The CoESPU Magazine - Quarterly no. 1-2023

THE AFRICAN PEACE AND SECURITY ARCHITECTURE (APSA), THE FRAMEWORK FOR PROMOTING PEACE, SECURITY AND STABILITY IN AFRICA CAPACITY BUILDING WITH FOCUS ON BUILDING INTEGRITY AND BUILDING INSTITUTIONAL RESILIENCE - Improving Capacity Building - The African Peace and Security Architecture Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units -Sub Iure ad Pacem tuendam Milites paro The CoESPU MAGAZINE The online Quarterly of Stability Policing 1-2023

THE COESPU COMPOUND MEMORIAL

Dear CoESPU Magazine Readers, The first three months of the year are drawing to a close, and yet they have been a time of tremendous and exciting intensity for our activities. Before I begin, I would like to take a moment to respectfully remember the terrible tragedy that struck Syria and Turkey in early February with the massive earthquake that caused the loss of thousands of lives. I would also like to express my condolences to the victims of the shipwreck that occurred near the coast of Cutro, Calabria, that cost the lives of more than 80 people attempting to reach Italy. My thoughts are with their families and loved ones. In the past three months, we have had the pleasure and honor of hosting two major events. The first was the Webinar on “The Protection of Vulnerable Groups in Domestic Policing and Peace Support Operations in the African continent,” which we hosted for the first time along with the African Union Commission. The second was the high-level international conference entitled “Geopolitics and Peace Operations,” which featured numerous experts from all over the world providing their views on various operational scenarios on the international stage. Naturally, a number of courses came through our gates, including the 9th edition of the “Core Pre Deployment Training Material for UN Peacekeeping Operations” course, the 25th edition of the “(enhanced) Protection of Civilians” course, and the 15th edition of the “High-Risk Operations” course. In this issue of the Magazine, you will find a remarkable contribution by Ms. Katharina Waczek and Ms. Sophie Aloë, Political Affairs Officers in the Light Coordination Mechanism (LCM) of the United Nations Department of Peace Operations. In their article, they highlight the United Nations LCM features and its role in strengthening the UN Secretariat’s efforts to better inform capacity-building providers of Troop/Police Contributing Countries needs and gaps, and to support them in putting their resources where they are most needed. Mr. Nenenga Driscole Agborsum, research and translation assistant, International School for Security Forces – (EIFORCES), Yaounde-Cameroon, and former CoESPU attendee of the “24th (enhanced) Comprehensive Protection of Civilians” and “8th Core Pre Deployment Training Materials for UN Peacekeeping Operations” courses, offers an interesting overview of some of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). His article aims to evaluate the input of the APSA in ensuring the return to peace, security, and stability in Africa and then analyzes the challenges the APSA has faced in its implementation, to make solid and sustainable proposals for the future. Mr. Jordi Bernal Fabra, graduate in International Relations by the Autonomous University of Barcelona and a former student of Stability Policing module held in February last year at CoESPU, as part of the Master’s in Security, Intelligence & Strategic Studies at the Universities of Glasgow, Trento, “Charles” in Prague and “City” in Dublin, presents a thorough study on the United Nations Peacekeeping Intelligence Reform of 2017, analyzing the flaws and virtues of the intelligence element in UN Peace Operations. MG Giovanni Pietro BARBANO CoESPU Director FOREWORD

The CoESPU Magazine is devoted to the publication of professional concepts and issues, research and doctrinal products developed by the Carabinieri Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units, in collaboration with other international research Centers. The Magazine addresses topics of professional, technical, operational and juridical nature in the field of Stability Policing within Peace Operations. Based on the core values of ethics, integrity, professionalism and respect for diversity, harmonically inflected and informed by the traditions of over two hundred years of Carabinieri history, the Magazine fosters Human Rights and gender mainstreaming, while seeking to enhance current police peacekeeping doctrine and promoting international police peacekeeping interoperability, cognizant of Lessons Learned and best practises. The CoESPU Magazine is constantly committed to upholding UN standards, norms, procedures and curricula, while endorsing self-sufficiency of the participating Police Contributing Countries. Consequently, its editorial policy promotes the principles of representativeness, responsiveness, and accountability, as well as effectiveness, efficiency, transparency, and accessibility, to provide the highest professional standards to build trust and legitimacy of beneficiary Law Enforcement Institutions. DISCLAIMER: The views expressed in this journal belong to single authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the CoESPU, the UN, The Italian Government, the Carabinieri or other nominated Institutions. Content is copyrighted where expressly indicated, but Material belongs to authors themselves. The Center of Excellence for Stabilities Police Units retains full and exclusive ownership over other magazine contents and original images. Reproduction of any part of this magazine without express written permission is strictly prohibited. Dr. Maureen BROWN BG (ret.) Giorgio CUZZELLI Prof. Andrea DE GUTTRY Dr. Michael DZIEDZIC (Col. ret) Dr. Karen J. FINKEBINDER Prof. Oreste FOPPIANI Dr. Nadia GERSPACHER Prof. Edoardo GREPPI Dr. David LIGHTBURN Col. Michele LIPPIELLO Prof. Paolo MAGRI Prof. Andrea MARGELLETTI Prof. Emanuele Vittorio PARSI Prof. Karla PINHEL RIBEIRO Prof. Bernardo SALA Amb. Dmitry TITOV Prof. Gabriella VENTURINI Prof. Salvatore CIMINI Col. Paolo DI PIAZZA Prof. Paolo FORADORI Prof. Gian Luca FORESTI Prof. Laris GAISER Prof. Marco LOMBARDI Prof. Sara PENNICINO Lt. Col. Pierpaolo SINCONI Lt. Col. Federico VECCI United Nations, CoESPU Magazine Team Cover picture by Mr. Denis Rizzotti Other authors are indicated in single captions COESPU, VIA MEDICI, 87 ZIP: 36100, VICENZA (ITALY) Telephone +39 0444 932190 IMAGES AND ARTWORK SOURCES: PUBLISHER: EDITORIAL TEAM MAGAZINE EDITOR IN CHIEF: MG. Giovanni Pietro Barbano MANAGING EDITOR: Maj. Lucio De Angelis DRAFTING, COMPOSITION, GRAPHICS AND EDITING: Maj. Lucio De Angelis CWO Massimiliano Dimichele Mr. Denis Rizzotti SCIENTIFIC COMMITTEE EDITORIAL BOARD

WHERE CAN PK LEADERSHIP IMPROVE?.......................................................................................... DEPUTY DIRECTOR’S CORNER......................................................................................................... ASSESSING THE UN PK INTELLIGENCE REFORM OF 2017............................................................. WEBINAR ON PROTECTION OF VULNERABLE GROUPS IN PSOS IN AFRICA................................... IMSISS: REFLECTIONS ON THE SP MODULE BY COESPU.................................................................. SP, THE GREAT ABSENCE IN THE AFGHAN CONUNDRUM................................................................ IMPROVING CAPACITY BUILDING........................................................................................................ THE AFRICAN PEACE AND SECURITY ARCHITECTURE......................................................................... “The CoESPU Magazine – the on line Quarterly of Stability Policing” is a stand-alone on line publication. Printed copies are intended for internal use and shall not be distributed. Published on www.coespu.org THE COESPU MAGAZINE REGISTRY COURT NUMBER: VICENZA N.3367/2018 U.G. R.S. 8/2018. ISSN: 2611-9005 COESPU MAGAZINE [ONLINE] PUBLISHED ONLINE ON THE COESPU WEBSITE WWW.COESPU.ORG - INTERNET SERVICE PROVIDER: AXERA SPA, VIA MADONNETTA N. 215 INT. 4 - 36075 MONTECCHIO MAGGIORE (VI) ITALY coespu.org facebook.com/coespu twitter.com/coespu linkedin.com/school/coespu [email protected] TABLE OF CONTENTS 12 8 60 40 64 72 20 29 30 46 CAPACITY BUILDING WITH FOCUS ON BUILDING INTEGRITY AND BUILDING INSTITUTIONAL RESILIENCE THE AFRICAN PEACE AND SECURITY ARCHITECTURE (APSA), THE FRAMEWORK FOR PROMOTING PEACE, SECURITY AND STABILITY IN AFRICA COESPU TRAINING COESPU ONSITE VISITS NEWS INTERNSHIP RESEARCH RESULTS ALUMNI EVENTS IN DEPTH

CAPACITY BUILDING WITH FOCUS ON BUILDING INTEGRITY AND BUILDING INSTITUTIONAL RESILIENCE THE AFRICAN PEACE AND SECURITY ARCHITECTURE (APSA), THE FRAMEWORK FOR PROMOTING PEACE, SECURITY AND STABILITY IN AFRICA - -

8 CAPACITY BUILDING WITH FOCUS ON BUILDING INTEGRITY AND BUILDING INSTITUTIONAL RESILIENCE Abstract Improving training and capacity-building is a major shared commitment of the Action for Peacekeeping1 initiative (A4P) and its implementation strategy A4P+2, which were designed to enhance the overall impact and effectiveness of UN peace operations. While it is the responsibility of the UN Secretariat to provide policies, standards and training materials, Member States are required to provide and deploy well-trained and equipped peacekeepers.3 Such a commitment to global peace and security requires resources that many troop- and police-contributing countries (T/PCCs) may not have, but that other Member States can assist them with. The United Nations Light Coordination Mechanism (LCM) in the UN Department of Peace Operations (DPO) has been officially active since 2019 in strengthening the UN Secretariat’s efforts to better inform capacity-building providers of T/PCCs’ needs and gaps, and to help match providers with recipient countries. The LCM not only focuses on training, but also on equipment, infrastructure, technical, logistical, and financial support. In 2021, building on the work of the LCM with regard to military training and capacity-building, UN Members States requested that the Secretariat expand the assistance provided through the LCM to supporting policing needs and knowledge management. As part of this expansion, a new tool, the Deployment Review Mobile Application4, was developed by the LCM to encourage T/PCCs to collect and share experiences and lessons learned in order to improve peacekeepers’ safety, security, and performance. To make this work a success, the participation of Member States is crucial. Main article: In order to implement their mandates effectively and face today and tomorrow’s operational challenges, UN peacekeeping missions must be provided with the right capabilities, at the right time. As of December 2022, only fifteen UN Member States provided about 65 percent of the 76,000 UN uniformed personnel currently deployed worldwide.5 With a view to expand the pool of countries providing police and military personnel, the UN is striving to ensure a diverse mix of contributors that provides the right capabilities to and increases by Katharina Waczek & Sophie Aloë IMPROVING CAPACITY BUILDING Improving capacity building through innovative partnerships and tools Source:https://www.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/GettyImages-473127956-cropped.jpg

9 the flexibility of peacekeeping. In this respect, the UN must rely on a variety of partnerships between Member States which can take on different forms, such as countries co-deploying their peacekeepers to a UN peace operation or providing training and capacity-building to those countries that contribute personnel. In 2017, given Member States’ increasing requests for UN-coordinated capacity-building, UN Secretary-General António Guterres proposed to the Security Council the establishment of a light coordination mechanism that would bring together Secretariat entities involved in training, capacity-building and force generation, T/ PCCs that would benefit from training and capacity-building, and Member States that can provide the necessary support or resources.6 As a result, the UN Department of Peace Operations’ Light Coordination Mechanism (LCM) was officially launched in 2019, with a core mission to facilitate bilateral and multilateral partnerships between T/PCCs and Member States, to address short- and medium-term needs impacting the delivery of peacekeeping mandates, to assist in deconflicting training and capacity-building and matching providers and recipients, with a focus on military training and capacity-building. Why a light coordination mechanism? The UN recognizes Member States’ authority to establish and develop bilateral and multilateral relationships for training and capacity-building purposes. The LCM doesn’t aim to replace these but works to support these relationships to better respond to gaps and needs identified by the Secretariat and field missions, and to support capacity-building providers in putting their resources where they are most needed. Some of the main activities of the LCM include engaging with Member States in information-sharing events, communicating capacity-building and training needs identified by the UN or T/PCCs, collecting information on peacekeeping training and capacity-building delivered by Member States, and identifying overlaps and helping to deconflict. The LCM also addresses specific requests for training and capacity-building support from T/PCCs by finding partners able to lend the needed support. These partnerships might lead to longer-term relationships between the provider and the recipient while some recipients might become capacity-building providers to others themselves. In all its activities, the LCM aims at supporting T/PCCs with improving the preparation and thus increasing the deployment of women peacekeepers. Fulfilling the LCM’s mandate requires good working relationships with many parties, trust on all sides, and openness to sharing information. Through its activities the LCM supports the peacekeeping performance agenda, which is considered as an integral part of A4P and A4P+ initiatives. Four years in, the LCM has expanded its activities beyond the military to also include UN Police peacekeeping training and capacity-building, as well as lessons learned and best practices. Throughout its work, the LCM aims to develop innovative approaches to facilitating partnerships and informa - tion-sharing that also leverage new technologies. Collecting and sharing lessons learned at the touch of a button In 2021, the LCM launched the Deployment Review Mobile Application7, the first of its kind developed by the UN for Member States, designed specifically to help TCCs and PCCs establish and develop their own lessons learned processes to better prepare and support their deployment to UN peace operations. Understanding that knowledge management is the responsibility of everyone, including civilian, military and police leadership and personnel at all levels at UN Headquarters and in field missions, is at the heart of this project. Together, they must adapt and react proactively to evolving operational contexts. The application is also a reflection of how digital technologies present new opportunities to improve the effectiveness of peace operations and supports the implementation of the Strategy for the Digital Tran- “IN ORDER TO IMPLEMENT THEIR MANDATES EFFECTIVELY AND FACE TODAY AND TOMORROW’S OPERATIONAL CHALLENGES, UN PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS MUST BE PROVIDED WITH THE RIGHT CAPABILITIES, AT THE RIGHT TIME.”

