036_LOCAL AND REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT_2017_665

KEVIN R. COX

the sorts of considerations emphasized by fundamental role. As Brenner and Glick
Weberian location theory. (1991) have argued:

One can make similar critical remarks Despite the heterogeneous modes of
about the ‘geography’ in the historical geog- regulation of its constituent parts the
raphy of institutions. But here, instead of the world economy as a whole has pos-
punctuation of time into discrete, mutually sessed a certain homogeneity, indeed
exclusive categories, the tendency has been unity, in terms of its succession of
to engage in a smoothing-out process which phases of development. The world
has marginalized the differences between economy, has, it seems, been able to
places, and particularly between one country impose its quite general logic, if not to
and another. Part of this is the result of precisely the same extent on all of its
attempts to universalize the periodizations of component elements, despite their
regulation theory or of arguments about very particular modes of regulation.
local economic development policy.As Sayer
(1989) has pointed out, what passes for post- (p. 112)
fordism can vary hugely between one coun-
try and another, to the point at which the The territorial structure
very term should be in question. Likewise, of the state
I would argue that Harvey’s managerial/
entrepreneurial distinction is a hybrid based If we are to take these methodological
on the American and British cases that does injunctions seriously, then one place to start
justice to neither of them. Since the Second would be an examination of the territorial
World War American cities have always been structure of the state.The politics of local and
far more entrepreneurial than managerial – regional development varies dramatically
virtually no public housing but always with between the US and Western Europe, and
serious concerns for a local tax base; while state form is heavily implicated in this con-
in Britain the entrepreneurialism that has trast. On the one hand, there is a radically
emerged has been weak tea compared to its decentralized state, whose fragmentation is
American cousin. Jessop makes similar over- deepened still further by the fact that it is a
generalizations in his (2002) book The Future presidential rather than a parliamentary
of the Capitalist State. democracy. On the other hand, there are the
highly centralized states of Western Europe,
In short, institutional historical geogra- and which continue to be so, despite the
phies might usefully be brought back onto exaggerated claims of many academics about
the research agenda rather than be made ‘hollowing out’ (Cox 2009) and the intense
the object of exercises that are ultimately interest that the topic of devolution is cur-
reductionist in character. Massey’s (2005) rently attracting, particularly in Western
happenstance circumstances and the coming Europe (see, for example, the recent issue of
together of various conditions and influences The Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and
at particular points in space-time might Society (Cox 2009), on ‘Rescaling the State’).
offer at least one ingredient of a necessary In the American case, representation, the
corrective. Different institutional innovations organization of the state and its outputs are
have meant different things in different all much more territorialized, and to a
places. There is evidence that just-in-time remarkable degree.
has been operationalized in ways in Western
Europe that are different from those in Japan This gives immense scope for a similarly
(Mair 1991). But, and contra Massey’s some- territorialized politics of local and regional
what voluntarist posture, the logics of the development.The use of the primary system
accumulation process also have to assume a

278

INSTITUTIONAL GEOGRAPHIES AND LOCAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

as a vehicle for selecting candidates, the interests in the future of local economies to
importance of legislative committees, and express themselves,accordingly much weaker.
the weakness of the party system give local The party–representative relation is quite
representatives both an intense interest in sat- different. Party central offices can override
isfying the sorts of local interests espoused by local choices. Once elected strict party disci-
growth coalitions, and the ability to do so. pline is expected. Legislative committees,
This applies to elections to state assemblies likewise, give less scope for the expression of
in the same way as elections to Congress. local interests; in fact they are used far less
Through the primary system competing than in the American case with the cabinet
candidates have to carve out programmes assuming a greater role in preparing bills
appealing to specifically local electorates. for consideration. Finally, these are for the
Once elected the committee system gives most part unitary states, and where they are
them the opportunity to push these legisla- federal their federalism is far less radical than
tive agenda and to block those of others. in the American instance. Local economic
When a bill leaves the committee stage, the development policy has been much more
weakness of the political parties allows the top-down than in the US. The sorts of
construction of all manner of coalitions, interventions that characterized Western
many bipartisan in character, with a view to Europe in the twenty to thirty years after the
promoting the interests of particular regions Second World War – aid to depressed
or particular sorts of locality. Epstein (1986) areas, New Towns in particular – would
is especially useful on the distinctive nature have been unworkable on the other side of
of the American state. the Atlantic. There were programmes
designed to channel aid to depressed areas
The federal nature of the US intensifies but the criteria defining them foundered on
these effects. The US has not one but fifty the shoals of log-rolling. The result was that
welfare states.Without this variety, territorial very few areas were excluded (Barnekov
competition around the idea of ‘business cli- et al. 1989: 111; see also Ellwood and
mate’ would make no sense. The states are Patashnik 1993).
responsible for local government, which
means that the localism of the American state This is to dwell on the enabling nature of
can be expressed at the state level in city- the state’s territorial structure. I would sug-
specific agenda. A good deal of legislation is gest, though, that it is also significant in the
city-specific, and log-rolling among repre- way it conditions local and regional interests.
sentatives lowers the barriers to getting it It is not just, for example, that local govern-
passed; if St Louis wants something from the ments dispose of powers of raising revenue
Missouri state legislature then the delegation for both operating and capital expenses
from the Kansas City area will be willing to and of land use regulation which might
agree so long as there is an understanding appeal to local business coalitions; it is also
that the favour will be returned in the future that they too have stakes in the growth of
(Shefter 1978; Burns et al. 2009).This means respective local economies.They are accord-
that there can be a quite remarkable flexi- ingly extremely active agents in the politics
bility in developing new institutions of met- of local and regional development. Local
ropolitan governance for particular cities. If planning departments have as a major mis-
the local will is there, converting it into a sion attracting in new investment to a
new institutional form is typically not that degree that would be regarded as unusual in
difficult, as Jonas and I (Cox and Jonas 1993) Western Europe. As a result, local govern-
have demonstrated. ments will usually be at the centre of local
growth coalitions, orchestrating their activi-
The West European case is almost dia- ties and their agenda. Likewise, every state
metrically the opposite and the scope for
279

KEVIN R. COX

has a Department of Development aimed development; sometimes as part of a broader,
at stimulating the growth of the state econ- coherent institutional structure of which the
omy through inward investment, arguing local is one part as in the national planning
through state congressional delegations for legislation encountered in Western Europe
regulatory relief for dominant industries and and for which there is little or no counter-
so forth. part in the USA; and sometimes as a response
to local initiatives seeking a way out of spe-
This is very different from the Western cifically local dilemmas – which is very
European experience. In the US, private common in the US and much less so in
interests in local and regional economies are Western Europe. What is then crucial is to
attracted to local and state government identify the tensions, often with strong spa-
because of the formal powers they possess. tial reflections, that will be generated by the
And if they aren’t attracted, they will be accumulation process, and how they contri-
solicited and duly organized. Without this bute to the formation of new institutional
very particular field of possibilities, a field fixes, or to such a confrontation of opposing
defined by a radically different territorial forces that the result is to reproduce the status
organization of the state, it seems unlikely quo. What emerges is inevitably unpredicta-
that the American politics of local and ble but always conditioned by past and
regional development would be as so – present institutional geographies and by what
equally radically – territorialized that it is. will work given the constraints of the local
Rather, and as in Western Europe they would economic development process. And if his-
look elsewhere: usually to sector–specific tory is anything to go by, more gradual and
organizations that lobby at the centre. less punctuated, and more geographically
differentiated, than some might assume.
Conclusions

The existing literature on institutions and References
local economic development, therefore, dis-
closes numerous lacunae. It is also a literature Allen, J. and Cochrane, A. (2007) “Beyond the
replete with received wisdoms that merit Territorial Fix: Regional Assemblages, Politics
a much closer and more critical look. and Power”, Regional Studies 41(9), 1161–1175.
Regulation theory and regime theory have
been especially prominent. So too are vari- Alonso, W. (1971) “The Economics of Urban
ous, quite questionable, assumptions about Size”, Papers and Proceedings, Regional Science
the territorial structure of the state, including Association 26, 67–84.
some odd ideas about shared institutions and
tendencies on either side of the Atlantic. Barnekov, T., Boyle, R. and Rich, D. (1989)
How, therefore, might one proceed? I assume Privatism and Urban Policy in Britain and the
first of all that anything to do with local eco- United States, Oxford: Oxford University
nomic development has to be approached Press.
from the standpoint of the capital accumula-
tion process, and its necessary conditions. Brenner, N. (2004) New State Spaces, Oxford:
These include institutions and geography. Oxford University Press.
Capital unfolds over space, creating various
institutional fixes as it goes. These occur at Brenner,R.and Glick,M.(1991)“The Regulation
more local scales but at others too, sometimes Approach: Theory and History”, New Left
in a layered fashion where the rules of the Review 188, 45–120.
central state, like zoning law, underpin local
Burns, N., Evans, L., Gamm, G. and
280 McConnaughy, C. (2009) “Urban Politics in
the State Arena”, Studies in American Political
Development 23, 1–22.

Cox, K. R. (2009) “‘Rescaling the State’ in
Question”, Cambridge Journal of Regions,
Economy and Society 1–15.

Cox, K. R. and Jonas, A. E. G. (1993) “Urban
Development, Collective Consumption and

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the Politics of Metropolitan Fragmentation”, Molotch, H. (1976) “The City as a Growth
Political Geography 12(1), 8–37. Machine: Toward a Political Economy of
Cox, K. R. and Mair, A. J. (1988) “Locality and Place”, American Journal of Sociology 82,
Community in the Politics of Local Economic 309–332.
Development”, Annals, Association of American
Geographers 78, 307–325. North, D. C. (1992) Institutions, Institutional
Cox, K. R. and Townsend, A. R. (2005) Change and Economic Performance, Cambridge:
“Institutions and Mediating Investment in Cambridge University Press.
England and the United States”, Regional
Studies 39(4), 541–553. Pike, A., Rodríguez-Pose, A. S. and Tomaney, J.
Cox, K. R. and Wood,A. M. (1997) “Competition (2007) “What Kind of Local and Regional
and Cooperation in Mediating the Global: Development and for Whom?”, Regional
The Case of Local Economic Development”, Studies 41(9), 1253–1269.
Competition and Change 2, 65–94.
Ellwood, J. W. and Patashnik, E. M. (1993) “In Sayer, A. and Walker, R. (1992) The New Social
Praise of Pork”, The Public Interest 110, 19–33. Economy, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Epstein, L. (1986) Political Parties in the American
Mould, Madison: University of Wisconsin Sayer, R. A. (1989) “Postfordism in Question”,
Press. International Journal of Urban and Regional
Harding, A. (1999) “North American Urban Research 13, 666–695.
Political Economy, Urban Theory and British
Research”, British Journal of Political Science Shefter,M.(1978)“Local Politics,State Legislatures,
29(4), 673–698. and the Urban Fiscal Crisis: New York
Harvey, D. (1985a) “The Geopolitics of City and Boston”, Chapter 6 in S.Tarrow, P. J.
Capitalism”, Chapter 7 in D. Gregory and Katzenstein and L. Graziano (eds), Territorial
J. Urry (eds), Social Relations and Spatial Politics in Industrial Nations, New York:
Structures, London: Macmillan. Praeger.
Harvey, D. (1985b) “The Place of Urban Politics
in the Geography of Uneven Capitalist Stone, C. (1989) Regime Politics: Governing Atlanta,
Development”, Chapter 6 in Harvey, D. 1946–1988. Lawrence, KS: University Press of
The Urbanization of Capital, Oxford: Basil Kansas.
Blackwell.
Harvey, D. (1989) “From Managerialism to Swyngedouw, E. (1997) “Neither Global nor
Entrepreneurialism: The Transformation in Local: ‘Glocalization’ and the Politics of
Urban Governance in Late Capitalism”, Scale”, Chapter 6 in K. R. Cox (ed.), Spaces
Geografiska Annaler B 71(1), 3–18. of Globalization, New York: Guilford.
Hoxworth, D. and Clayton-Thomas, J. (1993)
“Economic Development Decision Making in Teaford, J. (1984) The Unheralded Triumph: City
a Fragmented Polity: Convention Center Government in America, 1870-1900, Baltimore:
Expansion in Kansas City”, Journal of Urban Johns Hopkins University Press.
Affairs 15, 275–292.
Jessop, B., Peck, J. and Tickell, A. (1999) “Retool- Ward, K. (1996) “Rereading Urban Regime
ing the Machine: Economic Crisis, State Theory: A Sympathetic Critique”, Geoforum
Restructuring and Urban Politic”, Chapter 9 27, 427–438.
in A. E. G. Jonas and D.Wilson (eds), The Urban
Growth Machine, Albany: State University of Weiss, M. A. (1980) “The Origins and Legacy of
New York Press. Urban Renewal”, Chapter 4 in P. Clavel,
Jessop, R. (2002) The Future of the Capitalist State, J. Forester and W. W. Goldsmith (eds), Urban
Cambridge: Polity Press. and Regional Planning in an Age of Austerity,
Mair, A. M. (1991) “The Japanization of New York: Pergamon Press.
Volkswagen?” Local Government Centre,
Warwick Business School, University of Weiss, M. A. (1987) The Rise of the Community
Warwick, Coventry, England. Builders, New York: Columbia University
Massey, D. (2005) For Space, London: Sage Press.
Publications.
Mollenkopf, J. H. (1983) The Contested City, Wood, A. M. (1993) “Local Economic
Princeton: Princeton University Press. Development Networks and Prospecting for
Industry”, Environment and Planning A 25,
1649–1662.

Further reading

Brenner,R.and Glick,M.(1991)“The Regulation
Approach: Theory and History”, New Left
Review 188, 45–120.

Cox, K. R. (2004) “The Politics of Local and
Regional Development, the Difference the

281

KEVIN R. COX

State Makes and the US/British Contrast”, Harvey, D. (1985a) “The Geopolitics of
Chapter 10 in D. Valler and A. Wood (eds) Capitalism”, Chapter 7 in D. Gregory and J.
Governing Local and Regional Economies: Urry (eds), Social Relations and Spatial Structures,
Institutions, Politics and Economic Development, London: Macmillan.
London: Ashgate.
Cox, K. R. and Townsend, A. R. (2005) Massey, D. (1999) “Spaces of Politics”, Chapter 14
“Institutions and Mediating Investment in in D. Massey, J. Allen and P. Sarre (eds),
England and the United States”, Regional Human Geography Today, Cambridge: Polity
Studies 39(4), 541–553. Press.

282

24

Carbon control regimes, eco-state
restructuring and the politics of local

and regional development

Andrew E.G. Jonas, Aidan H. While
and David C. Gibbs

Introduction and above meeting environmental and social
targets.
Environmental regulation is having an increas-
ingly important impact on the practice and Nevertheless,mounting international con-
politics of local and regional economic cerns about carbon emissions and their
development. For more than a decade, locali- impact upon enhanced global warming, as
ties and regions have strived to incorporate well as the increasing cost of energy and fears
principles of environmental sustainability over peak oil, have given urgency to develop
into spatial development plans and policies a low carbon economy, both nationally and
(Haughton and Counsell 2004). For some at the local and regional scale (see, for exam-
practitioners and policy makers, promoting ple, DTI 2003; City of Chicago 2008; Lerch
sustainable forms of local and regional devel- 2008). Could it be that the development of
opment (e.g. eco-industrial parks, green low carbon economies is supplanting sus-
infrastructure, biofuels and other ‘alternative’ tainable development as the mantra of good
sources of energy, environmental industry practice in local and regional development?
clusters, etc.) is not much more than a place If so where, in what form and with what
marketing tool (Deutz and Gibbs 2004). For consequences for local firms, workers, resi-
others, it is seen as good economic develop- dents, policy makers and politicians? More
ment practice – see,for example,the Cornwall generally, what does a new era of carbon
Sustainable Energy Partnership in the United control and climate change portend for state
Kingdom (UK) (Aubrey 2007) and the theoretical approaches to local and regional
Global Green USA (2005) report on Los development?
Angeles in the United States (US), both of
which aim to use renewable energy projects In addressing such questions, this chapter
as a catalyst for economic regeneration. also considers the ways in which state envi-
However, in general we would argue that ronmental regulation in the form of terri-
such attempts to ‘green’ local and regional torial carbon control regimes (CCRs) might
economies have met with very mixed success inform and inspire new theoretical and
as suggested by a continuing preference for empirical work on local and regional devel-
promoting economic competitiveness over opment. The first part of the chapter sets
out a framework for understanding state–
economy–environment relations as part of

283

ANDREW E.G. JONAS, AIDAN H. WHILE AND DAVID C. GIBBS

broader processes of what elsewhere we are project of spatial science there was little
calling ‘eco-state restructuring’ (ESR) (While interest in developing a perspective on pro-
et al. 2009). Given the policy trajectory of cesses of industrial location and resource use
climate change governance, the concept of vis-à-vis mechanisms of state territorial redis-
ESR draws attention to the ways in which tribution. The revival of economic geogra-
states are struggling with growing pressures phy – qua geographical economics – as a
to reduce or manage global warming, cut mainstream social science at the end of the
carbon emissions and promote economic twentieth century has continued this separa-
development in environmentally less harm- tion of the sub discipline from the critical
ful ways. analysis of the state and the environment.

