The CoESPU Magazine 3-2020

In the particular case of judicial in- HAITI
stitutions, the political and econo- Court hearings in Port-au-Prince, focused on gender justice issues, organized with support from
mic elite may be satisfied with the MINUJUSTH (Source: United Nations, 8 March 2018)
ways that they operate. Corruption
and patronage often serves vested
key interests for those in power
who may want to maintain the sta-
tu quo. In addition, the reform of
these institutions fundamentally af-
fects the balance of power within
the State, and there is often little
political will to empower the judi-
cial branch of the Government.
Most critically, perhaps, the absen-
ce of a tradition of an independent
judiciary can constitute a funda-
mental cultural obstacle for reform.
The prevalence of non-state or tra-
ditional justice systems can also
in some circumstances be viewed
as a more credible and legitimate
alternative to formal justice institu-
tions31. Furthermore, prison reform
is rarely considered as a major pri-
ority and those detained tend to be
amongst the most disenfranchised
individuals in society. Hence, the
prevalence of inhumane deten-
tion in many such circumstances.
There are, however, several op-
portunities for reform in conflict
and post-conflict societies. Peace
agreements and constitutional re-
form initiatives, in conjunction with
adequate leadership at the highest
political level, can provide genui-
ne reform. The fact that institutions
may need to be re-built ex nihilo
as a result of the conflict, also cre-
ates opportunities for the vetting,
selection, recruitment and training
of a new generation of person-
nel. This is particularly important
for individuals at the helm and
mid-management level of these in-
stitutions. The appointment of qua-
lified, well-trained personnel, in
conjunction with the establishment
of adequate administrative sup-
port mechanisms can be a unique

51

INTERNATIONAL CRIMES: ROLE OF POS IN
ASSURING JUSTICE

lowed its personnel to use force

to achieve its objectives. It was

also, arguably, the first pea-

ce operation with a substantive

rule of law component, through

the deployment of formed police

units from Ghana and Nigeria.

In 1999, the Security Council

established the United Nations

Organization Mission in the De-

mocratic Republic of the Congo

(MONUC), primarily as a good

offices and military observation

mission. Subsequently, the Secu-

rity Council authorized the de-

ployment of police personnel with

MONUC34. Such personnel, who

first deployed in October 2001,

were primarily tasked with the

preparation of an assessment of

policing institutions in the coun-

KOSOVO try as well as liaison functions with

Security Council adopts its resolution 1244 authorizing the establishment of the United Na- their Congolese counterparts. The
tions Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (Source: United Nations, 10 June 1999) mandate of the police component

of MONUC was expanded over

opportunity for reform. This, along nable peace and security, and the the years to include aspects rela-
with the establishment of functio- successful implementation of the ted to support to the Congolese
nal internal and external accoun- mandate of these missions. Reso- National Police for the deployment
tability and disciplinary institu- lution 2447 of the Security Coun- of its personnel in conflict-affected
tions, can create a new paradigm. cil specifically emphasized that areas (Kisangani and the Ituri) as
assistance should be provided “to well as for the establishment of
Field engagements police, justice and corrections in- security arrangements in Kinsha-
General stitutions in peacekeeping opera- sa and electoral security35. Given
As of 1 October 2019, there were tions and special political missions the critical importance of support
approximately 11,000 police, 245 on both the rapid re-establishment to justice and corrections insti-
justice and 434 corrections per- of essential services to respond to tutions, MONUC established its
sonnel deployed in 17 peace ope- people’s justice and security ne- rule of law component in 2004.
rations32. This is out of an overall eds, and longer term institutional MONUC was replaced in 2010
presence at that time of more than reform based on transparency, by MONUSCO. The mandate of
100,000 United Nations person- efficiency and sustainability”33. this mission included an increa-
nel in such operations, most of sed focus on the protection of ci-
whom were military member of Case study 1 – The Democratic vilian and the strengthening of sta-
national contingents. Whilst poli- Republic of the Congo te institutions in conflict-affected
ce, justice and corrections person- The United Nations Operation areas, primarily in North Kivu,
nel only represented approxima- in the Congo (ONUC), deployed South Kivu and the Ituri. The Se-
tely 10% of overall deployments between 1960 and 1965, was curity Council also authorized the
in peace operations at that time, one of the first major peacekee- deployment of the Prosecution
their activities were and remain cri- ping operations of the Organiza- Support Cells (PSCs), an innova-
tical for the achievement of sustai- tion. The mandate of ONUC al- tive mechanism mandated to as-
sist Congolese military justice au-

52

other strategic priorities. This inclu-

ded security support through the

deployment of formed police units

and training and advising on speci-

fic technical areas (eg. crowd-ma-

nagement and community poli-

cing). Advice was also provided for

the development of a national ju-

stice reform strategy and an Action

Plan (2018-2022), including

aspects related to oversight and

accountability. Technical assistance

was provided to reduce arbitrary

and prolonged detention in confli-

ct-affected areas. MONUSCO also

assisted national authorities in the

development and implementation

of the Prison Biennial Plan (2019-

KOSOVO 2021), and for improving securi-

Secretary-General Kofi Annan meeting with Police cadets being inducted into the Kosovo ty and access to food and health
Police Service (Source: United Nations, 19 November 2002)
services in key detention centres.

thorities in their efforts to bring fic assistance was provided to the Case study 2 – Haiti
perpetrators of war crimes and Congolese National Police for the United Nations peace operations
other serious crimes to justice36. vetting and certification of its per- have been extensively involved
Between 2011 and 2019, the PSCs sonnel and the implementation of in the provision of support to the
provided assistance to Congolese Haitian National Police (HNP),
authorities in relation to 940 cases
that resulted in 1,260 convictions KOSOVO
and sentences for serious crimes, A student officer at the Kosovo Centre for Public Safety, Education and Development (Source:
including homicides and sexual United Nations, 21 March 2007)
assaults. The PSCs are compri-
sed of multi-disciplinary teams of
experts including +international
police, prosecutors and judges.
The trials in such cases often took
place close to the locations were
the crimes were committed and,
as such, demonstrated the willin-
gness of Congolese authorities to
ensure accountability for such acts.
Remarkably, in 2019, approxima-
tely 133 soldiers of the Armed For-
ces of the Democratic Republic of
the Congo (FARDC), 113 national
police and 59 members of armed
groups were convicted for human
rights violations and abuses37.
In addition to these efforts, speci-

53

INTERNATIONAL CRIMES: ROLE OF POS IN
ASSURING JUSTICE

as well as national prosecutorial, ments, notwithstanding the impor- impunity and a challenge to good
judicial and corrections institu- tant political and security challen- governance”40 and that “extreme
tions for 24 of the last 27 years ges faced by the country during overcrowding and poor hygiene
in Haiti. The United Nations Sta- this period. By 2019, it had assi- conditions” in most prisons facilities
bilization Mission in Haiti (MINU- sted Haitian authorities in: incre- contributed to “health problems,
STAH), which was deployed from asing the HNP by 10% compared which are compounded by irregu-
2004 to 2017, had a particularly to 2017, up to 15,400 personnel; lar food deliveries and a shortage
important role for the re-establi- reducing the number of detainees of medical staff and medication”41.
shment of justice institutions after held in pre-trial detention; certi- Recognizing the importance of the-
the February 2004 political crisis fying four prisons based on inter- se challenges, the Security Council
and collapse of the HNP. It also national standards; promulgating authorized the deployment of the
played a key role for humanita- a new legal aid law; and achie- United Nations Integrated Offi-
rian assistance and recovery after ving an increase of 300% in the ce in Haiti (BINUH) in October
the January 2010 earthquake. same-day processing of cases in 2019. This mission is mandated
inter alia to assist the Government
MALI of Haiti in its efforts to “reinforce
A guard at a prison in Gao (Source: United Nations, 14 February 2018) the capacity of the Haitian Natio-
nal Police”, “strengthen the justice
The United Nations Mission for the jurisdiction of Port-au-Prince38. sector” and “improve penitentiary
Justice Support in Haiti (MINUJU- Despite these achievements, the administration”42. This successor
STH) was the last peacekeeping Secretary-General noted in a re- mission to MINUJUSTH has been
operation deployed in the country. port to the Security Council in Mar- actively providing support in these
It was a transition mission between ch 2019 that the Haitian National areas since its inception. Specific
a large peacekeeping operation Police lacked “an adequate budget benchmarks, indicators, targets
and a special political mission and and remains underequipped, with and baselines were also develo-
had a comprehensive mandate in limited logistics such as vehicles, ped for the implementation of its
support of Haitian justice institu- protection equipment and medical mandate including for: an incre-
tions. During its deployment from support to achieve its full capaci- ase in government investment to
2017 to 2019, MINUJUSTH pro- ty”39. It was further noted that the sustain and further develop the
vided extensive support to Haitian “inability of the judiciary to achieve Haitian National Police; impro-
authorities in the rule of law sector full independence is seen as one of ving oversight and accountability
and had some significant achieve- the main drivers of corruption and mechanisms for police, justice and
corrections institutions; certifying
prisons based on international
standards; and reducing unsen-
tenced detainees as a proportion
of the overall prison population43.
Overall, while progress towards
building the capacity and integrity
of the Haitian National Police sin-
ce 2004 has been significant, the
development of Haitian justice and
corrections institutions remains a
serious challenge. According to
most observers, this is primarily
due to the lack of genuine political
will for reform. While substantive
investments were made in the past
decades by the United Nations
and other international partners

54

in support of these institutions, the MALI
sustainability of these efforts has Heavy artillery holes on the walls of what was once the Justice Court of Gao (Source: United
proven elusive in the absence of a Nations, 29 August 2013)
social contract in this regard, and
willingness for change. The adop- ployment of international police Kosovo stakeholders and in close
tion of a new criminal code and personnel to serve in Kosovo”44. cooperation with other internatio-
criminal procedure code in June As a result of the conflict, justice in- nal partners. By 2004, it was esti-
2020 is seen by many observers stitutions had to be reconstructed mated that Kosovo’s justice institu-
as an opportunity to initiate fun- ad nihilo. As a provisional mea- tions were comparable for the most
damental changes. However, this sure, more than 3,700 internatio- to their counterparts in the region46.
will only take place if clear politi- nal police, justice and corrections Following Kosovo’s declaration
cal and economic incentives are in experts were deployed by May of independence, UNMIK was re-
place for progress towards a new 2000, in essence to fill the rule of structured in 2008 and its rule
paradigm. Similarly, the potential law vacuum. By this time, the mis- of law executive tasks were tran-
politicization of the police could sion had managed to train 794 sferred to the European Union
seriously undermine this institu- Kosovo Police officers, appoint Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo
tion, and could act as a de-stabili- more than 400 judges, prosecu- (EULEX). The authorities of Koso-
zing factor, as was the case betwe- tors and lay judges and employ vo had already assumed by that
en 2001 and 2004. As in many 350 local correctional officers, all time most of the earlier UNMIK
other contexts, political and eco- from the different communities of responsibilities in the area of rule
nomic incentives, and leadership Kosovo45. This was a major achie- of law. From 2016 onward, UN-
at the highest-level, are keys for vement, given the extraordinarily MIK initiated new programmes in
the sustainability of achievements. challenging political, security and the rule of law sector in support of
In addition, social and economic humanitarian circumstances un- key priorities of Kosovo’s autho-
factors, particularly youth unem- der which UNMIK was deployed. rities. This was done as part of a
ployment and corruption, have a In the following years, UNMIK had joint approach with other United
fundamental role for the continued a lead role in the establishment of Nations entities involved in the rule
security and stability of the country. the Kosovo Police Service as well of law sector, and in complement
as prosecutorial and judicial insti- of initiatives from other internatio-
Case study 3 – Kosovo tutions and the Kosovo Corrections nal partners including the Europe-
The United Nations Interim Admi- Service. This was done in support of an Union and the United States.
nistration Mission in Kosovo (UN-
MIK) was deployed in June 1999,
in the immediate aftermath of the
conflict between the North Atlan-
tic Treaty Organization, the Fe-
deral Republic of Yugoslavia and
local armed groups. Under Secu-
rity Council resolution 1244, the
mission was given a broad man-
date for performing “basic civi-
lian administrative functions where
and as long as required”, “orga-
nizing and overseeing the deve-
lopment of provisional institutions
for democratic and autonomous
self-government” and “maintai-
ning civil law and order, including
establishing local police forces
and meanwhile through the de-

55

INTERNATIONAL CRIMES: ROLE OF POS IN
ASSURING JUSTICE

Specific assistance was provided nal Integrated Stabilization Mission dition, a total of 2,026 gendarmes
in regard to counter-terrorism fi- in Mali (MINUSMA) was created in and police officers were deployed
nancing, anti-money laundering April 2013. One key aspect of its by that date in the north, compa-
programmes, international law mandate was to support the re- red with 469 in 201251. This was
enforcement assistance, case ma- storation and extension of sta- achieved in the midst of significant
nagement, legal aid, the certifica- te authority, and the extension of security challenges and a notable
tion of documents and the preven- the rule of law in northern Mali49. increase during this period in ter-
tion of radicalization in prisons.
While significant progress has
been achieved, important chal-
lenges remain in regard to the ca-
pacity, integrity and performance
of Kosovo’s justice institutions. In
2004, the United Nations assessed
that “judges and prosecutors of the
Kosovo judiciary had faced a cer-
tain amount of pressure in specific
circumstances, particularly in ca-
ses involving members of Kosovo’s
minorities, terrorism and organi-
zed crime, and that this impacted
strongly on their ability to remain
independent and impartial”47. This
has remained a challenge ever
since. As noted in a 2019 report
of the European Commission, “the
judiciary is still vulnerable to un-
due political influence” and “the
administration of justice remains
slow and inefficient and rule of
law institutions need sustained ef-
forts to build up their capacities”48.
At the same time, most observers
would concur that Kosovo’s justi-
ce institutions compares quite fa-
vourably to other institutions in
conflict and post-conflict societies.