10 CAPACITY BUILDING WITH FOCUS ON BUILDING INTEGRITY AND BUILDING INSTITUTIONAL RESILIENCE sformation of UN Peacekeeping.8 A survey conducted by the LCM in 2019 to better understand the capacity-building needs of Member States, highlighted the need for better access to best practices and lessons learned from operational experiences in the field. It also underscored that the process of collecting and developing lessons from Member States’ experiences needed to be clarified, improved and systematized. In 2020, the LCM worked with 16 Member States to develop a methodology to help T/PCCs (national institutions, training centres and academies, contingent commanders, staff officers and support staff, and individual peacekeepers), to establish and/or strengthen their own lessons learning processes. The Application was created with several essential questions in mind: What are the most effective ways to identify best practices among UN Peacekeeping uniformed personnel? How can these be most effectively captured and shared more widely? What system could help ensure the most dynamic and engaging process for this? During the Covid-19 pandemic, the methodology was transformed “SOME OF THE MAIN ACTIVITIES OF THE LCM INCLUDE ENGAGING WITH MEMBER STATES IN INFORMATION-SHARING EVENTS, COMMUNICATING CAPACITY-BUILDING AND TRAINING NEEDS IDENTIFIED BY THE UN OR T/PCCS, COLLECTING INFORMATION ON PEACEKEEPING TRAINING AND CAPACITY-BUILDING DELIVERED BY MEMBER STATES, AND IDENTIFYING OVERLAPS AND HELPING TO DECONFLICT.” Deployment Review mobile app Scan to download

11 Sophie Aloë Political Affairs Officer Light Coordination Mechanism (LCM) Integrated Training Service (ITS) Division of Police, Evaluation and Training (DPET) Department of Peace Operations United Nations Headquarters note 1 https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/ action-for-peacekeeping-a4p 2 https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/action-peacekeeping 3 General Assembly Resolution A/RES/49/37 (1995) 4 https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/deployment-review-mobile-app 5 Data on Troop and Police Contributions accessible at https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/ data-troop-and-police-contributions. 6 Letter dated 15 December 2017 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/2017/1079. 7 https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/deployment-review-mobile-app 8 Strategy for the Digital Transformation of UN Peacekeeping: https://peacekeeping.un.org/ en/strategy-digital-transformation-of-un-peacekeeping. into a mobile application; as a result, the Deployment Review Mobile Application was launched in December 2021 within the margins of the Peacekeeping Ministerial Conference held in Seoul. Once downloaded on Android or iOS, the application gives access to the lessons learning methodology and practical templates whenever and wherever needed, including where there is poor or little internet access as may be the case in environments where peacekeepers are deployed. By facilitating knowledge sharing among uniformed deployed personnel, the application aims to improve the training, preparation and support phases of deployment. The lessons learned identified and collected by deployed personnel should ideally be integrated in the training and preparation of consecutive deployments to increase the safety and security of peacekeepers and to enhance their performance and mandate delivery. Only in this way can the exercise help to improve performance on the ground. The Deployment Review Mobile Application is currently available in French and English, and its translation into other languages, including national languages of some of the biggest troop- and police-contributing countries, is in progress. The idea is hereby to give a larger community of uniformed personnel access to this knowledge management tool and to increase its userbase. The Application is also a living tool, which is why the LCM continues to engage with Member States to encourage its adoption, to collect feedback from its users with the aim to adjust it as relevant in 2024. Upcoming milestones for the Deployment Review Mobile Application in 2023 include the development of educational videos for use in pre-deployment training. The LCM will also focus on the collection and sharing of some Member States’ experience in using the Application, as well as of their lessons learned and best practices identified with the Application. The Deployment Review Mobile Application is one example of how the LCM provides innovative tools for Member States to capture field-based information, learn from each other’s experiences and improve capacity-building and training with the ultimate goal of improving the safety and security of our peacekeepers and of the people they are mandated to protect. This work supports Member States’ collective efforts and the spirit of partnership that lie at the heart of Action for Peacekeeping. Katharina Waczek Political Affairs Officer Light Coordination Mechanism (LCM) Integrated Training Service (ITS) Division of Police, Evaluation and Training (DPET) Department of Peace Operations United Nations Headquarters

12 THE AFRICAN PEACE AND SECURITY ARCHITECTURE (APSA), THE FRAMEWORK FOR PROMOTING PEACE, SECURITY AND STABILITY IN AFRICA Abstract: The socio-economic and socio-political vices that have plagued the African continent since the dawn of the 21st century have turned Africa into a fertile ground for armed conflicts and have contributed greatly to the low economic growth and infrastructural development of Africa amongst others. As a result, ensuring peace, security and stability in Africa has been the top priority of AU stakeholders, hence, the creation of the APSA, a decision making instrument for the prevention; management and resolution of crisis and conflicts; post conflict reconstruction and development on the continent. APSA represents the materialisation of the campaign towards African solutions for African problems. However, despite the measures taken to ensure peace, security and stability on the continent, armed conflicts and security challenges prevail in contemporary Africa (the case of South Sudan, CAR and the Boko Haram insurgency in the Lake Chad Basin). To what extent has the APSA contributed in ensuring peace, security and stability in Africa amidst contemporary security challenges? In a prospective and forward looking approach, this article aims at evaluating the input of the APSA in ensuring the return to peace, security and stability in Africa on one hand, then analysing the challenges the APSA has faced in its implementation on the other hand, to enable us make proposals for the future. INTRODUCTION Supported by structures, objectives principles and values; accompanied by decision making processes in prevention, management and resolution of crises and conflicts, by Driscole Nenenga A THE AFRICAN PEACE AND SECURITY ARCHITECTURE The African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) faced with contemporary security challenges in Africa. “ENSURING PEACE, SECURITY AND STABILITY IN AFRICA HAS BEEN THE TOP PRIORITY OF AU STAKEHOLDERS, HENCE, THE CREATION OF THE APSA, A DECISION MAKING INSTRUMENT FOR THE PREVENTION; MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION OF CRISIS AND CONFLICTS.”

13 post-conflict reconstruction and development on the continent 1; the African Peace and Security Archi - tecture (APSA) could be conside - red as the operational framework for the instauration of peace, unity and stability on the African con - tinent. Adopted within a security context mainly characterised by armed conflicts, which originate from terrorism, military takeovers, as well as post electoral disputes just to name a few. To a greater ex - tent, Africa owes its under develop - ment to these armed conflicts, whi - ch have turned Africa into a fertile ground for the world’s most signifi - cant armed conflicts. On the back - drop of the above considerations and being a continent emerging from independence, the establish - ment of structural parameters for the blossom of the African conti - nent is imperative, hence, the APSA. The legitimacy of the APSA is imbedded in the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council (PSC), adop - ted in Durban (South Africa), in July 2002, and became effecti - ve in December 2003, which de - scribes the different components of the APSA and their respective responsibilities 2. However, the ef - fective implementation of the APSA lies essentially in the relationship between the AU and the Regional Economic Communities/Regional Mechanisms for Prevention, Mana - gement and Resolution (REC/RM), as well as the interaction between the PSC, other AU organs and the civil society 3. This affirms that co - operation and commitment at all levels of the African community are the backbone of the successful im - plementation of the APSA. Cogni - sant of the above considerations, to what extent has the APSA con - tributed in ensuring peace, secu - Figure 1: Military coups in Africa over the decades

14 THE AFRICAN PEACE AND SECURITY ARCHITECTURE (APSA), THE FRAMEWORK FOR PROMOTING PEACE, SECURITY AND STABILITY IN AFRICA rity and stability in Africa amidst contemporary security challenges? In a bid to answer the above problem statement, we will evaluate the input of the APSA in ensuring the return to peace, security and stability in Africa considering contemporary security challenges (I), analyse the challenges faced in the implementation of the APSA, then make proposals within a prospective approach (II). I. The APSA and Africa’s contemporary security context: The nomenclature of Africa’s security context is shaped by “megatrends”, which include a web of complex and reinforcing dynamics such as demographic and social change, urbanisation, climate change and migration4. In the midst of these “megatrends”, the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic and its global effects, exposed the unpreparedness and weaknesses of African States in the face of a Figure 3: Africa’s active Islamist Militant Groups

15 global threat. In the long run, violent conflicts would intensify and exacerbate, leading to grave security challenges for the African continent. Interstate conflicts are largely giving way for intrastate conflicts making them the major source of insecurity with Africa having the largest number of rising one-sided violence in relation to other regions5. In the same light, terrorism, violent extremism and military takeovers constitute the main causes of contemporary armed conflicts in Africa, with the prevalence of the Boko Haram insurgency in the Lake Chad Basin, the Anglophone crisis in the English speaking regions of Cameroon and the incursion of Da’esh affiliates in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger6. 2022 saw a massive resurgence of military take overs, with Burkina Faso experiencing two, as well as two failed attempts in Guinea Bissau, Gambia as well as Sao Tome and Principe7, just to name a few. Violent extremism, particularly perpetrated by militant islamist violence, represents one of the most pressing security threats in Africa in recent years. Largely operating in five main theatres; the Sahel, Somalia, the Lake Chad Basin, North Africa and Mozambique, with distinct locally based actors and context-specific challenges, they employ asymmetric tactics and integrate within local communities, seeking to amplify grievances and intercommunal differences8. The aim is to mobilise recruitment and foster anti-government sentiments. These modus operandi used by the militant islamist groups have deeply altered the security atmosphere and instilled a constant state of uncertainty amongst the local population, with repercussions on all aspects of social life. In response, the ECOWAS imposed tough trade and economic sanctions on its member States where military takeovers were resurgent such as Mali in August 2020 and May 2021, Burkina Faso in January 2022 and Guinea in September 20219. However, on the backdrop of the economic hardship experienced by these countries and with the global increase in fuel prices as a result of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, an ECOWAS summit was held in Accra, Ghana on 3 July 2022 to discuss a transitional roadmap for Mali, Burkina Faso and Guinea10. Though contrary to the sacrosanct principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of States, these sanctions are justifiable under the spectrum of international law by virtue of the fact that they aim at bringing an end to the security challenges caused by these military takeovers, registering considerable civilian casualties. This firm act by the ECOWAS buttresses the assertion fact that the effective implementation of the APSA lies in the interaction and commitment of the AU, REC/RM and other stake holders. Thanks to the AU’s implication, progress is being made in the signing and implementation of peace agreements between warring countries, or those emerging from decades of conflict and instability11. The AU has built up an impressive toolbox for conflict prevention and peace-making made of the Continental Early Warning System, the Panel of the Wise, Special Envoys, and ad hoc mediation panels, often comprised of sitting and former Heads of State12. II. Setbacks in the implementation of the APSA: Jean-François Bayart’s article, “L’Afrique dans le monde : une histoire d’extraversion”, opened up this new field of research which raises relevant questions on the complex nature of the relationships between African actors and the external environment13. According to Bayart, “it is not a question of denying that dependency exists, but to think about dependency without being a proponent of dependency theory”14. The successful implementation of the APSA will imply the application of African means whereby foreign aid would rather supplement already existing strategies rather that being the nucleus of the latter. Despite its notable successes, the APSA still finds difficulties in handling the multiple and various forms of conflict on the African continent, which explains the ambitious goal of “silencing the guns” by 202015 through the funding of the AU’s peace activities. This precedes “THANKS TO THE AU’S IMPLICATION, PROGRESS IS BEING MADE IN THE SIGNING AND IMPLEMENTATION OF PEACE AGREEMENTS BETWEEN WARRING COUNTRIES, OR THOSE EMERGING FROM DECADES OF CONFLICT AND INSTABILITY.”