In the second part of the chapter we That environmental economic geography
examine how these new territorial forms has undergone a revival is thanks mainly to
of environmental regulation might map out radical scholarship and the ‘institutional turn’
unevenly onto different local and regional in some branches of economic geography
economies, representing opportunities for (Gibbs 2006; Bridge 2008). Among other
some places and threats for others. Envi- developments, it has enabled Marx’s insights
ronmental regulation under a more stringent on production, accumulation, labour and
state-orchestrated CCR creates conditions nature in capitalism to be brought into con-
for a politics scaled around local and regional temporary work on industrial restructuring
development. This scalar politics takes many (Hudson 2005). Enriched by Marx’s concepts
possible forms, including a new politics of of accumulation, crisis and metabolism, neo-
locality, a competition between localities and Marxist approaches recognise that produc-
regions to be seen as leaders in climate tion in capitalism relies on the transformation
change policy, the re-incentivization of ter- of nature and that this contains inherent
ritorial growth coalitions, and new regional ‘ecological contradictions’ (O’Connor 1998).
or city-regional forms of governance. The For some neo-Marxists, moreover, the state is
chapter draws upon our ongoing research into a non-neutral instrument in mediating the
spaces of collective provision, sustainability, contradictions of social nature (Castree 2008).
and new forms of local and regional devel- Since capitalists ‘accumulate for accumula-
opment in the United States and Europe. tion’s sake’, the state plays an increasingly
important, yet spatially contingent, role in
Environmental economic mitigating the damaging environmental out-
geography and new forms of comes of global production (Drummond
state environmental regulation and Marsden 1995).

The emergence of economic geography as a One potential obstacle to further work
distinctive subdiscipline towards the end of along these lines is the intellectual divide
the nineteenth century, and having its own existing between the primarily economic
set of organising concepts and assumptions, is oriented work on clusters, new economic
closely associated with the acquisition of spaces and global production networks, on
knowledge of the spatial distribution of nat- the one hand, and the corresponding institu-
ural resources (Barnes 2002). Nevertheless, tional work on the role of the state in
the development of a critical environmental local and regional governance, on the other.
dimension to economic geography was ham- Likewise researchers have struggled to achieve
pered by the wider discipline’s flirtation with theoretical commensurability between the
environmental determinism and colonialist concrete concerns of work on urban and
discourses. Even under the liberal-modernist regional governance and the abstractions of
state and regulation theories (Lauria 1997).
284 The latter approaches occasionally make

C A RB ON CONT ROL REGIM ES, ECO - S TATE R ES TRU C TU R IN G AN D TH E POLITIC S

reference to environmental policy and regu- of the MSR itself is rarely discussed; nor is the
lation, but usually only as part of the broader possibility that local and regional MSRs –
problematic of social regulation rather than if they exist as such (see Peck and Tickell
as a response to pressing local or global eco- 1992) – contain institutional forms capable
logical and environmental imperatives (Gibbs of marrying local accumulation strategies to
and Jonas 2000). We can only assume that the social regulation of ecological conditions.
attempts to downscale state theories of the It seems that there is an urgent need for con-
environment to the realm of local and ceptual frameworks for local and regional
regional development are likely to encounter development that situate ecological processes
similar challenges, not least those posed by and environmentalism more centrally within
the different levels of abstraction involved in wider modalities of capitalist state regulation
such approaches (Bridge and Jonas 2002). (Krueger and Gibbs 2007).

For example, institutional approaches in The eco-restructuring of the
economic geography recognise that the state and the emergence
transformation of the ‘environment’ gener- of territorial carbon control
ates externalities and transaction costs, which regimes
firms, workers and local and regional author-
ities struggle to externalise via inter alia the Although regulation of the environmental
development of local and regional econo- and ecological impacts of human activity has
mies and governance structures; but we do always been part of the work of the modern
not necessarily learn about the possibility of state, we believe that the period since the
corresponding opportunities and pressures 1970s represents a concerted extension of
on local and regional economies emanating the scope and scale of state environmental
from the national scale (or increasingly the regulation. For instance, some scholars argue
supranational scale in the case of the European that we are in a period of ‘ecological mod-
Union) as a result of stringent environmental ernisation’ (Mol 2002).This period is charac-
regulation (Gibbs and Jonas 2000). Likewise terised by the search for national societal
the new environmental economic geography contracts that take into account public
certainly considers the ways in which the concerns about possible ecological and tech-
production, accumulation and circulation of nological limits to capitalist development
environmental resources shapes commodity trajectories. In contrast to some accounts
flows and exchanges on a global scale within ecological modernisation, which pre-
(Bumpus and Liverman 2008). For the most dict a linear progression towards a more eco-
part, however, the state remains an unexam- logically benign state (cf.Meadowcroft 2005),
ined entity in this process. In none of these we suggest that there are different, overlap-
perspectives is there much evidence of think- ping and contested phases of ESR. Our use
ing critically about the relationship – or ten- of the concept of ESR refers to the ways in
sion – between new forms of environmental which state and parastatal actors mobilise
regulation, the role of the state, and local and strategic interests and actors around eco-
regional development in a more integral – nomic development projects and social activ-
ecology and economy – sense. ities, which the state – or more accurately
certain actors within the state apparatus –
Even regulation theorists, for whom capi- regard as consistent with very specific and
talism has often shown signs of impending strategic environmental goals and outcomes
ecological crisis (Lipietz 1987), the environ- set at international and national levels (While
ment is treated as little more than an ‘extra- et al. 2010). Moreover, these strategic goals
economic condition’ for the establishment of
the mode of social regulation (MSR) ( Jessop 285
1997, 2002).The political-ecological content

ANDREW E.G. JONAS, AIDAN H. WHILE AND DAVID C. GIBBS

vary according to different political con- United States and countries in Europe
structions of environmental and economic (Schlosberg and Rinfret 2008). If the current
crises at respectively international, national, era has been captured under such headings as
regional and local scales. low-carbon capitalism, peak oil, decarbonisa-
tion, or climate change (Newman et al. 2009),
For example, the period from the early we choose to refer to it in terms of the rise
1970s and 1980s might be categorised as of carbon control regimes (CCRs). Crucially,
the era of ‘pollution control’, a period when CCRs operate not just nationally but also
there were growing public concerns about around localities and regions.
the impact of industrialisation and urbanisa-
tion on natural resources and human health. The conditions for the emergence of
This period was succeeded by the era of sus- CCRs at the national scale can be traced back
tainable development.This era was predicated to the 1980s and 1990s.The Intergovernmental
on a reorientation of, rather than a challenge Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) reported
to, growth-oriented accumulation strategies. in 1990 on the seriousness of the dangers of
Whether it has been beneficial for the envi- climate change. Global warming was also a
ronment remains in some considerable doubt leading consideration at the 1992 Rio Earth
given a lack of prescription in environmental Summit leading to the United Nations
target-setting (Owens and Cowell 2002). For Framework Convention on Climate Change
some writers, elements of the sustainability (UNFCCC) (Henson 2006: 272).The Kyoto
agenda have resonated with competitiveness Protocol of 1997 subsequently recognised
and the rise of the neo-liberal ‘competition the need for mandatory reductions, requiring
state’ (Keil 2007), allowing discourses of sus- industrialised countries to reduce their col-
tainable development to be internalised lective emissions of six greenhouse gases by
within neo-liberalism even as environmental 5.2 per cent over the period 2008 to 2012
protection, health care and social services compared to the year 1990 (United Nations
have been drastically cut back (Gibbs 2006). 1988). Since then states have sought various
ways of meeting international targets for
If pollution control and sustainable devel- emissions reduction.
opment have been the dominant – some-
times overlapping – dimensions of ESR in Given that some states did not ratify Kyoto,
the period 1970 to 2005, since around 2005 we might expect to see different national
state environmental regulation has entered a CCRs emerge as the eco-restructuring of
new phase (for further details, see While et al. the state meshes with distinct national modes
2010).This phase is marked by an instrumen- of regulation. For example, in the United
tal goal of reducing as quickly and efficiently States, the Chicago Climate Exchange
as possible the major greenhouse gas emis- (CCX) was established in 2003 to provide a
sions, and especially carbon dioxide. voluntary but legally binding trading
Ostensibly this era of carbon crisis is recogni- system for North America, supplemented
tion of the need to maintain carbon concen- by the Chicago Climate Futures Exchange,
trations in the atmosphere at levels sufficient the world’s first environmental derivative
to avoid dangerous and irreversible climate exchange. By 2008, CCX had nearly
change. The point we want to make is that 300 members drawn from the private and
carbon control is partly about protecting public sectors, all making a legally binding
society from the environmental damage asso- commitment to meet annual reduction tar-
ciated with global climate change, but gets set against their emissions baseline (see
it also serves other political-economic agen- www.chicagoclimatex.com, accessed August
das that are nation-state specific, not least 2008). There are plans to further roll out
increased anxiety about the rising costs and the CCX model with separate territorial-
future supply problems of oil and gas in the ised climate trading systems in California,

286

C A RB ON CONT ROL REGIM ES, ECO - S TATE R ES TRU C TU R IN G AN D TH E POLITIC S

New York and New England. In contrast to competing pressures and demands around
the CCX, which was based on voluntary environmental regulation – is being passed
agreements, the EU adopted a mandatory down to local and regional institutions in
Emissions Trading Scheme for large com- different national contexts.
panies in 2005 (Bailey 2007). CCRs in
Europe will nevertheless incorporate princi- Although our present interest is in CCRs
ples of subsidiarity and to that extent we rec- as a new dimension of state territoriality, our
ognise that the eco-restructuring of the state past research indicates that state institutions
must have a territorial – or scaled down – at various scales have responded to pressures
dimension. and demands for environmental regulation
by engaging in a search for a ‘sustainability
The eco-restructuring of the fix’ (While et al. 2004). By this we mean that
state and the down-scaling state environmental policy is always medi-
of CCRs ated by place- and scalar-specific interests,
including the presence (or absence) of terri-
The question of the state’s territorial struc- torial development coalitions pursuing strong
ture looms large in any analysis of the politics competitiveness vis-à-vis environmental sus-
of local and regional development (Cox tainability agendas. For the state, the possibil-
and Jonas 1993). Pressures for the rescaling – ity that environmental concerns – including
or, more precisely, the downscaling – of more recent concerns around reducing
environmental policy have been examined carbon emissions – are mediated (and often
by the likes of Bulkeley (2005) and Bailey driven) in the first instance by local and
(2007). Anticipating a debate about the use regional interests (interests in, for example,
of scalar concepts in human geography economic development and the collective
(Marston et al. 2005; Jonas 2006), Bulkeley provision of services) leaves some scope for
critiques a prevailing fetish for hierarchical mediating between these different interests
notions of scalar politics as represented in a in the following ways: by (1) passing respon-
‘cascade model’ of climate change govern- sibility for carbon emissions reduction on to
ance.While it is quite likely that CCRs will localities and their constituent firms (work-
be rolled out by international and national places) and residents (living places);
governments across localities and regions, we (2) introducing market-based mechanisms in
too caution against any approach that treats environmental policy as a mechanism for
CCRs as if they operate around a neatly stimulating inter-territorial competition;
ordered hierarchy of international-national- (3) providing incentives to public–private
local state ‘scales’. partnerships that pursue low carbon invest-
ment strategies – or what we have elsewhere
Nevertheless, what is clear is that local termed ‘carbon offsetting the urban growth
and regional authorities have continued to machine’ (While et al. 2010); and (4) devel-
assume greater responsibility for environmen- oping new regional or city-regional forms of
tal policy implementation, and increasingly governance. We explore each of these four
this has had to be factored into economic possibilities in a bit more detail before
development strategy. In part this expanded addressing the limits to progressive low
remit of local and regional environmental carbon alternatives.
policy is simply a reflection of the increased
demands being placed on nation-states, but CCRs as a new locality politics
there are important questions about how
responsibility for environmental policy – Carbon control is likely to mean some
including responsibility for reconciling form of territorially based target within

287

ANDREW E.G. JONAS, AIDAN H. WHILE AND DAVID C. GIBBS

nation-states, and perhaps a more free- by implication, a disincentive) in inter-local
wheeling form of ‘cap and trade’ that enables and inter-regional competition. Alongside
cities or regions to buy or sell carbon credits. the usual bundle of goods and services that
National carbon reductions can be achieved municipal or regional authorities are expected
without the need to devise specific targets to provide to residents and investors, effective
for sub-national territorial units, but there carbon control pricing strategies would be
are various political and technical advantages marketed for the savings they represent for
to devolving responsibility (though not nec- local businesses and residents. Here the abil-
essarily power) for some of the hard deci- ity to ‘vote with one’s feet’ (Tiebout 1955)
sions around climate change politics to might be taken literally to mean providing
individual localities. Aside from the vexed prices and incentives for residents and firms
question of where the carbon costs of things to move to a local jurisdiction that reduces
that move – notably cars, airplanes, traded dependence on fossil fuels or invests in alter-
goods and services, labour power, etc. – are to native modes of transport. Indeed, cities and
be located, it would be fairly straightforward regions are likely to want to engage in a ‘race
to find a proxy measure for sub-national to the top’ and be seen as leaders in meeting
carbon emissions in terms of energy use. more stringent emissions reduction targets.
Territorial carbon budgets would therefore This might already be happening.
sit alongside the range of other regulatory
obligations and incentives for carbon reduc- In July 2009, the UK government
tion that are being passed downwards to announced its plans to introduce Low Carbon
firms, individuals and public agencies, and Economic Areas (LCEAs) as part of a national
hence also to localities. A distinct possibility Low Carbon Industrial Strategy (see http://
is that it would be left to individual localities www.number10.gov.uk/Page20072, accessed
to determine how to respond to national July 2009). LCEAs are designed to foster
expectations and requirements; in other cooperation between regional development
words CCRs could reflect locality-specific agencies, companies, and local authorities
priorities. Sub-national emissions reduction involved in the development of alternative
targets would mean that difficult local choices energy supplies and low carbon industries
would have to be made about local invest- and supply chains. This announcement
ment decisions on the basis of carbon impacts. was accompanied by a decision by Nissan
Crucially, the trade-offs around different Corporation to invest over £200 million in a
economic development strategies would not new rechargeable lithium-ion battery facility
be restricted simply to industrial or commer- to be located near its European car manufac-
cial development, but would extend into turing operations in the North East of
residential development and household England.The North East region claims to be
energy use. Local authorities will need to the UK’s – and the world’s – first LCEA.
secure their own CCRs within the targets However, other UK regions such as the
they have been set, weighing up the costs South West have likewise claimed to be the
and savings of actions in the social, economic ‘first’ LCEA (see http://www.clickgreen.
and environmental spheres. org.uk/news/national-news/12340-south-
west-named-uks-first-low-carbon-economic-
Carbon reduction and area.html, accessed July 2009).
inter-territorial competition
In the US, the CCX recognises that
A second possibility is that carbon control strong carbon management will help posi-
simply becomes an additional incentive (or, tion member cities and states (see Table 24.1)
for economic opportunities including the
288 possibility for additional federal funds
from the Obama Administration for major

C A RB ON CONT ROL REGIM ES, ECO - S TATE R ES TRU C TU R IN G AN D TH E POLITIC S

Table 24.1 State and local government ‘Look! No more emissions!’ to the typologies
membership of the Chicago Climate Exchange of urban representational regimes identified
in Short (1999).
States
State of Illinois Carbon offsetting territorial
State of New Mexico growth coalitions

