MALAYA AND
SINGAPORE 1941–42
The fall of Britain’s empire in the East
MARK STILLE ILLUSTRATED BY PETER DENNIS
Author Illustrator
Mark E. Stille (Commander, United States Navy, retired) Peter Dennis was born in 1950. Inspired by contemporary
received his BA in History from the University of Maryland and magazines such as Look and Learn he studied illustration at
also holds an MA from the Naval War College. He has worked Liverpool Art College. Peter has since contributed to hundreds
in the intelligence community for 35 years including tours on of books, predominantly on historical subjects, including
the faculty of the Naval War College, on the Joint Staff and many Osprey titles. A keen wargamer and modelmaker, he is
on US Navy ships. He is currently a senior analyst working in based in Nottinghamshire, UK.
the Washington DC area. He is the author of numerous Osprey
titles, focusing on naval history in the Pacific.
Other titles in the series
CAM No: 226 • ISBN: 978 1 84603 501 2 CAM No: 247 • ISBN: 978 1 84908 605 9 CAM No: 255 • ISBN: 978 1 78096 154 5
CAM No: 263 • ISBN: 978 1 78200 268 0 CAM No: 284 • ISBN: 978 1 4728 0693 2 CAM No: 289 • ISBN: 978 1 4728 1125 7
CAMPAIGN 300
MALAYA AND
SINGAPORE 1941–42
The fall of Britain’s empire in the East
MARK STILLE ILLUSTRATED BY PETER DENNIS
Series editor Marcus Cowper
This electronic edition published in 2016 by Bloomsbury Publishing Plc ARTIST’S NOTE
First published in Great Britain in 2016 by Osprey Publishing, Readers may care to note that the original paintings from which the colour
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© 2016 Osprey Publishing Ltd Peter Dennis, Fieldhead, The Park, Mansfield, Notts, NG18 2AT, UK
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Key to military symbols
Army Group Army Corps Division Brigade Regiment Battalion
Company/Battery Platoon Section Squad Infantry Artillery Cavalry
Airborne Unit HQ Air defence Air Force Air mobile Air transportable Amphibious
Anti-tank Armour
Air aviation Bridging Engineer Headquarters Maintenance
Medical Missile Mountain Navy Nuclear, biological, Ordnance Parachute
Supply chemical
Transport
Reconnaissance Signal movement Rocket artillery Air defence artillery
Key to unit identification
Unit Parent
identi er unit
Commander
(+) with added elements
(–) less elements
CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION 5
The rise of Singapore n The British defence dilemma n Japan on the march
CHRONOLOGY 8
OPPOSING COMMANDERS 11
British commanders n Japanese commanders
OPPOSING FORCES 17
The British Empire n The Japanese Empire
OPPOSING PLANS 31
The strategic environment n British defence plans n The Japanese Plan
THE BATTLE 37
The Japanese landings n The fight for Kota Bharu n The landings in southern Thailand n The saga of
Force Z n Force Z – an assessment n The action off Endau n Debacle at Jitra n Jitra – the impact n The
battle of Kampar n The battle of Slim River n British reinforcements n The loss of Johore n The air battle
n The final air battles n The attack on Singapore n The Japanese attack n Battle for the Jurong Line n
The final battles n Capitulation
THE AFTERMATH 90
THE BATTLEFIELD TODAY 93
BIBLIOGRAPHY 94
INDEX 95
The Malaya and Singapore theatre
Patani XX N
5
Khlaung Ngae
6 Ind X X III
Alor Star
15 Ind 56 18
Jitra
Tumpat Kota Bharu
KEDDAH
X
8 Ind
Sungei Betong Machang Gong Kedah
Patani Kroh
XX
II Kuala Krai
11 Ind
Krohcol
Butterworth
Penang Grik Kuala Trengganu
KELANTAN
Port Weld Taiping TRENGGANU Kuala Dungun
Kuala Kangasar
X Ipoh
28 Ind
Kampar Kuala Lipis
Tapah Jerantur
Bidor Raub
Telok Anson X
Slim River 22 Ind Kuantan
SELANGOR Bentong PAHANG Maran
Kuala Selangor XX
9 Ind Kuala Lumpur
Port Swettenham XXX NEGRI
III Ind
Bahau
Seremban
Morib Endau
SEMBILAN Gemas
Port Dickson Segamat X
Tampin
22 Aus Mersing
X Jemaluang
Labis
12 Ind MALACCA Kota Tinggi
JOHORE
Malacca Kahang XX
Muar 8 Aus
Kluang X
Yong Peng 27 Aus
Batu Pahat Ayer Rengani
Hitam
SUMATRA
Johore Bahru
0 50 miles X Singapore
0 50km
1 Malaya X
2 Malaya
INTRODUCTION
THE RISE OF SINGAPORE
Coming out of World War I, the British Government marked Japan as a
future potential threat to the British Empire and its interests in the Far East.
Since the size of the Royal Navy was much reduced after the war, it was not
large enough to commit powerful forces to the Far East on a permanent
basis. This led to the strategy that called for the British to send a powerful
fleet to the Far East in times of crisis. To execute this strategy, a large naval
base would have to be available.
The Admiralty considered several possibilities for such a base. Among the
choices were Hong Kong, Australia and Singapore. Hong Kong was ruled
out because it was too close to Japan and could not be properly defended;
Australia, particularly Sydney, was ideal from several perspectives, but was
simply too far from the interests that it was supposed to be protecting. The
only remaining option was Singapore. It was ideally located at the strategic
chokepoint from the South China Sea into the Indian Ocean and was far
enough from the nearest Japanese bases to offer it strategic depth from attack.
Most of all, it was immediately accessible to the areas needing defence.
The British government announced its decision to build a new naval
base at Singapore in 1921. The Washington Naval Treaty of 1922 and its
associated agreements increased the importance of Singapore since the
construction of additional naval bases was prohibited. The treaty reduced
the size of the Royal Navy and made it unlikely that it would be big enough
to meet requirements in both Europe and the Far East. Part of the 1922
agreements was a treaty to restrict the construction of fortifications near
Japan. However, this excluded Singapore, which now became the most visible
symbol of British might in the Far East.
THE BRITISH DEFENCE DILEMMA
The rise of Japanese militarism resulted in the seizure and annexation
of Manchuria by Japan in 1931–32. In 1934, Japan renounced the
Washington agreements. This was followed by the invasion of China in July
1937. Concurrent with Japanese expansion in China, tensions in Europe
dramatically rose. In 1938, Germany pressured Czechoslovakia for territorial
concessions in the Sudetenland. The British policy of appeasement meant
5
This view of the naval base at war was averted, but it was soon apparent that continued German demands
Singapore was taken in March would lead to war. Great Britain began to re-arm.
1941. This facility was the focus
of the entire campaign from Work continued on the Singapore naval base. It was officially opened in
the British perspective, though February 1938, though not actually completed. As war loomed in Europe,
the Royal Navy was unable to the British plan to deploy a large fleet to Singapore during a crisis began to
devote adequate forces to use look even more hollow. In July 1939, the period required to deploy a large
it. It fell into Japanese hands force to Singapore was extended to 90 days from the 70 days set in March
after only moderate damage 1938. Until the arrival of the fleet, Singapore would have to hold out with
and served as a major IJN base whatever means were available.
throughout the war. (AWM)
When war did come in September 1939, only Germany entered the
conflict. Italy and Japan remained on the sidelines, but still had to be watched.
The period for getting a fleet to the Far East was extended to 180 days. The
British situation worsened when France fell to the Germans in June 1940,
which prompted the entry of Italy into the war that same month. The British
had already decided that the Mediterranean would have priority over the
Far East and, of course, both were secondary to the security of Great Britain
itself, which was under the threat of invasion. The worsening situation forced
the British to suspend their plan to send a large fleet to the Far East in a crisis.
When war came between Great Britain and Japan it would be centred
on Singapore and Malaya. This was the strategic centre of gravity for the
British in the Far East. The two areas held not just the naval base and a
number of airbases, but were strategically positioned to dominate Southeast
Asia. Although the British were stretched to the limit by the war, they still
believed that Singapore could be defended. Even though it was third in
priority for allocation of forces, behind the defence of Great Britain and
the Mediterranean, much had been done to bolster the fortress defences.
According to British calculations, it was unlikely that the Japanese Army,
still tied down by the conflict in China, would be bold enough and have the
logistical capabilities to attempt to launch an attack on the heart of British
power in the Far East. Therefore, depending on the state of the conflict in
northern Europe and the Mediterranean, the British would still have adequate
time to reinforce the
fortress. However, no
British plan foresaw
the direction the war
would take in 1940–41.
The British had suffered
defeat after defeat, and
were being pressed to
maintain the security
of the sea lanes in the
Atlantic, defend the
home islands from
attack, and protect
their key position in
Egypt. This undermined
any real hope of
providing significant
reinforcement to the
Far East when the
Japanese attacked.
6
JAPAN ON THE MARCH
The crumbling of the Allied position in Europe directly affected the A key part of the Singapore
strategic situation in Southeast Asia. The fall of France meant that French fortress was a strong battery of
possessions in Indo-China came under the control of the Vichy Government. coastal defence artillery. Shown
The Japanese were soon able to gain approval from Vichy French authorities here is one of Singapore’s five
to occupy first northern Indo-China and, later in July 1941, southern 15in. guns. None was used to
Indo-China. This greatly increased the threat to Singapore since it placed engage Japanese ships during
Japanese air and naval bases within easy range of the fortress. the campaign. Four of the
weapons were actually able to
Allied weakness in the Far East created a window of opportunity for engage land targets to the
the Japanese that they were determined to exploit. This determination was north, but none was used in
fed by the strong American reaction to Japanese expansionism that created this role because of a lack of
a situation in which the Japanese could not afford to give in to American high-explosive shells. (USAMHI)
demands, therefore making war their only choice. The Japanese move into
northern Indo-China prompted the United States to retaliate in September
1940 by placing an embargo on scrap metal to Japan. In November, the
Japanese received a secret British report captured by the Germans, which
stated that Britain was unable to send strong reinforcements to Singapore
in the event of war. The Allied position in Southeast Asia looked weaker
then ever.
In June 1941, the entire war changed when Germany attacked the Soviet
Union. This gave the Japanese an
opportunity to join the Germans
against the Russians, Japan’s
traditional enemy in the Far East.
However, a choice had to be made
since Japan did not possess the
capability to attack both Russia and
Great Britain. In order to gain the
resources needed to support its war
economy, the choice was made to
attack south and seize Malaya and
the Dutch East Indies.
A vital prerequisite was realized
in July 1941 when the Japanese
pressured the Vichy French into
allowing them to occupy southern
Indo-China. This directly threatened
Malaya and Singapore. This move
cost the Japanese dearly since it
resulted in a total embargo of all
materials from the United States
to Japan. The British and Dutch
also slapped an embargo on Japan.
With no access to oil, and current
stocks limited, and Japan unwilling
to accede to American demands for
withdrawal from China, the path
to war was inevitable. Both sides
prepared for war, which would decide
the fate of Malaya and Singapore.
7
CHRONOLOGY
1941 Japanese invasion convoys depart from Hainan Island.
4 December British receive first reports of Japanese convoys; British forces are
6 December placed on alert, but a move into Thailand (Operation Matador) is
placed on hold.
7 December
8 December Brooke-Popham again hesitates over Operation Matador.
Japanese troops make coordinated landings at Singora and Patani in
southern Thailand, where token Thai resistance is quickly overcome,
9 December and at Kota Bharu, where resistance from Indian troops is heavy.
10 December
11 December Japanese bombers make first raid on Singapore, and begin a series of
raids against British airfields in northern Malaya in order to seize air
14 December superiority.
16 December
18 December Japanese seize Kota Bharu airfield and town; forces driving from
21 December Singora cross the border into Malaya by midnight.
Battleship Prince of Wales and battlecruiser Repulse are sunk by
Japanese air attack off Kuantan.