16 THE AFRICAN PEACE AND SECURITY ARCHITECTURE (APSA), THE FRAMEWORK FOR PROMOTING PEACE, SECURITY AND STABILITY IN AFRICA an AU Assembly decision in 2015, to take financial responsibility for 25% of costs of peace activities on the continent by 2020. APSA’s 2016-2020 Roadmap concurrently declares conflict prevention and peacebuilding to be two of its five strategic priorities16. Regardless, these two aspects remain the weakest elements of the APSA due to its emergency-oriented approach whereby action is taken most often at the occurrence of a security threat. In this regard, a more proactive approach to security challenges is imperative and will entail the establishment of developmental policies, sanctions and elections monitoring amongst others. As per the core findings of the APSA Impact Report 2016 presented by Michelle Ndiaye Ntab, Director of the Africa Peace and Security Programme at IPSS and Melhik Bekele, Research project coordinator, while 28 out of 67 conflicts were addressed by the APSA, the report shows that the AU and RECs were more likely to intervene in high-intensity conflicts. 78% of interventions were deemed successful or partly successful17. Moreover, the report equally stipulates that the AU and the RECs have become effective indispensable actors in maintaining peace and security though significant challenges still exist18. In this light, some recommendations could include a significant increase in the inclusion of civil society, particularly youths and women for a more comprehensive approach. In addition, strengthening regional integration could be considered as well as a visible attribution of tasks and responsibilities to the various components of the APSA. The PSC needs to widen its mandate and activities to include non-conventional threats to peace and security which will increase peace, security, development and stability in Africa. In addition, the PSC lacks the indispensable human and finanFigure 4: Militant Islamist Activity by Theatre

17 Bibliography Bayart J-F., “L’Afrique dans le monde : une histoire d’extraversion”, Critique internationale, vol V, 1999, pp. 97-120 ; Chekol Y. G., “Major Successes and Challenges of African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA)”, International Journal of Political Science (IJPS), vol V, no.2, 2019, pp. 1-8. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.20431/2454- 9452.0502001; DESGRAIS N., LE GOURIELLEC S., “The Challenges of building the African Peace and Security Architecture”, Institut de Recherche Stratégique de l’Ecole Militaire, research paper No. 28, 2016, p. 2; NTWARI G-F., 2014, ‘l’Union africaine et la promotion de la paix, de la sécurité et de la stabilité en Afrique’, Thèse de doctorat en Droit Public, Lyon 3, Lyon ; https://pure.giga-hamburg.de/ws/files/21580504/web_afrika_2018_02.pdf visited on 24/02/2023 at 11:33 am; https://www.giz.de/en/worldwide/63606. html visited on 24/02/2023 visited on 24/02/2023 at 12:46 pm; https://www.aljazeera.com/ news/2022/1/28/ecowas-suspends-burkina-faso-after-coup visited on 22/02/2023 at 21:00; https://www.voanews.com/a/ecowas-suspends-burkina-faso-s-membership-/6417087.html visited on 22/02/2023 at 21:14; https://news.un.org/en/ story/2022/11/1130432 visited on 22/02/2023 at 13:53; https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-46783600.amp visited on 22/02/2023 at 14:08; https://www.peaceau.org/fr/topic/the-african-pe... visited on 20/02/2023 at 10:11 am; https://africacenter.org/in-focus/countering-vi... visited on 22/02/2023 at 13:21. Driscole Nenenga A Legal consultant specialised in international peace, security and preventive diplomacy. cial resources to fulfil its mandate. CONCLUSION The APSA is the actual lamp light that Africa needs to face its nebulous, dynamic and dysfunctional security challenges which keep heightening, resurging and evolving over time. African problems will be better resolved by African solutions under the prism of solidarity and unity to upgrade Africa from a theatre of insecurity to an arena of development and blossom. note 1 https://www.peaceau.org/fr/topic/the-african-pe... visited on 20/02/2023 at 10:11 am. 2 Ibid. 3 Ibid. 4 https://africacenter.org/in-focus/countering-vi... visited on 22/02/2023 at 13:21. 5 Ibid. 6 https://news.un.org/en/ story/2022/11/1130432 visited on 22/02/2023 at 13:53 7 https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-46783600.amp visited on 22/02/2023 at 14:08 8 Op. cit. https://africacenter.org/in-focus/ countering-vi... visited on 23/02/2023 at 13:09 9 https://www.aljazeera.com/ news/2022/1/28/ecowas-suspends-burkina-faso-after-coup visited on 22/02/2023 at 21:00. 10 https://www.voanews.com/a/ ecowas-suspends-burkina-faso-s-membership-/6417087.html visited on 22/02/2023 at 21:14. 11 Yayew Genet Chekol, “Major Successes and Challenges of African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA)”, vol V, no.2, International Journal of Political Science (IJPS), 2019, pp. 1-8. doi:http://dx.doi.org/ 10.20431/2454-9452.0502001. 12 Ibid. 13 Jean-François Bayart, “L’Afrique dans le monde : une histoire d’extraversion”, vol V, Critique internationale, 1999, pp. 97-120. 14 Nicolas DESGRAIS, Sonia LE GOURIELLEC, “THE CHALLENGES OF BUILDING THE AFRICAN PEACE AND SECURITY ARCHITECTURE”, Institut de Recherche Stratégique de l’Ecole Militaire, research paper No. 28, 2016, p. 2. 15 https://pure.giga-hamburg.de/ws/files/21580504/web_afrika_2018_02.pdf visited on 24/02/2023 at 11:33 am. 16 Ibid. 17 https://www.giz.de/en/worldwide/63606. html visited on 24/02/2023 visited on 24/02/2023 at 12:46 pm 18 Ibid.

AROUND THE WORLD INTERNSHIP RESEARCH RESULTS

20 INTERNSHIP RESEARCH RESULTS In 2015, a 12-year-old girl was raped, and a 16-year-old boy and his father were shot dead by UN peacekeepers in the Central African Republic (CAR). In response to these atrocities, UN secretary general Ban Ki-moon quickly ordered the resignation of Babacar Gaye as the head of peacekeeping operations in CAR. “I cannot put into words how anguished, angered and ashamed I am by recurrent reports over the years of sexual exploitations and abuse by UN forces,” Ban told reporters. In 2017, fourteen UN peacekeepers were killed in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in one of the deadliest attacks on the UN in the 21st century. In the recent years, there has been a rise in anti-UN sentiment from missions in Africa after years of repeated failures to protect civilians and prevent violence. When dozens of civilians and two peacekeepers were killed in South Sudan, UN investigations concluded that these casualties came from “a lack of leadership on the part of key senior Mission personnel [which] culminated in a chaotic and ineffective response.” As of November 2022, there are 12 peacekeeping operations being led by the United Nations Department of Peace Operations. Given the increasing casualties and reports of sexual exploitation from peacekeepers in the field, who claims responsibility for upholding the legitimacy of international peacekeeping operations? Leadership. Leadership is not a discipline that can be easily taught, and it must be understood to be successfully implicated. According to Professor Michael L. Tushman of Columbia University, the role of a leader is to “build competent teams, clarify required behaviors, build in measurement, and administer rewards and punishments.” Efficient leadership shapes the dynamic of a project, thus, recognizing the ideal qualities of a leader is a necessary step to understanding where improvements in leadership training are needed. What defines a leader? Leadership and management qualities are seen as one in the same. Although they work closely together and often overlap, understanding their differences is significant to defining the role a leader has in a group. In large organizations, to have a by Julia Day WHERE CAN PK LEADERSHIP IMPROVE? Where can peacekeeping leadership improve? Image provided by the United Nations Peackeeping organization website. Principles of peacekeeping | United Nations Peacekeeping

21 single figure acting as the leader and manager is difficult, if not impossible to maintain. Having two distinct roles, the leader, and the manager, helps assure that each appropriate characteristic is correctly applied to avoid confusion. The role of management is to plan and budget the direction of a mission. Managers have a narrow, but vital, purpose in a group dynamic in which a leader could not fulfill to the same extent. Management is meant for maintaining order and organizing the resources of a project. They are more strongly associated with an organizational structure and address short-term thoughts and concerns. Their role is to maintain the status quo. In stark contrast, leaders are strategic. They are meant to motivate and inspire their subordinates and produce the potential for drastic change, even at the cost of failure. The legitimacy of a leader depends on the acceptance of their peers; thus, they must embody the traits required of a leader rather than a manager. David A. Nadler is a former professor at Columbia University and president of Delta Consulting Group and, along with Tushman, collaborated in The Leader’s Companion in a title called “Beyond the Charismatic Leader: Leadership and Organizational Change.” According to Nadler and Tushman, good leaders are critical thinkers. They see the world as it exists, but also envision the possibilities of the future. Critical thinkers challenge the status quo with skepticism and enable their creative thinking skills to come up with new ideas, rejecting commonly accepted principles if a better solution presents itself. Thinking critically opens leaders to the “values, behaviors, social structures, and artistic forms of the world.” (The Leader’s Companion, 381) In an international peacekeeping environment, leaders with critical thinking skills have the capacity to quickly adapt to new circumstances and save lives. The open-mindedness of critical thinkers is desirable in peacekeeping leadership as to help connect leaders with local agencies and enhance communications. Envisioning leadership presents the ways in which a competent leader operates. In the back of leader’s mind should be how future uncertainties could change in the long-term. They continuously ask questions: How should this situation go wrong? What are the appropriate responses to it? How will the leader maintain the support of their subordinates? How should they plan for what comes next? Ambitious visions create a high level of expectation from group members. Though (if properly engaged with subordinates) new goals generate excitement, commitment, and motivation for the future of a project, they must also still be credible, and their pursuit must be attainable. Thus, clear, and precise communication for this vision from leadership to management is vital for any attainability. Communication skills enhance the relationship between the leader and the follower; when leaders treat their followers as individuals, the group dynamic and moral is stronger and the leader’s vision is more likely to succeed. This also increases the odds of potential problems being disclosed with leadership before they get out of hand. Does the natural-born leader exist? The concept of an immaculate natural-born leader is a contested phen o m e n o n between psychologists. It is true that a man or woman cannot truly be taught to be charismatic or think critically, however, leadership is not a mystical trait that only certain individuals are born with. John P. Kotter is a professor of organizational behavior at the Harvard Business School. In his contribution to The Leader’s Companion, Kotter states: Many dismiss the subject with the confident assertion that “leaders are born not made.” Nonsense! Most of what leaders have enables them to lead is learned. Leadership is not a mysterious activity. It is possible to describe the tasks that leaders perform. And the capacity to perform those tasks is wi- “IN 2017, FOURTEEN UN PEACEKEEPERS WERE KILLED IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO IN ONE OF THE DEADLIEST ATTACKS ON THE UN IN THE 21ST CENTURY. IN THE RECENT YEARS, THERE HAS BEEN A RISE IN ANTI-UN SENTIMENT FROM MISSIONS IN AFRICA AFTER YEARS OF REPEATED FAILURES TO PROTECT CIVILIANS AND PREVENT VIOLENCE.”

22 INTERNSHIP RESEARCH RESULTS dely distributed in the population. Given Kotter’s advice, the following should be understood, there is an untapped potential in mankind to develop leadership skills. The human mind is rational enough to see where they can work to inspire and motivate as leaders in group situations, thus, the so-called natural-born leader is but a fallacy. If the qualities of the ideal leader are understood and applied correctly, the effects will present themselves. The qualities mentioned prior are exemplary traits for leaders. The men and women given the privilege to serve as leaders in peacekeeping operations are responsible for countless items on the agenda. It is an overwhelming and difficult task to take on without the right tools and training to support them. The effectiveness of a peacekeeping mission reflects the competency of its leader. What defines effective leadership in peacekeeping? Peacekeeping systems originated out of a “rigid and predominately state-centric order” from Cold War politics and is “generally ill-prepared” for the complexity of 21st century peace and conflict resolution. The development of new hybrid warfare derives from ethno-political violence, non-state criminal groups, and armed resistance to authoritarian regimes which blur the lines of war and crime. The interference of peacekeeping operations in such scenarios give way to dangerous situations for civilians and peacekeepers if ill-prepared. A new battlefront for leaders in peacekeeping is the newfound reliance on technology in the field. Since the latter half of the 20th century, the digital revolution has reimagined the functions of everyday society. Thus, the use of strategic Brazilian peacekeepers with MINUSTAH patrolling the Bel Air neighborhood of Port-au-Prince, Haiti.© UN/MINUSTAH/Jesús Serrano Redondo “IN AN INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING ENVIRONMENT, LEADERS WITH CRITICAL THINKING SKILLS HAVE THE CAPACITY TO QUICKLY ADAPT TO NEW CIRCUMSTANCES AND SAVE LIVES. THE OPEN-MINDEDNESS OF CRITICAL THINKERS IS DESIRABLE IN PEACEKEEPING LEADERSHIP AS TO HELP CONNECT LEADERS WITH LOCAL AGENCIES AND ENHANCE COMMUNICATIONS.”

