Malaya and Singapore 1941-42

The destruction of Force Z FRENCH Soc Trang
INDO-CHINA
0 100 miles
0 100km

N

Escort Main
Force Body
0230hrs
10 Dec

1345hrs
9 Dec
1930hrs
1920hrs 9 Dec
9 Dec 1855hrs

2015hrs 1930hrs 9 Dec
9 Dec 9 Dec

1740hrs Sighted by aircraft
9 Dec

2355hrs
9 Dec
0052hrs
10 Dec

0210hrs 1345hrs Sighted by I-65
10 Dec 9 Dec
Sighted by I-58

0800hrs 1015hrs Natuna
Kuantan 10 Dec 10 Dec Island

1115hrs Air attack begins
10 Dec

1233hrs 1320hrs Prince of Wales sunk
10 Dec 10 Dec
Repulse sunk

MALAYA Anambas Island

P. Tioman Djemadja
1044hrs
10 Dec 0400hrs
Tenedos attacked 9 Dec

Strait of Johore Strait Track of Force Z
Malacca Imperial Japanese Navy Task Groups
Singapore Track of IJN aircraft
Singapore 17 35
Borneo
Strait 8 Dec
49

to the west at 1930hrs as if going to Singora. It was at this point that the
British force was only some 22 miles from the IJN task force searching for it.

At about 2000hrs Phillips conferred with his senior staff on whether
to continue the operation. It was quickly decided to abort it and head
south to Singapore, 275 miles away. Then, at 2355hrs, fate intervened. A
report reached Prince of Wales that a Japanese landing had occurred at
Kuantan, which was only 120 miles from Force Z’s current position. The
report was completely false, but, as Kuantan was a critical location, Phillips
decided that it should be investigated. Accordingly, Force Z changed course
at 0052hrs on 10 December to the south-west. Critically, Phillips did not
request air support for this change of plan, thinking that his Chief of Staff
in Singapore, in receipt of the same report, would know he was headed
there and arrange fighter cover. Besides, Kuantan was some 450 miles from
the nearest IJN airbase and thus probably beyond the range of effective
air attack.

By 0800hrs next morning, Force Z was located off Kuantan and sent an
aircraft from Prince of Wales and a destroyer to investigate inshore. Nothing
was found. Instead of making directly for Singapore, Phillips lingered for
some 90 minutes off Kuantan to investigate an earlier report of some barges
and a tug. This delay proved fatal.

At about 1015hrs, a lookout on Prince of Wales spotted a Japanese
aircraft. Even at this point, Phillips did not send a signal for fighter cover.
Just after 1100hrs, the first wave of attacking aircraft was spotted and the
action began.

Following the failure of the Japanese surface forces to make contact
with Force Z on the night of 9/10 December, it was left to the IJN’s land-
based air forces to attack the British force before a planned day engagement
on the 10th. At 0455hrs, nine bombers from the Genzan Air Corps took
off, followed by two reconnaissance planes at 0530hrs to find Force Z.
The attack aircraft from the Genzan, Mihoro and Kanoya Air Corps were
ordered to take off as soon as ready. A total of 85 twin-engined G3M ‘Nell’
and G4M ‘Betty’ aircraft took off between 0625 and 0800hrs. Among these
were 26 Bettys armed with torpedoes, and 59 Nells (25 with torpedoes, the
rest with bombs).

The lead aircraft flew south to a point just 80 miles north of Singapore
without finding the British ships. They turned north to continue the search.
At 1013hrs, they spotted the destroyer Tenedos, which had been detached
from Force Z because of fuel issues. Nine Nells attacked it with bombs,
but all missed. As the fuel levels of the Japanese aircraft were becoming a
concern, one of the reconnaissance aircraft spotted Force Z off Kuantan
at 1015hrs. At about 1100hrs, the strike force spotted Force Z and began
its attacks. Because the Japanese aircraft were not launched together, and
because they were spread out in search lines, the battle developed into a
series of attacks.

The British ships opened fire on the Japanese bombers at 1113hrs. The first
group to attack was composed of the eight Nells from the Mihoro Air Group
at 1115hrs against Repulse. Each aircraft dropped two 550lb bombs from just
under 10,000ft. Of these, all were close, but only a single hit was scored on a
hangar, which wrecked a seaplane and started a fire; this was quickly put out.
British anti-aircraft fire was heavy, and, against level bombers on a constant
course and speed, fairly effective. Five of the eight planes were damaged.

50

The second attack was made by 17 torpedo-carrying Nells from the Force Z under attack with Prince
Genzan Air Group. Eight planes dropped on Prince of Wales from 650–1,600 of Wales manoeuvring in the
yards. The Japanese claimed three hits, but only two were confirmed by upper right of the photo and
the British. But these two hits, both at 1144hrs, doomed the ‘unsinkable’ Repulse on the lower left.
Prince of Wales. The torpedoes struck the port side abaft the rear 14in. turret, Repulse is under attack by
which buckled the outer propeller shaft and flooded several compartments. horizontal bombers as seen by
The flooding caused an 11.5-degree list, cut speed to 15 knots, and placed the bomb splashes. Based on
the main anti-aircraft guns out of action. Meanwhile, nine aircraft attacked the Royal Navy’s European
Repulse with torpedoes, but no hits were recorded, despite Japanese claims experiences of German and
of four hits. About this same time, six aircraft from the Mihoro Air Group Italian air attacks, Phillips did
attacked Repulse with bombs, but all missed. not fear horizontal bombing
since it was inaccurate and
The third attack from 1157–1202hrs featured eight torpedo-carrying Nells lacked the power to cripple a
from the Mihoro Air Group, which launched their weapons against Repulse. heavily armoured capital ship.
The well-handled battlecruiser again avoided all these. The following wave, He had no concept of the scope
which was composed of the 26 Bettys from the Kanoya Air Group, took and capabilities of Japanese
place from 1220–1232hrs. Six attacked the crippled Prince of Wales and 20 torpedo bombers, and this is
went after the still-nimble Repulse. The battleship was unable to manoeuvre, what sank both British ships.
and was hit by four torpedoes on its starboard side. A well-executed pincer (NARA)
attack on Repulse presented its captain with an impossible situation. Five
torpedoes hit the ship and it listed rapidly to port. The ship sank at 1233hrs.

The next wave of attack was conducted
by nine bomb-carrying aircraft of the Mihoro
Air Group against the escorting destroyers.
No hits were scored. The final attack by
Mihoro Air Group Nells focused on Prince
of Wales with seven planes dropping 1,100lb
bombs. One hit was scored, which struck the
upper deck by the catapult and penetrated to
the main deck where it exploded and caused
severe casualties.

At this point, it was simply a matter of
time until the battleship sank. Speed was
reduced to six knots, and the list to port
increased as the ship settled quickly. The
order to abandon ship was given at 1315hrs.
Five minutes later, Prince of Wales heeled
over to port. All that was left were the three
destroyers, which went about the business of
rescuing the men in the water unmolested by
the Japanese. From Repulse, 513 men were
lost and 796 rescued; Prince of Wales lost
327 men and had 1,285 rescued. Japanese
losses totalled three aircraft and 21 airmen
and 27 other aircraft damaged.

The sinking of Prince of Wales and
Repulse marked not only the end of the
dreadnought era but also the end of British
sea power in the Far East. Since the RAF
was also crippled early in the campaign, the
fate of Singapore would be decided by the
British Army.

51

FORCE Z – AN ASSESSMENT

The loss of Force Z was met with great shock in Britain. But was it inevitable?
As Phillips saw it, he had three choices: stay in Singapore and be bombed,
move to a safer position and maintain his fleet for later action, or attack the
Japanese invasion knowing that only naval power could defeat the Japanese.
Not surprisingly, he chose the last of these. When his plan was discussed with
his staff on 8 December, nobody dissented. Phillips was aware of the risks,
but was confident he could deal with any Japanese surface forces in the area
(he counted on only a single Kongo-class battlecruiser and a few cruisers),
and did not understand the scope of the air threat. With the element of
surprise, he thought he could deliver a serious blow to the Japanese invasion
force on the morning of 10 December. With the nearest IJN bomber base
400 miles from Singora and 370 miles from Kota Bharu, Phillips believed
the threat from torpedo planes to be minimal. High-level attacks did not
concern him.

After the fact, there does appear to be a sense of inevitably about the
pointless loss of Prince of Wales and Repulse. The force sent to the Far East
was inadequate to act as a deterrent, and it was equally inadequate as a
balanced force to disrupt the Japanese invasion. There is little doubt that
Phillips or any other RN admiral would have chosen to take a calculated risk
to attack the Japanese invasion force. There is also no doubt that no British
admiral understood the power and range of the IJN’s land-based air groups.
And the failure to provide fighter cover to Force Z misses the point – even if
a squadron of poorly armed and short-endurance Buffalo fighters had been
present to defend the force, the result would not have changed, just the cost
to the Japanese.

In the final analysis, the decision to send a totally inadequate and
unbalanced force to an insecure base was fatally flawed. The premise for the
entire operation, that a force of two capital ships could act as a deterrent to
Japan, which was going to war for national survival, had no basis in reality.
The responsibility for the loss of Force Z was Churchill’s alone.

THE ACTION OFF ENDAU

The loss of Prince of Wales and Repulse effectively brought the naval portion
of the campaign to a close. Light RN units did remain in Singapore, but
these were focused on escorting convoys into the fortress and did not look to
contest control of the South China Sea with the IJN. The British did continue
to build up naval forces in the theatre, but this was done using Ceylon as a
base where they were largely immune from Japanese attack.

There was one exception to the Royal Navy’s reluctance to use naval
forces to defend Singapore. This came in the later part of the campaign when
the British were retreating toward Singapore. This small engagement has
been largely forgotten. It should be recalled that the original Japanese plans
called for landings on the south-eastern coast of Malaya to complement the
drive down the western part of the peninsula. This originally was to be a
four-battalion assault, but was changed to a logistics operation because of
concern over British naval and air intervention against an operation so close
to Singapore.

52

In fact, such an operation so close to Singapore did prompt a British
response. To Percival, the Japanese assault on Endau had the potential of
cutting off the retreating British force heading into the fortress. To forestall
this, the Royal Navy determined to attack the Japanese assault force with
whatever was available.

The actual Japanese landing was conducted by two IJA transports carrying
construction stores, ordnance and personnel to set up an airfield. These two
transports were escorted by the 3rd Destroyer Squadron with a light cruiser
and six Fubuki-class destroyers and five large minesweepers. On the morning
of 26 January, the IJN force was sighted north-east of Endau. The RAF threw
all available aircraft at the transports with the utmost gallantry. For the
loss of 15 aircraft, only near misses were scored. To conduct a follow-up
naval attack, the only units available were the 23-year-old S-class destroyer
Thanet and the 25-year-old Australian V-class destroyer Vampire. These two
obsolete destroyers carried only 4in. guns and a total of seven torpedoes.

The small Royal Navy force departed Singapore on the afternoon of 26
January and headed north with the intention of making a night attack. The two
destroyers transited close inshore, which meant they were not intercepted by
the Japanese destroyers patrolling the outer ring in defence of the transports.
The first Japanese ship to spot the British force was large minesweeper W-4.
Vampire fired two torpedoes at the minesweeper at 0242hrs on 27 January,
but both missed. After steaming around for another 30 minutes unsuccessfully
looking for the transports, the British commander decided to call off the
operation and return to Singapore. The two destroyers fired all their remaining
torpedoes at a Japanese destroyer then headed south-east at high speed. Finally,
the Japanese responded to the presence of two enemy destroyers in their heavily
defended anchorage. Within minutes, a Japanese 5in. shell hit Thanet in the
engine room, which severed both main and auxiliary steam lines. This quickly
left it dead in the water and it was sunk by Japanese gunfire. Of its crew, 65
were able to evade capture and return to Singapore; 12 were killed in action,
and 32 were rescued by the Japanese. Of these, a single officer was spared; the
rest were turned over to the IJA and executed. Vampire made good its escape
with the help of a smokescreen and suffered no damage or casualties.

DEBACLE AT JITRA

The 5th Division moved south from its landing areas at Singora and Patani
as quickly as possible. The main drive was mounted down the road from
Singora to Alor Star. This was assigned to the 9th Infantry Brigade, composed
of the 11th and 41st Infantry Regiments, supported by a tank battalion and
a battalion of artillery. The supporting drive from Patani down the road to
Kroh was assigned to the 42nd Infantry Regiment supported by two light
tank companies and a battery of artillery.

Preparing to meet the main Japanese thrust was the 11th Indian Infantry
Division. After the decision to cancel Matador, this unit moved into defensive
positions at the road junction of Jitra. This was not a strong position, but
it was the best available north of the airfield at Alor Star, which had to be
defended. Unknown to Heath was that the RAF decided to abandon the
airfield on 9 December and he was thus preparing to conduct a forward
defence against the Japanese for no purpose.

53

Japanese infantry crossing a The troops of 11th Indian Division
stream in Malaya. Their path of had done some work on improving the
advance was crossed by many position, but this had taken a lower
water features, and the British priority than preparing for Matador. The
engineers did a good job defence was mounted by two brigades
destroying bridges, so these forward. The 15th Indian Infantry Brigade
kinds of detours were often held a front of 6,000 yards including the
required. (USAMHI) road, and the 6th Indian Infantry Brigade
held a sector of 18,000 yards extending
to the coast. The position was supported
by artillery and anti-tank units. The
28th Indian Infantry Brigade was held
in reserve.