British fighters withdrawn to defend Singapore and supply convoys,
giving the Japanese air superiority over northern Malaya.
Battle for Jitra results in a major British defeat and decides the fate of
northern Malaya.
Japanese capture Alor Star airfield virtually intact.
British evacuate Penang Island which is occupied by the Japanese the
following day.
Percival and Heath decide to give up northern Malaya.
British forces ordered to retreat behind the Perak River.
8
22 December Lead units of the Japanese Imperial Guards Division join the attack.
29 December
31 December Four-day battle for Kampar begins as Percival intends to make a
stand to defend central Malaya.
1942
Percival orders Heath to hold the airfields in central Malaya long
2 January enough to allow the arrival of several critical reinforcement convoys.
3 January
4 January Battle of Kampar is lost when British forces retreat to avoid
7 January encirclement.
8 January British retreat from Kuantan on the east coast.
11 January
13 January British forces retreat to defences anchored on Slim River.
14 January
In the battle of Slim River, a Japanese tank attack destroys two
15 January Indian brigades with the loss of 3,200 prisoners and huge amounts of
equipment; central Malaya is lost.
18 January
24 January In a battlefield inspection, Wavell approves plans to withdraw to
25 January Johore.
26 January
Japanese occupy Kuala Lumpur.
First brigade of British 18th Infantry Division arrives.
Bennett assumes command of the Malayan front as commander of
‘Westforce’.
At a point some 10 miles north of Gemas, Australian forces ambush
a Japanese force and cause a brief delay.
Indian 45th Brigade is routed by Imperial Guards Division in the
vicinity of Muar.
Japanese forces continue their seaborne infiltration along the east
coast of Malaya and land at Parit Jawa.
Percival agrees with Bennett to withdraw behind Segamat River to
avoid encirclement.
An Australian machine-gun battalion and 2,000 replacements arrive
in Singapore.
British commanders decide to retreat onto Singapore Island.
Japanese conduct a logistical landing at Endau on the south-eastern
coast of Malaya; British air and naval attacks to disrupt the landing
fail.
9
28 January 22nd Indian Brigade is cut off and destroyed.
31 January
4 February Final British troops cross the Causeway from Johore into Singapore
5 February Island.
6 February
Japanese begin artillery bombardment of British defences.
8 February
Last reinforcement convoy reaches Singapore.
9 February
10 February Japanese artillery fire intensifies along the north-eastern part of the
Strait of Johore to deceive Percival about the location of the Japanese
assault.
11 February
At 1000hrs, Japanese begin an intensive artillery barrage that reaches
12 February a peak by 1900hrs. At 2000hrs, the Japanese 5th and 18th Divisions
begin their attack across the strait.
13 February
The Japanese gain a foothold on the island and a planned British
14 February counter-attack fails to materialize.
15 February Imperial Guards Division begins its attack in the area of the
Causeway; after heavy losses, it secures a lodgement.
Japanese pressure and British command confusion prompt British
troops to withdraw from the Jurong Line, the best defensive position
outside Singapore.
Japanese occupy Bukit Timah village, and the Imperial Guards
Division drives from the north into a gap in the British lines. British
morale begins to crack.
Japanese forces drive down the Bukit Timah road and approach the
outskirts of the city. Percival orders a retreat into a final defence
perimeter around the city.
Yamashita plans an attack into the city before British defences can
consolidate. Percival announces his decision to fight on to his staff,
which largely advocates surrender.
Japanese forces attack along two axes into the city while air raids
and artillery barrages pummel the defenceless city and its population.
Percival learns of the growing crisis of a water shortage in the city.
In a morning conference with his commanders, Percival decides to
surrender. That afternoon, he meets with Yamashita and signs the
documents of surrender.
10
OPPOSING COMMANDERS
BRITISH COMMANDERS
During the campaign for Malaya and Singapore, British commanders and Air Chief Marshal Sir Robert
their staffs proved universally unable to cope with the speed and tenacity of Brooke-Popham (left) in
the Japanese assault. This was bad enough, but perhaps paled in comparison discussion with General Sir
with the lack of realistic planning before the campaign that was built on Archibald Wavell. As
grossly erroneous assumptions regarding the capabilities of the Japanese. No Commander-in-Chief, Far East,
British commander emerged from the battle with his reputation untarnished. Brooke-Popham was denied
Post-war critiques of British commanders tend to blame key individuals the resources he and his
for the unprecedented disaster, but such a defeat cannot be traced to a few subordinate service chiefs
individuals, but rather reflects a combination of factors. The one individual assessed were necessary to
not usually held to account is Prime Minister and Defence Minister defend Malaya and Singapore.
Winston Churchill who, despite the advice of his senior military advisers, He was sacked after the
starved Malaya of resources that were readily available because of his false disastrous start of the
assumption that Japan would not attack Great Britain in 1941. campaign. (RAAF)
The British command structure for the Far East was
ill considered and impeded efforts to build a coherent
defence plan. The commander-in-chief was a Royal Air
Force (RAF) officer, the first time an RAF officer had
held such an appointment. As could be expected, he had
major differences with the head of RN forces in the Far
East about defence planning since RN forces reported to
their own operational commander in London. Meanwhile,
the civil authorities in the Far East also reported to their
ministers in London.
The Commander-in-Chief of the British Far East
Command was Air Chief Marshal Sir Robert Brooke-
Popham. He was responsible for defending not just Malaya
and Singapore, but also Burma and Hong Kong. He
received his commission in 1898 and fought in the Second
Boer War before transferring to the Royal Flying Corps in
1912. Quickly rising through the ranks, he was knighted
in 1927 and given a series of important commands. When
the war began he was Governor and Commander-in-
Chief Kenya, but soon returned to England to establish
training commands in Canada and South Africa. On 18
November 1940, he was appointed Commander-in-Chief
11
Lieutenant-General Arthur A. E. of British Far East Command. Upon his arrival,
Percival pictured in June 1941. Brooke-Popham realized that his command would be
Even this well-known picture of unable to withstand a Japanese attack, but his pleas
him suggests he would be for reinforcements went largely ignored. After the
better suited for duty as a staff initial disasters of the campaign, he was relieved on 27
college instructor than as December. He returned to England, but his reputation
commander of a force was destroyed. He held non-operational commands
committed to a desperate fight for the remainder of the war before his death in 1953.
against a ruthless enemy. Brooke-Popham was replaced briefly by General Sir
Though faced with a difficult, Henry Pownall until Field Marshal Sir Archibald
and probably ultimately Wavell assumed the role of Supreme Commander of
impossible situation, his weak ABDACOM (American, British, Dutch, Australian
performance guaranteed a Command) on 30 December.
quick and cheap Japanese
victory. (AWM) Lieutenant-General Arthur E. Percival was the
General Officer Commanding (GOC) in Malaya and
chief architect of the defence of Malaya and Singapore.
He began his army career during World War I, and saw
action on the Somme and in northern Russia. His first
exposure to the Far East was in 1936 when he was posted
to Malaya as Chief of Staff to the army commander
where he studied the vulnerability of Singapore to an
attack down the Malayan Peninsula. In April 1941, he
was appointed as GOC Malaya. Up until this point, he
was considered a brilliant staff officer but was untried as a commander.
His handling of the campaign has been roundly criticized. Most observers
from the campaign commented that while he clearly possessed the mental
capacity, he was not a strong leader and failed to inspire his officers and men.
He clearly lacked the required ruthlessness to fight the Japanese and was more
often than not indecisive in command. He quickly lost the initiative to the
Japanese and was forced into a reactive mode for the duration of the campaign.
He worked long hours and was quickly worn out. After surrendering to the
Japanese, he was held as a prisoner of war until the end of the conflict. After
the war, he wrote a book, The War in Malaya, about the campaign in which
he took some responsibility for the defeat. He died in 1966.
Wavell (left) in his capacity as
Supreme Commander of the
ABDACOM became Percival’s
boss on 30 December 1941.
Pownall (right) held the post of
Commander-in-Chief, Far East,
for a few days, and then
became Wavell’s chief of staff.
Though he was one of Britain’s
greatest field commanders,
Wavell was unable to infuse
determination into the defence
of Malaya and Singapore.
(AWM)
12
Lieutenant-General A. E.
Percival, General Officer
Commanding Malaya, and
Major-General H. G. Bennett,
General Officer Commanding
8th Australian Division, in
Malaya before the start of the
war. The two formed a very
unsuccessful command
relationship with Bennett
correctly assessing that Percival
was not up to a hard fight with
the Japanese. Unfortunately,
Bennett was unaware of his
own shortcomings as a
commander. (AWM)
Percival’s primary field formation was the Indian III Corps commanded This shot from February 1941
by Lieutenant-General Sir Lewis Heath. At the outbreak of war, he was shows Bennett with Murray-
appointed commander of the Indian 5th Infantry Division and played a key Lyon, General Officer
role in the successful East African campaign, which expelled the Italians Commanding 11th Indian
from Ethiopia. Heath was then sent to Malaya as commander of the Division (right). The 11th Indian
Indian III Corps which appeared to be an excellent choice. He and Percival Division was twice routed by a
were constantly clashing over strategy during the campaign, with Heath small force of Japanese tanks
continually advocating retreat. After the war, Percival admitted that he had after the British failed to ensure
lost confidence in Heath yet did not replace him. Heath went into captivity proper anti-tank defences were
after Singapore’s surrender and spent the rest of the war as a prisoner of war. in place. Murray-Lyon was
relieved after these debacles.
One of Heath’s divisional commanders was Major-General Arthur (AWM)
Barstow. He joined the British Indian Army in 1908 and was a veteran of
several campaigns in World War I. During the Malaya
campaign, he was the commander of the 9th Indian
Division until he was killed by a Japanese ambush on 28
January 1942. The other divisional commander in Indian
III Corps was Major-General David M. Murray-Lyon. He
was wounded in World War I and did not transfer to the
British Indian Army until 1927. He assumed command
of the newly formed 11th Indian Division and took it to
Malaya. Both Barstow and Murray-Lyon were qualified
division commanders, but neither had experience in this
capacity before the campaign.
The Australian Imperial Force was commanded by
Major-General H. Gordon Bennett. He also was a veteran
of World War I, having seen action at Gallipoli and on
the Western Front, but was not a professional soldier.
After being passed over for command of three Australian
divisions sent to the Middle East, he was given command
of the 8th Australian Division and sent to Malaya in
February 1941. He proved to be a disruptive presence,
creating disharmony within his division and quarrelling
with Percival. He was aggressive and driven by a feeling of
self-importance. He had difficulty getting along with other
British commanders during the campaign, as indicated by
13
Major-General Simmons (left) his criticism of British and Indian troops, which were the
confers with Brooke-Popham first to be defeated by the Japanese. His Australian troops
before the war. As commander fared little better except for a successful engagement
of the Singapore Fortress at Gemas on 14 January. Given a central role in
Command, Simmons failed to defending central and southern Malaya, Bennett seemed
prepare the city for a siege. overwhelmed by the requirements of commanding a force
(AWM) larger than a division over an extended area. Bennett’s
final actions during the campaign remain extremely
controversial. As the British were surrendering, Bennett
turned over his command and went with two other
officers to the waterfront at Singapore. They found a
sampan and made their escape, returning to Melbourne
on 2 March 1942. Later, a commission of enquiry did not
provide the justification for his actions that he sought.
The other major component of Percival’s command was
the independent Fortress Singapore. The command was
held by Major-General F. Keith Simmons, who had been
in the Far East since 1939, first as commander of British
forces in China, then as GOC Fortress Singapore. He was
another officer with a controversial influence during the
campaign. He argued against the construction of landward
defences for Singapore since he believed it would adversely impact morale.
Charged with preparing Singapore for attack when the campaign began, he
accomplished little. When Percival was considering surrender, he turned to his
confidant Simmons for advice; Simmons agreed that an orderly turnover to the
Japanese was more important than further, pointless resistance.