23 communication is now more than ever vital to the success of leaders. Strategic communication is a term used to describe how the variety of communication strategies, principals, and initiatives can help achieve the goals and values of an organization. Whilst being proficient in communications is part of the leadership, utilizing strategy takes leaders a step even further to execute their visions alongside those in management. What role does this play in advancements of peacekeeping technology? The shift in communications calls for a cultural change that recognizes the importance of these skills to ensure effective decision-making. Digital technology presents an opportunity for mass and targeted communications. One example of how this may improve peacekeeping missions is for rendering more inclusive dialogue initiatives in communities that are difficult to reach. The UN Strategic Communication and Public Information Policy establishes 3 ground rules for peacekeeping operations: 1. To build confidence in the peace process, understanding and responding to public sentiment. 2. Support for mission mandates among host countries: Through reputation management. 3. Manage threats by countering inaccurate media information to reduce the risk to personnel and minimize the impact of the crisis. Moving towards effective and tranThe UN peacekeeping mission in South Sudan. UN/Isaac Billy sparent forms of technology reduces the risk of ‘outdated’ communication in peacekeeping tactics. In the 21st century, peacekeeping leaders should desire to focus on “building information systems rather than increasing manpower on the ground” as it can save lives. Thus, strategic communication courses in leadership training initiatives should be held by agencies such as CoESPU. Developing countries contribute the highest number of military and police staff in peacekeeping operations, yet they are frequently deployed ill-equipped and without sufficient training. In the high-stress environment of international peacekeeping operations, leaders must also be aware and improve on gender-responsi-

24 INTERNSHIP RESEARCH RESULTS ve leadership. A gender-responsive leader is not only aware of the inequalities of the workplace (and in the context of peacekeeping on the field as well), but they are also active in working to close the gaps between men and women. The goal of a gender-responsive leader is making an environment that levels the playing field between men and women. As mentioned earlier, the UN has been plagued with cases of sexual abuse from peacekeepers with no substantial change in the system. Peacekeeping missions are delicate operations, leaders must ensure that their subordinates are in line with its ethical standards. The Folke Bernadotte Academy (FBA) of Sweden has identified five commandments of efficient gender-responsive leadership: 1.Leading by example; 2.Setting priorities and strategies; 3.Communicating clearly and convincingly; 4.Managing and developing staff, resources, and operations; 5.Holding oneself and other accountable The FBA acknowledges that “where leaders fail to respond to existing inequalities, discrimination and gender bias are perpetuated.” A simple solution would be to ap29 March 2011. Muhkjar: Peacekeepers from Thailand on patrol at the the road and the bridge rebuilt by them in Muhkjar (West Darfur). Photo by Albert Gonzalez.

25 ty (WIIS), & The Women in Peace Operations Project. (2008). Women in United Nations Peace Operations: Increasing the Leadership Opportunities. Women in International Security. Junk, J., Mancini, F., Seibel, W., & Blume, T. (2017). The Management of UN Peacekeeping: Coordination, Learning, and Leadership in Peace Operations. Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. Lundgren, M., Oksamytna, K., & Bove, V. (2022). Politics or Performance? Leadership Accountability in UN Peacekeeping. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 66(I), 32–60. https://doi. org/10.1177/00220027211028989 Oksamytna, K., Lundgren, M., & Bove, V. (2021). Leadership Selection in United Nations Peacekeeping. International Studies Quarterly. Role of Strategic Communications and Leadership in UN Peacekeeping Missions. (n.d.). The Kootneeti. Smith. (2022). Gender-Responsive Leadership in UN Peace Operations: The Path to a Transformative Approach? International Peace Institute. Under the Blue Flag: Leadership and Strategic Communications in UN Peace Operations. (2019). International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations. United Nations. (n.d.). The United Nations Leadership Model. United Nations Development Group. Wren, T. J. (2000). The Leader’s Companion: Insights on Leadership Through the Ages. Free Press. Julia Day International affairs student at John Cabot University in Rome, Italy Sources Cammaert. (2016, November 22). Better leadership needed to improve the protection of civilians on UN peace operations | Global Peace Operations Review. Global Peace Operations Review. https://peaceoperationsreview.org/ commentary/better-leadership-needed-to-improve-the-protection-of-civilians-on-un-peace-operations/ Coning, D. C., & Peter, M. (2018). United Nations Peace Operations in a Changing Global Order (1st ed. 2019). Palgrave Macmillan. Ford Foundation, Dag Hammarskjold Foundation, Urquhart, B., & Childers, E. (1990). A World in Need of Leadership: Tomorrow’s United Nations. N/A. Georgetown University, Pampell Conaway, C., Shoemaker, Women in International Securipoint more women into leadership and supporting roles in peacekeeping operations, however, this does not resolve the problem at hand. Research shows that by just increasing the number of women in peacekeeping does not challenge the patriarchal environment of the field. What must be done to combat the gender inequality at hand is to emphasize training courses that specialize in gender-responsive leadership. The FBA identifies an additional 5 suggestions to improve the skills training of gender-responsive leaders: 1.Leading by example through mitigation of gender biases and stereotypes (e.g., calling out day-today sexism); 2.Prioritizing and addressing gaps in gender equality; 3.Communicating on gender equality initiatives with gender-inclusive, convincing language; 4.Building staff capacity and developing resources to promote equality; and 5.Holding oneself and one’s team accountable for implementing gender-equality mandates (Valasek) The purpose of these suggestions is to enhance what was stated earlier to better incorporated gender inclusiveness into existing training operations. By normalizing its inclusion in everyday peacekeeping leadership, the world may see a drastic change in the ethical standards of peacekeepers and improve their international legitimacy. Adequate leadership training from CoESPU should pay close attention to the issues discussed above whilst organizing leadership training. Major General Patrick Cammaert (retired) said it best following his experience in UN peace operations, military advisory, and UN force commandment: Some of the shortcomings of military and police contingents and their leaders could be addressed through the provision of training and mentoring support by experienced peacekeepers in the mission and during mandatory pre-deployment training on the mission’s mandate, rules of engagement and use of force directives. Training should include scenario and rehearsal training on protecting civilians, including from conflict related sexual violence. It is imperative that peacekeepers’ adopt an outward-looking, robust posture, and use dismounted patrols by day and night, including with female peacekeepers, to reach out to local interlocutors and dominate terrain as required. With considerable attention to the areas of improvement for peacekeeping, CoESPU can lead the change in peacekeeping leadership training initiatives. The rationality of mankind shows the possibilities of a correct implementation of leadership. When given the opportunity to enhance specific skills, the natural leadership qualities of candidates will come through and drastically change the success and dynamic of peacekeeping operations.

ALUMNI

28 ALUMNI

29 Dear Readers, Welcome to the first edition in 2023 of the CoESPU Magazine – the online Quarterly of Stability Policing! In this issue, we highlight our continued commitment to building peace through international training activities, despite the challenging geopolitical events that continue to occur around the world. Our mission at CoESPU remains steadfast in preparing police and military personnel from different countries to work together effectively and professionally in complex and often hostile environments. As part of our alumni outreach efforts, we are exploring different ways to enrich the opportunities available to the professional network of stability policing. One of the new proposals is a closed network, available only to CoESPU alumni, where former attendees could access course materials, communicate with other alumni, and keep up to date on the latest developments in stability policing doctrine and training. We would like to hear from you if this is something that you would use or if you have any other ideas regarding alumni networking opportunities. I invite you all to follow us on our social media platforms (Facebook, Twitter, and LinkedIn) to stay updated on our training courses, seminars, and other events. Through social media and our website, you can learn more about our activities and achievements. We would also like for you to share your experiences and contributions while serving in peacekeeping missions abroad as well as the good work you are doing at home. Thank you for your continued support and interest in CoESPU’s mission and I hope you enjoy this edition of our Quarterly! DEPUTY DIRECTOR’S CORNER Will Daniel Col. - US Army CoESPU Deputy Director

30 ALUMNI Introduction This paper analyses the flaws and virtues of the intelligence element in the United Nations Peace Operations. Concretely, we highlight the challenges and weak points literature on, and practice of peacekeeping posed on the inception of intelligence, and we see if these are effectively tackled in the 2017 Policy on Peacekeeping-Intelligence and the subsequent guiding handbooks. The study assesses whether these reforms have been correctly implemented or they still pose problematics. We go from praxis to policy, and to praxis again. The analysis of the praxis of intelligence before the systematic policy of 2017 is key to understand how the latter was formulated, because the process of generating a formal intelligence capacity at the UN headquarters in New York “has been much slower than in the field”2. This is partly because the intelligence capability of the UN was not explicitly envisaged by the Charter. These capacities are based on Article 99 of the UN Charter, which draws on the capacity of the Secretary-General to bring to the Security Council (UNSC) matters threatening international peace and security. This, added to the fact that peace operations are increasingly deployed in volatile and violent contexts, makes that “information about the intentions and actions of conflicting parties, especially “spoilers” of peace processes, (become) essential”3. To see if the main problematics of peacekeeping intelligence have been correctly addressed by the Policy we lay out the most important ones: (1) alleged incompatibility between intelligence practice and peacekeeping principles; (2) alleged exclusivity of intelligence to the national domain; (3) lack of secrecy in the UN; (4) organizational and bureaucratic deficits; (5) lack of fluidity between tactical, operational and strategic domains within the UN; and (6) personnel qualitative and quantitative deficiencies. These points are assessed thoroughly in the following sections. Before, we contextualize it mentioning the historical precedents, and analyzing the embryo of peacekeeping intelligence more recently. After this, we focus on the theoretical challenges and weak points for an incipient peacekeeping intelligence, then we highlight the practical problems of this kind of intelligence on two case studies: MONUSCO4 and MINUSMA5. Finally, we analyze how all the issues raised by Jordi Bernal Fabra1 ASSESSING THE UN PK INTELLIGENCE REFORM OF 2017 Intelligence in Blue: Assessing the United Nations Peacekeeping Intelligence Reform of 2017 United Nations (https://news.un.org/en/story/2013/12/456942)

31 INTELLIGENCE REFORM OF 2017 are tackled by the 2017 Policy, to end with its application in the field. Historical Precedents The first use of intelligence capabilities by the United Nations was in the UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC) in the 1960s. This was rather a peace enforcement operation than a peacekeeping one, but intelligence remained at the tactical level, mainly carried out by a military intelligence unit, including aerial reconnaissance, informants, interrogations, decrypting radio messages, and a non-systematic use of field agents6. The Congo exception was followed by decades of softer peacekeeping during the Cold War, but the 1990s came with UN peace efforts failures in Somalia, Rwanda and Bosnia. The most visible consequence in this regard was the 2000 Brahimi Report (out of a UN Expert Panel), which asserted that complex peace operations “should be afforded the field intelligence”7. Also learning from failures, the bombing of the UN Headquarters in Baghdad in 2003 led to the creation of some embryotic units of risk assessment and situation centres in the field8. Even if the preferred wording was situational awareness or information rather than intelligence, some proto-intelligence units were created, as the 2005 first UN Security Council systematic policy of a JMAC (Joint Mission Analysis Centre) in each UN peacekeeping operation9. In 2013, the UN Operations and Crisis Centre (UNOCC) was established in New York, providing global situational awareness and risk management10. The UN High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) Report, without mentioning intelligence, calls for a systematization and professionalization of its “information collection, analysis, and dissemination system11. Furthermore, the 2016 Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (also known as C-34) of the UN General Assembly claimed the need to “improve situational awareness (…), including (…) modern technology as a complement to traditional methods, such as human-based information-gathering”12, clearly alluding to intelligence. Paving the way for a peacekeeping intelligence Here we outline what has been done before the 2017 Policy, most of which was not systematic and in the field. Technology in UN intelligence practices has been introduced in an ad hoc basis, as the use of CCTV in Cyprus Green Line13 by UNFICYP14. In most missions, intelligence capacities were not evenly distributed among contingents, some Troop Contributing Countries (TCC) had more advanced technologies or know-how15. New elements non-systematically introduced in peacekeeping intelligence included: commercial satellite imagery, human intelligence collection and aerial reconnaissance16. The latter might be the more noteworthy. In the 2010s, Unarmed Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UUAVs) were implemented in MONUSCO (Congo-Kin - shasa) and in MINUSCA 1 7 (Central African Republic), which are robust peace missions, facing highly volatile and violent environments 18. S u r v e i l l a n c e drones have helped peace missions in situational and operational awareness with higher resolution cameras and nightlight capabilities19. MINUSMA, in Mali, was the only UN peace mission with “organic military intelligence-gathering and processing capability”20, being vested with the Dutch-led Special Operations Land Task Force for complex security situations intelligence-gathering, and the All-Sources Information Fusion Unit, a NATO-style mission-wide centre for intelligence. MINUSMA has included private contractors, open-source intelligence, helicopters, UAVs, human “THE FIRST USE OF INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES BY THE UNITED NATIONS WAS IN THE UN OPERATION IN THE CONGO (ONUC) IN THE 1960S. THIS WAS RATHER A PEACE ENFORCEMENT OPERATION THAN A PEACEKEEPING ONE, BUT INTELLIGENCE REMAINED AT THE TACTICAL LEVEL, MAINLY CARRIED OUT BY A MILITARY INTELLIGENCE UNIT, INCLUDING AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE, INFORMANTS, INTERROGATIONS, DECRYPTING RADIO MESSAGES, AND A NON-SYSTEMATIC USE OF FIELD AGENTS.”