The advance guard of the 5th Division
made contact with the Indian covering
troops on the morning of 11 December.
This covering force slowly withdrew
and was reinforced by another battalion
to hold the Japanese north of Jitra until
the 12th. While manning an intermediate
position north of Jitra, the 1/14th Punjab
Battalion was overrun by Japanese tanks
and motorized infantry during a period
of heavy rain and low visibility. The unit
was scattered, with only 200 men being
accounted for the next day. The reinforcing
2/1st Gurkha Rifles Battalion was also
attacked frontally and from the flanks, and also scattered with heavy losses.
The Japanese column proceeded down the road toward the main position
of the 15th Indian Infantry Brigade. The Japanese force responsible for this
rout was under the command of Lt. Col. Saeki Shizuo, commander of the 5th
Division’s reconnaissance regiment. His force was led by two Type 95 light
and ten Type 97 medium tanks from the 1st Tank Regiment, and Type 97
tankettes and other elements from the 5th Reconnaissance Regiment.
This seemingly minor skirmish set the stage for a full disaster the following
day. Two battalions of Indian troops had been rendered combat ineffective,
lowering the already questionable morale of the 11th Indian Division. The
division commander ordered the reserve 28th Indian Infantry Brigade up
to Jitra and the brigade commander took over the 15th Indian Infantry
Brigade since that unit’s commander had gone missing the previous day. The
2/2nd Gurkha Battalion from the 28th Indian Infantry Brigade was placed
under the command of the 15th Brigade. With the third battalion of the 28th
Brigade assigned to protect the Alor Star airfield, this meant that the 11th
Indian Infantry Division had no reserve.
During the night, the Japanese reached the main British position north of
Jitra. At about 2030hrs, a tank probe down the road was repulsed with the
loss of two tanks. The battalion on the right, the 2/9th Jats, received false
reports that it had already been flanked by the Japanese, which prompted
the commander of the 28th Indian Infantry Brigade to request help from the
6th Brigade. In response, the 6th Brigade sent the bulk of two battalions to
reinforce the right flank of the 15th Brigade.

54

The Japanese resumed the attack down the road at Japanese infantry, mounted on
about 0300hrs on 12 December. A British counter-attack bicycles, roll down the road in
restored the position by dawn. More serious was an western Malaya. In some 54
attack at 0600hrs in heavy rain by Japanese tanks and days before they reached the
infantry east of the main road between the junction of Strait of Johore, the Japanese
two battalions – the 1st Leicester and 2/9th Jats. This covered over 400 miles.
attack achieved a penetration and prompted a counter- (Author’s collection)
attack. This counter-attack by the 1/8th Punjab Battalion
was ill-coordinated and was repulsed with heavy losses
including its commanding officer. Around noon, the
Japanese attacked again east of the road and overran
one company of the 2/9th Jats while penetrating as far as
the position of the reserve 2/2nd Gurkhas along a water
feature called the Sungei Bata.

The increasing Japanese pressure made the divisional
commander, Murray-Lyon, request a withdrawal to the
previously selected defensive position at Gurun 30 miles
south. He feared that his dispirited division, the only division
in northern Malaya, was exposed to tank attack, which he
had no reserves to contend with. His lines of communications
were threatened by the advance of the Japanese force down
the road to Kroh. Percival initially refused to approve this
withdrawal and sent orders for him to remain at Jitra.

Meanwhile, Murray-Lyon’s brigade commanders decided to order a
withdrawal to the Sungei Bata. The 1st Leicesters began a retreat at 1600hrs
and were joined by the 2/9th Jats. This withdrawal resulted in panic, fed by
false reports that Japanese tanks were already behind the main British force.
This underlined Murray-Lyon’s fears that his division could be destroyed
and at 1930hrs again asked for permission to withdraw. This time it was
approved, but now Murray-Lyon was faced with executing a withdrawal
over a single road with poorly trained troops in the pounding rain. In the
midst of great confusion, the 11th Indian Infantry Division was able to break
contact, but only with the loss of considerable amounts of men and material.

Australian troops man a
communications station in the
jungle. Command and control
of British units proved a
daunting challenge throughout
the battle. (AWM)

55

BRITISH FORCES
1. 1/14th Punjab Battalion, 15th Indian Brigade
2. 2/1st Gurkha Rifles Battalion, 28th Indian Brigade
3. 2/9th Jats Battalion, 15th Indian Brigade
4. 1st Leicestershire Battalion, 15th Indian Brigade
5. 2/2nd Gurkha Battalion, 28th Indian Brigade (placed under

command of 15th Indian Brigade)
6. 2nd East Surrey Battalion, 6th Indian Brigade
7. 2/16th Punjab Battalion, 6th Indian Brigade
8. 2/16th Punjab Battalion (2 companies)
9. 1/8th Punjab Battalion, 6th Indian Brigade reserve (1 company)
10. 155th Field Regiment (2 batteries)
11. 22nd Mountain Regiment (less 2 batteries)
12. 80th Anti-tank Regiment (less 1 battery)

XX

II
IND
MURRAY-LYON

76

EVENTS

11 December 8. About 1200hrs – Japanese renew their attack east of the road,
1. 1630hrs – Japanese advance guard overruns 1/14th Punjab Battalion in conditions overrunning one company of the 2/9th Jats and reaching the position
of poor visibility and then continues down the road to scatter the 2/1st Gurkha of the 2/2nd Gurkhas along a stream.
Battalion. 9. 1600hrs – 1st Leicesters ordered to withdraw, followed by 2/9th Jats.
2. General Murray-Lyon moves 2/2nd Gurkha Battalion under 15th Indian Brigade as 10. 2200hrs – Murray-Lyon orders general withdrawal; confusion reigns with many
brigade reserve. units not receiving orders and much equipment and weapons are lost.
3. 2030hrs – Japanese attack stopped in front of main position of 1st Leicestershire 11. Around 2400hrs – Japanese attempt to seize bridge over Sungei Bata stream but
Battalion; two tanks destroyed by anti-tank gunfire. are repulsed by 2/2nd Gurkhas. The bridge is destroyed two hours later and the British
4. Night – Japanese elements probe right flank of 2/9th Jats Battalion. break contact.
12 December
5. 0300hrs – Japanese attack down main road; British counter-attacks restore the line
by dawn.
6. 0600hrs – Japanese tanks and infantry attack east of the road between junction of
1st Leicester and 2/9th Jats Battalions and make a penetration.
7. 1000hrs – British attempt to counter-attack with 1/8 Punjab Battalion; the planned
artillery support does not materialize and the attack is repulsed with heavy losses.

THE BATTLE OF JITRA

On 12 December, one battalion of Japanese troops supported by tanks shattered two brigades of Indian
troops and penetrated the best-prepared British defences in Malaya.

56

Note: Gridlines are shown at intervals of 1km JAPANESE FORCES
A. 3rd Company, 1st Tank Regiment
B. Eight Type 97 tankettes, 5th Reconnaissance Regiment
C. Two motorized infantry companies, 5th Reconnaissance Regiment
D. One artillery battery, 5th Artillery Regiment
E. One machine-gun company, 5th Reconnaissance Regiment

A

1

1
NANGKA

A B
2

ASUN

D

3

45 C
A 4

9 6C 3

KAPUR 12 8 XX
10 JITRA KELUBI
5
C 7 TAKURO
A 9
E

8

11

52

SUNGEI BATA
STREAM

10 11

57

British engineers prepare a JITRA – THE IMPACT
bridge in Malaya for
demolition. Such operations The defeat of the 11th Indian Infantry Division was one of the British Army’s
were key to slowing the most unlikely and complete defeats during the entire war. A force of one
Japanese advance, and were Japanese battalion, supported by a company of tanks, had defeated an entire
one of the few bright areas for division in prepared positions in little more than a day. Japanese losses were
the British during the minor; the 11th Indian Division was shattered. The 15th Brigade suffered
campaign. (AWM) worst, being reduced to a quarter of its pre-battle strength; the 6th Brigade
suffered heavily, and the 28th Brigade had one of its battalions reduced to a
company. Many vehicles and guns were lost and morale took a serious hit. The
boldness of the Japanese had proved decisive, in no small measure aided by
the employment of tanks against which the ill-trained Indian troops seemed
helpless. An entire division had been routed, primarily by its poor deployment,
which allowed it to be defeated in detail, and a general low level of training.

After breaking contact with the Japanese, the 11th Indian Infantry
Division reached the Sengei Kedah on the morning of 13 December. A
Japanese attempt to cross the river failed that day. Murray-Lyon ordered the
retreat to continue to Gurun some 20 miles south. Nothing had been done to
prepare any defensive positions, so the tired troops were expected to prepare
their own.

The 6th Indian Brigade was placed on the right, the 28th Indian Brigade
on the left, and the 600-man strong 15th Indian Brigade was designated as
a reserve.

The Japanese were not going to give the British any opportunity to catch
their breath. A probe into the British defences on the afternoon of the 14th
was stopped. Early on the 15th, the Japanese attacked again down the road
and penetrated deep into the 6th Indian Brigade’s defences. This prompted
Murray-Lyon to order a complete withdrawal, and, by the morning of the
16th, his division was south of the Muda River. That same day, Heath decided
to withdraw the division a further 30 miles south to a position on the Krian

River. It was hoped this would
be a sufficient tank obstacle to
allow a solid defence.

Percival assessed that
a further retreat would
undermine his objective of
holding the naval base. The
only way the fortress could be
saved was by reinforcement,
and the only way he could
guarantee its arrival was by
reducing the air threats to
the convoys, which were set
to arrive in the first part of
January. Accordingly, he had
to hold as far north as possible
to keep Japanese air power
out of range of Singapore.
This was a tall order since the
ground troops would have no
air cover as a result of the RAF

58

deciding to keep its remaining aircraft in Singapore to defend the fortress
and the reinforcement convoys. Because of the threat of Japanese landings,
Percival declined to send the 8th Australian Infantry Division from its
positions in Johore. This left Indian III Corps by itself to bear the brunt of
the Japanese offensive. By 17 December, Percival decided to withdraw his
forces behind the Perak River. The 9th Indian Infantry Division was ordered
to defend the Kuantan airfield and protect the 11th Indian Infantry Division’s
eastern flank. The battered 11th Indian Division was reorganized with the
6th and 15th Indian Brigades formed into a single brigade named the 15th,
and then reinforced by the 12th Indian Brigade. The 28th Indian Brigade also
remained assigned, giving the division three brigades for the first time. After
the division’s disastrous early performance, Murray-Lyon was replaced by
Brigadier Paris on 24 December.

THE BATTLE OF KAMPAR

The next serious action was fought in the area of Kampar from 30 December Japanese gunners manhandle a
until 2 January 1942. The Japanese believed that the British would defend the 75mm field gun in the Labis
Perak River since it was a serious anti-tank obstacle, but were able to cross it area in Johore on 22 January.
unopposed on 26 January after Heath moved his forces south. The Japanese The 25th Army had a reinforced
continued to press the British rearguard, the 12th Indian Brigade, and, on the artillery park for the campaign,
28th and 29th, the unit came under heavy air and artillery attack, followed but the full weight of Japanese
by a ground assault led by tanks. By this time, the Japanese 5th Division had artillery was not felt until the
been joined by the Imperial Guards Division’s 4th Guards Regiment, which assault crossing of the Strait of
was supporting the main Japanese drive along the main road. Johore. (AWM)

Heath hoped to hold the Kampar
position since it could not easily be
outflanked inland, but only along the
coast. The Japanese came into contact
with the British defences on the 30th,
but not until 1 January were they able
to make a strong attack supported by
artillery. The attack was conducted by
the 41st Infantry Regiment using the
road, while the 42nd Infantry Regiment
attempted to outflank the position
through the swamps along the coast.
The Japanese made limited progress in
heavy fighting along the road and British
artillery played a key role in repulsing
several attacks with heavy losses. That
morning, the 11th Infantry Regiment
landed at Utan Melintang, south of the
Kampar position. The following day,
this force was reinforced by the 3rd
Battalion, 4th Guards Regiment, and
began to move inland by boat up the
Perak River. This gave Brigadier Paris
little choice but to withdraw, starting on
the night of the 2nd.

59

60

61

2
1

JAPANESE TANK ATTACK AT SLIM RIVER (PP. 60–61)

The single most disastrous engagement of the entire Malaya Japanese armour. This scene shows the engagement at
campaign for the British came on 7 January 1942 along the Slim
River. A force of 30 Japanese tanks went on a six-hour rampage approximately 0730hrs when Type 97 medium tanks from the 6th
against the 11th Indian Division and destroyed the better part of Tank Regiment (1) caught the 5/14th Punjabs moving up without
two brigades. The Indians had ample anti-tank guns, artillery, anti-tank support (2). The infantry was scattered by the tanks’
mines and pre-constructed roadblocks to contend with a tank
attack, but were caught by surprise and poorly deployed. The 57mm cannons and machine guns. The Japanese advance was
attack began at 0330hrs and two hours later the Japanese had
routed two Indian infantry battalions. A British infantry battalion, not stopped until two hours later when 25-pdrs engaged the
supported by armoured cars, was also unable to stop the
tanks at point-blank range. By then, some 3,000 British and Indian

prisoners had been taken and the 11th Indian Division rendered

temporarily combat ineffective.

62

In eastern Malaya, the Japanese 55th Infantry Regiment landed at Kota
Bharu on 30 December and moved down the coast behind the 56th Infantry
Regiment toward Kuantan. The airfield was defended by the 22nd Indian
Infantry Brigade. After heavy fighting on 2–3 January, the airfield and the
town fell to the Japanese.

