nsi book

Figure 131 - Example CIT equipment Figure 132 - GPS tracked armored vehicle
route
14.3.3. Coordination with stakeholders
Clear coordination procedures are vital for the 14.4.1. Vehicle operations
success of a CIT operation. This includes
communication with: Before starting CIT tasks
 Central control room
 CIT leader When preparing to use the Armoured vehicle to
 CIT driver when Courier and Escort are on complete a CIT task, the crew should inspect:
 Fitted security equipment is fully working
pavement
 Cash owners e.g. o 360 cameras
o Access locks
o Bank staff o GPS system
o Shop managers o Alarm system
 Cash centre o Vault and compartments
o Dummy bags and CIT containers
A well-defined plan for communication with o Radio communications
these personnel will provide the best situational  Vehicle condition is good
awareness to CIT crews and the central control o No leaks from engine compartment
room
or excessive exhaust
14.4. Basic principles of C-I-T o Signals and lights working
o Escape hatch operational
The CIT operation can be divided into 2 parts: o Tyre pressures set
 Vehicle mounted o Refuelled and filler cap locked
 Dismounted (on foot) o Windows clean
Some basic security principles applied to these o Interior clean and organised
2 parts of the operation will provide the best  Cargo is secured in place
opportunity for a successful CIT task.  Weight and Cash value limits are not
exceeded

While on the road

When mounted in the armoured vehicle, crews
should:
 Report progress through scheduled

communications checks
o Use established reference codes,
not actual place or location names
for security purposes

190

 Update the central control room if expected o Present a professional and vigilant
arrival times change for any reason e.g. image
traffic, route diversion etc.
o Signal the Courier to get out with
 Maintain 360 awareness of the vehicle the CIT container

surroundings Safety!
o Driver and crew responsible
o While moving, or stationary  Parking and unloading from the armoured
vehicle presents a high risk for accident or
 Report and record any suspicious or safety incidents
unusual observations
 Drivers should ensure enough room to
 Increase vigilance while stopped at traffic safely unload
signals or intersections
 Escort and courier should remain aware of
other traffic using the area

Key information

The size of a CIT crew may vary but a common
example is:

 1 x Driver
 1 x Courier
 3 x Escort
The size of the crew will determine the available
escorting formations while dismounted

Report line blue

Report line green

Figure 133 - Example of communication
reporting lines in progress

Arriving at the collection or delivery site
When approaching the intended dismount
point, crews should:
 Visually scan the area for potential risks and

threats
 Report arrival to the central control room
 If no immediate threats are identified, the

Escort can get out and;
o Walk around the car looking for
risks or threats
o Perform a secondary visual scan of
the area looking for threats

191

5 Person Crew:  4 x Escort  Square/Diamond walking formation
 1 x Courier

4 Person Crew:  3 x Escort  Triangle walking formation
 1 x Courier

3 Person Crew:  2 x Escort  Single file walking formation
 1 x Courier

Figure 134 - Example CIT crew formations

192

14.4.2. Dismounted operations surrounding the vehicle
Having arrived at the collection or delivery o Open the vehicle and load the CIT
point, the CIT crew will dismount the armoured
vehicle and move across the pavement and into container
the cash transfer area e.g. Shop, ATM, bank.
The entire CIT crew will now enter the vehicle
Topic focus and secure it. The CIT container will be secured
in the vault.
While moving from the armoured vehicle to
the transfer area The CIT crew will communicate with the central
control room, informing of transfer completion
 Ensure all protective equipment is worn and drive on to either the Cash centre or
correctly another transfer task.

 The T-Baton is carried in the standby Safety!
position
 Crews should take care for passing traffic or
 Move quickly to the transfer area other roadside hazards when loading the
o Adopt an appropriate walking CIT container
formation for the route
o Provide a buffer zone of protection Key information
for the courier
o Do not stop for any reason except CIT crews should unload only 1 CIT container
in an emergency per trip to the transfer area. The CIT company
o Be vigilant to threats, including will have a „Pavement Limit‟ which is the
diversions amount of cash that can be taken outside the
o Be prepared to take an alternate vehicle at a time. This amount is usually set by
route or return to the armoured an insurance company.
vehicle

When at the transfer area

 The escort team will
o Radio check with the driver
confirming safe arrival
o Complete collection or delivery of
cash
o Secure CIT containers and receipt
documents
o Provide continuous surveillance and
protection

 The driver will
o Remain inside the vehicle
o Not move the vehicle
o Continue to observe and report on
potential security risks

When returning to the vehicle from the
transfer area

 The escort team will
o Radio to the driver when ready to
return to the vehicle
o Adopt an appropriate walking
formation for the route
o Provide a protective buffer zone for
the courier
o Conduct a visual scan of the area

193

Module 14 Revision maintain communications with during a CIT
Revision questions operation
1. Name which chapter of Ministerial Decision
8. List 5 security features fitted to an
no. 557 of 2008 deals with CIT Regulations armoured vehicle

2. Name the 3 main roles within an
operational CIT crew

3. List 5 pieces of personal equipment used 9. List 5 checks to perform on an armoured
during a CIT operation vehicle before departing on a CIT task

4. Outline the 3 principles of CIT operations

5. List 3 sources of threat to a CIT operation 10. When dismounted, the CIT Escorts should
carry the T-baton in the standby position
6. Which government organisation is
responsible for licensing and inspection of TRUE / FALSE
CIT companies and staff?
11. When arriving at the cash transfer area, the
CIT escort will radio the driver to confirm
arrival

TRUE / FALSE

7. Give 3 examples of who CIT crews should

Module 3
Bank security

Module 15 Banks are located in a variety of locations
throughout the UAE, and vary from small
Bank security customer service centers through to large
branches with cash vaults and teller counters.
Qualification Link
Features of a bank that impact the security
Units considerations include:
 Nil  Open to public
Learning outcomes  Cash and electronic funds transactions
1. Identify bank security principles  Located in various and complex
2. Apply visual screening methods within a
environments e.g.
banking premises o Street front
3. Outline bank security zones o Inside malls
4. Outline roles and responsibilities of o At airports

security at a bank
5. Identify the relationships between bank

security and C-I-T crews

Key definitions Figure 135 - ADCB bank outer public zone

OPZ – Outer public zone 15.2. Banking security zones
IPZ – Inner public zone
PZ – Private zone In order to make sense of the approach to
ATM – Automated teller machine security at a bank, a system of zones have been
HVAC – Heating, ventilation and air used to define who is permitted to access
conditioning different parts of the bank, and the security
PIN – Personal Identification Number measures that go with each. This is a similar
Tiger kidnap – Kidnapping a persons loved concept to the use of access control zones for a
ones or relatives to force them to carry out a site or building as described in the access
crime to ensure safety of the kidnapped person control module.