32 ALUMNI intelligence operations and Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) in its toolkit21. Theoretical challenges for peacekeeping intelligence Academic literature, Member States and political figures have posed several challenges and weak points the UN has or would face vis à vis a systematic policy of peacekeeping intelligence. This section will spell them out in two blocks: normative and conceptual issues, and pragmatic issues. As it has been hinted, intelligence used to be a dirty word in the UN context22. The 1984 Peacekeepers Handbook stated that intelligence in this domain would “create prejudice and suspicion”, and as “trust, confidence and respect” were the key for success, intelligence practice would hinder the mission’s goals23. There is the debate in the UN on an alleged clash between the three principles of peacekeeping with intelligence. Consent of the parties, impartiality and non-use of force except in self-defense and defense of the mandate are the bedrock of peace operations, and intelligence, for many, threatens mainly impartiality. Intrusive information-gathering endangers the credibility of peacekeepers as impartial mediators, who should not be using “covert or misleading techniques”24. Moreover, “local populations can be mistrustful of blue helmets”25 as information collection and surveillance drones can be seen as illegitimate, as spying, giving information to foreign powers. Now, let’s turn to the pragmatic issues. Secrecy in a multilateral organization of 193 Member States is quite a challenge, and the UN Headquarters is often looked down on in terms of confidentiality and information security26. In addition, many Member States see UN intelligence as a tool of Western countries to spy on the Global South. Even more, TCCs may regard UAVs as instruments to provide incriminating evidence of their blue helmet’s misbehavior27. The UN has been criticized for not having deep intelligence, and for the absence of an intelligence direction from the New York Headquarters to the field missions. Finally, extensively relying in Member States and TCCs intelligence-sharing is naïf and ineffective. The United Nations, as seen by many, needs to develop its own holistic intelligence capabilities, as the states only share information when it is in their interest, because giving intelligence to the UN is many times seen by national officers as giving it to the whole of the international community28. Practical challenges of UN Peace Operations prior to the intelligence policy This section analyses the flaws of intelligence capacities of two concrete missions, MONUSCO and MINUSMA, two robust operations that have been at the forefront of intelligence innovations prior to the 2017 Policy. Beforehand, let’s briefly comment on the general ground experiences on intelligence among several missions. Podder and Manzillo29 conducted a survey to peacekeepers in the period 2017-2018 about their past experiences. Here we focus on the intelligence-relevant questions. The majority thought intelligence gathering, management, analysis and sharing was at a suboptimal degree. There was a perception of inequality in information-sharing between North and South TCCs. Also, a shared belief in the tendency of states to retain certain information was found. Peacekeepers understood that the problems rather aroused after data collection, in the analysis, partly due to the bureaucracy, that led to intelligence management ineffectiveness. Furthermore, peacekeepers felt the sharing of information was limited to vertical sharing, not horizontal among units, and much less among different peace missions30. The following two sub-sections will analyze the challenges of MONUSCO and MINUSMA in terms of personnel, organization and methodologies of intelligence. The case of MONUSCO “AS A RESPONSE TO THE ONGOING SITUATION IN SEVERAL PEACE OPERATIONS, NOTABLY IN MALI AND IN CONGO-KINSHASA, AND THE HIGHER ACCEPTABILITY AND NORMATIVE PUSH OF MEMBER STATES AND UN POLICY MAKERS, THE ORGANIZATION DEVELOPED IN 2017 THE “POLICY: PEACEKEEPING INTELLIGENCE”, REVISED IN 2019.”

33 MONUSCO, created in 2010, can be seen as a pioneer in the broad use of intelligence in peace operations. As such, it has had many weak points. First, regarding personnel, there are many problems with the lack of professionalization and the training of intelligence officers31, either they have political affairs backgrounds, unfamiliar with intelligence practices, or they come from national intelligence services, unfamiliar with UN peace operations practices. Regarding organization, MONUSCO has given in to excessive informality and ad hoc intelligence sharing32. Per se this is not a bad thing, but if one only relies in personal networks and trust in sharing, intelligence may not reach the necessary officers. Plus, there is no (apparent) link between the field intelligence in Congo and New York, the Security Council Resolutions, for instance, have not benefited from intelligence reports33. Regarding methodologies of intelligence, MONUSCO lacks signals intelligence capabilities. Human intelligence presents restraints, as for example there are financial restrictions on paying informants. Furthermore, the existence of the Force Intervention Brigade (a peace enforcement unit), shows the need for intelligence-driven and intelligence-led operations that were limited at the time34. These intelligence limitations, among others, concur with a high-profile attack against a UN base in Eastern Congo resulting in mortal casualties in 201735, in accordance with the casualty rate of MONUSCO, the fourth highest ever for a UN peace mission, just below MINUSMA36. The case of MINUSMA MINUSMA, created in 2013, shows the maturing character of intelliUnited Nations (https://minusma.unmissions.org/en/only-female-pilot-fly-armed-helicopters-minusma)

34 ALUMNI gence elements in peace operations. Regarding personnel, the mission also lacked experienced intelligence specialists, also being of insufficient size for the covered area37. Personal limitations found include illiteracy among many African soldiers, limited English skills, and unfamiliarity with the intelligence process among regular troops. Regarding organization, ASIFU was the central intelligence unit, but other intelligence units (special operations, helicopter detachment, etc.) had to report directly to the Mission Head instead, so ASIFU had to rely on informal and ad hoc information sharing, restrained by the strict hierarchy38. Moreover, the JMAC, present in most missions, and the 2014-created ASIFU had no clear boundaries, leading to competition and redundancies. In addition to this, UN Headquarters bureaucracy delayed technology deployment approvals for too long, as with the UAVs39. Regarding intelligence methodologies, without general guidelines, MINUSMA had to create from scratch an intelligence collection process plan, which lingered on due to divergencies among mission headquarters and intelligence units, enhanced by different intelligence cultures and periodic rotations of troops40; this ended up lacking focus and thus, utility. This also resulted in unwanted deviations of tasks within the same ISR units (e.g., Swedish and Danish detachments doing different things). Finally, while conducting human intelligence, the HUMINT Team was not allowed to operate with civilian clothing, having to be recognizable as UN military personnel. Plus, practically all troops and officers had no informant networks in Mali41. The 2017 UN Peacekeeping-Intelligence Policy As a response to the ongoing situation in several peace operations, notably in Mali and in Congo-Kinshasa, and the higher acceptability and normative push of Member States and UN policy makers, the organization developed in 2017 the “Policy: Peacekeeping Intelligence”, revised in 2019. As subsequent outputs, the Department of Peace Operations Gerben van Es (https://militairespectator.nl/artikelen/de-all-sources-information-fusion-unit-mali-en-de-dutch-approach)

35 published several handbooks: “Military Peacekeeping-Intelligence Handbook” (2019), “Peacekeeping-Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Staff Handbook (2020), “UN Reinforcement Training Package for UN Military Peacekeeping-Intelligence Officers” (2020), and the “UN Reinforcement Training Package for UN Peacekeeping-Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance” (2022), among others, with very detailed modi operandi, templates and training information. These official documents show that the UN is no longer afraid of the word intelligence. The 2019 handbook clearly argues that even if information was preferred to intelligence labelling, now the blue helmet does no longer guarantee protection, so intelligence is an accepted requirement at the strategic, operational, and tactical layers42. The Policy explicitly develops intelligence capabilities, that have to be different from information sharing and routine reporting, breaking with the more traditional activities that were labelled as intelligence by outsiders. As Martin-Brûlé argues, the Policy “represents a paradigm shift from intelligence conceived as an inherently sovereign matter to a rigorous approach to gathering information and making forward-looking assessments in the UN context”43, because it sets in motion a systematic and holistic implementation of intelligence in peace operations. Here we analyze how the Policy addresses the main problematics of peacekeeping intelligence outlined in the Introduction. On the alleged incompatibility between intelligence practice and peacekeeping principles The Policy bans clandestine activities to collect intelligence, understanding that clandestine is an illicit acquisition of intelligence or inconsistent with the legal framework. Peacekeeping intelligence must be under the rules, respecting state sovereignty and independent from Member States, and must ensure accountability and human rights. In this way, the Policy tries to assure the accomplishment of the peacekeeping principle of impartiality and the non-use of force to acquire information. The Policy also narrows down the objectives for which intelligence can be conducted to avoid overstepping: situational awareness for the safety and security of UN personnel and the protection of civilians and of the mandate. On the alleged exclusivity of intelligence to the national domain The justification for the UN to step in intelligence activities is that in “high-tempo, complex and dangerous environments, where asymmetric and transnational threats pose serious dangers to peacekeepers and negatively impact mandate implementation”44, there is an urgent need for operational and strategic information analysis. Nation-states are no longer the sole subjects of intelligence, not only private corporations, consultancies, or Internet freelancers challenge this exclusivity notion, but also the United Nations. To do so, it agreed on a definition of peacekeeping intelligence as the “non-clandestine acquisition and processing of information by a mission within a directed mission intelligence cycle to meet requirements for decision-making and to inform operations related to the safe and effective implementation of the Security Council mandate”45. Nevertheless, this definition was eliminated in the 2019 revision of the Policy at the request of some member states. To ensure legitimacy for the establishment of systematic intelligence capabilities, the Policy invokes UN Security Council Resolution 1894 (2009), which promoted intelligence resources for protection of civilians, and Resolution 2295 (2016), which underlined the need for improved intelligence for MINUSMA. Finally, the Policy breaks away from the dependence on national intelligence systems, asserting that only if there is reciprocity and a specific need intelligence-sharing will occur, mainly with the host state. On the lack of secrecy in the UN Several swathes of the Policy tackle secrecy. It states that information gathered and analyzed must be secure. The classification of information is to be in an exceptional basis, there should be a free flow within the mission, although a strong confidentiality must be kept if the information concerned endangers individuals or groups, violates rights or invades privacy. The dissemination of information is restricted in a need-to-know and need-to-share basis for specific duties. Ultimately, the accountable officer is the head of mission. On organizational and bureaucratic deficits The Policy establishes the effective use of resources, oversight, accountability and improvement as core principles of intelligence activities. Also, it describes the peacekeeping-intelligence cycle for a standard process in all missions: (1) direction, requirements and tasking, (2) acquisition, (3) examination, evaluation and collation, (4) analysis, and (5) dissemination. For this to be carried smoothly, the