THE BATTLE OF SLIM RIVER

The withdrawal of the 11th Indian Infantry Division from Kampar brought it
to the Sungkai–Slim confluence area by 4 January. Heath was told by Percival
to hold this area at least until the 14th so that the Japanese could not use the
airfields at Kuala Lumpur and Port Swettenham to attack the reinforcement
convoys. The Japanese were intent on not allowing the British any time to
create a firm defence. Yamashita ordered the 5th Division, supported by
armour, to continue its advance down the main road straight for Kuala
Lumpur. The spearhead was 42nd Infantry Regiment and a battalion of tanks
with the 11th Infantry Regiment as an exploitation force. The 5th Division’s
41st Infantry Regiment was in reserve. Supporting this main drive was
3rd Battalion of the 11th Infantry Regiment and the 4th Guards Regiment
advancing down the coast by land and sea in order to be in a position to
attack Kuala Lumpur from the west.

The 11th Indian Infantry Division selected a defensive position that was
assessed to be tank proof and that covered the Slim River crossings. Along
the main road, Brigadier Paris deployed the 12th Indian Infantry Brigade;
the 28th Indian Infantry Brigade was assigned the Slim River sector. The
12th Indian Infantry Brigade was deployed in depth along the road. The
jungle next to the road was so thick that the British believed that Japanese
outflanking tactics would be impossible. Tanks could use only the road and
so the main defences in the 5/2nd Punjab Battalion area were provided with
anti-tank guns, mines and concrete blocks to stop tanks. Though the British
were ready, the brigade was tired, morale was low, and the units were all well
under strength.

The Japanese made first contact with the covering force of the 4/19th
Hyderabad Battalion on 5 January. After being repulsed, they began to
flank the position the next day. At about 0330hrs on the 7th, the Japanese
launched an attack down the road and the adjacent rail line led by tanks with
motorized infantry. The leading Indian company was overrun, and the 4/19th
Hyderabads withdrew.

When the Japanese got to the main British defences at Milestone 61,
the column was temporarily stopped when one tank hit a mine and three
others were destroyed in fierce close-in fighting. However, when the Japanese
discovered an unused but passable loop road, they were able to bypass this
resistance and then overran the next position at Milestone 61.5, which had
no anti-tank defences. The advance was temporarily stopped again when the
lead tank struck a mine in front of the position at Milestone 62. The Indians
held out for about an hour, but when another loop road was discovered the
Japanese were able to surround the defenders again.

Because phone lines had been cut and the 11th Indian Infantry Division
was short of communications gear, the full extent of the growing disaster
and the pace of the Japanese advance was not apparent to the remainder of

63

BRITISH FORCES CD
1. 4/19th Hyderabad Battalion, 12th Indian Infantry Brigade 1
2. 5/2nd Punjab Battalion, 12th Indian Infantry Brigade
3. One troop, 215th Anti-tank Battery 1 AB
4. 2nd Argyll and SH Battalion, 12th Indian Infantry Brigade
5. 2 Batteries, 137th Field Regiment 22 A
6. 5/14th Punjab Battalion (reserve), 12th Brigade 3 B
7. 2/2nd Gurkha Rifles, 28th Indian Infantry Brigade
8. 2/9th Gurkha Rifles, 28th Indian Infantry Brigade 3 A
9. 2/1st Gurkha Rifles, 28th Indian Infantry Brigade 4 B
10. One troop, 215th Anti-tank Battery
11. One troop, 16th Light Anti-aircraft Battery HKSRA A
12. 155th Field Regiment B

XX 4

5 TROLAK
TAKURO
A
SLIM RIVER 6

5
6

A

8

7 A
7

10 KAMPONG SLIM

EVENTS

7 January 1942 7. The 2/9th Gurkha Rifles of 28th Indian Infantry Brigade watches as Japanese tanks
1. At about 0330hrs, the Japanese launch an attack with tanks and motorized drive by their positions at 0800hrs and head east down the trunk road.
infantry against the 4/19th Hyderabads. The lead Indian company is overrun and the 8. Just after 0800hrs, Japanese tanks encounter the 2/1st Gurkha Rifles on the road in
Hyderabads retreat. close formation. The entire battalion is quickly scattered.
2. When the Japanese reach Milestone 61 at 0430hrs, the lead tank hits a mine 9. Two parked batteries of the 137th Field Regiment are briefly engaged by tank guns
and a fierce firefight develops which destroys three tanks. The Japanese discover a and machine guns.
loop road, which enables them to surround and destroy Indian resistance. Another 10. 0840hrs – Japanese tanks reach the Slim River Bridge, which they seize after a
roadblock at Milestone 61.5, which has no anti-tank defences, is quickly removed. troop of light anti-aircraft guns unsuccessfully engages them. After leaving one tank
3. 0530hrs – at Milestone 62, the lead tank again hits a mine in a position held by the to guard the bridge, the Japanese continue south.
reserve company of the 5/2 Punjabs. The Indians hold out for about an hour, but the 11. After continuing another two miles, the Japanese surprise the 155th Field
Japanese find another undefended loop road, which enables them to surround the Regiment, which is moving up the road. After the unit’s headquarters is overrun, a 25-
defenders by 0630hrs. pdr knocks out the lead tank at short range, stopping the Japanese attack at 0930hrs.
4. 2nd Argylls is ordered to construct roadblocks north of Trolak and the 5/14th
Punjab Battalion is ordered to move up.
5. First British roadblock fails to stop the Japanese and is crushed at 0630hrs. At
0700hrs a roadblock manned by armoured cars with anti-tank rifles stops the
Japanese briefly. The planned demolition of the bridge at Trolak fails.
6. 0730hrs: Japanese tanks, now without infantry support, hit the 5/14th Punjabs
north of Kampong Slim. The Indians are unable to mount an effective defence and the
battalion is scattered.

THE BATTLE OF SLIM RIVER

In the battle of Slim River on 7 January 1942, some 30 Japanese tanks and a motorized infantry battalion
completed the virtual destruction of the 11th Indian Infantry Division.

64

Note: Gridlines are shown at intervals of 1km JAPANESE FORCES
A. Three tank companies with 30 medium tanks from the 6th Tank Regiment

B. One battalion motorized infantry, 42nd Infantry Regiment

C. Two platoons of engineers

D. One battery of artillery

98 59

A

A 10 XX
11
SLIM RIVER II
BRIDGE IND

A MURRAY-LYON
11

12

65

Indian troops practising with an the 12th Indian Infantry Brigade. The brigade commander ordered the 2nd
18-pdr dating from World War I. Argyll Battalion to construct roadblocks and for the 5/14th Punjab Battalion
Some field regiments in Indian in reserve to move up. The improvised British roadblock was attacked at
units did not receive their 25- 0630hrs and quickly brushed aside. The Japanese continued down the road
pdrs before the war and had to and hit another roadblock at 0700hrs manned by armoured cars with anti-
make do with this gun which tank rifles. These presented only a short delay, and the survivors decided to
could still fire an 18.5lb shell set off through the jungle for the Slim River bridges. After the demolition of
out to 9,300 yards. (Library of the bridge at Trolak failed, the Japanese tanks resumed their advance.
Congress)
The next battalion to meet the Japanese armour, now on its own with no
infantry support, was the 5/14th Punjabs. In an encounter at 0730hrs about one
mile north of Kampong Slim, two companies were quickly shattered and the
Indians were unable to bring their troop of attached anti-tank guns into action.

The marauding Japanese tanks reached the area of the 28th Indian
Infantry Brigade and caught this unit totally by surprise. The first battalion
encountered was the 2/9th Gurkhas, which were moving into position at
Kampong Slim. The Japanese tanks passed by their positions and then
contacted the 2/1st Gurkha Battalion on the road in close formation. The
entire battalion was scattered. Next up were two batteries of the 137th Field
Regiment parked in the Cluny Estate. The tanks did not stop to engage them
but pressed on to the Slim River Bridge, arriving at 0840hrs. The bridge was
seized after a troop of light anti-aircraft was destroyed when its guns failed
to stop the Japanese tanks.

66

After crossing the bridge, the tanks Australian troops on the move
continued another two miles down the road through thick jungle before the
where they met the 155th Field Regiment. war. In spite of this photo, no
Though caught totally by surprise, this unit Australian or Indian units, and
managed to get one of its 25-pdr guns into only a few British units
action and engaged and destroyed the lead conducted serious jungle
tank at some 30 yards range. This took place training. Few British
at 0930hrs and concluded the rampage of the commanders understood that
Japanese tanks. the jungle offered huge
advantages to the attacker
This ended one of the most dramatic and since it could be used for
significant actions of the entire Pacific War. infiltration movement to cut off
For six hours, a small group of Japanese British units. (AWM)
tanks had rumbled down a single road
machine-gunning and shooting up everything
in their path. Despite possessing abundant
anti-tank guns, mines, and artillery, which
could have been employed in an anti-tank
role, one Indian brigade had been smashed
and a second routed. In the process, five
battalions had been destroyed or dispersed.
The two remaining battalions of the 28th
Indian Infantry Brigade retreated, but suffered
heavy losses in the process. The net effect
was that the 12th Indian Infantry Brigade
was destroyed and the 28th Indian Infantry
Brigade reduced to about a third of its pre-
battle strength. All transport and supporting
anti-tank and artillery of these brigades were lost. More than 3,000 men
were taken prisoner; total Japanese casualties were 150.

From the operational standpoint, the Slim River engagement was a
disaster. It ensured the loss of central Malaya and reduced the chances of
holding southern Malaya long enough to enable the reinforcements flowing
into Singapore to become fully effective.

BRITISH REINFORCEMENTS

The reinforcements that Percival was counting on were finally arriving. The
most important reinforcement was the 18th Infantry Division, which was
at sea headed for the Middle East. On 11 December, it was decided to re-
assign the division to the Far East. Along with the division was the 82nd
Anti-tank Regiment (personnel only). Once the division landed in India, the
53rd Brigade Group was sent ahead, but did not arrive in Singapore until
13 January. The rest of the division arrived on 5 February, just in time to
surrender to the Japanese when the fortress fell.

The 85th Anti-tank Regiment (48 guns) and the 6th Heavy Anti-aircraft
Regiment (16 guns) and the 35th Light Anti-aircraft Regiment (24 guns)
were also routed to India for subsequent movement to Singapore. These
formations arrived on 13 January.

More immediate reinforcements were available in the form of two Indian
brigade groups from the still-forming 17th Indian Infantry Division. On

67

3 January, the 45th Indian Infantry Brigade arrived, and the 44th Indian
Infantry Brigade arrived in late January.

Plans were also made for the delivery of armour from the Middle East. A
brigade headquarters and two regiments of tanks (US M3 light tanks) were
allocated to the Far East. This unit became the 7th Armoured Brigade, but
never arrived in Malaya.

Overall, the flow of reinforcements to the Far East was grossly inadequate.
It was a case of too little, too late. The Indian units were only semi-trained,
and even the 18th Infantry Division had still to complete training and had
received no jungle training. The British defence was built on the premise that
reinforcements would be forthcoming in a timely manner, and now this was
shown to be a false hope. 

THE LOSS OF JOHORE

On his first trip to Singapore, beginning on 7 January, Wavell took stock of
the British defence so far. He attributed Japanese successes to mistakes by the
British and took immediate steps to stop the Japanese in Johore. He sided
with Bennett who days earlier had demanded of Percival that the Australians
be moved from the east coast to stop the Japanese in western Malaya. The
defeat of the 11th Indian Infantry Division at Slim River underlined that fact
that Indian III Corps was no longer capable of mounting an effective defence,
especially in the fairly open country south of Kuala Lumpur. On 9 January,
following Wavell’s intervention, Percival issued new orders. Indian III Corps
was to withdraw into Johore with only demolition actions to delay the
Japanese. This would allow Indian III Corps to be rested and reconstituted.
The 8th Australian Infantry Division would be moved to the area around
Segamat in western Johore to stop the Japanese. The 9th Indian Infantry
Division and the 45th Indian Infantry Brigade would be placed under the
command of General Bennett and form ‘Westforce’. Now Wavell’s ‘main
battle’ would be left in the hands of Bennett and his two Australian brigades.

