Turning Back to the Market 239
decline in the demographic dependency ratio) that coincided with the reform
period buoyed per capita GDP growth.
The countries shown above the diagonal line are the ones whose labor product-
ivity increased more rapidly during the reform period than during the phase of
state-led industrialization. Those in which it grew more slowly during the latter
period appear below the diagonal line. As the reader can appreciate, the first group
is composed solely of Chile and the Dominican Republic (the two strongest
economies of the last two decades) and Uruguay, which grew slowly during
both of these periods. Argentina is close to the diagonal line, but is in a situation
more similar to that of Uruguay, in that its labor-productivity gains were not very
substantial in either period. The other countries (fourteen in total) had slower
growth rates during the reform period than during the phase of state-led indus·
trialization. The countries in the worst position within this group include the
region's two largest economies (Brazil and Mexico), along with Ecuador, Para-
guay, and Venezuela, as well as Bolivia, Colombia, and Honduras.
Various studies on trends in total factor productivity corroborate these find-
ings. Although they use different methodologies, these studies indicate that total
factor productivity has grown more slowly or has actually declined since 1990,
whereas it increased sharply during the period of state-led industrialization (IDB
2010; Aravena et al. 2010; Palma 2011). Figure 4.6 (see Chapter 4) provides an
overview of the estimates presented in a recent IDB study (2010). After climbing
until the mid-1970s, total productivity fell sharply during the debt crisis, and its
growth was sluggish or even slightly negative between 1990 and 2005 (the last year
for which the study provides estimates). The widening productivity gap between
the region and the United States is accounted for entirely by the trend since 1980,
and this gap continued to grow during the period of market reforms. The country
data provided in this study shows that Chile and the Dominican Republic were the
only countries to register significant productivity gains in 1990-2005, which were
even greater than those experienced in 1960-74.
The reasons for this poor performance in terms of productivity growth have
been extensively debated. The first point that should be brought out in this respect
is that these aggregate indicators reflect the marked asymmetries that exist
between the productivity gains achieved by successful firms and sectors, on the
one hand, and the increasing under-utilization of production resources, particu-
larly labor, on the other. Productivity did rise in strong firms and sectors (agri-
business, mining, and modern telecommunications, financial and transport
services). This tren~ was no doubt supported by growing integration into the
world economy, FDI, the emergence of the trans-Latins, and privatizations. At the
same time, however, the informal labor market was also expanding, which drove
down the productivity of the services sectors, where informal workers seek refuge.
As a result, today there are more world-class firms present in the region, many of
which are transnationals (or trans-Latins), but there are also a growing number of
low-productivity small businesses and microenterprises. In other words, the
region's internal dualism (structural heterogeneity, to use the term traditionally
employed by ECLAC) has increased. The idea that an increase in productivity in
internationalized sectors would spread out to the rest of the economy and would
boost economic growth has therefore not been borne out; in fact, relative levels of
240 Economic Development of Latin America
productivity of different sectors and firms within each economy tended to become
more unequal.
The path taken by the liberalization process no doubt contributed to this
outcome during the years when the reform effort was at its height. The prevailing
trend at the microeconomic level was for firms to adopt "defensive" strategies for
adapting to the new situation that focused on low-cost organizational, production,
and marketing restructuring, rather than "offensive" ones, which would have
involved combining these processes with substantial new investments in equip-
ment and technologies, as well as strategic alliances. As a result, the Schumpeter-
ian process of "creative destruction" that took place at that time appears to have
involved more destruction than creation, since the labor, capital, technological
capabilities, and, at times, land that were displaced from the sectors and firms in
which production processes were restructured were not properly absorbed by the
sectors that were expanding. The increasing integration of the world economy
made it easier to import intermediate products and equipment. This helped many
firms to boost their productivity, but at the cost of the destruction of existing
production chains. As a consequence of the predominance of defensive restruc-
turings, the average investment rate remained low during the 1990-7 expansion
and did not bounce back until the boom of2004-8, although, as we saw, even then
it remained below its 1975-80 peak (see Table 5.1).
The restructuring of production sectors was also marked by a premature
de-industrialization process entailing a reduction in the share of manufacturing
production in the economy and job creation at lower levels of per capita GDP than
those registered when de-industrialization has taken place in industrialized coun-
tries (Palma 2005). In the preceding chapter, Figure 4.4 illustrates how strong this
trend was, both during the lost decade and in the two decades that followed, while
Table 5.8 shows that industrial output stagnated during the lost decade (as the
aggregate effect of increases in some countries and decreases in others) and then
grew very slowly during the next two decades (as may be seen from a comparison
of the figures set out in Table 4.6). The best-performing industrial sectors included
the maquila industry, some natural-resource processing industries, the automo-
tive sector (which, in Mexico, was aided by that country's access to the US market
and, in South America, was promoted by special protection measures put in place
in the context of the subregional integration processes), and branches of industry
that catered to the local market during periods of booming domestic demand (e.g.,
construction materials, beverages, and food processing). The industries that were
hurt the most were more traditional, labor-intensive activities (apparel, footwear,
leather manufactures, furniture, etc.), except for maquila-related industries.
The region's manufacturing sectors also lagged behind the global technological
frontier, and this was true not only of labor-intensive and engineering-intensive
sectors but also of natural-resource-intensive industries, as is shown up by
comparisons of productivity levels in Latin America and the United States.
Moreover, this was occurring in a situation marked by a very low level of capacity
to generate new technologies, not only in comparison with the more diversified
industrialized and dynamic Asian economies, but also with the more developed
natural-resource-intensive economies. This was reflected in a lower share of
engineering-intensive industries, a very scant degree of research and development,
and a near absence of patenting of technological innovations in relation to all
Turning Back to the Market 241
Table 5.8. Dynamics of productive sectors (annual growth rates)
Agriculture Manufacturing Dynamic services•
1980-1990 1990-2008 1980-1990 1990-2008 1980-1990 1990-2008
Argentina 1.3 2.8 -2.1 3.3 0.0 5.1
Bolivia 1.7 3.0 -0.7 3.8 0.6 4.7
Brazil 2.5 3.8 -0.2 2.2 3.7 3.0
Chile 6.0 5.0 2.6 3.9 2.5 6.1
Colombia 3.0 2.2 2.9 2.2 3.5 4.2
Costa Rica 3.1 3.7 2.2 5.3 4.1 6.8
Cuba -2.3 0.3 2.2
Ecuador 4.2 4.4 3.0 0.4 2.9 4.2
El Salvador -1.4 2.3 -0.9 4.1 3.5
Guatemala 1.3 2.9 -0.1 2.7 2.6 6.4
Honduras 2.7 3.1 3.0 4.5 5.1 7.2
Mexico 1.2 2.0 2.0 2.9 3.4 4.3
Nicaragua -0.7 3.7 -2.8 4.2 -1.2 4.3
Panama 2.9 3.8 0.7 1.9 2.1 6.7
Paraguay 4.0 4.3 2.2 l.l 4.3 3.5
Peru 2.2 4.6 -1.9 4.8 0.6 5.2
Dominican Republic 0.4 2.7 2.1 4.9 4.5 7.0
Uruguay -0.2 2.9 -1.0 2.0 2.8 3.2
Venezuela 2.0 2.5 1.9 1.9 2.3 3.8
Latin America 2.3 2.9 0.1 2.7 3.1 4.1
)!Transport, communications, and financial services
Source: ECLAC historical series at 1990 and 2000 constant prices, respectively
these groups of economies (ECLAC 2007a; Cimoli and Porcile 2011). The slug-
gishness of the countries' national innovation systems that had been a feature of
the preceding stage of development thus remained in evidence, and the situation
actually deteriorated somewhat further.
Agriculture withstood the events of the lost decade better than other sectors,
but its growth rate both then and in the following years has been lower than it
typically was before the debt crisis: 2.9 percent in 1990-2008 vs 3.5 percent in
1950-74. Thus, the elimination of the previous trade regime's so-called "anti-
agricultural bias" did not have the positive effects that market-reform advocates
had expected, even in cases (as occurred in a number of countries) where the
substantial reduction or outright elimination of measures that discriminated
against agro-exporting sectors was coupled with increased protection for agricul-
tural producers that were competing with imports (Anderson and Valdes 2008).
Thus, the reduction in internal technological, financial, and marketing support
mechanisms for the agricultural sector, as part of the restructuring of the state
apparatus that took place during the reform process, in many (or even most) cases
outweighed the advantages of doing away with the trade bias against that sector.
In addition, as had also occurred during the previous development phase, the
periodic appreciation of the exchange rate worked to the disadvantage of the
agricultural sector.
This aggregate trend in agricultural production is a composite of widely varying
experiences, however. Agriculture has grown more robustly in Bolivia, Chile,
Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay in recent decades that it did during the period of
242 Economic Development of Latin America
state-led industrialization, but just the opposite is true of Colombia, Guatemala,
Mexico, Nicaragua, and Venezuela, while the sector's growth rates were quite
similar in these two periods in Brazil (compare, in this regard, the figures given in
Table 5.8 and those shown in Table 4.6). What is more, some of the most dynamic
agricultural activities followed long-term trends that were unaffected by reforms,
with the most outstanding examples being the strong performance of soybean
crops in a number of South American economies and poultry production in a
broader range of countries.
Overall, the most robust sectors were modern services (i.e., public utilities,
transport, and financial and business services) (see Table 5.8). These industries
continued to grow during the debt crisis and have been the strongest since 1990.
Their combined share of Latin America's GDP has increased by nearly 8 percent-
age points since 1980. A notable change in these sectors relative to the situation
during the period of state-led industrialization is that they are now populated by
more private enterprises, including, in many cases, transnational corporations.
Generally speaking, the mining sector also grew more rapidly in resource-rich
countries, but extractive activities have expanded more rapidly than the process-
ing of minerals that generate more value-added. As in the case of modern services,
mining activities have received a boost from institutional reforms designed to
open up more areas to the private sector and FDI. In the case of both mineral
resources and intellectual property, one of the thrusts of the reform process has
been to provide greater protection to property rights.
The strength of the export sector does not appear to have helped to speed the
economy's overall growth. As pointed out by ECLAC (2001a) and, more recently,
by Palma (2009 and 2011), the region's share in world markets has been increas-
ing in export sectors in which international markets are not dynamic, in sharp
contrast with the patterns seen in East Asia. Hausmann (2011) also notes that the
activities in which Latin America has specialized offer fewer opportunities for
setting up new production activities or for making improvements in product
quality-two areas of progress that are considered to be essential for rapid
economic growth. To use Hausmann's terminology, the region has tended to
specialize in a portion of the "product space" that offers fewer opportunities for
technological change.