36 ALUMNI Policy implements the Mission Intelligence Coordination Mechanism in each peace operation as the central control for all intelligence units within a mission. It would not have analytical capacities of its own, but it would direct and oversee the intelligence cycle and implement the Policy. This mechanism would have fixed natural members: the JMAC (Joint Mission Analysis Centre), the military and the police components, UNDSS (UN Department for Safety and Security and JOC (Joint Operations Centre). On the lack of fluidity between tactical, operational and strategic domains within the UN The Policy tries to clear up from who and to whom the intelligence product is for. The Head of Mission is the primary client. The objectives of peacekeeping-intelligence are to obtain an operational and strategic picture, early warning or imminent threats and identify risks and opportunities. This is, in an inward-looking manner, safety and security of UN personnel, and in an outward-looking manner, regarding the theatre and the Mandate. Following the Policy, the Military Peacekeeping-Intelligence Handbook46 elaborates on the interlinks between operational and strategic domains: intelligence flows must be both bottom-up (from the field to New York), and top-down (from New York to the missions). The latter would include intelligence offices of the New York Department of Safety and Security, the Office of Military Affairs of the Department of Peace Operations (DPO), the Single Regional Structures (shared between the DPO and the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs), and the Peacekeeping-Intelligence Coordination Team of the Office of the Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations. Finally, the document states that operational intelligence is relevant for the military Force Commander, while strategic intelligence is relevant for the Head of Mission (normally the Special Representative of the Secretary General) 47. On personnel qualitative and quantitative deficiencies Although the Policy does not thoroughly discuss personnel issues, it compels the UN peace operations system to educate all intelligence personnel with standardized pre-deployment training. However, the publishing of the handbooks and training resources reinforce the Policy approach. Assessment of the application of the policy This section will assess the 2017 Policy application, from paper to the field. It is divided in the same main problematics’ categorization. On the alleged incompatibility between intelligence practice and peacekeeping principles Although there are still worries about the impact of intelligence on impartiality, the flexibility of the peacekeeping principles has allowed the UN to forward its policies, and more in the unstable contexts of many missions. And if not by conviction, by convenience. The COVID-19 Pandemic has diminished traditional information gathering methods and forced peace operations to find more technical intelligence-gathering tools 48. This may result in leaks and loss of transparency, as peacekeepers not used to intelligence techniques were pushed to obtain information in non-physical and non-traditional means. On the alleged exclusivity of intelligence to the national domain Although reality has demonstrated intelligence goes beyond national agencies, mindsets persist. There are still insufficiencies in information-sharing among units of different TCCs50. Intelligence-sharing remains ad hoc in most cases, as Member States understand that they do not only risk giving sensitive information to other states through the UN, but also their intelligence methods 51. On the lack of secrecy in the UN The lack of trust still endures. From Member States to the UN, among units, and among national divisions52. Even if confidentiality may have improved after the Policy, distrust in the UN Headquarters is still hindered by past experiences (e.g., the security breach with confidential documents on Somalia). Furthermore, there is no clear standardization of confidentiality degrees, and now information flows work on personal trust or in an ad hoc basis53. On organizational and bureaucratic deficits Interpersonal informal networks remain a wide practice in intelligence-sharing. Normally among individuals or groups having similar intelligence cultures54. Moreover, there is competition to attract attention from senior leadership55. Although this is not negative as such, it can be a double-edged sword. In addition, delays have been reported in visualizing data among different units within a mission56. On the lack of fluidity between

37 tactical, operational and strategic domains within the UN The guidance documents as the handbooks have been criticized for lacking coherence among them and with the Policy; also, peacekeepers or intelligence personnel do not have adequate access to or awareness of them57. This eventually leads to inconsistencies in practices in New York and in the field. On personnel qualitative and quantitative deficiencies UN efforts on recruitment and training have not sufficed. States want to keep good civil or military intelligence officers in their national structures58. Plus, the personnel deficit lingers on because candidates for civilian intelligence jobs are not normally career experts in intelligence, or those for military positions are usually more biased by their own national intelligence practices and culture, diverging from the UN way59. Conclusions This paper has found that the 2017 Policy for peacekeeping intelligence was a significant shift from the previous experiences of non-systematic intelligence in UN peace operations. Most challenges traditionally posed to peacekeeping intelligence were addressed by the Policy and/or the successive guidance documents. The United Nations seems to have learned from past experiences, most importantly from MONUSCO and MINUSMA. Flaws in intelligence-sharing, organizational needs, information security and intelligence methods are tackled in the policy reform of 2017. Nonetheless, the 2019 revision of the PoAfricanews (https://fr.africanews.com/2021/12/08/rdc-l-armee-signe-un-accord-d-operation-avec-la-monusco/)

38 ALUMNI note 1 Graduate in International Relations by the Autonomous University of Barcelona with a semester at Sciences Po Paris. Currently in Erasmus Mundus International Master’s in Security, Intelligence & Strategic Studies by the University of Glasgow, the University of Trento, and the Charles University of Prague. Collaborator in Werra and The Security Distillery think tanks, The Political Room specialized website and Análisis Jurídico-Político journal. Research interests include peace operations, internationalized civil wars, conflict mediation and resolution, transnational insurgencies and terrorism, Sahara-Sahel, Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa. 2 A. Walter Dorn. United Nations Peacekeeping Intelligence. The Oxford Handbook of National Security Intelligence, Oxford University Press, 2010, 275–95. https://doi.org/10.1093/ oxfordhb/9780195375886.003.0017. 3 Dorn, United Nations Peacekeeping Intelligence. 4 United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo 5 United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali 6 Dorn, United Nations Peacekeeping Intellilicy showed a lack of consensus among UN Member States. Erasing the definition of peacekeeping intelligence and establishing a set of principles instead paved the way for ambiguity and ineffectiveness. Even if there might be a growing consensus on the necessity to conduct intelligence, it is not enough. Even if Security Council members and UN departments agree on more robust intelligence, local populations must be considered. Growing discontent in host countries with peacekeepers, for instance in Mali, does not only aggravate the violent conflict taking place, but it also weakens intelligence capacities of UN missions. Officers find hostile environments to conduct human intelligence, unfriendly host government may not allow ISR activities with drones seen as foreign interference. But what comes after the Policy is vital. Reforms on paper need an effective translation into reality, and for now, that is not taking place. The last section revealed that many weak points are still posing great deficiencies in UN peacekeeping intelligence. However, we must acknowledge that recent literature on this topic is limited, and one must consider that policy reforms take time in all bureaucracies, especially in multilateral ones. Therefore, we must leave the door open to possible future developments, as five years with a pandemic in-between may leave not much space for transformation. Despite this, we must remember that conflicts and the people living in them do not have time to waste. References Bernal Fabra, Jordi. 2022. “Analysis of the United Nations Peace Operation in Mali: counterterrorism and counterinsurgency in MINUSMA.” Análisis Jurídico - Político 4 (8): 17–50. https://doi.org/10.22490/26655489.5845. Carnegie, Allison, and Austin Carson. 2021. “UN Peacekeeping after the Pandemic: An Increased Role for Intelligence.” Survival 63 (2): 77–83. https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2 021.1905985. Dorn, A. Walter. “United Nations Peacekeeping Intelligence.” The Oxford Handbook of National Security Intelligence, 2010, 275–95. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195375886.003.0017. Fatalities, United Nations Peacekeeping, accessed November 21, 2022. https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/fatalities. Johnson, Loch K., A. Walter Dorn, Stewart Webb, Sarah Kreps, Wolfgang Krieger, Elke Schwarz, Shlomo Shpiro, Patrick F. Walsh, and James J. Wirtz. 2017. “An INS Special Forum: Intelligence and Drones/Eyes in the Sky for Peacekeeping: The Emergence of UAVs in UN Operations/the Democratic Deficit on Drones/the German Approach to Drone Warfare/ Pursuing Peace: The Strategic Limits of Drone Warfare/Seeing but Unseen: Intelligence Drones in Israel/Drone Paramilitary Operations against Suspected Global Terrorists: US and Australian Perspectives/the ‘Terminator Conundrum’ and the Future of Drone Warfare.” Intelligence and National Security 32 (4): 411–40. https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527. 2017.1303127 Kuele, Giovanna, and Marco Cepik. 2017. “Intelligence Support to MONUSCO: Challenges to Peacekeeping and Security.” The International Journal of Intelligence, Security, and Public Affairs 19 (1): 44–68. https://doi.org/10.1080 /23800992.2017.1289751. Martin-Brûlé, Sarah-Myriam. “Finding the UN Way on Peacekeeping-Intelligence.” International Peace Institute, (2017). Accessed November 25, 2022. https://www.ipinst.org/ wp-content/uploads/2020/04/2004-Findingthe-UN-Way.pdf Martin-Brûlé, Sarah-Myriam. 2020. “Competing for Trust: Challenges in United Nations Peacekeeping-Intelligence.” International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, September, 1–31. https://doi.org/10.1080 /08850607.2020.1798153. Norheim-Martinsen, Per Martin, and Jacob Aasland Ravndal. 2011. “Towards Intelligence-Driven Peace Operations? The Evolution of UN and EU Intelligence Structures.” International Peacekeeping 18 (4): 454–67. https://doi. org/10.1080/13533312.2011.588391. Podder, Sukanya, and Giuseppe Manzillo. 2021. “Reflection on Labour Hierarchies in Peacekeeping: A Study on the Operational Experiences of Military Peacekeepers.” International Peacekeeping 28 (5): 701–31. https://doi. org/10.1080/13533312.2021.1968840. Rietjens, Sebastiaan, and Erik de Waard. 2017. “UN Peacekeeping Intelligence: The ASIFU Experiment.” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 30 (3): 532–56. https://doi.org/10.1080/08850607. 2017.1297108. United Nations Department of Peace Operations. 2019. “Military Peacekeeping-Intelligence Handbook (MPKI HB)”. https://pcrs.un.org/ Lists/Resources/07-%20UN%20Military%20 Units%20Manuals/UN%20Military%20Peacekeeping-Intelligence%20Handbook/Military%20Peacekeeping-Intelligence%20Handbook_English.pdf United Nations Department of Peace Operations. 2020. “United Nations Reinforcement Training Package for United Nations Military Peacekeeping-Intelligence Officers”. https:// resourcehub01.blob.core.windows.net/training-files/Training%20Materials/038%20 RTP-MIO/038-001%20UN%20MPKIO%20(Intel)%20Final%20Version%2015%20APR%20 2020.pdf United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations / Department of Field Support. 2017 (revised in 2019). “Policy: Peacekeeping Intelligence”. https://www.confluxcenter.org/ wp-content/uploads/2018/11/2017.07-Peacekeeping-Intelligence-Policy.pdf. United Nations General Assembly / Security Council. 2000. “Comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects”. https://peacekeeping. un.org/sites/default/files/a_55_305_e_brahimi_report.pdf United Nations General Assembly / Security Council. 2015. “Report of the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations”. https:// peaceoperationsreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/HIPPO_Report_1_June_2015. pdf

