nsi book

Figure 155 - Example of aircraft dangers The threats categorised here may present a
variety of risks to security and safety, including
Key information the potential for:

If an attacker is able to access non-passenger  Explosive events e.g. bomb threats and IEDs
areas of an aircraft, very serious damage and  Armed attack
death may be possible through sabotage,  Hostage taking
deliberate damage or other interference with  Unarmed violence e.g. physical assault
the aircraft.
18.4.2. Land border security hazards
Aviation security is a specialist field, and some The types of hazards present at land border
Security staff will spend their careers developing crossing points will depend on the
additional skills and knowledge in this area. The infrastructure and facilities, location, and
threats and risks are constantly changing, and equipment or machinery present, however
new methods of security and prevention are some potential hazards may include:
developed.
 Environmental exposure at outdoor
18.4. Land border security inspection points e.g.
o Sun burn
Land border security is the protection against o Heat stroke
threats to the national interests and society of o Dehydration
the UAE. Countries around the world maintain o Sand and dust
the right to protect borders, and Security staff
should be aware of the types of threats, risks  Vehicles and traffic
and systems of security control used at land o Impact and crush injuries
border crossing points. o Pinching or cutting of hands while
performing search duties
18.4.1. Land border security threats o Noise exposure
o Fumes and gas inhalation
Key information
 Biological hazards e.g.
Threats to the security of land borders can be o Interaction with animals and animal
categorised into the following types: waste
o Agricultural products and materials
o People immigrating across the
border may carry illness or infection

 Fuel, oil and flammable liquids stored on
site

 Radiation exposure through X-Ray
inspection

People or groups who wish to harm the UAE Figure 156 - OHS Hazards as trucks queue to
enter border control point
 Terrorists
 Political activists
Criminals

 Smuggling
 Illegal or prohibited item trafficking
 Counterfeit goods
Unauthorised migrants

 Seeking a new life
 Running from trouble
 May bring antisocial behaviours into UAE

society

236

Figure 157 - Border crossing point - UAE & Incoming traffic control:
Oman  Divided at the earliest opportunity into 4

18.4.3. Systems of security control at land categories:
borders o Pedestrians
o Light vehicles
Security staff deployed at land border control o Coaches and buses
points may be required to support a variety of o Cargo transport
agencies in the performance of their duties,
including customs officials, police, military and  Coaches, and cargo transport vehicles are
operations staff. diverted to heavy vehicle inspection lanes

A familiar idea of security access control zones  Pedestrians are directed to proceed toward
can be applied to border control points with the customs and immigration area
following zones identified:
 Light vehicles are directed through
 The approach zone inspection lanes
 The access control zone
 The response zone The access control zone

Topic focus Security screening:
 Drivers are directed to position their
The actual procedures followed will depend on
the policies and directives for each border vehicles in the appropriate inspection bay
crossing point, however, a typical land border  Passengers and other personnel are
crossing point may be operated in the following
way. directed into customs and immigration area
 Visas, permits and documentation are
The approach zone
inspected or issued by customs officials
 Men and women are separated for personal

and belongings search according to policies

Vehicle and cargo inspection:
 Vehicles are passed through x-ray

inspection points if available
 Cargo is passed through x-ray inspection
 Luggage and vehicle compartments are

searched as required by policy
 Import or export permits and paperwork is

checked for cargo loads
 Drivers and passengers return to vehicles

for onward movement

The response zone

Progression through the border control point:
 Customs and immigration cleared

personnel collect security screened personal
possessions
 Vehicles are directed forward and out of the
access control zone and into the response
zone (inside UAE)
 A secondary line of control is available to
delay unauthorised access into the country
e.g.