15.1. Introduction to bank security Key information

Throughout history, banks have been seen as Typical bank security zones are:
attractive targets for criminals due to the  OPZ – the outer public zone
potential for a high reward for their crimes.  IPZ – the inner public zone
The presence of large quantities of cash and  PZ – the private zone
other valuables is a temptation for thieves. In Security staff may be granted access to all 3
addition to this, modern banking zones, or may have limited access to certain
technologies mean that electronic funds are areas within the private zone. Security staff
also vulnerable to exploitation. Security staff must be aware of the areas they are permitted
must be aware of the potential threats faced to access in accordance with the specific bank
by banks. policy

15.2.1. Outer public zone  Cash teller counter
The outer public zone is used to describe  Queues
physical space that is outside the structure of  Staff offices/cubicles
the bank. Features of the outer public zone  Internal ATM installations
include:
Physical security measures available to detect,
 Accessible by any member of the public deter and deny a criminal the opportunity to
 May be monitored by the bank security carry out a crime include:

control room, including coverage of:  Security staff
o Road  Teller counter barriers
o Parking areas  Clear lines of sight into the IPZ from outside
o Footpaths
o ATMs o Reduces ability to commit crime
unnoticed from outside
 May be patrolled by bank Security staff
The outer public zone is the first layer of o Increases public awareness of what
protection for vital assets within a bank, and is happening inside the bank
physical security measures available to deter or
deny a criminal from accessing the inner public  Greeting staff (Security or bank staff)
zone include: o Visual screening of persons
entering the bank
 Hostile vehicle mitigation bollards o Able to interpret non-verbal
 CCTV monitoring communications on intent
 Security lighting
 Landscape design  CCTV
 Presence of Security staff  Silent alarms
 Rules of entry sign posted to increase CCTV  Exit control

monitoring effectiveness e.g.
o No motorcycle helmets to be worn
o No sunglasses worn

Figure 137 - Orange symbolizing inner public
zone - IPZ

Figure 136 - Green symbolizing outer public 15.2.3. Private zone
zone - OPZ The third layer of protection within a bank is the
PZ – private zone. This security controlled zone
15.2.2. Inner public zone will contain the most vital assets within a bank
The next layer of protection for vital assets held and is critical to the successful operations of a
in the bank is called the IPZ – inner public zone. bank. The IPZ will include:
This zone is the area that is accessed by the
banks customers and staff. The IPZ will include:  Cash drawers behind the teller counter
 Lobby  Vaults and Safes
 Customer service reception  Cash cage
 Management offices
 Security control room

o May be full sized security control Figure 138 - Red symbolizing private zone -
room or; PZ

o May be small installation for
remote monitoring from a central
operations centre

o Networked CCTV equipment
o Integrated security and building

management systems e.g.
 Security alarms
 Access and exit controls
 Fire panels
 HVAC monitoring

Physical security measures used to deny and
delay a criminal attempt to commit robbery or
other crimes include:

 Security staff
 Trained bank staff

o Security policies and procedures
o Threat response training
 Access control e.g.
o Key card, PIN entry, Keys, Biometric

access, Dual key entry
 Bullet resistant screens (teller counter)
 High security vault
 Security cash boxes with;

o Dye packs for identification of
stolen cash

o GPS trackers
 Bait cash

o Pre-recorded serial numbers for
tracing of stolen cash

Key information

The transition between Inner Public Zone and
Private Zone will always have a form of access
control to prevent unauthorised personnel from
entering

The 3 zones of b

Outer public zone - OPZ
Inner public zone - IPZ
Private zone - PZ

bank security

15.3. Roles and responsibilities of bank o Clothing worn appropriate to
security staff situation

Security staff working at a bank will maintain o Bags or cases
the basic principles of security, with some o Unusual shapes under clothing
additional considerations specific to banking o Walking in an unusual way to
security.
conceal items
Key information  Reading of a person‟s body language

Professional and vigilant Security staff will deter o Sweating
criminals from targeting the bank o Hyper alert
o Fidgeting and nervous
15.3.1. Primary duties o Fixed vision on a target area within

Topic focus the bank
 Welcoming and engaging in conversation
The primary duties of Security staff at a bank
include: o Get a feel for customer intention
 Protection of property, people and o Potential to identify trouble before

information it begins
 Detection and prevention of criminal
15.3.2. Secondary duties
activity through; Security staff working at a bank will have the
o Screening of all persons entering opportunity to contribute to safety and security
within the OPZ and IPZ through carrying out secondary duties within
o Liaising with CCTV operators the bank. These include:
 Providing customer service
 Detection and reporting of suspicious
behaviour e.g. o Ability to screen and profile people
o Possible hostile surveillance entering the bank
o Targeting of bank customers
o ATM fraud and tampering o Get to know regular customers and
identify changes in behaviour
 Response to safety and security incidents
including;  Direct movements within the bank e.g.
o Fire (lock down and evacuation) o Flow of customers to banking
o Security systems failure offices/cubicles/teller counter
o Medical emergencies
o Aggressive and abusive customers Key information
o Attempts at robbery
Bank security staff should cooperate with
 Securing the site of a crime scene arriving CIT crews to ensure that:
 Handling witnesses and evidence  Secured parking is available
 Cooperation with Police, Civil Defence  Pre-screen the approach to bank
 Cooperation with CIT crews  Inspect all 3 zones for potential threats
 CIT crews are inspected for:
Screening customers
Security staff can make assessments about o Valid IDs
customer intentions through: o Correct documentation
 Visual search of each person e.g.
15.4. Bank crimes

The banking industry is exposed to unique
types of crime and Security staff must be aware
of the threats present in this industry in order to
detect and respond appropriately.

15.4.1. Deliberate targeting of banks o Potential identity theft or fraud
The deliberate planning and targeting of a bank  Dropped or lost cheques/cash
to commit crime can take many forms, and
threats may include: o Potential theft
 Armed robbery  Cash left in the dispensing slot of an ATM

o With a weapon o Potential theft
o With the threat of a weapon
o With a note passed to teller Security staff working inside a bank will quickly
 Small theft learn to identify examples that provide for
o Pickpocketing unplanned criminal activities and can
o Personal belongings e.g. hand bag proactively work to reduce these chances
 Bomb threat
 ATM crimes 15.4.3. Insider threat
o Card copying The threat of crime from insiders has possibly
o PIN theft the greatest potential for loss for the bank. Staff
o False CIT crews/maintenance who abuse their position and access privilege
o Customer robbery could carry out large scale theft and fraud.
 Hostage taking These types of crime have been documented in
 Tiger kidnap the UAE, and some examples include:
o Crimes committed by an unwilling  Transferring funds from long unused

person who‟s loved ones are held customer accounts into personal accounts
by criminals  Assisting physical robberies with insider
 Cheque fraud and theft
 Identify fraud and theft information and access
 Fraudulent SMS posing as official bank  Collection and release of personal customer
communications e.g.
o Requesting reply with customer information
details o This has been used to gain access
o Account information and PINs to customer accounts and transfer
funds illegally
Figure 139 - ATM Card copying device fitted
over card slot Key information