Counties Third, there will certainly be opportunities
King County,Washington for rethinking the cost-benefit calculations
Miami-Dade County, Florida of mobilising growth coalitions around the
Sacramento County, California pursuit of pro-growth economic develop-
ment strategies. Assuming carbon targets are
Municipalities distributed equally to places on a per capita
City of Aspen basis, carbon control might offer incentives
City of Berkeley for mobile capital to seek out local alterna-
City of Boulder tives to overheating growth hot-spots; alter-
City of Chicago natively, target regimes would offer incentives
City of Fargo for regions and localities to invest in ‘smart
City of Melbourne,Australia growth’ planning and fiscal zoning tools
City of Oakland designed to reduce carbon output. Such smart
City of Portland growth regulations have developed furthest
in the US, but similar provisions have been
Source:Adapted from http://www.chicagoclimatex. transferred into UK planning policies (Falk
com/content.jsf (accessed August 2008) 2004; Krueger and Gibbs 2008; and see the
UK’s Planning Policy Statement 1: Planning
infrastructural projects. Some cities (e.g. and Climate Change (2007) www.commu-
Seattle) even claim to have introduced a nities.gov.uk/publications/planningand
target of becoming ‘emissions neutral’ by building/ppsclimatechange, accessed June
2050. Within a ‘cap and trade’ model, those 2009). National governments might further
cities, counties or states without effective opt to incentivise private–public regenera-
carbon reduction strategies in place may be tion partnerships by introducing some form
forced to buy extra carbon credits, compro- of contract and convergence mechanism,
mising their ability to fund other aspects of with an emphasis on carbon-efficient use of
collective provision. Economically marginal land and infrastructure rather than a ‘winner
communities, however, might find it more takes all’ form of urban competition. One
difficult to find matching local funds for can envision a variety of ways in which
infrastructure investments or to engage the carbon control can be deployed alongside
electorate in necessary carbon reduction existing neo-liberal measures used by
measures,thereby compromising their chance state agencies to incentivize and activate ter-
of federal funds. In all likelihood, then, this ritorial growth coalitions (cf. Jessop et al.
type of CCR will reinforce the neo-liberal 1999).
tendency for successful places – especially
the global cities – to reinforce their already New forms of city-regionalism
privileged status by attracting additional state
funding or local tax revenues (Hodson and Finally, unlike the concept of ‘splintered
Marvin 2007). For example, in his capacity urbanism’ – where different parts of the same
as Mayor of London Ken Livingstone was
active in positioning the city as a world leader 289
in governance for climate change with the
further aspiration to ‘lead the world in
becoming a low-carbon city’ (Mayor of
London 2005, 2007). Such overt low carbon
boosterism encourages us to add the slogan

ANDREW E.G. JONAS, AIDAN H. WHILE AND DAVID C. GIBBS

city-region have become ever more jurisdic- pursuit of alternative forms of economic
tionally fragmented and disconnected from development (Agyeman et al. 2003). For
each other (Graham and Marvin 2001) – the example, in the UK initiatives such as the
logic of carbon control involves forging new Transition Towns Movement provide fora for
city-regional connections – or perhaps even communities and residents in smaller towns
reconnections. It is possible that carbon and deprived communities to rethink their
budgets will lead to the development of dependence on fossil fuels and traditional
formal regional governance in places where energy sources (Transition Towns 2006).This
businesses and politicians have already devel- is crucial as it is becoming increasingly appar-
oped a strong culture of regional coopera- ent that the poor and powerless in localities
tion despite the fragmentation of local and regions both in the global North and the
jurisdictional arrangements. Denver in the South will suffer most from the consequences
US appears to be a good example where of climate change.
regional cooperation has been instrumental
in the development of infrastructure, includ- In contrast with the weak trade-offs of
ing a new light rail network linking the cen- sustainable development, the logic of CCRs
tral city to surrounding suburbs and centres at different scales means that countries,
of high-tech industry. The development firms and places will be required to account
and extension of the network, known as for ecologically unsustainable behaviours.
FasTracks, appears to represent a break from In this respect, there are important links to
the Denver region’s economic dependence be explored between carbon budgeting
on high energy consumption and fossil-fuel and work on alternative economic spaces
infrastructure. Regionalism in this respect (Leyshon et al. 2003; North 2009). Seyfang
might entail new city-regional interdepend- (2007) envisages potential for social redistri-
encies based on alternative energy supplies bution via personal carbon trading, which
and infrastructures. Such interdependencies would not only tax unsustainable behaviour
would be expected to reflect not just con- but allow green citizens to trade their unused
tiguous boundaries but also revenue sharing, credits, with the assumption being that as
new alliances between workers, employers they emit less greenhouse gases than the
and public agencies, the development of new wealthy, the poor would gain most from per-
industry clusters, or a shared public sense of sonal carbon trading. Work by the New
environmental and health security (see e.g. Economics Foundation on the Green New
Krueger and Savage 2007). CCRs might Deal is exemplary in this respect (Green New
also be developed around cross-territorial Deal Group 2008); albeit the fate of the
networks of localities and regions, which Foundation’s version of the Green New Deal
share in common existing energy supplies demonstrates how such progressive agendas
and infrastructures or engage in the develop- can quickly be co-opted by mainstream
ment of new environmental industries and political parties to serve wider state interests.
alternative energy sources. Much may depend here on how much CCRs
(and those devising them) reflect the need
Towards alternative low carbon for a paradigmatic shift in economic devel-
forms of local and regional opment trajectories or, as in ‘weak’ forms of
development ecological modernisation, are envisaged as
new sources of markets and innovation to
There is much about the new era of carbon kick-start more conventional economic
control that might be welcomed in terms of growth (Barry and Doran 2006; Milanez and
social justice, distributional equity and the Bührs 2007). For example, one might com-
pare the kinds of economic future envisaged
290 in the aforementioned UK government’s low

C A RB ON CONT ROL REGIM ES, ECO - S TATE R ES TRU C TU R IN G AN D TH E POLITIC S

carbon economy industrial strategy (www. discourse, rationalities and practices of
hmg.gov.uk/lowcarbon, accessed June 2009) state environmental regulation, particularly
with those of low-impact developments out- in terms of the use of market-based environ-
lined in Pickerill and Maxey (2009). mental policy instruments to re-regulate
economy–environment and state–citizen
Nonetheless, it is perhaps one of the iro- relations. This phase involves a hard-edged
nies of this period of ESR that the holistic instrumental concern with reducing carbon
perspective of sustainable development and dioxide emissions into the upper atmosphere
especially its ethical-moral concern with as a first order policy concern. It reflects a
uneven development and social equity has new realism about anthropogenic climate
dropped out of the equation in the push to change and the rising costs of oil dependence
meet the more instrumental goal of carbon in Western nations.
reduction. Indeed, our concept of ‘carbon
control regimes’ anticipates that a less socially In the process, new carbon reduction
progressive low carbon future is a more likely policy instruments devised nationally could
trajectory of the current round of ESR. be passed down to local and regional institu-
Carbon control portends a new cultural tions and state structures in the form of ter-
hegemony of increasing environmental sur- ritorial CCRs. So if localities, regions and,
veillance as local and regional economies increasingly, city-regions are to be seen as
struggle to adjust to global economic and strategic sites for innovation, creativity and
environmental crises. This is because carbon economic development, they are also likely
reduction measures could have disciplining to be places where experiments in carbon
effects not so much on capital as on labour reduction are likely to take place. As policy
by contributing to surveillance strategies – makers and practitioners seek to adjust to the
both in the workplace and living place – and new political and economic imperatives of
forcing some employers to (threaten to) relo- carbon control, new strategic and calculative
cate and avoid CCRs or go out of business practices will be introduced into local and
altogether. regional development. Given the amount
of economic activities and uses currently
Conclusions dependent on fossil fuels, local and regional
‘environmental’ policy under CCRs is likely
This chapter has explored the unfolding rela- to have potential implications for all areas of
tionship between local and regional develop- local and regional development strategy and
ment and the eco-restructuring of the state, practice. It calls into question the prevailing
and has introduced the concept of carbon ecological and economic rationalities of infra-
control regimes (CCRs). The re-regulation structural investments and energy uses which
of society and space around the goal of eco- underpin connections across space as well as
logical protection continues to gather pace in situ. Notably, CCRs shift policy attention
and move out in new directions and argua- to the wider systems of urban and regional
bly away from sustainable development and circulation: to flows of fuel, transportation,
ecological modernisation (cf. Mol 2002). A carbon and so forth. Infrastructure is a particu-
decisive shift might already have occurred, larly important arena of investment and eco-
from pollution control and sustainable devel- nomic development where carbon reduction
opment – which comprised initial waves of and economic development trade-offs are likely
state-environmental regulation in the late to be made. Different interests dependent
twentieth century – to the new territorial on working and living in urban places under-
politics of carbon control. In our view, CCRs going infrastructural developments will posi-
could mark a distinct phase in the dominant tion themselves differently in relation to
CCRs.

291

ANDREW E.G. JONAS, AIDAN H. WHILE AND DAVID C. GIBBS

A further aim of the chapter has been to to the US examples. The chapter has also
contribute to recent debates about the benefited from comments on an earlier draft
rescaling of the state, particularly in terms of by the editors.The usual disclaimers apply.
thinking through the processes underpinning
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urlVersion=0&_userid=224739&md5=eefb2 tal governance: towards a politics of scales and
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(An imaginative application of the concept of
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Interpreting Sustainability in the Planning Process, Global Environmental Governance, New York:
London: Routledge. Routledge. (Excellent monograph on the
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Peck, J. and Tickell, A. (1992) “Local modes for urban sustainability governance.)
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294

25

Competitive cities and problems
of democracy

Colin Crouch

Introduction on high-quality public facilities and social
infrastructure (OECD 2006a:137–152).More
Cities and regions are under increasing generally, living in a competitive city is likely
pressure to strengthen their economic com- to satisfy local citizens better than living in
petitiveness. As investment funds have an uncompetitive one. The problems raised
become thoroughly internationalized, even for democracy through local competitive-
globalized, local public elites have both ness strategies, at least in wealthier societies,
opportunities and needs to strengthen the are more subtle, and mainly relate to the
prosperity of their areas by attracting exter- following issues:
nal investment and providing environments
in which economic activities can flourish. i) The geographical areas around which
The implications of these developments for competitiveness strategies can be
local democracy are ambiguous and com- developed are unlikely to correspond
plex, and have been the object of a number to the contours of elected political
of studies. authorities.

This is not necessarily a story of the qual- ii) This fact, together with other attempts
ity of public services and urban amenities at fitting political institutions to a
being driven down in a race to the bottom as search for competitiveness, places a pre-
city authorities offer tax breaks to inward mium on mixed forms of governance,
investors, depriving themselves of resources threatening to dilute the role of dem-
to invest in the quality of life of their cities. ocratic institutions within governance.
Such processes do take place, particularly in
developing and some transition economies, iii) Stress on competitiveness and inward
where national and local authorities seek investment tends to make local (and
competitiveness through low cost. But many national) political authorities heavily
localities seek instead to attract high-value- dependent on corporate interests,which
added activities and to make themselves may also be reflected within the mixed
attractive places to live in for skilled profes- governance discussed under (ii).
sionals (Florida 2002). This can involve the
opposite strategy of increasing expenditure The following discussion will address each of
these issues in turn.

295

COLIN CROUCH from easy access by citizens, democracy
becomes more difficult to practise (Stoker
Democracy and flexible 2004a, 2004b). From a different perspective,
geography advocates of public choice through market
mechanisms (e.g. Tiebout 1956) consider it
It is possible to identify geographical areas important that citizens be able to “vote with
that, more or less, constitute economic units, their feet” and move out of local jurisdictions
in the sense that most journeys to work take that they find politically unacceptable or
place within them, supplier networks are administratively inefficient without much
dense within their boundaries, and collective disruption to their lives by moving house
institutions (such as technical colleges) in the over long distances.They therefore advocate
area’s specialisms are likely to be grouped geographically small local government units.
within them. In advanced economies these
areas can usually be identified as metropoli- Voluntary cooperation can of course
tan regions, bringing together either a domi- develop among neighbouring authorities,
nant city and several smaller ones, or a group and there are increasing examples of this,
of more or less equal cities. The OECD has such as the Local and Multi-Area Agreements
identified at least 78 of these among its in the UK. There are however difficulties
member states, and economic activity and when a diversity of authorities, often of dif-
dynamism in the wealthy countries are con- ferent political colour, try to tackle issues
centrated within these spaces (OECD 2006a). jointly. Local taxation systems designed to
In some cases (e.g. the Öresund region of give local authorities autonomous sources of
Sweden and Denmark), or the region around revenue (itself an important attribute of local
Vienna (Austria) and Bratislava (Slovakia) an democracy) often give them perverse incen-
economic region crosses national frontiers. tives – for example, by encouraging suburban
There are advantages for competitiveness authorities to establish decentralized business
strategies if public decision-making can be districts in order to reap returns from busi-
made at the level of a defined economic ness taxes,creating urban sprawl,when it might
region. However, not only are the bounda- be both more efficient and environmentally
ries of economic regions flexible in relation better to concentrate certain activities within
to political boundaries; they also change. a central city.
Furthermore, the fact that an economic
region exists for some purposes (say, com- Further, a high level of institutional frag-
muting patterns) does not mean that it has mentation can mean that some local jurisdic-
the same boundaries for others (e.g. supplier tions, generally central cities, bear the costs of
relations). This triple flexibility presents public services used by the residents of other
democracy with problems (OECD 2006a: areas without receiving income for them –
101–135). Political authorities have bounda- for example, coping with the strains imposed
ries that need to remain stable, subject only by commuting traffic and disposing of litter
to periodic boundary reviews, if citizens are dropped in the city during the working day.
to identify with them.There are also advan- In other words, lack of cooperation on a ter-
tages if local administrations can provide dif- ritorial base can lead to a mismatch between
ferent services and infrastructures across a decision-makers, taxpayers, and beneficiaries
similar geographical scale, as there are usually of public services (OECD 2006a: 156–158).
dense links among them. Also, an integrated
economic region can contain several million A number of approaches have been devel-
people, raising problems of scale for local oped in different parts of the world to recon-
democracy. cile these conflicting demands on cities, and
have been summarized by the OECD (ibid.
Advocates of “localism” argue that, as 158–200) as follows. Each contains a different
decision-making levels become removed balance between democracy, appropriateness

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COMPETITIVE CITIES AND PROBLEMS OF DEMOCRACY

of scale and flexibility, and none is able to directly elected assembly (Lefevre 2004;
optimize that relationship: OECD 2006b).
iii) Informal coordination bodies such
i) Functional models whereby govern- as platforms, associations or strategic
ance structures are reshaped to fit or planning partnerships, often relying
approximate to the economic area on existing networks of relevant actors,
(e.g. by the creation of a metropolitan without necessarily following territo-
government and the amalgamation of rial boundaries. A problem is caused
municipalities).This can be done only for democratic government by the
occasionally, as it involves complex fact that the appropriate boundary
political processes, and may eventually will probably vary according to the
lead to the erection of large authori- function or goal in question.This is of
ties remote from citizens. It is advo- course an issue even where local gov-
cated by those who believe in the ernment takes a tiered form of such
superior efficiencies of scale and pri- entities as regions, provinces, counties,
oritize this goal over both flexibility of cities, districts. It is magnified when
organizational form and local account- attempts are made to form different
ability (Newton 1982). Compared task-specific agencies that cut across
with some of the other forms to be this existing structure.
discussed below, such formal struc-
tural reforms do produce bodies with Both (ii) and (iii) are advocated by the “New
democratic accountability, but the Regionalism” school (Savitch and Vogel
strength of this will depend on local 2000).This school does not accept that polit-
acceptance of the enlarged structure – ical regulation should only be organized by
the “culture of cooperation” or “actor public bodies. Rather, metropolitan govern-
behaviour” that they induce (Kübler ance is seen as organized by more or less
and Heinelt 2005). For example, in formal and stable systems of different actors,
Stuttgart and Lyon the creation of involving structures of network cooperation
metropolis-wide governments derived between public and private actors with a
from long traditions of cooperation, relatively weak institutionalization (Walter-
in the latter case dating back to Rogg 2006). However, where there is a mix
the 1960s. of private and public bodies in such flexible
governance forms, flexibility is purchased at
ii) Inter-municipal joint authorities for the expense of clarity in the specific identity
specific tasks,such as agencies for trans- of democratic bodies, as these are mixed with
port, urban planning or economic the representatives of private firms in the
development. These provide a more governance structures.This will be discussed
flexible form and retain actual demo- again below.
cratic accountability at a more local
level, but at the expense of democracy Finally:
becoming more indirect, as the joint
authority is not itself accountable, iv) Purely fiscal arrangements such as
only its constituent municipalities. equalization mechanisms and tax-base
This has been an issue, for example, sharing to deal with fiscal disparities and
in France, where Urban Communities territorial spill–over as well as public–
and Agglomeration Communities have private partnerships and contract
been given an increasing range of services. These again raise issues of
responsibilities and larger and larger public–private relations that will be dis-
budgets without being run by a cussed in a later section of this chapter.