As noted in the preceding section, many of the more successful export sectors,
especially manufacturing, tend to employ a large number of imported compon-
ents and, in the extreme case of the maquila industry, generate very little domestic
value-added. This means that there may be a significant difference between the
growth registered for exports of manufactures, which is measured as gross value,
and the manufacturing sector's GDP (i.e., the value-added). In fact, as demon-
strated by Akyiiz (2003: ch. I, especially table 1.5), the increase in Latin America's
share of world trade in manufactures experienced during the closing decades of
the twentieth century coincided with a reduction in its share of the global
manufacturing sector's value-added. This is also illustrated by World Bank statis-
tics, which show that Latin America's share of world manufacturing value-added
fell from 7.2 percent in 1980 to 6.2 percent in 2007 and that the decrease was even
sharper relative to the performance of developing countries as a whole (i.e.,
excluding the high-income OECD countries), where the region's share slid from
Turning Back to the Market 243
..t:: ~6;0%.~----------------------------------~~~~-=--
~ Panama Dominican Republic
••
Chile
Ql ---5~o.--l-----------------------------------~•--8e+w----vOr-S=la R'ICa
.~
: --4;0"1<:,-+--------------------------- temala
c +• Honduras
(!) Colombia
(ij Uru~uay• Ecuador + El Salvador
:I •- - - - - - - - - - : o 7 " " : : : : : _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _18:>:r~a:;;zi~llN i c a r a g u a -
1: Paraguay
<1:
---{3;09/c
• • Mexico
0 1.0% 3.0% 5.0% 7.0% 9.0%
-1.0%
Annual growth rate of exports
Figure 5.11. Relationship between export and GDP growth, 1990-2010
31.2 percent to 18.0 percent in the same period. 19 This trend is particularly clear
in the case of Mexico, where the surge in exports of manufactures since 1980 and,
in particular, since the signing of NAFTA, coincided with a slack growth rate in
manufacturing GDP (value-added): 3.0 percent in 1994-2008, according to the
ECLAC data that were used to draw up Table 5.8 and only slightly over 2.2 percent
in 1980-94, versus the 8.0 percent rate shown in Table 4.6 for 1950-74.
The way in which these factors were combined in different countries varied a
great deal, which helps to account for the low correlation that exists between GDP
growth and export growth in the countries of the region for 1990-2010 (see
Figure 5.11). The rapid growth of Mexico's export sector, for example, translated
into a far slower GDP growth rate than in Costa Rica and Chile or than in Peru
and the Dominican Republic. This appears to demonstrate that the combination
of limited domestic production linkages and the destructive effects of liberaliza-
tion (e.g., the destruction of pre-existing production chains) had a strong impact
in Mexico, whereas the development of new export industries in Costa Rica
underpinned a marked net creation of production capacity, while, in Chile, the
destructive effects of liberalization were felt earlier on, in the 1970s. The destruc-
tion of production capacity that occurred when the region's economies were
opened up to imports appears to have been greater in the larger countries,
which may be part of the explanation for the slower pace of growth experienced
by Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, and Venezuela relative to the regional average.
The fact that the Latin American economies have been relatively successful in
opening up their economies to the international market but have been growing
19 These estimates have been arrived at using the World Bank's global development indicators
database.
244 Economic Development of Latin America
slowly is one of the paradoxical effects of market reforms. This has, once again,
opened the way for the supporters of industrial policies or, more generally,
production-sector development policies. This issue is closely related to techno-
logical development in today's open economies. ECLAC stands out among
the various international institutions in having continued to focus on this issue
during the time that reformers were, as noted earlier, emphasizing that "the best
industrial policy is no industrial policy" (see ECLAC 1990, 2000, and 2008).
Since the 1990s, progress has been made in some horizontal (i.e., non-
selective) policies, such as free-trade zones, support for microenterprises and
small and medium-sized businesses, ICT diffusion, and the design of techno-
logical funds. In addition, support has been provided for some production
chains and local production clusters. All of these policies are part of a strategy
to boost "competitiveness" (a term that does not carry with it all the negative
connotations associated with the concept of "industrial policy") and are
focused primarily on providing support for existing branches of activity rather
than diversifying the production base. In addition, some of the old sectoral
policies have remained in place, such as those that provide support for the
automotive industry in some South American countries and for the forestry
sector in others. In some cases, support for investment in individual firms
has played an important role, such as, for example, in the entry of INTEL in
Costa Rica, of mining enterprises in Peru, and of pulp and paper industries in
Uruguay (Peres 2012).
Starting at the turn of the century, there was a more widespread return to
sectoral policies in Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico and, later on, in Chile and
Colombia. Nevertheless, it was not until the 2008 launch of Brazil's production
development policy, and the simultaneous implementation in this country of a
policy focusing on building new production capacity around its oil discoveries,
that it can be said that there was a return to an ambitious industrial and, more
broadly, production sector development strategy. In the rest of the countries,
policies in this area remain limited, and the incentives they provide to businesses
are weak and complex, and are a far cry from those that protection measures and
other incentives provided during the previous phase of development.
The policy proposals for promoting the development of production that are
being put forward now tend to place more emphasis on science and technology,
an area that was largely neglected during the period of state-led industrialization.
The period of market reforms also introduced changes in the policies in this area.
In the 1990s, most of the countries began to move away from the supply-side
technology policies associated with the preceding stage of development and
toward a model focusing on demands from the production sector. The main
"horizontal" policy tools that were put in place-which were, at least in theory,
neutral in terms of their effect on the various production sectors-were the funds
made available to innovative investors, business counseling, and information
systems for innovative ventures, and quality control and certification mechan-
isms, especially for export products. Emphasis was also placed on the protection of
intellectual property as a means of attracting FDI, which was seen as a vehicle for
technical progress. Trade liberalization and the overvaluation of the exchange rate
in a number of the countries also paved the way for the introduction of technolo-
gies that were embedded in what had become cheaper capital goods.
Turning Back to the Market 245
These policies heightened the heterogeneity of the countries' production struc-
tures, since the design of co-financing arrangements had the effect of ensuring
that the main beneficiaries of these policies would be business ventures that
already had the capacity to innovate. At the Sj:lme time, the resources made
available for research and development remained very limited (0.54 percent of
GDP in 1998-2002, 0.57 percent in 2002-6 and 0.63 percent in 2007) (ECLAC
2010: table III.9). Brazil is the only Latin American country in which investment
in this area amounts to around 1 percent of GDP, and the majority of the
countries have investment rates in this area far below the regional average,
which is only a fraction (one fourth or one fifth) of the rate in countries that
invest heavily in technological development (Finland, the US, South Korea) and
half as much as the rate in China or Spain. Latin American investment in this area
comes largely from the government (over half), whereas the leading countries in
innovation rely more on the private sector. Latin America also lags even further
behind in terms of other indicators (number of scientists or of scientific publica-
tions per million of inhabitants, or the share of worldwide patenting) (ECLAC
2008: table III.l). 20
Meanwhile, at the same time that this dominant model was put in place, a
number of countries were making headway in developing more systemic
approaches to innovation. In the 1990s, Colombia and Costa Rica developed
more integrated innovation systems that were directed at ensuring that technol-
ogy supply and demand policies would be more closely interlinked and that there
would be broad sectoral and regional participation. In Colombia, efforts in this
area flagged in the late 1990s but were revived later on. In Argentina, Brazil, and
Mexico, progress was made in developing sectoral funds that played an important
role in enabling these countries to combine sectoral development policies with a
variety of instruments designed to identify demand components and to encourage
the private sector to invest in research and development. While Argentina and
Mexico focused more on demand, Brazil embraced a systemic model more similar
to the one used by Colombia and drew on a much larger pool of resources, as
mentioned earlier.
THE SOCIAL EFFECTS OF ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATIONS
The lost decade had a devastating effect on the region in terms of poverty levels.
For Latin America as a whole, the poverty rate climbed from 40.5 percent to 48.3
percent, with the rate in urban areas jumping by nearly 12 percentage points and
the already high rate in rural areas rising further (see Figure 5.12). The main cause
of this was the decline in the real income of workers and the steep decrease in
formal employment triggered by the deep recession, and the inflation that went
along with it. Income distribution also took a turn for the worse, with most of this
°2 For a more extensive discussion of this subject, see ECLAC (2008: chs III and IV) and ECLAC
(2010: ch. III).
246 Economic Development of Latin America
70.0
65.0 ---------------!+r£7&----------- - - - - --~-~-----
60.0
:- - -- ;-- - -- : ---
55.0 1-----~u;;J-------- --- :---
50.0 1----- :---- - 1----- -- :--- 1------- :--
45.0 - - --- -------- --- :-----
40.0 ;- --- ,-- __ 1--
---
35.0 -- 1--- ----- ---- 1--- 1-- 1----------
30.0 1-- 1-- i- 1--- 1- 1--
1--
25.0 c- 1---- 1-- 1--- :----- 1----
20.0 f-- '-- '---,- '-- ~ ~ '--
1980
1990 1997 2002 2005 2008 2009
J111 Total Urban tsJ RuraiJ
Figure 5.12. Poverty incidence
Source: ECLAC
deterioration being concentrated in the most acute phase of the crisis (see
Table 5.9).
The fiscal adjustments made during the lost decade did involve cuts in public
social spending, but this category of expenditure was reduced less than total public
spending. The net decline in social spending, measured as a percentage of GDP
(and it should be borne in mind that per capita GDP also contracted during this
period), amounted to a decrease of 9 percent in per capita social spending in
1982-9 relative to its level at the start of that decade. Social security was the most
heavily protected item of social expenditure (Cominetti and Ruiz 1998). Here
again, however, this aggregate figure is the result of a wide range of outcomes,
from countries in which social spending continued to rise through the 1980s, to
ones in which it plummeted.21 Despite the cuts made in some cases, education,
health, and other social indicators continued to improve. Nonetheless, the public
systems for social service delivery were hard hit, and this led to a loss of human
capital and a deterioration in the quality of those services.