Case study 4 – Mali By June 2014, five tribunals and five rorist activities targeting Malian
As a result of the 2012-2013 con- prisons in the north had re-opened institutions and civilians as well
flict, rule of law and security insti- with extensive assistance of MINU- as United Nations peacekeepers.
tution in northern Mali had all but SMA50. This represented more than In the following years, MINUSMA
collapsed. Personnel from Malian half of such institutions compared continued to provide assistance for
law enforcement, judicial and cor- to prior to the 2012 crisis. In ad- the restoration and extension of law
rections institutions left the region
during this period and illegal ar-
med groups established parallel
institutions in areas under their
control. It was in this context that
the United Nations Multidimensio-

56

enforcement and justice services, as well as Malian judicial institu- national organized crime activities
and the operations of prisons, in tions, particularly regarding the (including trafficking in persons,
northern and central Mali. Given detention, investigation and pro- arms, drugs and natural resour-
developments on the ground, MI- secution of individuals suspected ces, and the smuggling of mi-
NUSMA was specifically mandated of, and sentencing of those found grants)”52. Dedicated support was
“to help ensuring the effectiveness responsible for terrorism-related also provided for the strengthe-
of justice and corrections officials crimes, mass atrocities and trans- ning of national law enforcement
and strategies for justice reform,
MALI as part of the 2015 Peace Agree-
Member of a formed police unit of MINUSMA in Gao (Source: United Nations, 15 May ment. By early 2020, 16 of the 19
2014) tribunals in the North and Centre
regions were partially operational
despite the deteriorating security
situation and approximately 82%
of judicial personnel were re-de-
ployed in March 202053. Similar-
ly, there was a significant increase
in the past years in the presence
of Malian law enforcement per-
sonnel in conflict affected areas in
the north and centre of the coun-
try, with support from MINUSMA.
It should particularly be noted that
MINUSMA provided increased
assistance in recent years to the
Malian Specialized Judicial Unit
to Combat Terrorism and Trans-
national Organized Crime (PJS)
in its investigations and in scaling
up its criminal analysis and case
management capacity. As noted
in a letter of the Secretary-Gene-
ral to the Security Council, as of
20 May 2020 a total of 618 ca-
ses were being investigated by the
Unit, including 319 terrorism ca-
ses and 77 transnational organi-
zed crime cases54. As of December
2019, 60 individuals charged for
terrorism-related crimes had been
brought to trial by the PJS befo-
re the Criminal Court of Bama-
ko, leading to 51 convictions.
Nevertheless, Mali continues to
face important political and se-
curity challenges. In 2020, there
was a significant increase in ter-
rorist-related crimes in the north
and inter-community violence in
the Centre. Whilst the mandate of

57

INTERNATIONAL CRIMES: ROLE OF POS IN
ASSURING JUSTICE

MINUSMA remains geographically avour which requires a significant all persons, institutions and entities, pu-
focused on conflict and post-con- investment in human and financial blic and private, including the State itself,
flict areas, the challenges faced capital, often in the midst of other are accountable to laws that are publicly
by Malian law enforcement, judi- important competing priorities. promulgated, equally enforced and in-
cial and corrections institutions are Lastly, and most importantly, lea- dependently adjudicated, and which are
deep and widespread. These in- dership is key. It is critical to have consistent with international human ri-
clude the limited confidence of the a clear vision, at the highest level ghts norms and standards” and “requires,
Malian population in these institu- of the state, which can instill chan- as well, measures to ensure adherence to
tions –in part due to the prevalent ges in the mindset of all segments the principles of supremacy of law, equa-
impunity for serious crimes and of the population, towards a cul- lity before the law, accountability to the
limited inclusivity-, structural pro- ture of respect for the rule of law. law, fairness in the application of the law,
blems related to their capacity, in- separation of powers, participation in de-
tegrity and performance, as well as PICTURES: cision-making, legal certainty, avoidance
their absence from key conflict-af- -United Nations of arbitrariness and procedural and legal
fected areas that remain under the transparency” (see: Report of the Secre-
control of non-state armed groups. tary-General, The rule of law and transi-
These challenges are further com- tional justice in conflict and post-conflict
pounded by the deterioration of societies, supra, paragraph 6)
the social and economic situation 10. General Assembly resolution 70/1, Tran-
throughout the country, and poli- sforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for
tical instability in Bamako, culmi- Sustainable Development, A/RES/70/1,
nating with the military coup and 21 October 2015.
ousting of President Keïta and his 11112143.... Idem, paragraph 55. critical importance
government on 18 August 2020. Idem, page 2.
Idem, page 14.
Conclusion For an analysis of the
This paper provides a succinct of leadership and the nexus between Su-
overview of one critical area of the stainable Development Goal 16, leader-
United Nations support for rule of ship and the rule of law see: Stéphane
law assistance. Based on experien- Jean, Leadership and the rule of law in
ce to-date of peace operations, conflict and post-conflict societies, Inter-
some key lessons-learned have national Journal of Public Leadership, 1
emerged. This included, first, the August 2019.
importance for the United Nations 1. The views expressed herein are those of 15. See: https://www.un.org/sustainablede-
in having an inclusive and collabo- velopment/peace-justice/ and https://
rative approach for such assistan- the author and do not necessarily reflect sdgs.un.org/goals/goal16.
ce, based on national plans and the views of the United Nations. 16. See: Charter of the United
priorities with adequate human 2. Report of the Secretary-General on the October Nations, 24
and financial resources for man- Security 1945, article 24.
date implementation. Secondly, United Nations Organization Stabili- 17. Council resolution 2447, S/
any initiative should be informed zation Mission in the Democratic Re-
by, and in support of, clear political public of the Congo, 30 June 2014, RES/2447 (2018), dated 13 December
and security objectives. The reform 2018, paragraph 1.
of justice institutions is rarely a pu- 3. S/2014/450, paragraphs 72 and 93. 1198.. Idem, paragraph 7. Department of Pe-
rely technical matter. Thirdly, an in- Marc Ferro, Le Ressentiment dans l’histo- See: United Nations
cremental approach can be useful, ire, 2008 (english version Resentment in
by building momentum in specific history, 2010). acekeeping Operations and Department
sectors that can act as a model for General Assembly resolution 73/207, of Field Support, Revised Policy on For-
other areas. Fourthly, such initiati- 4. med Police Units in United Nations Pea-
ves are always a long-term ende- The rule of law at the national and inter-
national levels, A/RES/73/207, adopted cekeeping Operations, 1 January 2017
(available at: https://police.un.org/sites/
on 28 December 2018, paragraph 11. default/files/fpu_policy_2016.pdf).
56.. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 1971. 20. Guidance Note of the Secretary-General,
Jared Diamond, The world until yester- UN Approach to Rule of Law Assistance,
day, 2012, pages 97 and 98.
7. Report of the Secretary-General, The rule April 2008 (available at: https://www.
un.org/ruleoflaw/files/RoL%20Guidan-
of law and transitional justice in confli- ce%20Note%20UN%20Approach%20
ct and post-conflict societies, 23 August
2004, S/2004/616, paragraph 7. 21. FINAL.pdf)
8. Randy E. Barnett, Can Justice and the Decision no. 2012/13 – Rule of law ar-
rangements, dated 11 September 2012
Rule of Law Be Reconciled?, Foreword to (available at: https://www.refworld.org/
the “Symposium on Law and Philosophy,”
11 Harvard Journal of Law and Public 222423... pdfid/52ca7a2f4.pdf).
Policy 597 (1988), pages 598-599. Idem, paragraph (ii).
9. The then United Nations Secretary-Ge- Idem, Annex I. Stren-
neral noted in 2004 that concepts such Report of the Secretary-General,
gthening and coordinating United Na-
as justice and the rule of law “serve both tions rule of law activities, A/74/139,
to define our goals and to determine our
methods”. He further noted that the rule dated 11 July 2019, paragraph 80. As of
2020, the Global Point had conducted at
of law is “is a concept at the very heart of least 51 joint assessment missions, com-
the Organization’s mission” that it “…re-
fers to a principle of governance in which pleted 42 deployments of experts in 15
countries and supported the development

58

10 joint United Nations programmes 32. 12 March 2020, paragraphs 31 and 32) United Nations Interim Administration
In Abyei (UNISFA), Afghanistan (UNA- Mission in Kosovo, S/2000/538, dated 6
(see: https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/ June 2020, paragraphs 37 and 57.
default/files/gfp_factsheet.pdf). See also MA), the Central African Republic (MI- United Nations Development Program-
the 2018 Declaration of Shared Commit- NUSCA), Colombia (UNVMC), Cyprus 46.
ments on UN Peacekeeping Operations, (UNFICYP), Darfur (UNAMID), the De- me, Assessment of Administrative Ca-
pacity in Kosovo, April 2005 (available
whereas the Secretary-General commit- mocratic Republic of the Congo (MO- at: https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/files/
ted to “seek greater coherence among NUSCO), Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS),
UN system actors including through joint Haiti (MINUJUSTH), Kosovo (UNMIK), Assessment%20Admin%20Capacity_Ko-
sovo.pdf).
platforms such as the Global Focal Point Lebanon (UNIFIL), Libya (UNSMIL), Mali 47. United Nations Development Program-
on Police, Justice and Corrections” (para- (MINUSMA), Somalia (UNSOM), South
graph 16, available at: https://peaceke- Sudan (UNMISS), Western Sahara (MI- me, Assessment of Administrative Capa-
city in Kosovo, Idem, page 63
eping.un.org/sites/default/files/a4p-de- 3343.. NURSO) and Yemen (UNMHA). 48. European Commission, Kosovo* 2019
claration-en.pdf). Supra, paragraph 4.
25. United Nations Department of Peaceke- See: Security Council resolution 1355, Report, SWD (2019) 216 final, dated 29
May 2019, page 4.
eping Operations and Department of The Democratic Republic of the Congo, 49. Security Council resolution 2100, Mali, S/
Field Support, Guidelines on Police Ca- S/RES/1355 (2001), dated 15 June 2001.
pacity-Building and Development, 1 April 35. For an analysis of the role of MONUC and RES/2100 (2013), dated 25 April 2013,
paragraph 16.
2015 (available at: https://police.un.org/ challenges during this period related to 50. Report of the Secretary-General, The si-
sites/default/files/sgf-guidelines_police_ policing and the rule of law in the Demo-
cbd-2015.pdf). cratic Republic of the Congo see: Colo- tuation in Mali, S/2014/403, dated 9
26. United Nations June 2014, paragraph 27.
Department of Peacekee- nel Mamadou Gueye Faye and Stéphane 5521.. Idem, paragraph 29.
ping Operations and Department of Field Jean, Police reform in the Democratic Re- Security Council resolution
Support, Policy on Justice Support in Uni- public of the Congo in Providing Security 2531, The si-
tuation in Mali, S/RES/2531 (2020), da-
ted Nations Peace Operations, 1 August for People: Security Sector Reform in Afri- ted 29 June 2020, paragraph 28 (a) (iv).
2016 (available at: https://peacekee- ca, Global Facilitation Network for Secu- Report of the Secretary-General, Situa-
ping.un.org/sites/default/files/2016_po- rity Sector Reform, 2003. For a broader 53.
licy_justice_support_in_un_peace_opera- analysis on security sector reform in Afri- tion in Mali, S/2020/223, dated 20 Mar-
ch 2020, paragraph 22.
27. tions.pdf). ca during this period see: Stéphane Jean, 54. Letter dated 1 June 2020 from the Secre-
See: United Nations Department of Pe- Security Sector Reform and Development:
acekeeping Operations and Department an African perspective, Security Dialogue, tary-General addressed to the President
of the Security Council, S/2020/481,
of Field Support, Policy on Prison Support 36. 30 June 2005. page 2.
in United Nations Peace Operations, 1 Under paragraph 12 (d) of its resolution
September 2015 (available at: www. 1925, S/RES/1925(2010), dated 28 May
friendsofcorrections.com). In practice, 2010, the Security Council mandated
prison support also involves helping na- MONUSCO to “Support national and in-
tional authorities recruit and train prison ternational efforts to bring perpetrators to
staff, support development of prisoners’ justice, including by establishing Prosecu-
vocational training programmes, reha- tion Support Cells to assist the FARDC [Ar-
bilitation and reintegration initiatives med Forces of the Democratic Republic of
and the development of alternatives to the Congo] military justice authorities in
incarceration. In some instances, mis- prosecuting persons arrested by the FAR-
sions are further mandated to operate DC”.
detention facilities (in South Sudan) or to 37. Report of the Secretary-General, United
have a quasi-executive role in support of Nations Organization Stabilization Mis-
national authorities in their oversight of sion in the Democratic Republic of the
prisons (in the Central African Republic). Congo, S/2020/214, dated 18 March
All these activities aim to make the pri- 2020, paragraph 45.
son institutions safe, secure and humane 38. Report of the Secretary-General, Uni-
in accordance with national and interna- ted Nations Mission for Justice Support
tional criminal justice and human rights in Haiti, S/2019/805, dated 9 October
norms and standards. 2019, Annex I.
28. Available at: https://www.un.org/en/ 39. Report of the Secretary-General, United
events/peacekeepersday/2011/publica- Nations Mission for Justice Support in
tions/un_rule_of_law_indicators.pdf. Haiti, S/2019/198, dated 1 March 2019,
29. World Bank, World Development Report paragraph 57.
2011: Conflict, Security and Develop- 444120... Idem, paragraph 59.
ment, 2 June 2011. Idem, paragraph 32.
30. See: Stéphane Jean, Leadership and the Security Council resolution 2476, The
rule of law in conflict and post-conflict so- question concerning Haiti, S/RES/2476
cieties, supra. (2019), dated 25 June 2019, paragraph
31. In a few instances missions have provided 1.
support to customary justice mechanisms. 43. Report of the Secretary-General, Uni-
This was the case, for example, in Darfur ted Nations Integrated Office in Haiti,
(see: https://unamid.unmissions.org and S/2020/123, dated 13 February 2020,
Special report of the Chairperson of the Annex. Stéphane Jean
African Union Commission and the Se- 44. Security Council resolution 1244, Kosovo,
cretary-General of the United Nations on S/RES/1244 (1999), dated 10 June 1999, Judicial Officer and Coordinator
the African Union-United Nations Hybrid paragraph 11. OROLSI - UN DPO
Report of the
Operation in Darfur, S/2020/202, dated 45. Secretary-General, The

59

INTERNATIONAL CRIMES: ROLE OF POS IN
ASSURING JUSTICE

CORRECTIONS COMPONENT IN
THE (RE)-ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ROL

When Small Becomes Essential: However, are these commendable Justice and Corrections Section
The Role of Corrections Compo- aspirations and strong motivation of the United Nations Multidi-
nent in the (Re)-Establishment of adequately complemented by the mensional Integrated Stabiliza-
the Rule of Law required knowledge and skills? tion Mission in the Central Afri-
Do those sent on missions feel well can Republic (MINUSCA). After a
by Michael Langelaar prepared to take on the multitude mass escape of over 700 prisoners
Claudia Croci of challenges and capitalise on the from the central prison in Bangui
exciting opportunities presented in and under a new UN concept of
233 Government Provided Cor- these unique environments for the Urgent Temporary Measures de-
(re) establishment of the rule of law? veloped to support CAR nationals
rections Personnel (GPP), on loan in maintaining law and order, a
from approximately 28 Member The case of the United Nations team of 68 specialised Govern-
States, are deployed today in ei- Multidimensional Integrated Sta- ment Provided Corrections Per-
ght different peace operations. bilization Mission in the Central sonnel (GPP), from 6 contributing
These men and women have the African Republic (MINUSCA) Member States, were deployed to
opportunity of a lifetime - to con- Addressing the challenges posed support with the identification and
tribute to public safety as well as by high-risk prisoners in a vast- management of security incidents
the protection of the rights and ly underfunded and significantly in both Ngaragba Prison and its
dignity of prisoners, who become overcrowded prison system is one annex facility in Camp de Roux.
a particularly vulnerable group in of the most important responsibi- For corrections officers in MINU-
conflict- and post-conflict contexts. lities of corrections officers in the SCA, the line between operational

60

engagement and mere advising, corrections component of UNMISS degree of specialised training, con-

mentoring, and training quickly be- quickly stepped up to operationa- flicts in the holding facilities were

come blurred as they were reque- lise these facilities while ensuring either addressed prior to escala-

sted to perform “Enhanced Men- they were managed in accordan- ting or, should security inciden-

toring and Training” with national ce with international human rights ts happen, these were managed

uniformed personnel, and main- standards. This new role pushed appropriately with minimal force

tain “good order” and “control” in then deployed UN corrections of- required and with a due respect

these facilities. Equipped with ba- ficers from co-locating with the na- to detainees’ rights and dignity.

sic protective and security tools, the

68 GPP, worked - and continue to

work - in partnership with national

uniformed personnel - to thwart

mass escapes, riots, assaults and

planned hostage takings, while

enhancing the capacity of national

prison personnel to assume these

functions without infringing upon

the rights and dignity of prisoners.