297

COLIN CROUCH

A further problem for democracy is created of governance (e.g. Hollingsworth and Boyer
by trends towards geographical segregation 1997; Hollingsworth et al. 2002; Crouch
on class and ethnic grounds that frequently 2005) and those who see a historical trend
occur in very large urban spaces (Le Galès away from government towards other forms
2004; OECD 2006a: 190–200). There are of governance, in particular networks (e.g.
conflicts over the location of large, essential Giddens 1998; Greenwood et al. 2002; Leach
but unattractive elements of urban infrastruc- and Percy-Smith 2001; Rhodes 1997). The
ture, such as major roads or waste-disposal intricacies of this dispute do not concern
plants, which everyone needs but no one us here.
wants to live near. Formal government at
remote levels is unlikely to cope with these The whole process of authorities being
problems, and may make some of them worse concerned for the economic competitiveness
because of its remoteness from street level. of their areas brings the market to bear as a
Further, the conditions of modern city life source of decision-making and regulation.
generate various social movements and pro- Engagement with private firms in such
tests that cannot easily translate themselves matters as regional development authorities
into formal political and administrative terms. or contracting out public services brings
These movements, while not democratic in private corporate hierarchies into local gov-
the formal sense of having participated in ernance. The mobilization of civil society
elections, are indicators of the health of a groups can be seen as engaging networks and
vibrant civil society that is part of the infra- communities.
structure of democracy. Problems appear
when one tries to distinguish between a Some, mainly British, scholars would also
democracy-reinforcing civil society group, argue that the overall structure of “new” gov-
and a lobby using its power to undermine ernance thereby produced is itself a network,
democratic processes. with different participants linked horizon-
tally rather than in a hierarchy coming down
Flexible governance from formal government (Giddens 1998;
Greenwood et al. 2002; Leach and Percy-
The above discussion has introduced a Smith 2001; Rhodes 1997). During the
number of themes that are usually discussed 1990s “lightness” (or “living on thin air” in
within the framework of governance theory. the memorable phrase of Charles Leadbeater
This theory maintains that the regulation (1999) became seen as a desirable character-
of social life cannot be studied through the istic of institutions. This was a period when
concept of formal political government many large enterprises were ostensibly“down-
alone, but through a range of mechanisms, sizing” and “delayering”, and government
the word governance being used to distin- seemed clumsy alongside it. One says that
guish this broader idea from that of gov- firms were “ostensibly” downsizing, because
ernment. The other mechanisms usually they were simultaneously often becoming
discussed include markets, corporate hierar- enormous global businesses. Elimination of
chies (or the authority of the firm), business some middle layers of an organization and
associations and trade unions, networks, and the use of sub contracting rather than direct
communities. This much is agreed among a employment enabled shrinking to be com-
wide range of observers. There is however a patible with centralization of decision-
major division between those who use these making and the growth of an organization.
ideas purely analytically, and who see gov-
ernment as one among a number of modes It was also the period when stock markets
were discovering the possibilities of second-
298 ary markets and derivatives, enabling the
trading of stocks and making money to
become divorced from productive economic

COMPETITIVE CITIES AND PROBLEMS OF DEMOCRACY

activities. Lightness was seen, not just as a lit- For example, Svensson and Östhol (2003)
eral quality of high-tech and services sector discuss the “growth agreements” in Swedish
activities in contrast with “heavy” industry, regional partnerships, which include meas-
but as a desired organizational characteristic ures for dealing with such problems as the
of all institutions suited to the post-Fordist public/private balance and accountability.
economy (Giddens 1998). Rapid mobility However, the problem of which groups
and flexibility of structures were considered should be included within the networks has
to enable government to resemble, not just remained unresolved, as there are no clear
firms, but the market itself in its flexible and tests for entitlement to participate once one
rapid adjustment to changing needs. The has moved outside formal democracy.
search for flexible forms of governance of
local and regional economies is a key instance. Paradoxically, when authorities deal with
Networks were preferred to formal associa- individual firms such problems are not raised.
tions for the same reason. The former can Firms do not claim to be representative; they
adjust quickly and flexibly; the latter have lobby authorities in pursuit of contracts and
rather rigid structures and definitions of privileges for themselves, on the grounds of
their scope. what their activities can achieve for eco-
nomic growth in the territory concerned.
Our main focus here is on the democratic That is the only legitimation that they need,
quality of these different governance modes, but their participation raises problems for
as this might enable us to answer whether both the proper functioning of markets and
shifts among them in local and regional the delivery of collective competition goods.
affairs are likely to have implications for Moulaert and colleagues (2001), after exam-
democratic responsiveness. Only actual gov- ining large new urban projects in a number
ernment can possess the formal quality of of European countries, argue that the rheto-
democratic accountability, though whether ric of the market is used by public authorities
individual governments have the substantive to conceal granting privileged access to
quality of public responsiveness that might favoured corporate insiders. This confusion
be assumed to follow from this attribute between the market and corporate hierar-
varies. Only markets, provided they are true chies is a very common error in public poli-
markets, are certain to be responsive in this cy-making. Similarly, according to Novy et al.
way, but the market cannot be called demo- (2001), new coalitions of city council, busi-
cratic. Only governments, associations and ness and academics in Vienna made urban
corporations are formal legal identities; policy a fragmented, privatized, opaque and
this attribute makes them more accountable ad hoc area. A study of another, particularly
at law, but also makes them less flexible. large, project, that of the recent reconstruc-
Flexibility is most certainly possessed by the tion of Berlin,describes how corporate actors
market and networks. Changes in govern- used city authorities in order to unload
ance arrangements will therefore have impli- market risk on to the city, with (the authors
cations for this bundle of qualities:democracy, argue) strong negative effects (Häussermann
responsiveness, accountability, flexibility. It and Simons 2000).
is however not necessarily easy to work these
out a priori, and without well-founded The role of networks in the governance
knowledge of particular cases. of strong territorial economies is well
known, from the Italian industrial districts
Burroni et al. (2005) are sceptical of those (Burroni and Trigilia 2001) to Silicon Valley
who claim to see a major historical trend to (Kenney 2000). Patrucco (2003) describes
“light” governance, but do see a wide diversity how different kinds of institution worked
of different combinations of governance modes. together to produce a true complementarity
They speak of “kaleidoscopic” governance. of communication and networks in the

299

COLIN CROUCH

technological district of Brianza in northern a private interest in certain development
Italy. Sydow and Staber (2002), Baumann projects to seek to influence local policy
(2002), Baumann and Voelzkow (2004), and concerning them; has the rhetoric of net-
Elbing et al. (2009) have similarly described work governance simply provided legitima-
the role of multi-participant project net- tion for what, from stricter constitutional
works in German and British television. perspectives, is a dubious practice?
Formal levels of government do however
often play a role in such innovations. Izushi The successful networked economies tend
(1999) describes the role of the Welsh to be rather special places, produced by
Development Agency in promoting inter- chance combinations of factors that are dif-
firm cooperation among suppliers. Several ficult to reproduce at will: there have been
studies show that, even when production many unsuccessful attempts at creating new
becomes internationalized, inter-firm rela- Silicon Valleys. At times the loose, light
tions and other networks around techno- arrangements of new governance experi-
logical issues retain important local or ments may be not so much an ideal new
regional focuses: Swedish machinery pro- model of institutions as the best that can be
ducers (Larsson and Malmberg 1999); high- achieved in poor circumstances. This has
tech small ICT firms around Cambridge in been proposed by a recent literature on
the UK (Keeble et al. 1999), certain Dutch the advantages and disadvantages of light,
towns (Atzema (2001) and industrial districts flexible “projects” as opposed to heavy, firmly
of Italy (Burroni 2001, 2007); the biophar- established institutions (Grabher 2002).
maceutical sector around Oxford (Proudfoot
2004). Kaufmann and Tödtling (2000) report Grabher’s contrast between “cool projects
a similar mix of local and global for older and boring institutions” is ironic, as “boring”
industrial districts in Styria in Austria. They turns out to imply useful stability, but
put the emphasis the other way round – on Dornisch (2002) takes him rather literally
the fact that firms are inserted in European when discussing the state of economic regen-
as well as local networks; but the findings eration in the Łódz´ region of Poland.
also support the hypothesis of the continu- Formerly the site of a major textile and
ing importance of the local. clothing industry, the region was in severe
economic and institutional decline after the
The concept of networks is embraced very fall of the Soviet system, and (like most tex-
easily by policy-makers, partly because the tile districts in Europe) competition from
idea has been associated with these and other low-cost producers in Asia. There had to be
“success stories”, but also because the appar- highly contingent, improvised experiments
ent looseness and non-specificity of the idea with chance sets of actors. Dornisch sees
fits very well with the new “light” govern- advantages here. Because of the diversity,
ance concept. It may seem that if local actors people are “learning through switching”
from polity, economy and civil society come (ibid.: 310), a quality uniquely produced by
together, pooling their different and often the transition context, and particularly suited
complementary governance resources, they to projects. He argues that it was precisely
will produce networks with a rich diversity the “volatile discontinuity” and “loose cou-
of possibilities. But it is not clear whether pling” of the project approach that helped
central government policies of fragmenting achieve success and rapid moves away from
their own organizations in order to equip unsuccessful paths (ibid.: 315). On the other
them to participate in such governance, or hand, more recent research on the same area
requiring local authorities to interact with (Burroni et al. 2008) suggested that small-
private firms results in the generation of net- scale clothing manufacturing activities in
works. It is by no means new for firms having the area had been unable to get beyond very
informal arrangements and limited products,
300

COMPETITIVE CITIES AND PROBLEMS OF DEMOCRACY

because of an absence of strong supporting leverage over wider policies and resource
institutions. flows (Raco et al. 2003). However, these
authors do report positive achievements of
This research contrasted the Łódz´ case the system in bringing together public- and
with certain similar areas in southern Italy, private-sector actors in flexible local devel-
which had been able to take advantage of opment companies.
formal public policy and links to established
major firms. In the Italian cases it was formal Research on RDA activity in North East
local government which guided innovative England makes a different point, demonstrat-
experiments.The idea of “governance with- ing the ambiguities of any observed trends
out government” and of the role of light away from government and towards net-
institutions does not seem to be confirmed; works (Pike 2002). The author argues that
on the contrary, both local governments and central government rather than local actors
formal business and labour associations invest took the leading role, by creating 28 separate
in the experience of local development pacts and temporary “task forces”, designed to
in order to reinforce their own legitimacy forge new entities between state and market.
within local society, and thereby help embed These have been very flexible units of central
the pact itself as a form of real co-operation government engaged with local government
(Magnatti et al. 2005; Burroni 2005). The and other public agencies, as well as some
experience of the pacts also confirms firms. But Pike sees a problem of identifying
Grabher’s stress on the usefulness of stability, responsibility and legitimacy among the
as it favours: (1) the creation of mutual trust range of public agencies involved. He also
between public and private actors, (2) cumu- reports concern at the role of patronage
lative learning processes, and (3) the creation available to central government in such a
of collective goods with medium- and long- situation, and at the creation of “cosy circles”
term perspectives (Cersosimo and Wolleb of private and public insiders produced by
2001; De Vivo 2004; Magnatti et al. 2005). such an opaque process of identifying salient
participants.
Major examples of “mixed governance” in
the UK are the Regional Development A study of “partnership governance” in
Agencies (RDAs).These are creatures of cen- rural Wales similarly suggests that the rheto-
tral government, there being no formal and ric of partnership is used to remove compe-
democratic tier of regional government in tence from local government, either upwards
most of the UK. English RDAs comprise to a regional level or down to “communities” –
individuals appointed by central government hence in fact enhancing the role of the cen-
from various central government agencies, tral state (Edwards et al. 2001). The authors
representatives of local authorities, private report that partnerships are able to cross old
business, trade unions and the voluntary hierarchical lines and link unfamiliar part-
sector. Fuller et al. (2002) suggest that the ners, mainly within the public sector, in pre-
lack of discretionary power and resources has cisely the way expected by “new governance”
undermined the capacity of RDAs to pursue writers. However, the authors make two fur-
strategic aims; and that in response to this ther points that are unexpected from this
they have concentrated on particular activi- perspective.The central state itself appears as
ties and have developed relations with cer- far from being “hollowed out” and weak-
tain partners only. A study of new forms of ened; rather it takes new powers, particularly
governance of redevelopment in Govan, a away from local government. Second, and
long-term depressed area in the Glasgow related to this, the state uses the new flexible
region in Scotland (where an RDA format forms to depart from the universalism of the
had been established before the institution historical modern state, selecting privileged
of devolution), also comments on the weak interlocutors from among the institutions in

301

COLIN CROUCH

the territory. The research was carried out called “networks” and “communities” of
before the establishment of a democratic such firms (Laschewski et al. 2002).
tier of regional government for Wales. Since
then, however, the shift from formal local Private firms and local
government to “communities” has been democracy
followed in England, symbolized in the
renaming of the local government ministry This last point leads us to the role of private
as the Department for Communities and firms in flexible new governance arrange-
Local Government. ments. This raises certain problems: the
protection of special interests, sometimes
Parallel with this change has been a com- those of dominant but declining sectors;
plex shift in the role of local government in the exclusion of the concerns of SMEs to
England.Under the Sustainable Communities the advantage of large corporations better
Act 2007 (UK Government 2007) local equipped to lobby; the neglect of other legit-
authorities were given the power to raise imate non-economic social interests (OECD
issues and carry out inquiries in a wide range 2006a: 212–215). For example, research on
of issues going beyond their specified formal Reading, a former railway town in South
competences. At the same time, however, East England, describes the pressure imposed
local authorities in this country as well as by central government to persuade the city
many others are under increasing pressure to authorities to operate through partnership
privatize or subcontract provision of their with private and voluntary sectors when
services to private firms, thereby losing sub- seeking a new role (Raco 2003). Reading has
stantive powers to take action themselves to as a result become a successful regional retail
provide services. The role of formal local centre, but the core group sharing govern-
democracy therefore shifts to being one of ance with the city council in determining
advocacy on behalf of citizens rather than the policy were certain national property-
acting as a public authority on their behalf. development firms, not local businesses, rep-
In this way the distinction between formal resentative business associations or the local
local government and informal community population. It is difficult to judge whether
groups is reduced. this was a case of external groups helping
a city find a future that it could not have pro-
Another group of researchers has also duced from its own past legacies, or a solu-
questioned whether there is a decentraliza- tion serving a particular set of interests.
tion to local levels in these new flexible Neither democratic political processes nor
structures, or in fact a centralization (North the market drove the policy.
et al. 2001;Valler et al. 2000).They go on to
make a further point, related to the “cosy Counsell and Haughton (2003) compared
circles” and “privileged interlocutors”, and efforts to provide employment sites for large-
to the previously observed shift in the par- scale inward investment in the two highly
ticipation of business interests away from contrasting English regions: the declining
associations to individual firms, selected North East and the prosperous South East of
without formal or open process by the polit- England. They found that new modes of
ical centre out of a large number of potential governance had enabled different groups to
contenders. Again, this is not the market but try to use the system to advance their own
the engagement of private corporate hierar- interests, in particular taking advantage of
chies in governance. A further study of the confused meaning given to the idea of
North East England similarly reports prob- “sustainable development”. Based on research
lems in the formation of small firm networks that he conducted on local regeneration
because of doubts over the legitimacy of so-

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COMPETITIVE CITIES AND PROBLEMS OF DEMOCRACY

partnerships in four urban areas in Northern other issues being discussed in this chapter,
and Eastern England (Barnsley, Rotherham, there is a wealth of research evidence from a
Hull and North East Lincolnshire), Davies variety of cities and countries.While these do
(2004) reached several similar conclusions. reveal the trends that have been discussed, they
He describes a complexity of governance also show considerable continuing diversity.
modes, which he attributes to the paradoxi-
cal pressures placed on the government to Acknowledgement
achieve certain public regeneration goals
while also giving primary weight to market This chapter draws heavily on work that the
forces. One consequence of this complexity author carried out for two projects: as aca-
was fragmentation and institutional instabil- demic adviser to the Organization for
ity; another was an increasing flow of power Economic Co-operation and Development
to central government. Partnerships did not, (OECD) for its report Competitive Cities in
he argues, produce the strong role for net- the Global Economy (OECD 2006a); and on
work governance that Rhodes (1997) and local economic development with Luigi
other advocates of the new governance Burroni and Maarten Keune (Burroni et al.
approach criticized above had predicted 2005).
(Davies 2004: 581).