During the subsequent reform phase, different social indicators have followed
contrasting trends. The most positive development has been the steady rise in
21 On the b<)sis of the data provided by Cominetti and Ruiz (1998), Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica,
Honduras, Panama, and Uruguay can be classified as falling into the first group, while Guatemala, El
Salvador, Nicaragua, Peru, the Dominican Republic, and Venezuela can be placed in the second. In the
rest of the countries, social spending initially fell and then began to recover.
Turning Back to the Market 247
Table 5.9. Income distribution in Latin America (Gini coefficient) 2008
1980 1986 1992 1998 2002 46.3
54.2
Argentina 39.8 42.7 45.0 50.2 53.3 51.8
58.3 51.9
Brazil 57.4 58.0 60.1 59.2 54.8 44.5
56.6 57.2
Chile 52.9 56.1 54.7 55.5 45.4 55.6
60.1 53.4
Paraguay 53.3 55.8 52.7 57.1 55.6 48.0
56.5 43.5
Uruguay 40.2 41.2 42.1 44.0 51.4 48.7
47.5 46.9
Bolivia 57.2 58.2 57.8 49.8 53.6
52.3 55.3
Colombia 60.0 58.2 56.4 58.8 54.5 52.3
55.5 54.8
Ecuador 49.9 51.1 50.2 50.5
56.4 48.3
Peru 52.9 47.4 52.6 53.8
49.0 50.9
Venezuela 42.3 44.6 41.3 47.2
53.4 50.6
Costa Rica 44.0 44.6 45.9
53.3 50.3
El Salvador 52.7 53.4
53.5
Guatemala 56.2 58.2 56.0
Honduras 51.5 51.9
Nicaragua 56.3 53.8
Panama 48.0 51.8 55.5 55.4
Mexico 48.0 54.1 54.7
Dominican Republic 50.9 53.1 50.5
Average
All countries 49.2 51.3 51.9 53.1
Countries with data
for 1986 51.3 51.7 53.2
Countries with data
for 1980 49.2 51.0 51.0 53.4
Source: Gasparini et al. (2011)
public social spending experienced since the early 1990s. Since the reform process
has coincided with the longest stretch of democratic rule in Latin America's
history, the upswing in public social expenditure and the expanded .coverage of
basic social services which this has made possible can rightly be considered to be
"democratic dividends." In contrast to this persistent improvement, labor market
and income distribution indicators have gone through two different phases: a
deterioration during the 1990-7 recovery and the lost half-decade, followed by
an improvement during the economic boom that took place at the start of the
twenty-first century.22 For the region as a whole, the improvemen~ during .the
second phase was not strong enough to entirely reverse the cumulative detenor-
ation either in income distribution that occurred from 1980 on (see Table 5.9) or,
as we will see, in the labor market since 1990. The Great Recession of 2008-9
interrupted the positive trends in these variables but, in general, it had no more
than moderate adverse effects.
Thanks to the boom that preceded the Great Recession, poverty levels, which
had been falling very gradually since 1990, dropped by more than ten percentage
22 There is a wealth of literature on these subjects. In regard to trends during the 1990s, see ECLAC
(2001a), Behrman et al. (2001) and Szekely (2001). On the recent improvement in distribution, see
Cornia (2010), Gasparini and Lustig (2011), and the compilation prepared by L6pez-Calva and Lus!lg
(2010).
248 Economic Development of Latin America
points between 2002 and 2008. It was not until 2004 that poverty levels fell below
their 1980 level, however, which means that, in terms of poverty reduction, the
region experienced not a "lost decade" but a lost quarter-century! The actual
number of poor people held at around 200 million during the 1990s and rose to
220 million during the lost half-decade, before declining by about 40 million
during the boom that occurred at the start of the twenty-first century. The
distribution of poverty also changed significantly during those decades, since
although poverty and extreme poverty rates continued to be much higher in
rural areas, an "urbanization" of poverty took place when it is measured in
absolute numbers.
Although most of the ground lost during earlier years in terms of distribution
was regained during the 2004-8 boom, the same cannot be said for labor market
indicators. This situation has been compounded by the extreme volatility of
economic growth, which has heightened Latin America's economic insecurity.
As a whole, social trends can therefore be summarized as involving increased
social spending and coverage of social services accompanied by rising job precar-
iousness and economic insecurity. The latter is reflected, for wage-earners, in the
high risk of losing their jobs and the high incidence of job turnover and, for
informal-sector workers, a higher risk of losing income.
It is important to realize that these changes were taking place at a time when the
demographic transition and the urbanization process were reaching their peak,
which means that, during the 2000s, there was less pressure on labor supply,
especially in urban areas. The decline in birth rates that had begun in the mid-
1960s translated into a total population growth rate of 1.7 percent between 1980
and 2010, which was a full percentage point less than in 1950-80, but this decline
was a persistent one, with the result that, by the end of the first decade of the
twenty-first century, the population growth rate was only slightly above 1 percent
per annum. The slowdown in the population growth rate was quite widespread,
although it was more noticeable in countries that had witnessed a population
explosion in the preceding years and came somewhat later in a number of Central
American countries (Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua) and in Bolivia and
Paraguay; in turn, Costa Rica's population swelled owing to the influx of migrants
from other countries in the region (as shown by a comparison of the data given in
Table 5.10 with those shown in Table 4.9). The trend in rural-urban migration
also continued, with the result that over half of the population resides in urban
areas in all the countries and nearly three-fourths of the population does so in the
region as a whole, with a tendency for this rate to be higher in the larger
economies as part of a pattern that was already evident during the preceding
stage of development.
The labor supply expanded very rapidly from the 1970s on as a result both of
the still high growth rate of the working-age population and of the increased labor
participation rate of women as the demographic dependency rate continued to
fall. This dual effect continued to be seen until the end of the twentieth century.
According to CELADE (2006: table 11), the labor supply was still growing by as
much as 3.1 percent per year in the 1990s, which is not very different from the 3.3
percent rate that CELADE estimated for 1970-90. In the 2000s, however, as the
demographic transition neared completion and as the surge in the female labor-
Turning Back to the Market 249
Table 5.10. Population, population growth, and urbanization rates
Total population Population growth rate Urbanization rates
1980 2010 1980-2010 1980 2010
Latin America (19 countries) 349,009 572,479 1.7% 57.0 72.7
Large countries 121,672 199,992 1.7% 67.1 85.0
Brazil 69,325 110,056 1.6% 66.3 78.0
Mexico
28,094 40,519 1.2% 82.9 93.1
Southern Cone 11,174 17,094 1.4% 79.0 87.5
Argentina 2,914 3,363 0.5% 85.1 92.4
Chile
Uruguay 28,356 47,859 1.8% 64.3 78.5
17,325 28,861 1.7% 64.2 73.4
Andean 15,091 28,807 2.2% 79.0 93.6
Colombia
Peru 2,347 4,695 2.3% 42.9 66.0
Venezuela 4,586 7,453 1.6% 44.1 60.3
7,013 14,362 2.4% 33.0 57.2
Central America 3,634 7,614 2.5% 34.9 50.5
Costa Rica 3,257 5,825 2.0% 50.1 58.3
El Salvador
Guatemala 5,355 10,426 2.2% 45.5 66.4
Honduras 9,823 11,236 0.4% 68.2 77.4
Nicaragua 7,961 14,200 1.9% 47.0 65.0
1,949 2.0% 49.8 68.7
Other 3,198 3,497 2.4% 41.6 61.4
Bolivia 5,935 6,451 1.8% 37.3 68.6
Cuba 10,169
Ecuador
Panama
Paraguay
Dominican Republic
Source: ECLAC historical series
force participation rate leveled off, the growth of the labor supply dropped to a
yearly rate of 2.2 percent.
The lower demographic dependency ratio and the higher growth rate for the
economically active population relative to the total population seen during
the specific demographic transition experienced by the region in recent decades
have provided what has been dubbed in the literature as a "demographic
dividend." The benefits to be derived from this "dividend" are not automatic,
however; the economy has to create enough jobs in order to make it possible to
take advantage of that dividend. And this is why that opportunity was not seized
during the 1980s and 1990s, although it did help to bring poverty levels down. In
fact, according to Ros (2009), the decline in the dependency ratio is the main
reason for the relative trends in poverty rates seen in the Latin American countries
in 1990-2006. The positive effects of this demographic dividend were also experi-
enced in a stronger way in the 2000s, as per capita GDP for 2003-8 was similar to
the rates registered for 1967-74 (around 4 percent per annum) even though total
GDP growth remained lower than it had been during that period.
The poor performance of the labor market up to the start of the 2000s had a
devastating impact. It was the result of a number of different economic factors,
including, in particular, the slow pace of growth discussed in the preceding section
250 Economic Development of Latin America
and the effects that market reforms had on job creation. The data show that the
rate of increase in job creation was slower in the 1990s than it was in the second
half of the 1980s; what is more, unemployment rose, informal-sector employment
expanded, and wage hikes were concentrated in skilled jobs (Stallings and Weller
2001). It is worth noting that this was occurring during the years of the strongest
economic growth in the 1990s (up to 1997), which indicates that the net impact of
economic reforms on job creation was negative. These adverse trends became
more acute during the lost half-decade of 1998-2002. As the female labor"force
participation rate continued to climb (the male participation rate held steady at
around 74 percent, while the female participation rate jumped by eight percentage
points, from 38.4 percent in 1991 to 46.5 percent in 2002), the unemployment rate
skyrocketed and the informal sector of the labor market expanded rapidly (see
Table 5.11).
The deterioration in the labor market that occurred during the initial phase of
reforms was concentrated in South America, which highlights the impact of the
Latin American countries' different patterns of integration into the international
economy that were discussed earlier. As shown in Table 5.11, while employment
rates dropped and unemployment rates climbed in South America, both of these
indicators improved in Mexico and Central America. The contrast between the
"northern" and "southern" patterns was particularly evident in the manufacturing
sector. In the "northern" countries, employment in the manufacturing sector rose
at an average annual rate of 4.3 percent and accounted for 13 percent of all job
creation, whereas, in the "southern" countries, manufacturing employment
shrank by 0.1 percent per year (Stallings and Weller 2001). The maquila industry
is a key part of the explanation, given the important role it played in the growth of
the manufacturing sector in the northern part of the region during the 1990s. As
of 1999, jobs in the maquila sector accounted for between 10 percent and 40
percent of all jobs in the manufacturing sector in the northern countries (and in
some, such as Mexico and the Dominican Republic, it was a major employer as
early as the start of that decade).
