for OSHA section 6(a) of the OSH Act to adopt existing federal
from 2001 to 2004. He Section 6(a) specifically exempted standards ad- standards did not authorize or allow OSHA to expand
was Workforce Policy opted under the subsection from the Administrative the scope of coverage of those standards in the manner
Counsel for the U.S. Procedures Act and from the notice-and-comment in which it did so in September 1971. The majority said
House of Representa- rulemaking procedures in section 6(b), which other- that applying the standard to employers in “industries”
tives Education and wise apply to the adoption of any OSHA standard. other than “manufacturing and supply” constituted a
Workforce Committee. “substantive change” to the WHA standard, which the
The term established federal standard in section 6(a) majority said was not permitted under section 6(a).
Adele L. included standards that had been adopted prior to the
Abrams effective date of the OSH Act under the Walsh-Healey The majority also rejected the Secretary’s arguments
Act, the Contract Work Hours and Safety Standards that OSHA’s interpretation of its authority under section
Adele L. Abrams, J.D., Act, the Service Contract Act, the Longshore and 6(a) was entitled to deference under Chevron U.S.A. v.
CMSP, is an attorney and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, and the National Natural Resources Defense Council (1984). While the
president of the Law Foundation on the Arts and Humanities Act. majority found that section 6(a) is ambiguous on the
Office of Adele L. Abrams issue presented in the case, the majority said that the
P.C. The firm represents The quick drenching standard at issue in Kiewit Pow- Secretary’s interpretation, to apply the standard to all
employers in OSHA and er had its origins as a Walsh-Healey Act (WHA) stan- employers covered by the OSH Act, was not reasonable.
MSHA litigation, and dard. The WHA applies to contracts with the federal
provides consultation, government or the District of Columbia “for the manu- Thus, the majority held, the construction stan-
safety audits and train- facture or furnishing of materials, supplies, articles and dard, section 1926.50(g), under which Kiewit Power
ing to companies in equipment or furnishing of materials, supplies, articles had been cited, was not authorized under section
various industries. She is and equipment” in an amount greater than $10,000. 6(a). Since it had not been promulgated through no-
adjunct faculty for Cath- tice-and-comment rulemaking under section 6(b),
olic University of Amer- On May 29, 1971, OSHA published then-national OSHRC ruled that the standard is not a legally enforce-
ica, where she teaches consensus and “established federal standards” in “300 able standard. It therefore vacated the citation against
employment, labor and densely packed pages of the Federal Register” (Mendeloff, Kiewit Power. [Kiewit Power also sought a declara-
occupational safety law. 1979). The published standards included all the safety and tory order from OSHRC that the standard is invalid.
Abrams is a professional health standards previously promulgated under the WHA. OSHRC declined, stating that, although the commis-
member of ASSP. The Federal Register notice included a provision, 29 CFR sion has authority to issue declaratory orders, such or-
1910.5(e), which stated that the standards adopted from ders are “an extraordinary step.” Kiewit Power filed an
the WHA applied to “manufacturing or supply operations appeal of OSHRC’s decision insofar as the commission
that would be subject to the Walsh Healey Act.” declined to issue the declaratory order. As discussed
here, that appeal and the Secretary’s appeal of the main
On Sept. 9, 1971 [still well within the 2-year period decision have been consolidated in the U.S. Court of
provided by section 6(a)], OSHA published a Federal Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.]
Register notice that revoked section 1910.5(e) and stated
that it was removing the “limitation to the application The dissent disagreed on both points, finding
of the [WHA] standards so that they may apply to ev- that the language and history of section 6(a) did not
ery employment and place of employment exposed to prohibit OSHA from applying the quick drenching
hazards covered by the standards.” [The notice did not standard to all employers covered by the OSH Act,
provide an extended explanation for OSHA’s change of

48 PSJ PROFESSIONAL SAFETY FEBRUARY 2019 assp.org