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Further reading

Kübler, D. and Heinelt, H. (2005) Metropolitan
Governance:Capacity,Democracy and the Dynamics
of Place, London: Routledge.

Le Galès, P. (2004) European Cities, Oxford:
Oxford University Press.

OECD (2006a) Competitive Cities in the Global
Economy, Paris: OECD.

305

26

The politics of local and regional
development

Andrew Wood

Introduction literature that has now moved well beyond
the North American context in which it first
This chapter concerns work on the politics developed. The final section examines the
of local and regional development. I start out portability of the different approaches. In this
by situating the emergence of the literature section I emphasize their limitations and the
within the context of significant changes in need for a careful and measured appraisal of
the political economies of North America how well they travel.
and Western Europe.A shift in how cities are
governed coupled with the growing inten- The origin of work on the
sity of inter-locality competition stirred sig- politics of local and regional
nificant academic interest in the politics of development
local and regional development.The chapter
then examines three different theoretical The initial impetus for work on the politics
approaches that grapple with the politics of of local and regional development can be
local and regional development. The first traced to a series of profound changes in
concerns the concept of urban entrepre- the nature of the advanced capitalist econo-
neurialism and the related rise of a new urban mies of North America and Western Europe.
politics (Harvey 1989). The second centres Variously described as a period of economic
on the concept of the growth machine restructuring or deindustrialization, the late
(Molotch 1976; Logan and Molotch 1987). 1970s and 1980s marked a transition from
The chapter turns, third, to examine the the relatively stable period of post-1945
notion of the urban regime (Stone 1989, economic growth based on classic Fordist
1993). Collectively these concepts have industries to one in which local and regional
served to revitalize the study of the economic fortunes were far less certain or
politics of local and regional development. secure.This was a time in which questions of
There are, however, important differences local and regional development took on
within this literature and the chapter sets out significant urgency. In short, local and
to describe the relative strengths of the dif- regional development became a political
ferent approaches. Over the past two decades matter.
the frameworks have spawned an expansive

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THE POLITICS OF LOCAL AND REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT

This is not to suggest that Fordism had had long been active in seeking to cultivate
been marked by a universal pattern of local economic development largely on the basis
and regional prosperity.The health and vital- of attracting industry and investment from
ity of local economies had always fluctuated established regions (Cobb 1982).The Frostbelt
with shifts in the capitalist space economy. to Sunbelt shift of industry and employment
Certain localities and regions such as the within the US was accompanied by the vig-
coal-mining communities based on resource orous promotion of Sunbelt locations, her-
extraction or areas focused on traditional alding a competition for inward investment
manufacturing industries such as clothing that came to embrace an ever wider range of
and textiles had long witnessed significant locations.The general spread of inter-locality
changes in their economic fortunes and tra- competition also saw the development of
jectories. However, the 1970s marked the various metrics designed to describe and
beginning of an era in which uneven devel- account for the demise of the traditional
opment and the prospects for future economic manufacturing regions that constituted the
growth took on major political significance. Rustbelt and the corresponding growth of
At the same time the period saw a profound the US South. Perhaps the most widely cited
shift in the nature of the policy response. was the Grant-Thornton business index, an
Earlier periods of economic difficulty had annual measure first produced in 1979 that
generally been met by national-level pro- ranked states according to the health of their
grammes and policies focused on ‘disadvan- ‘business climate’. The index and the ideas
taged’ regions designated to receive state attached to it provided a model for policy
resources designed to mitigate economic makers that emphasized low corporate tax
decline. However, in the new era the institu- rates, relatively cheap labor and low levels of
tional architecture took a different form. In unionization. While the Grant-Thornton
Britain the period saw the growth of a new measure was criticized and subsequently aban-
set of local economic development agencies doned the competition for inward investment
and activities attached to local government, took on a decidedly neoliberal hue, despite
marking a significant shift in the spatial scale the heavy involvement of state agencies in
at which questions of local and regional orchestrating local economic development.
development were addressed (Campbell 1990;
Eisenschitz and Gough 1993). In the United Urban entrepreneurialism
States the picture was more complicated but
the period of economic restructuring gener- While recognizing a raft of earlier initiatives
ated a pattern in which local and state gov- designed to promote local economic devel-
ernments adopted a more proactive role in opment, the 1980s marked a much more
seeking to protect and enhance the develop- general shift in the significance attached to
ment of local and regional economies. The economic development and the extent of
transformation is captured in David Harvey’s inter-locality competition. David Harvey has
argument, explored shortly, about a shift described the shift as a general transforma-
from urban managerialism to urban entre- tion from urban managerialism to urban entre-
preneurialism (Harvey 1989). preneurialism (Harvey 1989). For Harvey,
urban politics had come to focus increasingly
While a turbulent economic time her- on local economic development:
alded academic work designed to theorize
the politics of local and regional develop- The new entrepreneurialism has as
ment we should be careful not to overstate its centrepiece the notion of public–
the novelty of the practices captured by the private partnership in which traditional
transition to entrepreneurialism. In the US
South state and local government agencies 307

ANDREW WOOD

local boosterism is integrated with the conflicts inherent to capitalism. For these
use of local government powers to try authors local or place-dependent coalitions
and attract external sources of funding, of interest signify a territorial form of politics
new direct investments or new employ- that can serve to mask more traditional forms
ment sources. of class-based political struggle. For Cox
and Mair the sense of a shared dependence
(Harvey 1989: 7) on a particular territory “provides a basis for
the suspension of conflict in favour of a soli-
Urban entrepreneurialism involved more darity within each locality… that can be
than simply a shift in the policy agenda to turned against the locally dependent in other
prioritize economic development in place localities” (Cox and Mair 1988: 307).
of the traditional emphasis on collective
service provision. As Harvey indicates, urban The concept of urban entrepreneurialism
entrepreneurialism was also bound up with is grounded firmly within the Marxist tradi-
changes in the institutional arrangements tion, emphasizing the way in which local
through which cities are run involving a politics is embedded within a wider set of
shift from government to governance. Urban economic and political structures. However,
entrepreneurialism marked the adoption of the same period also saw the emergence of a
a much more proactive role on the part set of novel ideas and frameworks that strive
of local interests seeking to capture and to capture the essence of the new urban
embed flows of investment and the economic politics by emphasizing the role of local
activities attached to them. Accordingly, agents and interests in shaping the politics of
the city’s economic health and prospects development. Two concepts in particular
became central to understanding the politics have assumed particular significance and I
of the city. consider each in turn. The first is Harvey
Molotch’s concept of the ‘growth machine’,
Harvey’s argument concerning the shift to introduced in 1976 (Molotch 1976) and later
entrepreneurialism is influential and widely elaborated with John Logan in Urban
cited.The thesis captures a diverse set of con- Fortunes (Logan and Molotch 1987). The
crete changes which Harvey links to an second is Clarence Stone’s concept of the
underlying shift in the extent and nature of urban regime (Stone 1989).
territorial competition.This,in turn,is related
to deep and persistent crisis tendencies in The growth machine
the capitalist space economy.The theoretical
basis for Harvey’s argument positions the The growth machine is a compelling and yet
shift as both widespread and lasting. Indeed, relatively simple concept. Molotch argues
the argument has served as the context for a that whatever the differences between pow-
wide range of studies that have sought to erful elite interests within US cities the
examine how urban entrepreneurialism plays mantra that holds them together is an over-
out in different national and local contexts riding concern with the economic growth of
(see, for example, Hall and Hubbard 1998). the city. Furthermore, this is a near-universal
phenomenon:
Harvey’s arguments have clear resonance
in the work of others. For Kevin Cox the the political and economic essence of
transition marked the development of a ‘new virtually any given locality, in the pres-
urban politics’ in which questions of local ent American context, is growth. I fur-
economic development were increasingly ther argue that the desire for growth
moved centre stage (Cox 1993, 1995). For provides the key operative motivation
Harvey and Cox territorial competition rep-
resents one particular expression of deep-
seated and fundamental contradictions and

308

THE POLITICS OF LOCAL AND REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT

towards consensus for members of Given their power and privileged position
politically mobilized local elite. Logan and Molotch argue that urban devel-
opment effectively serves to transfer resources
(Molotch 1976: 309–310; and wealth to the propertied interests that
emphasis in original) comprise the rentier class.

Building on the claim that growth provides Urban regimes
the basis on which elites come together
Logan and Moloth detail the local interests The growth machine thesis rests, as Molotch
that lie at the heart of the growth machine. explicitly acknowledges, on evidence drawn
The principal animators are what Logan and from the American city. Clarence Stone’s
Molotch term ‘rentiers’ or ‘place entrepre- work on urban regimes developed from
neurs’ defined as, “the people directly research on the post-war politics of Atlanta,
involved in the exchange of places and col- Georgia. Stone’s (1989) book Regime Politics:
lection of rents”(Logan and Molotch 1987: Governing Atlanta, 1946–1988 has become a
29).The fortunes of place entrepreneurs rest landmark study in the politics of urban devel-
upon the intensification of land use and the opment. In looking at the changing contours
realization of exchange value tied to rising of urban politics over the post-war period
land and property rents that accompany eco- Stone identifies a basic continuity in the
nomic growth.The tie to land and property arrangements for governing Atlanta. While
and the drive to intensify land use provide the individual protagonists came and went
the foundation for growth machine activity. two groups dominated Atlanta’s urban poli-
While propertied interests sit at the core of tics, forming a single urban regime commit-
the growth machine these local actors have ted to promoting the economic growth of
to mobilize the powers and resources of local the city. The governing coalition comprised
government in order to secure the infrastruc- Atlanta’s downtown business elite and,
tural conditions and the general political cli- reflecting the city’s post-war black electoral
mate conducive to growth.Beyond those with majority, Atlanta’s black middle class repre-
direct interests in land and property Logan sented by the city’s mayor. While these two
and Molotch identify a further set of interests groups comprised the governing coalition
in growth that includes local politicians, the the concept of the regime rested on more
local media (see Ward 2009) and utilities than simply the identification of those with
along with a set of ‘auxiliary players’ such as an interest in economic growth.The regime
universities, professional sports teams, cultural is defined as “an informal yet relatively stable
institutions, local retailers and even organized group with access to institutional resources that
labour (Logan and Molotch 1987:75–85).These enable it to have a sustained role in making
different actors and institutions are seen to governing decisions” (Stone 1989: 4; empha-
share a collective interest in the conditions of sis in original).While Stone’s work on Atlanta
the local economy and the realization of urban focused largely on the material resources or
growth. Logan and Molotch argue that. incentives that sustained the regime he later
defines resources as “not just material matters
the pursuit of exchange values so but also such things as skills, expertise, orga-
permeates the life of localities that nizational connections, informal contacts,
cities become organized as enterprises and level and scope of contributing effort by
devoted to the increase of aggregate participants” (Stone 2005: 329). In addition
rent levels through the intensification to focusing on the composition of the regime
of land use.The city becomes, in effect, and the resources mobilized by different
a “growth machine.”
309
(Logan and Molotch 1987: 13)

ANDREW WOOD

regime members regime analysis directs broader focus on the question of governance
attention to the nature of the relationship and specifically on the ways in which local
among the different coalition partners. As agencies develop what Stone terms ‘the
Stoker suggests, “the underlying issue is the capacity to govern’. Regime and growth
extent to which a regime achieves a sustained coalition accounts focus attention on a range
capacity to act and influence developments of powerful interests deemed to be particu-
in key policy areas” (Stoker 1995: 62). It is larly influential in determining the nature of
important to note that a commitment to urban politics. In this sense the work fur-
growth is just one of a number of strategies thers the long-standing interest in the US
that can define an urban regime. Indeed in literature in the question of ‘who governs?’
reviewing cities across the US Stone identi- (Dahl 1961; Harding 1995; Hunter 1953).
fies four different regime types (Stone 1993). Yet the move also marks a welcome depar-
The ‘development’ regime, characteristic of ture from a traditional pluralist understand-
post-war Atlanta, is committed to promoting ing of the state by drawing attention to the
economic expansion. Such regimes bear fact that different actors have quite different
close resemblance to the growth machine stakes in the nature, scope and outcomes of
identified by Molotch.‘Maintenance’regimes urban governance. Furthermore, such
seek to promote the routine delivery of approaches are adept at highlighting the
urban services, while ‘middle-class progres- contested nature of the state and the ways in
sive’ regimes set out to address the environ- which conflicts over the state’s multiple roles
mental implications of development or are commonly expressed via tensions
harness the gains from economic growth. between different departments and branches
The fourth type – the ‘lower class opportu- of the state (O’Neill 1997). Furthermore,
nity’ regime – seeks to structure urban devel- while focusing squarely on the relationship
opment in order to widen the distribution of between state agencies and interests within
economic and social benefits and opportuni- civil society these interests are by no means
ties. In relying on the mass mobilization of taken as a set of equivalent constituencies.
urban residents this regime is distinct from Indeed work in the growth machine and
the other forms.While the mantra of ‘growth’ regime traditions places particular emphasis
holds the growth coalition together, Stone’s on the relationship between the state and
framework allows for a much wider range of local business interests. Second, while the
urban agendas that help to define the nature frameworks recognize the structural or sys-
and scope of the governing coalition. In this temic power of business interests in influ-
sense the regime framework proves capable encing the capacity to govern the frameworks
of embracing a far wider range of scenarios also posit considerable scope for local agency.
than that associated with the growth machine As Stone indicates, “urban regime analysis
model (Stoker and Mossberger 1994). … concerns how local agency fits into the
play of larger forces. Local actors are shaped
The concepts of the growth machine and by and respond to large structures, but the
the urban regime have been widely deployed. appropriate lens for viewing this wider field
Most of the subsequent studies have, under- is local agency” (Stone 2005: 324). Third,
standably, focused on the politics of local both models direct attention to the informal
economic development, although its precise ways in which local interests seek to shape
form varies from case to case. The two and influence the pattern of urban gover-
frameworks share significant strengths. The nance. For Stone regime theory strives to
first, which they share with the concept of examine “the informal arrangements by
urban entrepreneurialism, is the move from a which public bodies and private interests
traditional concern with the formal struc- function together in order to be able to
ture and functions of local government to a