The deterioration of labor market conditions during the lost half-decade was
experienced in both subregions, but it tended to take the form of open unemploy-
ment in South America, whereas in Mexico and in Central America, it was
primarily manifested in an expansion of the informal sector.
In sharp contrast to the trends seen up to the start of the twenty-first century,
the 2004-8 boom had a much more positive impact in South America in terms
of both open unemployment and formal-sector employment. The decrease in
unemployment rates was particularly steep in five South American countries
(Argentina, Colombia, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Venezuela) and in Panama,
which were the ones that had exhibited the highest rates in the past. One of the
main reasons for this was, of course, soaring commodity prices, which
strengthened the "southern" pattern of specialization. The recession that began
in late 2008 clearly curbed these growth trends, but had much less of an impact
than the two preceding crises had.
Although it clearly did improve the situation, the 2004-8 boom did not entirely
reverse the steep decline in job quality that had built up between 1990 and the start
of the twenty-first century. In particular, as of 2008 the unemployment rate
remained above the levels registered in 1990. In turn, Table 5.12 compares trends
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252 Economic Development of Latin America
Table 5.12. Change in labor market conditions in Latin America, 1990-2008*
Open unemployment Informality Remuneration Social security
coverage
Argentina 0.5 -4.5 3.0 nq
Bolivia -0.6 -0.3 -0.7 -4.2
Brazil -9.1 -0.7
Chile 3.6 -8.9 0.1 -0.8
Colombia 0.0 -0.5 2.1
Costa Rica 1.0 0.9 nd
Ecuador -0.6 0.2 0.7 0.4
El Salvador 0.8 2.9 1.0 -6.0
Guatemala -4.5 5.4 -0.1 3.6
Honduras -0.2 3.5 0.1 2.8
Mexico -3.7 -9.4 -0.2 nd
Nicaragua 2.2 0.1 -0.5 -18.9
Panama 0.4 9.1 -0.7 -7.9
Paraguay -13.5 3.6 0.3 -4.7
Peru 0.8 1.2 0.7 3.0
0.1 -1.8 0.1 12.2
Dominican Republic -4.3 -4.2 0.6 nd
Uruguay -0.6 6.0 -0.2 4.4
Venezuela -3.1 10.7 -0.6 3.8
So11rce: ECLAC, Social Panorama Statistical Annex
' The change is calculated as the difference between the last and the first data point for each country. The years for
each country vary depending on data availability.
since 1990 in four variables that are indicative of labor market conditions. As
can be seen, a systematic improvement in all of these indicators is apparent only
in the case of Chile. In the other countries, there has been a long-term deterior-
ation in one or more of these indicators. Given the close correlation between
employment in the formal sector and access to social security, one of the
unfortunate effects of recent trends in the labor market has been a decline in
social security coverage in more than half of the countries for which information
is available. These figures corroborate the arguments made by Tokman (2007
and 2011) concerning the expansion of the informal sector of the economy
during these years, which he defines as including both informal workers as such
and wage-earners in the formal sector who do not have access to social securitf3
or an employment contract. According to his estimates (Tokman 2011), the
informal economy expanded from 58.8 percent to 64.0 percent of total urban
employment between 1990 and 2008.24
The adverse distributional trends observed in the 1990s and during the lost
half-decade also reflect a north-south pattern that very likely mirrors the ways in
which different patterns of specialization influenced labor market conditions. As
shown in Table 5.9, the situation worsened much more in South America between
23 On the subject of social security coverage, see also Uthoff (2011).
24 For 1990-2005, Garda (2007) estimates that over 55 percent of the increase in total employment
in Latin America corresponds to informal employment.
Turning Back to the Market 253
1990 and the start of the twenty-first century than it did in other parts of the
region. Even in this case, however, it was not an across-the-board phenomenon, as
the deterioration was much more marked in Argentina, Ecuador, and Venezuela
and less so in Bolivia and Uruguay, while a slight improvement was seen in Brazil.
In the northern part of the region, the setbacks in distribution began to be
reversed in Mexico and in some of the Central American countries starting in
the mid-1990s. But even in the northern part of the region, the trend was not
entirely favorable, as is shown by the figures for Costa Rica and Honduras.
It is interesting to note that some countries with more equal income distribu-
tions have witnessed a deterioration in this respect over the past few decades
(Argentina, Costa Rica, and Uruguay, in particular), while others with worse
distributions have seen an improvement (notably Brazil, but also Chile and a
number of Central American nations). There has thus been somewhat of a
convergence toward intermediate levels of inequality. Be this as it may, and
despite the recent improvement in this respect, Latin America, along with sub-
Saharan Africa, continues to be the region of the world with the highest levels of
inequality. In fact, the average levels of inequality are still somewhat higher than
they were in 1980 in the countries for which information on this variable is
available.
The ways in which structural reforms influenced income distribution have
been heatedly debated. The reforms certainly produced losers and winners, but
their net distributional impact was positive in some countries and negative in
others (see, for example, Ganuza et al. 2002), as is also true of individual compon-
ents of market reforms. No consensus on this subject has been reached.25 The
most widespread effect was an increasing wage gap between skilled and unskilled
workers in the 1990s. This was seen throughout the region, with the important
exception of Brazil. A number of authors endorse the thesis advanced by Morley
(2000), who contends that trade liberalization was the main cause of this widening
wage gap. Contributing factors included the reduction of tariffs on capital goods,
the complementarity of investment in machinery and equipment and the demand
for skilled labor, and currency appreciations (that made equipment less expensive
and increased the dollar cost of labor, which hurt the more labor-intensive
sectors). In addition, job creation in export sectors was not strong enough to
counterbalance the destruction of jobs in sectors that had once been protected and
that then had to boost their productivity to survive by initially cutting back on
their labor costs. The new jobs that were being created also tended to be less well
paid and to offer less stability (Lora 2011). Other authors, however, argue that the
widening wage gap was more a result of technological biases (as the new tech-
nologies coming into use generated a demand for more skilled labor) than of the
market reforms; this thesis would explain why this trend has been in evidence
throughout the world.
The recent reduction in inequality has been analyzed by Cornia (2010), Gas-
parini et al. (2009), Gasparini, Cruces, and Tornarolli (2011), and Gasparini and
25 Behrman et al. (2001) have argued, for example, that financial liberalization had regressive effects
that outweighed the moderately progressive impact of trade liberalization. In contrast, Morley (2000)
contends that trade liberalization had adverse effects that eclipsed the favorable impact of financial
liberalization.
254 Economic Development of Latin America
Lustig (2011), among others. This development appears to have been brought
about by a combination of short-term and structural factors, as well as by social
policy and, perhaps, strict political considerations. Short-run contributing factors
include the reversal of the severe adverse distributional shocks felt by various
countries during the lost half-decade and the reduction in the rural-urban gap
generated by the steep rise in the prices of agricultural products. The economic
boom also opened up more job opportunities for a workforce that, as mentioned
earlier, was growing more slowly than before. In addition, others were migrating
to the US and Europe in order to take advantage of the job opportunities to be
found there.
Among the factors of a more long-lasting nature that have exerted a favorable
influence, the most important one is the reversal of the sharp increase in the wage
gap separating skilled and unskilled workers. Education policy has had a great deal
to do with this outcome, both by leading to an increase in the number of years of
schooling completed by the population and by achieving a reduction, in some
respects at least, in educational inequality. According to Cornia (2010), the
reduction in educational inequality was the single most important determinant
of the improvement of income distribution in the 2000s.
The expansion of the new income-transfer programs and of conditional cash
transfers, in particular,26 along with other social assistance mechanisms, has also
helped to improve distribution, but to a lesser extent, since the amount of money
involved in these schemes is limited (no more than a few tenths of a percentage
point of these countries' national income) and, in a number of them, the coverage
of such programs is quite limited. This can be seen in the region's two largest
countries, which have implemented such transfer mechanisms on quite a large
scale. According to Gasparini and Lustig (2011), the "Oportunidades" conditional
cash transfer program has been responsible for slightly more than one fifth of the
improvement in income distribution achieved by Mexico in the 2000s, while the
broader range of transfer schemes in use in Brazil have accounted for two fifths of
the improvement in that country, although this is attributable to both social
security benefits (i.e., the non-contributory Beneficia de Prestarao Continuada, a
means-tested disability and old-age pension scheme) and to Balsa Familia
("family grant"), Brazil's conditional cash transfer program, which is now inte-
grated with other poverty-reduction policies.
Thus, although social assistance benefits are highly redistributive, the
actual amount of funds that they involve is relatively small, which is why
public expenditure on the core social policies has a greater redistributive
impact (Ocampo 2008a). The policies that have the greatest coverage, such
as primary education and, increasingly, secondary education, as well as public
health, have the strongest redistributive effect of all. Mechanisms that have
a somewhat more limited coverage, such as housing and sanitation programs,
have a slightly progressive effect, whereas those that reach no more than a
small portion of the population, such as higher education and the social security
26 Under these programs, poor households receive an income transfer from the state if parents
ensure that their school-age children attend classes and if pregnant women show up for prenatal
check-ups.
Turning Back to the Market 255
system, are regressive, although they are generally less so than the overall primary
income distribution.
The changes made in labor regimes in the course of the political changes
experienced by the region, and particularly the rise to power of a number of
left-leaning governments during the first decade of the twenty-first century, may
also have had something to do with the improvement in distribution. Even
though, as noted earlier, there had been no major liberalization of the labor
market, the earlier deterioration in income distribution occurred at a time when
the trade union movement was weakened and prevailing wage policies (especially
with regard to the minimum wage) were unfavorable for workers. In contrast,
during the 2000s, rt'(lations between employers and trade unions were more
amicable and a number of countries raised their minimum wages. Labor reforms
also changed direction in various countries and ushered in a greater degree of
protection for workers (Murillo, Ronconi, and Schrank 2011).
The impact of social policy on income distribution reflects the lagged effect of
the steady increase in public social spending over the past two decades. Infor-
mation compiled by ECLAC indicates that this item of expenditure climbed from
13.0 percent ofGDP in 1990 to 16.1 percent in 1998. Following a slowdown at the
turn of the century as a result of the impact of the lost half-decade, social spending
again picked up, rising to 18.9 percent ofGDP in 2008. What is more, as GDP has
expanded-at a quite rapid pace during some periods-these percentages trans-
late into even larger amounts in absolute terms. Over these past two decades, the
increase in social spending has been sharper in countries where it was initially
lower, which means that, in addition, the differences between the relative levels of
social spending as a percentage of GDP has tended to narrow across the region.