The Japanese were also reinforcing their drive. The 5th Division’s 21st
Infantry Regiment arrived at Singora on 8 January, and the 5th Guards

Australian troops on patrol
searching for the enemy before
their first contact on 14
January. The Australians were
very sure of their capabilities
against the Japanese, but, in
spite of tough resistance, would
soon join the pattern of British
troops always looking to
retreat. (AWM)

68

The battle for Northern Johore 14–24 January 1941

XX 14 January 16–17 January
18 January
5 X Batu Anam

95 X

X X 8 19 January
Ind
21 5 27 20 January
Aus Gemas Segamat

Ayer Kuning 15 January

Tampin Jementah X 21 January
Alor Labis
Gajah 22
Ind Bekok

Mt. Ophir X

Jasin Lenga 95

XX

Imperial
Guards

Malacca III Panchor Grisek 22–23 January
Jorak Palor
N 5 Gds X

British positions III 45
0 Ind
0 4 Gds

Pagoh

Kesang X 24 January
Nyor
15 January 21 5

18–19 January
2/29 II
Simpang Aus 20 January 21–23 January X
Yong Peng
16 January Muar Jeram 20–22 January 8 Kluang
Ind
Bakri Parit 23 January
Sulong X
2/19 II X
22
Ind

Parit Jawa Aus III Gds 53 X
5
27
Bt. Pelandok Aus

Bt. Banang 24 January Ayer Hitam S. Sayong Halt

III 21–23 January

4 Gds

20 miles 15 X Batu Pahat

20km II Ind

I 4 Gds II

I 4 Gds 69
17–24 January

Senggarang

Australian gunners in action Regiment reached central
with a 25-pdr gun in January Malaya on 10 January. To
1942. Bennett hoped to apply threaten the British defence
firepower to stop the Japanese, of Johore, it was planned in
but the Japanese were late January to land the 18th
successful in keeping the Division’s 114th Infantry
campaign a war of manoeuvre. Regiment and a battalion of
(AWM) the 55th Infantry Regiment
at Endau on the south-
eastern coast of Malaya. For
the drive through Johore,
Yamashita planned to give
the 5th Division a few days’
rest in the area of Seremban
and keep the Imperial Guards
Division moving along the
coast. The 18th Division
advanced down the east coast,
and had occupied Kuantan on
3 January. Since the requisite air superiority over Singapore was not gained
in mid-January, the planned landing at Endau was scrapped, but a landing
on 26 January with logistical units was conducted.
Kuala Lumpur was occupied by the Japanese on the evening of 11
January. On the night of 13/14 January, Indian III Corps withdrew through
Westforce. Bennett had his two Australian brigade groups deployed along
the expected main area of Japanese advance supported by anti-tank units
and four artillery regiments. The 45th Indian Infantry Brigade was deployed
along the coast. To stop the momentum of the Japanese advance, Bennett
planned an ambush and chose an area to the west of Gemas to execute it.
On the afternoon of 14 January, an advance detachment of the 5th Division
fell into the trap.

Japanese infantry and a Type
97 medium tank advance
through Kuala Lumpur. The
Type 97 with its 57mm main
gun and two machine guns
could be devastating against
troops unprepared and
untrained to meet a tank
attack, as was shown twice
against the 11th Indian
Division. Later in the campaign
against properly prepared
Australian troops, Japanese
armour was less effective.
(Author’s collection)

70

Japanese infantry advance
through Kuala Lumpur on 11
January. Yamashita stated that
once this city was captured, he
knew he would win the
campaign. (AWM)

For a cost of only one dead and nine wounded, the Australians claimed Bennett briefs war
to have inflicted 1,000 casualties on the Japanese on the carefully selected correspondents about the
stretch of road. In fact, Japanese records indicated only 70 dead and 57 initial clash between Australian
wounded. By dawn the next day, the Japanese had put tanks across the and Japanese troops in January
bridge destroyed during the ambush and had resumed their advance. On 15 1942. Despite his criticism of
February the first major clash between the Australians and the Japanese took the inability of Indian and
place and during this an Australian battalion from the 27th Brigade repulsed British troops to stand and
three Japanese attacks before being flanked and forced to withdraw. Despite fight, Bennett fared no better in
a brave showing, the Australians had been forced to retreat with the loss of stopping the Japanese
much equipment after only five hours in action against a single Japanese advance. (AWM)
battalion. The ‘main battle’ was off to an uncertain start.

Bennett had deployed nine battalions in the area of the Gemas–Jementah–
Segamat triangle but, of these, only two were heavily engaged through 20
January before Bennett was forced to withdraw. This was primarily because
of Bennett’s reliance on the badly deployed and supported 45th Indian
Brigade to hold Westforce’s
western flank along the coast.
The Indians were forced
off the Sungei Muar, which
endangered Westforce’s
communications. Percival
decided to commit the
newly arrived British 53rd
Infantry Brigade, but with
pressure mounting along
the trunk road from the re-
committed 5th Division and
along the coast from the
Imperial Guards Division,
Percival decided to withdraw
Westforce. The ‘main battle’
had lasted a mere five days.
The order to retreat came too

71

late for the 45th Indian Infantry Brigade, which was forced to break out
on 20 January through the Imperial Guards Division. From the 16th to the
22nd, the 45th Indian Infantry Brigade was annihilated save for 400 men.
The surviving wounded were massacred by the victorious Japanese, and the
45th Indian Brigade ceased to exist. Meanwhile, Westforce was able to pull
back to the road junctions of Lapis and Yong Peng.

As early as 18 January, Percival was already thinking of pulling out of
Johore entirely and retreating to Singapore to prolong the defence of the
island. On the evening of 20 January, Westforce was ordered to pull back to a
final defence line stretching from Mersing on the east coast, through Kluang
and then to Batu Pahat on the west coast. Wavell was concerned enough to
pay a second visit to Singapore on 20 January to instruct Percival to defend
Johore for as long as possible to allow additional reinforcements to arrive.
On 21 January, the Chiefs of Staff weighed in from London with instruction
to Wavell to prepare for a prolonged defence of the island. Churchill too
provided inspiration on the 20th as only he could:

LEFT I want to make it absolutely clear that I expect every inch of ground to be
This is a 2-pdr anti-tank gun of defended, every scrap of material or defences to be blown to pieces to prevent
the Australian 2/4th Anti-tank capture by the enemy, and no question of surrender to be entertained until
Regiment. On 18 January, the protracted fighting among the ruins of Singapore city.
Japanese 4th Guards Regiment
supported by the Gotunda Tank At this point, it was inevitable that a withdrawal to Singapore would
Company attacked down the be conducted. On 24 January, Percival issued an outline plan for such a
road to Bakri in a reckless withdrawal. Between 24 and 31 January, the units of Westforce retreated
manner. On this occasion, two through Johore under Japanese pressure. The 11th Indian Infantry Division
anti-tank guns, one of which is withdrew along the coast, pursued by the Imperial Guards Division. The
shown here with its crew, 15th Indian Infantry Brigade was cut off by a Japanese roadblock in the area
supported by infantry, knocked of Rengit, but escaped by being evacuated by sea between 28 January and 1
out eight tanks and stopped February. The other two brigades assigned to the division, the 28th Indian
the Japanese advance. (AWM) Infantry Brigade and the 53rd British Infantry Brigade, reached Singapore
Island by way of the bridge at Johore Bahru on the night of 30/31 January.
RIGHT
The first Japanese tank in the In the centre, the 27th Australian Infantry Brigade withdrew down the
column was a Type 95 light main trunk road under pressure from the 21st Infantry Brigade from the 5th
tank, shown here. It was Division. After a well-conducted rearguard action, the Australians crossed
destroyed and its crew did not
survive. (AWM)

72

over onto Singapore An Australian 25-pdr gun in
on the night of 30/31 action in Johore. It was hoped
January. The right flank that firepower such as this
of Indian III Corps fared would be more effective in the
worst. This was manned open country of Johore, but it
by the 9th Indian Infantry was insufficient to stop the
Division with the 8th Japanese. (AWM)
and 22nd Indian Infantry
brigades. Facing it was
the 9th Infantry Brigade
from the 5th Division.
On the 28th, the 22nd
Indian Infantry Brigade
encountered a Japanese
roadblock obstructing its
retreat path. The brigade
commander elected to try
to move through the jungle
instead of mounting an attack to clear the Japanese from the road. This led
to a four-day march through trackless jungle, which ended on 1 February
when the brigade’s remaining 350 troops encountered another Japanese force
and surrendered.

The only road and rail lines linking Malaya and Singapore Island were
across a 1,100yd-long and 70ft-wide bridge called the Causeway at Johore
Bahru. By 0815hrs on 31 January, the last British unit crossed the Causeway.
There was no panic or congestion; the withdrawal was certainly Percival’s
best-conducted operation of the campaign and thwarted Yamashita’s plans
to destroy British forces before they could reach Singapore. Inexplicably, the
3rd Air Division had ignored the Causeway and the continual movement of
vehicles over it. With assistance from RN engineers using depth charges, the
Causeway was blown up. The Japanese had reached the Strait of Johore in
only 55 days, which put them well ahead of schedule. The battle for Malaya
was over.

LEFT
Well-camouflaged Japanese
infantry cross a stream in
Johore on 26 January. The
ability of the Japanese to
operate off-road gave them an
enduring advantage against
the mostly road-bound British
forces. (AWM)

RIGHT
This photo shows Japanese
troops in Johore on 31 January,
the day the British forces
completed their withdrawal
onto Singapore Island. After a
few days’ rest, these troops
would begin the final battle of
the campaign. (AWM)

73

THE AIR BATTLE

Hudsons of RAAF 1 Squadron The battle for control of the air over Malaya was decided within days. Given
pictured over Singapore before the disparity between the IJA and IJN air forces and the RAF in terms of
the war. These were the first the numbers and quality of aircraft, and aircrew training, the outcome was
Allied aircraft to go into action never in doubt.
during the campaign when
they attacked Japanese The IJN Air Force opened the air campaign by going after targets on
invasion shipping off Kota Singapore Island. A total of 17 bombers were directed at Tengah and Selatar
Bharu in the early hours of 8 airfields, but caused little damage. Another 48 bombers were forced to abort
December 1941. (AWM) because of bad weather. British reaction was limited to ineffective anti-aircraft
fire. The fact that Japanese bombers could range as far south as Singapore
was a disconcerting surprise to the British, and there was no mistaking that
the war had come to Singapore.

The IJA Air Force opened its air campaign with a series of concerted
attacks on British airfields in northern Malaya beginning at 0730hrs on 8
December. These featured several waves of attacks by Ki-21 heavy bombers
against the airfield at Sungei Patani, 27 Ki-21 bombers from the 60th
Sentai against Alor Star and Ki-43 fighters strafing airfields as far south
as Butterworth. On several occasions, British aircraft were caught on the
ground and destroyed.

The RAF was not passive in the face of the Japanese onslaught. The
discovery of the Japanese landing force off Kota Bharu during the early
hours of 8 December prompted an all-out air assault. Throughout the night
and following day, the RAF mounted a series of attacks on the Japanese
invasion force, which was composed of three transports and their escorts.
The attacks began during the night with No. 1 Royal Australian Air Force
(RAAF) Squadron flying Hudsons out of Kota Bharu. These first attacks
were successful in damaging all three transports, one of which later sank.
This was followed by attacks throughout the day by Blenheims of 27, 34,
60 and 62 Squadrons, Vildebeests from 36 and 100 Squadrons, and more
RAAF Hudsons from 8 Squadron. Altogether, some 86 aircraft conducted
attacks that were pressed home bravely against the transports or the Japanese
beachhead at Kota Bharu; in spite of this maximum effort, the results were

comparatively meagre. One transport
was sunk, and the other two forced
to depart the invasion area, but
this did not stop the Japanese from
getting a force ashore strong enough
to defeat the Indian infantry brigade
defending Kota Bharu. Meanwhile,
the main Japanese invasion force off
Singora and Patani was unmolested.

A key part of the Japanese plan
to gain air superiority was to base
fighters on the Malayan Peninsula
as soon as possible. On 8 December,
Ki-27 fighters were moved to Singora
airfield, quickly followed by other
elements of the 3rd Air Division. Air
Marshal Pulford was determined to
attack the Japanese bases at Singora

74

and Patani even with his totally inadequate forces. On 9 December, the first
raid was conducted with six Blenheim bombers from Tengah airfield. The
bombers were to meet up with fighters from Butterworth airfield, but the
fighters did not appear and the bombers went to their target unescorted.
Once over the target, they met heavy anti-aircraft fire and were intercepted
by some 30 Japanese fighters. Incredibly, only three bombers were shot down.

Another attack was planned for later in the day, but the Blenheims of 34
and 62 Squadrons which had staged to Butterworth were attacked on the
ground before they could take off. All were destroyed or damaged, except a
single bomber, which proceeded by itself to Singora. This aircraft bombed
the target, but was shot down.

The battle for air superiority over northern Malaya was over in two days.
The Japanese effort to destroy British air power on the ground on 8 December,
combined with the losses suffered during the British air attacks, meant that
of the 110 British aircraft stationed on airfields in northern Malaya, only
50 remained operational by the end of the day. The reasons for this were
clear – British fighters were few and overmatched, but, more importantly,
the warning system covering northern Malaya was totally inadequate. The
level of anti-aircraft protection for each airfield was set at four heavy and 12
light anti-aircraft guns, but this was not provided, which allowed Japanese
aircraft often to bomb and strafe at will. The net effect was that the RAF was
broken within the first few days of the campaign, and the Japanese gained
air superiority. By 9 December, Pulford withdrew all but two squadrons to
Singapore. Before this occurred, congested Kuantan airfield was attacked and
seven more British aircraft destroyed on the ground.

By the evening of the 9th, the number of operational British aircraft in
northern Malaya totalled ten, concentrated at Butterworth airfield. Alor
Star, Sungei Patani, Kota Bharu, Machang and Gong Kedah had all been
abandoned, often hurriedly with much useful material being left for the
Japanese. The RAF was forced to fall back to airfields in central and southern
Malaya, which the ground staffs had to hurriedly prepare.

After the RAF’s defeat in northern Malaya, its new priority was to provide
air defence for the naval base and the convoys bringing reinforcements into
the fortress. Thus, most fighters were based in Singapore. On 12 December,
Pulford decided to provide some measure of air defence to the ground troops
and sent a single squadron of Buffalos to Butterworth. The final British air
attack on Singora was mounted on 12 December by three Blenheims, but
was ineffective. Further air attacks were abandoned since fighter cover
was no longer available. With almost all fighters retained in Singapore, the
few remaining strike aircraft were withheld to oppose a potential Japanese
invasion on the east coast of Malaya. No attempt was made to support
British ground troops directly, but night attacks were made on the major road
running down eastern Malaya. By 22 December, 453 Squadron, operating
out of central Malaya with its outclassed Buffalo fighters, was reduced to
three aircraft so it was pulled back to Singapore.