The case of the United Nations

Mission in South Sudan (UN-

MISS)

In May 2014, the United Nations

Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS)

experienced a significant shift in

priorities following a security crisis tional prison officers as mentors

that drove hundreds of thousands and advisors on a significant range The role of corrections in re-e-

of citizens into internally displa- of important prison administrative stablishing the rule of law

ced people (IDP) camps adjacent and managerial issues, including The two examples above demon-
to the UN bases PRISON SYSTEMS ARE FOUND AT THE BOT- strate just some of
in various par- the challenging re-
ts of the coun- TOM OF MOST MEMBER STATES’ LIST OF PRI- alities GPP typically

try. As a result ORITIES AND OFTEN LACK POLITICAL WILL face when deployed
of large clusters in peace operations.
of IDP located in AND RESOURCES NEEDED TO MEET EVEN While each confli-

relatively small THE MOST BASIC NUTRITIONAL AND HEALTH ct- and post-conflict
areas, the is- environment in whi-
sue of security NEEDS OF PRISONERS ch peace operations

and criminality in the camps be- prisoner rehabilitation, vocational are active, is uniquely different,

came of concern. The Mission re- and agricultural programmes, to the similarities are overwhelming.

sponded by establishing “holding being directly responsible for the In most cases, prison systems are

facilities” to safely, securely and full “care and custody” of detaine- found at the bottom of most Mem-

humanely hold those posing a se- es who were oftentimes inebriated, ber States’ list of priorities and

curity threat inside the IDP camp, verbally aggressive, and physically often lack political will and re-

until they could either be handed violent at time of admission. The sources needed to meet even the

over to national authorities or be early days of the holding facilities most basic nutritional and health

released back into the camps. witnessed multiple escapes, assau- needs of prisoners. Unfortunately,

Despite the lack of budget, the need lts on staff and general disorder. a high prevalence of disease in

to use converted sea containers as Yet, as UNMISS was able to sup- many prisons has the potential to

cells and a significantly weak sin- port corrections officers with ap- spill over into neighbouring com-

gle perimeter chain link fence, the propriate policy and a significant munities, resulting in bigger out-

61

INTERNATIONAL CRIMES: ROLE OF POS IN
ASSURING JUSTICE

breaks and subsequent major so- detention facilities. Wherever cri- Such preparation involves not only
cioeconomic costs. The systemic minal justice institutions are in- providing GPP with the right know-
under-prioritisation of prison servi- strumentalised against political ledge and skills, but also with a
ces also results in poor manage- opposition and civil society to de- specific mindset suitable for this
ment, ill-treatment, high rates of tain individuals in life-threatening kind of job - whereby mindset is
violence and mortality, corruption, detention facilities, this can ser- understood as a mental state that
security breaches, mass escapes, ve as a catalyst for further unrest entails beliefs, values and disposi-
instability, criminal contamina- and politically motivated violence. tions to act in effective ways in the
tion and in some cases, radicali- given operational environment to
sation to violence. In conflict and The importance of preparation achieve mandated tasks1. Equip-
post-conflict settings, this can fur. Corrections officers in peace ope- ping GPP with a proper mindset is
ther fuel and exacerbate already rations contribute to the mainte- possibly the most challenging task
ongoing conflicts and instability. nance of sustainable peace and of those organisations mandated
Properly funded and managed pri- security through building the capa- to deliver pre-deployment training.
son systems thus remain a critical city of national prison staff to de- According to 1994 UN Gene-
ral Assembly Resolution 49/37
element of sustaining security and velop and manage a viable, safe, {A/RES/49/37), the provision of
the rule of law in peace operations. secure and humane prison system. pre-deployment training is a na-
The ability to securely detain perpe- This is achieved by strengthening: tional responsibility. Beyond this,
trators of conflict-related and other strategic leadership; oversight and the Justice and Corrections Ser-
serious crimes is not only crucial to accountability; recruitment and vice of DPO, in partnership with
the protection of civilians, which a training; prison security and the the United Nations Institute for
key part of the mission mandate, management of high-risk prisoners Training and Research (UNITAR)
but also - in cooperation with other (violent extremists and perpetrators and the Swedish Prison and Pro-
mission components - fundamen- of conflict-related crimes); prison bation Service (SPPS) provide
tally supports the initiatives under- infrastructure; and basic prison pre-deployment training to better
taken by national authorities to im- conditions (subsistence of life and prepare GPP with the knowled-
prove the overall security, rule of protection of basic human rights). ge and skills, attitudes and beha-
law and public order in a country. Corrections support in the environ- viours required to adequately
Efforts to degrade armed groups, ments described above requires contribute to mandate delivery.
deter spoilers and hold state secu- significant patience, persistence, Pre-deployment training is offered
rity forces accountable for serious and creativity, which renders com- to all GPP in either French or Engli-
crimes are immediately undermi- prehensive and efficient pre-de- sh and focuses on critical aspects
ned without properly functioning ployment preparation essential. of their potential engagement with
their national counterparts. The
pre-deployment training consists of:

- Integrated Training Ser-
vice (ITS) endorsed Core Pre-de-
ployment Training Materials that
serve as the foundation to orient
participants to the values and
priorities of the United Nations.

- International human ri-
ghts standards, namely the United
Nations Standard Minimum Ru-
les for the Treatment of Prisoners
(Mandela Rules) and The United
Nations Rules for the Treatment of
Women Prisoners and Non-custo-
dial Measures for Women Offen-

62

ders (Bangkok Rules). These stan- portantly, these spaces are shared Michael Langelaar
dards establish the human rights with their national counterparts.
framework for all prison admini- In doing this, corrections person- Corrections Policy Officer with the
strative and managerial functions nel directly contribute to the (re) Justice and Corrections Service
for various prisoner populations, establishment of the rule of law in UN DPO
including: prison leadership; re- countries torn by decades of con-
cruitment and training; security flicts and violence. Strong and su- Claudia Croci
and discipline; conditions of deten- stainable justice, corrections and
tion; health and hygiene; prisoner other law enforcement institutions Senior Specialist-Division for Peace
admission, classification, regimes; are indispensable for the effective UNITAR
vocational training and pro- protection of civilians and state-bu-
grammes, and a variety of other ilding as well as for the success of
aspects of prison management. broader stabilisation efforts. Law
Advising and mentoring, the and order cannot be established,
key modality of working with and the safety and security of citi-
national counterparts and zens cannot be preserved, without
likely the most challenging law enforcement agencies opera-
aspect of working in the field. ting in conjunction with functioning
Other specialised training modu- justice and corrections systems.
les, for example those addressing Taken all together, these aspects
the evolving expectations placed dictate the need for more politi-
on GPP as described in both the cal attention and resources being
cases of CAR and South Sudan dedicated to prison systems and
above. These modules can inclu- prison reforms in challenging
de basic security techniques (han- conflict-affected environments as
dcuffing, searching, escorting) as well as to the related prepara-
well as more advanced skills, in- tion and capacity-building efforts.
cluding contingency planning, use
of force management models, and PICTURES:
emergency intervention (shield JCS/DPO
and baton, cell extraction, arrest
and control, self-defence) for hi- 1. Improving the Security of UN Peaceke-
gher-risk prisoner populations.
epers, 2017. Available at: https://
Conclusions peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/
United Nations corrections per- improving_security_of_united_nations_
sonnel are a small yet extremely peacekeepers_report.pdf
proud uniformed group, placed in
challenging environments, with litt-
le recognition and resources. Whi-
le guided by their mandate and
workplan, corrections personnel
are trained to create spaces that
would be conducive to positively
influencing ways of thinking and
working, providing adequate pro-
tection to prisoners, prison staff,
and the public and at the same time
aligning it with applicable interna-
tional human rights standards. Im-

63

CONSTRAINTS AND RESTRAINTS AS LIMITATION OF FREEDOM OF
ACTION IN PERFORMING A MISSION

THE “CORE” INTERNATIONAL CRIMES

The “Core” International Crimes: The concept of “international cri- as terrorism and piracy (to just
a brief introduction to Internatio- mes” is not defined by a universal- name a few) which are still object
nal Criminal Law ly accepted formulation, howe- of controversy among the members
ver they are usually referred to as of the international community.
by Marco Sutto “breaches of international rules en- Criminal accountability for tho-
tailing the personal criminal liabili- se “core crimes” is considered
International criminal law (ICL) is ty of the individuals concerned (as by the international community
opposed to the responsibility of the of fundamental importance with
a quite new and constantly deve- State of which the individuals may regard to respect for the rule of
loping branch of public internatio- act as organs)”1, “crimes that invol- law, deterrence of future viola-
nal law, which deals with the cri- ve direct individual criminal respon- tions, and the provision of re-
minal responsibility of individuals sibility under international law”2 or dress and justice for victims.
for the most serious violations of even “punishable acts or conduct These criminal conducts are con-
international human rights and proscribed by international law”3. sidered to affect the international
humanitarian laws. ICL, identi- ICL outlines four main categories community as a whole and, con-
fying a certain number of “inter- of international crimes: genocide, sequently, all states have an inte-
national crimes”, wants to expose crimes against humanity, war cri- rest to prevent the occurrence of
perpetrators of such serious viola- mes and the crime of aggression. these particularly heinous crimes
tions to personal criminal liabili- These are defined as ‘core’ inter- and in holding the perpetrators
ty and provides for criminal san- national crimes to distinguish them accountable. Indeed, perpetra-
ctions that apply to all offenders. from other categories crimes such tors of international crimes may

64

be convicted on the basis of their Imposing measures intended to tribunals for the former Yugosla-

own direct acts or omissions, or prevent births within the group; (e) via11 , Rwanda12 and, lastly, the ICC.

when ordering and facilitating a Forcibly transferring children of the The spirit of the crime of genocide

crime. This includes those who di- group to another group, commit- lies in the attack on specific pro-

rectly commit the crimes as well as ted with “the intention to destroy, tected groups of victims. It can only

those who, at the highest political in whole or in part, a national, eth- be committed against national,

and military levels, are involved in nical, racial or religious group”5. ethnic, racial or religious groups13.

the planning and authorization of Genocide is essentially conside- Other groups, such as political or

such acts. Thus, the individual cri- red an attack upon human diver- cultural groups, are not recogni-

minal responsibility for internatio- sity6. The term was crafted with zed as protected groups per se14.

nal crimes can be held in parallel the Holocaust in mind, it is com- Genocide does not require the

with the responsibility of the state. posed of the Greek word ‘geno’ actual destruction of a protected

The international crimes have been (tribe or race) and the Latin verb group. However, according to the

defined over time in a range of in- ‘caedere’ (to kill)7. The essence of Convention, the enumerated acts

ternational conventions and agre- genocide is the destruction of the must be committed with the ‘intent’

ements, beginning with the first cohesion and moral dignity of a of the perpetrator to destroy the

Hague Convention, at the end of group as collective entity, as an group in whole or in part’ (‘speci-

the 19th century, which established element of international society.8 fic intent’). Moreover, Genocide is

rules for military conduct during In the Nuremberg judgment, the the only crime in which incitement

wartime, up to the Rome Statute4 Holocaust was punished under the is expressly prohibited15. The prohi-

that, in 1998, “INTERNATIONAL CRIMES ” ARE USUALLY RE- bition takes into
established the FERRED TO AS “BREACHES OF INTERNATIONAL account that geno-
International cide is often spre-

Criminal Court RULES ENTAILING THE PERSONAL CRIMINAL ad through mass
(ICC) with ju- LIABILITY OF THE INDIVIDUALS CONCERNED” mobilization. While
risdiction over drafting the Geno-
, “CRIMES THAT INVOLVE DIRECT INDIVIDUAL
the four “core CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY UNDER INTERNA- cide Convention,
crimes” (ge- the delegates of the
nocide, crimes State parties deci-
TIONAL LAW” OR EVEN “PUNISHABLE ACTS ded to criminalize
against huma- public and direct
nity, war crimes OR CONDUCT PROSCRIBED BY INTERNATIO- incitement to ge-
and the crime
of aggression.) NAL LAW” nocide in order to

It is on the base of counter emerging

the Rome Statute provisions, which notion of ‘crimes against humani- patterns of genocide and take into

represent the most comprehensive ty’, which includes persecution and account the specific risks of incite-

modern codification of internatio- extermination. Only one year after ment of an indeterminate group of

nal crimes, that the following para- the Nuremberg judgment, in 1946, persons (e.g. through speeches,

graphs will synthetically explore the the UN General Assembly adopted radio, press or other media)16.

features of the four “core crimes”. a resolution in which it ‘affirmed’ As cultural factors, such as so-

Genocide that genocide is a crime under in- cial, historical and linguistic featu-

Genocide is defined by the Rome ternational law9. The UN Conven- res, are often necessary to explain

Statute as one of the following tion on the Prevention and Puni- whether a group qualifies as a ra-

acts : (a) Killing members of the shment of the Crime of Genocide cial, ethnic, religious or national

group; (b) Causing serious bodily eventually defined the crime as an group, the definition of the extent

or mental harm to members of the independent conduct in 194810. to which cultural destruction may

group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on The definition of the Convention amount to genocide has genera-

the group conditions of life calcu- was then reproduced in the Statu- ted a long debate17. As a matter

lated to bring about its physical tes of international criminal courts of facts, the cultural dimension

destruction in whole or in part; (d) and tribunals, such as the “ad hoc” play an important role in the de-

65

CONSTRAINTS AND RESTRAINTS AS LIMITATION OF FREEDOM OF
ACTION IN PERFORMING A MISSION

termination of genocide and, te- committed as part of a widespre- own citizens was strictly considered
chnically, the actus reus of ge- ad or systematic attack directed a matter of internal affairs. Ne-
nocide is not confined to killing. against any civilian population. vertheless, in the first codification,
Physical and biological destruction It appears clear that the concept the crimes against humanity could
are then often complemen- of crimes against humanity re- not be charged independently of
ted by the elimination of cultu- tains some features of genocide, a nexus to other crimes, they had
ral features, property or symbols. such as the idea of extermination. to be linked to war crimes or cri-

Crimes against humanity However, crimes against humani- mes against peace (aggression).

ty differ from genocide, as while As seen in Statutes of major inter-
Crimes against humanity are iden- the latter focuses on the collective national criminal courts and, lastly,
tified by the art.7 of the Rome nature of the victims as a group, in the Rome Statute, the concept
Statute, which contains their most identified by nationality, ethnicity, of crimes against humanity was
comprehensive modern treaty co- race or religion, they are inclined then unbound from its war-related
dification18, as the following acts: to penalize the collective natu- nexus and was developed more
(a) Murder; (b) Extermination; (c) re of the perpetration of crimes19. in line with the human rights tra-
Enslavement; (d) Deportation or Crimes against humanity are at- dition. Indeed, Crimes against hu-
forcible transfer of population; tacks on civilian populations that manity can now be committed in
(e) Imprisonment or other seve- are at risk because of their pre- both the context of armed conflict
re deprivation of physi-
cal liberty in violation of CRIMINAL ACCOUNTABILITY FOR THOSE and in pea-
cetime. The
fundamental rules of in- “CORE CRIMES” IS CONSIDERED BY THE IN- r e f e r e n c e
ternational law; (f) Tor- to the con-
ture; (g) Rape, sexual TERNATIONAL COMMUNITY OF FUNDAMEN- cept of ‘ci-

slavery, enforced prosti- TAL IMPORTANCE WITH REGARD TO RESPECT vilians’ in
tution, forced pregnancy, the defini-
enforced sterilization, or FOR THE RULE OF LAW, DETERRENCE OF FU- tion of the

any other form of sexual TURE VIOLATIONS, AND THE PROVISION OF crime is the
violence of comparable only remi-
gravity; (h) Persecution REDRESS AND JUSTICE FOR VICTIMS. niscence of

against any identifiable group or sence in the targeted population. the historical linkage to war crimes.
collectivity on political, racial, na- The basic idea is that, where exists Crimes against humanity could be
tional, ethnic, cultural, religious, a collective action of an organiza- differentiated in two categories of
gender as defined in paragraph tion that causes harm to the civilian offences. The first one encompasses
3, or other grounds that are uni- population throughout a widespre- the so-called murder-type offen-
versally recognized as impermis- ad or systematic violence, a crime ces. They include murder, extermi-
sible under international law, in is no longer simply an ordinary cri- nation, enslavement, deportation
connection with any act referred me under domestic law but an in- or forcible transfer of population,
to in this paragraph or any cri- ternational crime. Therefore, the torture, acts of sexual violence or
me within the jurisdiction of the peculiar element that distinguishes enforced disappearance of per-
Court; (i) Enforced disappearance crimes against humanity from do- sons. Some but not all of them are
of persons; (j) The crime of apar- mestic crimes is the context in whi- criminal offences in national legal
theid; (k) Other inhumane acts of ch they are committed, as part of systems. They were banned inter-
a similar character intentionally a widespread or systematic attack nationally because of their cruelty
causing great suffering, or serious against the civilian population. and barbarity. The second type of
injury to body or to mental or phy- Marking a significant development offences is ‘persecution’-related.
sical health. Paragraph 1 of art.7 in international law, crimes against They are typically geared at per-
requires that the mentioned acts, humanity were codified, for the first secution of a specific group of pe-
part of which are also recognized time, in the Charter of the Nurem- ople on racial, religious or political
as common crimes by many na- berg Tribunal. Indeed, until then, grounds20 and often may not be
tional legal frameworks, must be the conduct of a state towards its considered criminal or even prohi-

66

bited in national legal systems. public international law. IHL regu- ration of the condition of woun-
The notion of attack against ci- lates the conduct of parties enga- ded combatants. The body of IHL
vilian population of the crimes ged in an armed conflict and seeks rules was then complemented by
against humanity is understood to minimize suffering and harm. It the ‘Hague law’26, on the rights
in an extensive way, including the is based on a balance between mi- and obligations of belligerents in
use of armed force and any form litary necessities and humanitarian the conduct of military, and the
of mistreatment or discriminatory considerations. Indeed, in armed ‘Geneva law’27 designed to pro-
practices. An attack is considered conflict, certain acts of violence, tect victims of armed conflict and
‘widespread’ if it is conducted on such as attacking enemy’s military specific categories of persons,
a large scale and, even if there is objectives, are allowed (lawful) such as prisoners of war, detai-
no specific numerical threshold, and others prohibited (unlawful). nees, civilians and humanitarian
it results in a lar-
ge number of vi- International humanitarian law re- aid workers. Nowadays, nearly
ctims21 . The term gulates both lawful and unlawful every state in the world has agre-
‘systematic’ used acts of violence reconciling the two ed to be bound by IHL provisions
to define the at- different perspectives: on one side, and the core of them is conside-
tacks refers to their the humanitarian commitment ‘to red as customary international law.
organized natu- prevent or mitigate suffering’, on However, only specific and serious
re, such as the re- the other, the pragmatic warfare violations of international humani-
petition of similar necessity of overcoming the enemy. tarian law are criminalized as “war
criminal conduct Historically, a turning point in the crimes”. The initial IHL provisions
on a regular ba- codification of international huma- failed to specify whether a viola-
sis.22 In absence nitarian law has been identified in tion entailed criminal responsibility
of the repetitive the battle of Solferino24 and the and the “War crimes law” was de-
element, the sy- subsequent issue of the first Ge- veloped incrementally and throu-
stematic nature of neva Convention25 for the amelio- gh practice in the twentieth century.
the attacks could Even the Geneva Conventions and
be also substantia-
ted by the existen-
ce of a plan con-
cerning attacks or
other factors such
as, for instance,
the existence of a
particular policy or
ideology to destroy or weaken a
community, discriminatory me-
asures, measures changing the
demography of the population,
or the involvement of high-level
political and/or military leaders
in the establishment of the plan23.