The principal RN command figure in the defence of Singapore was Acting
Admiral Sir Tom Phillips. He joined the RN at the age of 15 and served at
Gallipoli in World War I. He was recognized as an officer of outstanding
intelligence. He was also short (5ft 4in.), but possessed supreme confidence.
Going into World War II, he had the reputation of a fine staff officer, but was
also seen as a ‘desk admiral’. As the protégé of the then First Sea Lord, he was
Then Vice-Admiral Tom Phillips
with his mentor Winston
Churchill in February 1940.
Phillips was selected to lead
Churchill’s naval deterrence
force to the Far East in late
1941. When deterrence failed,
he was left with an unbalanced
force to accomplish an
impossible mission. (NARA)
14
Vice Chief of the Naval Staff until October 1941. As early as May, he was
the candidate to command the RN’s Far Eastern force when it was formed.
As war in the Far East became likely, Phillips was appointed acting admiral
on 25 October and commander of the British Far Eastern Fleet.
Subsequent events have propagated several myths about Phillips. He had
seen no action to date, but he did have a keen knowledge of naval matters.
This included the effect of air power against ships. He understood the
difficulty of the mission he was being sent to carry out and the inadequacies
of his force. More than anything, he was aware of the importance of naval
power to the defence of Singapore. However, with the traditions of the Royal
Navy demanding aggressive action, there was no doubt what Phillips would
do with his small force (later named ‘Force Z’) when he had the opportunity.
JAPANESE COMMANDERS
Lieutenant-General Yamashita Tomoyuki, commander of the 25th Army, was The victor of Singapore
the most compelling and important command figure of the campaign. The campaign, Lieutenant-General
decisive Japanese victory has led many to assess Yamashita to be a brilliant Yamashita, commander of the
commander, but this is an overstatement. He did possess many essential 25th Army. (AWM)
attributes of a successful commander including charisma, audacity, decisiveness
and command intuition. He went into the campaign with combat experience,
having led a division in China. Not until 6 November was he appointed
commander of the 25th Army. This appointment was in line with his reputation
as one of the best operational commanders in the Imperial Japanese Army
(IJA). He was charismatic and bold, was known as a thoughtful commander
and made decisions intuitively. He was also impatient, which
prompted frequent changes in orders at points in the campaign.
Somewhat unusually for an IJA officer, he worked well with the
IJN and with the IJA’s air force.
Most importantly for the conduct of the campaign, he
assessed that the British troops, especially Indian forces, were
grossly inferior to Japanese troops in fighting spirit. In addition,
the Japanese also grossly underestimated the strength of British
forces in Malaya, which led Yamashita to build his campaign
plan around a ‘driving strategy’ against the British. This
assessment ultimately proved correct, and Yamashita remarked
after the battle that ‘our battle for Malaya was successful
because we took the enemy lightly’.
After the campaign, the IJA sent him into exile in Manchuria.
With the Americans rolling across the Pacific, he was brought
back into active service as the commander of Japanese ground
forces on Luzon in the Philippines. Here he fought a prolonged
battle against the American invasion in January 1945 until he
surrendered in September. After the war, he was placed on trial
for the atrocity-ridden defence of Manila. He was found guilty
of war crimes by ‘command responsibility’ and hanged on 23
February 1946. Even if the trial for his lack of control in the
Philippines was dubious on legal grounds, he was complicit in
the screening and execution of ethnic Chinese in Singapore after
the British surrender.
15
Yamashita, the famed Tiger of One of Yamashita’s staff officers deserves mention: Colonel Tsuji
Malay, surrenders to American Masanobu who served as the 25th Army’s chief operations planner. He
forces on Luzon in the played a key role in the campaign planning, turned up at several key points
Philippines. Within months, he during the campaign and then was involved in the massacre of thousands of
would be hanged for war Chinese in Singapore after the British surrender. After the war, he escaped
crimes. (USAMHI) justice and eventually returned to Japan where he became a politician. He
was the author of Singapore: The Japanese Version, which was translated into
English. Fearing prosecution, he disappeared again in 1961 and is presumed
to have died soon thereafter.
Two of Yamashita’s three divisional commanders were combat veterans
from the war in China and performed well during the campaign. The
commander of the 5th Division was Lieutenant-General Matsui Takuro. He
took command of the 5th Division in 1940 and participated in the planning
for the campaign. His division was the most important IJA unit in the battle.
In 1942, after the campaign, he returned to China and held a number of
posts, ending up as commander of the 13th Army. He died in 1969.
Lieutenant-General Mutaguchi Renya, commander of the 18th Infantry
Division, was also a militarist, but a capable divisional commander. He was
wounded in the final battle for Singapore. After the fall of Singapore, he went
on to have a busy combat career, serving on Bataan against the Americans
and in Burma and India against the British. Mutaguchi was arrested after the
war and placed on trial for war crimes. Though found guilty, he was released
in 1948 and returned to Japan where he died in 1966.
Yamashita got along well with the commanders of the 5th and 18th
divisions, but this was not the case with the commander of his final
division. The Imperial Guards Division
was commanded by Lieutenant-General
Nishimura Takuma. He was an artillery
officer by training and during the 1930s
became known as an ardent militarist.
In 1940, he was sent to Saigon as
the commander of the Indo-China
Expeditionary Army. In 1941, he assumed
command of the Imperial Guards
Division. The performance of Nishimura
and his division was uneven during the
campaign, which prompted a loss of
confidence by Yamashita. Yamashita
spent considerable time during the
campaign dealing with this troublesome
subordinate and often had to issue the
same orders twice to get the Imperial
Guards Division to move. At the end of
the campaign, Nishimura was involved
in the massacre of Chinese citizens in
Singapore. He retired later in 1942, but
turned up again as Governor of Sumatra
in 1944–45. After the war, he was put on
trial for his activities in Singapore and
for atrocities against Australian troops,
found guilty, and hanged in 1951.
16
OPPOSING FORCES
THE BRITISH EMPIRE
Malaya Command
With British air and naval forces so weak, the primary responsibility for the
defence of Malaya and Singapore fell to the ground forces under the control of
Percival’s Malaya Command. Despite efforts to strengthen the Malaya Command
since the beginning of the war, Percival had a force of only 31 infantry battalions
to defend Malaya and Singapore and no armour. Percival thought he needed 48
battalions and two armoured regiments to accomplish his mission.
Percival’s force was organized into three divisions, two of which were
Indian and one Australian. These were all under strength with two brigades
each and did not possess their full complement of artillery. Two more
brigades were in reserve, and two fortress brigades were in Singapore. The
fortress was also manned by coastal artillery units and anti-aircraft units.
Rounding out the forces in Malaya was a small garrison at Penang fortress
and an assortment of airfield and local defence units. The total strength
was approximately 88,600 personnel of which 19,600 were British, 15,200
Australian, 37,000 Indian and 16,800 local troops.
This was a collection of units from all over the Empire. They had no time
to train together, no combat experience and most had not been in Malaya
long enough to become acclimated to local conditions. They had not been
trained how to fight in the jungle and in the massive rubber plantations.
Unlike the Japanese, they looked on the jungle with fear.
Australian troops conduct
bayonet practice. By the start of
the campaign, the two
Australian brigades were the
best units in Percival’s
command. They proved able to
better the Japanese on most
occasions but were let down by
poor command decisions.
(AWM)
17
LEFT Most of the Indian units were manned by poorly trained recruits mobilized
Gurkhas training before the in the 1940 expansion of the Indian Army. There was also a shortage of
war. The overall standard of experienced leaders. The combat effectiveness of these units depended on a
training in Indian units was small number of British and Indian non-commissioned and commissioned
below average. (AWM) officers. If these officers were unable to command, the effectiveness of the
unit declined rapidly. Some Indian units had been trained for service in the
RIGHT desert in expectation of being sent to the Middle East. None of the units had
Australians of the 27th Brigade trained with tanks or received training on anti-tank defence. Much of the
arrive in Singapore in August potential training time before the war was spent building fortifications, since
1941. Later during the there was no civilian labour available to perform this task.
campaign, 1,900 Australian
replacements arrived, but these These problems were not just evident in Indian units. British battalions
had to re-train before being had not had sufficient opportunities to conduct field training and had had
assigned to units. (AWM) some of their most experienced personnel drawn off to replace losses in other
theatres. Once in combat, for both Indian and British units, personnel losses
could not be replaced. A similar situation existed in the command staffs
which were manned predominantly by British officers. Specialists were also
short; for example, Indian III Corps did not possess adequate numbers of
communications personnel and had to rely on civil communication during
the campaign. There was also no utilization of combat experience from
other theatres.
The overall state of training in British units was therefore a real factor in
the outcome of the campaign. Training was deficient both at the individual
and unit level. Units were not able to train effectively for jungle conditions
and were not trained to deal with tank attacks. They had no appreciation
of the type of enemy they were going to meet and were simply not combat-
ready. Some units acquired the necessary skills in action; others disintegrated
the first time they were exposed to combat.
The units
The 11th Indian Infantry Division with the 6th and 8th Indian Infantry
Brigades was sent to Malaya in October–November 1940. The 9th Indian
Infantry Division with the 15th and 22nd Indian Infantry Brigades arrived
in Malaya in March–April 1941. The third brigade from this division was
diverted to Iraq to deal with an April rebellion. Neither of these was a fully
trained formation.
The Australian Government authorized the formation of the 8th Australian
Infantry Division on 22 May 1940. The headquarters and three brigades were
18
actually formed in July. Bennett took over in August. In October 1941, the LEFT
division’s other brigade, the 23rd, was taken from it, so the division fought Australians of the 22nd Brigade
the entire Malaya campaign one brigade short. Training was generally up to arrive in Singapore in February
standard, but the infantry battalions did not get a chance to train with their 1942. (AWM)
supporting arms. Training of officers and non-commissioned officers was
uneven and was not helped by command issues generated by the abrasive RIGHT
Bennett. The 22nd Australian Infantry Brigade arrived in Malaya in February Indian reinforcements arrive in
1941 and the 27th Australian Infantry Brigade followed in August. Both Singapore. The state of training
brigades initially lacked a full complement of weapons and other equipment. of these troops was incomplete,
The division’s two artillery battalions were a hotchpotch – one had 3in. but they would soon be thrown
mortars and the other 18-pdrs from World War I. One got its standard 25- against a highly trained enemy.
pdr guns in November 1941 and the other in January 1942. By the start of (Library of Congress)
the campaign, many of the division’s problems had been rectified, and it was
Percival’s most capable division. Later in the campaign, it received 2,000 BELOW
replacements, but these were raw recruits with little training. Australian troops rush to set up
a 3in. mortar. Six of these were
British reinforcements allocated to each battalion, and
The British defence plan rested on the arrival the Japanese had nothing
of reinforcements. During the campaign, comparable at the battalion
reinforcements did arrive, but these were level. It had a range out to
too late and too little to stem the Japanese 2,725 yards. (AWM)
advance. The primary reinforcement was the
18th Infantry Division, which was the only
British division to fight in the campaign. This
unit had an illustrious history in World War I,
and was re-raised in 1939. By September 1941,
when the decision was made to send it to the
Middle East, the division was well trained and
equipped. While at sea, the Japanese opened the
war and the decision was made to re-route the
division to Malaya by way of India. The lead
elements, the 53rd Infantry Brigade Group,
arrived in Singapore on 13 January 1942.
19
LEFT The remainder of the division arrived on 5 February. One of the four
British soldiers with a Vickers ships carrying the bulk of the division was sunk by Japanese aircraft, which
Mk 1 machine gun. This water- accounted for the equipment of the reconnaissance and anti-tank battalions.
cooled weapon was extremely The division was engaged during the final battle for Singapore, but saw only
reliable. However, its weight a few days of action. The division went into captivity having never fought a
made it difficult to move. major action.