Security staff can contribute to neutralising the
insider threat by being fully aware of bank
policy and procedure in order to:
 Identify and report bank staff not

complying with security policies
 Identify unusual bank staff procedures
 Identify unlikely relationships between bank

staff and potential criminals posing as
customers

15.4.2. Crimes of opportunity
The bank may also offer opportunities for
unplanned crimes, and Security staff should
work to reduce the opportunity and
attractiveness to commit these type of crimes
including:

 Customers counting large sums of cash
o Potential criminal may follow the
customer to rob them

 ID documents left on counter or waiting
areas

Module 15 Revision 7. Describe the steps that bank Security staff
Revision questions should take when cooperating with CIT
1. List the 3 zones of bank security Crews

2. Give 3 examples of what infrastructure is
contained within the OPZ e.g. Roads.

3. Outline 5 examples of security measures to 8. Give 1 example of how Security staff can
deter and deny criminals in the OPZ contribute to reducing insider threats at a
bank

4. Outline 3 examples of security measures to 9. List 5 primary duties of bank Security staff
detect and deny criminals in the IPZ

5. Outline 3 examples of security measures to 10. List 5 examples of bank crimes
deny and delay criminals in the PZ

6. List 3 methods of security screening bank
customers

Module 16
Hospital
security

Module 16 that a hospital provides, however a typical
hospital Security team may perform:
Hospital security  Patient/ Customer service
 Access control
Qualification Link  Traffic control
 Internal and External patrols
Units  Emergency response
 Nil  Physical intervention & public safety
Learning outcomes  Surveillance and investigation
1. Identify Hospital security considerations  VIP escort and protection
2. List threats and hazards to hospital
16.2. Hospital specific threats and hazards
security
3. Identify hospital security zones In order to effectively provide protection and
4. Identify Hospital security incident colour safety, Security staff should be aware of
threats and hazards that may impact the
codes operational capabilities of the hospital.
5. Outline infection control principles
6. Identify critical incident response 16.2.1. Threats to hospital security
Security threats that hospitals may face vary in
procedures consequence, likelihood and risk, however the
following threats would present a significant
Key definitions disruption to healthcare provision or hospital
liability:
Infection control – steps taken to reduce the  Fire of any size
chance of spreading infectious diseases  Breach of information security & patient
Caregiver – any personnel responsible for
providing services to patients and their families confidentiality
Access zone – designated areas within a  Theft of medicinal supplies or equipment
hospital requiring authorisation and access  Abduction of children or babies
credentials  Sabotage of life support equipment
 Contamination of food or water supplies
16.1. Introduction to hospital security
The mitigation of these threats will rely on a
Security staff assigned to protect people, balanced combination of strong security
property and information at hospitals and policies and procedures, monitoring and control
health clinics must acknowledge the complex systems, and vigilance on behalf of the Security
environment and challenges that such a place staff.
presents.

The nature of healthcare means that a variety
of stresses and emotions are present every
day, and will contribute to the ability of
Security staff to effectively perform their
duties.

Specific roles and responsibilities may vary
depending on the size, facilities and services

204

Figure 140 - Secure drug and medicine o Blood and saliva
storage o Infectious diseases
o Deceased persons
Specific response procedures for security o Medical waste e.g.
threats are described in a later section of this
module  Bandages
 Soiled bedding
16.2.2. Hazards at a hospital o Allergies
The hospital contains a variety of health and  Powder lined Latex gloves
safety hazards unique to the healthcare  Pollen from flowers
industry, and Security staff must be aware in  Chemical hazards
order to maintain safety and accurately report o Mercury spills from damaged
on potential risks on the site. medical devices
 Portable blood pressure
Different locations within the hospital will
present different hazards, however each readers
location should be inspected, and a risk  Thermometers
assessment published by the health and safety o Cleaning materials
management. Security staff can access these  Psychological hazards
risk assessments and ensure that they are fully o Stress
aware of the hazards as identified. o Fatigue
o Burnouts
Key information o Death of patients

An overview of potential hazards Security staff must be prepared to guard
 Physical hazards against non-clinical potential hazards, and the
precautions to take will be specified by the
o Slips and falls (most common in hospitals policies and procedures, however for
hospitals) general guidance, refer to the health and safety
module of this book.
o Traffic accidents in
loading/unloading areas Safety!

o Compressed or flammable gasses  Particular care must be taken by all
and liquids members of staff to handle sharp items
including needles with extreme care, and
o X-Ray exposure dispose of used needles in the designated
o Electrical wiring and outlets containers
o Patient or visitor violence
Safety!
 Mental illness
 Substance abuse
 Stress and worry
 Biological hazards
o Used needles, surgical equipment

205

Mercury is a metallic liquid element, and Items in contact or
exposure can result in serious health risks. If containing
Security staff identify any mercury spillage from chemotherapy
a damaged medical device, the following
containment steps should be followed: Chemotherapy  Empty vials
trace  Empty intravenous
 Evacuate everyone from the room, shut the
door and turn off any ventilation system. tubes
 PPE
 Put on a face mask, remove any jewellery or  Wipes
lose items, and put on latex gloves  Packaging

 Identify the type of surface the mercury was  Pills
spilled on. Any absorbent surface needs to  Injectable medicine
be disposed of  Antibiotics

 Locate all the beads of spilled mercury, and Pharmaceuticals
use a piece of cardboard to push them
together  Hazardous
medication
 Use an eyedropper to suck up the mercury
and dispense it into an airtight plastic  Bulk chemotherapy
container  Infectious disease

 Place the plastic container in an airtight Zip exposed material
lock bag, seal and label the bag Hazardous to
environment
 Hand over to management for proper
disposal Table 19 - Hazardous waste disposal

Note: In some healthcare facilities, such
response is conducted by a team of experts that
is dedicated to deal with hazardous spills.

Container Contents
Sharps
 Needles
 Broken glass
 Blades
 Razors
 Wires
 Other sharps

 Blood
 Infectious waste
 Contaminated PPE
 Intravenous tubes

Biohazard Figure 141 - Spilled beads of mercury from a
thermometer

206

16.3. Access control at hospitals
Access control at a hospital will follow the basic
principles of physical security, however the
zones and levels of access may be arranged
according to the individual hospitals needs and
requirements including:
 Staff and specialisations
 Building size and layout
 Site access points e.g.

o Pedestrian
o Vehicle
o Ambulance
o VIP
 Equipment and facilities
 Substances and materials stored in the
hospital
 Assets Value and distribution

207

Public zone
Staff zone
High security zone

Figure 142 - Hospi

ital security zones

16.3.1. Levels of access control 16.3.2. Entry control mechanisms
Apply entry/access controls to the different
Key information zones of security access can be achieved
through the methods described in the Access
Public zone control module, however typical control
mechanisms found in hospitals include but not
Areas including: limited to:
 Drop off and pick up  Security staff physical control of drop off
 Parking
 Lobby and registration and pick up zones
 Cafeterias  Security staff physical control of Ambulance
 Patient wards
arrival zones
Users permitted:  Visitor registration and ID badge issue
 Patients
 Visitors between public and staff zones
 All staff  Specific zone enabled RFID key card
 Deliveries
between different staff zones
Staff zone  PIN code/Biometric access to high security

Areas including: facilities
 Administrative offices
 Surgery/treatment wards Figure 143 - RFID Access card
 Staff Break areas
 Clinical laboratories and Stations 16.4. Incident response
Security staff must be prepared to respond to a
Users permitted: wide variety of incidents that can occur within a
 Security staff hospital operating environment. Training and
 Authorised staff (as per job requirement) site familiarity, along with strong knowledge of
 Patients receiving treatment hospital SOPs will ensure that Security staff are
 Pre-cleared and escorted contractors or able to respond quickly and safely, enabling the
hospital to continue to provide care with
maintenance minimal interruption.