War crimes
War crimes are the oldest cate-
gory of international crimes. They
are grounded in international hu-
manitarian law (IHL), traditionally
known as jus in bello (the law of
war), an independent branch of

67

CONSTRAINTS AND RESTRAINTS AS LIMITATION OF FREEDOM OF
ACTION IN PERFORMING A MISSION

its Protocols, by qualifying the conflict to distinguish, at all times, are entitled to civilian protection32.
so-called grave breaches as ‘war between civilians and combatants A third fundamental principle un-
crimes’ , created a certain initial and direct the attacks only against der international humanitarian law
confusion from a conceptual point combatants and military objects. is the principle of proportionality.
of view, since the idea of “gra- They must not be directed against It prohibits an attack on a military
ve breaches” implies a hierarchy,
whereby certain violations are con- civilians or civilian objects, such objective if such an attack may be
sidered grave enough to qualify as as churches, hospitals or private expected to cause excessive colla-
crimes, whilst others do not. One of residences that are not used for teral damage (such as loss of civi-
the key prerequisites of a war cri- military purposes. The ICC Statute lian life, injury to civilians and da-
me is that the crime is connected to also expressly prohibits attacks on mage to civilian objects) in relation
the armed conflict. This is a neces- humanitarian assistance and pea- to the concrete and direct military
sary requirement to distinguish war cekeeping missions, as long as they advantage anticipated. Lastly, the
crimes from ordinary offences28.
Upon war crimes is established a
universal jurisdiction29, which entit-
les a State to prosecute offenders
even in the absence of any link
between the crime committed and
the prosecuting state. In order to
make this principle effective, States
are required to establish universal
jurisdiction for war crimes in their
national legislation. The basis for
the assertion of universal jurisdi-
ction over war crimes is found in
both treaty law and in customary
international law.30 The ICC Statute
consider the war crimes in art. 8,
providing a comprehensive list of
them and containing an additional
element that specifies the ICC has
jurisdiction ‘in particular’ when
war crimes are ‘committed as part
of a plan or policy or as part of a
large-scale commission of crimes’.
The large majority of war crimes
can be traced back to the violation
of certain fundamental principles
of international humanitarian law
grounded in the protection of per-
sons and property31. A first funda-
mental principle is the principle of
protection of non-combatants that
requires parties to an armed con-
flict to treat civilians, prisoners of
war and wounded or sick former
combatants humanely. A second
key principle is the principle of di-
stinction. It requires parties to a

68

fourth fundamental principle is the a relatively high mens rea standard it is essentially connected to armed
prohibition on employing wea- stating that, unless otherwise pro- violence. Still, aggression does not
pons, ammunition, materials and vided, intent in relation to conse- involves a breach of the jus in bel-
methods of warfare of a nature to quence exists only if the person lo, but a criminalization of certain
cause superfluous injury and un- ‘means to cause that consequen- forms of recourse to force (jus ad
bellum). Aggression is usually defi-
necessary suffering to members of ce or is aware that it will occur in ned as the most serious and dan-
the armed forces and civilians who the ordinary course of events’ .33 gerous form of illegal use of force
directly participate in hostilities. Crime of aggression. by a state against the sovereign-
To be held accountable of war cri- Aggression is one of the most con- ty, territorial integrity or political
mes, the required mental elements troversial crimes in international independence of another state35.
may differ in terms of their thre- criminal law34. Likewise war crimes, The crime of aggression highli-
sholds. On this matter, the ICC sets ghts the trend towards a jus con-
tra bellum in the international legal
order, characterized by the restri-
ction of the use of armed force
in international relations. Despi-
te that, the crime has a troubled
past and in most historical cases, it
has been prosecuted after the fact.
In the first version of ICC Statute the
crime of aggression was just sym-
bolically included in Article 5, but
its exercise of jurisdiction remai-
ned pending on the formulation
of a proper definition. Only after
years of debates and negotiations,
at the Kampala Review Conference
(2010), the participant States rea-
ched agreement on a definition of
the crime and the conditions under
which the Court can exercise juri-
sdiction. The new definition iden-
tifies as “crime of aggression” the
planning, preparation, initiation or
execution, by a person in a posi-
tion effectively to exercise control
over or to direct the political or mi-
litary action of a State, of an act of
aggression which, by its character,
gravity and scale, constitutes a
manifest violation of the Charter of
the United Nations36. The Kampa-
la definition describes aggression
as a leadership crime and extends
individual criminal responsibili-
ty from the traditional concept of
‘war of aggression’ to ‘acts of ag-
gression’ according with General
Assembly Resolution 3314 defini-

69

CONSTRAINTS AND RESTRAINTS AS LIMITATION OF FREEDOM OF
ACTION IN PERFORMING A MISSION

th and early nineteenth centuries
and the creation of a permanent
Court, the ICC, able to exercise
an international jurisdiction over
the four “core crimes”, represen-
ts, despite its legal and practical
limitations, an achievement of
paramount importance in the ad-
vancement of human rights pro-
tection. The modern interpretation
of international criminal law has
proved able to develop in a dyna-
mic way, covering both the ‘public’
and ‘private’ sides of violence thus
protecting different interests: state
interests, the autonomy and digni-
ty of individuals and group rights.

tions37. The idea of individual crimi- of force entails individual crimi- PICTURES:
nal responsibility is closely linked nal responsibility for aggression. -UN
to unlawful state action in interna- For the crime of aggression, com- -https://www.flickr.com/
tional relations. Therefore, an in- pared to the other crimes, the ICC
dividual cannot incur responsibility has limited jurisdiction in state 1. Cassese, International Criminal Law,
in the absence of an act of ag- referral or proprio motu proce- Oxford University Press: Oxford 2003.
gression under international law.38 edings40. Indeed, the Court can- 2. G. Werle, Principles of International
In practice, types of aggression not exercise jurisdiction over per- Criminal Law, T.M.C. Asser Press: The
may vary from mere violations sons of states which are not party 3. Terje Einarsen , The Concept of Univer-
of sovereignty (e.g. targeted air to the Rome Statute or have not sal Crimes in International Law: Torkel
strikes) to interventions with on-site accepted the aggression amend- Opsahl Academic EPublisher Oslo2012
presence or other unlawful uses of ment41. In these circumstances, Hague 2005.
force. These acts may involve high exercise of jurisdiction over ag- 4. Even ICC-International Criminal Court
civilian casualties or loss of life and gression is tied to the prospect of Statute.
disturb peace and security. In other a Security Council referral42. Mo- 65.. Rome Statute, Article 6
cases, they may cause limited hu- reover, another peculiar feature Stahn, C. (2018). A Critical Introduction
man damage, or even be exerci- of the this crime under the Rome to International Criminal Law. Cambrid-
sed with the intent to protect pea- Statute entails that State parties do ge: Cambridge University 2018
ce and security or human rights.39 not enjoy protection by the ICC 7. first officially used in 1944 by Poli-
However, several are the factors against crimes of aggression com- sh-Jewish lawyer R. Lemkin in his “Axis
that limit the definition of a con- mitted by non-state parties against Rule in Occupied Europe” (Washington,
duct as “act of aggression”. As them (i.e. on their territory), al- DC: Carnegie Endowment for Internatio-
stated in art.8 bis of the ICC Sta- though they enjoy such protection nal Peace, 1944).
tute, the crime of aggression requi- for other categories of crimes43. 98.. Ibid, 1.3.1.1 Origin of genocide
res an act which ‘by its character, In conclusion, as highlighted with See GA Res. 96 (I), UN Doc. GA/
gravity and scale’ constitutes ‘a this brief analysis of the “core cri- Res/96(I), 11 December 1946.
manifest violation of the Char- mes”, it appears clear that the 10. Art. 2 Convention on the Prevention and
ter’. These factors distinguish the approaches towards internatio- Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
crime of aggression from gene- nal crimes are quite new and still 9 December 1948, 78 UNTS 1021
ral violations of the prohibition in progress. International criminal “In the present Convention, genoci-
of the use of force, resulting in law has evolved significantly since de means any of the following acts
the fact that not every illegal use its first steps in the late eighteen- committed with intent to destroy, in
whole or in part, a national, ethni-
cal, racial or religious group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or men-
tal harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the
group conditions of life calcu-

70

lated to bring about its physical The Travaux Préparatoires (Leiden: Brill which constitute war crimes.”Stahn, C.
destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended 18. Nijhoff 2008), 2039. -1.3.3.6 Types of War Crimes - A Critical
Stahn, C. (2018). 1.3.2.1 Origin- Crimes Introduction to International Criminal
to prevent births within the group; against Humanity. Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the 19. Stahn, C. (2018). Citing
group to another group.” J. D. Ohlin, 31. 2018.
Art. 4, Updated Statute of ‘Organizational Criminality’, in E. van Stahn, C. -1.3.3.6 Types of War Crimes
11. the Interna- Sliedregt and S. Vasiliev, Pluralism in - A Critical Introduction to International
tional Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, S/Res/827 (1993) of 25 May International Criminal Law (Oxford: Criminal Law. Cambridge: Cambridge
Oxford University Press, 2014), 118. University 2018.
12. 1993. Statute of the International Tribu- 20. See generally F. Pocar, ‘Persecution as a 32. Arts. 8 (2) (b) (iii) and 8 (2) (e) (iii), ICC
Art. 2, Crime under International Criminal Law’ Statute.
nal for Rwanda, S/Res/955 (1994) of 8 3343.. See Art. 30. ICC
November 1994. (2008) 2 Journal of National Security Stahn, C. -1.3.4 Statute.
On difficulties of the Law & Policy 355. The Crime of Aggres-
13. concept of race, 21. Idib. Citing ITY-Prosecutor v. Blaškić, IT- sion.
see C. Lingaas, ‘Elephant in the Room: 35. See GA
The Uneasy Task of Defining “Racial” in 95–14, Judgment, 3 March 2000, para. Resolution 3314 of 14 December
206 (Blaškić Trial Judgment). 1974.
International Criminal Law’ (2015) 15 22. Idib. Citing ITY Kunarac Appeal Judg- 3376.. Article 8 bis3.
International Criminal Law Review 485. The UN General
14. Stahn, C. (2018). A Critical Introduction 23. ment, para. 94-95. Judgment, para. Assembly adopted
Idib. Citing Blaškić Trial Resolution 3314 in 1974, in order to
to International Criminal Law- Nature 203. guide the practice of the Security Council
of the crime of genocide. Cambridge: 24. The Battle
Cambridge University of Solferino (referred to in in relation to findings on aggression. The
Art.3 Convention on the Prevention Italy as the Battle of Solferino and San Resolution remained minimal in relation
15. and Martino) on 24 June 1859 resulted in the to individual criminal responsibility,
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
9 December 1948 : The following acts victory of the allied French Army under however. It simply reconfirms the Nurem-
Napoleon III and Sardinian Army under berg holding that a ‘war of aggression’
shall be punishable: (a) Genocide; (b) Victor Emmanuel II (together known as constitutes a crime of aggression (Art. 6
Conspiracy to commit genocide; (c)
Direct and public incitement to commit the Franco-Sardinian Alliance) against 38. of GA Res. 3314 ).
the Austrian Army under Emperor Franz Stahn, C. citing Jens David Ohlin ‘Orga-
genocide; (d) Attempt to commit genoci- Joseph I. nizational Criminality’, 107, 118.
de; (e) Complicity in genocide. 25. The First Geneva 39. Stahn, C. 1.3.4.3.1 State Act of Aggres-
16. The Russian Delegate stated: ‘It was Convention for the sion.
Amelioration of the Condition of the See artt. 13 and 15bis ICC Statute.
impossible that hundreds of thousands Wounded in Armies in the Field, 22 4401.. Which still represent the majority of
of people should commit so many crimes
unless they had been incited to do so … 26. August 1864. the
1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions on International community. Currently only
The peoples of the world would indeed means and methods of combat. 39 state parties ratified the amendment
be puzzled if … those who incited others 2287.. The four Geneva Conventions of 1949.
to commit the concrete acts of genocide, For instance, there is no reason why (https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDe-
tails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XVII-
were to remain unpunished.’ Summary crimes committed by certain civilians not I-10-b&chapter=18&clang=_en).
Records of the meetings of the Sixth 4432.. See art. 15 ter ICC Statute.
Committee of the General Assembly, 21 taking part in hostilities against other Art. 8 bis and 12 ICC Statute.
civilians should automatically qualify as
SeptemberĐ10 December 1948, Official war crimes.
Records of the General Assembly, state- 29. Universal jurisdiction refers
ments by Mr Morozov, 241. to the
See generally, E. Novic, The assertion of jurisdiction over offences
17. Concept regardless of the place where they were
of Cultural Genocide (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2016); L. Bilsky and committed and the nationality of the
perpetrator or the victim.
R. Klagsbrun, ‘The Return of Cultural 30. ICRC-ADVISORY SERVICE ON INTERNA-
Genocide?’(2018) 29 EJIL 373–396.
Russia made a proposal to cover it in TIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW-Universal
jurisdiction over war crimes –(03/2014):
the Genocide Convention as follows: ‘In “The treaty basis for the assertion of
this Convention genocide also means
any deliberate act committed with the universal jurisdiction was first introduced
by the four Geneva Conventions of 1949
intent to destroy the language, reli- for the protection of war victims in rela-
gion or culture of a national, racial or
religious group on grounds of national tion to those violations of the Conven-
tions defined as grave breaches. Under
or religious origin, or religious beliefs the relevant article of each Convention
such as: (a) Prohibiting the use of the
language of the group in daily inter- (Arts 49, 50, 129 and 146, respectively),
States are required to search for alleged
course or in schools or the printing offenders “regardless of their natio-
and circulation of publications in the
language of the group; (b) destroying or nality,” and either bring them before
their own courts or hand them over for
preventing the use of libraries, museums, trial by another State Party which has
schools, historical monuments, places
of worship or other cultural institutions made out a prima facie case. …..While
the relevant treaty law provisions are
and objects of the group.’ See General restricted to grave breaches, universal
Assembly, Agenda Item 32, UN Doc Marco Sutto
A/766, 5 December 1948, in H. Abtahi jurisdiction in customary international
law may be regarded as extending to all Lt.Col. - Italian Carabinieri
and P. Webb, The Genocide Convention: violations of the laws and customs of war CoESPU IHR/IHRLChair

71

ALUMNI



ALUMNI

74

DEPUTY DIRECTOR’S CORNER

FOR SUCH A LARGE PLACE, THE WORLD IS VERY SMALL!