(Library of Congress)
The 44th Indian Infantry Brigade was formed on 1 June 1941. Its training
RIGHT was poor, and what training did occur was based on the assumption that
The Short Magazine Lee-Enfield the brigade would be deployed to the Western Desert. The unit arrived in
rifle was one of the outstanding Singapore on 22 January 1942 in its poorly trained and poorly equipped
infantry rifles of the war and status and with an insufficient number of officers.
equipped all British units in
Malaya. Its main strengths were The 45th Indian Infantry Brigade was also created on 1 June 1941 and
firing accuracy, rugged trained for desert combat. It arrived in Singapore on 3 January 1942 and
construction and the ability to was immediately sent into action upon arrival, despite its weak training and
operate under extreme inadequate leadership, and found itself in the path of the Imperial Guards
conditions. It had a ten-round Division on 10 January. In only three days of fighting, its infantry strength
detachable magazine and was was reduced to 1,000 men. On 20 January, the unit’s commander was killed
bolt-operated. (Author’s at a Japanese roadblock and the brigade routed over the course of the next
collection) three days. The brigade was officially disbanded on 1 February 1942.
LEFT British unit organization and weapons
The most numerous British The standard British ground combat unit was the infantry battalion. This
armoured vehicle in Malaya was composed of four infantry companies and a headquarters company with
was the armoured carrier, mortar, machine-gun and anti-tank platoons for a total strength of just over
Universal No. 1, more often 800 men. Heavy weapons were plentiful with some 40 Bren light machine
known as the Bren gun carrier. guns and six 3in. mortars. The standard infantry rifle was the excellent Lee-
Each infantry battalion was
supposed to have 13 in its
carrier platoon, but few had the
full number. This vehicle was
used for a variety of tasks,
including reconnaissance,
towing guns, and as troop
carriers. They were unsuitable
as an armoured personnel
carrier since their armour was
only 10mm at the most, and, in
spite of an armament of a Bren
light machine gun and a Boys
anti-tank rifle, they were also
unsuitable as improvised
armoured fighting vehicles.
(AWM)
RIGHT
The other main British
armoured vehicle used during
the campaign was the
armoured carrier vehicle, Indian
Pattern (ACV-IP). This was
produced in India from 1940–
44, and was issued to the 9th
and 11th Indian divisions, with
the 8th Australian Division also
acquiring some. It used a
standard Ford of GMC truck
chassis, but was protected by
only 14mm of armour. (AWM)
20
Enfield. This organization was the same for British, Indian and Australian LEFT
battalions with only minor differences. From an ambush position, the
2-pdr (40mm) anti-tank was
Three battalions made up a brigade, which when it was full strength able to deal with any Japanese
totalled 2,500 men. Brigades usually fought as brigade groups with the tank in Malaya. Later in the
addition of divisional artillery, anti-tank and anti-aircraft elements. British campaign, these guns took a
and Australian brigades were composed entirely of personnel from their high toll on Japanese armour.
respective nationalities, but Indian brigades were usually composed of two (AWM)
battalions of Indian troops and the third of British. Its officers were mostly
British, with some Indians at the lower levels. RIGHT
These are 25-pdr guns loaded
Despite Percival’s assessment that two armoured regiments were needed on railcars in Singapore for
for the defence of Malaya, the British forces had no tanks during the transport to units in Malaya.
campaign. Available armoured vehicles included Bren carriers, an improvised Each field regiment was
armoured personnel carrier made in India, and various armoured cars. supposed to be equipped with
None of these was suited to taking on Japanese tanks. However, the British 24 of these guns, and, with
were fairly well equipped with anti-tank weapons to counter an armoured three field regiments assigned
threat. The standard 2-pdr anti-tank gun fired a shell that could penetrate to a full-strength division,
up to 49mm of armour at 100 yards, enough to kill any Japanese tank on British divisions had a
the peninsula. A divisional anti-tank regiment contained 48 2-pdrs in four considerable firepower
batteries. British artillery was very good, and the standard divisional 25-pdr advantage over their Japanese
gun with its 13,400yd range was better than any Japanese divisional gun counterparts. (Library of
and could be used successfully in an anti-tank role. Overall, British units Congress)
possessed a firepower advantage, but correspondingly were heavier than
their Japanese counterparts and thus could not move as quickly.
Royal Air Force
The Chiefs of Staff in London estimated that a successful defence of
Malaya would require 336 modern aircraft in 22 squadrons. This was in
great contrast to the thinking of the service commanders in Malaya who
recommended in October 1940 a force of 566 aircraft in 31 squadrons to
contend with simultaneous attacks from the north through Thailand and
amphibious attacks farther south. Air power was key to a successful defence
since the working premise for planning was that a Japanese invasion force
would be reduced by 40 per cent before getting ashore.
In response to persistent pleas to augment British air power in the Far East,
1941 did see a real increase in the RAF’s presence in Malaya. The command
went from four squadrons to 12 with another two being organized. There
was also one squadron from Burma present in Malaya for target practice
21
The Brewster Buffalo Mk 1 when the campaign began. When war broke out there were 14 squadrons
(Model 339) was the mainstay with 215 aircraft.
British fighter in the Far East
until the arrival of the Hurricane The four fighter squadrons had only arrived in 1941 and only three
later in the campaign. It was were considered fully trained. They were equipped with the American-built
inferior to Japanese fighters in Buffalo fighter, which was judged to be unsuited to European combat and
speed, climbing ability and was therefore relegated to the Far East. It was slow and unmanoeuvrable,
manoeuvrability. Its weight did and compared very unfavourably with the fighters in use by both the IJA and
allow it to outdive the lighter IJN. There was a squadron of night fighters equipped with Blenheim aircraft.
Japanese fighters. (Author’s Two light bomber squadrons were equipped with the fairly modern Blenheim
collection) I and IV aircraft. Two reconnaissance squadrons had the Hudson II, which
was also reasonably modern. These four squadrons were a remarkably small
force to cover both strike and reconnaissance roles in and around Malaya. For
These are Buffalos of RAAF 453
Squadron on Sembawang
airfield in November 1941. In
addition to flying an outclassed
aircraft, Buffalo pilots also
lacked combat experience.
(AWM)
22
A Blenheim IV light bomber
arrives in Singapore before the
war for assembly. This was an
improved version with added
armour and an upgraded
engine. The aircraft could carry
1,000lb of internal stores.
Designed as a fast bomber in
1935, its speed provided
insufficient protection in 1941
over Malaya. (Library of
Congress)
maritime strikes, there were two squadrons of Vildebeest torpedo bombers.
These were also relegated to the Far East since they were declared obsolete
in 1940. However, their crews were among the most experienced in Malaya.
In addition to the shortage of modern aircraft, there was a shortage of fully
trained and experienced aircrew. Whatever the shortcoming of his command,
the commanding RAF officer in Malaya, Air Vice-Marshal C. W. H. Pulford,
who arrived in April 1941, was determined to fight an aggressive campaign.
There was also a dedicated air defence command to defend Singapore.
This included a network of six early-warning radars situated in southern
Malaya. However, there was no similar early-warning network set up to
defend the airfields in northern and central Malaya where the majority of
the aircraft were based at the start of the war.
Royal Navy
Though naval power was seen as the key to the defence of Singapore, and
the primary mission of the ground and air forces in the theatre was to
defend the naval base at Singapore, the RN was unable to station significant
forces at Singapore in the period leading up to war. The only naval units
present were three light cruisers dating from World War I for convoy escort
duties and some gunboats for local defence. In addition, there were several
ships (one modern light cruiser and five destroyers) present at the naval
base undergoing repair or refit. The arrival of ‘Force Z’ days before the
start of the war gave the British a force capable of disrupting Japanese naval
communications in the South China Sea, but this threat was short lived as
will soon be detailed. Once Force Z was eliminated, the RN ceased to be a
factor in the campaign.
23
Order of battle 2nd Heavy Anti-aircraft Regiment (Hong Kong Singapore Royal
Artillery (HKSRA) (11 3.7in., four 3in. guns)
THE BRITISH EMPIRE
3rd Heavy Anti-aircraft Regiment (Royal Artillery) (nine 3.7in.
MALAYA COMMAND (LT. GEN. PERCIVAL) guns)
Indian III Corps (Lt. Gen. Heath)
9th Indian Infantry Division (Maj. Gen. Barstow) 1st Heavy Anti-aircraft Regiment (Indian Army) (16 3in.,
26 40mm guns)
5th Field Regiment (16 4.5in. howitzers)
88th Field Regiment (24 25-pdr guns) 3rd Light Anti-aircraft Regiment HKSRA seven 40mm guns
80th Anti-tank Regiment (two batteries) (about 18 2-pdr Three battalions Straits Settlement Volunteer Force
12th Indian Infantry Brigade (122nd Field Regiment (24 25-pdr
guns)
8th Indian Infantry Brigade (three infantry battalions; two guns) and three infantry battalions)
Major Reinforcements
Indian State Forces infantry battalions attached for 45th Indian Infantry Brigade (three infantry battalions)
airfield defence) 44th Indian Infantry Brigade (5th Field Regiment (about ten
22nd Indian Infantry Brigade (three infantry battalions)
11th Indian Infantry Division (Maj. Gen Murray-Lyon) 4.5in. howitzers), one anti-tank battery (about ten 2-pdr
3rd Cavalry (-) guns), one company machine gun, three infantry battalions)
137th Field Regiment (24 25-pdr guns) 18th Infantry Division
155th Field Regiment (eight 18-pdr guns, eight 4.5in. 53rd Infantry Brigade (three infantry battalions)
howitzers) 54th Infantry Brigade (three infantry battalions)
80th Anti-tank Regiment (less two batteries; about 18 55th Infantry Brigade (three infantry battalions)
2-pdr guns) 118th Field Regiment (24 25-pdr guns)
6th Indian Infantry Brigade (22nd Mountain Regiment 135th Field Regiment (ten 25-pdr guns, eight 18-pdr guns)
(three 18-pdr guns, ten 3.7in. howitzers) plus three 148th Field Regiment (24 25-pdr guns)
infantry battalions) 125th Anti-tank Regiment (36 2-pdr guns)
15th Indian Infantry Brigade (four infantry battalions) One reconnaissance battalion
28th Indian Infantry Brigade (corps reserve) (three infantry Divisional engineers
battalions) 2/4th Australian Machine Gun Battalion
Penang Fortress
11th Coastal Regiment (four 6in. guns) ROYAL AIR FORCE (AIR VICE-MARSHAL CONWAY
One infantry battalion WALTER HEATH PULFORD)
Airfield Defence Troops
Four Malay States Volunteer Force infantry battalions The following squadrons were assigned to RAF Far East Command. 60 Squadron
8th Australian Infantry Division (Maj. Gen. Bennett) was on detachment from Burma for target practice. Total operational strength
2/10th Field Regiment (12 18-pdr guns, six 4.5in. howitzers) was 155 aircraft with 88 aircraft in reserve.