Nonetheless, both in the early 1990s and in 2008, Argentina, Brazil, Costa Rica,
and Uruguay had above-average levels of social spending. The greatest increases
were seen in Brazil and Colombia, among the larger countries, and in El Salvador
and Paraguay, among the smaller nations.
The increase in social spending has translated into a steady improvement in
educational and health indicators, as well as in the coverage of water and sewerage,
among other services, although, clearly, with differences from one country to
another. The inroads being made in these fields place the region above the average
for developing countries and at comparable or higher rankings than other
developing regions with similar per capita income levels (East Asia), with the
notable exception of some health indicators (e.g., maternal mortality) in certain
countries (see Table 5.13). This is also reflected in the trend in the region's human
development indices, although, as seen in Chapter 1, somewhat less progress has
been made in this respect than during the stage of state-led industrialization.
However, these advances should not be overestimated. School dropout rates
continue to pose a challenge for countries striVing to ensure universal coverage for
primary education. Furthermore, the distribution of access to higher education
has not improved and has actually worsened in some countries, and there are
serious problems in terms of the quality of education at all levels. There are
still enormous problems in terms of public health as well, with high rates of
maternal mortality in some countries, as well as inadequate treatment of various
transmissible diseases (HIVIAIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis) and chronic non-
transmissible diseases whose incidence is on the rise (cardiovascular conditions,
256 Economic Development of Latin America
Table 5.13. Progress toward millennium development goals
Latin America and East Asia Developing
the Caribbean Countries
1990 2007 1990 2007 1990 2007
Underweight children 13% 6% 17% 7% 33% 26%
under-five years of age1
Population below minimum level 13% 8% 16% 10% 20% 17%
of dietary energy requirements
Net enrollment ratio 86.7% 94.9% 98.0% 95.2% 79.6% 88.1%
Primary 58.7% 70.2% 60.7% 69.0% 45.4% 52.6%
21.5% 31.3% 13.3% 24.2% 10.9% 17.4%
Secondarf
Tertiarf 97.0% 97.0% 94.0% 99.0% 87.0% 95.0%
Ratio girls to boys 106.0% 107.0% 97.0% 101.0% 90.0% 94.0%
Primary 113.0% 119.0% 55.0% 96.0% 78.0% 96.0%
Secondarf 103
Tertiarf 55 24 45 22 74
Under-five mortality rate
Maternal mortality ratio4 180 130 95 50 480 450
(per 1,000 births)
Proportion of births attended 68% 87% 71% 98% 47% 61%
by skilled health personnel
Proportion of population 84% 92% 68% 88% 71% 84%
using: 5 68% 79% 48% 65% 41% 53%
Drinking water
Sanitation facilities
1 Data for population below minimum level of dietary requirements correspond to the latest available: 1990/1992
and 2008.
2 Data for secondary correspond to 1999/2000 and 2006. Japan is included in the data of enrollment for East Asia.
3 Corresponds to gross enrollment rate. Given the variance in the length of programs ~t this educational level, it is
difficult to determine adequate age groups. Therefore, net enrollment rate in tertiary education is not relevant. The
data correspond to 1999/2000 and 2006.
4 The information for 2007 corresponds to 2005, which is the latest available.
5 The information for 2007 corresponds to 2005, which is the latest available.
Source: United Nations and UNESCO
diabetes, and cancer). In addition, high levels of violence are also reflected in the
health indicators of some countries. Furthermore, although progress h11s been
made in providing suitable housing, a significant proportion of dwellings are still
made of poor-quality materials and a still considerable portion of the population
hKks sanitary fittings and connections (IDB 2008a).
The area of social policy in which the least progress has been made or in which
there have been outright setbacks is unquestionably that of social security cover-
age, defined in a broad sense (old-age pensions, health-care coverage, unemploy-
ment benefits, etc.). In this respect, there is a clear contrast to be drawn between
the period of state-led industrialization and more recent decades. During the
former period, as was seen in the preceding chapter, a segmented welfare state
provided coverage primarily to workers in the formal sector of the economy.
During the more recent period, these social security mechanisms have either
stagnated or actually been rolled back, but, at the same time, there has been
considerable progress in the provision of social assistance in the form of condi-
tional cash transfers, and nutrition and employment programs (Ferreira and
Turning Back to the Market 257
Robalino 2011). The main problem in connection with social security is that
benefits are basically tied to formal employment (a situation referred to in
Chapter 4 as the "Bismarckian model"). This situation is at odds with trends in
the labor market in recent decades, where the informal sector accounts for an
increasing proportion of employment and job instability has increased.
The countries of the region can be divided into three camps in this respect,
according to Uthoff (2011). The first group, where the informal sector is very
extensive, includes Bolivia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicar-
agua, Peru, and Paraguay. These countries have relatively young populations and
a high dependency ratio that reflects the large number of young people and
informal workers. Social security coverage for employees is below 30 percent.
The second group is made up of Colombia, Mexico, the Dominican Republic,
Panama, and Venezuela. The birth rate has declined in these countries, and this is
reflected in striking changes in the age structure of their populations. Social
security coverage for employees is around 50 percent. Finally, countries such as
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, and Uruguay make up the last group. They
have older populations and a high dependency ratio that is attributable to the
presence of a large number of economically inactive older adults and young
people. Social security coverage for employees amounts to over 60 percent.
These are the countries that could potentially act as welfare states. As was
discussed in Chapter 4, they are also the countries that were the first to begin to
make the transition to modern welfare systems.
What this shows is that the entirely contributory social security systems that
were developed during the stage of state-led industrialization are exclusionary. In
addition, given the state's limited ability to build more comprehensive benefits,
firms and households have sought out ways of doing this for themselves or ways of
utilizing market mechanisms for this purpose. The explicit inclusion of the private
sector in social security systems can leverage the utilization of the market to fulfill
social security objectives, but this approach also has exclusionary effects.
A consensus has therefore been reached as to the fact that progress in this area
will have to be based on non-contributory government-financed mechanisms and
on the design of innovative systems for incorporating informal-sector workers.27
This is, therefore, the area of social policy in which the most serious failings of all
the development models used so far in the region are most apparent.
27 ECLAC (2006a), Levy (2008), and Uthoff (2011) and others have proposed reforms of this type.
6
By Way of Conclusion
The History and Challenges of Latin American
Development
Throughout this book, special emphasis has been placed on four aspects of the
economic history of Latin America. The first has to do with the region's achieve-
ments in terms of economic development, which, when compared with those of
other world regions, reveal some strengths and some failings. The second aspect is
the economic instability associated with the region's patterns of international
specialization, which even to this day revolve around natural resources and the
instability of its access to international financing. The third has been the slow pace
at which the region has developed modern political and economic institutions and
the high degree of variability in economic policies and development paradigms
that has gone along with this. The fourth is the degree of inequality existing in
Latin America, which is faced with more serious problems in this respect than
other regions. Let us take a look at how these different aspects are linked to one
another.
DEVELOPMENT AND INEQUALITY
There is no question about the fact that the region has developed. This is reflected
in increases in per capita GDP, improvements in human development indicators,
and reductions in poverty levels. The fact remains, however, that these processes
have been uneven in terms of both time and geography.
The two centuries covered by this analysis have been divided into four different
subperiods in order to help us see how the pace of progress has varied: (1) the
decades following the time when most of the countries won their independence;
(2) the closing decades of the nineteenth century and the first three decades of the
twentieth, which was when the first wave of globalization took place and develop-
ment in the region was driven by commodity exports; (3) the period of state-led
industrialization (this term being preferred over the misleading expression of
"import-substitution industrialization"), which occurred in the intervening period
between two major crises (the Great Depression of the 1930s and the "lost decade"
of the 1980s); and (4) the period of market reform, which began in the 1980s and
By Way of Conclusion 259
has coincided with the second wave of globalization at the international level.
Because Latin America is such a diverse region, these phases did not start or end at
the same time in every country, and the exact divisions between these periods may
therefore differ in some cases.
Generally speaking, the first phase was a time when the region lost ground
relative to what is now the industrialized world but gained ground vis-a-vis most
of the countries that make up what is considered to be the developing world. The
last period was also a time when the region lost ground, but in this case it was in
relation not only to the industrialized world but also to the world average and, in
particular, the developing countries of Asia.
In contrast, during the phase of commodity-export-led growth, Latin America
was-along with central and southern Europe-one of the peripheral regions that
was most successful in joining in the wave of economic growth. This enabled it to
become part of what might be described as a global "middle class." During the
period of state-led industrialization, Latin America's economy continued to grow
at above-average rates and to expand its share of world production. Nonetheless,
during neither of these relatively successful periods did it make any significant
progress in closing the wide gap that as early as 1870 was already separating it
from the developed world. What is more, during the industrialized countries'
"golden age" (1950-73), it fell further behind Western Europe. Looking at the
second and fourth periods-i.e., the first and second waves of globalization-we
can see that Latin America was clearly a winner during the first wave but was
unable to fully take advantage of the second, during which it again lost ground in
relative terms.
Progress was slower to come in the social arena. The deplorable state of the
education system at the start of the twentieth century, even in the countries that
were leading the regional development process, attests to this fact. The region's
human development indicators did begin to improve in the third decade of the
twentieth century and rose the most during the period of state-led industrializa-
tion. These indicators remained more or less constant relative to the industrialized
world during the phase of market reforms, although the education sector con-
tinued to make headway. The greatest progress in reducing poverty during the
twentieth century was also made during the period of state-led industrialization.
After a "lost quarter century" (rather than simply a lost decade) in this respect,
which had begun in the 1980s, the most promising substantive progress made in
reducing poverty came between 2002 and 2008. This was also a time during which
income distribution improved in many of the Latin American countries. (These
improvements may have continued to be made since then, but we do not yet have
solid evidence to confirm that conjecture.)
The history of how the region became such an unequal one is complex and
diverse and does not follow a single region-wide pattern. The colonial legacy of
highly economically and socially segmented societies continues to weigh upon the
region's development process. This dynamic has been highlighted by the Latin
American structuralist school of thought since the 1950s and, more recently, has
been underscored by the new institutionalist thinkers. The much-discussed fact
that the Latin American countries have the worst income distribution in the entire
world is glaring proof of this. But this situation cannot be entirely laid at the door
of the region's colonial past, because the trends and events that have taken shape
260 Economic Development of Latin America
between the collapse of colonial rule and the present day have also had a major
influence that has also differed substantially across countries.