High security zone 16.4.1. Hospital Security Control Centre
The Security team will operate from a central
Areas including: security control centre (SCC), where the
 Main data centre – I.T Server Room following roles and functions will be monitored:
 Telecommunication Room (TR)  Parking and traffic areas
 Medical waste disposalLoading bays  Public gathering areas
 Security sensitive locations
o Delivery and removal of medical  Elevators
equipment  Security staff on duty
 Incident reporting and resolution
 VIP wards  Crowd control
 Drug and medicine storage  Entry and exit control
 Security Control Centre  Investigation

Users permitted:
 Security staff
 Authorised staff (as per job requirement)
 Pre-cleared and escorted contractors or

maintenance

 Hospital incident management system Pink Unresponsive child or infant
(HIMS) Red medical emergency
Silver
Security staff can expect to be in constant White Fire or smoke
communication with the SCC while on duty.
Weapon or hostage
Key information situation

The primary focus of security staff must always Violent person
be the safety and protection of people, property
and information, but this aim should be aligned Yellow Missing adult
with keeping the hospital operational in order
to continue providing critical healthcare services Hospitals will have developed SOPs specific for
to society each site for responding to these incidents,
however Security staff can refer to the incident
16.4.2. Standard incident codes response plan/module for general guidance on
Common incidents have been planned for responding to these incident types
within hospitals, and a set of standard incident
response plans developed for quick reference 16.4.3. Common hospital incidents
and communication to all personnel within the Certain events and incidents occur more often
hospital. These plans are known by hospital at hospitals due to the nature of a high stress
staff as well as Security staff. healthcare environment. Some examples of
frequent incidents include:
Key information  Code white – Violent person
 Code blue – Adult medical emergency
Standard hospital incident codes  Stroke alert – Patient showing signs of

Code Event suffering a stroke
Amber Incident response
Black Missing infant or child
Code white – Security staff will be directly
Blue Bomb threat or suspect responsible for resolving violent and abusive
Brown object behaviour toward others within the hospital.
Unresponsive adult medical This behaviour can occur frequently due to the
emergency stressful situations that family of loved ones, or
mentally unwell persons can find themselves in.
Hazardous material spill Hospital staff, other visitors and Security staff
may find themselves subjected to violent
Gold Utility / I.T failure behaviour.

Green Internal disaster Topic focus

Grey Severe weather Steps in response to code white:
 Control room will coordinate calling police
Orange External disaster
if required
 Proceed to the reported incident location
 If violence is still ongoing;

o Intervene using physical restraint
methods

 If violence has stopped but the offender is
still present;

o Separate the victim and offender persons from severe health damage or death
o Engage the offender in situation.

conversation and request their 16.4.4. Critical hospital security incidents
cooperation Critical incidents that can occur in a hospital will
o Provide first aid to the victim if have a major impact on the ability of the
required hospital to provide care for patients. Examples
o Request the offender remain in of critical incidents include:
Security custody until the matter is  Code red - Fire
resolved  Code green – Internal disaster - outbreak of
 Secure any evidence, document and record
the incident, and take disease or infection
witness/victim/offender statements  Code orange - external emergency

Code blue – Security staff will be required to o Natural disasters
act in a facilitation role in order to allow the o Power outages
rapid movement of emergency medical o Mass casualty terrorism event
response teams, and controlling any family or
bystanders Incident response

Topic focus Code red – fire is a very serious event within a
hospital as it will threaten the ability to provide
Steps in response to code blue: care for the ill and injured (patients), and can
 Proceed to incident location spread quickly. Security staff must be prepared
 Provide first aid/CPR until relieved by to assist hospital staff in evacuating the affected
area/relocating to adjacent safe zone,
emergency response team (ERT)
 Control the incident site (crowd control)

allowing space for the ERT to perform duty
of care
 Clear access through the hospital for ERT to
move the casualty to the appropriate
treatment area
Ensure only authorised personnel cross access
control zones during transfer of the casualty

Stroke alert – stroke symptoms can be identify
through FAST method
F - Face: Ask the person to smile. Does one side
of the face droop?
A - Arms: Ask the person to raise both arms.
Does one arm drift downwards?
S – Speech: Ask the person to repeat a simple
phrase. Is their speech slurred or strange?
T- Time: If these symptoms are present, quickly
report the stroke alert to nursing staff

If such symptoms appear in a person, an
emergency stroke alert must be reported
immediately to nursing team to ensure speedy
response to such condition is achieved to save

Stage 1 – evacuate the immediate area, maintain caregiving capabilities
Stage 2 – monitor the situation and be prepared to evacuate further

Figure 144 - Example of relocation/evacuation stages during fire in hospital

Topic focus Code orange – external emergencies may place
a heavy burden on hospitals to provide
Steps in response to code red: treatment and are often made a central
 R.A.C.E: An acronym that hospital collection point for large amounts of casualties.
In the event of a code orange, Security staff will
personnel use to remember their duties in be expected to provide direction and control
case of fire. within the hospital site, in liaison with civil
If you are involved in a fire, remember R.A.C.E. defence, police and maybe even military
to help you respond safely and correctly: personnel.
R = RESCUE: anyone in immediate danger from
the fire, if it does not endanger your life Topic focus
A = ALARM: sound the alarm by calling “2600”
(on-campus locations only) and activating a pull Steps in response to code orange:
station alarm box  Occupy access control points at hospital
C = CONFINE the fire by closing all doors and
windows entries
E = EXTINGUISH the fire with a fire  Screen entering personnel for access
extinguisher, or EVACUATE the area if the fire is
too large for a fire extinguisher. permission based on medical assessment
(triage) or operational requirement
 P.A.S.S: An acronym that hospital
personnel use to remember their duties for o This judgement may be made by
discharging a fire extinguisher. medical staff or hospital
management
To use fire extinguishers correctly, remember
the P.A.S.S. acronym:  Assist hospital staff to transfer incoming
P = PULL the pin on the fire extinguisher patients by;
A = AIM the extinguisher nozzle at the base of o Clearing internal routes
the fire o Enforcing access zone rules
S = SQUEEZE or press the handle o Directing vehicles through
S = SWEEP from side to side until the fire emergency drop off zones
appears to be out
 Fight the fire if it is safe to do so  Be prepared to lock down the hospital
 Assist hospital staff to evacuate the area of
16.5. Infection control
all patients and staff through: Hospitals are unique in the way that they are a
o Advance clearance of evacuation concentration point for possible infection and
routes outbreak of disease. Hospital management will
o Guidance and direction to hospital prepare strict policies to be followed by all staff
staff in order to minimise the risk of infection and
spread of disease.
 Ensure the area is completely evacuated
and shut all fire doors and curtains to 16.5.1. General precautions to prevent
isolate the fire spread of infection

 Monitor and report on fire condition be Security staff working at a hospital must be
prepared to evacuate to the next safe aware of the basic principles of preventing
location infection.