39 gence. 7 United Nations General Assembly / Security Council. Comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects. United Nations, 2000, p. 9. https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/ files/a_55_305_e_brahimi_report.pdf. 8 Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé. Finding the UN Way on Peacekeeping-Intelligence. International Peace Institute, 2017. Accessed November 25, 2022. https://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/ uploads/2020/04/2004-Finding-the-UN-Way. pdf 9 Martin-Brûlé, Finding the UN Way. 10 Martin-Brûlé, Finding the UN Way. 11 United Nations General Assembly / Security Council. Report of the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations. United Nations, 2015, p.78. https://peaceoperationsreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/ HIPPO_Report_1_June_2015.pdf. 12 General Assembly. Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations. United Nations, 2016. https://digitallibrary. un.org/record/829258?ln=en#record-files-collapse-header 13 Dorn, United Nations Peacekeeping Intelligence. 14 United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus 15 Dorn, United Nations Peacekeeping Intelligence. 16 Dorn, United Nations Peacekeeping Intelligence. 17 United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic 18 Loch K. Johnson, A. Walter Dorn, Stewart Webb, Sarah Kreps, Wolfgang Krieger, Elke Schwarz, Shlomo Shpiro, Patrick F. Walsh, and James J. Wirtz. An INS Special Forum: Intelligence and Drones/Eyes in the Sky for Peacekeeping: The Emergence of UAVs in UN Operations/the Democratic Deficit on Drones/the German Approach to Drone Warfare/Pursuing Peace: The Strategic Limits of Drone Warfare/Seeing but Unseen: Intelligence Drones in Israel/Drone Paramilitary Operations against Suspected Global Terrorists: US and Australian Perspectives/the ‘Terminator Conundrum’ and the Future of Drone Warfare. Vol. 32 no. 4, Intelligence and National Security, 2017, pp. 411–40. https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527. 2017.1303127. 19 Johnson et al, An INS Special Forum. 20 Jordi Bernal Fabra. Analysis of the United Nations Peace Operation in Mali: counterterrorism and counterinsurgency in MINUSMA. Vol. 4, no. 8, Análisis Jurídico – Político, 2022, pp. 17–50. https://doi. org/10.22490/26655489.5845. 21 Bernal Fabra, Analysis of the United Nations. 22 Johnson et al, An INS Special Forum. 23 Quoted in Per Martin Norheim-Martinsen, and Jacob Aasland Ravndal. Towards Intelligence-Driven Peace Operations? The Evolution of UN and EU Intelligence Structures. Vol. 18, no. 4, International Peacekeeping, 2011, pp. 454–67. https://doi.org/10.1080/135333 12.2011.588391. 24 Dorn, United Nations Peacekeeping Intelligence, 277. 25 Bernal Fabra, Analysis of the United Nations (...), 37 26 Dorn, United Nations Peacekeeping Intelligence. 27 Johnson et al, An INS Special Forum. 28 Dorn, United Nations Peacekeeping Intelligence. 29 Sukanya Podder, and Giuseppe Manzillo. Reflection on Labour Hierarchies in Peacekeeping: A Study on the Operational Experiences of Military Peacekeepers. Vol. 28, no. 5, International Peacekeeping, 2021, pp. 701–31. https://doi.org/10.1080/13533312.2021.19 68840. 30 Podder & Manzillo, Reflection on Labour Hierarchies. 31 Giovanna Kuele, and Marco Cepik. Intelligence Support to MONUSCO: Challenges to Peacekeeping and Security. Vol. 19, no. 1, The International Journal of Intelligence, Security, and Public Affairs, 2017, pp. 44–68. https:// doi.org/10.1080/23800992.2017.1289751. 32 Kuele and Cepik, Intelligence Support to MONUSCO. 33 Kuele and Cepik, Intelligence Support to MONUSCO. 34 Kuele and Cepik, Intelligence Support to MONUSCO. 35 Martin-Brûlé, Finding the UN Way. 36 United Nations Peacekeeping. Fatalities. United Nations, s.d., accessed November 21, 2022. https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/fatalities. 37 Sebastiaan Rietjens, and Erik de Waard. UN Peacekeeping Intelligence: The ASIFU Experiment. Vol. 30, no. 3, International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 2017, pp. 532–56. https://doi.org/10.1080/0 8850607.2017.1297108. 38 Rietjens and de Waard, UN Peacekeeping Intelligence. 39 Rietjens and de Waard, UN Peacekeeping Intelligence. 40 Rietjens and de Waard, UN Peacekeeping Intelligence. 41 Rietjens and de Waard, UN Peacekeeping Intelligence. 42 United Nations Department of Peace Operations. Military Peacekeeping-Intelligence Handbook (MPKI HB), United Nations, New York, 2019. https://pcrs.un.org/Lists/Resources/07-%20UN%20Military%20Units%20 Manuals/UN%20Military%20Peacekeeping-Intelligence%20Handbook/Military%20 Peacekeeping-Intelligence%20Handbook_English.pdf 43 Martin-Brûlé, Finding the UN Way, 20. 44 United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations / Department of Field Support. Policy: Peacekeeping Intelligence. United Nations, New York, 2017 (revised in 2019). https://www.confluxcenter.org/wp-content/ uploads/2018/11/2017.07-Peacekeeping-Intelligence-Policy.pdf. 45 United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations / Department of Field Support, Policy: Peacekeeping Intelligence, 1. 46 United Nations Department of Peace Operations, Military Peacekeeping-Intelligence Handbook. 47 United Nations Department of Peace Operations, Military Peacekeeping-Intelligence Handbook. 48 Allison Carnegie, and Austin Carson. UN Peacekeeping after the Pandemic: An Increased Role for Intelligence. Vol. 63, no. 2, Survival, 2021, pp. 77–83. https://doi.org/10.108 0/00396338.2021.1905985. 49 Carnegie and Carson, UN Peacekeeping after the Pandemic. 50 Martin-Brûlé, Finding the UN Way. 51 Carnegie and Carson, UN Peacekeeping after the Pandemic. 52Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé. Competing for Trust: Challenges in United Nations Peacekeeping-Intelligence. Vol. 34, no. 3, International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 2020, pp. 1–31. https://doi.org/10.1080/ 08850607.2020.1798153. 53 Carnegie and Carson, UN Peacekeeping after the Pandemic. 54 Martin-Brûlé, Competing for Trust. 55 Martin-Brûlé, Finding the UN Way. 56 Carnegie and Carson, UN Peacekeeping after the Pandemic. 57 Martin-Brûlé, Finding the UN Way. 58 Martin-Brûlé, Finding the UN Way. 59 Martin-Brûlé, Competing for Trust. Jordi Bernal Fabra Graduate in International Relations by the Autonomous University of Barcelona (Spain)

40 IN DEPTH Afghanistan, August 2021: is the collapse of the security forces Afghans’ sole responsibility, due to their ancestral tribal divisions and deep-rooted institutional corruption, or is it also the International Community’s responsibility? However, this article is not meant to blame anyone. We are here to learn from the past and suggest possible solutions applicable in future, similar scenarios, to contribute to fostering long-term peace, stability, and development. Were only tribal divisions and deep-rooted institutional corruption responsible for the Afghan Security Forces’ (ASF) collapse or are there others to be singled out as well? Is it not true that, since 2001, little or no consideration was given to Robust Police assets’ role? In a such unstable environment where the Police was “the most hated institution”, how was it possible to delegate police tasks to ruthless tribal militias, armed and subsidized by the intervening Countries, rather than applying the Stability Policing model which, since 1998, the International Community has adopted to respond to the security needs of the population so effectively in the Balkans, in Iraq and in East Timor? After all, wars are like natural disasters: they wipe away everything, leaving behind nothing but blood, instability, and chaos. And who governs this chaos? Whilst the Military deals with the enemy, it is crucial to counter by Giuseppe De Magistris SP, THE GREAT ABSENCE IN THE AFGHAN CONUNDRUM Stability Policing, the great absence in the Afghan conundrum. Event on International approach to Policing in Conflict organized by the U.S. Institute of Peace on 6 December 2022, together with NATO Stability Policing Centre of Excellence’s Director, SIGAR’s Inspector General John Sopko, the Head of EULEX Kosovo Amb. Lars-Gunnar Wigemark and UNPOL Officer Jaswant Lal “AS A FORM OF ORGANIZED CRIME THAT TERRIFIES THE POPULATION AND DESTABILIZES THE RULE OF LAW, TERRORISM SHOULD BETTER BE ADDRESSED THROUGH BOTH DERADICALIZATION AND REINTEGRATION INTO THE SOCIETY AS WELL AS BY TARGETED INVESTIGATIONS AIMED AT DISMANTLING ITS STRUCTURE, NETWORK, AS WELL AS SOURCES OF SUPPLY AND FINANCING (THE SO-CALLED “FALCONE METHOD”: I.E., “FOLLOW THE MONEY”).”

41 those who benefit from havoc, the adversaries of the Coalition, those who take advantage of the war-crime overlap in the so-called grey zone, spoiling the peace process. Wouldn’t it have been better to call for a mandate from the UN Security Council to deploy Stability Policing units to deal with this state of almost total anarchy, thus filling this security vacuum? Instead, Resolution 1386/2001 to support international efforts to eradicate terrorism was based on two different criteria (the so-called light footprint approach and the lead-nations system), and – if I may – on a miscalculation, i.e., considering the fight against terrorism as an almost exclusively counterinsurgency military problem rather than as a social and police-related one. As a form of organized crime that terrifies the population and destabilizes the Rule of Law, terrorism should better be addressed through both deradicalization and reintegration into the society as well as by targeted investigations aimed at dismantling its structure, network, as well as sources of supply and financing (the so-called “Falcone Method”: i.e., “follow the money”). Indeed, terrorism becomes a military problem only as a last resort when its threat is so imminent that it can only be neutralized by kinetic actions. In an unstable country like Afghanistan, where terrorism, insurgency and organised crime were mingling and in unison subverting the foundations of the institutions, wouldn’t it have been better to deploy a military force expressing also civil law enforcement capabilities? They could have complemented and/or replaced the local Police, monitoring and intervening on corrupt and afflictive behaviours, providing services to the populace, thus filling the “security gap”, rather than leaving these tasks to the Afghan National Police (ANP), whose inefficiency was well known. There was in fact the need for an asset which was interoperable with both the Military and the civil society, capable to calibrate different levels of force and seeking to reduce the risk of “collateral damage” to the local population as much as possible. That would have hampered the Taliban’s narrative at its core. I am talking about an asset like the Multinational Specialized Unit, NATO Stability Policing’s forefather; a model now adopted by the major international organizations, albeit with different names and perspectives, but with similar functions, whose distinctive feature is the ability to carry out community-oriented policing to protect the civilian population. Failing to immediately ensure the rule of law and guarantee public order and security, hence to seize the so-called critical golden hour, has meant failing to provide a timely and effective response to the needs of the population and to help legitimise local governments. Indeed, the ANP operated in a chaotic context, characterised by three judicial systems (based on Islamic law, jirga/shura tribal system and penal procedural law, poisoned by an infamous bribe and release culture). Never were the ANP dedicated to the protection of civilians, despite the German and Turkish reforms in the early 1900s, as well as during Soviet domination. Nevertheless, the efforts of the international community have focused on developing a “paramilitary” force to support counter-insurgency operations conducted by the Afghan Army, rather than ensuring public order and security. Furthermore, the ANP, the most corrupt institution in the country, was characterized by endemic problems of discipline, transparency, nepotism, widespread drug use and inAfghan National Police train in search and apprehension techniques with Italian Carabinieri advisors from NATO Training Mission – Afghanistan at Central Training Center. (DOD photo by Chief Petty Officer Brian Brannon)

42 IN DEPTH consistent command and control relationships, as well as frequent resort to torture and the signing of written confessions to obtain convictions in court (the deep gender inequalities that characterised the ANP would deserve a separate chapter). Strategically, the ANP were tasked to man checkpoints located at the main crossing points of Afghanistan (what an opportunity to undisturbed prey upon travellers), neglecting the suburbs and remote villages, ultimately abandoned to themselves. Being the first to interact with the population, ensuring their security and basic needs, the Police are the most visible expression of a government; however, if perceived Police in Conflict report Conference by NATO Stability Policing Centre of Excellence and SIGAR on 20 October 2022 at the Carabinieri Officer School in Rome, Italy Afghan National police cadets practice riot control during an exercise held at the Mazar-e Sharif Regional Training Center (U.S. Air Force photo by Staff Sgt. Stacey Haga)

43 as inefficient and predatory, they undermine the legitimacy of the central authorities. In the Afghan volatile and asymmetric scenario Stability Policing could have indeed played a crucial role in preventing chaos and focusing on the protection of civilians, thus contributing to legitimising the institutions and paving the way for a progressive transition, rather than a hurried retreat. Unfortunately, the International Community did not seize this opportunity in Afghanistan, seeking the military defeat of the insurgents rather than promoting the Rule of Law. The latter, instead, mitigated their extremism, “getting closer” to the citizens, brutally turning their strategy against ASF. Maybe, the rule of law should have overridden the rule of guns. Shouldn’t it? Giuseppe De Magistris Col. Italian Carabinieri NATO Stability Policing Centre of Excellent Director A member of the Afghan Uniform Police burns a pile of seized heroin during an anti-drug summit hosted at Camp Hansen, the Marine Corps Forward Operating Base in Marjah (U.S. Marine Corps photo); The Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan destroy crops in Baharak District, Badakhshan (UNAMA photo by Eric Kanalstein) Cover of the “Police in Conflict: Lessons from U.S. and International Police Assistance Efforts in Afghanistan” report, which is an analysis report on the use of gendarmerie forces in Afghanistan, result of a collaboration between the Special Inspector for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) and the NATO Stability Policing Centre of Excellence, in the context of a specific Cooperation Agreement signed in December 2019 and expiring on 31 December 2024 This article has also been published on the “Rassegna dell’Arma dei Carabinieri” no. 4-2022 and on the Romanian Gendarmerie Magazine no. 16-2022