Some of the processes that have had a negative and more or less region-wide
effect on income distribution include the first wave of globalization, the 1980s
debt crisis, and the initial stages of the economic liberalization efforts of the late
twentieth century. For the countries with large labor surpluses, the downward
pressure on wages that this situation exerted during a large part of the twentieth
century also had negative effects in terms of distribution. These effects were
compounded by the measures enacted by many of the region's former military
dictatorships.
Positive forces have also been at work, however. The greatest step forward in
social equality was clearly the abolition of slavery, which was a long time in
coming in some countries (Brazil and Cuba). It took longer to do away with the
various forms of rural servitude, which were quite prevalent even in the early
twentieth century in most of the Latin American countries and continued to
influence labor relations for far longer. Advancing urbanization did a great deal
to open up new opportunities for people who had been subject to the strict social
segmentation characteristic of rural areas. The belated advances experienced in
the education system also helped to create a more level playing field, and this has
been reflected in a better pattern of income distribution in the early twenty-first
century. There is still a great deal of ground to cover in this respect, however, as is
demonstrated by the failings and inequalities in the quality of education found in
the vast majority of Latin American countries.
Other processes that have positive effects in terms of equity have been unevenly
distributed throughout the region. The large flows of European migrants that
went to the Southern Cone depressed wages at first, but in the long run had
positive distributional effects. One of the reasons for this was that these immi-
grants brought skills, knowledge, and especially institutions (including trade
unionism) along with them that helped to spread the benefits of development.
The most positive impact of this process was felt during the early stages of the
state-led industrialization phase. These gains were reversed, however, in the 1960s
and 1970s by bloody dictatorships that weakened the institutional mechanisms
which had served as a foundation for gains in equity. Other countries have made
institutional changes that promote equity, as occurred in Costa Rica in the mid-
twentieth century and in Cuba as a result of the 1959 revolution. Agrarian reforms
of widely varying scopes were less effective than expected in redistributing land,
but they did help to combat forms of labor servitude that were still in use in rural
areas. The combination of shrinking rural labor surpluses and improving levels of
education led to improvements in distribution in some countries during the 1960s
and 1970s.
What net effect did these trends have on income and wealth distribution? The
historical trends in this respect vary a great deal, and there is not enough infor-
mation to determine exactly what impact they had, but we can discern four
different phases. The first was the deterioration that occurred up to the start of
the twentieth century or even later in economies that had labor surpluses. This
was followed by an improvement in distribution which occurred earlier (starting
in the 1920s) in the Southern Cone, thanks to the institutional forces mentioned
above, and later on (in the 1960s or 1970s) in others (Colombia, Costa Rica,
By Way of Conclusion 261
Mexico, and Venezuela), although there were some countries, such as Brazil,
where this failed to occur at all. The third phase, in which distribution deterior-
ated, began in the Southern Cone countries but then spread to others in the late
twentieth century in the wake of the lost decade and market reforms. Finally, more
or less two thirds of the countries have witnessed an improvement in distribution
in the first decade of the twenty-first century; in some of them, this improvement
started in the latter years of the twentieth. From a long-term perspective, inequal-
ity in income distribution in Latin America, which is widely recognized as being
highly structural in nature, may actually be worse today than it was before the
region experienced the first burst of economic growth in the second half of the
nineteenth century. In fact, despite the improvement in distribution that occurred
in the early years of the twenty-first century, the mean level of inequality in the
region is higher than it was in 1980.
The region's inequality is also evident in geographical terms. Even during the
years following independence, when economic performance was generally poor,
some countries made headway, such as those of the Southern Cone and perhaps
Costa Rica, and there were also some successful regions within countries, such as
northern Mexico and Antioquia in Colombia. Extensive growth was also observed
in the two economies (Brazil and Cuba) that continued to rely on the horrific
institution of slave labor-partly because there was no break with the colonial
system as such. During the second of these stages, this divergence in development
processes deepened, at least until the First World War. By that time, the countries
of the Southern Cone and, to a lesser extent, Cuba, had increased their edge over
the rest of the region. From that point on, there was a tendency toward conver-
gence as the other countries began to become more successful and the leading
nations' pace of growth began to slow, although there were a few countries
(Bolivia and Nicaragua, in particular) that were left behind. This process of
regional convergence came to a halt during the lost decade of the 1980s, however,
and in more recent decades has given way to a growing divergence once again.
In sum, the situation in terms of social equity has been somewhat dishearten-
ing, since the gap separating the region from the more developed countries has
grown at the same time that the inequalities within the individual countries of the
region have also increased. The only bright spot has been a decline in inequalities,
over the long term, among Latin American countries.
MACROECONOMIC INSTABILITY, INSTITUTION -BUILDING,
AND DEVELOPMENT PARADIGMS
The fact that the leading countries in the region began to grow more slowly in the
aftermath of the First World War demonstrates the variability of Latin American
development. As part of this pattern, countries of the region have tended to grow
rapidly for extended periods of time. During these periods they have narrowed the
income gap separating them from industrialized countries. But these growth
spurts have then given way to equally long periods during which this gap widens
again. This process has been described as one of truncated convergence-i.e.,
262 Economic Development of Latin America
periods of convergence that are cut short and followed by increasing divergence.
Cuba is perhaps the first and most prominent example: after having been one of
the leading export success stories in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,
its per capita income levels remained almost entirely flat from the 1920s on. Much
the same thing occurred in the Southern Cone, which forged ahead of the rest
until the First World War, but then lost ground. This was particularly the case in
Argentina, which was one of the greatest development success stories during the
first wave of globalization. Following in its footsteps was Venezuela, which was
Latin America's star performer from the 1920s to the 1960s, thanks to its oil boom
and its ability to spread the benefits reaped from that boom, although this period
was followed by one of relative retrogression. Brazil and Mexico, the "stars" of the
period of state-led industrialization, followed this same path soon after, lapsing
into a period of fairly slow growth starting in the 1980s. The absence of "growth
miracles" but also of major crises is the curious secret of Colombia, which seems
to have found the key to a way of achieving a moderate but steady development
path. This more stable pattern can also be discerned, although somewhat less
markedly, in Costa Rica and Panama, which have been two of the three most
successful smaller countries in the long run (the other one being Uruguay, which
has experienced sharper fluctuations in its development process).
As can be seen from the above, past trends in development and in income
inequality have not moved in parallel with one another. In the countries of the
Southern Cone, for example, the greatest improvements in income distribution
took place during a time when economic development was lagging. At other
times, periods of slow growth have had adverse distributional effects, with the
most conspicuous example being the lost decade of the 1980s. In other cases,
periods of strong growth have been coupled with deteriorations in income
distribution (the first wave of globalization in most of the countries of the region
and the Brazilian "miracle," for example), while, in still others, growth and gains
in equity have gone hand in hand (as in the boom of2004-8 and perhaps in recent
years as well).
The most frequent and widespread fluctuations have been associated with the
Latin American economies' external vulnerability and the resulting volatility of
economic growth. The overriding factor throughout the two centuries analyzed in
this book has been the region's dependency on commodities, whose prices have
been highly volatile, especially between the First World War and the Great
Depression and since the early or mid-1970s. This situation has been com-
pounded by the even greater volatility associated with the countries' highly
irregular and procyclical access to external financing, which has been at the root
of some of the region's most abrupt business cycles, as in the boom of the second
half of the 1920s, which was followed by the deep downturn and the defaults of
almost all the debtor countries in the 1930s. The boom of the second half of the
1970s, which gave way to the lost decade of the 1980s, is another example. This
last crisis has been the most sever~ one experienced by Latin America as a region,
not only because of the strength and duration of some of the shocks generated by
international markets (the higher relevant interest rates and lower commodity
prices that were triggered by this crisis lasted for more than two decades), but also
because the region was faced with a true creditors' cartel that had the backing of
the leading developed countries and international financial institutions. As a
By Way of Conclusion 263
result, this was the first time that the countries of the region could not resort
(except for very brief periods) to the primary mechanism that had been used to
manage financial crises in the past: external debt default.
This economic instability has been coupled with institutional instability and
significant shifts in development policies and paradigms. Institutional instability
was one of the most serious problems that the countries faced after they had won
independence. This problem was overcome by some of the countries later on, in
the nineteenth century, although in many cases they did so by resorting to
authoritarian regimes. Revolutions or major social conflicts occurred in all of
the countries whose economies were growing slowly during the period of state-led
industrialization, and disruptions of this sort swept over most of the Central
American region (with the exceptions of Costa Rica and Panama) in the 1970s
and 1980s. As the experiences of the late nineteenth and most of the twentieth
centuries indicate, there has been a tendency to guarantee institutional stability
by resorting to authoritarian regimes throughout the region's history. Thus, the
triumph of economic liberalism, although much more gradual than what had been
expected following independence, was not matched (except in a handful of coun-
tries and, even then, only in some respects) by a victory of political liberalism. It has
n~t been until more recent times, since the 1980s, that the region has, for the first
time in its history, witnessed a convergence of economic and political liberalism.
The major shifts in Latin America's development paradigms have perhaps been
the issue that has received the most attention in traditional economic historiog-
raphy. We use traditional typologies as a starting point here, but with a number of
significant variations. As we have seen, in a number of the major economies,
during the phase of commodity-export-led growth the development of a dynamic
export sector was not viewed as being opposed to modern industrialization under
high tariff protection. Indeed, at that time, Latin America-along with the United
States and Australasia-had the highest tariffs in the world. Although the basic
rationale was to obtain public revenues, many of the countries in the region could
not resist the temptation to use tariffs as a form of protection as well. Be this as it
may, the structural changes that took place during this stage of development were
quite moderate and left Latin America lagging far behind in terms of its educa-
tional system and its level of industrialization. As a result, Latin America played a
very marginal role, and even then only belatedly, in what has been called the
second industrial revolution, after having played a similarly marginal part in the
first.