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THE POLITICS OF LOCAL AND REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT

make and carry out governing decisions” The merit of exporting the US-based the-
(Stone 1989:8–9).Accordingly,a key strength ories beyond their original context has gen-
of such work is in delving beyond the formal erated a significant and ongoing debate. In
arrangements by which urban decisions are one corner scholars argue that the frame-
made in order to examine the negotiations works reflect conditions particular to the
and compromises that underpin urban US (Ward 1996; Wood 1996; Jessop et al.
decision-making. 1999; Davies 2003). For Peck and Tickell,
“the growth machine hypothesis … remains
In short, the frameworks highlight a con- a framework with which to understand the
cern with the practices and discourses that particularity of US politics” (Peck andTickell
help to constitute urban strategy. A concern 1995: 59).While this is not to deny the capac-
with the informal arrangements of gover- ity of the frameworks to shed light on the
nance also has important methodological US case it does bring into question their
implications for it brings with it a require- wider application. However, others see any
ment for detailed qualitative work designed such problems as surmountable. Dowding
to examine how urban agendas are con- and colleagues use the regime concept to
structed and particular decisions are made. It explore local politics in London (Dowding
is no coincidence that work that deploys et al. 1999), while Mossberger and Stoker
such concepts tends to undertake case studies argue that once suitably modified the use
of particular cities or, at most, a small number of the regime framework beyond North
of cases. Furthermore, the emphasis on the America has “facilitated the development of
stability and endurance of governing coali- a valuable and plausible political economy
tions favours detailed ethnographic work. perspective” (2001: 830).
After all, Clarence Stone’s major contribu-
tion is based on the detailed study of a single The relationship between local state insti-
city, Atlanta. tutions and business interests provides a useful
window on the question of the wider utility
The politics of local and regional of regime and growth coalition models.This
development beyond the US is, after all, the relationship that lies at the
core of both frameworks. For Mossberger
While the concepts of the urban regime and and Stoker (2001) the regime concept is par-
the growth machine were developed to ticularly helpful in examining the extent and
examine the US city, their use in a wide vari- nature of business engagement in urban gov-
ety of different local and national contexts ernance. And yet Harding suggests that in
suggests considerable flexibility. In this sec- practice work on Britain has largely failed to
tion I examine the portability of these frame- examine the nature and scope of business
works. The earliest applications beyond the mobilization (Harding 1999). In part this
United States are found in research looking reflects basic differences in state form, not
at the politics of local economic develop- least the susceptibility of local state institu-
ment in Britain (Bassett 1996, 1999; Bassett tions in the US to the power and influence
and Harloe 1990; Cooke 1988; Harding of business interests (Wood 2004). Despite
1991; Lloyd and Newlands 1988). I suggest these differences the 1980s saw a sustained
that this work serves to highlight some of the effort to incorporate business interests into
limits as well as the strengths of the growth local policy-making in Britain and a number
machine and urban regime frameworks. of studies examined the nature and extent of
I then turn to the recent use of these concepts business mobilization, albeit often highlight-
to study the politics of urban development ing the difficulties involved in creating a shared
in China. and coherent local business vision (Peck
1995; Peck and Tickell 1995; Raco 2003;

311

ANDREW WOOD

Rogerson and Boyle 2000;Valler 1996;Wood bargaining that characterizes the inter-
et al. 1998; Valler and Wood 2004). Similar dependence of state and markets in a
findings have been reported in other con- locality.
texts in which business interests have come
to play a more active role in urban politics. (McGuirk 2003: 203)
The much vaunted growth of “public–private
partnerships’ might be taken to mark conver- Yet urban politics is shaped by an interde-
gence on the US model. However, despite a pendent set of political economic relations
similar concrete form, work beyond the and processes that operate across a range of
US commonly positions such coalitions as spatial scales that extends well beyond the
heavily orchestrated by the state rather than urban. In place of a fixed, bounded and ter-
driven by the spontaneous engagement of ritorial notion of the urban recent work has
local business interests. In the case of Sydney, begun to embrace a relational view of scale
McGuirk argues that, “beyond project- that reflects the open and dynamic interrela-
specific public–private partnerships, the tionship between activities, relations and proc-
formation of partnership-style relations esses stretched over different spatial extents
with government has largely been state- (Macleod and Jones 2007). Rather than fall
orchestrated” (McGuirk 2003: 215). In con- into the “localist trap” (Stoker 1995: 67), stud-
tinental Europe such partnerships can be ies “require a multiscalar perspective” that
seen to reflect the prominent and long- serves to problematize “the scalar organiza-
standing tradition of corporatism,while work tion of governance” (McGuirk 2003: 204).
on Britain suggests a similar dynamic in
which engagement between local govern- Related to the sanctity of the urban scale
ment and the private sector rests heavily on is the tendency for traditional frameworks to
rules and norms established by central gov- privilege the internal dynamics of urban
ernment ( Jones and Ward 1998). regimes or coalitions or what Stone terms
“the internal politics of coalition building”
The tendency for US models to underplay (1989: 178). What matters is how the state/
the influence of the central state reflects its market dynamic plays out within the urban
highly decentralized form. However, it also arena and interest centres on how urban
raises a wider conceptual issue concerning agendas are produced by a set of local agents
geographic scale and what many see as the trying to develop workable strategies that
limited ability of the growth coalition and enable and encourage collective action. The
urban regime models to conceptualize the emphasis on the role of the local newspaper
place of local politics within processes and in serving “to bolster and maintain the pre-
relationships that operate beyond the urban disposition for general growth” (Logan and
scale (Lauria 1997;Stoker 1995;Tretter 2008). Molotch 1987: 72) is one sign of the empha-
Rather than treat the urban as both consti- sis on the internal machinations of urban
tuted by and constitutive of these broader coalitions. While such accounts highlight
scale processes they are merely seen to pro- the vitality and agency of local actors and the
vide the context in which the dynamics of complex ways in which urban agendas are
local/urban scale governance play out. As negotiated and pursued they commonly
McGuirk suggests: serve to marginalize the role played by much
wider discourses and practices that have
the determinants of urban politics national or international scope.Developments
are predominantly understood … to such as the rise of the ‘creative city’ or the
be the local mediation of conflicting ‘global city’ are examined as de facto changes
interests, the negotiated construction in the context in which urban politics plays
of coalition agendas, and the ongoing out rather than as ideas and practices that are
partly constituted and reproduced by local
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THE POLITICS OF LOCAL AND REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT

agency at the urban scale. Once again, the power rests firmly with the ownership and
urban scale and processes and relations control of economic assets or, in other words,
beyond the urban are treated as analytically the owners of private capital. On this basis
separate phenomena. private business interests are deemed to be
essential to the coalitions that assemble
The privileging of the local scale and its together in order to devise and shape urban
internal politics is one reason why regime agendas (Mossberger and Stoker 2001).
accounts commonly drift towards the detailed Given the systemic power of business inter-
empirical description of urban governance ests it is little surprise that the strategies and
rather than interpreting concrete cases policies pursued by governing coalitions
through reference to more abstract theoreti- tend to favour the owners of capital rather
cal frameworks. On this point the contrast than other interests and groups within civil
with Harvey’s account of urban entrepre- society.
neurialism is particularly telling.While work
in the regime and growth coalition traditions On this basis China represents an inter-
explicitly recognizes the significance of social esting paradox.As Stoker indicates:
stratification there is little attempt to inter-
pret regime types or growth coalition politics Regime theory takes as given a set of
through a broader interpretive framework. government institutions subject to
For this reason regime accounts commonly some degree of popular control and an
struggle to explain regime change other than economy guided mainly but not exclu-
through reference to the internal dynamics of sively by privately controlled investment
regime building. Furthermore, while regime decisions.
analysis identifies a plethora of regime types
it is often difficult to assess the significance (Stoker 1995: 56)
of the differences between them given the
absence of a broader theoretical framework Growth coalitions and urban regimes rest on
in which to position them. stable, established patterns of accommoda-
tion between the state and a range of power-
While the contextual limit of the regime ful business interests often represented
and growth coalition concepts remains an through collective business organizations.Yet
open question the frameworks have been it is also clear that even when these condi-
ever more widely adopted. The case of China tions are present the existence of regimes is
proves particularly intriguing. As indicated not guaranteed – it is a necessary but not suf-
above, a common starting point for work in ficient condition. The popular control of
the regime and growth coalition traditions is government allied to the strength of local
the manner in which two sources of power business interests would both seem to mili-
are combined and mobilized in order to tate against the application of regime and
bring about certain results. The first is the growth coalition models to the Chinese case.
power of governmental authority which, in However,a number of recent changes broadly
the US case, is seen to rest on the legitimacy captured in the notion of ‘transition’ are seen
of elected government. While elected offi- to have opened up the possibilities for such
cials are beholden to local constituencies work (Zhang 2002). The decentralization
the state has the resources and authority of governmental decision-making and the
that enable the development and pursuit of growth of revenues outside of the central
an agenda designed to meet the goals of planning process provide a key incentive
coalition interests.Yet these various interests for more entrepreneurial forms of urban
clearly differ in terms of their own power governance. With regard to local business
and significance. Molotch and Stone recog- interests the movement towards the com-
nize that in capitalist societies economic modification of land and property is seen to

313

ANDREW WOOD

have the potential to generate the local agendas and strategies that reflect the decen-
‘landed interests’ at the heart of the urban tralized nature of the US state. Land use reg-
growth coalition (Zhu 1999). Furthermore, ulation provides just one example where
the speed and intensity of economic growth powers of land use zoning and regulation rest
would also seem to highlight the prevalence very firmly with local tiers of government.
of development as a political issue. As Zhu Accordingly, the politics of land use intensi-
suggests,“pro-growth seems to be at the core fication is very much a local matter.
of urban policies in the face of fierce eco-
nomic competition” (Zhu 1999: 537). Given Arguably, the parochialism of the models
the nature of these changes both the growth reflects a more general failure to theorize the
coalition and urban regime models have state. Just as the nature and territorial con-
recently been applied to examine urban figuration of the state can be brought into
development in China (Yang and Chan 2007; question attention should be given to the
Zhang 2002; Zhu 1999; Wang and Scott geographic specificity of the business inter-
2008). While this work provides a very ests that animate urban coalitions. Again the
welcome addition to the literature on the US context provides a particular set of
comparative politics of local and regional circumstances that are not always widely rep-
development the analytical contribution of licated. Central to the urban regime and
the growth coalition and urban regime con- especially the growth coalition model are
cepts is much less clear. Harding’s (1999) ear- interests intimately connected to land and
lier argument concerning the tendency for property. While this by no means exhausts
research on Britain to use the terminology the range of interests that engage in coalition
rather than the analytical purchase of the activities it does serve to highlight the geo-
American models continues to resonate. graphic specificity of the interests involved,
or, what Cox and Mair term, their local
Conclusion dependence (Cox and Mair 1988; Cox 1998).
What matters for the ‘landed interests’ is the
Traditional frameworks for understanding realization of exchange values in a particular
the politics of local and regional develop- place. In short, the politics of local and
ment have now generated a wealth of studies regional development in the US remains
that have significantly enriched our under- driven by a set of interests with local stakes.
standing. Harvey’s thesis on urban entrepre- Recent work on China, like much of the lit-
neurialism and the rise of the new urban erature on the politics of local and regional
politics has proved particularly influential, development, pays relatively short shrift to
linking the politics of local and regional the geographic specificity of the interests
development to a powerful set of wider caught up in the politics of local and regional
changes in the nature of the capitalist econ- development. The centrality of land-based
omy. The concepts of the growth machine interests to the politics of local and regional
and the urban regime have also provoked a development also has critical implications for
welcome array of studies.Yet in closing I sug- what counts as ‘development’.The traditional
gest that we continue to exercise some cau- models presented in this chapter tend to
tion when applying these models beyond the privilege the way in which local and regional
US context. First, we should recognize the politics is animated by interests in a particular
differences between contexts and the extent form of economic development, centred on
to which the US-based models reflect their local economic growth and, more narrowly
particular place of origin. Regime and still, on the intensification of land use.Again,
growth coalition models direct attention to the models reflect their time and place of
origin and, as such, it is difficult to see how
314 such approaches might handle the emergence

THE POLITICS OF LOCAL AND REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT

of more holistic and sustainable understand- Cox, K. (1998) “Spaces of dependence, spaces of
ings of development centred on strategies of engagement and the politics of scale, or: look-
low or no growth (Pike et al. 2006). ing for local politics”, Political Geography 17,
1–24.
The coupling between strong business
interests and local governmental power and Cox, K. and Mair, A. (1988) “Locality and com-
authority in the pursuit of economic growth munity in the politics of local economic devel-
sits at the very centre of US-based work on opment”, Annals of the Association of American
the politics of local and regional develop- Geographers 78, 307–325.
ment.This parochial emphasis is problematic,
placing undue emphasis on local events and Dahl, R. (1961) Who Governs?, New Haven, CT:
interests while failing to take into account Yale University Press.
sources of power and authority across
the range of geographical scales. In part the Davies, J. (2003) “Partnerships versus regimes:
emphasis on the local scale stems from the Why regime theory cannot explain urban
fact that much of the US-based work is coalitions in the UK”, Journal of Urban Affairs
rooted in urban studies. However, in turn, 25, 253–269.
this reflects the particular conditions preva-
lent in the US, most notably the significant Dowding, K., Dunleavy, P., King, D., Margetts, H.
power and authority of sub-national govern- and Rydin, Y. (1999) “Regime politics in
ment allied with strong and active local London local governance”, Urban Affairs
business interests. Review 34, 515–545.

References Eisenschitz, A. and Gough, J. (1993) The Politics of
Local Economic Policy, Basingstoke, Hampshire:
Bassett, K. (1996) “Partnerships, business elites and Macmillan.
urban politics: new forms of governance in an
English city?”, Urban Studies 33, 539–555. Hall, T. and Hubbard, P. (eds) (1998) The
Entrepreneurial City: Geographies of Politics,
Bassett, K. (1999) “Growth coalitions in Britain’s Regime and Representation, Chichester: John
waning Sunbelt: some reflections”, in A. Jonas Wiley & Sons.
and D.Wilson (eds) The Urban Growth Machine,
Albany New York: State University of Harding, A. (1991) “The rise of urban growth
New York Press, 177–193. coalitions,UK style?”,Environment and Planning
C 9, 295–317.
Bassett, K. and Harloe, M. (1990) “Swindon: the
rise and decline of a growth coalition”, in M. Harding, A. (1995) “Elite theory and growth
Harloe, C. Pickvance and J. Urry (eds) Place, machines”, in D. Judge, G. Stoker and
Policy and Politics, London: Unwin Hyman, H. Wolman (eds) Theories of Urban Politics,
42–61. London: Sage, 35–53.

Campbell, M. (ed.) (1990) Local Economic Policy, Harding,A. (1999) “North American urban polit-
London: Cassell Educational. ical economy, urban theory and British
research”, British Journal of Political Science 29,
Cobb,J.(1982) The Selling of the South:The Southern 673–698.
Crusade for Industrial Development, 1936–1980,
Baton Rouge, Louisiana: Louisiana State Harvey, D. (1989) “From managerialism to entre-
University Press. preneurialism: the transformation of urban
governance in late capitalism”, Geografiska
Cooke, P. (1988) “Municipal enterprise, growth Annaler 71B, 3–17.
coalitions and social justice”, Local Economy 3,
1319–1336. Hunter, F. (1953) Community Power Structure: A
Study of Decision Makers, Chapel Hill, North
Cox, K. (1993) “The local and the global in the Carolina: University of North Carolina Press.
new urban politics:a critical view”,Environment
and Planning D 11, 433–448. Jessop, B., Peck, J. andTickell,A. (1999) “Retooling
the machine: economic crisis, state restructur-
Cox, K. (1995) “Globalisation, competition and ing and urban politics”, in A. Jonas and
the politics of local economic development”, D. Wilson (eds) The Urban Growth Machine,
Urban Studies 32, 213–224. Albany, NY: State University of New York
Press, 141–159.

Jones, M. and Ward, K. (1998) “Grabbing grants?
The role of coalitions in urban economic
development”, Local Economy 13, 28–38.

Lauria, M. (ed.) (1997) Reconstructing Urban Regime
Theory,Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Lloyd, G. and Newlands, D. (1988) “The ‘growth
coalition’ and urban economic development”,
Local Economy 3, 31–39.