Just over a year ago I had the great fortune to join the team at the Center of Excellence for Stabi-

lity Police Units (CoESPU). Within a few short months of my arrival, I was highly impressed by the
number of my personal friends that were already CoESPU Alumni members or current followers of
CoESPU activities. Also, as I visited our courses in session, I met attendees that served on the same
missions, attended the same conferences, or completed the same schooling as me. Though our
paths did not cross until we met on the CoESPU campus, we share specific experiences and I have
really enjoyed ‘catching up’ and collaborating with old friends and new. It is interesting to see the
broad reach we gain being a member and Alumni of CoESPU. It truly opened my eyes to just how
small the world is, and specifically the Stability Police Community.
So, it should not have come as such a big surprise (but it did) to me when we were contacted by
Captain Vito Franchini, the former CoESPU Chief of Public Affairs and Managing Editor of the
CoESPU Magazine, letting us know he had met some Alumni members. Many of you remember
Vito from behind the one of the cameras at CoESPU. Vito is serving on a mission abroad and took
some time to get to know a CoESPU Alumni member, Lieutenant Victor Kashai. Initially, Captain
Franchini did not personally know Lieutenant Kashai, but now, they collaborate and have establi-
shed an important connection to support the global Stability Police mission stimulated from their
connection at CoESPU.
I do not want to share too much about this important opportunity for collaboration, because Cap-
tain Franchini tells the story much better. Please continue reading this quarters Alumni section to
see how small our Stability Policing Community really is - and the positive impacts, as well as per-
sonal professional development, we can achieve with as we build our professional networks.
You never know when a friendship grown at CoESPU will bloom again
or when a new friendship will bud, from a classical exchanges of bu-
siness cards to the use of many social network platforms. I make it a
habit to avoid saying goodbye, since more often than not our paths
will cross again; it doesn’t matter the distance between missions, or the
time between when we serve, and it doesn’t matter that we work on dif-
ferent continents on opposite side of the globe, with our connections,
networks and friendships the world is small – and that is good!
No matter where you are serving, at home or on an overseas mission,
please continue to share these unique stories as our paths continue to
cross in the Stability Policing World.

Rebecca D. Hazelett

Col. - US Army MP
CoESPU Deputy Director

75

ALUMNI

A CHAT WITH LT. VICTOR KASHAI
(TANZANIA POLICE)

A chat with Lt. Victor Kashai (Tan- list of Tanzanian CoESPU Alumni. members of his unit (and his boss),
zania Police), FPU Coordinators That is how I got the email address visited several offices, then he of-
Course 04 at CoESPU in 2018. of Lieutenant Victor Kashai, who fered me a “Chai” (local tea) and
attended the FPU Coordinators he drove me back after a couple of
By Vito Franchini Course 04 at CoESPU in 2018. hours of interesting conversation.
Once you are part of the CoESPU I asked him some questions about
A few months ago, I was asked Community, even for few days like his deployment missions and
he did some years ago, you can’t about the impact his CoSEPU trai-
to depart CoESPU to be appoin- simply forget it. So even though ning made on his experiences. He
ted as the Regional Coordinator we did not meet during his time was happy to answer as follows:
of EU-ACT Project in Tanzania at CoESPU, Victor was immedia-
(European Union action against tely interested in creating a new QUESTION 1
drug and crime). I knew the professional connection with me. Regarding your experience at
Country quite a bit, so I decided He came to visit me in my office, CoESPU as participant in the FPU
to accept and to move to Dar where I was happy to share with Coordinator Course 04 in 2018,
Es Salaam with no hesitations. him information on my mission. could you please tell us if the fa-
On my way to getting in touch with Afterwards, he drove me to his offi- ce-to-face exchange of experien-
the people, the culture, and the ce, a Police Department in Tabata, ce with colleagues from all other
wonderful places, all that make this a highly populated area of the Dar UN Missions was beneficial for
Country so unique among other es Salaam district, where he is ser- your job in the field?
African States, I decided to ask my ving as the Deputy Commander, The personal exchange of expe-
former colleagues in Vicenza for a running investigations on com- rience with colleagues from the
mon and High-level crimes. I met other UN Missions was very bene-

76

ficial to me in the field, because as documents for FPUs, such as, The at concrete ways to reduce fa-
FPU Coordinator I had overall ma- Policy on Formed Police Unit 2016,
nagerial responsibilities for FPUs Guidelines for FPUs on Assignment talities in field, those documen-
and the support office. I liaised with with UN Peace Operations 2006,
all partner agencies and other UN Policy on Authority, Command and ts were essential tools for day to
components in UNAMID, to mana- Control in UN Peace Keeping Ope-
ge administrative and operational rations 2008, SOP on Assessment day operations as formed police
issues related to timely deploy- of Operational Capability of FPUs
ment, rotation, reloca- unit management is concerned.
tion, and co-location. 2017, Assessment of Operational
I also planned and Capability (AOC), FPAT Contin- The model adopted by COE-
coordinated the man- gent Owned Equipment (COE),
dated activities of and the Manual on Policies and SPU facilitators for presentations,
four (4) FPUs (Burki- Procedures Concerning the Reim-
na Faso FPU, Bangla- bursement and Control of Contin- brainstorming, and group discus-
desh FPU, Pakistan gent Equipment for Troops/Police.
FPU, and Nepal FPU) Also, the course work introdu- sions of the challenges,
to ensure that were in ced me to different UN reports
accordance with FPU related to reducing fatalities and gaps and the strategies
policy, and guidelines. improving Security of United Na-
As the FPU coordinator tions peace keepers such as the to overcome identified
I also provided support Santos Cruz Report which looks
of humanitarian activi- challenges and gaps
ties, dynamic patrols,
and other pertinent helped me in the field
tasks directed by the
police Commissioner to achieve smoothly
Monitor, monitored
the level of serviceabi- coordinated Sector
lity of the Contingent
Owned Equipment south FPUs, in Nyara,
(COE), and reported,
in collaboration with to achieve UNAMID
respective FPU Com-
manders, to ensure mandated activities.
that all FPU members
are treated in accor- The interaction cre-
dance with United Nations ru-
les regulations guidelines and ated friendships and
other directives and issuance.
Therefore, the face to face exchan- relationships among
ge of experiences with colleagues
and the dedicated facilitators and participants to com-
facilities offered by COESPU, was
very beneficial to me personal- municate and sha-
ly in my career and during mis-
sions. The face to face exchange re information about
and experience sharing, during the
course, gave me increased know- challenges and stra-
ledge of the United Nations Core
tegies to overcome

those challenges.

And that experience, I

am currently using it to

prepare an FPU from

Tanzania, the first time

Tanzania is to partici-

pate in a UN mission.

The face to face

exchange of expe-

rience equipped me

with knowledge, skills,

values, strategies, integrity pro-

fessionalism, and diversity along

with confidence related with For-

med Police Unit management.

QUESTION 2
The Formed Police Units are spe-
cialized assets of high value, but
they are not always used and
considered in the proper way in
the field. Do you have any sug-
gestions on how they could be
used more efficiently?

77

ALUMNI

FPU Coordinators Course 04 at CoESPU in 2018

The Formed Police Units are Spe- pacities includes canine handling, Formed Police Units instead of mi-
cialised Assets of high value but close protection, crime analysis, litary. Therefore, they can be used
they are not always used and con- forensics, investigations public more efficiently but it depends
sidered in the proper way in the order management, special wea- on mission mandated activities.
field. No doubt, Formed Police pons and tactics (SWAT) guard unit
Units are deployed as a trained and riverine policing in accordan- QUESTION 3
and equipped cohesive and fully ce with mandated tasks. So, you The spreading CoViD19 disea-
self-sustained units. A standard can see, Formed Police Units are se is a challenge for most of the
composition and organization of specialised Assets of high value world Countries. How has this
FPUs consists of three componen- and can be used in various ways. pandemic impacted in the daily
ts: 1) command and operation; 2) I believe FPUs are used proper job of the UN Police officers de-
logistical support; and 3) executive depending on the particular mis- ployed in international missions
component, to make up a desired sion mandated activities. Take an such as UNAMID?
minimum strength of 160 officers. example in UNAMID where mili- The impact of the spread of CO-
They are deployed as specialised tary down sized troops and their VID-19 in the daily duties of the
units and their expertise and ca- roles and duties were taken by UN police officers is obvious. The

78

essential functions across mis- long term the ability of missions most of Tanzanian people are.
sions include police patrols, acti- to achieve mandated activities Karibu Sana, Captain!
vities related to protection of ci- and objectives will be impaired.
vilian, convoy escorts and other Almost all missions are all in cri- PICTURES:
forms of Support to humanita- sis management mode and are -Vito Franchini
rian assistance, force protection, adapting to radical new situations -UN Photo/Evan Schneider
protecting vital installations, and while ensuring the safety of civi- -CoESPU Magazine Team
support to host State institutions lian, police and military peace ke-
and local authorities, in some epers. Most of the countries where Victor Kashai
missions have been suspended. these missions are deployed have
Their quick impact project plans closed their borders and have im- Lt. - Tanzania Police
and funds are now reallocated to posed social distancing measures. Former CoESPU Attendee
support the efforts of local and Some countries have asked the
National institutions to contain United Nations not to rotate new Vito Franchini
the spread of COVID-19. Limi- troops into their countries especial-
ting operations to the essential ly from countries that seen as high Capt. - Italian Carabinieri
will help to prevent and contain risk. In response to the pandemic EU ACT Regional Coordinator in
the virus, but in the medium to Peace Operations are assessing Tanzania
which functions and Operational
activities are critical and need to
continue as normal and which can
be paused until the crisis is over.
The staff, that arrived in the mis-
sions before the travel was suspen-
ded, were isolated until medical
cleared. It created some incon-
venience for staff, most National
and International staff in Pea-
ce Operations either work from
home or their accommodation in
same locations. Working from
home may create some challen-
ges like poor internet connection
and electricity cuts. Some Ope-
rational duties of police and mili-
tary cannot be operated from ac-
commodations take an example
Convoys escorts, interactive ses-
sions with internal displaced per-
sonnel (IDPs) and police patrols.
As the result different missions
should anticipate the increase po-
tential criminal threats, such as
Domestic violence SGBV. Police
relationship with the communi-
ty were impacted by the enfor-
cement of COVID-19 measures.
Asate sana, Victor (thanks a lot
in Swahili), you have been very
kind, talkative and positive, like

79

IN DEPTH



IN DEPTH

EVOLUTION OF POLICE
INTERNATIONAL ENGAGEMENT

The development of Police commitment to Peace As it is common knowledge, the events following the
Operations: from the early international presence fall of the Berlin Wall, in summary, produced a si-
gnificant transformation of the global equilibrium,
to end of the 1990s. which contributed to a sudden transition towards an
increasingly multipolar and multidimensional wor-
By Luca Volpi ld, forcing mission mandates to adjust accordingly.
David M.V. Fontana Barberis As a result from the Police perspective, in the
1990s, after a relatively long period of stil-
From a broad perspective, the Police commitment to lness, as peacekeeping mandates grew in num-
ber and complexity, so did the number of UN Po-
Peace Operations is no recent invention, yet the poli- lice personnel deployed and their functions.
cing within the United Nations framework did not be- One of the first and major changes entailed the
gin with the early Peacekeeping Missions in the 1950s. inclusion of executive policing tasks in peacekee-
In fact, the first international presence of Police ping mandates. These involved complete responsi-
personnel under the UN’s aegis was in the 1960s bility in the maintenance of law and order, and the
within the United Nations Operation in the Con- performance of the whole spectrum of Police-re-
go and the first Police Component was deployed lated activities, such as powers of arrest and de-
in 1964 in the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus. tention, evidence collection and information ga-
However, from their initial appearance and until the thering, investigation of crime, border security, riot
end of Cold War, the functions of the international and crowd control, robust patrolling and so on.
Police Components – at that time known as CIVPOL – These mandates pushed UN Police “to ser-
centred on the mere monitoring of the respect of the ve as the national Police Service until dome-
ceasefire and reporting on human rights violations.

82

stic capacities [were] developed”, as stated in of tasks assigned to Police Officers deployed in the
the 2003 edition of the Handbook on United Na- field, as well as their number, has continued to grow.
tions Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations. Broadly speaking, UN Police were progressively cal-
As a result, this produced a radical transforma- led also to contribute to supporting the reform and
tion of the Peace Operations’ context, where new restructuring of a new responsive, representati-
and multiple security challenges and threats en- ve and accountable host-State Police, as well as to
sued, requiring the international Police to operate in promoting Human Rights and protecting civilians.
a whole new scenario and in highly unstable envi- As a consequence of this epochal transformation,
ronments – where, in some cases, conflicts led the the establishment of a stable, safe and secure en-
entire institutional and social structure to collapse. vironment for the local population became one of
Even if in recent times executive mandates have been the main challenges that characterized - and that
rarely authorized – as a conceivable result of political continues to characterize - the efforts of the Po-
sensitivities about host-State sovereignty and the ope- lice Components engaged in Peace Operations.
rational challenges associated with them – the variety

An overview of the evolution of Poli- This delay is not just a consequen- ferent Police culture, procedures,
ce international engagement and its ce of the – generally speaking – equipment and, of course, with
political scope less structured and projectable lo- no common policing background,
gistic chain of the typical Civilian as it normally refers to their do-
By David M.V. Fontana Barberis Police Units, but it is also due to the mestic criminal justice systems.
difficulty encountered by the Poli- Finally, the “capability gap” emer-
The detection of the “Public Se- ce Contributing Countries in fin- ged as the difference between the
curity Gap”, the advent of Sta- ding personnel who is at the same capabilities expressed by a typical
bility Policing and the ensuing time adequately trained, readily Civilian Police Component, gene-
structural and doctrinal reform of deployable and available to be rally unarmed and with no executi-
the United Nations Police diverted from domestic policing. ve powers, and those possessed by
The second gap is the “time-effi- the Military Components, basically
In this new scenario that has been ciency gap”, which is the conse- responsible for ensuring the areal
quence of the considerable amount security and which are mainly in-
outlined, a serious flaw emerged of time necessary for the typical tended to perform “combat” tasks.
in the prompt realization of a sati- Civilian Police Components before This gap also comprises the dyna-
sfactory public security framework they can reach an – albeit minimal mics that may have affected the host
in the various theatres of opera- – operational capability, if compa- nation’s Police in a post-conflict en-
tions, this attributable to the gap red to the military forces deployed. vironment, such as the conceivable
existing between the capabilities This is not just attributable to degradation of their facilities and
and aptitudes expressed by the typi- the unstable environment whe- equipment, the potential collap-
cal Civilian Police Components de- re the Police personnel is called se of their organizational structu-
ployed so far and those possessed to operate, for sure significantly re or, even, their possible involve-
by the Military Forces in the field. different from the domestic set- ment in Human Rights violations.
This weakness can be suitably ter- ting, but also it is a consequen- As a result, the “Public Security
med the “Public Security Gap”, whi- ce of their multifaceted composi- Gap” is represented by the grey
ch, in its turn, is the result of three tion, thus needing a conspicuous area of insecurity given by the
different gaps detected between amount of time to eventually ope- sum of the three gaps as above
the Police and Military functions. rate with the same standards. defined, which none of the typi-
The first gap can be defined as In this sense, it has to be taken into cal components of an internatio-
the “deployment gap”, which con- account how a typical international nal Peace Operation had histori-
sists of the substantial incapacity Civilian Police Component gene- cally proved to be able to bridge.
of a typical Civilian Police Com- rally consists of personnel coming In this context, stemming from the
ponent to deploy quickly along from different countries, with dif- experience of the Italian Carabi-
with – or, at least, close to – the
deployment of the Military Forces.