237

o Police unit
o Additional barriers
o Extended area of empty space

allowing police or military
intervention before offenders arrive
at towns or cities
 Patrols may be conducted along the border
line to detect unauthorised crossings

Security staff may perform various duties within
the system of security control including:
 Traffic control
 Personnel and vehicle security searches
 Assisting customs officials
 Inspecting IDs and documents
 Preventing unauthorised access to security

controlled areas
 Ensuring personnel and vehicles are

matched correctly after screening
 Controlling all movements of persons in

transit within the border control point

238

1. Traffic controller
2. CCTV/Detection tools
3. Hostile vehicle barriers
4. Border fencing
5. Light vehicle search
6. Access control breach

response (police, barriers
etc.)
7. Bags and belongings search
8. Personnel search
9. Customs and immigration
10. Heavy vehicle search

Figure 158 - National

23

border crossing point
39

Module 18 Revision 7. List 3 organisations that work at a port
Revision questions 8. What is the IATA
1. List 3 threats to port security 9. What is the ICAO

2. List 3 hazards at a port

3. List 3 threats to airport security

10. List 3 security threats to national land
borders

4. List 3 hazards to health at an airport

5. What are the 3 components of airport
passenger screening

6. Name 4 agencies working at an airport that
contribute to security

240

Module 19
Critical

infrastructure

241

Module 19  Electrical grid distribution stations
 Water treatment and desalination facilities
Critical Infrastructure
19.2. Nuclear infrastructure security
Qualification Link
Nuclear energy can be used to provide power
Units to a nation, and the disruption of operations
 Nil may result in serious harmful consequences
Learning outcomes through the loss of power supply. The nuclear
1. Define what is critical infrastructure materials used to generate power are also
2. Identify critical infrastructure threats risks highly controlled, and the theft or smuggling of
these materials is a critical incident that must be
and hazards guarded against.
3. Outline standard security measures
19.2.1. Nuclear security regulation
implemented at critical infrastructure
sites The UAE Government has established Federal
4. Outline incident response procedures for Law no. 6 of 2009 Regarding the peaceful uses
most common incident types of nuclear energy, and formed the Federal
5. Outline incident response procedures for Authority for Nuclear Regulation (FANR) to
most dangerous incident types oversee the activities of nuclear energy in the
UAE.
Key definitions
Responsibilities of FANR include:
Critical infrastructure – Assets that are  Issuing licences to operate in the nuclear
essential for the functioning of society and the
economy energy sector
Desalination – The removal of salt and minerals  Setting radiation dose exposure limits
from salt water in order to make it drinkable  Optimising radiation protection in nuclear
Power generation – The production of
electricity from sources of energy such as oil, facilities
gas or nuclear reactors  Regulating the design of nuclear power

19.1. What is critical infrastructure? plants
 Regulating the physical protection
Critical National Infrastructure, is facilities or
assets that provide essential services or utilities measures for nuclear material and facilities
for a society and economy to operate. Critical  Emergency planning and preparedness for
Infrastructure can be found across many
industrial sectors including communications, nuclear facilities
defence, emergency services, public  Regulating safe transport of radioactive
transportation and energy. This section will
focus on the security of critical infrastructure in materials
the energy and water systems sectors.  Conducting inspections and studies
Examples of critical infrastructure facilities
include: ensuring compliance with regulations
 Nuclear power plants
 Oil and Gas The UAE is also signed up to the International
Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA, and follows
o Extraction sites global standards on Nuclear safety and security
o Transport pipelines including the treaty on the non-proliferation of
o Storage and distribution facilities nuclear weapons

242

19.2.2. Nuclear safety hazards 19.2.3. Nuclear security threats

Health and safety risks at a Nuclear energy The biggest threats to nuclear security is the
producing facility will be similar to other illegal smuggling of radioactive materials. These
industrial facilities except for one major area. can be used to build weapons, and cause
Radiation exposure is the single greatest health massive harm.
risk to Staff working at a Nuclear energy site.
Topic focus
Radioactive materials
Security staff will inspect all vehicles and people
 Naturally occurring metals from the earth entering and leaving a Nuclear Energy Plant.
 Used to fuel Nuclear reactors Detection of radioactive material can be done
 Used in medical equipment using 3 types of detector:
 Can be found in small amounts in common
Pocket detecting device
items including:  Used to detect radiation levels
o Smoke detectors
o Bananas Hand held detector
o Brazil nuts  Used to detect, locate the position, and