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Logan, J. and Molotch, H. (1987) Urban Fortunes: Valler, D. (1996) “Locality, local economic strategy
The Political Economy of Place, Berkeley: and private sector involvement: case studies in
University of California Press. Norwich and Cardiff ”, Political Geography 15,
383–403.
Macleod, G. and Jones, M. (2007) “Territorial,
scalar, networked, connected: in what sense a Valler, D. and Wood, A. (2004) “Devolution and
‘regional world’?”, Regional Studies 41, the politics of business representation: a strate-
177–191. gic relational approach”, Environment and
Planning A 36, 1835–1854.
McGuirk, P. (2003) “Producing the capacity to
govern in global Sydney”, Journal of Urban Wang, Y. and Scott, S. (2008) “Illegal farmland
Affairs 25, 201–223. conversion in China’s urban periphery:
local regime and national transitions”, Urban
Molotch,H.(1976)“The city as a growth machine: Geography 29, 327–347.
toward a political economy of place”, American
Journal of Sociology 82, 309–332. Ward, K. (1996) “Re-reading urban regime
theory”, Geoforum 27, 427–438.
Mossberger, K. and Stoker, G. (2001) “The evolu-
tion of urban regime theory: the challenge of Ward, K. (2009) “Urban political economy, ‘new
conceptualization”, Urban Affairs Review 36, urban politics’ and the media: insights and
810–835. limits”, International Journal of Urban and
Regional Research 33, 233–236.
O’Neill, P. (1997) “Bringing the qualitative state
into economic geography”, in R. Lee and Wood, A. (1996) “Analysing the politics of local
K.Willis (eds) Geographies of Economies,London: economic development: making sense of
Arnold, 290–301. cross-national convergence”, Urban Studies 33,
1281–1295.
Peck, J. (1995) “Moving and shaking: business
elites, state localism and urban privatism”, Wood, A. (2004) “Domesticating urban theory?
Progress in Human Geography 19, 16–46. US concepts, British cities and the limits of
cross-national applications”, Urban Studies 41,
Peck, J. and Tickell,A. (1995) “Business goes local: 2103–2118.
dissecting the‘business agenda’in Manchester”,
International Journal of Urban and Regional Wood, A., Valler, D. and North, P. (1998) “Local
Research 19, 55–78. business representation and the private sector
role in local economic policy in Britain”, Local
Pike, A., Rodríguez-Pose, A. and Tomaney, J. Economy 13, 10–27.
(2006) Local and Regional Development, London:
Routledge. Yang,Y. and Chan, C. (2007) “An urban regenera-
tion regime in China: a case study of urban
Raco, M. (2003) “The social relations of business redevelopment in Shaghai’s Taipingqiao area”,
representation and devolved governance in the Urban Studies 44, 1809–1826.
United Kingdom”, Environment and Planning A
35, 1853–1876. Zhang, T. (2002) “Urban development and a
socialist pro-growth coalition in Shanghai”,
Rogerson, R. and Boyle, M. (2000) “Property, Urban Affairs Review 37, 475–499.
politics and the neo-liberal revolution in urban
Scotland”, Progress in Planning 54, 133–196. Zhu, J. (1999) “Local growth coalition: the con-
text and implications of China’s gradualist
Stoker, G. (1995) “Regime theory and urban pol- urban land reforms”, International Journal of
itics”, in D. Judge, G. Stoker and H. Wolman Urban and Regional Research 23, 534–548.
(eds) Theories of Urban Politics, London: Sage,
195–212. Further reading

Stoker, G. and Mossberger, K. (1994) “Urban Cox, K. and Mair, A. (1988) “Locality and com-
regime theory in comparative perspective”, munity in the politics of local economic devel-
Environment and Planning C: Government and opment”, Annals of the Association of American
Policy 12, 195–212. Geographers 78, 307–325. (A theoretical argu-
ment concerning the territorialized nature of
Stone, C. (1989) Regime Politics: Governing Atlanta, the politics of economic development.)
1946–1988, Lawrence, Kansas: University
Press of Kansas. Hall, T. and Hubbard, P. (eds) (1998) The
Entrepreneurial City: Geographies of Politics,
Stone, C. (1993) “Urban regimes and the capacity Regime and Representation, Chichester: John
to govern: a political economy approach”, Wiley & Sons. (A collection of essays extend-
Journal of Urban Affairs 15, 1–28. ing the concept of the entrepreneurial city.)

Stone, C. (2005) “Looking back to look
forward – reflections on urban regime
analysis”, Urban Affairs Review 40, 309–341.

Tretter, E. (2008) “Scales, regimes and the urban
governance of Glasgow”, Journal of Urban
Affairs 30, 87–102.

316

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Harvey, D. (1989) “From managerialism to entre- Journal of Sociology 82, 309–332. (The classic
preneurialism: the transformation of gover- statement introducing the concept of the
nance in late capitalism”, Geografiska Annaler growth machine.)
71B, 3–17. (The classic statement of the nature Stoker, G. (1995) “Regime theory and urban pol-
of urban entrepreneurialism.) itics”, in D. Judge, G. Stoker and H. Wolman
(eds) Theories of Urban Politics, London: Sage,
Jonas, A. and Wilson, D. (eds) The Urban Growth 195–212. (An introduction to the strengths
Machine, Albany, NY: State University and limits of urban regime theory.)
of New York Press. (A collection of critical Stone, C. (1989) Regime Politics: Governing Atlanta,
commentaries on the concept of the growth 1946–1988, Lawrence, Kansas: University
machine.) Press of Kansas. (The classic study introducing
the concept of the urban regime.)
Molotch,H.(1976)“The city as a growth machine:
toward a political economy of place”, American

317

27

Spatial planning and territorial
development policy

Peter Ache

Introduction harbours of delight, as well as the motorways
to commute between spatially separated
In Europe, the systematic education of plan- functions of work and living (due to the
ners turned one hundred in 2009, taking very influential Charter of Athens (CIAM)
the W.H. Lever Chair for Civic Design in 1933, LeCorbusier 1942; see also the New
University of Liverpool’s Department of Charter of Athens, http://www.ceu-ectp.
Civic Design as the commonly agreed start- org/e/athens/).The aspect of ‘social deliber-
ing point (Hall, 1996, Albers, 1997). The ation’ is possibly still there or might have
British founder of a company producing been surpassed by questions of sustainability
‘bare necessities of life’ (with the slogan (Sachs and Santarius, 2007). What became a
‘A bar of soap is a piece of hope’) stands systematic activity at the level of individual
actually at the beginning of a systematic quarters or model towns (the policing of
approach towards the education of people buildings is a long-standing historic prac-
who plan and develop our living environ- tice especially; see e.g. Benevolo, 2000) has
ment. In those days it was Victorian Utopian evolved into a system of elaborate and highly
Humanist thinking which made Lever integrated layers of government and non-
experiment with the 1887 Port Sunlight government action. Those planning territo-
garden city – or for similar reasons Krupp rial development systems have faced change
with the 1909 Margarethen Höhe in Essen, time and again and have, at least in the
at that time the German steel capital – giving European context, also seen the rise of a new
people of the heavy days of industrialization layer, that of the European Union (Faludi,
a better life and living environment. A lively 2007), no matter how elaborate this level is
picture of these conditions was provided by or is not at the start of the third millennium.
Friedrich Engels (1892), observing the ‘con-
ditions of the working class’ and its methods The following sections will elaborate on
very ‘dense’ description of urban issues. aspects of these dimensions – which are by
no means an exhaustive account of what
One hundred years later, spatial planning is planning is or can be (an overview on exist-
still at the point of attempting to give people ing practice can be found in Ryser and
better places to live in and, at the same time, Franchini, 2008). In the first section, formal
allowing them to produce their own little planning systems will be addressed and the

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SPAT IAL PL ANNING A N D TER R ITOR IAL D EV E LOPMEN T POLIC Y

increasing ‘hybridization’ of planning activi- (e.g. a local plan, even if this is increasingly
ties outlined. Whereas over its history the negotiated between public and private par-
planning task might have been easily cap- ties) (Ennis, 2003). For the exploding popu-
tured by one dimension only, in today’s world lation mega metropolises one instrument
planners face much more complex tasks and which helps in getting those cities straight is
need to invent new approaches to cope with to empower citizens via ownership of land,
those challenges. The second section will enabling the citizens to take responsibility
elaborate on new spatial structures and prob- without being expelled (e.g. property rights,
lem situations, mainly from a European per- land titles and registers, cadastres; see UN
spective.The main point here is the enlarged Habitat, 2006). A ‘planner’ usually has to be
spatio-functional context surpassing tradi- ‘registered’ to have the full rights in profes-
tional spatial patterns and city perimeters and sional terms (i.e. the role of professional asso-
establishing polycentric metropolitan spaces ciations regulating markets; see Geppert and
at a European level. The management and Verhage, 2008).This starts usually at the higher
the achievement of territorial cohesion (if at education level with the question whether a
all) are major issues of the future. The third course in planning has been ‘accredited’ (in
section will widen the perspective and look the UK e.g. by the Royal Town Planning
across European borders into those develop- Institute; see Ache, 2008b). In sum, there are
ment features which have already been many complex ‘system dimensions’ structur-
labelled as ‘urban millennium’.The dire out- ing the field, and some of the core aspects, in
looks of population ‘metapolises’ (UN particular institutional structures and plans,
Habitat, 2006) of the southern hemisphere will be addressed in the following sections.
call for new planning governance and sus-
tainability but are also full of social innova- Over past years research but also practice
tions. The concluding remarks at the end related-projects (like the Interreg IIIB Baltic
remind us that there is still a utopian func- Sea Region; see http://commin.org/en/
tion for cities in society. commin/) tried to develop a full picture of
such dimensions of planning and territorial
Territorial development systems development systems. One such project was
the ‘compendium of European planning sys-
Planning and territorial development, tems’ (European Commission, 1997). In
defined as a coordinated approach towards 2006, with the enlarging European Union a
specific aims or objectives, is usually based on fresh overview was needed and provided,
a set of processes and institutional structures using a more generic approach to understand
and at least in part defined as an act of sover- the governance of territorial and urban poli-
eignty with mandatory results.This statement cies from EU to local level, acknowledging
might surprise in the face of the many differ- the more elaborate structure and changes
ent forms which the core activities in the inside territorial development (University of
professional field have taken, as is indicated Valencia et al., 2006).The analysis of territo-
by the notion of a change ‘from government rial development systems is an altogether dif-
to governance’.Yes, planning has changed its ficult venture, given that there are not only
instruments and procedures and much has differences between state systems (due to
happened over recent years in terms of varying constitutional settings or basic laws)
empowerment, participation and new mana- but also because of cultural differences which
gerial approaches in planning. But try imag- are expressed in varying professional tradi-
ining a multi-billion Euro investment being tions. Despite variations in what constitutes
fixed without a solid legally binding basis such systems in the various countries, on the
basis of the compendium we can identify
some structural similarities. At the national

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PETER ACHE

level we can find spatial planning frameworks land controlling the changes of use. All land
as point of reference for lower tiers with a use plans distinguish at least three categories
coordination function. At the regional level of land use, namely: infrastructure, urban and
again spatial planning policies have been open land. In the case where a country has a
defined as frame of references for intra-re- land use planning style it has a land use plan
gional development. At the level of regions in the form of a municipal or other plans at
there is also the overlap with regional policy, the local level, for instance, a land use desig-
i.e. the economically driven development of nation plan. Furthermore, plans on a higher
regions. And, last but not least, at the local scale are absent (e.g. UK).
level spatial frameworks can be found, but
then again, instruments stipulating and con- Regional economic approach is the man-
trolling land use (especially land use plans) aging of space through the development of
are even more important. So, the usual com- regional plans that are made by either the
position of planning systems works with a regions or the national level. Regional plan-
multi-level government of three to four ning deals with the efficient placement of
layers. With the European Union and the infrastructure and zoning of economic activ-
discussions outlined earlier, we are likely to ities and population for the sustainable growth
see one additional layer arising (Faludi, 2008). of a region; it addresses region-wide issues
One decisive element of such an analysis is such as environment, social and economic
the locus of power (i.e. who has the right to concerns. It pursues a balanced spatial devel-
define what kind of development is intended opment in all fields (spatial justice). When a
and allowed) and between how many levels country can be categorized under the regional
the power (in planning) is distributed. In a economic approach style it has regional plans,
plan-led system like the one established in national plans with a regional focus and local
Germany, the existing levels are linked plans that are there to execute the regional
together by what is called the ‘counter cur- plans (usually because hierarchic relations
rent principle’, i.e. frameworks at national among levels and spatial justice presuppose
level have to be respected by lower tiers, presence of a main tutorial level) (e.g. France).
whereas existing strategies or projects inform
the comprehensive planning documents of Comprehensive integrated approach is the
the upper tier. managing of space through a hierarchical
system of spatial plans on several geographi-
When looking into the predominant pro- cal levels taking into account all relevant sec-
fessional orientation and dimensions, the var- tors that have an impact on the spatial
ious systems in Europe have been categorized development. It is related with land use and
as follows (European Commission, 1997). cross-sectoral coordination. Countries that
fall under the comprehensive integrated
Urbanism tradition is the managing of space approach planning always have a hierarchy of
through the smallest geographical unit availa- plans and institutions with a planning com-
ble, the physical structure, through building petency. Furthermore one can see vertical
regulations. Countries that can be classified and horizontal coordination between the
under the urbanism tradition don’t have spatial different sectors and levels taking place (e.g.
plans on a higher scale, or are not developed Nordic Countries, Germany).
when they do exist, but only have building
regulations (e.g. Mediterranean Countries). The second part of the aforementioned
report (University of Valencia et al., 2006)
Land use management is the planning of approached the issue of territorial deve-
space through the development of a local lopment from a governance perspective,
plan for the future use of land in accordance i.e. trying to pay attention to the general
with the land’s capabilities through zoning changes in state action.The conceptualization
laws based on the regulation and control of followed a multi-level approach, reflecting

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among others the shifting of responsibilities ii) A superseding of what might be called
(but not always also resources) towards lower ‘basic spatial ordering’ with a develop-
levels, which are observable in various states. ment function including the develop-
Parallel to that,also the more formal approach ment of a new regional governance
towards territorial development opened to (ultimately very closely connecting
softer horizontally integrated approaches. the two fields of planning with regional
Furthermore, not only at the EU level a development).
strong connection with regional economic
policy exists. In general, a discussion of a more iii) The embracing of project-based plan-
integrated approach and the reorientation of ning, i.e. using projects as drivers and
planning systems is observable. The first components for more comprehensive
impulse comes from the territorial cohesion plans.
theme (CEC, 2008) which is so prominent at
the European level, demanding a more inte- iv) The incorporation of ‘stakeholders’ to
grated territorial approach in all its develop- promote ‘problem ownership’.
ment activities (EC, 2006, EC and Ministers
for Spatial Development, 2005). The second v) The opening up of expert-led plan-
point is that the existing planning systems ning as a political arena via integration
increasingly evolve towards the comprehen- of wider groups (actually going beyond
sive integrative and the regional economic ‘stakeholders’).
management models (University of Valencia
et al., 2006). Ultimately the message is that vi) The attempt to control projects via
territorial organization matters with the Environmental Impact and Territorial
implication that coordination and develop- Impact Assessment (regarding the latter
ment using integrated schemes is of the see various projects of the ESPON
essence. This does not mean a strict hierar- research programme, http://www.
chical approach in the sense of primacy of espon.eu/).
any level over the other, but of agreed and
discussed sets of aims and objectives. An vii) The adoption of management con-
important further aspect is the need for a cepts on the side of institutions but
more cooperative approach between national also for processes.
territories. This idea of ‘territorial coopera-
tion’ has been built into the current ERDF viii) The management by objectives in the
regulations as one of the major policy orien- frame of sustainable development.
tations and it has therefore become a part of
EU regional development policy (EC, 2006). ix) The introduction of economic control
instruments (e.g. licensing).
In addition to these large-scale systems
shifts, are there further visible changes inside Planning, in sum, shows therefore several
the planning systems, giving them a new tendencies, establishing hybrid systems
character? A synthesis (Fürst, 2005) of such between still important formal foundations,
changes from a German perspective (arguing which need to be politically and democrati-
against the background of a rather elaborate cally legitimized, and new ‘governance’ fea-
plan-led system) includes: tures, of an increasingly softer nature and
bringing in more parties to ‘chart the courses
i) The replacing of a rather techno- of action into the future’ (Friedmann, 1987).
cratic approach with one emphasizing The next section will look into the new ter-
communicative action (towards plan- ritories for which planning and development
ning diplomacy). need to draft those courses of actions.