Note: It is not preferable to completely Topic focus
evacuate the building as critical life support
facilities may not be able to be transported Infection control measures at a hospital
outside the hospital
1. Hand hygiene

Visibly dirty hands: private room if no AIIR available
 Restrict access to the room for people
 Wash with soap and water
 Rub hands together for at least 15 with low immunity e.g. have symptoms
of illness
seconds  Restrict transport of patient unless
 Rinse and dry with disposable towel medically necessary
 Use towel to turn off water (if required)
Unsoiled hands: 5. Textile and laundry handling
When hospital gowns and bedding have
 Rub with antibacterial rub been used:
 Rub all surfaces of hands and fingers
 Ensure disposable patient gowns are
until dry placed in appropriate bins
 Performed after
 Bedding linen is handled with minimum
o Contact with a person‟s skin movement to prevent contamination of
o Contact with body fluids air, surfaces and people
o Removing gloves
o Handling phones, door knobs  Laundry is disposed of in approved
chutes for collection and washing
or other communal surfaces
o Entering a new zone within the 16.6. Special considerations for hospital
security
hospital
Security staff should be aware of special
2. Cough etiquette considerations for security at a hospital, and be
 Cover mouth and nose with a tissue prepared to act in an appropriate manner in
 Use the nearest rubbish bin to dispose order to maintain safety, security and public
of the tissue order within the hospital site.
 Perform hand hygiene
16.6.1. Special patient types
For patients or staff exhibiting coughing There may be certain types of patient or visitor
symptoms: that could be classed as special, as they require
 Offer face masks to reduce airborne a certain approach to handling or interactions,
treatment, or protection. Such examples could
spread of infectious droplets include:
 Encourage dispersion of coughing
 VIPs
personnel e.g. extra space around each  Heavily drugged or under influence of
person in waiting areas etc.
alcohol
3. Using PPE  Criminals under police custody
If required to perform duties in a potentially  Mentally disabled or genetic disorders e.g.
infectious environment:
o Alzheimer‟s
 Wear a gown, covering torso from neck o Dementia
to knees o Schizophrenia
 Unaccompanied children (no guardian
 Wear a face mask found or available)
 Wear sterile gloves
 Dispose of all PPE after use in a medical 16.6.2. Special needs and people of
determination
waste container
 Perform hand hygiene after disposal of Security staff will likely encounter patients or
visitors with special needs, and should be
PPE mindful of their requirements when moving
within the hospital site. Simple acts of kindness
4. Airborne infection precautions such as holding a door or directing those in
If a patient is suspected to be infected with wheelchairs toward elevators or ramps can
airborne disease such as tuberculosis, build a positive environment within the hospital.
measles or chickenpox:

 Put a mask on the patient
 Isolate the patient in the airborne

infection isolation room (AIIR) or

Key information Figure 145 Empathizing with a frustrated
patient
Security staffs are not required to carry
belongings, aide people to walk, or push wheel When greeting and welcoming visitors to the
chairs – their primary duties are to the safety hospital facility, Security staff can follow the
and security of people, property and START method of customer service:
information within the site. Arranging suitable  Smile and greet
help from hospital staff is sufficient, allowing  Tell your name
Security staff to remain vigilant to risks and  Actively listen
threats.  Rapport and relationship building
 Thanking the person
16.6.3. Empathy and discretion
Due to the emotions and stresses felt by all This approach goes together with mindfulness
hospital users, including staff, patients and of cultural considerations for patients, visitors
visitors, a key skill for Security staff is to display and staff.
empathy and discretion. This approach to most
situations can set the tone for a successful 16.6.4. Patient confidentiality
outcome to any personal grievance or Hospitals have an obligation to protect the
complaint. personal information of patients, and there are
very serious consequences to breach of patient
Most people entering a hospital are fearful, confidentiality. Security staffs are in a position
anxious and stressed no matter what their to support the hospital with maintaining
reason for being there, and a Security team who confidentiality and through awareness, can
approach people with empathy can de-escalate prevent or reduce potential breaches. Examples
stressful situations from the very beginning. of patient confidentiality breach may include:
 Theft of patient records
A tool commonly used by hospital staff is
known as HEART: o From wards, bedside, or filing areas
 Hear the story (of the upset person)  Observation of patient condition, and
 Empathise with them
 Apologise for the fact they are upset disclosing this information to others
 Respond with suitable resolution options  I.T systems being breached
 Thank them for their time and cooperation  Identity fraud

Key information o Criminals posing as hospital staff to
obtain personal information about a
Security staff working at a hospital will be patient
exposed to many situations where they receive
privileged information, and must display
discretion in order to protect the confidentiality
and dignity of others.

Figure 146 - Patient file confidentiality

Module 16 Revision Code Event
Revision questions Amber
1. List 5 major security threats to hospitals Black

2. List 3 physical hazards present in a hospital Blue
Brown
3. List 3 biological hazards present in a Gold
hospital Green
Grey
4. Describe the 3 main security zones of a Orange
hospital, giving 2 examples of what would Pink
be located in each zone
Red
Silver
White
Yellow

6. List the 3 most common hospital incident
types

7. Explain the code red evacuation procedure

5. Recall the incident type for each code:

8. List 4 examples of high security areas within
a hospital

13. List 3 examples of how patient
confidentiality might be breached

9. List 2 types of hospital user that would be
authorised to enter a high security zone

10. List 3 times that hand hygiene must be
performed

11. List 3 special patient types that a hospital
may receive

12. Describe the principle of HEART when
dealing with upset hospital patients, visitors
or staff

Module 17
special events

security

Module 17 Special events take place regularly within the
UAE and the provision of effective security is
Special event security essential to ensure the safety of all involved. A
special event will typically involve a large team
Qualification Link of Security staff, many of whom may not have
worked together before, and various other
Units personnel who will also contribute to the
 Nil running of the event. Examples of special events
Learning outcomes may include:
1. Identify special event planning  Concerts and musical performances
 Formula 1 racing
considerations  Football games
2. Identify roles of security at special events  Food festivals
3. List threats and hazards to special events  Tennis tournaments
4. Outline incident response procedures  Trade shows and conventions
5. Recognise the impact of media  Cultural exhibitions

perception and professionalism 17.2. Roles and responsibilities of event
security
Key definitions
Security staff working at a special event may be
Special event – A unique event involving a required to perform various roles and duties as
large gathering of people part of a larger security team. Familiarisation
Ticketing – Method by which entry to an event with these roles will allow Security staff to
is authorised contribute and offer flexibility to event security
Event management – Staff responsible for the supervisors and managers.
organisation and logistics of the event
Sponsor – The organisation(s) that contribute 17.2.1. Static posts
funds toward running the event in exchange for Locations that Security staff may be deployed
public exposure and recognition to carry out duties at an event venue may
VOC – Venue operations centre, central control include:
area for event operations and security
monitoring Pre-entry ticket checks
 Verify approaching spectators hold a ticket
Figure 147 - Du Arena in Abu Dhabi  Direct spectators to the appropriate access