2/15th Field Regiment (3in. mortars; equipping with 18- and
25-pdr guns) Squadron Airfield Aircraft type and number
2/4th Anti-tank Regiment (12 2-pdr and 24 75mm guns) Ten Hudson II
22nd Australian Infantry Brigade (three infantry battalions) 1 (Australian) Kota Bharu reconnaissance/bombers
27th Australian Infantry Brigade (three infantry battalions) 12 Hudson II
Singapore Fortress (Maj. Gen. Simmons) 8 (Australian) Kuantan reconnaissance/bombers
1st Malaya Infantry Brigade (two infantry battalions) 12 Buffalo fighters
2nd Malaya Infantry Brigade (three infantry battalions) 21 (Australian) Sungei Patani 2 Blenheim IF night fighters
7th Coastal Regiment (two 15in. guns, three 9.2in. guns, ten 6in. 27 Sungei Patani 17 Blenheim IV bombers
guns, one 18-pdr gun, six 12-pdr, two twin 6-pdr) 34 Tengah 12 Vildebeest torpedo
9th Coastal Regiment (three 15in., two 9.2in., eight 6in., two 18- bombers
pdr, three 12-pdr, six twin 6-pdr guns) 36 Gong Kedah Eight Blenheim I bombers
16th Defence Regiment (two batteries 18-pdr and one battery 18 Blenheim I bombers
2-pdr coastal defence guns) 60 Kuantan 14 Vildebeest and six
1st Heavy Anti-aircraft Regiment (Hong Kong Singapore Royal 62 Alor Star Beaufort torpedo bombers
Artillery) (eight 3.7in., two 3in., eight 40mm guns) Five Catalina flying boats
100 Seletar
17 Buffalo fighters
205 Seletar
243 (New Kallang 18 Buffalo fighters
Zealand) Sembawang
453 17 Buffalo fighters
(Australian) Kallang
488 (New
Zealand)
24
ROYAL NAVY Light cruisers: Danae, Dragon, Durban
Eastern Fleet (Admiral Sir Tom Phillips; succeeded by Vice- Destroyers: Electra, Express, Tenedos, Vampire (Royal
Admiral Sir Geoffrey Layton on 10 December 1941) Australian Navy (RAN)); Scout and Thanet from Hong Kong
Battleship: Prince of Wales Armed merchant cruisers: Manoora (RAN), Kanimbla (Royal
Battlecruiser: Repulse New Zealand Navy)
THE JAPANESE EMPIRE
The Imperial Japanese Army
Of the Japanese forces, the force that the IJA fielded to execute the Malaya
campaign was the best led, among the best trained and certainly the best
equipped and supported of the entire Pacific War. Though outnumbered by the
British forces, the IJA fielded a large force supported by what was in Japanese
terms a lavish amount of armour, artillery and engineer support. Additionally,
the IJA’s doctrinal emphasis on attack made it well matched for Yamashita’s
plans for the Malaya operation. The ability of the IJA to operate with minimal
logistical support was also on display during the campaign. It was also a
supremely confident force since it rated the fighting capabilities of the British
units to be very poor, particularly the Indian units. Just like in China where IJA
units routinely routed much larger Chinese forces, the IJA expected the Malaya
campaign to display again how a smaller force endowed with superior morale
and tactics could defeat a larger force with inferior battle instincts.
The IJA was built around its highly trained and motivated infantry.
Essentially, the IJA substituted fighting spirit for firepower. This had worked
well against the Chinese since 1937, but the Japanese expected that it would
be severely tested against British forces. Against the British, the IJA’s highly
developed infantry tactics were key since they emphasized the importance
of spirit and its ability to defeat lesser-motivated Allied forces. Night tactics
were especially important, as this would magnify the Japanese desire to fight
at close quarters and the IJA’s morale advantage. The IJA did possess major
weaknesses, particularly in logistics and intelligence, but these could be
minimized if the Japanese were able to maintain the initiative and not allow
British forces to establish a firm defence.
Japanese tactics
The IJA’s lack of firepower was reflected in its amphibious doctrine.
Substituting firepower were surprise and concealment. If possible, the IJA
preferred to launch landings in darkness. Unlike the common practice in
Allied landings, the Japanese did not rely on prolonged bombardment of
enemy shore defences. Instead of landing into the teeth of a defence, the
Japanese emphasized landings to outflank enemy defences. If defences
were strong, commanders were encouraged to seek another landing site. To
confuse the enemy, landings could be conducted at widely separated sites.
Once ashore, forces were expected to press inland as quickly as possible
rather than consolidate the beachhead.
Between 1937 and 1941 in China, the Japanese conducted 16 multi-
battalion landings, so the IJA had considerable experience in such operations
and had trained units for them. The 5th and 18th Divisions were among
the units amphibiously trained. In spite of these successful experiences, the
conduct of an amphibious operation on Malaya was expected to be difficult.
On the operational level, this explains the Japanese plan to land on uncontested
25
sites in southern Thailand instead of locations along the eastern coast of
Malaya, which the Japanese believed were fortified. Had the British executed
Operation Matador and beaten the Japanese to the landing sites in southern
Thailand, the Japanese would have had problems overcoming the defences,
especially since rough weather made even the unopposed landings difficult.
Once ashore, IJA tactics emphasized speed and the power of the attack.
The IJA preferred to close with its enemy as quickly as possible since close
combat maximized the impact of superior Japanese fighting spirit and
minimized Allied firepower. The preferred type of attack was either a single
envelopment to one flank, or a double envelopment to both flanks in concert
with pressure on the enemy’s front. This tactic, and the tactic of encirclement
that called for a deeper thrust to cut the enemy off from his rear, worked well
against the road-bound British forces in Malaya. During the campaign, the
Japanese would conduct enveloping movement several miles deep and then
establish battalion-sized roadblocks.
When a frontal attack was necessary, infiltration would locate weak
spots that the main attack could exploit. If available, tanks were brought up.
The goal was to penetrate the enemy’s rear to attack his command facilities,
artillery and reserves. Usually, artillery preparation and support were
minimal, so the attack was supported by battalion and regimental weapons.
As a matter of course, the Japanese preferred hasty attacks, even against
larger enemy forces in defensive positions. This reflected a combination of
wanting to annihilate the enemy as quickly as possible, overconfidence, and
lack of time or desire to perform full reconnaissance. Against poorly trained
or ill-prepared troops, these tactics often succeeded.
The traditional IJA reliance on an infantry-heavy force was modified for
the Malaya campaign. In order for the campaign to be quickly and successfully
completed, given the distance from the main landing areas to the ultimate
objective of Singapore, the 25th Army received extensive supporting units.
The 5th Division was motorized with 860 trucks and the Imperial Guards
Division received 660. The 18th Division still relied on horse-drawn transport.
Most impressively, the 25th Army received three tank regiments with a total
of 160 light and medium tanks. These were important to enable the pace
of the advance to be maintained and were to be employed against British
defences that could not be readily outflanked. Several independent artillery
units were also allocated to the 25th Army. It was expected that these would
be crucial when the Japanese attempted to make the assault on Singapore.
Engineering support was also provided in the form of several independent
engineer regiments and units equipped to repair bridges and conduct assault
landings. These were expected to play a key role since they were responsible
for building or repairing bridges over the many rivers on the road to Singapore.
Japanese weapons
IJA weapons were of mixed quality. Individual weapons were rugged and
were comparable with those used by the British. The Arisaka 6.5mm Type 38
and 7.7mm Type 99 rifles were reliable bolt-action rifles. The infantry squad
was built around the 6.5mm Type 96 light machine gun, which was supported
at the battalion level by the 7.7mm Type 92 machine gun. It could maintain a
high rate of fire and proved reliable in service. Present in every IJA company
were nine 5cm Type 89 heavy grenade dischargers. These were effectively
employed on the attack or defence and took the place of mortars. Providing
26
direct or indirect fire support was the Type 92 70mm battalion gun.
The field artillery regiment of an IJA infantry division consisted of 2,100 men
and 36 guns. The 18th Division was equipped with 36 75mm mountain guns.
The 5th Division was equipped with two battalions of 24 75mm field guns and
a single 12-gun battalion of 100mm weapons. This was also the organization
of the Imperial Guards Division artillery regiment. Unlike most campaigns
against the Allies during the Pacific War, Japanese artillery was well supplied
with ammunition and was able to play a significant role during the campaign.
Japanese tanks
The IJA did not have a well-developed doctrine on the use of tanks. They
were viewed as infantry support weapons, and not a weapon to be employed
in mass. In spite of this, the finest moments of the IJA’s tank arm were
recorded during the Malaya campaign.
The 25th Army received a large armour contingent. Unlike the British,
who believed that the many bridges in Malaya would not support the weight
of tanks, the Japanese correctly assessed that tanks would be valuable in
Malaya. Three tank regiments were assigned to the 3rd Tank Group. The 1st
and 6th Regiments each had 20 Type 95 light tanks and 37 Type 97 medium
tanks. The 14th Tank Regiment had 45 Type 95 light tanks for a total of
85 light and 74 medium tanks. In addition, there were small numbers of
tankettes assigned to the reconnaissance regiments of the infantry divisions.
By the standards of 1941, the IJA’s medium tank, the Type 97, compared well
with Western designs. It mounted a low-velocity 57mm gun and two machine
guns but had only 28mm of frontal hull armour and 50mm on the gun mantlet.
This meant that the British 2-pdr anti-tank gun could penetrate it at normal
battle ranges displayed during the campaign. However, the tank was reliable
and weighed only 15 tons, which meant that it could cross available bridges. The
Type 95 light tank weighed 10 tons, and carried a 3.7cm gun and two machine
guns. The tankettes were the Type 92, which weighed 3.4 tons and mounted a
single machine gun. They were suitable for reconnaissance, but not for combat.
The units
The 25th Army had four divisions assigned to undertake the conquest of
Malaya and Singapore. Since this was a high percentage of the 11 divisions
the IJA dedicated to operations in the southern areas, this was indicative of the
importance attached to taking Singapore. However, Yamashita decided to leave
one of his divisions, the 56th, in Japan so he could better support his other
three divisions. The 56th Division was later assigned to operations in Burma.
The 5th Division was to act as the main force for the initial phase of the
campaign. This was one of the oldest units in the IJA, having been established
in 1873. At the start of the Pacific War, it retained its ‘square’ organization,
meaning that it had two infantry brigade group headquarters (the 9th and
21st), each with two regiments (the 11th and 41st assigned to the 9th Brigade
and the 21st and 42nd assigned to the 21st Brigade). The Japanese preferred
these large units because of the flexibility provided by the command staffs of
the brigades, particularly if the unit was tasked with operating in disparate
areas. Another key unit was the division reconnaissance unit, which had a
small number of tankettes. The 5th Division was tailored for the Malaya
operation since it was motorized and trained for amphibious operations.
It also had a considerable degree of combat experience as it had fought in
27
China from 1937 until September 1940 when it was moved to Hainan Island
where it conducted training for operations in Malaya.
The 18th Division dated back to 1905 and also had extensive combat
experience from November 1937 until 1941. It was also a square division,
but one of its brigade headquarters, the 35th, was detached along with the
124th Infantry Regiment to conduct the invasion of northern Borneo. This
brigade went on to fight on Mindanao and was then sent to Guadalcanal
to launch the September offensive there against US Marine defenders. This
left the 23rd Infantry Brigade with the 55th and 56th Infantry Regiments
and the 114th Infantry Regiment for operations in Malaya. The division
also possessed a reconnaissance unit with small amounts of armour and an
artillery regiment with 36 75mm mountain guns.
The last unit to join the 25th Army was the Guards Division. This division
had an infantry and artillery group headquarters which controlled the three
infantry regiments (3rd, 4th and 5th Guards) and the 2nd Guards Field
Artillery Regiment with 24 75mm field guns and a battalion of 12 105mm
howitzers. There was also an organic reconnaissance regiment with 600
men. In 1940, elements of the division were sent to China where they gained
combat experience. The division was re-formed in China and then sent to
Indo-China in 1941 and later Thailand to enforce Japanese rule in those
areas. Despite the fact that the division was manned by conscripts selected
from all over Japan to meet high physical standards, the division was trained
for ceremonial duties and had no real combat experience. Tsuji went as far
as to call the division unsuited to field operations. During the battle, the unit
performed well enough, but it was the least effective of Yamashita’s divisions.
Imperial Japanese Army Air Force
The attack on Singapore was supported by the IJA’s 3rd Air Division. This
formation was broken down into three air brigades each with two to four air
regiments with a mix of fighter and bomber units. Fighter regiments were up
to 48 aircraft organized into three squadrons of 16 aircraft. These included the
Ki-27 ‘Nate’ with its fixed landing gear, which was highly manoeuvrable but
lightly armed, and the Ki-43 ‘Oscar’, which followed in the same vein, being
extremely manoeuvrable but armed with only two 12.7mm machine guns.