Ionising radiation measure dose levels

 Energy transmitted with enough energy to Automatic detector
change physical matter  Used to detect radioactive material within

 Can come in safe levels such as goods, baggage, cars and trucks
o Rays of the sun
o Medical x-ray  When using the detectors, they should be
o Natural levels in the earths soil calibrated and the alarms set to the
appropriate radiation level to avoid false
 Exposure to radiation is called a „Dose‟ alarms
 Dose is measured in „Millirems‟
 Most humans receive a dose of 280  Security staff will use the Hand held
detector to conduct inspections when
millirems per year from natural sources entering or exiting a nuclear power plant

When working at a Nuclear Energy Plant, there
are many safety barriers to limit the amount of
radiation dose that staff are exposed to. Three
simple principles are:

 Create a barrier – Steel, concrete and water
provide protection from radiation. The
Nuclear reactor inside an energy plant will
have several layers of thick walls made of
steel and concrete

 Minimise time – The less time a person
spends near a radiation source, the smaller
dose they will receive

 Increase distance – The further away a
person is from a radiation source, the
smaller dose they will receive

Security staff may be exposed to low levels of
radiation while on duty, and will be required to
wear a badge called a dosimeter that measures
how much radiation dose they are exposed to.

243

Figure 159 - Barakah Nuclear Power Plant, Figure 160 - Map of Abu Dhabi Oil and Gas
UAE fields

19.2.4. Nuclear critical incident response 19.3.1. Oil and Gas safety hazards
Nuclear Power Plants will plan and rehearse
critical incident response with the Regulatory Within oil and gas extraction, transport and
Authority (FANR) and other organisations such refinery facilities there are many health and
as the police, civil defence and military. Security safety hazards. Some prominent hazards may
staff working at a Nuclear site will be required include:
to participate in incident response drills and  Explosion and fires
understand the requirements that they must  Vehicle collisions
fulfil.  High pressure pipes and equipment
 Falls from platforms and raised walking
The details of these plans are kept secret on a
need to know basis, and only Staff who have paths
been cleared to work at these sites will receive  Noise and vibration of operating equipment
the relevant response plans.
Safety!
19.3. Oil and Gas plant security
When working in high risk areas, Security staff
The UAE has major Oil and Gas production must observe the PPE requirements and wear
facilities, and disruption to these operations can the protective equipment as appropriate
cause major financial loss, and potential
destabilisation of the economy and society.

The provision of physical security is essential to
safeguard against acts of sabotage or terrorism,
and accidents or safety breaches.

Figure 161 - Facility in Abu Dhabi, UAE
19.3.2. Oil and Gas Security threats
Oil and gas security threats may come from a
variety of sources, and these threats will be
monitored by National Security agencies and
reported to the relevant organisations for better
awareness.

244

Any disruption to water treatment and storage
will produce serious and costly consequences,
and may have a large impact on the economic
and social stability of the UAE.

Figure 162 - Burning oil wells in northern 19.4.1. Water treatment facilities safety
Iraq after sabotage by terrorists hazards

Topic focus The most serious hazards to health and safety
at water treatment facilities include:
As with most other sites, the means to protect  Electrical transformers overheating causing
oil and gas facilities can be achieved through
the use of the 4 D‟s fire
 Deter  Leakage of treatment chemicals
 Detect  Explosion of high pressure pumps
 Deny
 Delay These hazards can be controlled through
These principles applied to an oil or gas site regular inspection of equipment and servicing;
with the related technologies and monitoring however, this responsibility will fall to other
systems will provide a level of protection that departments within the organisation. Security
will allow time for Public security forces such as staff should report any observations that may
the police or military to respond to major offer clues to equipment becoming worn or
breaches of security. unsafe.