On the night of 27 December, six Blenheims from 34 Squadron hit the
Japanese airfield at Sungei Patani and claimed some 15 aircraft destroyed.
This apparent success prompted a repeat attack the following night, but it
did nothing to stop the relentless pressure on British ground forces from
Japanese aircraft. In early January, the retreating Indian III Corps offered a
wonderful target for Japanese air power, which had air superiority in central

75

RAF deployment, 8 December 1941

Singora Patani Occupied air eld
Unoccupied air eld
Khlaung Ngae Landing ground
Sadao
N

Alor Star Jitra Tumpat Kota Bharu
62 Sqn 1 (RAAF) Sqn, Det 243 Sqn

KEDDAH Det 36 Sqn
Gong Kedah
Sungei 21 (RAAF), Betong Machang
Patani 27 Sqns Kroh
Kuala Krai
Ka Ketil
Butterworth Grik Kuala Trengganu
Penang Sungei Bakap
Lubok Kiap KELANTAN
Malakoff

Port Weld Taiping TRENGGANU Kuala Dungun
Kuala Kangasar

Ipoh

Stiawan Kampar Kuala Lipis
Telok Anson
Tapah Jerantur
Bidor Raub

Slim River Kuantan
8 (RAAF), 60 Sqns

SELANGOR Bentong PAHANG Maran
Kuala Lumpur
Kuala Selangor

Port Swettenham NEGRI

Seremban Bahau

Morib SEMBILAN Gemas Segamat Endau
Port Dickson
Tampin Mersing
Jemaluang
Sembawang MALACCA Labis
Kahang
453 (RAAF) Seletar Malacca
Sqn 36, 100, JOHORE
205 Sqns
34 Sqn Muar Yong Peng Kluang
Tengah
Rengani
Ayer
Batu Pahat Hitam Kota Tinggi

243 (RNZAF), 0 50 miles Tebrau
488 (RNZAF) Sqns 0 Johore Bahru
Singapore Kallang 50km
Singapore

76

Malaya. However, the Japanese failed to mass air power, using only small
groups of bombers that did not disrupt the retreat. If the IJA Air Force did
not conduct interdiction, British accounts indicate that Japanese aircraft were
consistently active over the key battle areas. They caused little direct damage,
but did have a discernable impact on British morale.

As British ground forces were pushed out of central Malaya into Johore,
the RAF’s emphasis was still on providing cover for convoys arriving in
Singapore. There were small-scale attempts to mount night-time attacks on
Japanese airfields at Kuantan and Kuala Lumpur and some attacks were
flown against Japanese traffic on the trunk road. In addition to the British
air units, several squadrons of Dutch Glenn Martin bombers briefly joined
the fight, and a small number of United States Army Air Force B-24s attacked
Japanese airfields in Malaya from their base in Java, using Palembang in
Sumatra as a staging point.

The only way for the RAF to sustain the air battle was to keep a steady flow
of reinforcements coming into Singapore. This ultimately proved impossible
since the air reinforcement route was long and insufficiently developed. This
meant that attrition on the way was high. The reinforcements that did arrive
were not complete units with their ground staffs, but small groups of aircraft,
which had to be thrown into action before they were ready.

For example, in mid-December, a group of 18 Blenheim IV bombers were
slated to fly to Singapore, but, of these, only seven reached Singapore by
25 December; the others were lost en route. Late in the month, Hudson
II bombers began to reach Singapore. The flow of shorter-ranged fighters
was much more difficult to maintain, especially after the Japanese occupied
a staging airfield in southern Burma. This meant that after mid-December
all fighter aircraft had to be delivered by sea. A convoy with 51 Hurricane
fighters in crates, along with 24 pilots, was diverted to Singapore on 17
December and arrived on 13 January. This was followed late in the month
by the delivery of 48 Hurricanes from the carrier Indomitable, which were
flown off to Sumatra and then proceeded to Singapore.

THE FINAL AIR BATTLES

In the second week of January, the focus of the air campaign shifted to
Singapore itself. The lack of early warning and the poor performance of
the Buffalo fighters handicapped the British defence. In mid-January, the
RAF boasted 56 serviceable fighters from five squadrons. The arrival of the
crated Hurricane fighters on 13 January was seen as opportunity to regain
air control over Malaya, but these fighters proved no more effective than
the much-criticized Buffalos. While the Hurricanes were more capable than
the Buffalos, especially at altitude, they were not superior to the IJA’s nimble
Ki-43 fighters, and remained clearly inferior to the IJN’s Zero fighter. Thus,
the much-anticipated debut of the Hurricane was unable to change British
fortunes in the air. In the final analysis, the numerical disparity between the
two sides was decisive. Between 15 and 24 January, the average strength
of Allied air power was 74 bombers and 28 fighters. In comparison, the
Japanese brought 250 bombers and 150 fighters to the fight.

In the second half of January, the Japanese made large-scale attacks on
Singapore, focusing on the naval base, the port and the airfields. These were

77

mounted by bomber formations of 27 aircraft escorted by fighters and were
a daily event. Beginning on 20 January, the RAF’s Hurricane fighters joined
the battle, but the RAF continued to suffer daily losses, which the trickle of
reinforcements was unable to cover. The RAF did occupy the full attention of
the Japanese air forces, so they made no attempt to attack the reinforcement
convoys. In addition, the RAF put up enough of a fight that the Japanese
judged they did not have the absolute air superiority required to launch a
major landing on south-eastern Malaya in the second half of January. The
cancellation of this operation was a contributing factor to the successful
withdrawal of Percival’s forces from Johore onto Singapore Island.

When a Japanese convoy did appear off Endau on 26 January, the British
did not know it was only a logistical support landing for the 3rd Air Division.
The RAF committed its remaining strike aircraft against this threat, but it
was not until the afternoon of the 26th that the first British aircraft were
dispatched to attack the apparent landing force. The strike force consisted
of nine Hudson bombers and 12 Vildebeests armed with bombs instead of
torpedoes. A strong escort was provided in the form of 15 Buffalos and eight
Hurricanes. Against heavy fighter opposition, the British attack was pressed
home and hits claimed on both transports anchored offshore. The price
was five Vildebeests shot down. Another wave with nine Vildebeests, three
Albacores and 12 fighters reached the target area at about 1730hrs and, in the
face of fierce fighter resistance, pressed home its attack. This attack achieved
little, but suffered five Vildebeests, two Albacores and a fighter shot down.

Following the demolition of the last two airfields in Malaya at Kahang
and Kluang beginning on 21 January, all Allied air forces had to fly from
the four airfields on Singapore. To reduce the congestion, arrangements
were made to fly from airfields on southern Sumatra. By 28 January, all the
bomber units were based outside Singapore. Of the airfields on Singapore,
Tengah, Sembawang and Seletar were located on the northern part of the
island, which would soon be in range of Japanese artillery from across the
Strait of Johore. The fourth airfield, at Kallang, was located on the south
coast. This was the former civil airfield and since it was on a salt marsh at
sea level, it proved difficult to repair the holes made by Japanese bombing. A
plan to create dispersal strips was rendered impractical after it was realized
that there were no troops to guard them against possible Japanese airborne
attack. This situation forced the withdrawal of all remaining aircraft to
bases in southern Sumatra, with the exception of eight Hurricanes and eight
Buffalos. This withdrawal made provision of air defence for the front-line
troops even more problematic and further lowered morale in the fortress.

During the first week of February the British maintained a small force of fighters
on the island, while a bomber force averaging 20 Hudsons and 15 Blenheims
operated from southern Sumatra. These conducted ineffective night attacks to
disrupt Japanese attack preparations. In return, the Japanese made constant
bombing attacks on Singapore’s dock area, which were largely unchallenged
since there was inadequate warning to get defending fighters airborne to meet
the high-altitude formations. This inability to counter the weight of Japanese air
power over a defenceless city contributed to the sense of the futility of prolonging
resistance. By the time of the British surrender on 15 February, Japanese air forces
based in Malaya were already conducting operations to support the upcoming
invasion of Sumatra and Java. Air power was not a decisive factor during the
campaign, but it did contribute to the speed of the Japanese conquest.

78

THE ATTACK ON SINGAPORE

The island of Singapore is separated from Malaya by the Strait of Johore.
This is between 600 and 5,000 yards wide with the shortest distance being in
the northern part where the Causeway was located. The coast was marked by
many small rivers and creeks, and these were covered by mangrove swamps,
which became a series of islands at high tide. The rest of the island, which
is 27 miles at its widest and 13 miles deep, is fairly flat. The highest points,
some 600 feet high, are at Bukit Mandai and Bukit Timah in the centre of the
island. The terrain was mainly covered in jungle, but there were several good
roads, which led to Singapore city in the southern part of the island. One
factor which would become key was the existence of three water reservoirs in
the centre of the island, providing 17 million gallons daily for the population,
which had swelled from the pre-war 550,000 to almost twice that by late
January.

The British defences
The British plan to defend the island was based on pre-war concepts, which
were focused on defending the naval base from seaward attack. It is unfair
to say that there were no preparations made to defend the island from an
attack from the north, since the entire campaign in Malaya was conducted
for this purpose. When it came to improving defences along the Strait of
Johore to defend the island, it is fair to say nothing was done to create any
fortifications. There were some scattered beach defences constructed, and
two defensive lines had been surveyed in the interior of the island to stop
landings from the east or west. The line in the west was called the Jurong
Line and limited preliminary work on it had begun in January. Singapore was
a fortress in name only.

While the troops expected to hold the fortress were impressive on paper,
with a total combat strength of 70,000 men, they were in fact a demoralized,
under-trained, and poorly equipped force. Of the 38 infantry battalions, only
13 were British battalions. These were largely from the 18th Division, two
brigades of which had not yet seen any action and were thus at full strength.
The remaining seven were all under strength. The six Australian battalions

The view from Singapore, near
the Causeway, across to Johore
Bahru and the Sultan’s Palace.
Yamashita chose this structure
to view the attack across the
strait. (AWM)

79

had been brought up to full strength, but only by using the recently arrived
untrained replacements. Of the 17 Indian battalions, only one was at full
strength. The others included three battalions of the just-arrived 44th Infantry
Brigade which was semi-trained and 13 battalions which were either hastily
reorganized or still in the process of reorganization. There were also two Malay
battalions of unknown value and three volunteer battalions suitable only for
guarding static positions. Those units which had returned from the mainland
were short of weapons. Morale of these troops had been shaken by the long
retreat, and the recent withdrawal of naval and air forces from the island.

Percival was convinced that the most likely place for a Japanese assault
was on the north-east part of the strait. At the same time, he did not rule out
an assault from the sea or from airborne troops, so he was faced with the
requirement to defend all 70 miles of coast. He decided to fight a forward
battle in which the defenders would try to prevent a Japanese landing,
and then counter-attack any Japanese lodgement. He recognized that this
had inherent disadvantages given the lack of depth of the defence and the
terrain which precluded any coherent beach defence, but felt this was better
than allowing the Japanese to land and fight a battle inland. Key to the
defence was the employment of Percival’s considerable artillery strength,
which totalled 226 guns of all calibres against the Japanese while they were
struggling to get ashore. Despite myth, this included most of the coastal
artillery (four of five 15in. guns, all six 9.2in. guns and most of the 18 6in.
guns), which could engage at least some targets to the north. This firepower
was never fully brought to bear because of a lack of a central fire-control
plan and failure to coordinate fire at every level. The defence was broken
down into three sectors. In the north-east, the 11th Indian Infantry Division
and the 18th Division were placed. The western sector was the responsibility
of the 8th Australian Infantry Division and the 44th Indian Infantry Brigade.
The southern sector was guarded by Malay and volunteer troops. None of
Percival’s commanders had confidence in his plan, especially the Australians
who were soon to bear the brunt of the Japanese assault.

The Japanese plan
The Japanese reached the Strait of Johore on 31 January. The 5th and 18th
Divisions were concentrated west of the Causeway and the Imperial Guards
Division to the east. Yamashita assessed that the British defences were more
formidable in the north-eastern part of the strait, which was true since that
is where Percival had placed his best unit (the 18th Division). Instead of
attacking into the teeth of the best British defences, he determined to attack
in the sector between Tanjong Buloh and Tanjong Murai, the area held by
the 22nd Australian Infantry Brigade. The Japanese attack would go in
with the 18th Division on the right with two regiments and a battalion in
the first wave and two more battalions in reserve. The 5th Division was
on the left with three regiments in the first wave and another in reserve.
Altogether, Yamashita massed a main attack with 16 battalions in the first
wave and another five in reserve on an attack sector of only 4.5 miles. Facing
this onslaught were three Australian battalions. Also supporting the attack
was the 1st Tank Regiment assigned to the 5th Division. The attack was
scheduled to begin between 2000 and 2400hrs on the night of 8/9 February.
To mount this attack across the strait, the Japanese were well equipped with
assault craft. The 5th Division was allocated 30 collapsible boats, 30 small

80

Part of the Japanese
preparatory artillery campaign
before the assault crossing of
the Strait of Johore was to
destroy the naval base fuel
tanks. The Japanese feared that
the British would empty the
fuel into the strait and set it on
fire. The British had no such
plans, but ironically such an
unplanned incident did
incinerate boats of the Imperial
Guards Division when it made
its crossing. (AWM)

landing craft, 30 pontoons, and seven heavy pontoons. The neighbouring The Type 96 150mm howitzer
18th Division had to make do with 140 collapsible boats and 30 pontoons. was the most modern IJA gun
used in the campaign. One is
After the main attack had been delivered, a supporting attack would be seen here firing on British
conducted by the Imperial Guards Division in the area west of the Causeway, positions in February 1942. One
which was held by the 27th Australian Infantry Brigade. This attack included heavy artillery regiment was
a total of seven battalions supported by the 14th Tank Regiment. The equipped with this gun, which
Imperial Guards Division was allocated only 30 collapsible boats, but was to had a range of over 13,000
be augmented by craft from the other divisions that had already made their yards. (Author’s collection)
assault crossing. This attack was hastily planned and approved by Yamashita
only after Nishimura complained that his Guards were being sidelined.