17.1. Introduction to special event security control point

Security screening
 Personnel searches
 Vehicle search

Access control points
 Venue entry

o Turnstile operator
o Gate controller
 Vehicles
o Delivery zones
o Emergency vehicles
o VIP arrivals
 Spectator zones
 Restricted zones

o Performer or team areas Key information
o Venue infrastructure
Significant threats to event security may
 Power & Utilities include:
 Stairwells
o Media zones  Fire
o VIP and hospitality areas  Terrorism
 Parking and traffic management
o Bomb threats
Venue Operations Centre o Suspicious devices
o Person borne IED (Suicide vest)
 CCTV Operator o Vehicle borne IED
 Communications operator o Armed attack
 Crowd tension and violence
 Forced entry into the venue
 Protests or ideological demonstrations
 Crime outside and within the venue
 Alcohol and drug use
 Child abduction

Figure 148 - Automated turnstiles at a high 17.3.2. Hazards at special events
security venue Hazards present at an event will vary depending
on many factors, however a basic guide to
17.2.2. Mobile duties common special event hazards can include:
 Crowd monitoring
 Severe weather e.g.
o Crowd behaviour o Sand and dust storm
o Over crowding o Extreme winds
o Blocking of emergency escape o Rain and flooding

routes  Structural failure e.g.
 Venue patrols o Seating collapse
o Scaffolding and temporary
o Inspection of critical security areas structures
o Perimeter patrols
o Parking areas  Hazardous materials and substances e.g.
 Incident response teams o Pressurised cylinders
o Crowd control o Flammable liquids and gasses
o Evacuation guides o Landscaping supplies such as;
o Additional support as required  Fertiliser
 Weed killer
17.3. Special event threats and hazards o Pest control poisons
o Toilet waste
Threats and hazards to a special event will
depend on the type of event, venue, anticipated  Noise and vibration levels e.g.
spectators and environmental conditions. o Music concerts
o Race tracks
17.3.1. Threats to event security o Air shows

 Sun and heat exposure at outdoor events
 Fireworks and lasers

17.4. Screening and access control

Security screening and access control are
primary duties of Security staff working at a

special event. The options and methods used to access into the venue, and reduce the load of
perform this task will vary depending on the Security staff to provide direction and control
type of event, venue and threat levels identified
by the event planning team. For low security A system of security zones can be used to
events such as a food festival in an open field, a define the limits of access for different ticket
simple visual search and ticket inspection may holders or venue ID holders. A recommended
be sufficient. Other higher risk events may layout of zones for larger venues such as
require detailed searching of personnel and stadiums and concert halls is as follows:
belongings in order to ensure the safety and
security of spectators attending.  Public zone – Areas outside the control of
event organisers and Security staff
IMAGES – Entry to an event
 Exclusive zone – The approach to the
17.4.1. Visitor security screening venue where official ticket sales,
merchandise or other promotional activities
Topic focus may take place

Security screening at venue Access Control  Outer perimeter – First visual check of
Points tickets and ID, along with a control line for
security screening before entering the inner
Security staff must check that: perimeter
 The person holds a valid ticket or venue ID
 The person does not possess any;  Inner perimeter – Entry turnstiles or gates
where tickets or IDs are scanned and
o weapons or prohibited accounted for in official attendance counts,
items/substances public access areas such as food and
beverage outlets, toilets and smoking areas
o Racist, offensive or political posters
or banners  Inner event zone – Seating or spectator
areas, divided according to ticket or ID held
o Alcohol or drugs
 The person is not under the influence of  Event participant zone – Restricted to
performers, teams, exhibitors and media.
alcohol or drugs This zone can be further divided depending
 The person is permitted to access the zone on the event, with specialised badges or ID
used to control access to areas such as:
or area using the ticket or ID presented o Backstage
o Team rooms
17.4.2. Access control methods o Media and broadcast area
There are a variety of access control methods o Venue Operations Centre
available for special events ranging from simple o Operations offices, medical
queues and visual ticket inspection, through to facilities, police and security
crowd distribution and automated turnstile facilities
systems. The methods and systems in use at o VIP areas
each event will depend on the venue, and event o Hospitality and catering
type. preparation

Key information An example of venue security zone layout can
be found on the following page.
Venue signs
Well signposted approaches to the venue,
along with clearly marked entry points for
different viewing or seating areas can greatly
assist with spectators regulating their own

1. The public zone
2. The exclusive zone
3. The outer perimeter
4. The inner perimeter
Inner event zone – access granted as per ticket or ID accreditation

Figure 149 - Example security zo

one layout for larger event venue

Topic focus Figure 150 - Distribution of arriving
spectators through zigzagging approach to
Basic principles of controlling access to a venue
for special events can be summarised as ACP
follows:
17.4.3. Parking and traffic management
1. Pre-entry Security staff may work together with other
a. Verification of tickets event staff to coordinate traffic entering the
b. Distribution of crowds into venue parking. The principles of traffic
screening points management and directing vehicles will still
apply, however there may be several additional
2. Security screening factors that require consideration.
a. Assessment of entry eligibility
based on Depending on the event venue, its location
i. Age within a city, number of vehicles attending and
ii. State of mind (alcohol or space available for parking, the following may
drugs) be required:
iii. Social behaviour  Street closures in the surrounding area
b. Search of people and bags
o Permissions from municipality
3. Entry control o Coordinated by police
a. Scanning or recording of tickets/ID  Sign posting directing approaching vehicles
b. Movement through turnstile or into allocated parking areas
gate into inner perimeter  Specific parking entry and exit points
o Reduces congestion if traffic flows
4. Spectator placement
a. Movement from inner perimeter to in and out through different points
inner event zone based on ticket  Parking space indicators
privileges
b. Enforcement of seating and zones o Spaces available
o Sections closed off until required
Safety!
Safety!
The points of entry to large venues may present
a serious risk of crowd crushing, or breach of Security staff performing parking and traffic
access control points if consideration is not management duties must maintain personal
given to the design and layout of approaches in safety through the use of appropriate PPE
the outer perimeter. including:
 High visibility vest
A method of delaying and distributing crowds  Traffic direction wands
as they approach should be considered such as  Torch
the use of zigzagging approach routes