19.3.3. Oil and Gas critical incident Figure 163 - Taweelah water desalination
response plant , UAE

High risk / critical incidents planned for at Oil 19.4.2. Water treatment security threats
and Gas sites include: Threats to security at water treatment facilities
 Fire or explosion may include:
 Suspicious or confirmed explosive device
 Gas leak / Oil spill  Terrorism
 Political enemies
Sites will prepare response plans for specific  Disgruntled employees
incidents and all staff will be involved in the  Unsupervised visitors or contractors
rehearsal and practice of these plans.

19.4. Water treatment and desalination
The UAE relies on desalinated water for
drinking, and this process is done 70 major
desalination plants along the UAE coastline.
There are also several dams constructed
throughout the emirates to store rainwater for
use in agriculture and other industries.

245

Topic focus

Security staff will be required to maintain safety
and security through applying:
 Access control
 Patrolling
 Monitoring and inspection of high security

areas
 Reporting and follow up of incidents
Water treatment facilities are vital to the
continued stability of UAE society, and they
must be protected as high priority. Security staff
will contribute to the overall security plan for
these sites and must be prepared to learn about
the complex issues in such vital facilities .

246

Module 19 Revision 6. List 3 major hazards at oil and gas facilities

Revision questions

1. Name the regulatory agency for Nuclear
Power in the UAE

2. Identify the major health hazard at Nuclear
Power Plants

7. Identify 2 critical incidents that could
happen at an oil and gas facility

3. Describe how security staff will prevent the 8. List 4 potential security threats to water
unauthorised removal of radioactive treatment facilities
materials from a Nuclear site

4. Name the device that measures the dose of
radiation a person receives when working at
a Nuclear site

5. List 3 devices used to detect radioactive
material

247

Module 20
Museum and
cultural centre

security

248

Module 20 artefacts on exhibit. There are items of priceless
and irreplaceable value, along with cultures and
Museum and Cultural customs on display for the world to view. The
Centre security security of these establishments is a serious
task, and Security staff may be asked to perform
Qualification Link various duties in providing for the safety and
security of people, property and information at
Units these establishments.
 Nil
Learning outcomes Key information
1. Identify unique threat, risk and hazard
Prominent museums and cultural centres in UAE
considerations for museums and cultural include:
centres  The Louvre Abu Dhabi
2. Outline security control options for use at  Dubai Museum
museums and cultural centres  Sharjah Museum of Islamic Civilisation
3. Outline response procedures for critical  Al Ain National Museum
incidents at museums and cultural  Sheikh Zayed Palace Museum
centres
20.2. Unique security risks and threats

Key definitions Museums and cultural centres offer attractive
targets for theft and often the biggest threat
Cultural centre – A place designed to exhibit can come from insiders working within the
cultural practices, traditions and history organisation. Security staff must be aware of
Museum – A place devoted to the any changes to behaviour and suspicious
procurement, care study and display of objects activity from within, as well as any external
of lasting interest and value threats such as:
Artefact – An object made by humans of
historical or cultural significance  Potential surveillance
Counterfeit – An object made in imitation of an  Attempts at bribing of staff
original, attempting to be passed as a genuine  Attempts to damage exhibits
article  Unauthorised handling of exhibits by

Figure 164 - Sharjah museum of Islamic visitors
Civilization  Unauthorised photography

20.1. Introduction to Museums and 20.2.1. Historical importance
Cultural Centres Many exhibits at museums or cultural centres
can be considered priceless as they hold
The UAE has a wide range of museums and historical importance and cannot be replaced if
cultural centres, with many high profile and rare stolen or damaged. This places an extra level of
responsibility on Security staff to ensure that
the historical record of exhibits and antiquities
are preserved for future generations.