Yamashita went to great efforts to hide the location of his main thrust.
The Imperial Guards Division built dummy camps in the north-east sector,
conducted a demonstration attack on Ubin Island, and Japanese pre-attack
artillery preparations with the 168 available medium and heavy guns
focused on this area. The assault troops were
not moved forward until the day before
the attack. Australian patrols did detect the
extensive Japanese activity opposite the 22nd
Australian Infantry Brigade on the night of
7/8 February, but it was too late for Percival
to react.

THE JAPANESE ATTACK

Beginning on the morning of 8 February,
Japanese air and artillery opened up on
the sector of the 22nd Australian Infantry
Brigade. After sunset, the barrage intensified.
The Australians prepared themselves for the

81

JAPANESE FORCES D C H
A. 18th Division, Right Wing (55th Infantry Regiment, I Battalion, 56th Infantry Regiment; A B
1
elements of 1st Independent Anti-tank Battalion, elements 12th Engineer Regiment) 1 2
B. 18th Division, Left Wing (114th Infantry Regiment; elements of 1st Independent Anti-tank
2
Battalion, elements of 12th Engineer Regiment) AMA KENG
C. Engineers (12th Engineers Regiment, Elements, of 21st Independent Brigade, 23rd
3
Independent Engineer Regiment, 15th River Crossing Material Company, 22nd Bridge

Building Material Company)
D. 18th Division Reserves (2nd and 3rd Battalions, 56th Infantry Regiment)
E. 5th Division, Right Wing (21st and 42nd Infantry Regiments; one medium tank company,

1st Tank Regiment, 5th Engineer Regiment (minus one company)
F. 5th Division, Left Wing (11th Infantry Regiment; one company, 5th Engineer Regiment)
G. Engineers (15th Independent Engineer Regiment, Engineer unit 3rd Tank Group, 5th

Independent Engineer Company, 26th Independent Engineer Regiment (one company),

21st River Crossing Material Company, 27th Bridge Building Material Company)
H. 5th Division Reserves (41st Infantry Regiment, 5th Reconnaissance Regiment, 1st Tank

Regiment (less one company))
I. Imperial Guards Division Assault Group (4th Guards Infantry Regiment, 3rd Battalion, 3rd

Guards Infantry Regiment, 1st Independent Anti-tank Battalion (two companies), Guards

Engineer Regiment (one company))
J. Imperial Guards Division Left Flank Guard (2nd Battalion, 5th Guards Infantry Regiment)
K. Engineers (Guards Engineer Regiment (less elements with Assault Group and Left Flank

Guard, 20th Independent Engineer Regiment, 26th Independent Engineer Regiment (one

company)))
L. Imperial Guards Division Reserve (5th Guards Infantry Regiment (less one battalion), 14th

Tank Regiment)

7

TENGAH 8
AIRFIELD BULIM

9

EVENTS

8 February 9. Nightfall – Jurong Line occupied with 12th Indian Brigade on right, 44th Indian
1. Japanese attacks begin at about 2030hrs with 16 infantry battalions focused on Brigade on left. The 22nd Australian Brigade holds Bulim and 15th Indian Brigade is
defensive areas of Australian 2/20th and 2/18th Battalions. ordered to move up.
2. Despite losses, the Japanese soon gain a lodgement and begin to infiltrate around 10. 2030hrs – The Imperial Guards Division makes its assault crossing and meets
Australian defensive positions. heavy opposition.
3. 2400hrs – 2/29th Battalion from the 27th Australian Infantry Brigade is attached to 11. 2400hrs – 27th Australian Brigade is forced back to the vicinity of Kranji. At
the 22nd Australian Infantry Brigade and ordered to Tengah Airfield. 0400hrs on 10 February, the brigade is ordered to retreat, giving the Japanese a firm
9 February lodgement.
4. 0100–0300hrs – the forward troops of all three Australian battalions are ordered to
fall back to battalion perimeters. The withdrawal is accomplished with heavy losses.
5. Dawn – remnants of 2/18th Battalion are attacked at Ama Keng and forced to
retreat to Tengah airfield, which they reach at 0930hrs.
6. 0830hrs – Percival moves his only reserve unit, the 12th Indian Brigade, to Keat
Hong; it arrives there at 1200hrs.
7. 1000hrs – isolated parties of the 2/20th and 2/19th battalions reach Tengah Airfield;
the 22nd Australian Infantry Brigade is now combat ineffective.
8. British forces reach area of Bulim, 1500hrs.

THE JAPANESE ASSAULT ACROSS THE STRAIT OF JOHORE

On the night of 8/9 February 1942, two Japanese divisions fall upon a single Australian brigade across the
Strait of Johore. The Japanese soon establish a lodgement and create the conditions for the conquest of
Fortress Singapore.

82

Note: Gridlines are shown at intervals of 1km BRITISH FORCES
1. 2/20th Battalion, 22nd Australian Brigade
XX 2. 2/18th Battalion, 22nd Australian Brigade
3. 2/19th Battalion, 22nd Australian Brigade
18 X X 4. 2/30th Battalion, 27th Australian Brigade
5. 2/26th Battalion, 27th Australian Brigade
RENYA 5 XX 6. 2/29th Battalion, 27th Australian Brigade
7. Dalforce
TAKURO IMPERIAL 8. 28th Indian Brigade
GUARDS 9. 12th Indian Brigade
L TAKUMA 10. 44th Indian Brigade
G 11. 15th Indian Brigade
E F
JOHORE STRAIT
1 JOHORE BAHRU
12 K 8

7I J XX
10
II
54 IND
MURRAY-LYON
4
5 XX

3 KRANJI 8
MANDAI VILLAGE AUS
6
BENNETT
KEAT HONG
9

BUKIT PANJANG
6
10

11

83

Japanese troops, including a attack they knew was coming, and at about
pontoon carrying a tank, cross 2030hrs landing craft were sighted approaching
the Strait of Johore. Once the their positions.
Japanese secured a lodgement
to bring supplies, armour and Despite stiff resistance, the forward
artillery across unmolested by Australian positions were swamped by the
British fire, the battle was over. weight of the Japanese attack. The Australians
(AWM) fought without artillery support and once ashore
the Japanese infiltrated between the widely
separated Australian defences.

Between 0100 and 0300hrs, the forward
companies of all three Australian battalions
were ordered to fall back to previously selected
battalion perimeters. This was a difficult
undertaking at night, through heavy terrain and
with the Japanese pressing their attack. Only
half the men from the 2/18th Battalion reached
Ama Keng and the other two battalions suffered
even worse with about a company escaping. This
rendered the 22nd Australian Infantry Brigade
combat ineffective.

As the focus of the Japanese attack became
clear, Percival ordered his only real reserve, the
12th Indian Infantry Brigade to support the
Australians, and Bennett moved the reserve
2/29th Battalion from the 27th Australian
Infantry Brigade sector to the 22nd Brigade’s
sector. By nightfall, the British had fallen back to the Jurong Line. The 44th
Indian Infantry Brigade held the southern sector, the 22nd Australian Infantry
Brigade, which had been reinforced by a number of units, was established
around Bulim, and the 12th Indian Infantry Brigade was deployed to their
north. The first day had seen the Japanese gain their planned objectives. The
British had taken a beating, but still maintained a viable defence.
The next part of the Japanese attack unfolded on the night of 9/10
February. During the day, artillery fire was intensified against the sector
held by the 27th Australian Infantry Brigade. At about 2030hrs, the
Japanese began their assault. Australian machine-gunners took a heavy toll
in the Japanese assault boats, and General Nishimura sought permission
from Yamashita to call off his attack and land behind the 5th Division the
following day. But by midnight, the 2/26th Battalion had been forced back
500 yards and, by 0400hrs, the commander of the 27th Australian Infantry
Brigade had ordered a retreat which opened a gap with the neighbouring
11th Indian Division and allowed the Japanese the opportunity to bring up
the rest of the Imperial Guards Division without interference.

BATTLE FOR THE JURONG LINE

The battle for the Jurong Line was over before Percival and Bennett
realized it had started. Bennett ordered the 22nd Australian Brigade to hold
Bulim until early on 10 January and then to fall back to the Jurong Line
between the 12th and 44th Indian Brigades. Throughout the few days of

84

the battle for Singapore, Percival’s Japanese infantry advance up
Malaya Command was unable the high ground near Bukit
to coordinate operations at any Timah on 11 February. Not only
level. The events of 10 January was this the highest ground on
give the best example of this. the island, which had a
The northern part of the line was commanding view of the city,
abandoned when the 12th Indian but it was the location of
Brigade pulled back without orders important supply depots for
to prevent the Imperial Guards the garrison. (AWM)
Division from driving down from
Kranji behind the British defences.
In the southern part of the line,
the 15th and 44th Indian Brigades
pulled back to protect the Jurong
road in response to a set of orders
from Percival not even in effect. The
result was that by the evening of the
10th, the Jurong Line, which had
been partly surveyed and prepared,
had been lost and the British forces
in the west disrupted. The loss of
this line was the last chance to
defend Singapore city.

Yamashita sensed the British
confusion and ordered a major
drive to seize Singapore quickly.
The 18th Division massed on the
Jurong road and the 5th Division, with tanks, was in the area of Tengah
airfield. The Imperial Guards Division was still crossing the Strait of Johore
to the west of the Causeway, but posed a threat to drive down from the
north to cut off British forces in the western part of the island. To counter
the later potential threat, Percival formed a three-battalion force drawing
from all three brigades of the 18th British Division (named Tomforce) and
sent it to cover the main road leading from the Causeway on the evening
of 10 January. Under prompting from Wavell, who visited Singapore for
the last time on 10 January, Percival ordered a counter-attack to regain the
Jurong Line. The attack was to include four brigades. Of these, only two were
actually able to follow orders.

Meanwhile, infantry from the 5th Division, supported by tanks, attacked
to the east from the area of Tengah airfield down the Choa Chu Kang road.
The Japanese sliced through the 12th Indian Brigade and an Australian
battalion until reaching the main road and turning south. In spite of three
roadblocks, which accounted for several Japanese tanks, the Japanese reached
the vital road junction and depots at Bukit Timah at about midnight on the
night of 10/11 February.

The British counter-attack never got going. At 0300hrs on 11 February,
the Japanese 18th Division attacked down the Jurong road into the positions
of the British units preparing for the attack. This attack was held, but it
forced the counter-attack to be cancelled. Another Japanese attack at 0730hrs
smashed through the 15th Indian Brigade and sent the survivors reeling back
to the position of the 22nd Australian Brigade.

85

The battle of Bukit Timah and the loss of the Jurong Line

British positions 10 February Johore N
British positions 11 February Bahru
0 2 miles Naval
Base Area
0 2km
X
28 X
Ind 53

Imperial XX
Guards

8X X
Ind
53

Sembawang
Air eld

Mandai Village Imperial XX 8X
Guards Ind
1. 0600hrs, 10 Febuary Bt. X Nee Soon
2. 0800hrs, 10 Febuary Mandai Seletar
3. 1800hrs, 10 Febuary Reservoir
4. 2400hrs, 10 Febuary 27
Aus

Tengah 12 X 28 X
Air eld Ind Ind

2 3
1
XX Keat Hong Bukit Panjang
Bulim Village
5 22 X
Aus
Pierce
Reservoir

XX 15 X 27 X
Ind Aus
18 (-)

Jurong 4 XX MacRitchie Thomson
Line Reservoir Village
5

44 X Bt. Timah Massy X
Ind Force
XX
X 18
18
Sleepy Tomforce
Valley
Race Course
Village

Kg Jawa 22 X
Aus

1X 44 X
Malaya Ind

Tanglin

1X
Malaya
Pasir Panjang

86

The failure of the Japanese to press their advantage because of
ammunition shortages, gave the British a chance to recover and organize
another counter-attack. Bennett ordered three battalions to re-take Bukit
Timah, but, in the face of two Japanese divisions, this counter-attack stalled
by early afternoon. Meanwhile, Percival was assembling another brigade-
sized force from the British 18th Infantry Division to cover the left flank of
the 11th Indian Division and protect the reservoirs in the centre of the island.
This did nothing to lessen the pressure on the 11th Indian Division, which
came under attack on the 11th from the Imperial Guards Division. Japanese
pressure and continued British command and control issues prompted the
27th Australian Brigade to move south to the Race Course, which left the
left flank of the 11th Indian Division entirely exposed. The commander of
the 11th Indian Division ordered a withdrawal to protect his left, which
meant abandoning the naval base. By 1800hrs, the base was abandoned and
final demolitions conducted. By the evening of the 11th, the British had been
forced back to the area of the MacRitchie reservoir and the Race Course.
South of these defences was the reinforced 22nd Australian Brigade, which
withstood attacks throughout the day by the 18th Division’s 56th and 114th
Infantry regiments.