83

IN DEPTH

nieri in the Balkans, the idea of te the growing importance of UN ce Division and Integrated Trai-

Stability Police came to light, as an Police in Peace Operations – to ning Service through the “UNPOL

innovative and essential tool for the extent of being involved sin- Training Architecture Program”.

bridging this security gap that had ce the planning phase of the va-

affected all the previous internatio- rious missions – little doctrinal The political scope of Police en-

nal Police endeavours, at the same guidance on “Police Peacekee- gagement in Peace Operations.

time highlighting the added value ping” was generated until recently. Having so far outlined the evo-

of gendarmerie-type – or Carabi- It was only in 2014 with the UNSC lution of the Police international

nieri-like – Police Services and their Resolution 2185, which was the engagement and their progres-

specific capabilities, such as their first resolution ever adopted on Po- sively increasing roles and fun-

quick deployment capacity, flexi- lice – and the subsequent report ctions within the UN system, it

bility, interoperability and cohe- of the High-Level Independent Pa- becomes clearer and clearer how

siveness, as well as their aptitude nel on Peace Operations – better the Police endeavour in Peace

to operate in highly destabilised known as “HIPPO Report” – that it Operations has – by its own na-

environment and to interact with was clearly emphasized the need ture – an intrinsic political impact.

the Military Forces on the ground. to promote system-wide coherence In this context, the same 2016

As for the United Nations per- and to develop further standards. “External Review of the Functions,

spective, the evolving interna- Once again, this need for gui- Structure and Capacity of the Uni-

tional scenario entailed a pa- dance is even more clear whi- ted Nations Police Division” states

rallel reform of the UN bodies le considering how multifaceted that “while United Nations enga-

devoted to Peace Operations. the Police Component could be. gement with host-States’ Police

From the Police is technical, it is
EVEN IF IN RECENT TIMES EXECUTIVE MAN- also inherently
side, in the year political in na-
2000, after the DATES HAVE BEEN RARELY AUTHORIZED, THE ture, and ne-
issuing of the
“Brahimi Report”, VARIETY OF TASKS ASSIGNED TO POLICE OF- eds to be under-
which stressed the stood as such”.
need for a doctri- FICERS DEPLOYED IN THE FIELD, AS WELL AS In this view,
nal shift in the use
THEIR NUMBER, HAS CONTINUED TO GROW the political di-
of civilian Police mension of Po-

with an integrated, holistic appro- In this sense, if on the one hand lice engagement needs to be

ach, the UN CIVPOL Unit was ele- the diversity that characterizes the better appreciated, at all le-

vated to Police Division, being se- United Nations Police – for sure – vels, as clearly identified in the

parated from the military branch. represents one of its greatest stren- United Nations Policy on Poli-

Furthermore, in order to respond to gths, on the other hand it also po- ce in Peacekeeping Operations

the increasing need for UN Police ses some substantial challenges as and Special Political Missions.

and the complexity of the tasks in- mentioned before, which, eventual- In fact, in the current Peace Ope-

volved, a Standing Police Capacity ly, could affect their performance. ration scenario it is quite evident

(SPC) was created in 2006, to con- As a result, a remarkable and how Police tasks do not just involve

tribute to mission planning, speed huge effort has been made by the activities related to crime and se-

of response and start-up capability. United Nations in this direction curity, but also to the promotion of

Then, in 2007, the Office of Rule and a doctrinal series consisting Rule of Law and a culture of Hu-

of Law and Security Institutions of Policies, Guidelines and Ma- man Rights, eventually encompas-

was established within the UN De- nuals has been released, named sing what David Bayley – former

partment of Peacekeeping Ope- “Strategic Guidance Framework Dean and Professor of the School

rations – now Department of Pe- for The United Nations Police in of Criminal Justice, State University

ace Operations – which, among Peacekeeping Operations and of New York at Albany, NY, USA,

other responsibilities assigned to it, Special Political Missions” or sim- who, sadly, has recently passed

oversights the UN Police Division. ply SGF, which is currently being away – termed “democratic poli-

Against this background, despi- operationalized by the UN Poli- tical development”, meaning the

84

or restoring policing and other
Law Enforcement is fundamental-
ly political – as it involves shifting
power and access to key state in-
stitutions – and the control over
Police enhances power and in-
fluence for those both outside and
within the Police organization.
In the end, the ability of the Police
Components to work effectively in
peace situations is dependent on
their understanding of the speci-
fic political context of the mission.

reform of foreign Police institutions any contribution to democratic po- The desirable – and beneficial –
so as to encourage and support litical goals and could be easily mutually supportive interaction
democratic political development. perverted to nondemocratic ends. between Police Components and
According to Professor Bayley, the In short, the development Political Advisers.
Police cannot be made democratic of democratic policing can- Acknowledging the Political di-
through policies that focus exclu- not be left to the Police nor mension of the Police engagement
sively on the Police. Hence, pa- can it involve only the Police. in international context as so far
raphrasing his own words, since In this direction, it is no surprise delineated, it is now advantageous
the democratic development is po- that the same Strategic Guidan- to briefly elaborate on how the Po-
litical by its very nature, the involve- ce Framework for UN Police ack- lice Components deployed to Pe-
ment with foreign Police that does nowledges the political context ace Operations and the missions’
not take into account the political of the Police engagement, expli- Political Advisers can – and should
context will conceivably fail to make citly stating that re-establishing – be mutually supportive in order
to fulfil the respective mandates
toward the eventual and para-
mount goal of a long lasting peace.
In this perspective, there are two
questions that instinctively arise:
1. In what way can Political Advi-
sers enhance the effectiveness of
the action of Police Components?
2. And, on the other hand,
in what way can Police Com-
ponents be a strategic re-
source for Political Advisers?
In the end, it is possible to an-
swer these two questions by in-
vestigating on how the Political
Advisers and the Police Compo-
nents should successfully interact.
Starting from the general per-
spective toward a more practical
dimension, it is fundamental for
Police practitioners deployed to
Peace Operations to have a clear
awareness of the political context

85

IN DEPTH

of the concerned area, as well as a More specifically, Political Advisers, litical objectives to be pursued ac-

sound understanding of the politi- in order to effectively usher the cording to the mission mandate.

cal goals of the mission mandate. action of the Police Component, Moreover, Political Advisers can

Since, as outlined before, the im- can beneficially provide a political share an overall outline of the po-

plementation of Police mandates overview of the operational envi- tential key counterparts and related

inherently entails political impli- ronment, considering both the in- political assessment in the light of

cations, as it in- the mission man-

volves access to date, consequent-

key state insti- “PUBLIC SECURITY GAP” IS THE RESULT OF ly contributing to
tutions, shifting elaborating the
power and al- THREE DIFFERENT GAPS DETECTED BETWEEN necessary “spe-
locating econo- aking notes” for
mic resources, THE POLICE AND MILITARY FUNCTIONS. interacting with

it seem fairly Police-related sta-

consequential keholders, in or-

that Political Advisers are the na- ternal and external or international der to eventually achieve the “Police

tural interlocutors of the Poli- balances at stake, in this context goals” with no prejudice to the ove-

ce Component in these contexts. giving a clear illustration of the po- rall mission mandate, or vice-versa.

86

Of course, as mentioned before, 6. UNITED NATIONS. A More Secu- CIL. Report of the Secretary-General on
this is not a one-way interaction. re World: Our Shared Responsibility – Re- United Nations Policing, S/2016/952,
In fact, if from the one hand Po- port of the High-level Panel on Threa- New York, NY, USA, 10 November 2016;
litical Advisers play a key role ts, Challenges and Change, DPI/2367, 20. UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUN-
in making Police Components New York, NY, USA, December 2004; CIL. Resolution on United Nations Pe-
aware of the political status quo, 7. UNITED NATIONS. External Review of the acekeeping Operations: Police Com-
from the other hand Police Com- Functions, Structure and Capacity of the UN Po- missioners, S/RES/2382 (2017), New
ponents represent an invaluable lice Division, New York, NY, USA, 31 May 2016;
antenna to monitor the deve- 8. UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF PE- York, NY, USA, 06 November 2017.
lopment of the local situation. ACEKEEPING OPERATIONS / DEPARTMENT
In this view, benefitting from the OF FIELD SUPPORT. United Nations Pea- PICTURES:
scattered distribution of the va- cekeeping Operations Principles and Gui- UN
rious Police assets and from their delines, New York, NY, 18 January 2008;
proximity to local communities, 9. UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF PE- Luca Volpi
Political Advisers can adjust their ACEKEEPING OPERATIONS / DEPART-
assessments in accordance with MENT OF FIELD SUPPORT. Policy on Col. - Italian Carabinieri
the information and feedbacks United Nations Police in Peacekeeping Ope- Head of CoESPU Studies and
gathered from the Police person- rations and Special Political Missions, Ref. Research Department
nel and, ideally, already proces- 2014.01, New York, NY, 01 February 2014;
sed through their technical know- 10. UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF PE- David M.V. Fontana Barberis
how and, partially, on the basis of ACEKEEPING OPERATIONS / DEPARTMENT
their political awareness acquired OF FIELD SUPPORT. Guidelines on Poli- Capt. - Italian Carabinieri
while interacting with the same ce Capacity Building & Development, Ref. Former Staff Officer within CoESPU
Political Advisers in the first place. 2015.08, New York, NY, USA, 01 April 2015; Studies and Research Department
To conclude, it is quite evident 11. UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF PE-
how this is a cycle. A never-en- ACEKEEPING OPERATIONS / DEPARTMENT
ding and virtuous cycle, whe- OF FIELD SUPPORT. Guidelines on Police
re these two complementary ac- Operations in United Nations Peacekeeping
tors work side by side towards Operations and Special Political Missions, Ref.
the most effective implementa- 2015.15, New York, NY, USA, 01 January 2016;
tion of the respective mandates. 12. UNITED NATIONS - PEACEKEEPING BEST
PRACTICES UNIT. Handbook on United Na-
References and Bibliography tions Multidimensional Peacekeeping Opera-
1. OAKLEY ROBERT B., DZIEDZIC MICHA- tions, New York, NY, USA, December 2003;
EL J. e GOLDBERG ELIOT M. (Ed). Policing 13. UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEM-
the New World Disorder: Peace Operations BLY. Report of the Special Committee on
and Public Security, National Defense Uni- Peacekeeping Operations and Its Wor-
versity Press, Washington, DC, USA, 1998; king Group, 2005 Substantive Session,
2. BAYLEY DAVID H., Democratizing the A/59/19/rev.1, New York, NY, USA, 2005;
Police Abroad: What to Do and How to 14. UNITED NATIONS GENERAL AS-
Do It, US Department. of Justice – Offi- SEMBLY / SECURITY COUNCIL. Re-
ce of Justice Programs – National Institu- port of the Panel on United Nations Pea-
te of Justice, Washington, DC, USA, 2001; ce Operations, A/55/305-S/2000/809,
3. BAYLEY DAVID H., Changing the Guard: New York, NY, USA, 21 August 2000;
Developing Democratic Police Abroad, Oxford 15. UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEM-
University Press, New York, NY, USA, 2006; BLY / SECURITY COUNCIL. Report of the
4. WESSLAU FREDRIK, The Political Advi- High-Level Independent Panel on Pea-
ser’s Handbook, Folke Bernadotte Aca- ce Operations, A/70/95-S/2015/446,
demy, Sandöverken, Sweden, 2013; New York, NY, USA, 16 June 2015;
5. STINGO VITTORIO, DZIEDZIC MI- 16. UNITED NATIONS GENERAL AS-
CHAEL J. and BARBU BIANCA (Ed.), SEMBLY / SECURITY COUNCIL. Re-
Stability Policing: A Tool to Project port of the Secretary-General. The Futu-
Stability, Headquarters Supreme Allied Com- re of United Nations Peace Operations:
manderTransformation,Norfolk,VA,USA,2018; Implementation of the Recommendations
of the High-Level Independent Panel on Pe-
ace Operations, A/70/357–S/2015/682,
New York, NY, USA, 02 September 2015;
17. UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUN-
CIL. Report of the Secretary-General on the
Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Con-
flict and Post-conflict Societies, S/2004/616,
New York, NY, USA, 23 August 2004;
18. UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL.
Resolution on United Nations Police in Pe-
acekeeping Missions, S/RES/2185 (2014),
New York, NY, USA, 20 November 2014;
19. UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUN-

87

IN DEPTH

PROHIBITION OF TORTURE:
THE TICKING BOMB SCENARIO

Prohibition of torture: analyzing and “ticking bomb scenario”, to eluci- certain degree of torture applica-
defusing the ticking bomb scenario. date it and to debunk its assump- tion helpful in saving innocent li-
The reasons why torture is never an tions in order to logically support ves, at least in specific serious si-
option, even if it seems the only one. the necessity of the absolute prohi- tuations. Those, who support the
bition of torture. For the purpose possible advantages of torture,
By Marco Sutto of this essay, I assume the reader are the ones who commonly pro-
is already familiar with the inter- pose the “ticking bomb scenario”.
In the previous edition of the Co- national legal framework based The scenario, a hypothetical “thou-
on the previsions and definitions ght experiment”3, is designed to
ESPU Magazine I examined the of the United Nations Convention logically question the absolute
difficulties associated with the im- Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman prohibition of torture and to chal-
plementation of an effective torture or Degrading Treatment or Punish- lenge its supporters. Indeed, in re-
prohibition and its importance in a ment (1984)2. I suggest, otherwi- cent years, it has been at the core
capacity building mission context1. se, before proceeding, to con- of the debate on torture and, par-
In that context I even introduced sult the above-mentioned article. ticularly since the 9/11 events, it
the concept of “ticking bomb sce- It is a fact that the legal prohibition has prompted extensive inquiry
nario” to support the necessity of of torture and similar practices is into the legal, moral and practical
the absolute prohibition of torture absolute and Law Enforcement In- issues surrounding the use of tor-
far beyond the legal constraints stitutions and peacekeepers must ture as an anticipatory means of
and to highlight the pointlessness uphold this position anywhere preventing the use of unlawful vio-
and the hazards of permitting this and always. However, despite the lence and, thus, of protecting lives.
practice. It is my intention, in this clear rules, some people deem a The scenario involves the capture
few pages, to properly expand the

88

of a terrorist by the police, on su- stances to evoke sympathy or even 4. The person in custody is a per-

spicion of having placed a bomb admiration for the torturer, and petrator of the attack.

due to explode imminently in the hatred or indifference towards the 5. The person has information that

middle of a large city. It is usually torture victim. Torture is presen- will prevent the attack.

proposed to a torture opponent as ted a necessary evil in the pursuit 6. Torturing the person will obtain

follows: “Suppose that a perpetra- of a greater good. It tries to force the information in time to prevent

tor of an imminent terrorist attack, torture opponents to concede that the attack.

that will kill many people, is in the such practice may be acceptable at 7. No other means exist that might

hands of the authorities and that least in some extreme cases. Pro- get the information in time.

he will disclose the 8. No other
THERE IS TOO MUCH TO LOSE BY CREA- action could be
information nee- taken to avoid
ded to prevent the TING LEGAL EXCEPTIONS TO ACCOMMODA- the harm.
attack only if he is
TE SOME SORT TICKING BOMB SCENARIO, 9. The motive
tortured. Should he of the torturer
be tortured?”4. This THAN THERE IS BY MAINTAINING THE AB- is to get infor-
question is often di-
rectly posed to so- SOLUTE PROHIBITION OF TORTURE, EVEN IF mation, with

meone in front of an THAT MEANS ASSUMING SOME HYPOTHETI- the genuine in-
audience, putting tention of sa-
him/her in a strug- CAL RISK.
ving lives, and

gling moral dilem- nothing more.

ma: “…the only way to prevent the ponents of the ticking bomb ar- 10. It is an isolated situation, not

attack, to defuse the ticking bomb, gument want to weaken the very often to be repeated.

is to torture the prisoner. Would idea that torture prohibition must The scenario, as articulated after

you jeopardize innocent lives just be absolute both as a principle the assumptions are spelled out,

to observe the absolute prohibi- and as a practice. Truly, everyo- clearly describes a situation that

tion of torture, when you could ea- ne involved in such circumstan- would rarely, if ever, manifest in

sily have access to the necessary ces, saving innocent lives applying reality. The easy absence of one

information to stop the attack? “. torture or doing nothing leaving or more of these premises is the

Its intended effect is to create them at risk, would find himself in reason often leading the scena-

doubts about the wisdom of the front of a harsh moral dilemma. rio advocates to amend the the-

absolute prohibition of torture, However, considering the fact that oretical original conditions and

leading the people involved in even torture advocates want to make concessions in order to

the discussion to accept the cre- limit its use to very strict and se- make it more lifelike and still con-

ation of a legal exception to the rious occasions, the ticking bomb template the recourse to torture.

prohibition, or at least to accept hypothesis is not as simple as pre- Such exceptions inevitably lead to

non-application of the criminal sented above and is based on a a much wider acceptation of tor-

law against torture in particular number of often hidden or only ture than it was initially suggested,

cases. For this purpose, torture implied assumptions which must even far beyond the will of the

is considered applicable only to be disclosed and analyzed. Typi- “torture to save lives” supporters.

obtain information to save lives cally, the scenario, to penetrate the Ultimately, the tendency to broa-

in serious cases of terrorism; any moral standards of those against den the permissible circumstances

other objective such as infliction torture, supposes certainty, or near become inevitable conducing to a

of punishment or procurement certainty, as to all of the following5: dangerous escalation of its use,

of confessions remains excluded. 1. A specific planned attack is defined as the “slippery slope” 6.