20.2.2. Handling of artefacts and
antiquities

Specially trained museum staff will be permitted
to handle artefacts and antiquities, and Security
staff should not attempt to do so. There is the
potential for even the slightest interference

249

from untrained people to cause damage to o Dust/Sand
artefacts. o UV Exposure (Sun light)
o Damp or Dry air
If exhibits are being transported in or out of a  Fire
museum or cultural centre, Security staff may  Exposure to cleaning agents or chemicals
be involved in providing a secure route for the Security staff can play a part by being aware of
loading and unloading of exhibits. In this case, potentially damaging conditions and reporting
the items should be treated as any other these to the appropriate departments within the
valuable asset and due care given to the museum or cultural centre.
protection of those items.
20.3. Museum and Cultural Centre security
20.2.3. Theft options
Theft is a constant threat, and Security staff
must be vigilant to the possibility of theft Topic focus
occurring. It is normal for museums and cultural
centres to use several layers of security systems Applicable security control measures to counter
and technologies to protect against theft, and museum and cultural centre threats:
these options will be noted in the following
section. Vibration sensors
 Placed behind exhibits or paintings
20.2.4. Counterfeit  Set off alarms with very light touch
Potential thieves or other organised crime rings  Can notify the control room of location for
may attempt to replace genuine exhibits with
counterfeit copies, and these will normally be response
detected by specialists from that field. Security
staff should be aware of any suspicious activity Exhibit inventory numbers
around the transfer of exhibits that may indicate  Unique numbers to record each item on
swapping or replacement of genuine exhibits
with counterfeit copies. display and kept in a register
 Can be used to verify claims of found stolen
20.2.5. Wilful damage
There may be occasions where a visitor or items
member of staff attempts to cause damage to  The register can keep detailed information
exhibits or items of cultural significance. This
may be due to: about each exhibit that proves its genuine
 Political or social disagreements
 Disgruntled employment Exhibit fixings
 Juvenile behaviour  Items such as paintings, sculptures and
Security staff should be aware of any person
carrying the means to cause damage, or other movable exhibits can be bolted to
behaving in a way that the intent to cause walls or the floor to increase difficulty of
damage is suspected. theft

20.2.6. Sources of risk at Museums and Glass casings
Cultural Centres  Clear plastic or glass casing can be used to

Aside from direct threats such as theft, damage prevent touching of sensitive items
and counterfeit exhibits, there are further  The cases can be alarmed to alert if any
sources of risk such as:
 Damage caused by environmental tampering takes place

conditions e.g. Environmental sensors
 Fire and smoke
 Temperature controls
 Humidity sensors

Viewing gaps

250

 Low rails around the perimeter of an exhibit Museums and cultural centres require a unique
 Changes in flooring to signify „no go‟ areas knowledge of the environment, exhibits,
significance to society and potential threats in
Motion sensors order to effectively provide security, and
 Large areas of rooms can be covered Security staff will need to apply themselves to
 Alarms sent to the control room with learning as much about the Museum or Cultural
centre that they are working in.
location
 Can cover areas not often used by visitors

e.g.
o Ventilation ducts
o Delivery bays
o Storage and maintenance areas

CCTV Cameras
 Used to monitor the site by security staff
 Record evidence and deter criminals
 Used to conduct surveillance of potential

criminals at face identification level

20.4. Incident response options

Incidents may include fire, lost children, medical
emergency and many other scenarios, however
these incidents have been covered in previous
sections of this book. For museums and cultural
centres, the incident with the greatest risk is
likely to be theft, and this will be covered in the
next section.

20.4.1. Critical incident response
In the event of a critical incident, Security staff
will follow established SOPs. A good guide for
actions to take if an exhibit alarm is activated is
to:

 If on duty in the alarm location, seal all
entry and exit from the hall, zone or area.

 Control visitors and organise them into
orderly groups

 Attempt to confirm if the alarm is legitimate
or false

 Relay any information gained to the Control
room

 Await the arrival of support from Security
colleagues and police.

251

Module 20 Revision 6. True or false? Security staff will be required
Revision questions to handle artefacts while on duty
1. Define what an artefact is
TRUE / FALSE
2. List 4 major museums in the UAE
7. List 3 potential environmental risks to
exhibits at museums and cultural centres

3. List 3 Security threats to exhibits in a
Museum

4. List 4 Security measures available to secure
exhibits within a museum

5. List the basic steps required of Security staff
if a theft alarm is sounded

252

Appendix A: lesson plans
Appendix B: Assessment
Appendix C: Presentations and materials

253