The Oscar was superior to the Buffalo and comparable with the Hurricane,
which arrived later in the campaign.
Bomber regiments were normally composed of 27 aircraft divided into
three squadrons of nine aircraft. The Ki-48 ‘Lily’ was a mediocre light bomber
with a payload of only 880lb, a poor defensive armament and above-average
speed. It was comparable with the British Blenheim. The Ki-21 ‘Sally’ was
a heavy bomber with the range to strike Singapore from bases in southern
Indo-China with its 2,200lb payload.
Japanese air power played a major role in the battle, but not a decisive
one. Once the Japanese air force gained air superiority, it turned its attention
to supporting the ground offensive. The IJA Air Force did not conduct true
ground support in the immediate proximity of its own troops, but its constant
pre-planned raids against British headquarters, artillery positions and along
roads contributed greatly to demoralizing British troops. With a total of 350
aircraft, it could have had a greater impact on the campaign than it did. For
example, interdiction of the main road in eastern Malaya was ineffectual and
allowed the British to conduct a retreat largely unmolested.
28
Imperial Japanese Navy The Mitsubishi G4M1 Navy Type
For the First Stage Operations of the Pacific War, the 1 Attack Bomber (later in the
Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) was responsible for war given the Allied codename
conducting operations over a vast area of the Pacific ‘Betty’) was a long-range
Ocean. The southern thrust was a very high priority so it bomber capable of level or
was allocated a sizeable chunk of the IJN’s most powerful torpedo bombing. It had no
units. The carrier force was required for the Hawaiian counterpart in the RN, and its
operation, so in its place the Southern Force received a capabilities were unknown to
large land-based air force. Based in southern Indo-China, the British at the start of the
these aircraft had the range to hit Singapore and to cover war. These aircraft sank Repulse
the South China Sea. After the British sent a naval force and gave the coup de grâce to
to Singapore, the importance of the IJN’s land-based air Prince of Wales on 10 December.
force was magnified. These aircraft were drawn from (NARA)
the 21st and 22nd Air Flotillas and totalled 99 bombers.
These were the long-range G3M ‘Nell’ and G4M ‘Betty’
bombers, which were capable of level bombing of land and
naval targets and conducting torpedo attacks against naval
units. The aircrews of these units were very proficient in
attacks against naval units as would be quickly shown in
the campaign. In addition to the bombers, there were 25
A6M Mitsubishi ‘Zero’ fighters, which were superior to
any fighter aircraft available to the British.
The IJN’s surface force for the southern area offensive
was built around its force of powerful heavy cruisers. The
IJN’s battleships were mostly retained in home waters for the anticipated
decisive battle against the US Navy. The exception was the four fast
battleships of the Kongo class; two were assigned to the carrier force and
the other two were assigned to the southern operation to support either the
attack on Malaya or the Philippines. These had been modernized before the
war, but were inferior to Prince of Wales. If forced to engage an RN force
with capital ships, the IJN preferred to do so at night. This was when the
Japanese could employ a large force of heavy cruisers and almost 30 fleet
destroyers, which embarked a large number of torpedoes. The seven heavy
cruisers assigned to the southern operation were probably the most powerful
in the world in 1941. Japanese destroyers were also formidable offensive
platforms with many carrying nine torpedo tubes with reloads. During the
campaign, the IJN successfully performed its mission of escorting convoys to
Malaya and Thailand, and was never seriously challenged by Allied forces.
Order of battle
IMPERIAL JAPANESE ARMY 5th Engineer Regiment
25th Army (Lt. Gen. Yamashita) 5th Transport Regiment
5th Division (Mechanized) (Lt. Gen. Matsui Takuro) Signal, ordnance and medical units
9th Infantry Brigade (Maj. Gen. Kawamura Saburo) Total: 15, 342 men and 1,008 vehicles
18th Division (Lt. Gen. Mutaguchi Renya)
11th Infantry Regiment (three battalions) 35th Infantry Brigade (Maj. Gen. Kawaguchi Kiyotaki) (detached)
41st Infantry Regiment (three battalions)
21st Infantry Brigade (Maj. Gen. Sugiura Eikichi) 114th Infantry Regiment (three battalions)
21st Infantry Regiment (three battalions) 124th Infantry Regiment (three battalions) (detached)
42nd Infantry Regiment (three battalions) 23rd Infantry Brigade (Maj. Gen. Takumi Hiroshi)
5th Reconnaissance Regiment 55th Infantry Regiment (three battalions)
5th Field Artillery Regiment 56th Infantry Regiment (three battalions)
29
22nd Reconnaissance Regiment IMPERIAL JAPANESE ARMY AIR FORCE
18th Mountain Artillery Regiment
12th Engineer Regiment 3rd Air Division (Lt. Gen. Sugawara Michiyo)
12th Transport Regiment
Signal, ordnance and medical units 3rd Air Brigade
Total: 22,206 men, 33 vehicles and 5,707 horses
Imperial Guards Division (Mechanized) (Lt. Gen. Nishimura Takuma) 59th Regiment (fighters) 21 Ki-43, 3 Ki-27
Guards Infantry Group Headquarters
27th Regiment (reconnaissance) 28 Ki-51
3rd Guards Regiment (three battalions)
4th Guards Regiment (three battalions) 75th Regiment (light bombers) 25 Ki-48
5th Guards Regiment (three battalions; only one was
90th Regiment (light bombers) 23 Ki-48
employed in Malaya)
Guards Reconnaissance Regiment 7th Air Brigade
Guards Field Artillery Regiment
Guards Engineer Regiment 64th Regiment (fighters) 35 Ki-43, 6 Ki-27
Guards Transport Regiment
Signal, ordnance and medical units 12th Regiment (heavy bombers) 21 Ki-21
Total: 12,649 men and 914 vehicles
Army troops 60th Regiment (heavy bombers) 39 Ki-21
3rd Tank Group
1st Tank Regiment 98th Regiment (heavy bombers) 42 Ki-21
6th Tank Regiment
14th Tank Regiment 10th Air Brigade
1st Independent Anti-tank Battalion
Eight independent anti-tank companies 77th Regiment (fighters) 27 Ki-27
3rd Independent Mountain Artillery Regiment
3rd Heavy Field Artillery Regiment 31st Regiment (reconnaissance) 24 Ki-30
18th Heavy Field Artillery Regiment
21st Heavy Field Artillery Battalion 62nd Regiment (heavy bombers) 22 Ki-21
3rd Trench Mortar Battalion
5th Trench Mortar Battalion 70th Independent Squadron (reconnaissance) Eight Ki-15
14th Independent Mortar Battalion
17th Field Air Defence Unit (four battalions) 12th Air Brigade
Three independent anti-aircraft companies
4th Independent Engineer Regiment 1st Regiment (fighters) 42 Ki-27
15th Independent Engineer Regiment
23rd Independent Engineer Regiment 11th Regiment (fighters) 39 Ki-27
5th Independent Heavy Bridging Company
21st Bridging Material Company 15th Independent Squadron (reconnaissance) 11 Ki-15/Ki-46
22nd Bridging Material Company
27th Bridging Material Company 81st Regiment (reconnaissance) Seven Ki-46, nine Ki-15
10th River Crossing Material Company
15th River Crossing Material Company IMPERIAL JAPANESE NAVY
21st River Crossing Company
2nd Field Military Police Unit Southern Force (Vice-Admiral Kondo Nobutake)
2nd Railway Unit
25th Army Signal Units Main Body (Kondo)
Total 88,689 men, 4,325 vehicles and 10,442 horses
Various lines of communications, transport, construction and Squadron 3, Section 2
medical units totalling 36,719 men, 2,995 vehicles and Battleships Kongo and Haruna
1,740 horses
Squadron 4, Section 1
Heavy Cruisers Atago (flagship) and Takao
Destroyer Divisions 4, 6 and 8
Ten destroyers
Malaya Seizure Force (Vice-Admiral Ozawa Jisaburo)
Main Body
Heavy cruiser Chokai (flagship)
One destroyer
Escort Force
Squadron 7
Heavy cruisers Kumano, Suzuya, Mogami, Mikuma
Destroyer Squadron 3
Light cruiser Sendai
16 destroyers
Air Forces
22nd Air Flotilla
Mihoro Air Group 36 G3M
Genzan Air Group 36 G3M
Kanoya Air Group (detachment) 27 G4M
Attached: 25 A6M fighters
12 A5M fighters
6 C5M reconnaissance aircraft
Totals: 37 fighters, 99 bombers, 6 reconnaissance aircraft
30
OPPOSING PLANS
THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT
Both the British and Japanese considered Malaya and Singapore as
strategically inseparable. Singapore could not be held if Malaya was lost.
Both also agreed that the only viable method of capturing Singapore was
overland. This meant an advance down the length of Malaya. Both also saw
the role of air power as potentially decisive.
The area that the campaign was fought over was expansive. The Malayan
Peninsula is over 400 miles long from southern Thailand where the Japanese
initially landed to the southern tip of the peninsula where Singapore is
separated from the mainland by the narrow Strait of Johore. The peninsula
varies in width from 60 to 200 miles. Actual operations were restricted to the
coastal plains since the centre of the peninsula was covered by a mountain
range, which starts at 7,000ft in the north and runs down to 3,000ft in
the south.
Australian troops moving along
a road in Malaya. British
formations were motorized
which made them road bound.
In some areas of Malaya, as
shown here, it is easy to see
how adjoining jungle or
plantation could dominate the
roads. (AWM)
31
The coastal areas were also subject to considerable terrain difficulties.
North–south movement was impeded by many fast-flowing rivers and
streams, which run from the central mountains into the sea. On the west
coast, the coastal plain included mudflats and mangrove swamps; on the
east coast, mangrove swamps populated the mouths of the rivers. The most
significant factor was the dense jungle, which originally covered the entire
peninsula. On the west coast and in the southern part of the peninsula called
Johore, this jungle had been partly cleared for cultivation. The east coast
was covered by primeval jungle. Ameliorating the terrain conditions was
an extensive road system. These were concentrated on the west coast and
in Johore. Roads on the east coast were few, and there were only two roads
connecting the east and west coasts.
Weather conditions were also a factor. Being near the equator, the climate
was and still is hot and humid. Typically, new troops needed a period of
adjustment to be fully effective. Rainfall was heavy and often included
violent afternoon thunderstorms with heavy clouds that extended from 300ft
up to as far as 30,000ft and were a serious impediment to flying. The biggest
factors were the two monsoon seasons per year. The worst of the two ran
from November to March, which created winds and a swell along the east
coast of Malaya. The accompanying rains made off-road movement on the
eastern part of the peninsula difficult.
BRITISH DEFENCE PLANS
British strategic planners were facing difficulties on every front in 1941. The
German invasion of Russia in June and the resulting decision to send large
numbers of tanks and aircraft to Britain’s newest ally meant there was even less
available for Malaya. In addition to the sheer unavailability of enough troops
and weapons to cover all of Britain’s defence requirements, there were further
problems, which lessened the prospect for a successful defence of Malaya.
The British, as forcefully advocated by Churchill, believed that the
Japanese would not attack in the Far East since it would mean going to war
with the United States. As we have already seen, the Japanese were determined
to go to war, even if this meant attacking both Britain and the United States.
This rendered Churchill’s assessment that it was more important to send
forces to the Mediterranean instead of sending them to the Far East, where
they would sit idle, totally inaccurate. Finally, Churchill believed that as long
as the fortress of Singapore and its immediate approaches were held that this
would be sufficient. This rested on the assumption that Singapore was in fact
a fortress and overlooked the vulnerability of the naval base and any fleet
based there to air attack.
The British Chiefs of Staff concurred with the pre-war assessment that
the only way to hold Singapore was to hold Malaya. All plans to defend
Singapore depended on keeping the naval base open for the arrival of the
fleet. In order to do this, Malaya had to be held to provide the required
strategic depth. To hold Malaya, much larger ground and naval forces had
to be allocated to the Far East. Not only were these unavailable, but it was
also impossible for the Royal Navy to assemble a large, balanced force in late
1941 for operations in the Far East. Thus, the entire British defence scheme
was nothing but a house of cards.