Clearly, the scenario, as proposed, known to exist. However, to make clear that the

works by manipulating the emo- 2. The attack will happen within a best option is always not recur-

tional reactions of those involved. very short time (it is “imminent”). ring to torture and that the ri-

It builds a condition of fear and 3. The attack will kill a large num- sks overcome any possible ad-

anger. It artificially tilts the circum- ber of people. vantage, the next paragraphs

89

IN DEPTH

will analyze and debunk the sce- 5). Torturers, though, are seldom ve method of acquiring reliable
nario assumptions one by one. likely to have such a degree of information (assumption 6). How
Firstly, the consideration that a certainty that the person they are can we be sure that the informa-
specific planned attack is known holding is a perpetrator or even tion released by the tortured su-
and will happen within a very short that he has relevant information. spect are correct and not designed
time rises serious concerns about Perversely, an “innocent” per- to send authorities in the wrong
the imminence of it (assumptions son, who has no connection to, or direction? As the torture will stop
1 and 2). How sure and imminent knowledge of the attack is likely as soon as the interrogator be-
should it be to justify the applica- to suffer the deepest and longest, lieves he has the information ne-
tion of torture? Are we sure that having no means to satisfy tortures eded to prevent the attack, it se-
the bomb is placed and ticking or requests and stop his/her ordeal. ems likely that a perpetrator would
it is just a suspicion? The risk is to In conceding such a possibili- be able both to stop his suffering
recur to torture for a bomb that ty, the proponents of the “ticking and to misdirect authorities long
does not even exist. Will the bomb bomb” scenario may soon ac- enough for the bomb to go off.
explode in hours, days or mon- cept the inevitability of applying It is important to recognize that the
ths? The timing of attack should torture to someone completely types of persons who would plan
be far enough to allow authorities innocent, who ultimately is not and execute an attack are the very
to do something to stop it and, involved in any terrorist activi- ones who are most likely trained to
on the other side, not so far off ty and who may turn out not to withstand torture until it is too late
in the future that the loss of lives have any relevant information. anyway. Professional interrogators
could be prevented in some other Admitting the latter option could have emphasized that interroga-
way (evacuation or humane inter- easily create the “flexibility” to al- tion can be conducted much more
rogation methods, for instance). low torture in the following circu- effectively without the use of tortu-
In both situations, the supposed mstances: a person just suspected re9. Furthermore, if you intend to
“need” for torture simply disappe- of a certain degree of involvement, rely on torture you should create
ars. Still, the issue, regarding the persons not directly involved but and maintain a professional class
grounds on which it is determi- who could have relevant informa- of torturers, and to equip them
ned whether alternative methods tion (for instance a relative of the with continuously-updated tortu-
would not work in time or even suspected perpetrator). Falling re techniques somehow diverting
faster than torture, remains open. down to the “slippery slope” could resources from other means of
The fact that the life of a large lead to the worst abomination of preventing such attacks. Needless
number of people should be thre- allowing torture even on a child, to say that institutionalized pro-
atened (assumption 3) opens the who has no relevant information, fessional “torture squads” would
debate about the number of pos- in the presence of the perpetrator pose grave dangers to democracy
sible victims necessary to recur to to force him talk (maybe the father, and to individual freedoms whi-
torture (is it one, ten, hundreds?). member of an extremist group, who ch no one would easily accept.
And why only victims of terrori- trained himself to resist torture). Besides, despite the just debated
sm? Many are the crimes endan- It appears that no matter how one uncertain efficacy of torture, the
gering the life of innocent peo- tries to confine the use of torture scenario assumes it is the only
ple. For instance, serious debates to extreme, narrow circumstan- available means that might get the
have been raised in kidnapping ces, the temptation to broaden information in time and no other
cases as happened in Germany these conditions is inevitable. Wi- action could be taken to avoid
with the Magnus Gäfgen case7. thout an absolute prohibition on harm (assumptions 7 and 8). Is it
With this in mind, if we still want the use of torture, it seems vir- really possible that there are no
to apply torture, in order to pro- tually impossible to ensure that other leads to pursue? Why can-
ceeding, we should consider the “special cases” remain special.8 not other investigative techniques,
person in custody as a perpetra- In addition, if we consider tor- such as humane methods of in-
tor of the attack and in possess ture as an investigation tool, we terrogation, search warrants, wi-
of relevant information that will should take into account that it is retaps and so on, be considered?
prevent it (assumptions 4 and far from been proven as an effecti- This tunneled vision on torture re-

90

liability seriously risks to render torture, even if that means assu- The Association for the Prevention of
detectives less active in exploiting ming some hypothetical risk. The Torture 2007.
other investigative opportunities. erosion of democratic institutions 65.. Ibid.
and the destruction of any open, The ‘slippery slope’ argument essentially
With regard to the actions to be free and just society based on the holds that once torture is authorized
undertaken to mitigate the pos- modern Human Rights standards in one set of specific circumstances, it
sible harm, is it actually not pos- represent serious side effects of becomes ‘routinized and uncontrollable’.
sible to evacuate the building, any theoretical torture acceptance. Farrell, M. (2013). The Prohibition of
neighborhoods, or city under thre- Torture in Exceptional Circumstances. In
at? If there is not enough time, The Prohibition of Torture in Exceptional
as supposed, recurring to tortu- Circumstances (pp. I-Ii). Cambridge:
re could lead us to the release Cambridge University Press.
of information appositely desi- 7. A 2002 German case in which Gäfgen,
gned to misdirect the investiga- a suspected kidnapper, was threatened
tion as seen for assumption nr.6. with torture by a police officer in order to
find out the whereabouts of a kidnapped
The “ticking bomb” exception child. Afterwards the investigation of the
also insists that the aim of torture kidnapping revealed that Gäfgen had
is intelligence gathering, not pu- suffocated the boy prior to making his
nishment (assumption 9). In the demand for a ransom and, thus, prior to
real world, however, it is unre- his arrest. The case resulted in a Grand
alistic to assume that interroga- Chamber judgement by the European
tors’ motives will be pure. Anger Court of Human Rights, see, Gäfgen v
and desire for payback have pro- Germany (App no 22978/05) ECHR 1
ven that can too-easily take over June 2010.
under extreme circumstances10. 8. Marcy Strauss, ‘Torture’ (2004) New York
Law School Law Review vol. 48.
Lastly, the scenario assumes the 9. See, for example: Mayer, Jane, ‘Wha-
exceptionality of torture (assump- tever it takes: The politics of the man
tion 10), nevertheless, as seen, PICTURES: behind 24’ The New Yorker (19 February
any acceptance of torture, whether Original photo by Pressfoto / Freepik 2007); the 31 July 2006 “Statement on
granted in advance through legal
permissions or granted postfacto Interrogation Practices” presented to the
by non-prosecution or other me- US Congress by twenty former interro-
ans, conducts inevitably to a “slip- gators;
pery slope” where its use quickly 10. see: ”The Tortured Lives of Interroga-
becomes much more widespre- tors”, LAURA BLUMENFELD, The Washin-
ad11, thus no longer exceptional. gton Post | June 4, 2007
11. See: Sumner B. Twiss, ‘Torture, Justifi-
To sum up, the reasons of any cation and Human Rights: Toward an
exception to the absolute prohibi- Absolute Proscription’ (2007) , Human
tion of torture, based on the “ticking 1. The CoESPU Magazine 2-2020-“Secu- Rights Quarterly 346, 360
bomb scenario”, have proven to be rity Sector Reform and Human Rights:
ineffective and dangerous, therefo- a focus on torture prohibition and
re, must be categorically rejected. prevention”.
There is too much to lose by cre- 2. “Torture means any act by which severe
ating legal exceptions to accom- pain or suffering, whether physical or
modate some sort ticking bomb mental, is intentionally inflicted on a
scenario, than there is by main- person for such purposes as obtaining
taining the absolute prohibition of from him or a third person information
or a confession, punishing him for an
act he or a third person has committed
or is suspected of having committed, or
intimidating or coercing him or a third
person, or for any reason based on
discrimination of any kind, when such
pain or suffering is inflicted by or at
the instigation of or with the consent or
acquiescence of a public official or other
person acting in an official capacity. It
does not include pain or suffering arising
only from, inherent in or incidental to
lawful sanctions.”.
3. Historically,it does appear to have
originated in the course of the Algerian
war (1954-1962) as a legitimation for
the use of torture by the French military
and police. Marco Sutto
4. “Defusing the Ticking Bomb Scenario:
Why we must say No to torture, always”- Lt.Col. - Italian Carabinieri
CoESPU IHR/IHRLChair

91

IN DEPTH

POS: FROM COMPETITION
TO COORDINATION

POs run by UN and Regional or- Operations), peacekeeping opera- and command of the forces at its
ganizations: from competition to disposal, the discipline of arma-
coordination. A focus on the Afri- tions (PKOs). The PKOs have evol- ments and possible disarmament”.
ca continent. The failure to activate Articles 43 et
ved since 1948 as a result of the seq. of the Charter led the Securi-
By Nicola Carrera ty Council to intervene in interna-
non-application of certain articles tional and internal crises through
The Charter of the United Na- military and police measures: the
of the Charter, according to whi- famous Blue Helmets. These had
tions1 includes, among its main the task of working for peacekee-
objectives, the maintenance of ch each UN Member State should ping through the PKOs. This type
international peace and security. “make available to the Security of operation has developed and
Among the instruments that this Council, in accordance with spe- evolved over the years and is ba-
Organization has developed over cial agreements, its armed forces, sed on “a particular customary rule
the years to achieve and guaran- assistance and facilities necessary in Chapter VII - under which the
tee this goal, there are the Peace for the maintenance of internatio- Security Council has always acted
Operations (POs). The Constituti- nal peace and security”2. These when establishing a mission”4
ve Act of the UN does not explicit- agreements concerning the provi- and therefore not directly defined
ly mention this type of operations within the UN Constitutive Act.
which were already called, before sion of military contingents, whi- Peacekeeping operations repre-
the reform of the DPKO (Depart- ch should have been “negotiated sent one of the measures through
ment of Peacekeeping Operations) as soon as possible”3, have never which the Security Council can act
in DPO (Department of Peace found practical application. The

General Staff Committee was ne-

ver activated. This Committee was
supposed to “assist and advise the
Security Council on all military mat-
ters for peace and security, the use

92

to fulfill the task of maintaining cive characteristic of the operation. tainment and resolution of both re-

international peace and stability. Finally, the use of force is limited gional and armed conflicts within

The first such operation was car- to self-defense or, generically, states between opposing factions

ried out in 1948, sending military to the protection of the mission. or political groups, or between en-
observers to the Middle East and This type of missions, defined as 1st claves, which today constitute the
was named Uni-
ted Nations Truce PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS REPRESENT ONE majority of wars.
The transforma-
Supervision Orga- OF THE MEASURES THROUGH WHICH THE SE- tion of the inter-
nization - UNTSO. national environ-
Since then there CURITY COUNCIL CAN ACT TO FULFILL THE ment has led to
TASK OF MAINTAINING INTERNATIONAL PEA- the development
have been more

than 60 UN peace CE AND STABILITY. of a new gene-
operations of whi- ration of opera-

ch, after 1990, 27 tions defined as
were deployed in the African con- Generation missions, was mainly multidimensional6. This definition

tinent: the most recent are the UN of a military nature and was limited was given because the United Na-
Mission in Burundi (ONUB, 2004), onlytoovercomethecurrentconflict. tions did not only deploy military
UN Operation in Cote d’Ivoire The forces employed ne- personnel but civilian and police
(UNOCI, 2004), UN-AU Hybrid ver had a role for which they contingents were also employed
Operation in Darfur (UNAMID, July could have a political influence. to support the implementation of
2007), UN Organization Stabiliza- With the end of the Cold War the far-reaching peace agreemen-
tion Mission in the Democratic Re- international context changed and ts signed by the states in conflict.
public of Congo (MONUSCO, July the United Nations was actively Today, Africa is not only the poo-
2010), UN Mission in the Republic of engaged in promoting the con- rest continent in the world but also
South Sudan (UNMISS, July 2011).5

Just to give an insight to the re-

aders, here below I drop the

past (pic nr.1) and the current

operations (pic nr.2) upda-

ted at who UN is carrying on:

The recruitment of military per-

sonnel for PKOs was managed

through agreements between

the United Nations and Mem-

ber States, whenever necessary.