EVENTS

46 EVENTS The first Webinar on “The Protection of Vulnerable Groups in Domestic Policing and Peace Support Operations in the African continent” was held on the 1st of February and was hosted online as a result of the collaboration of the Center with the African Union Commission. In case you missed it, the event aimed at drawing attention to the issue of protecting vulnerable communities, both through local law enforcement and international support. The topics covered revolved around the protection of vulnerable groups, ranging from human rights matters, social protection, counterterrorism, and many more. The center was successful in attracting numerous enthusiastic briefers from around the world, who provided talks that encompassed multiple viewpoints, case studies, and firsthand experiences in the subject. The Webinar was hosted by Moderators Ten. Col. Federico Vecci, Gender Advisor of the CoESPU Center, and Ms. Margherita Corti, a Criminology graduate who is now working in cybersecurity. The event was also live streamed on Youtube and can be accessed following this link: https://lnkd. in/d2X9GzVt. We were especially pleased to see the level of interest demonstrated by the large number of registrations we received from a diverse range of professionals and academics, as we were blessed to count more than 100 Webinar subscribers. The presenters came from a variety of backgrounds, including academic and military. This diversity surely enriched the webinar and deepened the discussion that came from it. In order to ensure the correct flow of the webinar, it was divided into two parts: the African Perspective and the International Perspective. Several AU colleagues attended the first session, which centered on the African perspective. It was started by Mr. Lefhoko Kesamang, a social development specialist currently employed by the Department of Health, Humanitarian Affairs and Social Development of the African Union Commission in Somalia. He started off the Webinar by giving a brilliant insight into the African Union Agenda 2063, the master plan and strategic framework for transforming Africa with the goal of achieving equitable growth. By illustrating its goals, priorities, aspirations and vision, he explained the Pan-African vision in 50 years: “an integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa, driven by its own citizens, repreby Margherita Corti WEBINAR ON PROTECTION OF VULNERABLE GROUPS IN PSOS IN AFRICA The first Webinar on “The Protection of Vulnerable Groups in Domestic Policing and Peace Support Operations in the African continent” FEBRUARY 1ST, 2023

47 VULNERABLE GROUPS IN PSOS IN AFRICA senting a dynamic force in the international arena.” The Agenda places inclusion at its center and emphasizes the necessity of safeguarding against discrimination, particularly towards older people, individuals with disabilities, and people with albinism, as well as safeguarding against abuse and harmful traditional practices. Its aim of addressing vulnerabilities will be done by promoting education and training of police personnel in order to provide a service that guarantees all human rights of vulnerable groups. On a similar theme, colleagues of the AU Mr. Kasenene and Mrs. Thundu discusses the importance strengthening law enforcement’s capacity to deal with child protection issues, with an emphasis on stopping child marriage and online child exploitation and abuse. The focus of their work at the AU Commission is the abolition of harmful practices like female genital mutilation across the continent. FGM is a very severe form of gender-based violence that violates the human rights of women and girls. It is a form of abuse that occurs all throughout the world, not only in Africa, and it affects more than 200 million females. It’s an abuse used in many parts of the world, not just in Africa and it affects more than 200 million females around the world. He complained about the limited resources his department is sadly experiencing and pointed out the need to make sure that the right policies, conventions, legal instruments are in place to make sure we can end such behaviors. Subsequently, the South-African Mr. Mbokazi guided us through the sound policies and programs at his Division, the Department for Health, Humanitarian and Social Development, for which he is currently serving as Head of Labour, Employment and Migration at. With relation to the AU perspective on the protection of vulnerable groups in policing, his intervention was notably focused on the aspects of labor, employment, and migration. His intervention was noteworthy for highlighting how child workers in the informal economy and illegal labor migrants are those who are most vulnerable and are more likely to be victimized simply because they are not citizens of the receiving country. David Butare, Assistant Commissioner of Police and Head of Department for PSO in Rwanda National Police, shared with us his experiences working with the Rwanda Police in PSO with his 30 years of law enforcement experience. He extensively reported Rwanda’s extensive involvement in peacekeeping operations, which he explained is a commitment resulting from the international community’s inability to act during the 1994 genocide. Since 2005, he explained, Rwanda has supplied more than a thousand police officers to AU/UN Peacekeeping Missions, making it the second-largest police contributing country. As a UN Member State, Rwanda feels it is its duty to contribute to the preservation of international peace and security. Another intriguing aspect raised by Mr. Butare is the female participation in Police operations. Despite being such a small country, Rwanda is the first female police contributor to UN PKOs. When talking about police training in the protection of civilians, we felt that the discussion that emerged in relation to female peacekeepers was particularly relevant as The CoESPU Center itself witnessed the significant female presence in police officers during training. Female police officers serve as role models and sources of inspiration. More importantly, nevertheless, girls and women feel more secure in reporting crimes while speaking with a female counterpart. Colonel William Daniel, the Center’s current Deputy Director, who also had first-hand experience in PKO in Rwanda, stated his admiration for the country’s engagement with civil populations in Peace Keeping environments and the benefits it offers to the community. In relation to the same subject, Colonel Robleh, who is presently working as the Head of the Police Component of the Eastern African Standby Force, discussed the challenges in protecting civilians and carrying out peace support operations. He made a contribution to the discussion by first outlining the international legal framework for POC, which includes the Geneva Convention, UN Security Council mandates, and the Law of Armed War (IHL). Protecting civilians during PSOs presents a number of difficulties, including frequent insufficient command and control in logistics and support capacities, limited unit interoperability, poor information sharing, and inadequate intelligence analysis capabilities. There is a general agreement on the fact that there is a lack of contributors, and lack of sufficient

48 EVENTS capacity to act from the authority. Similarly, Chief Superintendent Lewis Karichi, Mission Support Officer at SADC and member of Zimbabwe Republic Police shared his experience of the SADC mission in Mozambique to counter terrorism. He also provided a few legislative frameworks that the SADC can refer to while formulating its policies. Mahad Adam Botan and Ellen Vermeulen, who serve as the National Project Officer and Human Rights Adviser respectively for the European Union Capacity Building (EUCAP Somalia), were the final speakers to conclude the first segment of the webinar, focused on the African perspective. “Policing and the Rule of Law in Somalia’’ was the topic of their talk. They started the presentation by pointing out the “Xeer” law, Somalia’s customary law which was established to guarantee the protection of vulnerable groups in times of war and peace. But after the Civil war of 1991, which saw the collapse of the judiciary institutions, vulnerable people were exposed to killings, rape and forces labor. Not to mention, what worsened the situation is Somalia’s enormous problem of severe drought, food insecurity, ongoing conflict and growing displacement. According to UNICEF, more than 8 million people are affected and in heavy need of Humanitarian assistance. Women and girls are said to be exposed to higher risks due to weakened protection, as SGBV service provision is very limited and female police officers are scarce. Mrs. Vermeulen emphasized on the fact that the more vulnerabilities there are, the more human rights are violated. To conclude, they presented the 2024 EUCAP Mandate, which intends to increase capacity building training to enhance Police cooperation and promote gender equality. The second half of the Webinar focused on the International perspective of the protection of vulnerable groups, and the topics touched ranged from human rights, Social Protection, the protection of civilians in conflict zones and the issue of Human Trafficking. Expert in training of international and national police officers for deployment in PSOs and currently lecturer in International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law, Ltc Marco Sutto is the UN Point of Contact for CoESPU’s resident courses. He set to scene and introduced the second part of the Webinar’s theme, “Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law”. He highlighted the key features of human rights from a legal perspective. Adopted in 1948 by the General Assembly, the UDHR (Universal Declaration of Human Rights) was drafted as a “common standard of achievement for all people and nations” that everyone should respect and protect. Nowadays there are 30 fundamental rights recognized at the international level and they need to be universal, applicable in both peace and war time, inalienable, interdependent, legal and internationally guaranteed. He stressed on the fact that states are responsible for protecting the population and addressing their needs. As history has taught us, some of the worst human rights violations have resulted from discrimination against specific groups; it is therefore our duty to do everything in our power to ensure non-discrimination against vulnerable groups. Following, we were blessed to have Silvia Golin, Public Prosecutor at Padua Court. Her substantial expertise represented an incredible value added to our day. In particular, linked to the topic of her presentation on Human Trafficking, she led the OSCE (Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe) exercise focused on the international legal training, investigative cooperation and protection of victims in the field of trafficking of human beings, held in close cooperation with our Center of Excellence. She explained that as the African Union adopted the Free Movement Protocol in 2018, facilitating the free movement of people, goods and money, it also facilitated the illegal market. The fact that trafficking people for forced labor is

49 a crime that typically targets economic migrants, especially women and children, was pertinent to our webinar. In order to combat international crime and defend human rights, she emphasized the necessity of common procedure. A very insightful and rich presentation was given by Alessandra Morelli, expert (and witness, as she liked to point out) in emergency management in high-risk environments. She has worked as Senior Officer for the UNHCR in complex humanitarian operations ensuring protection and assistance to refugees, and defines herself as a “woman of dialogue and mediation”. She basically took everything that has been previously shared and brought it into the practical talking and sharing that comes from her experience. She began to explain how the fact that warfare has changed is important when it comes to protecting civilians. It has become asymmetric, the target is different (90% of the victims are civilians in today’s conflicts), and the objective is to terrorize. She had seen firsthand how dangerous it has become to provide aid since today’s humanitarians are the main targets of terrorist attacks because they get in the way of their plans to wreak havoc by attempting to provide stability. In nations fighting war on terrorism, civilians are caught in the crossfire between the terrorists and the army, feeling threatened and victimized by both. Several people have left their town simply as a result of the confrontation between the two factions. As an officer on the ground, she gave an amazing insight on what it means and what are the implications to protect civilians in the first line. Mrs Gatteschi explained the importance of social protection, whose goal is to reduce social and economic risk and vulnerability, providing basic social security to all but mostly to vulnerable groups. She interestingly explained her work in Somalia with Social Protection Requirements, for which the integration of programmes and interventions and the coordination between forces are fundamental in order to achieve it. Finally, Social Protection is the only instrument capable of creating a multidimensional response to multidimensional vulnerability. Last but not least, Ltc Elizabeth Coffee, Army Civil Affairs Officer currently stationed with AFRICOM J56, closed the seminar by sharing her insightful experience with AFRICOM and DoD in addressing vulnerable populations. That said, we trust that the conference has been stimulating and inspiring, and that our intent of drawing attention to the issue of protecting vulnerable communities both through local law enforcement and international support has been successful. The enthusiastic participation shown worldwide is just another indicator of the need for additional effort and research on the subject. We had the honor of hosting a number of briefers who delivered highly entertaining and interesting presentations that helped to raise awareness about the delicate and critical subject of safeguarding vulnerable communities on the African continent. It is our duty and responsibility as the international community to protect individuals who cannot protect themselves, and to implement policies in order to guarantee an equal and effective enjoyment of human rights. We will see you next time, hopefully soon. Margherita Corti Recent Criminology Graduate at City University of London

50 EVENTS CONFERENCE ON GEOPOLITICS AND PEACE OPERATIONS – LESSONS LEARNED AND FUTURE STRATEGIES FEBRUARY 16TH, 2023 The one-day Conference, held at the CoESPU on February 1st, aimed at identifying lessons learned from past engagements (or lack of engagements) of the international community in peace operations while detecting potential future strategies in order to optimize the resort to peace operations as critical tool in the geopolitical and geostrategic arena. The sharing of knowledge and development of concepts in this domain was supposed to favor a better understanding of the potential of peace operations to prevent the outburst of conflicts or to facilitate the recovery from crisis and the stabilization of destabilized context for the benefit of the international security. Moreover, the event was created to reach international visibility, asserting the intent of the Arma of the Carabinieri to contribute to the development of geopolitical and geostrategic studies and research in the domain of peace operations. The Conference envisioned the achievement of the following objectives, among others: identifying and analyzing the dimension of peace operations in the framework of geopolitics and geo-strategy; detecting lessons learned in the solution of international crisis making resort to peace operations; analyzing the relations among peace operations and other tools of geopolitics; encouraging the senior officials involved in the field of peacekeeping to develop the understanding of a wider, geopolitical and geostrategic perspective, in which the international community address destabilized situations via peace operations and the interrelation among different strategic factors; developing new concepts and strategic approaches in support of the main International Organizations and the Italian Defence, particularly for what concerns the geopolitical perspective of peace operations; fostering the sharing of sector specific acquired knowledge among the International Organizations, Friend Nations, Allies and the scientific community, so that it can be an integrating part of the stability processes. Lt. Gen. Maurizio Detalmo Mezzavilla, Carabinieri Deputy Commanding General, delivered his opening speech at the beginning of the event in the morning and then gave the floor to relevant Academia representatives for the matter, UN officials, Experts from civil, military and police institutions or international organizations who developed geopolitics or geostrategic studies and research and Senior Officers and experts involved in the domain of geopolitics and peace operations.