Spatial development problems

Spatial planning and territorial development
policy look onto a considerable set of spatial

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PETER ACHE

problem situations (EC and DG Regional A threefold reinforcement process of
Policy, 2007, European Commission, 2008a, increased mobility factors, innovation
European Commission, 2008b, World Bank, and quality-based competition, and general
2009). The complexity of societal develop- metropolization forms the positive feedback
ment lends itself to a matching set of not triangle. Metropolitan regions are the princi-
least ‘unintended spatial consequences’ of pal suppliers of the relational resources that
policies and practices. Looking into this land- fuel open-ended coordination processes,
scape there is clearly an indication that we which cannot be set up either by decision
need more ‘planning’ instead of less. For making of a centralized techno-structure or
instance, it is quite obvious that market inter- through sheer market forces (Veltz, 2004). In
actions alone do not produce the best result, terms of spatial structures, the resulting pic-
where best might be defined in the sense of ture is that of a system of highly dynamic and
a ‘common good’ or ‘public interest’.This is a well-connected metropolitan islands on
constant struggle in planning and territorial which the better off and economic dynamic
development (Hillier and Healey, 2008), bat- parts of society settle, which are floating in
tles ‘lost and won’ on an almost daily basis. By deserts of abandoned spaces (see below on
way of demonstration, looking at the actual the situation in East Germany).
global economic crisis and responses by vari-
ous governments to control the onward In terms of further territorial futures, the
effects, in many cases public investments into ESPON 3.2 Project (2007) describes the
infrastructures are considered a possible solu- economic core territory of the European
tion. However, building broadband networks, Union, what was once called ‘Blue Banana’
motorways, investing in built structures in (Brunet, 1989) or the ‘Pentagon’ (EC, 1999),
general (no matter how beneficial this might as an‘oscillating’space,depending on whether
be for a local populace in the individual case) those scenarios continue a trend, look at
for instance, put strategies to harness the the effects of increased competitiveness or
consumption of unspoilt unbuilt land imme- attempt to compensate at a regional level. In
diately at risk and therefore the aims of particular the competition scenario (follow-
sustainability. ing basically the ideas of the Lisbon strategy;
Lisbon European Council, 2000) is alarming,
This said, the core process driving land use describing a further concentration of growth
in our modern Western societies is clearly processes on the European core territory. In
the economy and its varying features over fact, looking at one of the key indicators
different periods of time. The question here Europe is interested in, which is R&D
is, which spatial form the economy takes, activities, already today most of it is con-
e.g. what links global flows and local condi- centrated in the centre (e.g. about 60 per
tions (Swyngedouw, 1992)? Two scenarios cent of all patents in 2002 came from that
will be looked at to demonstrate those con- region; ESPON Project 3.1 and BBR, 2006
cerns. One is the work by PierreVeltz (2004) (October)).
who speaks about ‘archipelago economies’.
The second resulted from the ESPON This large-scale picture re-emphasizes the
research programme, namely the projects need to think about ‘territorial cohesion’,
on territorial futures (ESPON 3.2 Project, which will be the prominent issue for Europe
2007, Robert and Lennertz, 2007). The over the coming years:
core of the first hypothesis builds on metro-
politan spaces (the OECD defines a metrop- “The concept of territorial cohesion
olis of at least one million inhabitants;OECD, extends beyond the notion of economic
2006) which become the adequate ‘ecosys- and social cohesion by both adding to
tems’ of advanced technology and economy. this and reinforcing it. In policy terms,
the objective is to help achieve a more
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balanced development by reducing In any case, looking at such problems in
existing disparities, avoiding territorial various countries (like the UK, Finland or
imbalances and by making both secto- Germany) it is obvious that from a planning
ral policies which have a spatial impact perspective the professional world will still
and regional policy more coherent.The have to cope with disadvantaged regions. In
concern is also to improve territorial the UK context, the dominating southern
integration and encourage co-operation region around London almost strangulates
between regions”. the rest of the country (Buck et al., 2005).
In the Finnish context, the demographic
(EC, 2004) change and internal migration movements
will empty the expansive countryside
Territorial development policies financed by (Steinbock, 2007). The unification of East
the Structural Funds of the EU have since with West Germany did not result in blos-
their inception in the mid-1970s attempted soming landscapes but, on the contrary, now-
to initiate a catch-up process (Ache, 2004). adays planners are talking about ‘perforated
The results of it can be expressed as a relative cities’ (Lütke-Daldrup, 2001, Sander, 2006),
process of cohesion, i.e. least developed where entire quarters were abandoned and
regions can be more dynamic but they start housing or infrastructure systems have fallen
from a very low level (in the EU from index derelict. It is especially this latter phenome-
values of 40 where the EU average is 100; non, which provides at the moment the most
European Commission, 2008b) – but this striking ‘evidence’ for the scenarios men-
means also that we speak about generations tioned at the outset, in particular with refer-
to come or need ultimately to bring the most ence to the ‘archipelagos’. Beyond such
disadvantaged regions closer to the currently already serious anecdotes, what are other
leading regions (Bröcker et al.,2004,Cheshire spatial development trends for which answers
and Carbonaro, 1997). have to be found in Europe?

Territorial cohesion at the level of the EU Clearly one major issue relates to demo-
is at the moment the theme which might graphic changes, migration and multicultural
lever proper planning activities in addition to societies. Births and deaths, ageing and the
regional development policies, using an inte- balance of inward to outward migration are
grated comprehensive approach (to remain the main drivers of demographic change.
in the terminology of the previous section). Their individual combination is a response
However, at the same time the immediate to external factors in fields like economy,
policy orientation seems to turn away from a life-styles, general cultural setting and – talk-
compensation pattern towards a ‘strengthen- ing about an individual – aspirations (ESPON
ing of the strong’ and hoping for spread Project 3.1 and BBR, 2006). Migration
effects. The guidelines for the Structural becomes the prime driver of regional popu-
Funds are read here as an indicator for such lation changes. Europe is one of the major
an approach or model (EC, 2006).The texts net immigration areas globally:
however also emphasize the potentials of
‘territorial capital’ (European Commission, All migratory flows, whether external
2005, OECD, 2001) which is diverse in or internal in relation to the EU, as
Europe (and should continue being diverse) well as in inter-and intra-regional
and which should be utilized by the less movements, are regionally targeted and
advantaged regions to the maximum age-specific. A redistribution from less
possible effect.It will be interesting to observe favoured to more favoured areas
how the practice will work and whether we occurs. ... Demographic structures
will see a possibly accelerating process of and trends in Europe highlight the
cohesion.
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potential for a further increase in ‘Europolis’ (Hall and Pain, 2006). The look
regional polarisation,with declining and across European boundaries proves that such
growing areas existing side by side. a situation is already there, as the next section
Urban areas and metropolitan agglom- will demonstrate.
erations are the main winners from cur-
rent demographic trends. They are the Urban millennium
regions in which positive migratory bal-
ances reinforce positive natural increases The final point of this chapter tries to open
or compensate for natural population the perspective which until now was mainly
losses in this era when families have the perspective of the ‘northern hemisphere’
fewer children. The south of Germany, and Europe. The UN Habitat programme
central England and southern and west- has labelled the new millennium as ‘urban’,
ern France, as well as Ireland, are repre- i.e. alluding to the continuous streams of
sentatives of this kind of region. people into the population mega-metropo-
lises, basically of the ‘southern hemisphere’
(ESPON 3.1, 2006: 11) posing different planning problems to
respond, like the principal organization of
European cities are increasingly turning into ‘cities’, urban social divides, or risk through
the multi cultural stages of our societies environmental disasters, to name the impor-
(Sandercock, 1998, 2003). This implies new tant ones.
forms of potentials but also conflict not least
over contested spaces (Harvey, 1997). In UN Habitat ( 2006) in view of the World
2008/2009 the city of Rotterdam, I guess as Development Goal 7:‘Ensure Environmental
one of the very first, saw the election of a Sustainability, Improving the Lives of at Least
new mayor with a migratory background 100 Million Slum Dwellers’ produced an
and of Muslim faith. Looking at him in this extensive report on the state of the world’s
high political office, citizens with a migra- cities with alarming results regarding the
tory background have finally arrived in the negative side of things: “Africa is the least
centre of our societies. And hopefully, the urbanised continent but by 2030 its urban
cynical comment made by Max Frisch on population will exceed the total population
the politics in the 1950s and 1960s can be of Europe.” Also the World Development
buried: “Wir riefen Arbeitskräfte, und es Report 2009 (World Bank, 2009) foresees
kamen Menschen” (We called labour force, a continued process of concentration of
and ‘Menschen’ came; Frisch, 1965). Beyond populations in mega-cities in the ‘southern
or on side of ethnic issues many more social hemisphere’, i.e. in situations of serious
problems characterize in particular our cities development problems.The United Nations
(Ache and Andersen, 2008, 2009). (UN Habitat, 2006) speak about ‘metapolises’
with more than 20 million inhabitants which
In summary, the direct and indirect spatial grow in particular in the developing coun-
effects of what can be called ‘globalization’ tries. One out of every three city dwellers –
(Held and McGrew, 2000, Taylor, 2004) or nearly one billion people –already lives in a
‘glocalization’ (Swyngedouw, 1992) create slum. The forecast for 2020 is 1.4 billion
new spatial structures which also have an altogether.The problems are revealed through
increasingly growing interdependency and the criteria which are applied to measure
responsibility (Massey, 2005). Urban devel- ‘slum conditions’: durable housing, suffi-
opment processes show a ‘transitional’ char- cient living area, access to improved water,
acter in that they are no longer confined to access to sanitation, secure tenure (referring
tightly bounded cities but spread out into back to the formal instruments still needed
urban regions of unprecedented scale with
the possible climax of a 70 million inhabitant

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in planning). The future of such a radically fragmented city of planned and unplanned
unequal and explosively unstable urban sections.
world has been captured by Mike Davis
(2006), speaking about a ‘planet of slums’ and The report did not find unanimous
portraying a vast humanity ‘warehoused in acclaim and has been criticized by John
shantytowns and exiled from the formal Friedmann (2002) as a typical view from the
world economy’. developed world. As to the issues, they can
also be critically reviewed, not least with a
Already in the year 2000 for the Global view towards the imprints and resulting
Conference on the Urban Future held in responsibilities which colonial periods of the
Berlin, Hall and Pfeiffer prepared a report past left behind. For instance, most of the
based on the results provided by a ‘World planning ideas and features of planning sys-
Commission URBAN 21’ and a related tems, including the education of planners,
expert group which worked for more than go back to those periods and might be
two years on millennial challenges of the considered culturally inadequate. In terms of
urban world in 2025. One of the main sec- the normative orientations for‘development’,
tions formulates so-called ‘urban essentials’, again most ideas were generated from a
i.e. dimensions of a sustainable city. These support philosophy, focusing on model
can be listed as follows: a sustainable urban orientations of ‘exogenous’ vs. ‘endogenous’
economy – work and wealth; a sustainable development (see Vázquez-Barquero, 2002)
urban society – social coherence and solidar- or following from ‘growth pole’ ideas (refer-
ity; sustainable urban shelter – decent afford- ring to the work by F. Perroux in the 1950s;
able housing for all; a sustainable urban see Parr, 1999a, 1999b).
environment – stable ecosystems; sustainable
urban access – resource-conserving mobility; One of the most conspicuous trends of the
sustainable urban life – building the liveable last decade has been the transformation of
city; and sustainable urban democracy – the state, creating new arenas for pluralistic
empowering the citizenry. debates and helping a more diversified range
of actors to emerge. One-party or military
All of these very broad issues are bound governments have been replaced by multi-
together with what Hall and Pfeiffer (2000) party systems and civil society organizations
call ‘good governance in practice’.The basic have gained voice. The decentralization of
principles are laid down in strong urban government functions and their devolvement
government at a local level with adequate to regional and local political and adminis-
distribution of responsibilities and resources. trative levels is progressing, albeit slowly.
The normative aim is set to sustainable devel- The last decade has, however, also seen
opment, i.e. the major concern lies with increased political destabilization in some
health and pollution, recycling and renew- parts of the world, internal conflicts, civil
able energy, in general high sanitation stan- wars or ‘failed states’.
dards. But also economic growth and social
inclusion are obvious aims. The liveable city Given the extended global economic rela-
in the end is a city which provides proper tions nowadays, much of the ‘development
housing and infrastructures, allowing citizens issues’ therefore are subject to conflicting
successfully to seize opportunities and de- interests if not power games. Rather typical
velop their individual potentials accordingly. than a-typical continues to be the issue of
Here the question is also raised: what kind of resource exploitation. By way of an example,
planning can ‘poor’ cities afford? The answer much of the communication technology for
meanders between a yes ascertaining univer- the Western information and communication
sally applicable principles and solutions and a society depends on ‘tantal oxides’ (coltan), for
no, as the hyper-growth city will always be a which the main global supplier nowadays is
the Democratic Republic of the Congo (so

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PETER ACHE

at least the official title). As observers report, The project reflects on key investigation
“Mineral firms ‘fuel Congo unrest’’’ (BBC areas, like the changing nature of work and
News, 2009), pointing out the power games its impact on the physical form of the city;
not only between local groups (in part the effects of mobility and transport systems
militia) but also between global economic on social cohesion and economic viability;
interests and nation states, leaving much of how the design of housing and neighbour-
the population in unrest or a state of flight. hoods affects local communities and urban
Urban areas and cities are in such a context integration; and how the public life and
often the locus of conflict. urban spaces of the city foster or impede tol-
erance and conflict among the different con-
In sum, does this constitute a perspective stituencies (Burdett and Sudjic, 2007: 10).
that inescapably results in a dystopia? And has But there is also the intention to generate
the ‘utopian’ power of the city, as essentially new ideas and impulses for the betterment of
the important place of individual freedom, local living situations, understanding cities
escape, opportunity, innovation and creation “as places where ‘urban life becomes a source
of new solutions vanished? The European of mutual strength rather than a source of
view might be largely covered by a ‘veil mutual estrangement and civic bitterness’”
of ignorance’ in this respect, but looking (Burdett and Sudjic, 2007).
into cities of the ‘southern hemisphere’
and their approaches towards social and Cities and metropolitan regions are not
environmental issues, there is a lot to be just concentrations of problems – which they
learnt. The 2006 Nobel Peace Prize went are, too – but they are also the places where
to Muhammad Yunus and the Grameen we create the solutions to problems in an
Bank, pioneers of microfinance, supporting ongoing set of experiments and failures.
social entrepreneurship which not least has Planning professionals do what they can to
a strong gender impact and aims at a create and shape those ‘spaces of hope’, some-
self-sustained economy. Meanwhile, micro- times futile but many more times surpris-
credits re-enter the ‘northern’ cities as a tool ingly effectively and efficiently.
to remedy unemployment under conditions
of economic crisis. And what could be the utopian dimen-
sions? John Friedman (2002), one of the most
Conclusions out- and long-standing ‘urbanists’, keeps to a
vision of a ‘good city’, consisting of both
In their edited publication on the ‘Endless a manual of indispensable processes and
Metropolis’, Burdett and Sudjic (2007) normative indications for achievements.
bring together the dimensions of a London The ‘good city’ is a political act in the sense
School of Economics-based Urban Age of Arendt’s ‘vita activa’ (Arendt 1958). John
Project: Friedmann postulates as a common aim of
the ‘good city’ human flourishing, a minimal
(It) is ... an exploration of the connec- agenda of appropriate homes, health, waged
tions between urban form and urban labour, and social networks and infrastruc-
society, translating a conventionally tures. A central instrument for this is ‘good
constrained two-dimensional discourse governance’, in the end also good govern-
into a three-dimensional dialogue. ment, which consists of inspired and inspir-
In (...) the insights of Jane Jacobs (...) ing political actors with visions, publicly
that ‘the look of things and the accountable, working transparently, satisfying
way they work are inextricably bound the public information duty.All citizens have
together’. equal rights to the city, harnessing and forc-
ing politics to be responsive. Suffice it to say
326 that this society is free of aggression but not

SPAT IAL PL ANNING A N D TER R ITOR IAL D EV E LOPMEN T POLIC Y

free from conflict, and solutions are found in Bröcker, J., Roberta Capello, L. L., Roland Meyer,
peaceful ways. ‘A Bias for Hope’ (John Jan Rouwendal, Nils, Schneekloth, A. S.,
Friedmann quoting Albert Hirschmann) is Martin Spangenberg, Klaus Spiekermann,
the overall guidance for that vision: Daniel Van Vuuren R. V., Michael Wegener
(2004) ESPON 2.1.1 Territorial Impact of EU
“The position I hold is for inclusive, Transport and TEN Policies.
democratic practices, for local citizen
rights, for peaceful, multicultural diver- Brunet, R. (1989) Les villes europeennes. La
sity in the cities of this world, for Documentation Francaise, Paris: RECLUS,
cooperative rather than competitive DATAR.
solutions, and for meaningful interven-
tion by states in the market economy Buck, N., Gordon, I., Harding, A. and Turok, I.
to protect and further citizen rights” (eds) (2005) Changing Cities. Rethinking Urban
Competitiveness, Cohesion and Governance,
(Friedmann, 2002). Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave
Macmillan.
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