THE FINAL BATTLES

The Japanese kept the pressure up on 12 February. The 5th Division,
supported by tanks, continued to attack down the Bukit Timah road toward
Singapore city. This sector was held by the scratch brigade from the 18th
British Division, which was named Massy Force. On the left of the 5th
Division, the Imperial Guards Division occupied all three reservoirs in the
centre of the island and began to pressure the perimeter around Singapore
from the north and north-east. The 18th Division continued to press along
the Holland road and along the southern coast of the island against the
defences of the 22nd Australian Brigade, the 44th Indian Brigade, and on
the coast against the 1st Malaya Brigade, which was in combat for the first
time. Against this pressure, Percival decided to withdraw to a final perimeter
around the city itself. This withdrawal commenced at about noon on the
12th and was accomplished by evening.

By the morning of the 13th, the British held a perimeter stretching 28
miles around Singapore. The fighting strengths of the British brigades had
been greatly reduced; the 22nd Australian Brigade was down to 800 men and
the 44th Indian Brigade was down to 1,200 men.

By this time, British morale was unravelling. There was clearly no chance
of defending the city and calls for resistance to the last round were having
no effect. Though there were instances of the British troops holding their
ground, such as the 22nd Australian Brigade along the Holland road, the
most obvious manifestation of broken morale was a continual propensity
to withdraw. On the 12th, the Governor gave orders that the Singapore
broadcasting station be blown up and the contents of the treasury burned.
With no confidence in their leadership, troops in the rear began to desert, and
armed deserters were even reported to be looting. Others seized small boats
to escape or attempted to board ships leaving the port area.

87

CAPITULATION

Yamashita (top left) discusses The scale of the British demolition
the terms of the surrender with programme increased as the fall of the
Percival (bottom right). After an island looked to be imminent. The stocks
hour, Percival agreed to of rubber were burned, and the tin-
surrender unconditionally, smelting plants and a number of factories
having received assurances destroyed. However, the demolition was
from Yamashita for the safety of actually handicapped by the staff and
the civilians and soldiers in the owners of some plants. Some facilities
city. (AWM) were given exemptions for morale
purposes, so the overall scale of denial of
useful military equipment and industrial
facilities was incomplete.

On the early afternoon of 13
February, Percival held a conference with
his principal staff and unit commanders.
All present concurred that a counter-
attack had no hope of success, and Heath
and Bennett both advocated surrender.
Percival resisted this, but later admitted
to Wavell that resistance would likely last
only another day or two. On the night of 13/14 February, the last ships and
seagoing craft in the port were ordered to leave for Java and Sumatra with
3,000 evacuees on board. The scale of Japanese attacks was reduced on the
13th, with the exception of the sector held by the 1st Malaya Brigade.
The Japanese pressure on the western part of the perimeter increased on
14 February. By the end of the day, the Japanese 18th Division was some
3,000 yards from the southern outskirts of the city. In the centre, attacks
by the 5th Division, supported by tanks, made progress down the Bukit

The most iconic photo of the
campaign – Percival and several
of his staff officers march to the
Ford Factory at Bukit Timah to
surrender the Singapore
garrison. (Author’s collection)

88

Timah road and reached a British soldiers have thrown
residential area on the outskirts their rifles on the ground and
of the city. In the east, minor surrender to the Japanese
Japanese penetrations were soldiers – 16 February 1942.
cleared up by the end of the (AWM)
day. Adding to Percival's
troubles, on the morning of
the 14th, he was informed by
the Director General of Civil
Defence that the collapse of
the water supply in the city was
imminent. Another meeting
with municipal authorities
later in the day indicated that
the water supply situation was
slightly improved. Percival
indicated to Wavell that the
water situation did not change
his intent to fight on.

Despite encouragement
from Wavell to fight on,
Percival’s situation was
becoming increasingly perilous.
There were now about one
million people crowded into
the city, and with the remaining
troops of the garrison also
spread out in every part of the
city, the Japanese continued
widespread shelling and aerial
bombing. This created severe
casualties on the undefended civilians and crowded hospitals and other
temporary facilities used as hospitals with wounded.

The following day, Percival was forced to bow to the inevitable. At a
0930hrs staff meeting, the water situation was reported to be dire, with a
total failure expected within 24 hours. Food was adequate, as was small-arms
ammunition, but shortages in fuel and heavier ammunition were already
evident. Percival painted the situation as a choice between a counter-attack
to regain control of the water reservoirs or an immediate surrender. With a
counter-attack clearly impossible, this left capitulation. When Wavell gave
Percival discretion in a morning telegram to surrender if he felt it was no
longer possible to continue fighting, Percival made plans to end resistance.

Accordingly, at 1715hrs on 15 February, Percival and his chief of staff
followed Japanese instructions to proceed to the Ford Factory at Bukit Timah
to meet his Japanese counterpart. Yamashita demanded an unconditional
surrender from the reluctant Percival, and under threat of renewed Japanese
attacks, Percival agreed after a 55-minute discussion. The surrender was
signed at 1810hrs and was effective as of 2030hrs that evening. The 70-
day campaign for Malaya and Singapore was over, and the greatest military
defeat in British history complete.

89

 

THE AFTERMATH

Japanese soldiers in Fullerton Singapore was one of the most pivotal campaigns in the Pacific War. The
Square, Singapore on 17 myth of the invincibility of the IJA was born and both Burma and India were
February 1942. Yamashita never open to invasion. The question remains: how could a larger British force be
let his main combat troops into routed in a campaign which lasted only 70 days? Was such an astounding
the city since he did not trust defeat inevitable?
them not to go on a rampage.
The only troops sent in were The start of the campaign was a disaster for the British. The weak British
military police and selected air force was crippled on the first few days, and never became a factor in the
infantry companies. Percival’s campaign. The Japanese enjoyed air superiority, and all the advantages that
surrender before the battle this confers, for virtually the entire campaign. The RN was forced to send a
entered the streets of small force immediately to the Far East for political reasons, but in military
Singapore probably prevented terms it was a bluff. It did not deter the Japanese, who promptly exhibited
a massacre. (AWM) that the day of the battleships operating in the face of air power was over.

The first stage of the campaign revealed every possible British weakness.
The failure to execute Operation Matador into southern Thailand, again
because of political reasons, meant the Japanese were able to gain a solid

foothold on the Malayan Peninsula, which
they were quickly able to expand. The
widely dispersed British forces were never
able to concentrate against the Japanese.
When the British did make a stand their
poor state of training, particularly among
the Indian units, resulted in a string
of defeats.

The battle for central Malaya was a
decisive defeat for the British. This was
the best opportunity Percival had to derail
the Japanese plan for a quick victory. A
successful stand here offered the strategic
depth to create the conditions for a British
counteroffensive. If driven back into
southern Johore, there was no chance of a
counter-offensive, which meant a withdrawal
to Singapore was inevitable. Once this
occurred, a British surrender was inevitable
since no further reinforcements could enter
the besieged fortress, and the island had not
been prepared for an attack from the north
and was not prepared for a siege.

90

The defence of northern Johore was another disaster. Two brigades were Yamashita and his staff survey a
lost, and the momentum of the Japanese attacks was not blunted. The British battlefield after the fighting. On
defence was compromised by poor planning. With a Japanese force of at least the right is his IJN liaison officer.
two divisions bearing down on the western side of the peninsula, this became (AWM)
the main threat to Singapore. Nevertheless, Percival held excessive units on
the island and on the eastern coast of Malaya. This precluded him from
deploying his strongest unit, the 8th Australian Division, to face the main
threat. This unit could have been paired with the 9th Indian Division, with
the battered 11th Indian Division and the newly arrived 53rd British Brigade
in reserve. Only two axes of advance had to be covered – the trunk road
and the coastal road. Making matters more doubtful for the British was the
decision to form Westforce, placing Bennett in charge of the battle along two
widely separated fronts without commensurate staff and communications
capabilities to control them.

Bennett decided to defend the trunk road with three brigades and the
coastal road with a single inexperienced brigade – the 45th Indian. This was
impossible, and resulted in the loss of the brigade and the near encirclement
of the rest of Westforce. The Japanese never allowed Percival to gain his
balance, and many defensible positions were lost as the British were forced
out of Johore.

After a disastrous campaign in Malaya, Percival topped that off with
an equally poorly conducted defence of Singapore. He decided to base his
plan on preventing the Japanese from gaining a toehold on the island. If the
Japanese did manage to cross the Strait of Johore, then a timely counter-
attack would push them back. Success demanded two important factors.

91

Since the entire 70 miles of coastline could not be strongly defended, Percival
had to decide where to concentrate his defences. Though the north-west
sector offered the Japanese several advantages, Percival could not abandon
his pre-war notion that the north-east was the most likely avenue for attack.
As a result, he tried to defend everywhere, with the north-west being the
least well defended. Not only was this a fatal miscalculation since the main
Japanese attack did come from the north-west, but such a defence left no
reserve readily available for a counter-attack.

Following the failure to organize a counter-attack, the Japanese gained
a lodgement sufficient to start bringing tanks and artillery across the strait.
In this second phase, the British again failed to organize sufficient strength
for a counter-attack. The strongest unit on the island, the fresh 18th British
Infantry Division, was fed into the battle piecemeal instead of being used for
a major counter-attack. The failure to mount a counter-attack and ultimately
to hold the Jurong Line was largely due to errors in command judgement
and failures in coordinating the movements of units. The net effect was that
the British forces never launched a meaningful counter-attack and were
continually off balance reacting to Japanese movements.

As poor as the British performance was across the board, the Japanese
must be given full credit for their intelligent planning and relentless effort
to keep the initiative. Of all the armies fielded by Japan during the war, the
25th Army was the best led and equipped. Not known for its prowess with
armour, the IJA made effective use of its tanks in Malaya, which were key
enablers of victory. But the real agent of victory was the Japanese infantry,
which was better trained, more resolute, and used better tactics than its
British counterpart.

The final result was a disaster of unprecedented proportions for the
British Empire. The defeat in Malaya and the fall of Singapore presaged the
invasion of Burma and later India, and the fall of the Dutch East Indies. The
considerable economic resources of Malaya fell under the control of Japan,
and, with those of the Dutch East Indies, allowed the Japanese war economy
to function for almost the next four years. Casualties were immense for the
British – totalling 138,708 – of which more than 130,000 were prisoners
of war. The breakdown of the casualties revealed 38,496 British, 67,340
Indian, 18,490 Australian and 14,382 local troops. In addition, the Japanese
captured the naval base, which had been only partially destroyed, and a
large booty of weapons and equipment. In comparison, Japanese casualties
totalled only 9,824 for the entire campaign.

For the next four years, until the return of the British in September 1945,
the population had to endure a harsh occupation. The occupation began with
a purge of all Chinese inhabitants, which had been planned before the start of
the campaign. Between 21 February and the end of the month, Chinese males
between the ages of 18 and 50 were ordered to report to screening centres.
Those who were assessed to be anti-Japanese were detained, loaded into
trucks, and then driven to isolated places where they were killed by machine
guns or bayonets. The numbers massacred are in dispute; the usual number
cited is 50,000, but there appears to be no basis for this number. The figure
given by the commander of the Singapore garrison, a brigade commander
from the Imperial Guards Division, gave the figure as 5,000, while a 25th
Army staff report prepared right after the massacre gave a figure of over
twice that many. The real figure will never be known.

92

 

THE BATTLEFIELD TODAY

Just as it was in 1941–42, Singapore is still one of the main transportation
hubs in Asia. It is therefore easy to get flights into the city, and travel around
the island or into neighbouring Malaysia is also easy. Singapore has grown
into a city-state of some 5.5 million people on a land area of 277 square miles.
This sprawl has covered many of the areas which saw fighting in February
1942, but there is still much to see. There are multiple tour companies
offering tours on Singapore, which focus on the battles of 1942. These cater
to western visitors and offer tours in English with varying levels of expertise.

A must-see attraction is the Kranji War Memorial, the well-maintained
Commonwealth War Grave. It is 14 miles from the city centre overlooking
the Strait of Johore. The memorial honours Allied dead from the war, with
a cemetery that contains 4,400 gravestones. Up a short flight of stairs is
the Singapore Memorial, which bears the names of some 24,346 Allied
servicemen killed in Southeast Asia who have no known grave.

There are plenty of other attractions, which are in or near Singapore
city. The National Museum of Singapore covers back to 1887 and includes
a section on the war. Visitors can tour Fort Canning, the site of the
headquarters of the British Far East Command where Percival made the
decision to surrender. Alexandra Hospital where Japanese soldiers bayoneted
wounded and medical staff just before the surrender can also be seen. Also
downtown is a memorial to the Indian National Army, which was formed
by the Japanese to enlist Indian prisoners of war to fight against British
occupation. Many of the Indian soldiers who surrendered at Singapore
decided to join this short-lived and ineffective army. A marker to these men
was originally erected in July 1945, and then removed after the British re-
occupied the city. A new version was erected in 1995.

Tours of the coastal defence batteries on the island include the 6in. guns
at the site of the former Fort Pasir Panjang west of the city. Just offshore from
Keppel Harbour is Sentosa Island, which contains two large forts, Connaught
and Siloso. At Fort Siloso, three 9.2in. guns can be seen as well as the tunnels
and magazines from the former battery. An elaborate museum includes life-size
dioramas of the British surrender in 1942 and the Japanese surrender in 1945.
Also to the west of Singapore is the site of the former Changi prisoner of war
camp, which has a museum. Nearby is a replica of one of the 15in. guns.

One of the more poignant attractions is what is left of the Ford Factory
on Upper Bukit Timah road, where the Japanese took Percival’s surrender.
This is one of the places where the course of history changed. The factory
closed in 1980, but was turned into a museum, which details the ordeal of the

93

Singaporeans under what was almost four years of harsh Japanese occupation.
The exhibits also trace the course of the Malaya campaign. The Japanese
occupation is also the subject at the Civilian War Memorial, which was opened
in 1962 on the site of a mass grave of civilians in the southern part of the island.