 Parking management requires arriving spectators to fill parking spaces from furthest point into the
parking lot

 Separate entry and exit points to increase traffic flow

Figure 151 - Parking area layout and flow

17.5. Security team resources people or property, and respond in an
Security staff working at a special event must appropriate manner. Before any event, Security
have access to sufficient resources and staff and other key staff working at the venue
instructions in order to carry out their duties will need to conduct training and rehearsals for
effectively. Event management, security incident response.
managers, and emergency departments will
need to ensure that appropriate plans and tools Topic focus
are available to Security staff.
Agencies operating at special events
17.5.1. Required plans and resources
In order to effectively provide prevention and Security staff will need to be familiar with, and
response capabilities at a special event, Security cooperate with the follow agencies commonly
staff must be able to access: present at special events:
 Police, including traffic control
 Contact numbers for key personnel  Ambulance services
 Venue maps identifying;  Civil Defence
 Venue owners
o Seating or viewing zones  Event management staff
o Restricted areas
 Site security plans identifying; Key information
o CCTV locations
o Zone boundaries It is important that event staff and Security
o Entry and Exit control points teams rehearse incident response at the specific
o Medical treatment points venue hosting the event in order to provide
o Evacuation routes familiarity and awareness to personnel that may
o Safe assembly points not have worked together, or at that particular
o Static post duty locations venue before.
 Contingency plans for identified incident
response e.g. 17.6.1. Common incidents at special events
o Evacuation Some incidents that are common at special
o Lost child events may include:
o Crowd violence  Lost and found items
 Codes of conduct for spectators  Minor first aid
o Prohibited items  Lost child reported
o Acceptable behaviour
o Removal from venue
17.6. Incident response
As with any safety or security incident, Security
staff must assess the potential for harm to

 Lost child found manner. Examples of unprofessional behaviour
 Prohibited items detected at Access Control include:
 Inappropriate searching procedures
Point  Intimidation of spectators
 Spectator seated in wrong location  Inappropriate use of force
 Lost or stolen tickets  Accepting bribes
 Illegal ticket sales outside the venue  Allowing access to zones without proper

17.6.2. Critical incidents at special events tickets or ID
Examples of critical safety or security incidents  Confiscating items that are not prohibited
at special events include:
Key information
 Fire
 Terrorist attack The consequences of poor security practices
 Power failure being broadcast by media may include:
 Gas leaks or hazardous material spills  Legal action against negligent Security staff
 Security system failure e.g.  Damaged reputation of event organisers
 Financial loss due to withdrawal of event
o Automated turnstiles
o CCTV sponsorship
o PA systems
o Fire warning and detection systems 17.7.2. Professionalism in the public
 Stage, pitch or performance zone invasion environment
 Crowd crushing or panic
 Natural disasters e.g. Security staff working at special events are
o Flooding exposed to a large number of agencies and
o Extreme winds members of the public, and must represent
o Lightning strikes their organisation with professionalism. The
o Earthquakes basic standards of personal presentation must
be met, and a calm and confident approach to
Key information duties will encourage event spectators and staff
to follow directions and cooperate with Security
If a venue is large and holds many visitors, an staff. A professional image presented to the
evacuation may need to be conducted in public may:
sections. Security staff should be prepared to  Encourage cooperation
coordinate evacuation section by section under  Discourage potential criminals
control of the Event Security Manager.  Increase event organiser confidence,

17.7. Media perception and resulting in future business for Security
professionalism organisations

Most events will have some form of media Figure 152 - Professional image while on
coverage, and members of the media may be duty
granted special access to zones within the
venue. Security staff should be familiar with the
credentials required to identify members of the
media, what access privileges they are given
and what equipment they can carry.

17.7.1. Media at special events
The presence of media at events means that if
any safety or security incident occurs, it will
almost certainly be noticed and captured by the
media. Security staff must remain aware of this,
and respond in a professional and ethical



Module 17 Revision 5. Explain why it is important for event staff
and Security to rehearse incident response
Revision questions

1. Identify 5 Major security threats to special
events

6. List 3 common incidents that occur at
special events

2. List 3 Major health hazards that could be
present at a special event

7. List 3 Major incidents that might occur at a
special event

3. List 5 Static Post roles of security at special
events

8. Describe what might be required to
successfully evacuate a large venue with
many people

4. List 3 Mobile post roles of security at
special events

9. List 3 behaviours that Security staff should
avoid that may result in negative media
coverage

Module 18

Ports, Airports,
and land borders

security

Module 18 National border – The point at which a person
is processed into a country e.g. airport, port,
Ports, Airports and Land land border

borders security Customs – The government agency responsible
for the protection of a country through
Qualification Link regulation of incoming goods and people

Units 18.1. Introduction to National border
 Nil security
Learning outcomes
1. Identify unique considerations for sea UAE National borders provide a barrier of
protection for citizens and residents from
port security external risks and threats. Government policies
2. Identify unique considerations for airport regarding immigration, import and export are
enforced at National borders in order to
security provide National Security. Security staff may
3. Identify unique considerations for land work alongside other public security agencies
to achieve the National Security mission of the
border security UAE.
4. List specific threats and hazards to Ports,
18.2. Port security
Airports and Land borders
5. Outline systems of control used at Port security is concerned with the safety and
security of operations at maritime ports.
national borders Security staff will often be deployed to provide
6. Identify organisations and agencies protection to people, property and information
at a port, and should be familiar with specific
working at national borders threats and hazards at ports, and systems of
7. Identify methods of access control within providing security.

national border checkpoints
8. Outline vehicle movement procedures

while airside at an airport
9. Outline incident response procedures for

Ports, Airports and Land borders

Key definitions Figure 153 - Complex security environment
of a port
Security alert level – A system of categorising
alert levels in accordance with heightened risks 18.2.1. Sea Port security threats
of security threats, Level 1 – Level 2 – Level 3 Security breaches at a sea port can result in
serious consequences, from small theft all the
Port – A geographical area located by the sea way up to deliberate sabotage of critical
for the logistics of maritime transport facilities within the port such as container
cranes and warehousing.
PFSO – Port Facility Security Officer, the person
in charge of port security operations Key information

Airport – A geographical area designed to Specific security threats at ports may include:
accommodate aircraft, passengers, cargo and  Stowaways and illegal immigrants
maintenance operations  Theft of cargo during loading and

ATC – Air Traffic Control tower responsible for unloading
guidance of all aircraft using the airport  Smuggling of drugs, weapons or other

Airside – The sector of the airport in which
aircraft move e.g. runways, taxiways, hangars
and aprons