32
This disconnect had implications for all aspects of British defence
planning. A further problem was the inability of the services to coordinate
their planning properly. For example, the RAF had built its primary bases in
northern Malaya and along the east coast in order to extend its range against
a Japanese invasion force. The problem was that these were the most likely
areas for a Japanese invasion and that the army did not possess the means
to defend them. In 1937–38, then Lt. Col. Percival revised the plan to defend
Singapore. His goal was to keep the Japanese as far as possible from the
naval base for as long as possible. The real fear was that the Japanese could
establish airbases in Malaya and then use them to isolate Singapore. At a
minimum, Percival wanted to establish a defensive line some 30 miles north
of the naval base to keep it out of artillery range. Given what was available to
the army, this was all that could be readily achieved. But the RAF demanded
that their airbases in the northern and eastern parts of Malaya be defended.
The RAF got its way; if the fleet would not arrive in a timely manner, then
air power seemed the best way to defeat a Japanese landing force.
The expansion of Malaya Command gave Percival a chance to implement
the plan to defend forward. In May 1941, Indian III Corps was established
and given the mission to defend northern and central Malaya. To do this, it
had five Indian infantry brigades. The defence of Johore was given to 8th
Australian Infantry Division. Two brigades were assigned to the Singapore
Fortress. A single Indian brigade was held in reserve.
Operation Matador
In an effort to defeat a Japanese invasion before it could get established,
the Commander-in-Chief Far East proposed a plan to move into southern
Thailand to establish defensive positions at Singora and Patani before the
Japanese could land. This ambitious plan was codenamed Operation Matador.
This offered real prospects to disrupt the Japanese plan since the only port of
any consequence in the area was Singora and without it the Japanese would
have to advance south from Bangkok or conduct a riskier amphibious attack
at Kota Bharu. The plan was sent to London in August 1941 for approval.
The problem was that it violated the territory of a neutral country, and
London did not want to approve it for fear it would present the Americans
with political problems that might reduce the possibility of their coming to the
aid of Britain in the Far East. For the plan to have a chance of being successful,
the local commander had to have authority to initiate the operation as soon
as the Japanese invasion force was spotted at sea. There would be no time
to get approval from London. The plan was not approved until 5 December
1941, but only with important conditions attached. Since these did not grant
automatic approval for Brooke-Popham, the plan was essentially dead. The
11th Indian Infantry Division was charged with the execution of Matador,
and consequently did not finish preparing defensive positions at Jitra. These
had immediate consequences in the first few days of the campaign.
Percival was forced to spread his forces out. The 11th Indian Infantry
Division was positioned in north-western Malaya, which contained the
roads leading from the likely invasion points in Thailand. This division had
only two brigades, meaning it had no reserves. The Indian III Corps’s other
division, the 9th Indian Infantry Division, also had only two brigades. These
were deployed on the east coast to defend the airfields at Kota Bharu and
Kuantan. Neither of the brigades could support the other, and neither of
33
Indian troops marching along a the divisions could support the other. The only corps reserve was a single
road in western Malaya. As can brigade. This deployment opened the units of Indian III Corps to defeat in
be seen in this photo, the detail. Adding to the danger was the fact that no defensive positions existed,
conditions of the roads were Percival having rejected a proposal from his chief engineer, Brig. Ivan Simson,
excellent. (Author’s collection) to build a countrywide system of defences.
British plans – an evaluation
The British were not unaware of the threat posed by the Japanese and had
deduced the broad outlines of the Japanese plan. Nevertheless, they were
surprised by the timing and intent of the Japanese plan. They did not believe that
the Japanese would attack during monsoon season and hoped that the arrival of
Force Z would give the Japanese additional reason for pause. To execute the type
of offensive required to clear Malaya quickly and capture Singapore, the British
believed the Japanese needed a force much larger than what was available.
Most of all, the British failed to foresee the kind of campaign the Japanese were
planning to fight. The Japanese ‘driving strategy’ was predicated on running a
major offensive on a logistical shoestring, something the British were unprepared
to do and could not see the Japanese risking. At worst, if the Japanese did attack
and get a major force ashore, it could not advance far and fast enough to threaten
Singapore before the British could bring in reinforcements.
To say the British plan to defend Malaya was unrealistic would be
charitable. The basic premise was to defend the naval base, but the RN did
not have the ships to send there and did not plan to use it. In order to defend
the navy base, the RAF had built airbases in northern and eastern Malaya,
but these were equipped with few aircraft with marginal capabilities. The
army was forced to defend these bases, but in so doing became overstretched
and open to defeat in detail. The notion of a fortress which could be held in
spite of all difficulties was impossible against an enemy with control of the
air and sea. The stage was set for Britain’s greatest military disaster.
34
THE JAPANESE PLAN
The attack into Malaya was one aspect of a much larger Japanese offensive to
open the war. The most important operation in the first phase was the attack
on the United States Pacific Fleet in Hawaii. Another critical requirement was
the capture of Singapore before the British could reinforce it. Once captured,
the entire Allied defence of Southeast Asia would be fatally compromised.
The IJN devoted large escort forces to support the invasion convoys bound
for Malaya. Most of the air power for the Malaya operation was provided
by the IJA. Ground troops were limited since only 11 divisions could be
allocated to the Philippines, Malaya and the Dutch East Indies invasions. This
meant that the Japanese were actually outnumbered on the ground, and that
the operations had to be conducted with speed before Allied reinforcements
could arrive.
One of the myths of the campaign is that the Japanese had planned and
trained extensively for the attack. Though contingency plans against the
British had been prepared as early as 1936, serious planning began only in
1941. Preceding attack planning was the IJA’s establishment of a unit on
Taiwan in December 1940 to work on a doctrine for jungle warfare. The
work of this 30-man unit was later published as a 70-page manual called
Read This Alone – And the War Can Be Won and issued to all members of
the invasion force. The new doctrine went far in making the jungle an asset
for the Japanese. It was also the basis for a series of exercises on Taiwan and
Hainan Island in southern China which tested problems like transporting
units in as few ships as possible, making an opposed beach landing in difficult
weather, the use of bicycles to speed the advance, and employing combined
arms in jungle terrain.
Not until 25 August was the 25th Army ordered to prepare a campaign
plan for the attack on Malaya. As was usual for the IJA, the plan depended
on the enemy acting according to the Japanese script and showed an utter
contempt for his capabilities. Fortunately for the Japanese, both were
accurate assessments. The 25th Army completed its Operational Outline
on 3 November. Yamashita was appointed to command the operation on
6 November, and on 10 November an agreement was reached between the
army and the navy for the conduct of the campaign.
In broad terms, the plan called for a landing at several points in northern
Malaya and southern Thailand, followed by an advance through Malaya
along the western coastal plain until the final assault across the Strait of
Johore onto Singapore Island. The 5th Division was slated to make the initial
attack by seizing Singora and Patani in southern Thailand. The problems of
landing in Thailand were lessened since the Japanese knew the Thais would
not put up a defence and that the British would not advance into Thailand.
The quick seizure of the ports would allow the Japanese to get ashore quickly
and nearby airfields would allow the 3rd Air Division to establish bases.
Once ashore, the 5th Division would advance into Malaya with the 9th
Infantry Brigade using the Singora–Alor Star road and the 42nd Infantry
Regiment assigned to the Patani–Kroh road. The initial objective was the line
of the Perak River where additional airfields were to be captured. After 23
December, the advance on Kuala Lumpur would begin.
More risky was the planned attack at Kota Bharu just south of the Thai
border in north-eastern Malaya. This landing was assigned to the 56th
35
Infantry Regiment of the 18th Division. It offered the benefit of protecting
the main landing from air attack by seizing three nearby airfields. The other
elements of the 18th Division, less one regiment and a brigade headquarters,
which were allocated to attack northern Borneo, were to land at Singora
and Patani early in January with the rest of the 25th Army to reinforce the
attack on Singapore.
The Imperial Guards Division was ordered to move into Bangkok from
Cambodia to establish Japanese control, and then join the advance through
Malaya. The lead unit of the division, the 4th Guards Regiment, was to
move by rail and arrive in the Taiping–Ipoh area by 23 December. The rest of
the division would follow as soon as possible. Yamashita’s last division, the
56th, was not even included in the operation. Yamashita decided to leave it
in Japan so he could use his available shipping to move supplies to keep his
advance going. Thus, of the 42 infantry battalions in the 25th Army, only 28
were actually used during the campaign.
The final plan was approved on 23 November. Yamashita had been
convinced, if he needed convincing, that it was better to risk supply problems
rather than to pause after landing to build up his forces. Now, the 5th Division
would advance to the left bank of the Perak River as quickly as possible
to create conditions for the continued advance into Malaya. The Imperial
Guards Division would be employed as a follow-up force, and brought into
action in an amphibious landing on the east coast of Malaya. This ‘driving
strategy’ as coined by Yamashita would result in the destruction of British
forces in Malaya before they could retreat to Singapore.
To maintain the speed of the advance, the infantry would advance along
the roads until contact was made, then the Japanese would move through the
adjoining jungle or plantations to encircle the enemy. Once the enemy was
flanked, the Japanese would set up roadblocks to complete the encirclement.
Only if an enemy position could not be flanked would a frontal assault be
attempted. This is where the tanks would come in, which the 25th Army had
a plentiful supply of.
Japanese plans – an evaluation
The Japanese plan to invade Malaya and seize Singapore was audacious,
almost to the point of recklessness. Yamashita was faced with taking a fairly
small force, with an overstretched shipping capacity, to advance down 400
miles of jungle road against a larger force which had had time to prepare
formidable defences. At the end of this advance, the Japanese were still
faced with the problem of attacking across a major water obstacle to seize
a well-defended fortress. Yet, this plan was a brilliant success. Both at an
operational and tactical level, the Japanese were continually able to gain
surprise. Their ‘driving strategy’ kept the British off balance and kept the
initiative in Japanese hands. It worked primarily because the British thought
it impossible even to attempt. Under the bold leadership of Yamashita, it was
a formula for victory.
36
THE BATTLE
THE JAPANESE LANDINGS
A 19-ship convoy carrying elements of the 5th Division departed Hainan A Japanese landing barge
Island early on 4 December. Another convoy with seven ships left Saigon on loading troops off the coast of
the afternoon of the 5th. These convoys were ordered to join in the Gulf of southern Thailand. Japanese
Thailand on the morning of 7 December while transiting as close to the coast amphibious doctrine would
as possible to avoid detection by British aircraft. have had trouble conducting
an opposed landing, as was
Since 3 December, the British had been flying search missions over the demonstrated at Kota Bharu,
South China Sea, but not in the Gulf of Thailand. About midday on 6 but the main landings at
December, a Hudson aircraft spotted what was reported as three convoys 80 Singora and Patani were
miles south-east of Cape Cambodia. The British were unsure if the convoys uncontested. (NARA)
were headed to Bangkok or to make a landing on Malaya or southern
Thailand. This was sufficient to prompt Brooke-Popham to order all British
forces on alert, but he did not order Operation
Matador activated since the British could not be
seen to make the first move.
Because of bad weather on 7 December and
the fact that the Japanese convoys had turned to
the north-west into the Gulf of Thailand out of the
range of British searches, no further information
was gained on Japanese intentions until later in
the day. At 1730hrs, Japanese ships were spotted
110 miles north of Kota Bharu headed toward
Singora. Another group was spotted north of
Patani. This information did not reach Far East
Command until 2100hrs, but it was insufficient to
confirm that the Japanese were intent on invading
southern Thailand.