Taking into account these procedu-

res for the enlistment of the Blue

Helmets, it can be easily noted

that the model of peacekeeping

operations does not correspond to

the original idea provided for the

UN Charter in fact the contingen-

ts, instead of being permanently

available to the Security Council

(Articles 43 et seq.), are constitu-

ted from time to time. Moreover,

in order to use national contingen-

ts, the consent of the State on the

deployment of personnel is always

provided, thus excluding the coer- Pic nr.1

93

IN DEPTH

Pic nr.2

the most affected by inter and in- eping operations had concerned deaths of over a million people8.
tra-state conflicts. The causes of Africa, nowadays more than 60% The current situation can be inter-
this situation are several and of of the missions deployed by the preted in a negative way and the
different origins, but perhaps the United Nations concern these peacekeeping system seems to be
main one concerns the effects of areas, including 4 of the five lar- “under pressure”. In fact, it has
colonization on the entire terri- gest operations ever managed, been calculated that the number of
tory. In fact, during the phase of with the deployment of more than operations rose 6 times since 1998.
European domination, Africa was 50,000 troops between Congo, A solution to this problem could
subdivided in a superficial way, “at Sudan (Darfur), Liberia and Ivory be found in increased collabora-
the table”, without in any way ta- Coast. Currently more than half tion with regional or sub-regional
king into account the ethnic, tribal, of the peacekeepers, working for organizations, which can allow
cultural and linguistic differences the UN, are present in African ter- or at least try to reduce conflicts
of the population. This erroneous ritories: in percentage, 84% of the within their areas of competence.
division led, once the colonization current 104,0007 peacekeepers. I deem this conclusion could be con-
ended, to the outbreak of nume- Since 1945, there have been 8 mil- sidered avery goodpoint,very prag-
rous conflicts between the various lion victims in Africa for conflict-re- matic and adherent to the necessi-
African tribes, which each tried to lated reasons alone, not counting ty on the field, field-led approach.
assert their sovereignty. Although all deaths due to illness or famine, The motto “try OUA/UA first” has
the problem of borders is the most while approximately 9 million are accompanied African institutio-
used motivation to justify the ter- refugees hosted in other states or nal life for decades: the willing to
rible situation in Africa, there are in emergency camps and under resolve their problems with their
many problems of various kinds: international protection. African own means has represented and
political, economic and social. refugees represent 33% of wor- continues to represent the leit-
Since the end of the Second Wor- ld refugees. Genocides like the motif in the history of the African
ld War, 17% of the UN peaceke- one of Rwanda have led to the continent. So, here is the key to

94

understand that it is not good to developed different ways of de- most important interventions are:
talk about competition between aling with conflicts, starting from Darfur (July 2007), Democratic Re-
the global vision and the local ne- 1963, the year of the its birth, public of Congo (July 2010), South
cessities but what is needed is a from ad hoc interventions, until Sudan (July 2011), Libya (UNSMIL,
cooperation-oriented approach. 1993 to the creation of the Cairo September 2011), Mali (MINU-
There are still many fears about Mechanism for Conflict Preven- SMA, April 2013), Central African
foreign interventions: one example tion, Management and Resolution. Republic (MINUSCA, April 2014).
is certainly the Sudanese one, for The twenty-first century will wi- In this sense, we can affirm that
the fear that the presence of forei- tness the legal and normative African regional organizations are
gn personnel could determine a transformation of the African or- more solicited than other organiza-
return “to the times of colonial do- ganization; in fact, since 2000 tions in other geographical areas.
mination” that could lead the con- we will speak of African Union, The UN has intervened in this
tinent to be plundered of raw ma- AU and no longer of OAU. continent through the deployment
terials of which the continent is rich. Within this renewed body, a new of many peace operations and
However, the field of peacekee- mechanism for crisis prevention beyond..., participation in media-
ping missions and conflict mana- and management, the African Pea- tion activities in the context of po-
gement in general represents one ce and Security Architecture, APSA, litical crises that have degenerated
of the various sectors in which Afri- was immediately
ca is trying to assert its authority developed, whose into civil war or are likely to turn
on its own territory, but there are structure is remini- into widespread violence are other
still many problems that prevent scent of that of the examples of intervention. African
the realization of 100% autonomy. United Nations. crises occupy more than 60% of
The reasons: scarcity of resources, Currently, 20 ope- the monthly agenda of the Security
lack of qualified personnel, ade- rations led by the Council. In these emergencies, the
quate technology and equipment, United Nations De- OAU and the AU have assumed
but also the lack of money to pay partment of Peace the role of mediator by participa-
for the contingents employed, Operations (DPO) ting in conflict prevention missions.
whether civilian, military or police, involve more than The transition from the Organi-
are just a few aspects that make 104,000 people zation of African Unity to the Afri-
it clear why Africa cannot make on 4 continents can Union represents a historic
itself independent from sharehol- and 12 different decision by the African heads of
ders (e.g .donors). Not only the time zones, directly affecting the state and government, who have
UN, but also the individual states lives of hundreds of millions of promoted the creation of a new
of the international community people. The number of UN pea- “continental” system of peace and
are working to ensure that Africa cekeepers employed today is se- security, designed as an instrument
becomes more autonomous and ven times greater than in 199910. capable of ensuring the promotion
succeeds in positioning itself as Most of the operations take place
a dynamic and active player in in the African continent. Examples
the international political arena9. include Angola (UNAVEM I, II and
Despite the fact that there are many III, 1989 - 1995 and MONUA,
problems in Africa, there are just 1997 - 1999), the Republic of Cen-
as many positive aspects or at le- tral Africa (1990 and 1994), Libe-
ast the attempts that are still being ria (1993), Mozambique (1992
made to make the African conti- - 1994), Rwanda (1996), Sierra Le-
nent better, more stable and safer. one (UNAMSIL 1998 - 1999), So-
The OAU was the first organiza- malia (UNOSOM I and II, 1992 -
tion in Africa at continental level 1995), the Democratic Republic of
to deal with issues related to pe- Congo (MONUC, 1999) and We-
ace and conflict resolution on the stern Sahara (MINURSO, 1991).
continent. Over the years, it has While in the 2000s, among the

95

IN DEPTH

of “African solutions to African cri- rity Architecture. Since the 2000s, the states concerned or by refe-
ses”. The evolution from ad hoc the attitude of African countries rence from the Security Council.
mechanisms, through a more spe- has changed and this has been 4. This Article in no way impairs the
cific mechanism, that of Cairo in well emphasized in the Constituti- application of Articles 34 and 35.
1993, to the current African Peace ve Act of the African Union12, whi- Then articles 53 and 54 respecti-
and Security Architecture 11 (APSA), ch guarantees intervention within
underscores all the efforts made by the sides involved without their vely report:
both organizations to create a pe- direct consent. In general, Chap-
aceful and stable environment that ter II tries to present the main me- Article 53
will enable Africa not only to face chanisms that have been created 1. The Security Council shall,
the new “millennium challenges” in order to manage and then eli- where appropriate, utilize such
but also to position itself as a pro- minate conflicts on the continent. regional arrangements or agen-
tagonist on the international stage. The desire and ambition for a cies for enforcement action under
The African Organization focused global partnership between the its authority. But no enforcement
its attention above all on peace-ma- UN and regional organizations action shall be taken under regio-
king and peace-building missions, has always been tangible and ex- nal arrangements or by regional
leaving peacekeeping to the UN. ternalized on many occasions. agencies without the authoriza-
The increase of the internal con- In order to give a legal framework tion of the Security Council, with
flicts in Africa in the 1990s led to to the intent, it is easy to find in the exception of measures against
the evolution of some relevant re- the UN Chart, in Chapter VIII, any enemy state, as defined in
gulatory aspects, the birth of the the article 52 that it mentions: paragraph 2 of this Article, provi-
African Union and a new mecha- 1. Nothing in the present Charter ded for pursuant to Article 107 or
nism for conflict management and precludes the existence of regio- in regional arrangements directed
peace and security maintenance in nal arrangements or agencies for against renewal of aggressive po-
Africa, the African Peace and Secu- dealing with such matters relating licy on the part of any such state,
to the maintenance of interna- until such time as the Organization
tional peace and security as may, on request of the Govern-
are appropriate for regional ments concerned, be charged with
action provided that such ar- the responsibility for preventing
rangements or agencies and further aggression by such a state.
their activities are consistent 2. The term enemy state as
with the Purposes and Prin- used in paragraph 1 of this Ar-
ciples of the United Nations. ticle applies to any state which
2. The Members of the Uni- during the Second World War
ted Nations entering into such has been an enemy of any si-
arrangements or constituting gnatory of the present Charter.
such agencies shall make Article 54
every effort to achieve pacific The Security Council shall at all
settlement of local disputes times be kept fully informed of
through such regional arran- activities undertaken or in con-
gements or by such regional templation under regional arran-
agencies before referring gements or by regional agen-
them to the Security Council. cies for the maintenance of
3. The Security Council shall international peace and security.
encourage the development Chapter VIII of the Charter of the
of pacific settlement of lo- United Nations introduces the the-
cal disputes through such me of “regional agreements”, wi-
regional arrangements or thout making any direct reference
Conflicts in Africa (source: Limes, Le Afriche by such regional agencies
in Guerra, 3/2010) either on the initiative of to regional organizations. From

a more in-depth reading of the

Charter it can be seen that Arti-

cle 52 recognizes the existence of

96

“regional arrangements or agen- a distinction between the regio- paragraph 1 without any advisory
cies” for dealing with those issues nal actions, which are coercive, opinion, positive or negative, of
concerning the maintenance of decided and directed by the UN the Security Council, it is conside-
international peace and security. Summit, i.e. the Security Council, red illegitimate according to the
This article highlights the role of and those “originated” directly wi- UN Charter and may determine
regional actors in resolving, at the thin the same regional framework, responsibilities for the Member
local level, issues between coun- linked to actions of aggression States. It is necessary to emphasize
that the authorization of the Secu-
tries belonging to these groups against them: it is admitted the col- rity Council remains a necessary
of states. The use of regional or- lective legitimate defense in case and fundamental element for a
ganizations is also mentioned in of armed attack. In this way, only if regional organization to use force.
Chapter VI of the Charter, refer- they are attacked directly, they can Finally, in Article 54, it is empha-
ring to “Peaceful Dispute Reso- act coercively without the authori- sized the obligation of regional
lution”, as an instrument for the zation of the Security Council; while organizations to inform the Se-
peaceful settlement of conflicts. in any other case the authorization curity Council at any time of all
After defining the main task of re- of this authority is required. The actions they intend to take in or-
gional organizations, Article 53 authorization of actions involving der to ensure the maintenance of
mentions those organizations that the use of force against or within a international peace and security.
have as their objective the defen- State makes these regional organi- Since 1994, the year in which the
se and mutual assistance between zations appear almost like as “de- “Declaration on Enhancement of
Member States. In addition, the centralized bodies” of the Security Cooperation between the United
Security Council may make use of Council, which, in order to have Nations and Regional arrange-
regional organizations, which un- effective control over the action, ments or Agencies in the Mainte-
der its authority may be used for must previously grant authoriza- nance of International Peace and
coercive measures. After reading tion. In the event that an action Security” on the strengthening
this article, it is possible to make is taken on the basis of Article 53 of cooperation between the Uni-
ted Nations and regional and
sub-regional organizations in the
maintenance of international pe-
ace and security was approved,
regular “high level” consultations
were agreed between the leaders
of the respective organizations.
Subsequently, in July 2005, during
the 6th meeting between repre-
sentatives of the UN and regio-
nal organizations, the proposal
for a regional-global mechanism
for peace and security began to
be discussed in a more concrete
way, recognizing the need to de-
fine a more structured system of
relations between the UN and re-
gional organizations, based on:
• the principle of comparative
advantages;
• the implementation of precise
cooperation agreements or “me-
morandum of understandings”.
In the “Conclusions of the 6th hi-

97

IN DEPTH

gh-level meeting between the UN vested in the Security Council, ac- logistical capabilities: all these ele-
and regional and other intergovern- cording to the Secretary General, ments have hindered the proper
mental organizations”13, all partici- could have increased the margins functioning of some operations.
pants recognized their commitment of success of the efforts conducted The following table summari-
to organize subsequent sessions by the entire international commu- zes the peacekeeping missions
on the margins of the meetings nity to defend peace and security. managed by the African Union
between the Security Council and The African Union, compared to between 2003 and June 2011.
regional organizations in in order the OAU, has had the opportuni-
to guarantee the maximization of ty to conduct a significant num- The African Union is still facing
the possibilities of complementarity ber of peacekeeping operations, many problems today, trying to
of the initiatives; moreover, it was but still suffers today from some adapt to the needs and challen-
decided to set up a high level fo- major structural impediments, ges in progress: conflict preven-
cal point within each organization. such as dependence on exter- tion, management and resolution
Subsequently, with Resolution 1625 nal funding, lack of bureaucracy remain three main targets for the
of October 200514, the Security and intervention forces adequa- African political and academic
Council not only started a process te and well trained to the various world, always in a collaborative
of strengthening its action in the tasks of the mission and lack of and partnership key with the Uni-
field of “conflict prevention”, but
also recognized the urgency to pro-
mote a further and new deepening
of cooperation and communica-
tion between the UN and the diffe-
rent regional organizations, in line
with Chapter VIII of the UN Charter.
Also in the same year, with a fur-
ther resolution, 1631, the Security
Council expressed its support for the
consolidation of cooperation with
regional organizations, inviting all
Member States to strengthen their
capacities, with particular atten-
tion to that of the African region:
- conflict prevention,
- crisis management,
- stabilization in the post-conflict
phase,
- the fight against terrorism and
the small arms trade.
This resolution reaffirmed, firstly,
the role of the UN in the develop-
ment of regional and sub-regional
capacities in the field of peacekee-
ping and, secondly, the need to en-
courage the action of regional and
sub-regional organizations in pea-
ceful dispute resolution processes.
The in-depth knowledge of local
conflicts owned by regional or-
ganizations combined with the
global legitimacy and authority

98

ted Nations. One thing on top of OAU are very high. A negative 7. (2008).
the other priorities is the strengthe- aspect in the work of the African htpps://peacekeeping.un.org/en/info-
ning of the regional organizations Union is the poor capacity to cope graphics.
such as the African Union. To be with humanitarian disasters, as in 8. In the period following independence
mentioned the resolution Resolu- the case of Darfur, where UN aid in Africa, the number of conflicts grew
tion 2457 (2019) adopted by the has been crucial. This gap has a inexorably: since the 90s the number
Security Council at its 8473rd me- negative impact on the perspecti- of deaths in Sudan, Congo, Ethiopia
eting, on 27 February 2019. With ves of the international commu- and Nigeria exceeded 8 million, while
this meaningful resolution UN put nity vis-à-vis the continental or- in mid-2005 as many as 10 million
a spotlight on the situation in Afri- ganization and reinforces the refugees were estimated to be present
ca emphasizing the role and the idea of Africa’s inability to deal throughout Africa.
action to be taken by the coun- with some issues related to con- 9. https://ambwashingtondc.esteri.it/
tries and the regional partners flict prevention and management. ambasciata_washington/it/sala-stampa/
together with the Security Coun- The management of the security dall_ambasciata/mou-operazioni-pace.
cil to manage and solve conflicts, business therefore remains inse- html.
troubles and diplomatic issues. parable from the relationship of 10. https://archive.unric.org/it/pace-e-sicu-
In any case, the new structure of cooperation with the Glass Palace. rezza/74.
the AU has been created along The reasons for the previous 11. http://peaceau.org/en/topic/the-afri-
the lines of that of the UN and is statement in the article are ba- can-peace-and-security-architecture-ap-
designed to act where the UN is sed on five key points to be ad- sa.
unable or unwilling to operate. dressed and resolved, sum- 12. https://au.int/en/treaties/constituti-
The cases of Burundi15, Somalia16 marized in the diagram below. ve-act-african-union.
and Sudan17 represent three dif- These are the new challenges to 13. UN General Assembly, “Conclusions
ferent situations in which the Afri- be overcome in the coming years. of the Chairman of the sixth high-level
can Union has intervened directly. No more time for competi- meeting between the United Nations
The OAU, before, and the AU, tion, we need cooperation! and regional and other intergovernmen-
now, have always tried to deve- tal organizations”, 8th September 2005,
lop a mechanism for managing A/60/341- S/2005/567.
tensions and peacekeeping, pe- 14. UN Security Council, “Resolution 1625
ace-making and peace-building – Declaration on Strengthening the
operations with a continental ma- effectiveness of the Security Council’s
trix based on the motto “Try Africa role in Conflict Prevention, particulary in
First” and on the conviction that Africa”, 14th September 2005.
an African solution to African pro- 15. https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/
blems should be found, excluding abs/10.1177/0974928416683038 “The
or limiting interference from actors African Mission in Burundi (AMIB): A Stu-
outside the continent. Unfortuna- dy of the African Union’s Peacekeeping
tely, this remains today a purpo- PICTURES: Success and ‘Triangular Area of Tension
se rather than a result achieved. -Vito Franchini in African Peacekeeping’.
Over the past decades, the APSA -UN 1167.. https://amisom-au.org/.
has taken many steps forward in https://www.un.org/press/en/2017/
its implementation and althou- 1. The UN Chart was signed in San Fran- sc12993.doc.htm.
gh much still needs to be done. cisco on the 26th June 1945 at the end
Conflict-related issues in Africa of the conference of the United Nations
continue to be a central element about the international organization, but
in continental policy and destabi- it came into effect on the 24 October
lizing for other key sectors such as 1945.
socio-economic development: the 243... Article 43 Chapter VII of the UN Chart.
expectations of the African Union Article 47 Chapter VII of the UN Chart.
to be qualitatively better than the Conforti B. e Focarelli C., “Le Nazioni
Unite”, Cedam 2012.
5. https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/cur-
rent-peacekeeping-operations.
6. To date, PKOs are defined as a technique
both to preserve peace, however fragile,
in areas where tensions have ended, and
to assist the implementation of peace
agreements reached through diplomatic
mediation. From an initial military instru-
ment of observation and monitoring and
interposition, peacekeeping operations
have incorporated a vast complex of
components, both civilian and police,
who cooperate with military personnel
to ensure the definition of a lasting Nicola Carrera
peace. United Nations Department of
Peacekeeping and Department of Field Capt. - Italian Carabinieri
Support, “United Nations Peacekeeping Former Staff Officer within CoESPU
Operations – Principles and Guidelines” Training Department

99

HEALTH AND WELL-BEING