During the stage of state-led industrialization, Latin America moved closer to
the mixed European model and was, accordingly, less statist than the rest of the
developing world-a fact which is often overlooked in the literature. In addition,
in a number of middle-sized and especially many small countries, the industri-
alization process was overlaid upon what continued to be a fundamentally
commodity-export-led growth model. Even in the largest countries, commodity
export sectors continued to play an important role, which is why industrialist
interests never did achieve the hegemony that they had in the European countries
that were latecomers to industrialization or the hegemony that they would have
later on in East Asia. Finally, in the more recent period, apart from some steps to
open up the economy to trade and foreign capital that were taken by virtually all
the countries, the way in which economic liberalization took place varied quite a
264 Economic Development of Latin America
bit among Latin American countries. This is why we have preferred to speak about
"market reforms" rather than about a uniform "neo-liberal" paradigm.
Much of what has been discussed here makes it clear that the "Black Legend"
about the period of state-led industrialization that has been propagated by the
orthodox school of economic thought is founded more upon ideology than on an
examination of the economic and social outcomes of that paradigm. This stage
was not only the period of the most prolonged, rapid, and stable economic growth,
but was also the period when poverty was reduced the most sharply and major
advances were made in terms of human development. We have also argued that
the debt crisis of the 1980s was not generated by the failings of that paradigm, but
by the abrupt boom-bust cycles of external financing that the Latin American
economy experienced in the 1970s and 1980s. The fact that the economies of the
Southern Cone, in which the liberalization cycle had already begun, were hit the
hardest is perhaps the best evidence of this. However we must be careful not to
create a myth about the success of the state-led industrialization model either, nor
should we embrace the illusion that the region could return to a past era that had
its origins in the collapse of the first wave of globalization and that would therefore
be an anachronism during the second wave of globalization that we are experi-
encing today.
The main defect of that paradigm was its inability to build a solid technological
base. That inability was deeply entrenched, as it was rooted in the lag in Latin
America's industrial development during the first wave of globalization, cumula-
tive lags in education, and the even greater backwardness in terms of the con-
struction of a scientific-technological base of its own. Starting in the mid-1970s,
this problem was compounded by the reversal of the industrialization process
while the region was still at an early stage in its development. This turnaround led
to the slowing or even reversal of the upward trend in productivity levels that most
Latin American economies had been experiencing; furthermore, this reversal took
place despite the advances made in some specific firms and sectors under market
reforms. In our view, the early truncation of the convergence of the leading
countries in the region was essentially a result of these structural phenomena.
An additional factor in the Southern Cone countries was that the combination of
their domestic-market orientation and the underdevelopment of their export
sectors proved to be a fatal flaw during the period of state-led industrialization.
In the other case of truncated convergence-that of Cuba-the problem was quite
possibly just the opposite-i.e., an excessive e)\port orientation.
An "anti-export bias" was a problem for many of the larger economies during
the period of state-led industrialization. Policymakers were aware of this problem,
however, and consequently began moving toward a mixed model in the mid-
1960s that combined export protection with export diversification and regional
integration. The advances made by export sectors have been the great success
story of the market reform phase, but the benefits of this process in terms of
overall development have yet to be fully realized.
It should be added that, while the concept of an "anti-export bias" is valid in
some respects, we find no solid basis for stating that the phase of state-led
industrialization generated an "anti-agricultural bias" or a general lack of macro-
economic discipline. In fact, the agricultural sector grew more during this phase of
By Way of Conclusion 265
development than it has done after market reforms, although this comparison is of
the averages of widely varying experiences. As for the question of a lack of
macroeconomic discipline, we have shown that a propensity to inflation was not
in evidence almost anywhere except the Southern Cone and Brazil up to the early
1970s and that there was no widespread lack of fiscal discipline until external
financing was made available in abundance during the second half of that decade.
Runaway inflation was more of an effect, rather than a cause, of the debt crisis of
the 1980s. The achievements made in these two areas in recent decades are, of
course, attributable to successful macroeconomic management. This has been a
net historical gain for Brazil and the Southern Cone, and a return to the condi-
tions that were typical up until the 1960s for the rest of the countries.
PRESENT CHALLENGES FROM A HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE
At least four major lessons for the future can be drawn from Latin America's
history. The first has to do with the region's achievements in the area of macro-
economic management. Its accomplishments in terms of inflation and fiscal
sustainability need to be consolidated, but policymakers are also faced with the
immense challenge of managing the Latin American economies' long-standing
vulnerability to external shocks. The response to the 2008-9 global crisis was in
many ways a positive one for Latin America: there was no external or domestic
financial crisis in any country and inflation did not spiral out of control. However,
it proved impossible to avoid a sharp initial recession in the region, though this
was, fortunately, turned around quite rapidly, with the region (and especially
South America) registering a positive growth rate in 2010 and 2011. Furthermore,
the boom that preceded the most recent global crisis and the return of capital
flows and high commodity prices since mid-2009 have shown that there is still a
great deal to be learned about handling economic booms and, in particular, about
averting cyclical currency appreciations (which make even less sense in today's
export-oriented economies), upswings in public-sector spending during times of
abundance, and especially the steep increases in lending and private-sector
spending that typically occur during such periods.
The second lesson relates to economic growth, which has been a frustrating
issue for a majority of Latin American countries during the market reform phase.
History tells us that high growth rates cannot be attained solely on the back of a
sound macroeconomic situation or patterns of specialization based on static
comparative advantages. Proactive production policies-which were explicitly
excluded from public-sector agendas during the market reform phase-are also
needed. And there is an even more glaring need to fast-forward the design of
proactive technology policies, which were also seriously neglected during the
period of state-led industrialization. This effort should be coupled with a consoli-
dation of the progress made in education and the introduction of measures to
address the education system's failings, especially in terms of quality and of the
266 Economic Development of Latin America
alignment of curricula with the skills and capacities required in order to change
the region's production patterns.
The third lesson refers to institution-building and particularly one dimension
of that process which has long been a subject of controversy: the relationship
between the state and the market. A related facet of the Latin American
development process has been the region's tendency toward rentism, which
has been manifested both as a dependence on the rents afforded by natural
resource endowments and as a reliance on those to be derived from a "special
relationship" with the state. Education and the development of technology (the
two policy areas on which we focused in the preceding paragraph) are the best
way to overcome this Latin American institutional trait. International experi-
ence tells us that an appropriate mix of the state and the market is vital, but it
also shows us that there is no single design that is best for achieving positive
synergies between the two.
Contrary to what many have thought in recent decades, the greatest
weakn~sses in this area may be in the development of the state's capabilities.
This question was also of importance in the early years of the Latin Ameri-
can republics. The greatest strides in this regard were made during the phase
of state-led industrialization, even though the state that was created at that
time often fell victim to its own inefficiencies and its inability to stand up to
powerful interest groups. Latin America clearly fell farther and farther behind
not only the industrialized nations but also the Asian countries (where the
development of the state has deep historical roots). History shows us that
forward progress is perfectly feasible, however. When strong policy initiatives
are taken, they make important inroads. Examples include the creation of
social-service delivery mechanisms and the development of the production
sector during the period of state-led industrialization, the development of
strong finance ministries and social assistance programs during the market
reform phase, and the steps taken to build strong central banks during both
periods. Education and technological development should therefore be at the
center of state reform efforts in the future.
The last and most important lesson has to do with the enormous social debt
that Latin America has built up over its history. The colonial legacy of extreme
economic and social inequality, which has been analyzed in classic works of Latin
American economic historiography, has been perpetuated and, in some cases,
heightened in subsequent periods of the region's history, which have added new
dimensions to this phenomenon. In the past few decades, more ground has been
lost in this respect, and an entire quarter-century was lost in terms of poverty
reduction before advances again began to be made in 2002-8. What is more, the
contrast between these results and the advances made in human development
indicate that social policy is not enough, in itself, to made headway in terms of
social equity-not as long as the economic system continues to produce and
reproduce high levels of inequality in income distribution.
Herein lies Latin America's greatest historical debt. The return to an equity
agenda, the new discourse around "social cohesion," and the forward movement
in this area observed during the first decade of the twenty-first century are all
promising signs. The future will show whether or not these trends herald the first
steps toward correcting the most grievous aberration of the Latin American
By Way of Conclusion 267
development process. As history has shown us, however, these advances will not
be lasting ones unless they are combined with the changes in education, technol-
ogy, and production that are needed in order for the region to be able to integrate
itself into the global economy in a more dynamic manner while at the same time
deepening the integration of its own economies and societies.
1
i
I
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STATISTICAL APPENDIX
Notes to Appendix Tables
Tables A.l. and A.2: GDP and Per Capita GDP
l. We depart from Angus Maddison's data base <http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/> to
obtain GDP and per capita GDP figures for the year 1990 expressed in 1990 inter-
national Gheary-Khamis US Dollars. This benchmark allows us to construct our series
in a way that makes them internationally comparable.
2. 1950-2010. Departing from the 1990 year benchmark, we let the series vary according
the yearly variations of the series provided by ECLAC's Latin America and Caribbean
historical statistical series <http://www.eclac.cl/publicaciones/xml/1/37041/LCG2415e.
pdf>.
3. Before 1950. The available series were spliced at the year 1950. Maddison's series were
used except for the following countries and series:
i. Argentina, 1875-99: Cortes Conde and Harriague (1996).
ii. Brasil, 1870-1912: Goldsmith (1986).
iii. Chile, 1830-1949: Economic History and Cliometrics Lab, Instituto de Economia,
Pontificia Universidad Cat6lica de Chile <http://www.economia.puc.cl/cliolab/
produccion>.
iv. Colombia, 1870-1905 according Kalmanovitz y Lopez Rivera (2009). 1905-25
according to Banco de Ia Republica (1999), El Crecimiento Econ6mico Colombiano
en el siglo XX, Bogota; Fonda de Cultura Econ6mica. 1925-50 according to ECLAC
(1957), Ana/isis y proyecciones del desarrollo econ6mico, Vol III: El desarrollo
econ6mico de Colombia, Mexico: ECLAC.
v. Cuba, 1870-1928: Santamaria, A (2009), Las cuentas nacionales de Cuba, 1690-2009,
Madrid: Instituto de Historia, CSIC.
vi. Peru, 1870-1950: Seminario, B. and Beltran A. "Peru: Crecirniento y Cambia
Estr\lctural en el Siglo XX", El Laberinto del Minotauro, <http://sites.google.
com/site/lbserninario/ >.
vii. Venezuela, 1870-1950: Baptista (2006); however, since this series seems to overesti-
mate long-term growth, it has been adjusted so that the GDP for 1900 is similar to
that of Maddison.