Any uncertainty regarding Japanese intentions
was dispelled soon enough. According to plan, the
landing at Kota Bharu began at about 0045hrs
on 8 December. Reports soon arrived from the
defending 8th Indian Infantry Brigade and the
RAF airfield at Kota Bharu that the Japanese were
landing. In response, the Hudsons at Kota Bharu
conducted moonlight attacks on the ships off the
coast, sinking one and damaging two.
37
38
39
1
2
RAF ATTACK ON SINGORA (PP. 38–39)
The first couple of days of the campaign included intense air Ki-27 began development in 1934 and looked antiquated with its
activity by both sides as each struck the other’s airfields to gain air fixed landing gear, but was extremely manoeuvrable. It was the
superiority. The scale of the RAF’s attacks was much smaller, and most numerous fighter used by the IJA Air Force during the
usually these did not have the benefit of fighter protection. One campaign. The Japanese claimed to have shot down five of the
of the main attacks of 9 December was mounted by a group of British bombers, but only three were lost. A 60 Squadron aircraft
Blenheim IV bombers from 34 and 60 Squadrons (1). Of the 14 got separated from the formation, bombed Japanese ships in the
Mark IVs and four Mark Is available, six Mark IVs were ordered to harbour, and was shot down. Another 60 Squadron bomber was
attack Singora airfield in southern Thailand, which had just been also lost, and a 34 Squadron aircraft was damaged over the target,
captured by the Japanese and was already being heavily used. No and crashed on the return flight. The other three survived and
fighter escort was available, but the small strike group was not claimed to have hit the congested airfield. For the loss of half the
intercepted on its way to the target. Once over the target area, strike, several Japanese aircraft might have been destroyed, but
they were swarmed by Ki-27 ‘Nates’ from the 1st Sentai (2). The the RAF could not afford this kind of attrition.
40
THE FIGHT FOR KOTA BHARU
A heavy swell made the Japanese landings at Kota Bharu difficult. On top of
this, the Japanese ran into prepared beach defences held by a battalion of Indian
troops. It took three trips by the landing craft to get the Japanese force ashore,
with the first coming under artillery and air attack. After heavy combat, by
0345hrs, the Japanese penetrated the centre of the Indian line and threatened
the airfield located only two miles inland. An attack by two Malayan battalions
later in the morning was unsuccessful. The confused situation was made worse
by a premature order to destroy the airfield at about 1600hrs. With the sighting
of additional Japanese transports, the British brigade commander gave the order
to fall back from the beach defences to cover Kota Bharu at about 2000hrs. By
2200hrs, the Japanese occupied the airfield.
Next morning, the Japanese pressed their attack on the disorganized
British troops and began to infiltrate around the British strongpoints. On
the 10th, the British broke contact, and surrendered the airfields at Gong
Kedah and Machang. Demolitions were carried out on the facilities and fuel,
but all three of the airfields were seized by the Japanese with their runways
intact. The defeat of the 8th Indian Infantry Brigade had given the 3rd Air
Division an important toehold.
A British soldier surrenders to
the Japanese during the early
fighting in Malaya. He faces an
uncertain future, even if he
survives to go into a prisoner of
war camp. (Author’s collection)
41
The landing at Kota Bharu on 8 December
Kota Bharu Air eld III N
56 18 K. Besut
British blocking positions
Tumpat 8 Dec 2/12 II
Frontier 0 5 miles
Badang Forces Ri es 0 5km
II Sabak
1/13 II
Frontier Forces Ri es
3/17
Dogras
X Kota Bharu 2200hrs,
8 Dec
8 Ind
HQ
Bachok
Pasir Mas
Peringat
Afternoon 9 Dec
Kelantan River
Ketereh Mulong II
9 Dec–
II Morning 11 Dec 2/10
Baluch
4/19
Hyderabad
Chondong
Tanah Merah Machang Pasir Puteh
Air eld Gong Kedah
Air eld
To Kuala Krai Machang
11 Dec
42
THE LANDINGS IN SOUTHERN THAILAND
The 5th Division convoys reached their landing areas at about 0220hrs and
by 0400hrs began landing. The Thais offered little resistance. Meanwhile,
confusion reigned in Indian III Corps whether to conduct Matador, and,
more importantly, whether to order a force named ‘Krohcol’ (one battalion)
into Thailand to act as a delaying force, by occupying the easily defended
Ledge position on the Patani road. The Ledge position was a defile that
constituted the only good defensive position north of Kroh. Not until
1500hrs did Krohcol cross the frontier into Thailand, but Thai resistance and
roadblocks resulted in only a three-mile advance by dusk. By the morning
of 10 December, the British were still six miles short of the Ledge position,
and when they tried to advance the last leg on foot they were stopped cold
by Japanese forces. The Japanese had won the race to the Ledge, advancing
75 miles in 60 hours over bad roads after coming ashore, before the British
could advance 30 miles. It was an impressive performance and a portent of
things to come.
THE SAGA OF FORCE Z
As the outbreak of war in the Far East looked more likely, the RN was
making plans to send a large, balanced fleet to Singapore. In August 1941, the
RN was proposing to send seven capital ships (all older ships), one aircraft
carrier, ten cruisers and 24 destroyers to the Far East. However, it would take
until March 1942 to assemble and dispatch such a fleet. Also in August, the
Australian government requested the early dispatch of some capital ships to
act as a deterrent to Japanese ambitions. This prompted Churchill to consider
sending a smaller force to Singapore in October built around a modern
battleship, a battlecruiser and an aircraft carrier. This resulted in a stand-
off between Churchill and the Admiralty which favoured sending a larger,
balanced fleet. Nothing was resolved until a meeting on 20 October when
it was agreed that battleship Prince of Wales would begin a transit to Cape
Town, South Africa with a final decision to be made when it arrived there.
HMS Prince of Wales entering
Singapore naval base on 2
December. It was the second
ship of the King George V class,
veteran of the Bismarck chase in
May 1941 and the most
modern battleship in the Royal
Navy. More than a match for
the two IJN battleships then in
the South China Sea, it was not
a match for large-scale air
attack. (NARA)
43
HMS Repulse was the second
capital ship in Phillips’
unbalanced Force Z. It was a
battlecruiser completed in
1916, and, like almost all Royal
Navy battlecruisers of its day,
was weakly protected,
especially against air attack. Its
anti-aircraft armament was also
totally deficient. (NARA)
Prince of Wales steamed from the Clyde on 25 October with three
destroyers. On 16 November, the battleship arrived in Cape Town. This stop
was heralded in the press and no attempt was made by the Admiralty to
change its destination. When Prince of Wales reached Colombo on Ceylon
(present-day Sri Lanka), it was joined by battlecruiser Repulse and two
destroyers. On the late afternoon of 2 December, Force Z with its two capital
ships and four destroyers arrived at Singapore.
The sighting of three large convoys of Japanese transports south of Indo-
China on 6 December suggested that Force Z would soon be tested. On
the 8th, reports came in of Japanese landings at three points in Thailand
and Malaya. That same day, IJN aircraft bombed Singapore where Prince of
Wales was at anchor.
By the morning of 8 December, when the scale of Japanese attacks across
the Pacific had become obvious, and the Admiralty had given orders to
commence hostilities, it was also obvious that the primary mission of Force Z,
to act as a deterrent, had failed. With this realization, London pondered what
to do with Force Z. Before it could decide, Phillips had already acted. He had
returned to Singapore on the morning of 7 December from a conference with
the Americans at Manila. Following an early-morning conference with British
commanders at the naval base on 8 December, Phillips determined he would
Prince of Wales leaving
Singapore on the evening of 8
December. Phillips’ plan for
Force Z was a calculated risk,
but was not reckless as is often
portrayed. (AWM)
44
have to act quickly with his small but powerful force if there was any hope
of defeating the Japanese invasion. The operation was highly dependent on
surprise, but with the monsoon weather providing cover, he rated his chances
of reaching Singora as 50-50. Later, in the morning, he changed his target to
Kota Bharu with the intent of arriving there on the morning of 10 December.
The Prince of Wales was the second ship of the King George V class – the
most modern class of British battleships to see action during the war. The ship
was heavily armoured, carried an impressive main armament of ten 14in. guns,
and possessed a top speed of 28.5 knots. Its principal weakness was a limited
capability for engaging modern aircraft, especially low-flying ones. Repulse
was a battlecruiser that had not been modernized since its completion in 1916.
As would be expected of a battlecruiser, the ship was fast, carried a strong
armament built on six 15in. guns, but did not possess strong protective armour
against bombs or torpedoes. Its anti-aircraft battery was totally inadequate.
Despite these shortcomings, the two capital ships constituted a real threat to
Japanese sea lines of communications through the South China Sea.
The true nature of the Japanese air threat was unknown to Phillips and
the RN in general. The capabilities of Japanese aircraft and aviators were
judged to be unimpressive, and probably not as developed as the threats
that the RN had faced in the North Atlantic and in the Mediterranean. Just
before it departed for the Far East, Prince of Wales was exposed to Italian
air attacks, which were repulsed (though another battleship, Nelson, was
hit by a torpedo and severely damaged). Using the range of present British
torpedo bombers as a basis for comparison, the general belief was that if
Force Z stayed 400 miles from Japanese bases on southern Indo-China the
threat would be minimal.
Prince of Wales and Repulse, escorted by a mere four destroyers departed
Singapore naval base after dusk on 8 December. It soon became apparent
that the prospects for air cover were nil, so surprise was now even more
critical. The target of the Japanese landing site at Kota Bharu would lessen
the time under threat of air attack from bases in Indo-China. At 0400hrs on
the 9th, Phillips changed course to the north under heavy weather, which
brought promise of no detection.
Unbeknown to the British, Force Z was spotted by Japanese submarine
I-65 at 1345hrs. Then, an hour before sunset, the skies cleared and at 1740hrs
the first of three Japanese aircraft was spotted tailing the force. Phillips
continued north then changed course to the north-west at 1855hrs and then
Repulse departing Singapore on
8 December. The battlecruiser
was well handled during the
initial phases of the attack
before finally succumbing to
overwhelming torpedo attack.
(AWM)
45
46
47
1
2 3
4
THE DEATH OF PRINCE OF WALES (PP. 46–47)
The key blow against Prince of Wales came early in the action. This Disruptive camouflage (3). The 17 planes of the 1st and 2nd
was landed by the second group of aircraft to attack, 17 torpedo- squadrons of the Genzan Air Group attacked in waves of two or
carrying G3M2 Navy Type 96 attack bombers (later given the three aircraft abreast. The 1st Squadron selected Prince of Wales as
Allied codename of ‘Nell’) from the Genzan Air Group (1). This its target and dropped eight torpedoes between 1144 and
aircraft began development in 1933 and was the IJN’s first long- 1146hrs from 650–1,600 yards. The anti-aircraft fire was intense,
range land-based bomber. It was replaced early in the war by the and one aircraft was shot down and three more damaged. The
G4M ‘Betty’, so remains much less well known. For 1941, it was a Japanese claimed three hits, but only two hit the battleship.
formidable weapon and could carry one Type 91 aerial torpedo to However, these two hits, both at 1144hrs and both in the same
a maximum range of 2,365nm. The Nells carried the Type 91 Mod area of the port side aft, were sufficient to doom the ship (4). The
1, which was a reliable weapon with a range of 2,200 yards at torpedoes struck abaft the rear 14in. turret, which buckled the
41–43 knots with a warhead of 331lb. As the Nells closed in to outer propeller shaft and flooded several compartments. The
commence their attack, the 5.25in. guns on Prince of Wales ship’s speed dropped from 25 to 15 knots and within minutes
opened up with a deafening roar, and were soon joined by the six flooding caused an 11.5-degree list. Prince of Wales was left a
eight-barrel 2-pdr (pom-pom) mounts, and finally by the single sitting duck unable to manoeuvre and with its main anti-aircraft
40mm mount on the stern and the seven single 20mm mounts battery out of commission.
(2). The battleship is in the striking six-colour First Admiralty
48
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Malaya and Singapore 1941-42
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