Land border – The agreed physical line
between 2 or more nations

prohibited items  Facilitating the movements of trade and
 Hazardous materials transport passengers through a port
 Terrorist attacks
 Organised crime rings  Inspection of goods and materials
 Importation of radiological (dirty) or
Civil Defence
biological weapons  Responding to fires
 Supporting incident management and
18.2.2. Sea Port hazards
disaster recovery
Key information
Other port users
Specific safety hazards at sea ports include:  Seamen
 Container loading and unloading  Navy crews
 Port operations staff
o Crush or impact hazards
o Overhead cargo loads 18.2.4. Systems of security control within
 Slips and trips on cabling, ropes and wet Sea Ports
surfaces
 Falling off docks into water Like most large sites, sea ports utilise a variety
 Spillage of oils and petrol (flammable) of systems to control security in and around the
 Noise and vibration of heavy machinery port. Common systems include:
 Shared space with vehicles and plant  Access Control Points at the entrance to
machinery
ports
18.2.3. Organisations and Agencies  Security zones within the port site
operating at Sea Ports
o Entry control at transitions between
Security staff should be aware of the other zones e.g. RFID card, Padlocks etc.
agencies and organisations working at the port,
and what their role is in relation to port  CCTV and control rooms
operations. Typical agencies working at a port  Container and cargo inspection and
include:
searching
Ministry of Climate Change and Environment  Vehicle and personnel searching
(MOCCAE)
 Supporting biosafety within UAE by Topic focus

protecting from importation of unsafe Static guarding duties at a port
foods, animal or agricultural products
 Protecting against epidemics and disease General duties:
 Supervise parking areas outside the main
Abu Dhabi Food Control Authority (ADFCA)
 Ensuring health of animals and plants port entrances
 Inspect trucks and light vehicles for
entering the UAE
Critical Infrastructure and Coastal Protection authorised personnel and cargo
Authority (CICPA)  Foot patrolling of various security areas
 Safeguarding the coastal waters
within the port
surrounding ports, and critical infrastructure  Clearance of passenger terminals after last
sites
ship or ferry departs
UAE Federal Customs Authority (FCA)  Escort and monitoring of work crews on site

at the port, including verification of permits
to work
 Direct and guide external agencies such as
Police and CID to the appropriate locations
 Report and record health and safety
incidents and near misses
 Inspection of port ID for incoming
personnel and vehicles

 Completion of port visitor and contractor cause serious disruption to a country through
both financial and reputational loss.
logs
 Liaise with the control room in event of Key definitions

emergencies ICAO – International Civil Aviation Organisation
 Opening and closing of daily use facilities IATA – International Air Transport Association
ACI – Airports Council International
e.g.
o Office and administration areas
o Training facilities

 Inspection of cruise ship ID for passengers

coming on board or departing the ship
 Vehicle patrols of port facilities
 Control room duties including radio

operator, CCTV operator and key holding
 Reporting and recording incidents and

occurrences in the daily occurrence book

18.2.5. Incident response Figure 154 - Complex security environment
Due to the critical nature of ports, most security of an airport
incidents will be responded to by Police and
other supporting agencies. In the event of a 18.3.1. Aviation security threats and risks
serious incident, Security staff will respond as
per the local site standard operating Key information
procedures, and be prepared to cooperate with
public security agencies and civil defence. Specific threats to airport safety and security
may include:
Examples of critical incidents may include:  Terrorism
 Sabotage
 Fire  Theft and organised crime
 Capsized vessel  Insider threats
 Container crane collapse  Cyber and I.T Network attacks
 Release of hazardous materials
 Serious vehicle accident 18.3.2. Aviation hazards
 Suspected improvised explosive device Airports are large and complex sites with many
areas that can present hazards to those working
(IED) and travelling.
 Armed robbery
Safety!
18.3. Airport security
Security staff may be deployed to airports to Health and safety considerations whilst airside
provide safety and protective services to airport include:
staff, passengers, assets and procedures. Airport
security is regulated by several international  Extreme noise
conventions and codes of practice, along with  Moving vehicles
local policies and practices, and Security staff  Aircraft engine exhaust
should be aware of these regulations for both  Fume inhalation
compliance purposes and to enable effective
provision of security services.

Airports and airlines are a high value target for
potential threats as they represent national
capabilities, well developed societies, and are
essential to economic stability, along with
receiving widespread media coverage should
any incident occur. Targeting an airport can

18.3.3. Airport security operations
Security is achieved at airports through a
system of access zones, security clearance
requirements for different employees and staff,
and technologies.

Airports are divided into security zones and
access is controlled through a variety of
measures including:
 Wearing of ID
 Access cards for doors
 Keys and locks

The security of an airport is shared between
several agencies and organisations, and
commonly will include:
 Police
 Airline staff
 Customs and immigration
 Private security
 Vigilant citizens
Security zones can be divided into:
 Airside – the area that aircraft and

supporting machines and equipment
operate, e.g. runway, tarmac, baggage
loading and fuelling trucks
 Terminal – The check in, immigration and
security screening, and departure or arrival
lounges

Within these 2 major zones, an airport may be
divided into further security zones with different
levels of access control. Security staff must be
aware of the access control measures, and
authorised personnel at the airport.

Example of Airport Security age

Passenger terminal
Airport logistics and commercial operations
Airside operations

encies and their areas of operation

18.3.3.1. Passenger and baggage inspection 1. Queue supervisor for busy periods
One of the most important security measures at 2. Tray loader for x-ray inspection
an airport is the inspection of passengers and 3. X-ray operator
their baggage. This process is normally carried 4. Male searcher
out by customs officials, however private 5. Female searcher
security staff may be required to assist, and 6. Secondary searchers for suspicious bags
should be aware of the passenger screening
process. Table 20 - Example of security staff duties at
Airport inspection point
Topic focus
18.3.3.2. Aircraft security
Passenger inspection is normally divided into 3 Aircraft security is very important, as the aircraft
components, that each have several represent a valuable target for attackers.
considerations including: Security staff may be required to provide
physical security for aircraft that are parked on
1. Checkpoint entry the tarmac during refuelling, passenger loading
a) Pre-inspection and queue zone or unloading, and baggage handling
b) Bag unpack and inspection zone procedures. Some important considerations for
security staff include:
2. Inspection point  Health and safety around aircraft
3. Repacking zone
o Noise
a) Seating and tables for repacking o Jet engine exhaust
b) Inspection tray return o Propellers
 Safe distances from the aircraft
Security staff may be required to direct  Routes that support vehicles are travelling
passengers through each of these zones, and on e.g. refuel trucks, baggage trucks etc.
assist customs staff with secondary inspection  Mobile passenger bridges
of suspicious items, perform searches of people
or maintain an orderly queue and flow of Critical danger of propellers and jet
passengers. engines
Hazard of moving vehicles accessing
Duties at the checkpoint entry include: the aircraft
 Direction of passengers through the

queuing area
 Notifying passengers of security rules and

regulations
 Assisting passengers to arrange their

belongings on the x-ray tray
 Looking for suspicious people or items

Duties at the Inspection point include:
 X-Ray operation and inspection
 Walk Through Metal Detector
 Physical searching of people
 Secondary searching of bags
 Explosive or narcotics trace detection

Duties at the repacking zone include:
 Return of inspection trays
 Looking for suspicious activity

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