On the northern part of the island are the landing sites of the Japanese
assault on the night of 8/9 February 1942. When the author was there
in 1990, the difficulty of mounting a defence on such terrain was readily
evident. A good tour guide can trace the course of the Japanese attack across
the Strait of Johore and through the south-west part of the island.

Tours are available of the battlefield sites in Malaya, which is now
Malaysia. There is little to see dating back to the war, but there are remnants
of British fortifications at Kota Bharu and Alor Star airfields. A good tour
guide is required to bring the battle to life.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Allen, Louis, Singapore 1941–1942, Frank Cass (London, 1993)
Bond, Brian and Tachikawa, Kyoichi, ed., British and Japanese Military Leadership in the Far

Eastern War 1941–1945, Frank Cass (London, 2004)
Cannon, Peter, Night Action, Malaya 1942, published in Warship 2015, Conway (London,

2015)
Chung, Ong Chit, Operation Matador, Times Academic Press (Singapore, 1997)
Corfield, Justin and Corfield, Robin, The Fall of Singapore, Hardie Grant Books (Richmond,

Victoria, 2012)
Diamond, Jon, The Fall of Malaya and Singapore, Pen & Sword Military (Barnsley, South

Yorkshire, 2015)
Falk, Stanley L., Seventy Days to Singapore, Robert Hale (London, 1975)
Farrell, Brian and Pratten, Garth, Malaya, Army History Unit (Canberra, Australia, 2009)
Farrell, Brian P., The Defence and Fall of Singapore 1940–1942, Tempus (Stroud,

Gloucestershire, 2005)
Historical Section, G-2, GHQ, FEC, Malay Operations Record November 1941–March 1942

(Japanese Monograph 54)
Historical Section, G-2, GHQ, FEC, Southeast Area Air Operations Record November 1941–

June 1942 (Japanese Monograph 55)
Kinvig, Clifford, Scapegoat, Brassey’s (London, 1996)
Kirby, S. Woodburn, Singapore: The Chain of Disaster, The MacMillan Company (New York,

1971)
Kirby, S. Woodburn, The War Against Japan, Volume I, The Loss of Singapore, HMSO

(London, 1957)
Mace, Martin and Grehan, John, Disaster in the Far East 1940–1942, Pen & Sword Military

(Barnsley, South Yorkshire, 2015)
Marder, Arthur J., Old Friends, New Enemies, Clarendon Press (Oxford, 1981)
Middlebrook, Martin and Mahoney, Patrick, Battleship, Allen Lane (London, 1977)
Ness, Leland, Rikugun (Volume 1), Helion (Solihull, West Midlands, 2014)
Nicholson, Arthur, Hostages to Fortune, Sutton Publishing (Phoenix Mill, Gloucestershire, 2005)
Rottman, Gordon L., Japanese Army in World War II, Osprey Publishing (Botley, Oxford, 2005)
Ryan, David, Hughes, David and Rothwell Steve, The British Armies in World War Two An

Organizational History, Volumes Two, Three, Four, Five, Nine, Supplement Two,
The Nafziger Collection, Inc (West Chester, Ohio, 2002)
Shores, Christopher and Cull, Brian, Bloody Shambles (Volume One), Grub Street (London,
1992)
Stephen, Martin, Scapegoat, Pen & Sword Maritime (Barnsley, South Yorkshire, 2014)
Tsuji, Masanobu, Singapore 1941–1942, Oxford University Press (Oxford, 1988)
Underwood, John L., The Japanese Order of Battle in World War II, Volume I, The Nafziger
Collection (1999)
Warren, Alan, Singapore 1942, Hambledon and London (London, 2002)
Wigmore, Lionel, The Japanese Thrust, Australian War Memorial (Canberra, 1957)

94

INDEX

Note: page locators in bold refer to 24, 33, 59, 68, 80, 91 demolition programme in Singapore
illustrations, captions and plates. 22nd Bde 80 19, 19, 81–83, 84, 87, 88

ABDACOM (American, British, Dutch, 85, 87 Endau assault on retreating British
Australian Command) 12, 12 23rd Bde 19 forces 52–53
27th Bde 18, 19, 71, 72–73, 81,
ACV-IP Indian Pattern armoured carrier Fortress Singapore, defence of 79,
20 84, 87 79–89, 81, 82, 84, 85, 86, 91–92
Indian III Corps 13, 18, 33–34, 43,
air battles over Singapore 77–78 Gurkhas 18, 54, 55, 56, 64-65, 66
air superiority in northern Malaya 68, 75–77
6th Div 18 Heath, Lt-Gen Sir Lewis 13, 53, 58,
74–77 6th Heavy Anti-aircraft Rgt 67 59, 63, 88
aircraft 9th Div 13, 18, 20, 59, 68,
IJA (Imperial Japanese Army) 15, 22,
Brewster Buffalo Mk I fighter plane 73, 91 25–26, 35, 40, 53, 54, 55, 73, 84, 90
(US) 22, 24, 28, 52, 75, 77, 78 8th Bde 37, 41 3rd Tank Group
22nd Bde 18, 33–34, 73 1st Rgt 27, 54, 57, 80
Bristol Blenheim IV bomber/fighter 11th Div 13, 18, 20, 33, 53, 54, 6th Rgt 27, 60–62(62), 65
plane (UK) 22, 23, 24, 28, 38– 55, 58, 59, 62, 68, 70, 72, 80, 14th Rgt 81
40(40), 74, 75, 77 84, 87, 91 25th Army 15, 26, 27, 35, 59, 92
6th Bde 54, 56, 58 5th Div 16, 25, 26, 27–28, 35,
Hawker Hurricane fighter plane (UK) 15th Bde 18, 33–34, 54, 56, 58, 36, 43, 53, 54, 59, 63, 70, 71,
77, 78 80–81, 85, 88–89
59, 72, 85 21st Rgt 68
Lockheed Hudson II reconnaissance/ 28th Bde 54, 56, 58, 59, 63, 64, 5th Reconnaissance Rgt 54, 57
bomber plane (US) 22, 24, 74, 74, 9th Infantry Bde
77, 78 66, 67, 72 11th Rgt 53, 59, 63
17th Div 67–68 41st Rgt 5, 59, 63
Mitsubishi A6M ‘Zero’ fighter plane 18th Div 19–20, 67, 68, 79, 80, 18th Div 16, 25, 26, 27, 28, 70,
(Japan) 29, 77 80, 81, 85, 87, 88
85, 87, 92 56th Rgt 35–36, 87
Mitsubishi G3M ‘Nell’ bomber 53rd Bde 67, 71, 72, 91 114th Rgt 70, 87
(Japan) 29, 46–48(48), 50, 51 35th Light Anti-aircraft Rgt 67 21st Infantry Bde
85th Anti-tank Rgt 67 42nd Rgt 35, 53, 59, 63, 65
Mitsubishi G4M ‘Betty’ bomber Brigades 23rd Infantry Bde 63
(Japan) 29, 29, 50, 51 1st Malaya 87, 88 56th Div 27, 36
12th Indian 59, 63, 64, 66, 67, Imperial Guards Division 9, 10,
Mitsubishi Ki-21 ‘Sally’ bomber 16, 20, 26, 27, 36, 68-70, 71,
(Japan) 28, 74 84, 85 72, 80, 81, 81, 84, 85, 92
44th Indian 20, 68, 80, 84, 4th Guards 28, 36, 59, 63, 72
Nakajima Ki-27 ‘Nate’ fighter plane
(Japan) 28, 38–40(40) 85, 87 IJAAF (Imperial Japanese Army Air
45th Indian 20, 68, 70, 71, Force) 28–29, 46–48(48), 74
Nakajima Ki-43 ‘Oscar’ fighter plane 3rd Air Division 35, 41, 73,
(Japan) 28, 74, 77 72, 91 74, 78
Punjab battalions 54, 55, 56, 62,
Vickers Vildebeest torpedo bomber IJN (Imperial Japanese Navy) 6, 22,
(UK) 23, 24, 74, 78 63, 64, 66 29–30, 35, 53
British defence planning 6, 32–34, Genzan Air Corps 48, 50
ambush near Gemas 70–71 Mihoro Air Group 50, 51
armour protection 17, 20, 21, 23, 27, 90–91
British military strength 17–19 Japanese entry into World War II 7
45, 51, 70, 92 British naval strategy 5, 6, 44, 44–50, Japanese militarism 5, 6, 7, 25, 32
atrocities 15, 16, 90, 92 Japanese military strategy 25–26, 27,
51, 52
Barstow, Maj-Gen Arthur 13 British POW 41 28, 35–37, 80–81, 92
battle for Kota Bharu 41, 41–42 British strategy in the Far East 11 Japanese naval strategy 29
battle for Northern Johore 68–72, 69 Brooke-Popham, Sir Robert 11, 11–12, Japanese occupation of Singapore 92
battle for the Jurong Line 84–85, 92 jungle warfare 17, 18, 35, 63,
battle of Bukit Timah 85, 85–87, 86 33, 37
battle of Jitra, the 54–59, 56–57 67, 68
battle of Kampar, the 59–63 casualties 9, 10, 18, 46–48(48), 51, 52,
battle of Slim River 60–62(62), 63–67, 53, 54, 55, 58, 59, 67, 92

64–65 chronology of events 8–10
battlefield sites 93 Churchill, Winston 11, 14, 32, 43,
Bennett, Maj-Gen H. Gordon 13,
52, 72
13–14, 19, 68, 70, 70, 71, 71, 84, 87, climate influences 32
88, 91 consequences of the British defeat in
Bren (Universal) No. 1 armoured
carrier (UK) 20, 21 Malaya and Singapore 92–93
bridge demolition 54, 58 critiques of British war commanders
British Army
8th Australian Division 18–19, 20, 11–15, 12

95

Kota Bharu landings 37, 37, 41, 42, 74 RAAF, the 22, 74 Type 95 light tank (Japan) 27, 54, 72
Kuala Lumpur occupation 70, 71 RAF, the 21–23, 24, 33, 34, 37, 51, 53, Type 97 medium tank (Japan) 27, 54,

Malaya and Singapore theatre 4 74, 75–77, 76, 78, 90 60–62(62), 70
Malayan Peninsula topography 31, attack on Singora 38–40(40)
reconnaissance 22, 27, 28, 37 underestimation of Japanese
31–32, 34, 54 reinforcements 19, 19, 67–68, 77 capabilities 6, 11, 32-34, 52,
massacre during Japanese occupation Royal Navy, the 5, 6, 11, 23–24, 25, 90-91
29, 32, 52, 53, 68
of Singapore 90, 92 Force Z 15, 23, 34, 43–52, 44, 49, unit organization 20–21, 27–28
Matsui, Lt-Gen Takuro 16
memorials and museums 93 51 Vichy France and Indo-China 7
military resources in Malaya and HMS Prince of Wales (battleship)
Washington Naval Treaty (1922) 5
Singapore 11, 11, 12, 14, 17, 32, 29, 29, 43, 43–44, 44, 45, Wavell, Gen Sir Archibald 11, 12, 12,
79–80 46–48(48), 50, 51, 51, 52
Murray-Lyon, Maj-Gen David M. 13, HMS Repulse (battlecruiser) 29, 44, 68, 72, 85, 88, 89
13, 55, 58, 59 45, 45, 50, 52 weapons
Mutaguchi, Lt-Gen Renya 16 HMS Thanet (destroyer) 53
2-pdr anti-tank gun (UK) 21, 21,
Nishimura, Lt-Gen Takuma 16, 81, Simmons, Maj-Gen F. Keith 14, 14 27, 72
84 Singapore British naval base 5, 6, 6, 7
squadron requirements 21–23, 22 6.5mm Type 38 rifle (Japan) 26
Operation Matador (1941) 8, 26, Strait of Johore defences 79, 79–84, 6.5mm Type 96 light machine gun
33–34, 37, 43, 53, 54, 90
81, 82, 84 (Japan) 26
order of battle 24, 29–30 surrender to the IJA 88, 89, 89, 90 7.7mm Type 92 machine gun (Japan)

perception of Japan as a threat after training 17, 17–18, 18, 19, 20, 22, 23, 26
World War I 5 25, 66, 67, 90, 92 7.7mm Type 99 rifle (Japan) 26
25-pdr anti-tank gun (UK) 21, 21,
Percival, Lt-Gen Arthur E. 12, 12–13, Tsuji, Col Masanobu 16, 28
13, 14, 17, 21, 33, 34, 55, 58–59, 63, Type 89 heavy grenade dischargers 62, 67, 70, 73
67, 68, 72, 73, 80, 81, 84, 85, 87, 88, Bren light machine gun (UK) 20
88, 89, 90, 91–92, 93 (Japan) 26 Lee-Enfield rifle (UK) 20, 20–21
Type 91 aerial torpedo (Japan) Vickers Mk I machine gun 20
Phillips, Acting Adm Sir Tom 14, Westforce 68, 71, 72, 91
14–15, 44, 44–45, 50, 51, 52 48 withdrawal to Singapore 72–73, 73
Type 92 70mm battalion gun
Pulford, Air Marshal Conway Walter Yamashita, Lt-Gen Tomoyuki 15, 15,
Heath 74, 75 (Japan) 27 16, 16, 25, 27, 35, 36, 63, 70, 73,
Type 92 tankette (Japan) 27 79, 80, 81, 85, 88, 89, 90, 91

96

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