4. Aggregated Latin American GDP and per capita GDP estimates before 1950: As infor-
mation was not available for all the countries for the period before 1950, we had to make
assumptions in order to estimate total GDP and per capita GDP to make the estimates
for some benchmark years: 1870, 1913, 1929 and 1940. Expanding the total GDP and
per capita GDP of the existing sample of countries to the total of the Latin American
population would generate an upward bias, as the relatively high income countries are
overrepresented in the existing estimates. In order to sort this problem, and using the
information for the countries for which we have information, we first estimated the total
GDP and the per capita GDP of each of the three groups of countries of the typology
discussed in Chapter 1 and presented in Table 1.2. These figures were expanded to the
total population of each of the three groups and later on aggregated to generate the total.
Statistical Appendix 287
Table A.3. Latin America: Volatility of GDP, GDP of "Relevant World"
(Trading Partners}, and Terms of Trade, 1870-2008
1. The GDP data of the Latin American countries is taken from Table A.l.
2. The GDP data of the "relevant world" (if not a Latin America countries) was taken from
Maddison.
3. The "relevant world" of each Latin American country is specific to it and was created in
the following way:
i. 1962-2008: a weighted structure of commercial traders of each country was estimated
including only those with exports representing 5% or more of the total, according to
Feenstra and Lipsey (2005) and COMTRADE. The results were used to weight GDP
growth of each trading partner in order to estimate total GDP growth of the relevant
world.
ii. For the period before 1962, the same procedure was applied to the data kindly
provided by Antonio Tena, resulting from his project "Nuevas Interpretaciones
sabre Ia Integraci6n Econ6mica de las Periferias Europeas y Latinoamericanas
entre 1850 y 1950".
4. The terms of trade series were constructed on the basis of:
i. Up to 1940: Williamson (2011).
ii. After 1940, ECLAC and MOxLAD.
Table A.l. Latin America: GDP (in millions of 1990 international Geary-Khamis dollars)
Year Argentina Bolivia Brazil Chile Colombia Costa Rica Cuba Ecuador El Salvador Guatemala Honduras Mexico Nicaragua Panama Paraguay Peru Dominican Republic Uruguay Venezuela Total
1870 2,673 6,935 2,554 1,740 1,418 5,906 2,193 738 942 29,103.42
1871 7,063 2,561 1,778 1,484 2,328 761 966
1872 3,583 7,417 2,754 1,817 11,272 2,388 945 991
1873 3,660 7,321 2,937 1,857 2,198 2,398 965 1,017
1874 4,035 7,578 2,816 1,898 13,626 2,274 884 1,Q43
1875 3,839 7,852 3,049 1,940 1,650 592 2,130 765 1,078
1876 4,005 7,691 3,017 1,983 2,435 619 17,664 2,112 854 1,115
1877 3,925 7,627 2,921 2,026 2,277 647 19,167 2,123 888 1,154
1878 3,988 8,141 3,098 2,071 3,053 677 17,812 2,134 969 1,193
1879 5,023 8,367 3,569 2,116 3,574 708 19,807 1,672 865 1,234
1880 5,629 8,141 4,011 2,163 4,156 739 20,152 1,542 953 1,312
1881 6,030 8,351 4,152 2,210 3,715 773 22,247 1,553 919 1,394
1882 7,068 8,705 4,498 2,259 22,000 1,566 1,030 1,482
1883 7,098 8,624 4,525 2,309 1,658 1,235 1,575
1884 7,580 9,396 4,565 2,360 1,739 1,245 1,674
1885 8,796 8,882 4,429 2,411 1,750 1,430 1,718
1886 9,650 9,075 4,617 2,464 1,718 1,511 1,762
1887 8,852 8,930 4,940 2,494 1,730 1,365 1,808
1888 8,379 8,753 4,744 2,524 1,777 1,703 1,855
1889 10,004 8,994 4,867 2,554 1,814 1,573 1,904
1890 10,601 10,056 5,220 2,585 1,824 1,454 1,922
1891 12,217 10,909 5,646 2,616 1,837 1,596 1,941
1892 13,548 9,702 5,533 2,647 1,799 1,646 1,961
1893 14,983 8,463 5,808 2,679 1,802 1,799 1,980
1894 12,158 8,656 5,713 2,711 1,760 2,019 1,999
1895 13,183 10,523 6,113 2,744 1,775 2,007 2,011
1896 15,507 9,750 6,148 2,777 1,904 2,127 2,022
1897 13,682 9,847 6,012 2,810 2,081 2,065 2,034
1898 14,851 10,330 6,740 2,844 2,216 1,918 2,045
1899 14,543 10,378 6,783 2,878 2,339 1,984 2,057
1900 16,634 10,249 6,609 2,912 2,463 2,003 2,079
1901 18,417 11,456 6,774 2,947 2,643 2,050 2,031
1902 10,846 12,260 7,070 2,983 2,788 2,399 2,194
1903 21,892 12,341 6,673 3,019 2,977 2,480 2,356
1904 12,373 7,219 3,055 3,077 2,545 2,285
1905 12,646 7,212 3,091 3,303 2,288 2,242
1906 13,226 7,776 3,179 3,567 2,522 2,078
1907 22,353 15,060 8,187 3,389 735 3,362 808 1,279 2,032 959 23,281 822 1,837 3,790 2,792 2,064 117,030.86
1908 24,536 13,564 9,056 3,578 720 3,812 853 1,283 2,231 970 23,256 853 1,739 3,862 3,060 2,191 194,855.18
1909 25,766 14,996 9,102 3,767 784 4,262 901 1,359 2,106 1,055 23,946 781 1,767 3,927 3,099 2,253 242,637.08
1910 27,641 16,090 10,131 3,981 724 4,024 951 1,417 2,316 1,048 24,144 836 1,871 3,995 3,345 2,311
1911 28,133 16,154 9,857 4,178 829 4,015 1,004 1,515 2,504 979 24,316 886 1,910 4,081 3,245 2,454
1912 30,439 17,860 10,248 4,383 826 4,394 1,060 1,411 2,456 1,182 24,464 978 1,951 4,224 3,960 2,522
1913 30,747 18,149 10,436 4,574 913 5,215 1,121 1,668 2,480 1,193 24,636 850 4,365 3,845 2,892
1914 27,549 17,753 8,819 4,748 829 4,853 1,170 1,466 2,643 1,310 24,801 854 4,339 3,203 2,511
1915 27,703 18,549 8,535 4,968 872 5,594 1,223 1,719 2,702 1,473 24,968 1,082 4,713 3,038 2,571
1916 26,903 19,090 10,463 5,223 835 6,636 1,267 1,722 3,016 1,459 25,135 1,209 5,201 3,141 2,409
1917 24,720 20,410 10,688 5,438 876 4,924 1,311 1,765 3,145 1,554 25,304 977 5,393 3,465 2,792
1918 29,271 19,995 10,824 5,740 865 4,474 1,358 1,582 2,933 1,587 25,474 914 5,425 3,672 2,757
1919 30,347 22,634 9,286 6,217 796 4,906 1,419 1,419 2,567 1,422 25,645 823 5,606 4,149 2,557
1920 32,561 24,866 10,490 6,642 948 5,956 1,483 1,611 2,593 1,334 25,817 1,035 5,662 3,618 3,050
1921 33,391 25,385 9,092 7,024 836 5,665 1,536 1,664 2,933 1,292 25,990 940 5,896 3,806 3,153
1922 36,035 27,134 9,425 7,500 905 5,718 1,590 1,832 3,390 1,235 26,606 955 6,404 4,353 3,218
1923 40,032 28,692 11,352 7,978 966 7,438 1,646 1,791 4,657 1,257 27,518 760 6,845 4,583 3,688
1924 43,137 28,673 12,208 8,431 1,126 7,059 1,704 1,961 4,567 1,201 27,075 824 7,490 5,022 4,243
1925 42,953 28,788 12,739 8,886 1,193 6,274 1,764 1,822 4,693 1,271 28,750 852 7,688 4,826 5,446
1926 45,013 29,404 11,678 9,735 1,228 5,718 1,821 1,955 5,282 1,307 30,475 1,059 8,469 5,268 6,542
1927 48,211 31,539 11,466 10,612 1,178 6,150 1,916 2,124 6,034 1,396 29,144 1,157 8,618 6,026 7,289
1928 51,224 35,172 14,046 11,391 1,319 6,618 2,023 2,078 6,357 1,393 29,317 1,266 9,174 6,345 8,107
1929 53,560 35,250 14,780 11,801 1,182 6,274 2,135 2,258 6,440 1,273 28,183 1,219 10,133 6,398 9,131
1930 51,347 33,151 12,414 11,699 1,180 5,910 2,216 2,448 4,293 1,275 26,410 1,337 8,972 7,271 9,232
1931 47,780 32,410 9,780 11,513 1,069 4,965 2,230 2,322 4,162 1,305 27,296 1,324 8,246 6,014 7,411
1932 46,212 33,539 8,264 12,276 3,984 2,244 23,207 7,930 5,583 7,051
1933 48,364 36,153 10,183 12,966 4,310 2,294 25,843 8,822 4,883 7,662
1934 52,208 39,178 12,293 13,782 5,062 2,344 27,592 10,016 5,814 8,121
1935 54,514 40,250 13,001 14,119 5,922 2,404 29,637 10,955 6,156 8,651
1936 54,883 44,114 13,640 14,866 6,903 2,486 32,002 11,481 6,448 9,439
1937 58,880 45,557 15,508 15,097 7,932 2,566 33,062 11,637 6,564 10,755
1938 59,126 47,461 15,687 16,080 6,151 2,657 33,603 11,820 7,082 11,549
1939 61,370 47,932 16,016 17,066 6,492 2,747 35,402 11,884 7,083 12,166
1940 62,385 48,408 16,658 17,436 5,643 2,928 35,895 12,114 7,099 11,614
1941 65,582 51,799 16,469 17,728 7,581 2,943 38,826 12,126 7,221 ll,346
1942 66,351 49,880 17,234 17,764 6,358 3,067 41,585 11,848 6,621 9,854
1943 65,828 56,826 17,726 17,837 7,Q48 3,455 43,137 12,035 6,679 10,684
1944 73,300 58,941 18,060 19,Q43 8,090 3,501 46,660 13,068 7,513 13,089
(continued)
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